{"document_id": "1950_1_1008_1018_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "Patntalal Jankid-:u\n\nv, Mohanlal and\n\nAnother,\n\nPata1tjali S11stri J.\n\n!950\n\nDeo, 21.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\nof section 14, it seems to me, they would be bringing themselves under the bar of section 18 (2).\n\nThe respondents cannot therefore claim that the loss of the goods was explosion damage within the meaning of the Ordinance so as to bring the case within section 14 and at the same time contend that the loss was not \"due to or did not in any way arise ont of the explosion\" in order to a void the bar under section 18.\n\nBoth section 14 and section 18 have in view the physical cause for the loss or damage to property for which compensation is claimed and not the cause of action in relation to the person against whom relief is sought. The respondents cannot, in my opinion, be allowed to take up inconsistent positions in order to bring themselves within the one and to get out of the other.\n\nI would therefore allow the appeal and dismiss the counter-claim.\n\nDAS J. agreed with the Chief Justice.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Mohan Behari Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondents : I. N. Shroff.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL v.\n\nCALCUTTA AGENCY LTD.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA CJ., PATANJAL! SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.]\n\nfoli.tn Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), ss. 10 (2) (xv), 66-Reference-Jwrisdiction of High Ooilft-Duty to decide case ori facts stated by Tribuna.l-Accepting arauments of CO'ltnsel as proved fa.cts and basing decision on them, impropriety of-Business expenditnre- Payments to avoid disclosure of misfeasance of director.~-Burden of prcof.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of incometax references is an advisory jurisdiction and under the Inco:netax Act the decision of the Appellate Tribunal on facts is final unless it can be successfully assailed on the ground tha~ there was\n\nno evidence for the conclusions on facts recorded by the Tribnnal. 1950 It is therefore the duty of the High Court to start by looking at tbe facts found by the Tribunal and ans~'e!: the questions of lHW Cornmiss:oritr of on that footing.\n\nIt is not p1oper to depart fron1 this rule of law Incnme-tax, as it will convert the High Court into a fact finding authority, Wcst Bengal which it is not, under the advisory jurisdiction. v.\n\nAs the statement of the case prepared by the Appellate Tri Calcutta Ag•ncy bunal in accordance v.'ith the rules fran1ed under the Income-tax Ltd.\n\nAct is prepared with the knowledge of the parties concerned and they have full opportunity to apply for any addition or deletion from that statement, if they have approved of the state1nent n1ade by the Tribunal, it iR the agreed etatement of facts by the parties on w bich the Iligh Court has to pronouncs its judgment.\n\nThe High Court would be acting improperly if it takes the arguments of the counsel for the assessee as if they were facts and bases its conclusion on tboso arguments.\n\nOne of the directors of the assessee company, acting in the capacity of managing agents of certain l\\'fills, had dra\\vn some hundis in the name of tho Mills, aod as the Mills repudiated liability, suits were filed on the hundis against the Mills and the assessees. The assessees thereupon agreed to reimburse the Mills by permitting the latter to deduct a moiety of the commission pa.yable to them under the agreement of managing agency, against payments which the Mills may have to make under the decrees.\n\nIn their assessment fio income-tnx the assessees claimed that the amounts so deducted should bo excluded from their asRessable income as business cxpenditme under s. 10 (2) (xv) of tbe Incometax Act.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal found that the assessees had agreed to pay off the decree a1nount from the remuneration due to them, that the decre.e was passed against them evidently for some misfeasance committed by their directors, that the books of both companies showed that the assessees were paid their remuneration in full, and that the expenditure was not therefore laid out for the purpose of carrying on the business, and also that, as the payment was made for the liquidation of a debt, it was not a revenue expenditure. In the High Court the assessees' counsel argued, relying on the case cf Mitchell v. B. W. Noble Ltd.(1), that the payments were made by th• assessees to avoid the publicity of an action against them and the consequent exposure and loss of reputation as a. managing agency company, and as such the payments were deductible as business expenditure. The High Court accepted this argument and reversed the decision of the Tribunal.\n\nHeld, that the High Court acted wrongly in accepting the argurr1ents of the assessees' counsel as if they were proved facts and basing its decision on them ; and, as the facts necessary to support the claim for exemption under s. 10 (2) (xv) had not been established at any stage of the case, the assessees were not entitled to the deduction cJ.imed.\n\n(11 (1927] l K.B. 719,\n\n1~9\n\n1950 Judgment of the Calcutta High Court reversed.\n\n0 . . / APPELLATE JumsDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 59 of onimissioner o\n\n1\"come-tax, 1950.\n\nWest Bengal Appeal from a Judgment of the High Court of Judiv. cature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.)\n\nGalcu~~/Y'\"'Y dated 9th Septern ber, 1949, in a reference under\n\n section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. (Reference No. 8 of 1949).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N. ] oshi, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. Mitra (B. Banerjee, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1950. December 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKan•a o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.) pronounced on a reference made to it by the Income.tax Tribunal under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income.tax Act.\n\nThe relevant facts are these. The respondents are a private limited company which was brought into existence to float various companies including cotton mills. In November, 1932, the Basanti Cotton Mills Ltd. was incorporated and the respondents were appointed their managing agents.\n\nTheir remuneration was fixed at a monthly allowance of Rs. 500 and a commission of 3 per cent. on all gross sales of goods manufactured by the Mills Company.\n\nThe fixed monthly allowance was liable to be increased in the event of the capital of the company being increased. The details are immaterial. lt appears that certain hundis were drawn by one of the directors of the respondent company, acting in the capacity of the managing agents of the :Mill Company, in the name of the Mill Company and the same were negotiated to others. The Nath Bank Ltd. claimed payment of these hundis.\n\nThe Mill Company repudiated its liability as it appeared from the books of the Mill Company that they had not the use of the sum of Rs. 1.80,000 claimed by the Nath Bank Ltd. under the hundis. The Nath Bank Ltd. instituted four suits\n\nI'\n\nagainst the Mill Company, in two of which the res- 1950 pondent company were party-defendants. The Mill Comm;:.;;; n.,· of Company was advised to settle the suits and the res- Incom•ta:r:. pondent company entered into an agreement with the w .. t Bengal Mill Company, the material part of the terms of which •. rnns as follows ·- Calcutta Agency • Ltd. \" Memorandum of Agreement made between the Calcutta Agency Limited of the one part and Basanti Kama c. J.\n\nCotton Mills Ltd. of the other part. \\;\\/HEREAS the Nath Bank Limited demanded from the Mills the payment of the sum of Rs. 1,80,000 and interest thereon AND WHEREAS the said Mills repudiated their liability in respect thereof as it appeared from the books of the said Mills that the said Mills did not have the use of the said sum of Rs. 1,80 000 or any part thereof AND WHEREAS the said Nath Bank Ltd. thereupon instituted four suits in High Court being suit Nos. 1683, 1720, 1735 and 1757 of 1939 for the said aggregate sum of Rs. 1,80,000 and the interest thereon AND WHEREAS the said Mills have been advised to settle the said suits amicably AND WHEREAS the Calcutta Agency Limited by its Directors, S.N. Mitter or S.C. Mitter, having been and being still the Managing Agents of the said Mills have undertaken to reimburse the said Mills in respect of the decrees to oe\n\nmade in the said four suits in the manner hereinafter appearing NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS\n\nAND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED\n\n(i) That out of the commission of 3% payable by the said Mills to the said Agency under Regulation 131 of the Articles of Association of the Company, the\n\nCompany shall have paramount lien on and deduct and set off a moiety thereof against any payment which the said Mills may make in respect of the decrees or any of them and/or costs of the said suits.\n\n(ii) The said moiety shall be one half of the commission so payable less such sum as the Directors of the Mills may from time to time allow to be deducted.\" ..\n\nUnder the said agreement, the respondent company paid to the Mill Company Rs. 22,500 made up of\n\nt9oO Rs. 18,107 as principal and Rs. 4,393 as interest in the\n\n0 -:--:- 1accounting year. The assessee company claimed this omm1ssioner o .\n\nIncomo-ta:c before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as a deduc- Weat Benadi tion permitted under section IO (2) (xv) of the Indian v.\n\nIncome-tax Act. The relevant part of that section Calcutta Agency runs as follows :-\n\nLtd. \"10. (1) \"The tax shall be payable by an assessee\n\nKania o. J. under the head 'Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation' in respect of the profits or gains of any bminess, profession or vocation carried on by him.\n\n(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely:- ....................................\n\n(xv) any expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation.\"\n\nIn the statement of the case submitted by the Tribunal after reciting the fact of the incorporation of the company and the terms of the compromise mentioned above, the arguments urged on behalf of the assessee company have been recapitulated. The first argument\n\nwas that under the first proviso to section 7 of the Indian Income-tax Act, this payment was liable to be exempted. The Tribunal rejected that argument. On the reference, the High Court also rejected the same and it was not presented before us.\n\nThe next argument of the respondents was that in respect of\n\nRs. 22,500 it was entitled to exemption under section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act on the ground that the payment was an expenditure which was not in the nature of a capital expenditure or personal expenses of the applicant company but was an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of its business. They urged that if the applicant company did not agree to pay this amount, Basanti Cotton Mills Ltd. could have brought a suit against the company to realise this amount due on the hundis which would •\n\nhave exposed the applicant company to the public and 1950 in order to save themselves from the scandal and maintain the managing agency they agreed to the deduction Commissioner of of certain amounts from the managing agency commis. 1\"come-ta•, sion due to it and thereby brought it within the West , Bengal principles of the decision of 1Vlitchell v. B. W. Noble Oalcutt.\"Agency Ltd.(1) The Tribunal found as facts: (1) That the Ltd. applicant company agreed to pay off the decretal amount from the remuneration which they are entitled K., nia o. J. to get from the Basanti Cotton Mills.\n\n(2) The decree was passed against the applicant company evidently for certain misfeasance committed by its directors and the applicant company agreed to pay it off from its remuneration.\n\n(3) The books of account of Basanti Cotton Mills Ltd. would show that they were paying the applicant company in full its remuneration and the books of the applicant company also show that it was entitled to its remuneration in full.\n\n(4) In the circumstances the Tribunal held that the expenditure was not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of carrying on the business. (5) Besides, the Tribunal was of the opinion that in this case it was not a revenue expenditure at all. As the payment had to be made towards liquidation of the decretal amount the Tribunal held, in the circumstances of this case, that it was a capital payment. On behalf of the respondent it was argued in the further alternative that the Privy Council decision in Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhuria's easel.') would cover the present case. That contention was rejected by the Tribunal.\n\nThis statement of the case prepared by the Incometax Tribunal and submitted to the High Court for its opinion was perused by the parties and they had no suggestions to make in respect of the same. The statement of the case was thus settled with the knowledge and approval of the parties. When the matter came before the High Court, Mr. Mitra, who argued the case for the present respondents, as shown by the judgment of the High Court, urged as follows:-\" If the applicant company had not agreed to pay the amount mentioned\n\ni 1l [J 921) 1 R. B. 719.\n\n12) 61.T, C. 449,\n\n1950 in the aforesaid agreement, then the Basanti Cotton\n\nMills Ltd. would have sued the company for the reali- Oommi\"'•\"\"' of sation of the amounts due on the hundis and it seems\n\nIncom•tax, that there would have been no defence to the action.\n\nWest Bengal T .\n\nJd h b' d th l' t t v his wou ave su iecte e app ican company o Oa!cutt.\"Ag•ncy the danger of public exposure and in order to save Ltd. itself from the scandal and in order to maintain the managing agency, the applicant company agreed to Kania o. J. deduct certain amounts from the managing agency commission and therefore such expenditure came within section 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\" The High Court thereafter noticed several cases including 111 itchell' s case(') and towards the close of the judgment delivered by Chatterjea J. observed as follows:-\"In this case it is clear that the agreement was entered into with a view to avoid the publicity of an action against the managing agents and consequent exposure and scandal and in order to maintain the managing agency so that the company could carry on its business as before.\n\nThe payment in question did not bring in any new assets into existence nor in my opinion can it properly be said that it brought into existence an advantage for the enduring benefit of the company's trade. The Appellate Tribunal observed that the decree was evidently passed against the appellant company for certain misfeasance by its directors and the appellant company agreed to pay it off from its remuneration ...... The object of the agree. ment was to enable the company to remove a defect in carrying on the business of the company and to earn profits in its business. Therefore this case is covered by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mitchell's case(') ...... \" Applying this line of reasoning the High Court differed from the conclusion of the Tribunal and allowed the deduction to the respondent company under section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act, as claimed by the respondents.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income.tax, West Bengal, has come in appeal to us.\n\nNow it is clear that this being a claim for exemption of an amount, contended to be an expenditure falling under section 10(2)(xv), the burden of proving the\n\n(l) [1927] l K.B. 719. ...\n\nnecessary facts in that connection was on the assessee, 1950 it being common ground that the commission was due -:--:- and had become payable and was therefore the business cc7m\"\" 0;'\" of income of the assessee company liable to be taxed in ,;.::m;;:;:.1 the assessment year. The jurisdiction of the High Court v. in the matter of income-tax references is an advisory Calcutta Agency jurisdiction and under the Act the decision of the Ltd.\n\nTribunal on facts is final, unless it can be successfully\n\nKa1ita C. J, assailed on the ground that there was no evidence for the conclusions on facts recorded by the Tribunal. It is therefore the duty of the High Court to start by looking at the facts found by the Tribunal and answer the questions of law on that footing. Any departure from this rule of law will convert the High Court into a fact-finding authority, which it is not under the advisory jurisdiction. The statement of the case under the rules framed under the Income-tax Act is prepared with the knowledge of the parties concerned and they have a full opportunity to apply for any addition or deletion from that statement of the case. If they approved of that statement that is the agreed state. ment of facts by the parties on which the High\n\nCourt has to pronounce its judgment. In the present case the parties perused the statement of case and as disclosed by the note made at the end of it had no suggestions to make in respect thereof. It is therefore clear that it was the duty of the High Court to start with that statement of the case as the final statement of facts.\n\nSurprisingly, we find that the High Court, in its judgment, has taken the argument of Mr. Mitra as if they were facts and have based their conclusion solely on that argument. Nowhere in the statement of the case prepared by the Tribunal and filed in the High Court, the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the payment was made by the assessee company to avoid any danger of public exposure or to save itself from scandal or in order to maintain the managing agency of the appellant company. The whole conclusion of the High Court is based on this unwarranted assumption of facts which are taken only from the argument of counsel for the present respondents before\n\n1950 the High Court. The danger of failing to recognise -. -. that the jurisdiction of the High Court in these matters Commm•onu of l d d 1 l f J T 'b 1 1 t \" is on y a v1sory an t ie cone uswns o t ie n una\n\n;,;:; m;~:az on facts are the conclusions on which the High Conrt\n\nv, is to exercise such advisory jurisdiction is illustrated Oa'cutta Agency by this case. It seems that unfortunately counsel for\n\nLtd. the respondents caught hold of Mitchell's case(1) and - basing his argument on the circumstances under which Ka, zia 0. J. d a payment could be escribed as a business expenditure falling within the terms of section 10 (2) (xv), argued that the facts in the present case were the same.\n\nInstead of first ascertaining what were the facts found by the Tribunal in the present case, the process was reversed and the procedure adopted was to take Mitchell's case(1) as the law and argue that the facts in the present case covered the situation. In our opinion this is an entirely wrong approach and should not have been permitted by the High Court. The High Court fell into a grave error in omitting first to ascertain what were the facts found in the case stated by the Tribunal. The High Court overlooked that in Afitchell's case(') the whole discussion started with a quotation from the case stated by the Commissioners as the facts of the case.\n\nA scrutiny of the record in the present case shows that before the Income-tax Officer the assessees claimed only a deduction of the interest of Rs. 5,582 as a permissible deduction under section 10 (2) (iii) of the Income-tax Act. That claim was rejected by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nWhen the matter went to the Assistant Income-tax Commissioner it was argued that the Income-tax Officer was in error in not allowing the deduction of interest and was also wrong in not allowing the entire sum of Rs. 22,500 as a deduction on the ground that, that portion of the income (viz., Rs . .'22,500) should be treated as not earned or deemed to be earned by the assessees at all, having regard to the decision of the Privy Council in Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhuria's case.(') The first paragraph of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner contains the following\n\n(ll [1927) I K, B. 719.\n\n12) 6 I.T.C. '49,\n\n• •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS l017\n\nstatement:-\" In disallowing this (interest) claim the 1950 Income-tax Officer was following the decision of my .-- predecessor in his order dated the 18th March 1942 in Oommimoner 0!\n\nAppeal No._ 1-~-~ 1 of.1941-42. My predecessor obser- ~:~·;;~~~1 • ved: \"Nothmg 1s m evidence to show that the managmg v. agency company had surplus money and such money Calcutta Ag••cv was invested or that there was any need to borrow.\n\nLtd.\n\nThus the need to borrow is not established. There is no doubt that money was borrowed but lmless it can Kania c. J. to proved that the borrowing is for the purpose of the business and the loan was u:sed in the business, the interest cannot be allowed under section 10(2)(iii).\"\n\nThe second objection raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was in these terms:-' That the Income-tax Officer should have allowed the said sum of Rs. 22,500 as allowable expenditure being allocation of a sum out of the revenue receipt before it became income in the hands of the assessee.\" The wording of the objection and the argument noticed in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner show that the contention was that this sum should be treated as not having become the income of the assessee at all because it was deducted at the source by the Mill company.\n\nReliance was placed for this contention on Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhuria's case('). The contention was rejected.\n\nAt the third stage, when the assessee urged his contentions before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, he thought of urging as an argument that this was a permissible deduction under section 10 (2) (xv) because of the principles laid down in Mitchell's case(2).\n\nNo evidence, it appears, was led before the Income Tax Tribunal, nor has the Tribunal recorded any findings of fact on which the principles laid down in Mitchell's case(') could be applied. The Tribunal's conclusions of facts were only as summarized in the earlier part of the judgment. It is therefore clear that the necessary facts required to be established before the principles laid down in Mitchell's case(2) could be applied, have not been found as facts in the present case at any stage of the proceedings and the High Court was in error\n\nil) 6 I.T.C. H9.\n\n(~) [19271 I K.B. 719.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\n1950 in applying the principles of Mitchell's case(1) on the -. -. assumption of facts which were not proved. The High OomI missioner of Court was carried away, it seems, by the argument of\n\nncometax, West Bengal the counsel and through error accepted the argument v. as facts.\n\nIndeed, if it had noticed the contention\n\nCalcutta Agenoy urged before the Income-tax Officer it would have seen Ltd, at once that the argument was in a measure conflicting with that contention which was based on the foot- Kania a. 1 ing of Rs. 1,80,000 being a loan to the assessee on which it had to pay interest, which was sought to be deducted under section 10 (2) (iii) of the Income-tax Act. In our opinion. therefore, this appeal should be allowed on the simple ground that the facts necessary to be established by the respondents to support their claim for exemption under section 10 (2) (xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act have not been established at any stage of the proceedings and therefore they are not entitled to the deduction claimed. The appeal is therefore allowed with costs here and before the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P.A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondents: Ganpat Rai.\n\n(1) [19~1] 1 K.B. 719 .\n\n'J'", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "Patntalal Jankid-:u", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patntalal Jankid-:u\n\nv, Mohanlal and\n\nAnother,\n\nPata1tjali S11stri J.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 62, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 370, "end_char": 380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 556, "end_char": 566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DAS J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 978, "end_char": 984, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1062, "end_char": 1078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Mohan Behari Lal."}}, {"text": "I. 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(", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "Chatterjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5196, "end_char": 5206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.)\n\nGalcu~~/Y'\"'Y dated 9th Septern ber, 1949, in a reference under\n\n section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. ("}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5300, "end_char": 5327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5357, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N. ] oshi, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mitra (B. Banerjee, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5455, "end_char": 5466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mitra (B. Banerjee, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Kan•a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKan•a o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.) pronounced on a reference made to it by the Income.tax Tribunal under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income.tax Act.", "canonical_name": "Kan•a"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5576, "end_char": 5581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKan•a o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.) pronounced on a reference made to it by the Income.tax Tribunal under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income.tax Act.", "canonical_name": "Kan•a"}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKan•a o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.) pronounced on a reference made to it by the Income.tax Tribunal under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income.tax Act."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKan•a o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Chatterjea J.) pronounced on a reference made to it by the Income.tax Tribunal under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income.tax Act.", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Basanti Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1932, the Basanti Cotton Mills Ltd. was incorporated and the respondents were appointed their managing agents."}}, {"text": "Nath Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Nath Bank Ltd. claimed payment of these hundis."}}, {"text": "Bengal Mill Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7161, "end_char": 7180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pondent company entered into an agreement with the w .. t Bengal Mill Company, the material part of the terms of which •. rnns as follows ·- Calcutta Agency • Ltd. \" Memorandum of Agreement made between the Calcutta Agency Limited of the one part and Basanti Kama c. J.\n\nCotton Mills Ltd. of the other part."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Agency • Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7244, "end_char": 7266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pondent company entered into an agreement with the w .. t Bengal Mill Company, the material part of the terms of which •. rnns as follows ·- Calcutta Agency • Ltd. \" Memorandum of Agreement made between the Calcutta Agency Limited of the one part and Basanti Kama c. J.\n\nCotton Mills Ltd. of the other part."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Agency Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7310, "end_char": 7333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pondent company entered into an agreement with the w .. t Bengal Mill Company, the material part of the terms of which •. rnns as follows ·- Calcutta Agency • Ltd. \" Memorandum of Agreement made between the Calcutta Agency Limited of the one part and Basanti Kama c. J.\n\nCotton Mills Ltd. of the other part."}}, {"text": "Basanti Kama", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pondent company entered into an agreement with the w .. t Bengal Mill Company, the material part of the terms of which •. rnns as follows ·- Calcutta Agency • Ltd. \" Memorandum of Agreement made between the Calcutta Agency Limited of the one part and Basanti Kama c. J.\n\nCotton Mills Ltd. of the other part."}}, {"text": "Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7374, "end_char": 7391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pondent company entered into an agreement with the w .. t Bengal Mill Company, the material part of the terms of which •. rnns as follows ·- Calcutta Agency • Ltd. \" Memorandum of Agreement made between the Calcutta Agency Limited of the one part and Basanti Kama c. J.\n\nCotton Mills Ltd. of the other part."}}, {"text": "Nath Bank Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7426, "end_char": 7443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\;\\/HEREAS the Nath Bank Limited demanded from the Mills the payment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "S.N. Mitter", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8079, "end_char": 8090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,80,000 and the interest thereon AND WHEREAS the said Mills have been advised to settle the said suits amicably AND WHEREAS the Calcutta Agency Limited by its Directors, S.N. Mitter or S.C. Mitter, having been and being still the Managing Agents of the said Mills have undertaken to reimburse the said Mills in respect of the decrees to oe\n\nmade in the said four suits in the manner hereinafter appearing NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS\n\nAND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED\n\n(i) That out of the commission of 3% payable by the said Mills to the said Agency under Regulation 131 of the Articles of Association of the Company, the\n\nCompany shall have paramount lien on and deduct and set off a moiety thereof against any payment which the said Mills may make in respect of the decrees or any of them and/or costs of the said suits."}}, {"text": "S.C. Mitter", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,80,000 and the interest thereon AND WHEREAS the said Mills have been advised to settle the said suits amicably AND WHEREAS the Calcutta Agency Limited by its Directors, S.N. Mitter or S.C. Mitter, having been and being still the Managing Agents of the said Mills have undertaken to reimburse the said Mills in respect of the decrees to oe\n\nmade in the said four suits in the manner hereinafter appearing NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS\n\nAND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED\n\n(i) That out of the commission of 3% payable by the said Mills to the said Agency under Regulation 131 of the Articles of Association of the Company, the\n\nCompany shall have paramount lien on and deduct and set off a moiety thereof against any payment which the said Mills may make in respect of the decrees or any of them and/or costs of the said suits."}}, {"text": "Mills to the said Agency under Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8437, "end_char": 8478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9271, "end_char": 9285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9413, "end_char": 9418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) \"The tax shall be payable by an assessee\n\nKania o. J. under the head 'Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation' in respect of the profits or gains of any bminess, profession or vocation carried on by him.", "canonical_name": "Kan•a"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10230, "end_char": 10239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10254, "end_char": 10268, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10547, "end_char": 10560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10573, "end_char": 10587, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Basanti Cotton Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11595, "end_char": 11615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Agency Ltd.(1) The Tribunal found as facts: (1) That the Ltd. applicant company agreed to pay off the decretal amount from the remuneration which they are entitled K., nia o. J. to get from the Basanti Cotton Mills."}}, {"text": "Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhuria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12555, "end_char": 12580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent it was argued in the further alternative that the Privy Council decision in Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhuria's easel.')"}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter came before the High Court, Mr. Mitra, who argued the case for the present respondents, as shown by the judgment of the High Court, urged as follows:-\" If the applicant company had not agreed to pay the amount mentioned\n\ni 1l [J 921) 1 R. B. 719."}}, {"text": "Basanti Cotton\n\nMills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13282, "end_char": 13308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12) 61.T, C. 449,\n\n1950 in the aforesaid agreement, then the Basanti Cotton\n\nMills Ltd. would have sued the company for the reali- Oommi\"'•\"\"' of sation of the amounts due on the hundis and it seems\n\nIncom•tax, that there would have been no defence to the action."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13486, "end_char": 13497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "West Bengal T ."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13855, "end_char": 13868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitchell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14983, "end_char": 14991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore this case is covered by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mitchell's case(') ...... \" Applying this line of reasoning the High Court differed from the conclusion of the Tribunal and allowed the deduction to the respondent company under section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act, as claimed by the respondents."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15161, "end_char": 15174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15187, "end_char": 15201, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income.tax, West Bengal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income.tax, West Bengal, has come in appeal to us.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15420, "end_char": 15437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Agency jurisdiction and under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15862, "end_char": 15908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ka1ita C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15994, "end_char": 16003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The jurisdiction of the High Court v. in the matter of income-tax references is an advisory Calcutta Agency jurisdiction and under the Act the decision of the Ltd.\n\nTribunal on facts is final, unless it can be successfully\n\nKa1ita C. J, assailed on the ground that there was no evidence for the conclusions on facts recorded by the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16462, "end_char": 16476, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18368, "end_char": 18378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Afitchell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18971, "end_char": 18980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court overlooked that in Afitchell's case(') the whole discussion started with a quotation from the case stated by the Commissioners as the facts of the case."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19293, "end_char": 19303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19321, "end_char": 19335, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21522, "end_char": 21551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the third stage, when the assessee urged his contentions before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, he thought of urging as an argument that this was a permissible deduction under section 10 (2) (xv) because of the principles laid down in Mitchell's case(2)."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21633, "end_char": 21643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21757, "end_char": 21776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No evidence, it appears, was led before the Income Tax Tribunal, nor has the Tribunal recorded any findings of fact on which the principles laid down in Mitchell's case(') could be applied."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Agenoy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22653, "end_char": 22668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, if it had noticed the contention\n\nCalcutta Agenoy urged before the Income-tax Officer it would have seen Ltd, at once that the argument was in a measure conflicting with that contention which was based on the foot- Kania a. 1 ing of Rs.", "canonical_name": "CALCUTTA AGENCY LTD"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22965, "end_char": 22975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22993, "end_char": 23007, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23192, "end_char": 23202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23226, "end_char": 23240, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23480, "end_char": 23490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23520, "end_char": 23530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: Ganpat Rai."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_15_25_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAM KRISHNA RAMNATH AGARWAL\n\nOF KAMPTEE v.\n\nSECRETARY, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE,\n\nKAMP TEE.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND GOVERNMENT OF\n\nMAD HY A PRADESH : INTERVENERS.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, and S.R. DAS JJ.]\n\nGovl!rnment of India Act, 1985, ss. 100, 148, 292; Sch. VII List I, Entry 45; List II, Entry 49-0entral Exciieli and Salt Act (I of 1944), SS. 2, a-Central Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1922), s. 66 (1) (e)-I mport of tobacco within municipality for manu faoturing bidis-Tobaoco liable to Central excise duty-Levy of ootroi duty by municipality-Legality.\n\nSection 66 (1) (e) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, empowered municipalities within the Province to levy an octroi duty on goods brought within their .limits for sale, con su.mption or use within those limits. Section 3 of the Centr&l Excises and S&lt Act, 1944, an Act of the Central Legislature,. provided that there shall be levied and. collected duties of excise on all excisable goods other than salt which were produced or manu factured in British India, and included tbbacco in the list of excisable goods. The question being whether a municipality situated in the Central Pro•inces could levy octroi duty on tobacco brought within its limits for the purpose of manufactur ing bidis, in view of the exclusive power of the Central Govern ment to levy excise duty under Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and the provisions of s. 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act: Held, that excise .duty and octroi were taxes essentially diff erent in their nature and tho power of the Province to levy octroi was not inconsistent with the power of the Centre to levy excise duty on the same goods, and a municipality could therefore validly levy an octroi duty on such tobacco under s. 66(1)(e) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act of 1922.\n\nHeld further, that there was nothing in the Central Excises and Salt Act or its provisions contrary to the provisions of s. 66(1) (e) of the Central Provinces .Municipalities Act or to the levy of octroi duty under the same and s. 143 of the Government of India Act, therefore, preserved the right of the municipality to levy octroi duty under the Act of 1922.\n\nProvince of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons (1942) Ji'.C.R. 90; Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras (1942] F.C.R 129, In re the Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938,\n\nMarch 14\n\nRam Krisltna\n\n[1939] F.C.R. 80, Mi,. Kishori Shetty v. The King [1949) F.C.R. 650 referred to.\n\nAdministrator, Laho1'e Municipality v. Daulat Ram [1942] Ramnatl• F.0.R. 31 distinguished.\n\nAgarwal of Kamptce Judgment of the High Court of Nagpur affirmed. v.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Nag- Srmtary, Mun;. pur: Case No. III of 1948. cipal Comn1ittee,\n\nKampt\" This was an appeal from a judgment and order of\n\nKanf4 C.J.\n\nthe High Court of Nagpur (Mis .. Civil No.158 of 1946) dated 9th April, 1948, made on a reference under s. 83 (2) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1922) by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur. The facts of the case and the, arguments of counsel appear in the judgment.\n\nT.J. Kedar and B. B. Tawakley (Sri Narain AndJey with them) for the appellant.\n\nLobo, for the respondent.\n\nM. 0.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General of India, (8. M. Sikri with him) for the Union of India.\n\n1950. March, 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court at Nagpur, made on a reference under Section 83 (2) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act II of 1922, by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur. The appellant is a trader in Kamptee who manufactures bidis. On the 30th of November, 1945, he brought to Kamptee from outside tobacco to make bidis. A declaration form signed on his behalf stated that the 254 bags of tobacco liable to octroi duty, which had that day arrived at octroi post No. 3, had been brought for use and consumption within the limits of the Municipality. He however put on record his protest against the recovery o'f the duty which was fixed at Rs. 1,128-2-0. Against the order claiming the amount, the appellant filed an appeal to the Extra Assistant Commissioner with , revenue appellate powers, Nagpu[. He contended that the municipality claimed to levy the duty under\n\nSection 66 (1) (e) of the Municipal Act, but they had\n\nno right to do so as under Section 3 of the Central I9l50 Excises and Salt Act, 1944, that excise duty was Ram Krishna levied on tobacco by the Central Government and the Ramnath levy of the octroi duty on the tobacco in question was Agarwal of covered by the excise duty and therefore not.permissi- Kamptee ble. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in making v. . the reference to the Nagpur High Court expressed his scretary, M~·· · h h 11 > • h h ciPal Committee op1mon t at t e appe ant s content10n t at as t e Kamptee ' bidis were not sold within the municipal limits, duty was not leviable, was unsound. He however thought I<aniaC.J. that because under Section 3 of the Excise Act, e:lcise duty was levied by the Central Government the levy of the octroi duty was not in consonance with Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was ultra vires the Provincial Government. The High Court rejected the appellant's contention and disagreed with the view of the Appellate Commissioner.\n\nThe High Court however granted a certificate under Section 205(1) of the Constitution Act and the appellant har. come in appeal to this Court.\n\nThe Central Provinces Municipalities Act was passed in 1922 and the relevant notifications fixing the rates of octroi duty were issued in 1928.\n\nNo question about the validity of the Act when passed, or of the notifications issued in pursuance thereof has been raised before us.\n\nThe argument on behalf of the\n\n- appellant is that as under the Central Excises and\n\nSalt .Act, I of 1944, tobacco became excisable goods under Item 9 in Schedule I to that Act and continued to be so till it got converted into bidis, the Central Government alone was entitled to levy excise duty on it till then.\n\nAccording to the definition of 'manufacture' in the Excise .Act that duty could be levied at any stage in the manufacture of bidis and therefore any tax imposed, while tobacco was being converted into bidis, was excise duty. Legislation in connection with excise duty is within the exclusive province of the Central Legislature as shown by Entry 45 of List I in Schedule VII of the Constitution Act. The impost of octroi duty in pursuance of the Municipal Act, before tobacco was made into bidis, is it wq, s argued in conflict with the legislative powers of the Centre. In this\n\n1950 connection our attention was drawn to AdminiBtrator, Lahore Municipality v. Daulat Ram Kapur('), in Ram Krishna\n\nRamnatli which it was held that the levy of octroi duty on salt Agarwal of was not within the powers of the Provincial legislature.\n\nKamptee It was argued therefore that under Section 100 of the v. . Government of India Act, octroi duty levied on Secretary, Munitobacco under the legislative powers of the Provincial cipal Committee, G t - I'd Th J t 'J Kamptee. overnmen was mva I . e on y way o reconc1 e the two Entries, namely, Entry 45 in List I and Entry Ka,, ia C.J. 49 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, was to read the\n\nwods \"for consumption or use\" in Entry 49 as meaning \"for consumption or use except for manufacture of exciBable article8\". So read, the levy of octroi duty on the facts of this case was invalid. In reply to the argument that Section 292 of the Government of India Act kept alive the old Provincial legislation, namely, the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, and the right to levy octroi duty was saved under Section 143 of the Constitution Act, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of the Excise Act were contrary to the right to levy octroi duty and as that Act was passed in 1944 the right to levy octroi duty saved by Section 143 of the Constitution Act had lapsed. It was argued that although there was no express provision in the Excise Act to that effect, the definition of \"excisable goods\" and \"manufacture\" rea.d with Entry 9 in Schedule I and the charging Section 3 in the Act led to that conclusion. It is clear that both parts of this argument are thus based on the plea that the impost of any duty at any stage before bidis are manufactured is excise duty and therefore the levy of octroi duty is illegal.\n\nSection 66 (1) (e) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, runs as follows:-\n\n\"an octroi on animals, or goods bronght within the limits of the municipality for sale, consumption or use within those limits;\"\n\nThe words \"excisable goods\" and \"manufacture\" are defined in Section 2 of the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944, as follows:-\n\n(11 [1942] l!'.O.R. 31.\n\n2. ( d) \"excisable goods\" means goods specified in l950 the First Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise Ram Krishna and includes salt;'~ Ramnath\n\n2. (f) \"manufacture\" includes any process inciden- Agarwal of tal or ancillary to the completion of a manu- Kamptee factored product; and s t v. M . ecre ary., uni- ( i) in relation to tobacco includes the preparcipal Committee, ation of cigarettes, cigars, cherots, bidis, Kamptee. cigarette or pipe or hokkah tobacco, chewing tobacco or snuff; and Kania C.J.\n\n(1.1\") .................\n\nSection 3 of the Excise Act runs as follows:-\n\n\"There shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods ?ther than salt which are produced or manufactured in British India, and a duty on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into any part of British India as, and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule ............ \"\n\nEntry 9 to the First Schedule of the Excise Act is ' in these terms:-\n\n\"9. TOBACCO, CURElJ-\n\n'Tobacco' means any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured, and whether manufactured or not, and includes the leaf, stalks and stem of the tobacco plant but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth;\"\n\n(Then follows a list of various articles into which\n\n~ tobacco can be converted, like bidis, cigarettes, snuff, etc. with different rates of duty mentioned against each article.)\n\nSections 143 and 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, run as follows:-\n\n\"143.\n\n(1) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter affects any duties or taxes levied in any Federated State otherwise than by virtue of an Act of\n\n~ the Federal Legislature applying in the State.\n\n(2) Any taxes, duties, ceases or fees which, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1950)\n\n19!50 were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, municipality or other local authority or body for Ram Krishna he Ramnath t purposes of the Province, municipality, district or\n\ngarwal of ot-her local area under a law in force on-the first day .Kamptee of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, may, v. . notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, ceases or Secretary, Munifees are mentioned in the Federal Legislative List cipal Committee • b 1 d d b I' d h ' K mptee. ' contmue to e evie an to e app 1e to t e same a purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Kania c.J. the Federal Legislature\" . . \"292. Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the Government of India Act, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, all the law in force in British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act shall continue in force in British India until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority\".\n\nSection 143 can be considered in two ways. If the Government of India Act did not bring the particular impost of tax by the Provincial Government within the legislative powers of the Centre, by reason of the , inclusion of such tax in List I of the Seventh Schedule, the pre-existing right of the Provincial Government to levy such tax remained unaffected. If so, Section 143 of the Government of India Act did not affect such legislation and the same continued to be valid and operative under Section 292 of the Constitution Act.\n\nIf however the levy of such tax by the Provincial Government was a subject which was within the exclusive legislative power of the Centre by reason of • such tax being included in List I of the Seventh Schedule, the levy of such tax under the Provincial legislation continued to be valid until the Central Legislature passed an Act the provisions whereof were contrary to the provisions of the Provincial legislature or to the levy of a tax under the Provincial Act.\n\nExamining next the contentions of the appellant it seems clear that octroi duty as levied by the respondent comes within the exact wording of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution A<Jt.\n\nPrima facie, therefore, there is no reason to\n\nconsider the levy of the octroi duty under the Provin- 1950 cial legislation invalid. Such levy remained unaffect- Ram Krishna ed by reason of Section 292 of the Constitution Act.\n\nRamnath The argument of the appellant is that the levy of the Agamal of octroi duty being at a stage after the excisable article, Kam:Ptee viz., tobacco, came into existence and became liable to v. . excise duty under the Excise Act, the levy of octroi se_re 1 tacry, tutni d b r b d d f t b . . 1.d c1_,, a onmu ee, uty elore i is were ma e rom o acco, ls lnva 1 • Kampteo.\n\nIn support of this argument the definition of 'excisable goods', 'manufacture' and the Entry 9 in the Schedule /{ania C.J. to that Act were relied upon. The error underlying the argument of the appellant is the assumption that any impost of tax from the time tobacco came into existence till the same was converted into bidis is necessarily excise duty.\n\nThe Federal Court had to consider the distinction between the duty of excise and a tax on sale in The Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(!). It is there observed as follows:-\"Plainly, a tax levied on the first sale must, in the nature of things, be a tax on the sale by the manufacturer or producer; but it is levied upon him qua seller and not qua manufacturer or producer. It may well be that a manufacturer or producer is sometimes doubly hit ........ If the tax-payer who pays a sales tax is also a manufacturer or producer of commodities subject to a central duty of excise, there may no doubt be overlapping in one sense, but there is no overlapping in law. The two taxes which he is called on to pay are economically two separate and distinct imposts. There is, in theory, nothing to prevent the Central Legislature from imposing a duty of excise on a commodity as soon as it comes into existence, no matter what happens to it afterwards, whether it be sold, consumed, destroyed, or given away ....... It is the fact of manufacture which attracts the duty even though it may be collected latter. In the case of a sales tax, the liability to tax arises on the occasion of a sale and a sale has no necessary connection with manufacture or production\". The Court further observed that in the Constitution Act the whole\n\n(1) (1942] F.O.R. 90.\n\n1950 of the taxing power in this particular sphere (power to impose duties of excise) is expressly apportioned Ram Krishna\n\nRamnath between the Centre and the Provinces, to the one being ,1garwal of assigned the power to impose duties of excise, to the Kamptee other taxes on the sale of goods. It is natural enough, v.. . when considering the ambit of an express power in\n\nSmtary, M_umrelation to an unspecified residuary power to give a\n\nciJutl Committee , . h ,, ' Kamptee ' broad mterpretat1on tot e iormer at the expense of the latter. The case however is different where as in the l{anJa C.J.\n\nConstitution Act there are two complementary powers, each expressed in precise and definite terms.\n\nThere can be no reason in such a case for giving a broader interpretation to one power rather than to the other; and there is certainly no reason for extending the meaning of the expression \"duties of excise\" at the expense of the Provincial power to levy taxes on the sale of goods.\n\nIn The Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras('), the Judicial Committee approved of the distinction drawn in this case between.the excise duty and a tax on sale.\n\nThere the question arose in respect of tax on the sale of excisable goods.\n\nTheir Lordships observed as follows:-\"An exhaustive discussion of this subject (namely, the meaning of the term 'duty of excise') from which their Lordships have obtained valuable assistance is to be found in the judgment of the Federal Court in Re The Central Provinces arul Berar Act No. XIV of 1938(\").\n\nConsistently with this decision their Lordships are of opinion that a duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced.\n\nIt is a tax on goods not on sales or the proceeds of sale of goods. Here, ago.in, their Lordships find themselves in complete accord with the reasoning and conclusions of the Federil:l Cora-tin Boddu Paidanna case(\"). The two taxes, the one levied on a manufacturer in respect of his goods, the other on a vendor in respect of his sales, may, as is there pointed out, in one sense overlap. But in law there is no overlapping.\n\nThe taxes are separate and\n\n(!) [1942) F.C.R. 129.\n\n(8) [19U) F.C.R. 90.\n\n(2) [1939] F.0.R. BO.\n\ndistinct imposts. If in fact they overlap, that may be 19!50 because the taxing authority, imposing a duty of ex- Ram Krishna cise, finds it convenient to impose that duty at the Ramnalh moment when the excisable article leaves the factory Agarwal of or workshop for the first time on the occasion of its KamJ>lee sale. But that method of collecting the tax is an acv. . cident of administration it is not of the essence of the secretary, Munid t f h\" h ' tt t d b th f t cipal Commillee. u yo exmse, w 1c is a rac e y e manu ac ure KamJ>tee. itself. That this is so is clearly exemplified in those excepted cases in which the Provincial, not the Kania C.J.\n\nFederal, legislature has power to impose a duty of excise. In such cases there appears to be no reason why the Provincial legislature should not impose a duty of excise in respect of the commodity manufactured and then a tax on first or other sales of the same commodity. Whether or not such a course is followed appeara to be merely a matter of administrative convenience. So, by parity of reasoning, may the Federal Legislature impose a duty of excise on the manufacture of excisable goods and the Provincial legislature impose a tax on the sale of the same goods when manufactured.\" This discussion clearly shows that the relevant question is what is the nature of the tax. Excise duty is a tax on manufactured goods. Octroi duty is a tax levied on the entry of goods within a particular area.\n\nUnder the Excise Act, tobacco becomes excisable goods within the meaning of Item 9 in the Schedule. The subsequent use of such manufactured goods in making different articles only affects the rate of tax. Therefore, tobacco becomes subject to excise duty when it reaches the stage of manufacture mentioned in Item 9 of the Schedule to the Excise Act. Even before it is converted into bidis or any other article mentioned in the entry it has become excisable goods and liable to pay excise 1duty. The levy of such duty is therefore not in conflict with the levy of an impost on the entry of the goods within a certain area ..\n\nIt was argued that under the rules framed by the Goyernment under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Government retained control over the movement of the\n\nRam \" rishna\n\nRaninaf/1 Agarwal of /{amptee v.\n\nSecretary, M11ni\n\nciPal Comtnittee, /{ aniptee\n\nKania C.J.\n\nSUPR!!:ME COURT REPORTS [ 19501\n\ngoods from the beginning till the end.\n\nThis.argument is not of assistance in determining the nature of the octroi tax. As Government has to collect excise duty and the rate of duty varies in respect of different shapes in which the excisable goods are ultimately converted, there is nothing unnatural in the Government keeping a control and note of the articles till the manufactured article becomes a commodity, and is mixed up with the commodities used by the people at large. 'l'he argument that Entry 49 in List II being in conflict with l<Jntry 45 in List I of Schedule Seven to the Constitution Act, Entry 49 should be read as \"for consumption or use, except for manufacture of goods\", in our opinion, is unsound. In the first place, the approach to the question itself is wrong. \\Vhen a particular legislation falls within the exact words of an Entry in the Provincial List, under section 100 it is valid and no question of reconciliation arises.\n\nA similar argument advanced in regard to a supposed conflict between Entry 19 of List I and Entry 31 of List II was rejected by us in Caae No. 27 of 1949: Miss Kishori Shetty v. The King(1).\n\nIn the present case, if the question of the validity of the 'Provinciallegislation arises, on the interpretation of Entry 49 in List II, it appears that the answer must be in favour of the validity of the legislation. The decision in Administrator, Lahore Municipality v. Daulat Ram Kapur(1) does not help the appellant because in that case Entry 47 in List I is only \"salt\". A comparison with Entry 45 in List I shows distinctly that Entry 45 is limited to excise duty and is not wide enough to cover tobacco or other goods generally for all purposes of legislation.\n\nThe observations in that case therefore are not helpful to the appellant.\n\nOn the second part of the contention the appellant can succeed only if he est.ablishes that the provisions of the Excise Aet are contrary to the levy and recovery of duty under the Provincial Act of J 922.\n\nThere is no express provision in the Excise Act contrary to the provisions of the Municipal Act. Unless, therefore, it is neces8arily implied under the Excise Act, the levy of\n\n(I) [19f9J F, C.R. 600,\n\n1.2\\ [1942] F.C.R, 31.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS 25\n\nthe octroi duty under the Municipal Act continues to be valid. On this point again the appellant's argument is that the levy of a duty at any stage of the manufacture of bidis out of tobacco would be the levy of the excise duty and therefore those provisions were contrary to the provisions permitting the levy of the octroi duty.\n\nWe have already discussed and rejected in the first part of the judgment this contention. It is wrong to think that two independent imposts arising from two different sets of circumstances were not permitted in law. In our opinion, therefore, there is nothing in the Excise Act to make its provisions contrary to the provisions of Section 66 (1) (e) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act or to the levy of octroi duty under the same. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.\n\nBHA W ANIPORE BANKING CORPORA-\n\nTION, LTD. v.\n\nGOURISHANKARSHARMA\n\n[SHRI HARILAJ, KANIA C.J., SAIYID l!'AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHJmn; A and S. I~. DAS JJ.]\n\nLimitation Act (IX of 1908j, Art. 152, els. 2 and 3-Exe 1mtion of decree-Limitation-Starting point-\" TVhe1e the1e has been a re, view\", meaning of-Applicatit!n for 1eope11in(I decree under s. 30, Benr; al Money-lenders Act dismissed /01: default and appeal from order of <lis11iissal-lVhether afre fresh startina for liinitntion\n\n~ :(or execution f decree-Interpretation of Art. 182, els. 2 and a.\n\nA preliminary decree on a mortgage was pa~ed ex 1ia.rtn on the 2lt August, 1940.\n\nThe judgment debtor made an application uurlet ij, 36 of tho Bengal MoneylenderR Act for reopeuing the\n\nRani J(rishna\n\nRamHath AgaYWal of\n\nKamJ>tee\n\nSecretary, Mt1ni .. ciJ>al Committee,/\n\nKamJ>tee\n\nKania C.J.\n\nl\\Iaroh 1'.", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "RAM KRISHNA RAMNATH AGARWAL\n\nOF KAMPTEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM KRISHNA RAMNATH AGARWAL OF KAMPTEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SECRETARY, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE,\n\nKAMP TEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SECRETARY, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, KAMP TEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 210, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 227, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID l!'AZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 246, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 100, 148, 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1985", "statute": "India Act, 1985"}}, {"text": "Exciieli and Salt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SS. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Exciieli and Salt Act", "statute": "Exciieli and Salt Act"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 446, "end_char": 482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 497, "end_char": 502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act", "statute": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act"}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act", "statute": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922", "statute": "the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1132, "end_char": 1137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "collected duties of excise on all excisable goods other than salt which were produced or manu factured in British India, and included tbbacco in the list of excisable goods."}}, {"text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1902, "end_char": 1913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2089, "end_char": 2097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2196, "end_char": 2202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "(1942] F.C.R 129", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Krisltna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2534, "end_char": 2546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XIV of 1938,\n\nMarch 14\n\nRam Krisltna\n\n[1939] F.C.R. 80, Mi,.", "canonical_name": "Ram Krishna he Ramnath"}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 80", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2548, "end_char": 2564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1949) F.C.R. 650", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2598, "end_char": 2615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "APPEAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2792, "end_char": 2798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Nag- Srmtary, Mun;."}}, {"text": "High Court of Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cipal Comn1ittee,\n\nKampt\" This was an appeal from a judgment and order of\n\nKanf4 C.J.\n\nthe High Court of Nagpur (Mis .. Civil No.158 of 1946) dated 9th April, 1948, made on a reference under s. 83 (2) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1922) by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur."}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3074, "end_char": 3079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T.J. Kedar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.J. Kedar and B. B. Tawakley (Sri Narain AndJey with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.J. Kedar and B. B. Tawakley (Sri Narain AndJey with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain AndJey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.J. Kedar and B. B. Tawakley (Sri Narain AndJey with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Lobo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lobo, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3377, "end_char": 3385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, (8."}}, {"text": "M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Sikri with him) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court at Nagpur, made on a reference under Section 83 (2) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act II of 1922, by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "High Court at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court at Nagpur, made on a reference under Section 83 (2) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act II of 1922, by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act II of 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3675, "end_char": 3704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3743, "end_char": 3749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court at Nagpur, made on a reference under Section 83 (2) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act II of 1922, by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Kamptee", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a trader in Kamptee who manufactures bidis."}}, {"text": "30th of November, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of November, 1945, he brought to Kamptee from outside tobacco to make bidis."}}, {"text": "Nagpu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order claiming the amount, the appellant filed an appeal to the Extra Assistant Commissioner with , revenue appellate powers, Nagpu[."}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4447, "end_char": 4457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act II of 1922", "statute": "Municipalities Act II of 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4529, "end_char": 4538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act II of 1922", "statute": "Municipalities Act II of 1922"}}, {"text": "Excises and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4888, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the reference to the Nagpur High Court expressed his scretary, M~·· · h h 11 > • h h ciPal Committee op1mon t at t e appe ant s content10n t at as t e Kamptee ' bidis were not sold within the municipal limits, duty was not leviable, was unsound."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excises and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Excises and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5222, "end_char": 5240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He however thought I<aniaC.J. that because under Section 3 of the Excise Act, e:lcise duty was levied by the Central Government the levy of the octroi duty was not in consonance with Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was ultra vires the Provincial Government."}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excises and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Excises and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 205(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5555, "end_char": 5569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Schedule I to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "List I in Schedule VII of the Constitution Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6594, "end_char": 6640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Krishna\n\nRamnatli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6927, "end_char": 6948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this\n\n1950 connection our attention was drawn to AdminiBtrator, Lahore Municipality v. Daulat Ram Kapur('), in Ram Krishna\n\nRamnatli which it was held that the levy of octroi duty on salt Agarwal of was not within the powers of the Provincial legislature.", "canonical_name": "Ram Krishna he Ramnath"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7116, "end_char": 7127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I in Schedule VII of the Constitution Act", "statute": "List I in Schedule VII of the Constitution Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7140, "end_char": 7163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7435, "end_char": 7451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7696, "end_char": 7707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8118, "end_char": 8129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8335, "end_char": 8345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8363, "end_char": 8372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8643, "end_char": 8685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922", "statute": "the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8935, "end_char": 8949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Ramnath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9135, "end_char": 9142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d) \"excisable goods\" means goods specified in l950 the First Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise Ram Krishna and includes salt;'~ Ramnath\n\n2. (", "canonical_name": "Ramnath"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9494, "end_char": 9499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cigarette or pipe or hokkah tobacco, chewing tobacco or snuff; and Kania C.J.\n\n(1.1\") .................\n\nSection 3 of the Excise Act runs as follows:-\n\n\"There shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods ?", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9532, "end_char": 9541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9746, "end_char": 9759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ther than salt which are produced or manufactured in British India, and a duty on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into any part of British India as, and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule ............ \"\n\nEntry 9 to the First Schedule of the Excise Act is ' in these terms:-\n\n\"9."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9887, "end_char": 9901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9933, "end_char": 9947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944", "statute": "the Central Excises and\n\nSalt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "TOBACCO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9993, "end_char": 10000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TOBACCO, CURElJ-\n\n'Tobacco' means any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured, and whether manufactured or not, and includes the leaf, stalks and stem of the tobacco plant but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth;\"\n\n(Then follows a list of various articles into which\n\n~ tobacco can be converted, like bidis, cigarettes, snuff, etc."}}, {"text": "Sections 143 and 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10433, "end_char": 10453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part III of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10804, "end_char": 10824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Krishna he Ramnath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10969, "end_char": 10991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Any taxes, duties, ceases or fees which, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1950)\n\n19!50 were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, municipality or other local authority or body for Ram Krishna he Ramnath t purposes of the Province, municipality, district or\n\ngarwal of ot-her local area under a law in force on-the first day .Kamptee of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, may, v. .", "canonical_name": "Ram Krishna he Ramnath"}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11633, "end_char": 11706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11844, "end_char": 11855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act", "statute": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12093, "end_char": 12109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act", "statute": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12208, "end_char": 12219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act", "statute": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "Section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12338, "end_char": 12349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act", "statute": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12570, "end_char": 12586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act", "statute": "British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13013, "end_char": 13029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Krishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13219, "end_char": 13230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such levy remained unaffect- Ram Krishna ed by reason of Section 292 of the Constitution Act.", "canonical_name": "Ram Krishna he Ramnath"}}, {"text": "Section 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13247, "end_char": 13258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramnath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13285, "end_char": 13292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramnath The argument of the appellant is that the levy of the Agamal of octroi duty being at a stage after the excisable article, Kam:Ptee viz.,", "canonical_name": "Ramnath"}}, {"text": "Ram Krishna\n\nRamnath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15485, "end_char": 15505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950 of the taxing power in this particular sphere (power to impose duties of excise) is expressly apportioned Ram Krishna\n\nRamnath between the Centre and the Provinces, to the one being ,1garwal of assigned the power to impose duties of excise, to the Kamptee other taxes on the sale of goods.", "canonical_name": "Ram Krishna he Ramnath"}}, {"text": "[1942) F.C.R. 129", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17577, "end_char": 17594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Secretary, M11ni\n\nciPal Comtnittee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19933, "end_char": 19967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The levy of such duty is therefore not in conflict with the levy of an impost on the entry of the goods within a certain area ..\n\nIt was argued that under the rules framed by the Goyernment under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Government retained control over the movement of the\n\nRam \" rishna\n\nRaninaf/1 Agarwal of /{amptee v.\n\nSecretary, M11ni\n\nciPal Comtnittee, /{ aniptee\n\nKania C.J.\n\nSUPR!!:ME COURT REPORTS [ 19501\n\ngoods from the beginning till the end."}}, {"text": "List I of Schedule Seven to the Constitution Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20583, "end_char": 20631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20915, "end_char": 20926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of Schedule Seven to the Constitution Act", "statute": "List I of Schedule Seven to the Constitution Act"}}, {"text": "is no express provision in the Excise Act contrary to the provisions of the Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22031, "end_char": 22120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22949, "end_char": 22959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no express provision in the Excise Act contrary to the provisions of the Municipal Act", "statute": "There is no express provision in the Excise Act contrary to the provisions of the Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23160, "end_char": 23175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23204, "end_char": 23215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23248, "end_char": 23259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "BHA W ANIPORE BANKING CORPORA-\n\nTION, LTD. v.\n\nGOURISHANKARSHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23262, "end_char": 23327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHA W ANIPORE BANKING CORPORA-\n\nTION, LTD."}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23330, "end_char": 23342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nGOURISHANKARSHARMA\n\n[SHRI HARILAJ, KANIA C.J., SAIYID l!'AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHJmn; A and S. I~. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23344, "end_char": 23354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nGOURISHANKARSHARMA\n\n[SHRI HARILAJ, KANIA C.J., SAIYID l!'AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHJmn; A and S. I~. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "SAIYID l!'AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23356, "end_char": 23373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nGOURISHANKARSHARMA\n\n[SHRI HARILAJ, KANIA C.J., SAIYID l!'AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHJmn; A and S. I~. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID l!'AZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23447, "end_char": 23461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23476, "end_char": 23484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23636, "end_char": 23641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23821, "end_char": 23829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal MoneylenderR Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23989, "end_char": 24012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_25_29_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS 25\n\nthe octroi duty under the Municipal Act continues to be valid. On this point again the appellant's argument is that the levy of a duty at any stage of the manufacture of bidis out of tobacco would be the levy of the excise duty and therefore those provisions were contrary to the provisions permitting the levy of the octroi duty.\n\nWe have already discussed and rejected in the first part of the judgment this contention. It is wrong to think that two independent imposts arising from two different sets of circumstances were not permitted in law. In our opinion, therefore, there is nothing in the Excise Act to make its provisions contrary to the provisions of Section 66 (1) (e) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act or to the levy of octroi duty under the same. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.\n\nBHA W ANIPORE BANKING CORPORA-\n\nTION, LTD. v.\n\nGOURISHANKARSHARMA\n\n[SHRI HARILAJ, KANIA C.J., SAIYID l!'AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHJmn; A and S. I~. DAS JJ.]\n\nLimitation Act (IX of 1908j, Art. 152, els. 2 and 3-Exe 1mtion of decree-Limitation-Starting point-\" TVhe1e the1e has been a re, view\", meaning of-Applicatit!n for 1eope11in(I decree under s. 30, Benr; al Money-lenders Act dismissed /01: default and appeal from order of <lis11iissal-lVhether afre fresh startina for liinitntion\n\n~ :(or execution f decree-Interpretation of Art. 182, els. 2 and a.\n\nA preliminary decree on a mortgage was pa~ed ex 1ia.rtn on the 2lt August, 1940.\n\nThe judgment debtor made an application uurlet ij, 36 of tho Bengal MoneylenderR Act for reopeuing the\n\nRani J(rishna\n\nRamHath AgaYWal of\n\nKamJ>tee\n\nSecretary, Mt1ni .. ciJ>al Committee,/\n\nKamJ>tee\n\nKania C.J.\n\nl\\Iaroh 1'.\n\n1915()\n\nBhawanijJore Banking Cor- J>oration, Ltd,\n\nGowri Shankar\n\nSharma\n\nFazl AliJ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]\n\ndecree and the application was dismissed for default of appear ance on the ~0th December, 1941, and an application under O. IX, r. 9, C.P.C .• for restoration of this application was also dismissed on the 1st June, 1942. In the meanwhile on the ~2nd December, 1941, a final decree was passed.\n\nThe judgmentdebtor preferred an appeal from the order dismissing his application under o. IX, r. 9, C.P.C., a.nd this appeal was disn1issed for nonprosecution on the 3rd July, 1944. On the 9th April, 1945, the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree: Held that, even assuming that the Y/Ortl \"review\" has been used in Art. 182 of the Indian Limit:ttion Act, 1908, in a wide sense and that the application under ,. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act was an application for revibw. cl. 3 of Art. 182 was not a.pplica.ble to the case inasmuch a,; tbe application under s. 36 having been dismissed fo1 default the court had no occasion to apply its mind to the question \\vhether the decree could or should be re-opened ancl it could 11ot therefore be sidd t.ha, t ''there has been a review\" of the decrer \\Yithin the n1eaning of the !'ai<l clause.\n\nHeld also, that; the \\\\\"Ord~\n\n0 \\vhere there bas beeu !ill appeal\" in cl. 2 of Art. 182 must Le read with the word> \"for the exe cution of a decree or order\" iu the 1st coluwn of the Article and the fa.ct that there was a.n appeal from the order rlis1nissing the application under O. IX. r. 9, wade in connection with the proceeding under s. 36 of Money-lender• Act, could c.ot thernfore give\n\na fresh starting point for limitation under Art. 18~, cl. \\!.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature' at Calcutta: Civil Appeal No. LI of 1949.\n\nManohar Lal, (H. K. Mitter with him), for the appellant.\n\nB. G. Mitter, for the respondent.\n\n1950. March 14.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nFAZL ALI , J.-The only question to be decided in this appeal, which arises out of an execution proceeding, is whether the decree under execution is barred by limitation. The first court held that the decree was not barred, but the High Court has come to the opposite conclusion, and the decree-holder has, after obtaining a certificate under Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, appealed fo this Court. • The facts may be briefly stated as follows.\n\nOn the 21st August, 1940, a preliminary mortgage decree was\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COBRT REPORTS 27\n\npassed ex parte in a suit instituted by the appellant to enforce a mortgage. On the 19th September, 1940, the judgment-debtor made an application under Order IX, rule 13, of the Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte decree, but this application was rejeMed on the 7th June, 1941. On the 11th July, 1941, the judgment-debtor filed an application under Section 36 of the Bengal Moneylendtirs Act, for reopening the preliminary decree, but this application was dismissed for defal}lt of appearance on the 20th December, 1941. Thereafter, a final mortgage decree was passed in favour of the appellant, on the 22nd December. The judgment-debtor then made an applicationunder Order IX, rule 9, of the Civil Procedure Code for the restoration of the proceedings under Section 36 of the Moneylenders Act. The application was however dismissed on the 1st June, 1942, both on the ground that no sufficient cause for the nonappearance of the applicant and his failure to take steps in the proceedings was shown and on the ground that no purpose would be served by reopening the preliminary decree after . the final decree had been passed. The judgment-debtor thereafter preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta from the dedsion dismissing his application under Order IX, rule9, but the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution, on the 3rd July, 1944. On the 9th April, 1945, the appellant filed an application for executing the decree against the original judgment-debtor, though he .had died previously, and this application was dismissed for default on the 11th May, 1945. On the 2nd June, 1945, the present application for execution was .filed, and the question which we have to decide is whether this application is in time.\n\nIt is quite clear that the application for execution having been macje more than three years after the date of the final decree, it must be held to be timebarred, unless, as has been contended before us, the\n\n6. case falls under either clause 2 or clause 3 of article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nUnder these clauses, t.ime to make the applic1ttfon begins t.o run fromi980\n\nBhawaHij>orc BaffliHgCor j>oratiMS, Ltd.\n\nGowi ShaHkar\n\nSharma.\n\nFaz/ Ali].\n\n19ll0\n\nBha.wanipore BaHking Cor-\n\nJ>oratio1i Ltd.\n\nGo11Yi Sl1ankar\n\nShartna,\n\nFusl AUJ.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ll950] • \"2. (Where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or\n\n3. (Where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review .... \"\n\nIt is contended that the case is covered by clause 3, and the ground urged in support of this contention is • that the application made by tbe judgment-debtor for reopening the preliminary mortgage decree under Section 36 of the Moneylenders Act must be regarded as an application for review and time should be held to run from the date of the final order passed in the proceedings connected with that application. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. The important words in clause 3 of article 182 are : '\n\n(1) \" where there has been a review \" and (2) \" the decision passed on the review \". These words show that before a case can be brought under article 182, clause 3, it must be shown firstly that the court had undertaken to review the relevant decree or order and secondly, that there has been a decision on the review.\n\nIn the present case, even if it be assumed that the • word \"review\" has been used in article 182 in a large sense and that the application for reopening the decree under Section 36 of the Bengal Moneylenders Act was an application for review, the appellant cannot succeed, because the court never undertook or purported to review the decree in question.\n\nWhat actually happened was that the application under Section 36 for. reopening the prt>liminary decree (not the final decree which is the decree sought to be executed) was dismissed for default and the application under Order IX, rule 9, ofthe Civil Procedure Code for the restoration of the proceedings under Section 36 of the Moneylenders Act was also dismissed. Even if the fact that the judgment-debtor's application under Section 36 was directed against the preliminary mortgage decree is overlooked, that application having been dismissed for default, the court never had occa- J sion to apply its mind to the question as to whether the decree could or should be reopened, and hence it\n\ncannot be said that \" there has been a review \" of the\n\nS.O.R.\n\nSUPREME OOUR1' REPORTS 29\n\ndecree. The proceedings under Order II, rule 9, of the Code of Civil Procedure are not material to the present discussion, because they did not involve a review of the decree under execution but a review, if it is at\n\ne.11 possb~ to call it a review, (which, in our opinion, it is not), of the order dismissing the judgment- •· debtor's application under Section 36 for default.\n\nIt was also suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant.that the case mig'b.t be held to be covered by clause 2 of article 182 on the ground that, even though no appeal was preferred from the final mortgage decree, the words \" where there has been an appeal \" are comprehensive enough toinchide in this case the appeal • from the order dismissing the application under Order\n\nIX, rule 9, of the Civil Procedure Code, made in connection with the proceedings under Section 36 of the Moneylenders Act. This argument also is.a highly far-fetched one, because the expression \"where there has been an appeal\" must be read with the. words in column 1 of article 182, viz., \"for the execution of a ; decree or order of any civil Court ........ \", and, however\n\n•.\\.\n\nbroadly we may constrµe it, it cannot be held to cover an appeal from an/ order which is passed in a coll1Lteral proceeding o\\r w)lich ha.a no direct or immediate connection with tne decree under execution.\n\nIn our view, this appeal has no substance, and we accordingly dililmiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Ghatterji.\n\nAgent for the respondent: R.R. Biswas.\n\nBhawaniport Banking Cor. poration Lid.\n\nGo11ri Shat1kar\n\nSharma.\n\nPaz/ All j.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 909, "end_char": 924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 953, "end_char": 964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 997, "end_char": 1008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "BHA W ANIPORE BANKING CORPORA-\n\nTION, LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1011, "end_char": 1052, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAWANIPORE BANKING CORPORATION, LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOURISHANKARSHARMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1058, "end_char": 1076, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOURISHANKARSHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1093, "end_char": 1103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANIA C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID l!'AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1105, "end_char": 1122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1125, "end_char": 1141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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IX, r. 9, C.P.C., a.nd this appeal was disn1issed for nonprosecution on the 3rd July, 1944."}}, {"text": "9th April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2500, "end_char": 2515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th April, 1945, the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree: Held that, even assuming that the Y/Ortl \"review\" has been used in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2639, "end_char": 2647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2810, "end_char": 2818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2887, "end_char": 2892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3236, "end_char": 3241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3245, "end_char": 3253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3505, "end_char": 3510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature' at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature' at Calcutta: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3708, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal, (H. K. Mitter with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. K. Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal, (H. K. Mitter with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. G. Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3766, "end_char": 3778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. G. Mitter, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL ALI , J.-The only question to be decided in this appeal, which arises out of an execution proceeding, is whether the decree under execution is barred by limitation."}}, {"text": "Section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4205, "end_char": 4216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "21st August, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st August, 1940, a preliminary mortgage decree was\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COBRT REPORTS 27\n\npassed ex parte in a suit instituted by the appellant to enforce a mortgage."}}, {"text": "11th July, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th July, 1941, the judgment-debtor filed an application under Section 36 of the 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{"document_id": "1950_1_30_63_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "l[areh li.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nABDULLA AHMED v.\n\nANIMENDRA KISSEN MITTER.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c . .1., SAIYID F AZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\nS. R. DAS JJ.)\n\nOontmct-.{gencu-Estate b1\"0ker-Authorit11 to ' 11tgotiate a sale' and '3ecure purcha.se1 '-Whether empower& broker to conclw11 contrnct-Constr\"-Otion of contract~Broker finding out purchaur ready awl willing to buy for pries fixed by principal-Principal concl,,.ding contract with same purchaser for lower price-Broker'1 right to commission-Powers of e&late agents.\n\nThe appellant, •u estate broker, was employed by the respondent by a letter .dated 5th May, 1943, to negotiate a sale of a certain property on the terms mentioned_ in a commission note which ran as follows: \"J ...... do hereby authorise yon to negotiate the sale of my property 27, Amratolla Street, free from all encumbrances at a price not less than Rs. 1,00,000. I shall make out a good title to the property. If you succeed in securing a huyer for Rs. 1,00,000, I shall pay you Rs. 1,000 as your remuneration. If the price exceeds Rs. 1,05,000 e.nd does not exceed Rs. 1,10,000, I shall pay you the whole of the excess over Rs. 1,05,000 in addition to your remunemtion of Rs. 1,000 as\n\ntated above.\n\nIn ce.se you can secure a buyer at a price exceed ing Rs. 1,10,000 I shall pay you twentyfive pet cent. of the excess amount over Rs. 1,10,000 in addition to Rs. 6,000 as stated\n\n1tbove.\n\nThis authority will remain in force for one month from !late.\" In pursuance of this contract the appellant found two persons rearly and willing to purchase the property for Rs. 1,10,000 on the 2nd June and by letters exchanged with them he purportecl to conclude the contract for the sale of the property, and on the 3rd June communicated the same to the responrlent.\n\nThe respondent, however, cancelled the authority or the appellant on the 9th June and on the same date entered into an agreement \\Vith a nominee of the said persons for a •ale of the property for Rs. 1,05,000 and eventually executerl a conveyance in their favour for Rs. 1,05,000. The appellant institutecl a suit against the respondent for Rs. 6,000.\n\nHeld, per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS .J.T.-(i) that a house or estate agent is in a different position from a hroker at the Stock Exchange owing to the peculiarities or the p1operty with which he has to deal, and an owner employing an estate agent should not, in the absence of clear words to that effect, be taken to have authorised him to conclude a contract or\n\nsale; but the lack of such authority is not inconsistent with an understanding that the agent is . .not to be entitled to his commis- •ion unles• the owner and the purchase1 introduced by the agent\n\ncarried the transaction to completion; (ii) that even j.f the\n\n191JO commission note in the present case were to be construed as making payment of commission conditional on the completion of Abdulla Alimed the tre.nsaotion, the appellant having \"negotiated the sale\" and v. \"secured buyers\" who made a firm offe1 to buy for Rs. 1,10,000, Animendra acquired. the right to the payment of commission on the basis of Kis#n Mitter. that price subject only to the condition that the buyers should • complete the transaction of purchase and sale ; and as this condition was fulfilled when the buyers eventually purchased the property in question; the appellant's right to commission on that basis became absolute, and could not be affected by the circumstance that the respondent fo1 some reason of his own sold the property at a lower price.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Under the terms of the commission note in the present case the appellant had authority to enter into a binding contract on behalf of the defendant, and, as he had entered i. into such a contract he was entitled to the commission of Rs. 6,000 according to the terms of the comission note. Even conceding that he had no such authority, under the terms of the commission note the agent was entitled to his remuneration as soon as he in troduced a buyer ready and willing to purchase for the price fixed by the o'wner, whether the owner completed the transaction or not.\n\nLuxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper ([1941) A.O. 108) distin guisbed. • Chadburn v. 1'rloore (67 L.T. 257), Rosenbaum v. Belson ((1900) 2 Cb. 267), Durga Charan Mitra v. Rniendra Narain Sinha (36 C.L.J. 467), Wragg v. Lovett ([1948) 2 All E.R. 969) referred to.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta: Civil Appeal No. XLIV of 1949.\n\nThis was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) dated 5th January 1948 which varied a judgment passed by a single Judge l sftting_m the Original Side of the same High Court\n\n(Gentle J:) dated 11th June, 1945. The facts of the case and the arguments of the Counsel appear fully in the judgment.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad (A. K. Sen with him), for the appellant.\n\nB. Sen, for the respondent.\n\n- - <t.\n\n1950. March 14. The judgment of Kania C. J., and Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ., was delivered by Patanja.li Sastri J.: Mahajan J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\n19t:O\n\nAl1f/ulla Ahmed v.\n\nA11i111e1Jdra Jlisset? Mitter.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal dated 5th January, 1948, which varied a judgment and decree passed by a single Judge on 11th June, 1945, on the Original Side of the same Court.\n\nTh<> appellant who is carrying on business as an estate broker in Calcutta was employed by the respondent on the terms mentioned in a commission letter dated the 5th May, 194-3, to \"negotiate the sale\" of premises No. 27, Amratolla Street, Calcutta, belonging to him.\n\nIn pursuance of this contract the appellant found two persons who were ready and willing to purchase the property for Rs. l,10,000, and by letters ex<lhanged with them on 2nd June, 1943, he purported to eoncl ude a con tract for the sale of the property and communicated the same to the respondent by a letter of even date. The respondent, however, entered into an agreement on !lth .Tune, 1943, with a nominee of the said persons for the sale of the property for Rs. l,05,000 and eventually executed a conveyance in their favour on 8th December, 1943.\n\nThereupon the appellant brought the suit alleging that the contract concluded by him with the purchase1s for Rs. I , I0,000 on the 2nd .June, 1943, was binding on the respondent and claimed that he was entitled to the payment of Rs. 6,000 as remuneration in accordance with the terms <if his employment as he had done all that he was required to do on behalf of the respondent. In the alternative he claimed the same sum as damages for breach of contract. In defence to the snit the respondent pleaded, intei alia, that the appellant had no authority to conclude a binding contract for sale with any one, that the purchasers refused to complete the transaction alleging that they had been induced by the fraudulent misrepresentation of the appellant to agree to a price of Rs. 1,10,000, that the subsequent sale was effected ,. independently of the appellant, and that the appellant was not therefore entitled to any remuneration or damages.\n\n....\n\nGentle J. who tried the suit found that the terms of the appellant's employment did not authorise him to conclude a contract of sale and that the letters of 2nd , June, 1943, did not effect a contract of sale binding on the respondent. The learned Judge, however, rejected the respondent's case that the purchasers refused to purchase on the ground of any fraudulent misrepresentation by the appellant and that the negotiations were later resumed afresh directly between the respondent and the purchasers, and came to the conclusion that the agreement to sell of the 9th June, 1943, and the subsequent conveyance of 8th December, 1943, were due solely to the efforts of the appellant in bringing the parties together as potential buyers and seller.\n\nThe learned Judge refused to accept the suggestion that the sale was in fact effected for Rs. l, l0,000 as not being supported by any evidence but found that the reduction of the price by Hs. 5,000 from Rs. l, l0,000 for which the purchasers were ready and willing to buy the property, was made only for the purpose of depriving the appellant of his legitimate remuneration of Rs. 6,000.\n\nHe accordingly held that the appellant, who had performed his part of the contract by finding two persons who were ready, able and willing to buy at Rs. 1,10,000 was entitled to the commission claimed.\n\nThe Division Bench (HarriesC.J. and Mukherjea J.) which heard the appeal of the respondent, agreed with the trial Judge that the appellant's authority did not extend to the concluding of a binding contract for sale of the property, but differed from his view that all that the appellant was required to do was to introduce a purchaser who was ready and willing to buy for Rs. 1,10,000 and that he was entitled to his commission whether or not the property was sold at that price or at all.\n\nThey held, following certain observations of Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer in the case next mentioned, that the appellant, having undertaken to \"negotiate .the sale\" and to \"secure a buyer'', - could not be said to have either secured a buyer or negotiated the sale \"unless the sale actually took place or at least a contract had been entered into\". As,\n\nAl1d11lla Ahmed\n\nAnioientlfa [{ i ssen M ittc r,\n\nPatanjali\n\nSa>tri J.\n\nAbdulla Ahm<d\n\nAni1nendra\n\nKi1sn MitU,..\n\nPtdanjali\n\nSastrl /,\n\nhowever, a sale did take place between the persons introduced by the plaintiff and the defendant, and as that sale, in the view1also of the learned Judges, was the \"direct result of the plaintiff's negotiations\", they held that the appellant was entitled to commission but only on the price mentioned in the sale deed, namely, Rs. 1,05,000 which, they found was the price actually received by the respondent. As.to why the respondent accepted a reduced P, rice, Harries C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observlld: \"All\n\nthat is known is that persons who undoubtedly ma.de a firm offer of Rs. 1,10,000 for this property eventually bought it for Rs. 5,000 less. I strongly suspect that the price was reduced at the defendant's instance but I cannot find it as a. fact\". In support of their view that the appellant was not entitled to any aommission above that payable on a. purchase price of Rs. 1,05,000 the learned Judges relied on the decision of the House of Lords in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v.\n\nCooper('), where it was held tl!.at, in a contract to pay commission upon the completion of the transaction which the agent was asked to bring about, there was no room for implying a term that the principal shall not without just cause prevent the agent from earning his commission, and that it was op!m to the principal to break off negotiations and refuse to sell even after the agent had produced a customer who was ready and willing to purchase on the principal's terms. Applying what they conceived to be the principle of that decision, the Appellate Bench varied the decree of the trial Judge by reducing the a mount payable to the appellant to a sum of Rs. 1,000.\n\nThe commission letter runs as follows :\n\n\"I, Animendra Kissen Mitter of No. 20-B, Nilmoni Mitter Street, Calcutta, do hereby authorise you to negotiate the sale of my property, 27, Amratolla Street, free from all encumbrances at a price not less than Rs. 1,00,000. I shall make out a good title to the property. If you succeed in-securing a buyer for Rs. 1,00,000 I shall pay you Rs. 1,000 as your remuner- -\n\na.tion. If the price exceeds Rs. 1,05,000 and does not\n\n(1) (1941] A.C, lOS.\n\n-, 'L\n\nexceed Rs. 1,10,000 I shall pay you the whole of the excess over Rs. 1,05,000 in addition to your remuneration of Rs. 1,000 as stated above. In case you can secure a buyer at a price exceeding Rs. 1,10,000 I shall pay you twenty-five per cent.. of the excess amount over Rs. 1,10,000 in addition to Rs. 6,000 as stated above. This authority will remain in force for one month from date\".\n\nIn the absence of clear words expressing the intention of the parties it is possible to construe these terms in three different ways corresponding to the three patterns into which commission contracts with real estate brokers may broadly be said to fall. In the first place, the letter may be read as authorising the appellant not only to find a purchaser ready and willing to purchase the property at the price required but also to conclude a binding contract with him for the purchase and sale of the property on behalf of the respondent.\n\nSecondly, the contract may be construed as promising to reward the appellant for merely introducing a potential buyer who is ready, able and willing to buy at or above the price named, whether or not the deal goes through. And lastly, the commission note may be understood as requiring the appellant to find such a purchaser without authorising him to conclude a binding contract of sale but making commission contingent upon the consummation of the transaction. As stated already, the first of these interpretations was rejected by the learned trial Judge as well as by the Appellate Bench, but it was pressed upon us by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the appelant. We are unable to accept that view. '£he contract specifies only the price required by the respondent but does not furnish the broker with other terms such as those relating to the payment of the price, the investigation and approval of title, the execution of the conveyance, the parties who are to join in such conveyance, the costs incident&! thereto and so on. In fact, the agreement of sale dated the 9th June, 1943, entered into by the respondent with the purchasers contains detailed stipulations on all these and other matters. Mr. Setalvad laid stress on the statement in the commission note that the sale was to\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimendra Ki ssen Mitter.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSa•tri J•\n\nAbdulla Ah1ned\n\nAui11iendra Kissen Mitter,\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastt'i J.\n\nbe free from encumbrances and that a \"good title\" would be made out, but this is no more than a general indication of the nature of the bargain proposed and is perfectly consistent with an understanding that further details will be subject to negotiation between the respondent and the purchaser when found.\n\nAs pointed out by Kekewich J. in Chadburn v.\n\nMoore(') a house or estate agent is in a differeu t position from a broker at the stock exchange owing to the peculiarities of the property with which he is to deal which does not pass by a short instrument as stocks and shares do but has to be transferred after investigation of title as to which various special stipulations, which might be of particular concern to the owner, may have to be inserted in a concluded contract relating to such property.\n\nThe parties therefore do not ordinarily contemplate that the agent should have the authority to complete the transaction in such cases.\n\nThat is why it has been held, both in England and here, that authority given to a broker to negotiate a sale and find a pnrchaser, without furnishing him with all the terms, means \"to find a man willing to become a purchaser and not to find him and make him a purchaser\": see Rosenbaum v. Belson(') and Ditrya Charan 11!/itra v. Rajendra Narayan Sinha(').\n\nMr. Setalvad next suggested, in the alternative, that the second interpretation referred to above, which was favoured by the trial Judge, should be adopted, and that, inasmuch as, in that view also, the appellant had done all that he was required to do when he introduced to the respondent two prospective buyers who were ready and willing to bny the premises for Rs. I, I0,000, he was entitled to commission on that basis. Learned counsel criticised the view of the Appellate Bench, who adopted the third consruction, as illogical and inconsistent, and argued that, if authority to secure a buyer were to be taken to mean authority to find one who is not only ready and willing to buy but also becomes eventually a buyer in order to entitle the agent to his commission, then such authority must. of necessity\n\n(1) 67 L.T. 257.\n\n12) [1900] 2 Ch. 267.\n\nIS)\n\n86 O.L.J. '67.\n\ni I\n\nextend to the concluding of a contract of sale, as otherwise the agent could not possibly accomplish the task assigned to him. We.do not see much force in this criticism. As already indicated there are cogent reasons why an owner employing an estate agent to secure a purchaser should not, in the absence of clear words to that effect, be taken to have authorised him to conclude a contract of sale, and we cp.nnot see how the lack of such authority is iiiconsistent with an understanding that the agent is not to be entitled to his commission unless the owner and the purchaser introduced by the agent carried the transaction to completion.\n\nIn the present case, however, it is not necessary to decide whether or not the commission note imports such an understanding, for a sale was in fact concluded with the purchasers introduced by the appellant who has thus, in a; ny view, earned his commission, both the trial Judge and the Appellate Bench having found that the appellant's efforts were the effective cause of that sale. The only question is whether the commission is payable on the basis of Rs. 1,10,000 for which the appellant brought a firm offer from the purchasers, or on the basis of Rs. 1,05,000 which is the price mentioned in the conveyance.\n\nAs already stated, the Appellate Bench based their decision on the ruling in the Luxor case. The learned Judges reasoned thus: \"In that case the principal had refused to sell in cirQumsta nceswhich afforded no reasonable excuse. Nevertheless, the House of Lords, revers- . ing the Court of Appeal, held that no commission was payable. It appears to me that the principle is applicable to thicase. Though the.agent introduced a purchaser ready and willing to buy for Rs. 1,10,000 the sale for !JOme reason took place at a lower figure. Even if the defendant unreasonably or without just cause refused to conclude the sale at the higher figure, nevertheless the plaintiff has no right to commission based on that higher figure.\" We are unable to agree with thia reasoning. a.nd conclusion. The ground of decision in -the Luxor case was that, where commission was made payable on the completion of the transaction, the agent's right to. commission was \" a purely\n\n19'50\n\nAbdulla Aluned\n\nAnifllendrn K issen Mitter.\n\nPatattjali\n\nSastriJ,\n\n1lbdulla Ahnzcd\n\nAniutendra /( isst:n l'if itter.\n\nF>atanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nMahajan}.\n\ncontingent right\" and arose only when the purchase materialised.\n\nAs Lord Simon put it \" The agent is promised a reward in return for an event and the event has not happened\". But the position is different where the principal, availing himself of the efforts of the agent, concludes the sale with the purchaser introduced by him, as the respondent did in the present case.\n\nAs observed by Lord Russell of Killowen in the same case, \"where a contract is concluded with the purchaser, the event has happened upon the occurrence of which a right to the promised commission has become vested in the agent. From that moment no act or omission by the principal can deprive the agent of his vested right\". Applying that principle, (even if the commission note in the present case were to be construed as making payment of commission conditional on the completion of the transaction, as it was in the English case) the appellant, having \"negotiated the sale\" and \"secured buyers\" who made a firm offer to buy for Rs. 1,10,000 had done everything he was required by the respondent to do and acquired a right to the paymel)<t of commission on the basis of that price which he had successfully negotiated, subject only to the condition that the\n\nbuyers should complete the transaction of purchas~ and sale. The condition was fulfilled when those buyers eventually purchased the property in question, and the appellant's right to commission on that basis became absolute and could not be affected by the circumstance that the respondent \"for some reason\" of his own sold the property at a lower price.\n\nWe accordingly hold that the appellant is entitled to the full commission of Rs. 6,000.\n\nThe appeal is allowed, the decree passed on appeal in the Court below is set aside and that of the trial Judge restored. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal including the costs incurred in the lower court as well as his costs of the appeal in that court.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court at Calcutta, dated 5th January 1948. By that judgment the High\n\n. f\n\nI I\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 39\n\nCourt va.ried the judgment and decree of Gentle J. dated 11th June 1945 made in exercise of his original jurisdiction, decreeing the plaintiff's suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,000.\n\nThe appellant is a broker by profession residing at Nq. 81/l Phear Lane, Calcutta, and carries on the busihess of a house agent. The respondent, Animendra Kissen Mitter, resides in No. 20B, Nilmony Mitter Street, Calcutta.\n\nThe appellant was employed by the respondent to negotiate the sale of the respondent's premises, No. 27, Amratolla Street, Calcutta, on certain terms and conditions on commission and the questio~ raised by this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to his commission under the circumstances Jli.ereinafter mentioned.\n\nThe facts are substantially admitted. By a letter dated 5th May, 1943, the appellant was employed by the respondent for arranging a sale of the premises above mentioned. This letter is in the following terms:- \"I, Animendra Kissen Mitter of No. 20B, Nilmoni Mitter Street, Calcutta, do hereby authorize you to negotiate the sale of my above property free from all encumbrances at a price not less than Rs. 1,00,000.\n\nI shall make out a good title to the property. If you succeed in securing a buyer for Rs. 1,00,000 I shall pay you Rs. 1,000 as your remuneration. If the price exceeds Rs. 1,05,000 and does not exceed Rs. 1,10,000\n\nI shall pay you the whole of the excess over Rs. 1,05,000 in addition to your remuneration of Rs. l, OOOas stated above. In case you can secure a buyer at a price exceeding Rs. 1,10,000 I shall pay you twenty-five per cent. of the excess amount over Rs. 1,10,000 in addition to Rs. 6,000 as stated above. This authority will remain in force for one month from date.\"\n\nAs recited in the letter, the authority given to the appellant was to remain in force for one month from 5th May 1943. Three days before the termination of the appellant's authority, on 2nd June 1943 the plaintiffappellant obtained an offer from two persons, namely,\n\nAbd,.lla Ahmed v.\n\nAnimendra Kissen Mitter.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAbdtdla A11med v.\n\nAnimendra Kissen Mitter.\n\nMahajan j.\n\nKishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor, for the purchase of the premises regarding which the plaintiff had been authorized to arrange a sale. This letter is in these terms:-\n\n\"We are willin:g to purchase the above house, land and premises at and for the price of Rs. 1,10,000 only free from all encumbrances.\n\nWe hereby authorize you to accept the offer for sale of the above permises from Mr. A. K. Mitter for Rs. 1,10,000 on our behalf and send the confirma.tion to the vendor Mr. A. K. Mitter on our behalf.\" On the same date the plaintiff gave a reply which runs thus:-\n\n\"I am in receipt of your letter of date and under authority from the owner Mr. A. K. Mitter, I hereby confirm your offer for the purchase of the above permises at and for the price of Rs. 1,10,000 free from all encumbrances.\"\n\nSimultaneously with the issue of this letter he gave intimation of this contract to the respondent in the following terms :-\n\n\" Under the authority given to me by you I made an offer for the sale of the above premises to Messrs.\n\nKishorilal Maha war and Ram KumarMahorof No.27, Amratolla Street, Calcutta, for rupees on lakh and ten thousand only and they have accepted the offer and they have authorized me to send a confirmation to you of the said offer. I accordingly confirm the offer made by you for the sale of the above premises for rupees one lakh and ten thousand orrly.\n\nThe draft agreement for sale will be sent to you in the usual course.\n\nA copy of the letter of Messrs. Kishori Lal Maha war and Ram Kumar l\\Iahor accepting your offer is enclosed herewith.\"\n\nThe lettel', Was received by Mitter on 3rd June 1943, two days bo'fore the termination of the plaintiff's authority. The respondent made no reply and kept silent. He did not question the agent's authority in effecting a binding contract of sale with the purchasers.\n\nHe did not repudiate the transaction nor did he\n\n.. '\n\n\\ ;\n\n' .\n\nexpressly ratify it. It was the plaintiff's case that he had accepted the purchasers' offer after getting express instructions from the respondent. That case, however, was not accepted in the two courts below.\n\nOn 3rd June, 1943, the solicitor for the purchasers wrote to the solicitor for the agent that as the offer of his client for the purchase of 27, Amratolla Street had already been accapted and acceptance communicated to him, the title deeds should be sent so thata conveyance may be prepared. At his request inspection of the letter of authority was offered by/the plaintiff and a copy of the letter was sent to him by post. On receipt of this copy the purchasers' solicitor assumed a curious attitude. He said that the copy of the letter sent contained different terms as to commission than those contained in the letter of authority originally shown to his client. The plaintiff was charged with making a secret illegal gain. In spite of these allegations it was asserted that the contract was a concluded one and that being so, the plaintiff was bound to refund to the purd10'sers whatever moneys he would receive from the vendor. It appearr:; that the purchasers' attorney did Qot like the ideaoftheplaintiffpocketing a sum of Rs. 6,000 out of the purchase price, and this dislike on the part of the purchasers for the broker's commission has led to further complications resulting inthis litigation.\n\nOn 9th June, 1943, the purchasers' solicitor wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor that his client had cancelled the agreement of purchase. Immediately on receipt of this communication the plaintiff's solicitor replied expressing surprise at this attitude and accused the other party of a change of front with an ulterior motive. It was said that further instructions wtmld be given after getting instructions from Mitter to whom these letters were forwarded. It seems that the plaintiff was in the dark while writing the letter of 9th June, 1943, of the negotiations that were going on behind the scene directly between the purchasers and the vendor who had kept absolutely silent all this time. On 9th June the date of the alleged\n\n19li0\n\nAbdulla Alimed\n\nAnimendra Kissen Milter.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter.\n\nMahajan/.\n\ncancellation of the bargain already made, an agreement was executed between Animendra Kissen Mitter, the vendor, and Makkanlal, a benamidar of Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor (the purchasers) for sale of the premises for a sum of Rs. 1,05,000. The sale deed in pursuance of this agreement was actually executed on 8th December, 1943, in favour of the original purchasers and not in favour of the benamidar.\n\nAs pointed out by the learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the appellate Bench, possibly some arrangement was made whereby both the defendant and the purchasers benefited by the insertion of a lower price in .the contract of sale and the transfer deed. It seems obvious enough that the defendant having received a firm offer of Rs. 1,10,000 for this property could not have parted with it for Rs. 5,000 Jess except on the basis of some arrangement between himself and th.e purchasers under which both of them shared the commission instead of paying it to the broker. It was to the advantage of both of them.\n\nOn 14th August, 1943, the appellant filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for recovery of Rs. 6,000, brokerage payable under the commission note. He also claimed relief by way of damages in the alternative.\n\nThe defendant resisted the suit and denied the appellant's claim. Gentle J. who heard the suit, gave judgment for the plaintiff and passed a decree for a sum of Rs. 6,000, with interest and costs in his favour.\n\nHe held that on a true construction of the commission note'the appellant's authority was to find a purchaser, namely, a man ready, able and willing to buy at a price acceptable to the respondent and that the appellant had accomplished this when he introduced to the re~; ondent the purchasers and thathe had done all that \"':1s required of him. It was held that the appellant I.ad no authorit.y to conclude a contract of sale and no binding contract of sale was made on 2nd and 3rd June, 1943, that the transaction effected nominally in the name of Makkanlal and completed on 8th December, 1943, in favour of Kishorilal Mahawar and Rarnkumar Mahor, was effected solely through the intervention of the appellant who brought\n\n.. •\n\nthe parties together in the capacity at least of a potential buyer and seller, that the reduction of the price by Rs. 5,000 from Rs. 1,10,000 wal.' more than peculiar and that this reduction was made for one purpose and that was to deprive the plaintiff of his remuneration.\n\nThe respondent preferred an appeal against this decree. This was partially allowed by the learned Chief Justice and Mukherjea J. on the following findings: that the appellant procured two persons, vi~., Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor, on 2nd June, 1943, who were willing to buy the property for Rs. 1,10,000, that on a true construction of the contract of agency no commission was payable until at least a binding contract had been entered into between the appellant and the respondent, that the agent could only be said to have negotiated the sale if he introduced a person willing to buy who eventually bought, that the -sale took place between the persons introduced by the appellant and the respondent and it was the direct result of the appellant's agency, that the commission note gave no authority to the appellant to conclude a contract of sale, that Makkanlal with whom the sale a.greement dated 9th June was entered into was a benamidar of Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor; that the appellant had no right to commission on a higher price than for which the sale was actually made and as the sale was actually made for Rs. 1,05,000, his remuneration could not exceed a sum larger than Rs. 1,000. On the basis of these findings the appeal was allowed and the decree granted by Gentle J. was modified and the plaintiff's suit was decreed in the sum of Rs. 1,000.\n\nNo order for costs was made in the appeal.\n\nIn this appeal Mr. Setalvad for the plaintiff raised three contentions: (1) That the finding of the court below that on a true construction of the commission note the plaintiff had no authority to make a binding contract regarding the sale of this property with the purchasers was erroneous; (2) That even if that finding was correct, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree\n\n19ll0\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter-.\n\nMahajan J,\n\n19ll0\n\nAbdulla Ahmett\n\nT, Animendra K is sen M itler.\n\nMahaj\"\" J.\n\n for the sum of Rs. 6,000, because he had done all that he had promised to do for the respondent, viz., he had secured a purchaser for Rs. 1,10,000, who was ready, able and willing to buy the property and that if by_ reason of his own caprice or in collusion with the purchasers, the respondent did not sell the property for Rs. 1,10,000 but chose to receive instead Rs. 1,05,000, the plaintiff could not be made to suffer.\n\n(3) That on the evidence it should have been held that the sale was made for a price of Rs. 1,10,000 and that the amount entered in the sale deed was fictitious.\n\nThe first thing to see is what the parties have expressed in the commission note and what is the true effect of the language employed in it, read in the light of the material facts.\n\nAs pointed out by Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor, in Luxor (Eastbourne), Ltd.\n\nv. Cooper('), contracts with commission agents do not follow a single pattern and the primary necessity in each instance is to ascertain with precision what are the express terms of the particular contraut under discussion.\n\nI have very carefully considered the terms of this contract in the light of the material circumstances and with great respect to the Judges who decided this case in the High Court, I am of the opinion that the authority given by the principal to the agent authorized him to enter into a binding contract of sale on his behalf. It was not a mere authority authorizing him to find a purchaser willing, able and ready to buy the premises for a price mentioned in the document. The note, to begin with, confers authority on the plaintiff to negotiate a sale free from all encumbrances at a price not less than Rs. 1,00,000. Then it proceeds to say that the principal undertakes to make out a good title to the property. It further provides that if the agent succeeds in securing a bnyer for Rs. 1,00,000, he will be paid a sum of Rs. 1,000 as remuneration. In the concluding part of the note a scale of commission proportionate to the price bas been promised in case a price higher than Rs. 1,00,000 was secured. In express words it is said that if the price exceeds Rs. 1,05,000 and does not exceed Rs. 1,10,000,\n\n(1) [19U] A.O. 108,\n\n\"I shall pay you the whole of the excess' over Rs. 1,05,000 in addition to your remuneration of Rs. 1,000\", that if a buyer is secured at a price exceeding Rs. 1, 10,000, he will be paid 25 per cent. of the excess amount over Rs. 1,10,000 in addition to Rs. 6,000. The authority of the agent was to remain in force for one month. In my opinion, the terms of the rrote as regards the property being free from encumbrances and in respect of the guarantee about title :indicate that the agent was given authority to make a binding contract. In a bare authority conferring power on a broker for introducing a customer, these stipulations would ordinarily find no place: The words \"to negotiate a sale\" standing by themselves may not authorize an agent to make a contract of sale.\n\nBut here they do not stand by 17hemselves. They are followed by two illl.llortant conditions adverted to above. The agreement further lays down that if the broker succeeds in securing a buyer, he will get a certain remuneratiOn. Gentle J. observed that the word \"securing\" here had the meaning of \"obtaining a. buyer\". I have consulted the same dictionary :as the learned Judge did and I find that the true meaning of the expression \"securing a buyer\" is \"to. obtain a buyer firmly\". • It is not possible in business sense to secure a buyer firmly unless he is bound by an offer and an acceptance. Otherwise, he is entitled to withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance and it cannot in this situation be said that a buyer has been secured firmly. The word \"secure\" has not the same meaning as the word \"find\" or \"procure\". It gives an id-ea. of safety and certainty. If a buyer fa ensured he, is said to be secured and no buyer can be said to be ensured till he is bound by his offer and that cannot happen unless it stands accepted. The agent could only secure a buyer in the strict sense of the term if he had authority to enter into a binding contract. The word \"buyer\" when used in a strict sense also means \"a person who l: 11os actually made the purchase\". The authority given\\ to an agent to secure a buyer therefore gives him authority to enter into a inding conhact of sale with him. Without such an authority it\n\nAbdulla Ahmed v.\n\nAnime•dra Kissen Mitter.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nAIN\"'11aAhmed\n\n•• A.#U..mdra Hiuen Mitter.\n\nMaloaja\" J,\n\nwas not possible to secure a buyer. I am further supported in this view by the language employed in the document in respect of the paym•mt of the commission. When the price .secured was Rs. 1,10,000, the broker was entitled to 25 per cent. of the excess. It is difficult to think of an excess in relation to price in a stipulatiOn for commission unless the agent has been given an authority to make a contract of sale.' If the scope of the authority is only to introduce a customer ready, able and willing to buy the property with an option to the principal to accept or to refuse the offer, then it would have been drawn up in a different language.\n\nThe subsequent conduct of both the parties to the agreement very strngly supports this view The evidence of such conduct is relevant in this case because, as pointed out by Viscount Simon, L. C., in the case already referred to, the phrase \"finding a purchaser\" is itself not without ambiguity. Here the phrase is\n\n\"securhg a purchaser\". This phrase similarly is not without ambiguity. The evidence of conduct of the parties in this situ .. tion as to how they understood the words to mean can be considered in determining the true effect of the contract made betwen the parties.\n\nExtrinsic evidence to determine the effect of an instrument is permissibie where there remains a' doubt as to its true meaning. Evidence of the acts done under it is a guide to the intention of the parties in such a case and particularly when acts are done shortly after the date of the instrument. (Vide p.ara 343 of Haiisham Edn. of Halsbury, Vol. 10, p. 274).\n\nSo far as the conduct of the agent is concerned, he accepted the offer and under his own signature Rent. the letter of acceptance to the purchasers. In the letter written by him to his principal he specifically refers to his authority. The correspondence above mentioned clearly shows that both the purchasers and the agent thought that a concluded contract had been made. Information of this was given to the vendor and though he did not speak, his silence in the circumstances of the case seems as eloquent as speech would have\n\n,.,\n\nI ,;\n\nbeen. He never repudiated the contract made by the agent but behind his back entered in.to a fresh contract with the same persons who had been secured by the agent in a surreptitious manner.\n\nIn the witness box he assumed a dishonest and untruthful attitude. The learned trial Judge pronounced him a liar and rightly too.\n\nHe asserted complete igngrance about the subsequent contract of sale and fixed all blame on to his son . . When asked about the sale price on the contract of 9th June, 1943, his answer was that be knew nothing about this and said that because his son asked him to sign the deed he did sign it and that W&, S all that he knew.\n\nWhen faced with the sale deed, he said that he did not know what his son had told him astowhatwaswritten in the deed. He added that be did not know what consideration was paid to him for the sale. He further professed not to know whether the sale price went into his banking account or was even entered in the account books. After a great deal of prevarication he was made to accept the document of 5th May, 1943, and its terms.\n\nHe admitted that on 3rd June he had a conversation with the purchasers and was informed by them that they had entered into a bargain with the broker and that the broker had deceived them about the commission and therefore they would not buy the house. He admitted that he got the letter sent by the plaintiff, but gave no explanation as to why he sent no reply to that letter. With great difficulty he was made to accept his signature on the postal acknowledgment about the receipt of the letter sent by the broker to him informing him of the concluded bargain made with the purchasers, and he had to admit that he got that letter from the broker. He also admitted that he took no objection to the letter written by the broker before Kishoribabu had told him the story about the commission of two per cent. In further cross-examination he admitted that what was stated by the broker in the letter of the 2nd June was correct. The whole evidence given by the defendant consists of evasive statements and his ultimate resort was in lapses of memory. It is quite clear from his deposition that the respondent accepted the contract made by the a.gent and was clearly under the\n\n19!50\n\nAbdulla Al1mcd\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter,\n\nMaha jail j.\n\n\\, 1950\n\n.Ablulla Ahmtid\n\nv. .AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter.\n\n~Iahajan l.\n\nbelief that the agent had nof exceeded his authority in entering into a binding contract with the purchasers .\n\nI am therefore of the opinion that the authority given to the agent in this case was an authority to enter into a binding contract of sale and this he did and he was therefore entitled to his commission of Rs. 6,000.\n\nThe learned single Judge and the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal found otherwise on this part of the case in view ot certain decisions of English Courts and a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In my opinion, none of those cases touch the present case.\n\nUnless the language of two documents is identical, an interpretation placed on one document is no authority for the proposition that a document differently drafted, though using partially similar language, should be similarly interpreted. .. . - ·· In Hamer v. Sharp(1) Sir Charles Hall, V. C., considered the case of an authority of an agent for sale appointed by the owner of an estate. The document in that case was in these terms :-\n\n\" I request you to procure a purchaser for the following freehold property, and to insert particulars of the same in your Monthly Estate Circular till further notice, viz., my beer house and shop No. 4 and No. 6, Manchester Road, Tenant No. 4, \\Villiam Galloway, gilder, and No. 6, Albert Vaults, Henry Holmes, beer retailer, and work rooms above.\n\nPresent net rent, £150, price £2800, when I will pay you a commission and expenses of fifty pounds. About six years' lease unexpired.\"\n\nThe Vice-Chancellor observed as follows :-\n\n\"The question is whether, when an owner of an estate puts it into the hands of an estate agent for sale, stating a price for and giving particulars of the property to enable him to inform intending purchasers, but giving no instructions as to the absolute disposal, and none as to the title of the property, and mentioning none of those special stipulations which it might be proper to insert in conditions in reference to the title,\n\n(11 L. R. 19 Eq. 1000\n\n>-.\n\n- that is sufficient authority to the agent to sign a con- 1950 tract for the sale of the property fort.he price stated in the instructions, without making any provision wha_ tso- Atididla Alimed v. ever as to title. In considering whether the instructions - Animendra of October, 1872, were a sufficient authority to the agent Kissen Mitter. for that purpose, I cannot help expressing an opinion that such an authority to an agent on the part of a Maliajan J. vendor would be highly imprudent, as the purchaser would then be entitled to require, on completion, attested copies of all documents of title, and the expense of them would swallow up, to a great extent, the purchase money. This estate agent must have known that if this property had been offered for sale by public auction there would have been conditions to guard the vendor against being subject to c('lrtain expenses, and to prevent the contract becoming abortive by reason of a purchaser requiring a strictly marketable title. Could he suppose that he was invested with authority to sign a contract without considering what it should contain as regards title? As an intelligent and well informed person, he could not suppose that he was properly discharging his duty to his principal when he signed the contract which he signed; such a contract was not one within the scope of his authority to sign.\"\n\nThe case therefore stood decided on the construction of the document. It was remarked that in those circumstances it was not necessary to decide what words would confer such an authority. Having said so, the learned Vice-Chancellor proceeded to observe as follows:-\n\n\"but I nevertheless state my opinion to be, that when instructions are given to an agent to find a purchaser of landed property, he, not being instructed as to the conditions to be inserted in the contract as to title, is not authorized to sign a contract on the part of the vendor.\"\n\nThis case can hardly be said to be an authority for the construction of the agreement that we are called upon to construe in the present case. Considerable emphasis was laid in that case on the point that no instructions had been given as to the conditions that had to he\n\n1915() .\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimt!ndra\n\nKissn Mitter.\n\nMahajan J.\n\ninserted in the agreement as to title. In the present case the agent was told that the principal guaranteed marketable title. He was further told that the sale should be free of encumbrances. All the material conditions of sale were thus contained in the present agreement.\n\nThe next case on which considerable reliance was placed in the courts below is the case of Chadburn v.\n\nMoore('). In this case an advertisement appeared in the Daily Telegraph in these words:-\n\n\" Forced sale by order of the niortgagees-thirtyfour well built houses, situated at Grays, closa to the station on the London, Tilbury, and '<ISouthend Railway, within easy reach of the docks, all let to respectable tenants at rents amounting to £ 620 per annum.\n\nHeld for about ninety-five years at ground rents amounting to£ 146; price£ 3500, of which £3000 can remain on mortgage. For further particulars apply to Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, 33 and 34, Savilerow, London, W.\"\n\nIn response to this advertisement the plaintiff in that case, James Chadburn, called on Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, a firm of surveyors and estate agents, for further information. He then went to see the houses and came back and made an offer to purchase them, which was reduced to writing. It appeared from the evidence that the offer was to be submitted by Mr. Newman to his client the defendant; and the plaintiff was to return the next day for an answer.\n\nNewman saw the defendant, who gave him instructions to withdraw five <3f the houses, and fixed the price, but did not, according to the evidence given in court, give instructions to Newman to enter into a binding contract. Later on the plaintiff called on Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman and two letters were exchanged between them, which were letters of offer a:Qd acceptance for the twenty-nine houses at Grays. The offer and acceptance were forwarded by the defendant to the estate agents. The defendant on receiving this offer wrote a letter saying inter alia :-\n\n(!) 67 L.T, ~61.\n\n\"I think you were, as you usually are, a little premature in actually entering into what might be a binding contract. It is always best to have an offer and acceptance subject to a formal contract being entered into .... \".\n\nTo this Newman replied:--\n\n'\"The offer for the above was accepted under your definite instructions anrl is a very good get out for you.\"\n\nKekewich J., who decided this case, gave the following judgment:-\n\n\"Having heard Mr. Newman, who was called without the plaintiff knowing what he was going to say, and having read the correspondence, I have little doubt that I have the real transaction-which is a mere transaction between principal and agent-before me. It might be that a different colour would be put upon the matter by the cross-examination of Mr. Moore, but this was not done, and he is entitJed to have judgment upon the point of law. Moore undoubtedly authorized Newman to find a purchaser for the houses. It is true the expression does not come out on the correspondence.\n\nOn the second occasion Newman appears to have been instructed to negoti:ate a sale.\n\nWhatever else he did do, Moore did not il). express terms authorize Newman to enter into a contract.\n\nNewman wus to .find a purchflser, and to negotiate a sale.\n\nIs that sirftfoien t ? No evidence was given as to custom; no evidence was brought to show that the position of a house or estate agent resembles that of a broker on the Stock Exchange or any other exchange.\n\nA house or estate agent is in a different position, owing to the peculiarity of the property with which he has to deal, which does not pass by a short instrument as stocks and shares do, but has to be transferred after investigation of title and in accordance with strict laws.\n\nAn agent for sale of real estate must be more formally constituted than a seller of stocks and securities of a similar nature. There is no definite authority; in Hamer v. Sharp('), Hall V.C., does not\n\n(1) 19 Eq. 108.\n\nAhdulla Ahmed\n\nA11i1ncndra Ii issen Mitter.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAbdtllla Al1111ed\n\nAninrendra Kisscn 1'.litter.\n\nMahaja.iJ.\n\ngo so far as to say an estate agent cannot enter into any contract, and does not decide the question of authority, but only states his opinion. I must per• force refer to Prior v. Moore('), where I indicated my -0wn opinion distinctly; that instruction to a house agent to procure a purchjl.ser and to negotiate a sale does not amount to authority to the agent to bind his principal by contract. Here the circumstance must not be forgotten that Moore on the J!eccind occasion told Newman what he was prepared to take for the twenty-nine houses. Newman then jumped at the conclusion that he had power at that price to enter Into a contraot. That is in my opinion not sufficient, and unless express authority is given to the agent to -aell, and for that purpose to enter into a binding contract, the principal reserves his final right to accept or refuse.\"\n\nIn this case there was no written document between the principal and the agent. From th'e correspondence it was inferred that the principal had asked the agent to find a purchaser or to negotiate a sale and it was held that within these words an authority to sell could not be spelt out. Not only is the language of the document with which we are concerned different, but the evidence in the case particularly about the conduct of the parties is materially different. The observations made by the learned , Judge must be taken to be limited to the facts found by him. The expressions \"find a purchaser'', \"procure a purchaser'', \"negotiate a sale\" standing by themselves may not be sufficient to confer authority on the agent to enter into a binding contract on behalf of the principal; but as I have in di ca ted a hove, the words in the present case are such as by necessary implication conferred authority on the agent for making a binding contract.\n\nThe next case ia D?trga Oharan Mitra v. Rajendra Narain Sinha(•), a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court. The document considered in that case bears considerable resemblance with the document in the present case.\n\n(1) 8 T.L.B. 69'.\n\n(ii) 86 C.L.J. 467.\n\nIt was in these terms:- \"I hereby authorize you to negotiate the sale of the lands at Tolligunge I have recently purchased from Messrs. Martin and Co. If you can secure a purchaser to purchase the same at the gross value of Rs. 16,000, I shall pay you Rs. 200 as your remuneration. If you be able to raise the price to any amount above Rs. 16,000, you will be entitled to the excess amount\n\n- folly and I shall be bound to mention the whole amount in the conveyance.\n\nPlease note that this letter of authority will remain in force for a fortnight only to complete the tran..c;- action; after that this letter will stand cancelled.\"\n\nThe agent acting on this authority sold the property.\n\nOn receipt of this letter the vendor informed the agent that he would not sell the land. On the acceptance of the agent a suit was brought for specific performance.\n\nSir Asutosh Mookerjee who delivered the judgment of the Bench referred to the cases of Hamer v.\n\nSharp (1), Prior v. Moore (2), Chadburn v. Moore (3), and also Rosenbaum v. Bel8on ('), and observed that it was well settled that an estate or house-agent, authorized to procure a purchaser, has no implied authority to enter into an open contract of sale, because the transaction mentioned is as specified in the letter, viz., to negotiate a sale after securing a purchaser.\n\nThere is similarity in the language employed in the letter dealt with in this case and the letter of authority with which we are concerned; but read as a whole, the two documents are drafted with different intents and the true effect of both is not the same. There was no mention of the title being guaranteed by the vendor or of the sale being made free of encumbrances in that case.\n\nTherl! was no evidence of surrounding circumstances or of the conduct of the parttes. On the other hand, the plaintiff who was himself a solicitor realized the difficulties of the situation and endeavoured to alter the foundation of his claim. He conceded that as a broker he had no authority to sell the property and that he\n\n(1) 19 Eq. 108.\n\n(2) S T.T •. R. 62~.\n\n(S) 67 L.T. 257.\n\n(41 (1900) 2 Oh. 267.\n\nAl>d11/lt1 Al11n, d\n\nAui111eudra f{issen Mitto.\n\nMt1ht1jt1t1 J.\n\n19ll0\n\nAbdulla Altmed\n\nAnimendra l\\\"issen Mitter.\n\nMahajau }.\n\ncould not have taken a conveyance of sale of the plot.\n\nIn the present case the attitude adopted by the parties, as already pointed out, was entirely different. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee also cited the case of Rosenbaum v.\n\nBelson ('). In this case the learned Judge made the following observations:-\n\n\"To my mind there is a substantial difference between those expressions .. Authorizing a man to sell means an authority to conclude a sale; authorizing him to find a purchaser means less than that-it means to find a man willing to become a purchaser, not to find him and also make him a purchaser.\"\n\nIn Saunders v. Dence('), Field J. distinguished Hamer v. Sharp('), saying that 'all th&t Hall, V.C., in that case decided, as I understand it, was that if you go to an estate agent, and tell him you have a property to sell, and that you want a purchaser, and you tell him what you have made up your mind shall be the price, and to a certain extent what shall be the conditions, and you instruct him to try and find a purchaser, that is not sufficient, under those circumstances, to authorize the agent to make a contract without any conditions whatever with regard to the title'.\n\nI have been unable to find any case in which it has been held 'that.Jnstructions given by A.B. to sell for him his house, and an agreement to pay so much on the purchase price accepted, are not an authority to make a binding contract, including an au.thority to sign an agreement.\n\nIn my opinion, on the terms of the instrument in this case and in view of the relevant evidence the correct conclusion to draw is that the agent had authority to enter into a binding contract with the purchaser and that he did and is therefore entitled to succeed in the case.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to Wragg v. Lovett('), where Lord Greene, M.R., put the proposition in these words:-\n\n\" Whether or not the . agents were authorized (or, what in law is the same thing, reasonably understood\n\n(ll 11900) 2 Ch. 267.\n\n(2) 62 L.T. G4'1.\n\n(8) 19 E:i 108.\n\n!') [19•SJ 2 A.E.R. 969.\n\nthemselves to be authorized) to make this particular contract\",\n\nand it was held that the proper inference from all the facts of the case was that the defendant was satisfied to allow his agents to make whatever contract they thought best and relied on them to protect his interests provided, and provided only, that they obtained the desired statement from the plaintiff as to his intention to remain in the house. The answer to the question depends on the facts of each individual case and though authority to make a binding contract has not to be lightly inferred from vague or ambiguous lnguage but from substantial grounds, that however does not mean that in express words it should be stated that the agent is authorized to sell the property.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in the judgment under appeal observed that \"the agent had undertaken to negotiate a sale and secure a buyer. He could not be said to have either secured a buyer or negotiated a sale unless a sale actually took place or at least a contract of sale had been entered into\". If that is the correct construction of the note, then in my judgment, the true implication of the note is that the agent was authorized to enter into a bin'ding contract, because othewise he could not have secured a buyer. Later on, the learned Chief Justice while referring to the case.of Rosenbaum\n\nv. Belson(1), took the view that authorizing a man to sell meant an authority to conclude a sale and authorizing a man to find a puchaser meant less than that. It meant finding a man willing to become a purchaser, not to find him and also make him a purchaser. If that was the duty entrusted to the agent, then he had clearly performed his duty and was entitled to his commission.\n\nFor the reasons gi\\; en above I am o\"fthe opinion that the plaintiff had authority to enter into a binding contract on behalf of the defendant and he entered into such a contract and thereby earned the C61,!; lmission which he has claimed in the suit and he is entitled to a\n\n(1) [1900] 2 Ch. 267. 8\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAui111£ n,/ru /(i,')se.i Mitter.\n\nMahaja11 J.\n\n1911()\n\nAbdulla Aluned\n\n•• Animendf'a I( i.-rsen Mittr.\n\nMahajan}.\n\ndecree in the sum of Rs. 6,000 which the trial Judge hadgiven to him, with all costs throughout.\n\nConceding for the sake of argument that the construction that I have placed on the agreement entered into between the principal and the agent is not the correct one, the question arises whether in that event the decision under appeal can be maintained. I am inclined to the opinion that even on the construction placed by the trial Judge on the commission note the view taken by him was the correct one and the court of appeal arrived at a wrong conclusion by giving too much importance to certain obiter observations of Lord Russ(lll of Killowen and Lord Romer in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Gooper(1). In this very case it was pointed out by Viscount Simon L. C. that there were at least three different classes of cases in which the question of a right to commission could arise. He states the first of them in these terms:-\n\n\"There is the class in which the agent is promised a commission by his principal if he succeeds in introduc ing to his principal a person who makes an adequate\n\n' .\n\noffer, usually an offer of not less than the stipulated - amount. If that is all that is needed in order to earn his reward, it is obvious that he is entitled to be paid when this has been done, whether this principal accepts the offer and carries through the bargain or not. No implied term is needed to secure this result.\"\n\nIn my opinion, the present case falls within this class of case and commission became payable on the introduction of a willing buyer by the agent to the principal.\n\nIn Burchell v. Gowrie & Blockhouse Collieries Ltd. (1) it was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Coun cil that if an agent brings a person into relation with his principal as an intending purchaser, the agent has done the most effective, and possibly, the most labo rious and expensive, part of his work, and that if the principal takes advantage of that work, and, behind the back of the agent and unknown to him, sells to the purchaser thus brought into touch with him on terms\n\n(1) [19'1] A.C. 108. l~) (1910] A.C. 614.\n\nwhich the a.gent theretofore advised the principal not to accept, the agent's act may still well be the effective cause of the sale and that there can be no real difference between such a case and those cases where the principal sells to the purchaser intr@duced by the agent at a price below the limit given -to the agent.\n\nIn ln¢h/Jald v. Western Neilgherry Coffee etc.' Oo.(1) Willes J,. thus lays down the rule of law applicable to SUGh cases : -\n\n. -- u I apprehend that wherever money is to be paid by oue man to another upon a. given event, the party upon whom is cast the obligation to pay, is liable to the party who is to receive the money if he does any act which prevents or makes it less probable that he should receive it.\"\n\nThe rule has been stated by Story on Agency at page 404 in the following terms :-\n\n\"The general rule of law, as to commissions, undoubtedly is, that the whole service or duty must be performed, before the right to any commissions attaches, either ordinary or extraordinary ; for an agent must complete the thing required of him, before he is entitled to charge for it. In the case of brokers employed to sell real estate, it is well settled that they are entitled to their commission when they have found a. purchaser, even though the negotiations are conducted and concluded by the principal himself; and also where there is a failure to complete the sale in consequence of a defect in title and no fault on the part of the brokers.\"\n\nIn my judgment therefore, Gentle J. was right when he held on the interpretation placed by him on the document that the plaintiff had earned his commission in full iµasmuch as be had secured a buyer who was ready, able and willing to buy the property fol'. Rs. 1,10,000.\n\nAs l have indicated above, if the word \"buyer\" is to be construed in a strict sense, then it must be .held that the broker had authority to secure a buyer of that type an~ he could only do so by making a binding\n\n(1) 17 O.B. (N.B.) 788.\n\n1915()\n\nAbdulla Ahmul\n\nA.nime•ldra K isseu Jlfittcr.\n\nMahajati J.\n\n1911()\n\nAb:lulla AJ11ned\n\nAfiintendra Ki.ssen ,\\fitter.\n\ncontract with him. On the other hand, if the word is taken to mean a potential buyer, such a buyer having been secured, the agent was entitled to the commission that had been promised to him.\n\nIt is now convenient to consider the case of Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper(') in some detail because certain observations made by Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer are the basis of the decision of the learned Chief Justice. In this case no commission note was addressed to the broker and the contract was not contained in any document. Evidence in support of the commission agreement was oral and its terms had to be deduced from that evidence. Viscount Simon L. C., out of the materials from which express contract had to be pieced together, reached the result that the bargain was this:\n\n\"If a party introduced by the respondent should buy the cinemas for at least £1,85,000, each of the two appellants would pay to the respondent £5,000 on the completion of the sale.\"\n\nNo such sale took place, and in those circumstances it was hel~ that there could be nothing due to the respondent on the terms of the express bargain. It was then argued that since the proposed purchasers introduced by the respondent were and remained willing and able to buy the properties for the minimum price, while the appellants did not close with the offer, the appellants were . liable in damages to the respondent for breach of an implied term of the commission contract. In the statement of claim the implied term was said to be that the appellants would \"do nothing to prevent the satisfactory completion of the transaction so as to deprive the respondent of the agreed commission.\" The breach pleaded was the failure to complete the contract of sale with th\\) respondent's client and the disposal of the subject-matter in another quarter. The Lord Chancellor was of the opinion that the suggested implied term was not necessary in this contract and it was observed that in contracts made with commission agents there was no justification for introducing a.11 implied term unless it was necessary to\n\n(1) [19U] A.C .. 108,\n\ndo so for the purpose of giving to the contract th'.e business effect which both parties to it intended it should have.\n\nLord Russell of Killowen in his opinion said that the only right of the plaintiff was to receive his commissi_on out of the purchase moneys if and when received. His right was a purely contingent right. He stood to earn a very large sum at comparatively small pains, taking the risk of either side withdrawing from the negotiations before any binding contract of sale and purchase was concluded, or of the contract for any reason not being carried to completion. In this view of the case the action was bound to fail and no occasion arose for pronouncing on the correctness or otherwise of the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Trollope & Sonav.\n\nMartyn Brothera(1).\n\nThen it was said that as the question of these commission contracts was discussed at great length, that furnished an excuse for stating briefly conclusions which his Lordship's mind, free as it was from the fetter of previous decisions, reached. In dealing with the subject the following observations were made:-\n\n\"I can find no safe ground on which to base the introduction of any such implied term. Implied terms, as we all know, can only be justified under the compulsion of some necessity.\n\nNo such compulsion or necessity exists in the case under consideration.\n\nThe agent is promised a commission if he introduces a purchaser at a specified or minimum price. The owner is desirous of selling. The chances are largely in favour of the deal going through, if a purchaser is introduced.\n\nThe agent takes the risk in the hope of a substantial remuneration for comparatively small exertion. In the case of the plaintiff his contract was made on September 23, 1935; his client's offer was made on October 2, 1935.\n\nA sum of £10,000 (the equivalent of the remuneration of a year's work by a Lord Chancellor) for work done within a period of eight or nine days is no mean reward, and is one well worth a risk. There is no lack of business efficacy in such a contract, even\n\n(1) [1984] 2 K.B. 486.\n\n1911tl\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimendra\n\nKissn Mitter.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAb4uUo Ah-tl ..,, Atlimnsdra Kis&m Jl; Uer.\n\nM aloaj\"\" J.\n\nthough the principal is free to refuse to sell to the agent's client.\n\nThe position will no doubt be different if the matter has proceeded to the stage of a binding contract having been made between the principal and the agent's client. In that case it can be said with truth that a 'purchaser' has been introduced by the agent; in other words, the event has happened upon the occurrence of which a right to the promised commission has become vested in the agent. From that moment no act or omission by the principal can deprive the agent of that vested right.\"\n\nIt is the observations last quoted which are the basis of the decision of the learned Chief Justice in the pre- -sent case. It seems to me that these observations had reference to cases visua.Jized by Lord Russell ofKillowen in the earlier part of this quotation with specific reference to the facts found in that case and cannot apply to all cases where the word ' purchaser' or 'buyer' has been loosely used in a different context.\n\nLord Romer in his opinion made the following obser vations :-\n\n\"But supposing that a contract by one person to pay another a sum of money in the event of the latter performing an unsolicited service. t6 the former is as\n\nmuch subject to an implied condition as if the latter had been employed to perform the srvice, the condition is in general one that merely imposes on the former a negative and not a positive obligation. If I employ a man for reward to build a house on my land I subject myself to an implied condition that I will do nothing to prevent him carrying out the work. But I am under no implied obligation to help him earn the reward whether by the supply of building materi11ols or otherwise. But there are exceptional cases where in a contract of employment the employer is under a positive obligation. If, for instance, I employ an artist to paint my portrait I subject myself to the positive obligation of giving him the requisite sittings.\n\nThe question, then, to be dermined upon the hypothesis that I mentioned just now is .this : Where an owner of\n\nproperty employs an agent to find a purchaser, which must mean at least a person who enters into a binding contract to purchase, is it an implied term of the contract of agency that, after the agent has introduced a person who is ready, willing and able to purchase at a price assented to by the principal, the principal shall enter into a contract with that person to sell at the agreed price subject only to the qualification that he may refuse to do so if he has just cause or reasonable excuse for his refusal ? This qualification must plainly be added, for the respondent does not contend, and no one could successfully contend, that the obligation of the principal to enter into a contract is an unconditional one.\"\n\nThe learned Chief Justice relying on the last part of the above quotation reached the conclusion that in the present case as the duty of the agent was to secure a purchaser, it could not be held that the purchaser had been secured till the contract of sale was concluded by the vendor with him and that the actual sale having been concluded for a sum of Rs. 1,05,000, the plaintiff ~9uld only get his remuneration on the basis of the price for which the sale was made and not on the basis of the offer the plaintiff had secured. It seems to me that when Lord Romer was laying down that a purchaser in such contracts means at least a person who enters into a binding contrct to purchase, he had in mind the contract with which he was dealing in that case ..\n\nI am free to think that Lord Romer had not in mind commission notes herein the word \"buyer\" or \"purchaser\" had been employed in a loose sense.\n\nIn Jones v. Lowe(1), wherein the instrument was in these terms-\n\n\"In the event of my introducing a purchaser, I shall look to you for the payment of the usual commission in accordance with the scale fixed by the Auctioneers and Estate Agents Institute'', Hilbery J. said that hadhebeenfreeofauthority, he should have thought that there were strong grounds for saying that what every owner of a house who desired to\n\n11) [19, ll] 1 K.B. 78.\n\n19&0\n\nAbdulla Ahmeil\n\nAnimenilra l(issen MUler.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAbdulla Ahmed v.\n\nAnlntendra Kiuen Mitter.\n\nMahajan].\n\nsell it expected a house agent to do, was to bring the property fairly to the notice of persons who resorted to him for houses and endeavour to persuade one of them to buy it. The learned Judge further observed as follows:-\n\n\"If the agent introduces someone who is perfectly willing to go through with the purchase at a price which will satisfy the vendor, it would seem that the agent has done everything that the parties contemplate that he should do, for they do not contemplate that 'the agent should have anything to do with the actual completion of the transaction. He is to find a person who will pay the price which is asked for the property, and the contract is entered into on the basis that the person so found will be the person to whom the owner of the property will sell.\n\nIt seems to me hard, if an agent has done to the full extent what the parties contemplated that he should do, that he should not be entitled to say 'I have done what I contracted to do because I have introduced someone willing to purchase although he never, in fact. became the actual purchaser'. I do not feel, however, that it is open to.me to put thp.t construction on the words of the contract in the present case because I think that the observations made in the House of Lords, and particularly those of Lord Russell ofKillowen and Lord Romer in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper('), ahow that they were clearly of opinion that if an agent is employed to introduce a purchaser for a house and before the purchaser has entered into a binding and legal contract, the house is withdrawn from the market, the agent cannot say that he has earned his commission.\"\n\nIn a later case, E. H. Bennett v. Millet('), the same learned Judge had to deal with a case where the contract was in these terms :-\n\n\"We confirm that in the event of our introducing a purchaser who is able and willing to complete the transaction, our commission will be in accordance with the recognized scale .... \".\n\nThe plaintiffs introduced a prospective purchaser, whom the court found to have been at all times able\n\n(l) [19U] A.C. 108,\n\n12) (19<8) 2 All E.R. 929,\n\nand willing to purchase, but the defendant refused to complete. It was argued by the defendant that the qualification of the word \"purchaser\" in the plaintiffs' letter was otiose and therefore should be struck out and the plaintiffs had not performed the contract until they had introduced a person who actually completed the purchase, It was held that the expression \"a purchaer who is able and willing to complete the transaction\"\n\nmeant not a person who did, in fact, ultimately purchase the property, but one who was prepared to purchase it at the seller's price, and, as the estate agents had found suQh a person, they were entitled to their commission. The learned Judge further stated that in ordinary parlance we do not use the word \"purchaser\" as necessarily restricted to a person who actually completes a transaction of purchase and sale.\n\nIn my judgment, therefore, on the alternative interpretation which has been placed by the two courts below on the commission note the word \"purchaser\" cannot be read in the strict sense in which it was read in Luxor's case (1), but should be read in the sense in which it is loosely used in common parlance, and that being so, the decision under appeal cannot be sustained.\n\nl\\Ir. Setalvad cited a number of Indian authorities where the words \"buyer\" and \"purchaser\" had not been given the strict meaning that had been given in Luxor' s case (1).\n\nSimilarly, the words \"lender\" and \"borrower\" had been given the meaning of \"potential lender\" and \"potential borrower\". It is, however, unnecessary to enter into a discussion of all those cases as it does not in any way advance the matter beyond what I have already said. It is unnecessary to go into the third contention of Mr. Setalvad in view of the above decision.\n\nFor the reasons given above I agree with the conclusion reached by my brother, Patanjali Sastri, in the judgment just delivered by him, that the appeal be allowed with costs throughout.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Agent for the respondent:\n\n(1) [1941] A.O. 108.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nS. P. Varma.\n\nSukurnar Gho8e.\n\n19!50\n\nAbduJla Ahtned\n\nAni11iettclra Kissen Mitter.\n\nMahaja11 J.", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "ABDULLA AHMED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANIMENDRA KISSEN MITTER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID F AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Patanja.li Sastri", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS .J.T.-(i) that a house or estate agent is in a different position from a hroker at the Stock Exchange owing to the peculiarities or the p1operty with which he has to deal, and an owner employing an estate agent should not, in the absence of clear words to that effect, be taken to have authorised him to conclude a contract or\n\nsale; but the lack of such authority is not inconsistent with an understanding that the agent is .", "canonical_name": "Kania C."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2187, "end_char": 2195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS .J.T.-(i) that a house or estate agent is in a different position from a hroker at the Stock Exchange owing to the peculiarities or the p1operty with which he has to deal, and an owner employing an estate agent should not, in the absence of clear words to that effect, be taken to have authorised him to conclude a contract or\n\nsale; but the lack of such authority is not inconsistent with an understanding that the agent is .", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Animendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3087, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,10,000, Animendra acquired."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3586, "end_char": 3593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-Under the terms of the commission note in the present case the appellant had authority to enter into a binding contract on behalf of the defendant, and, as he had entered i. into such a contract he was entitled to the commission of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Mahajati"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4442, "end_char": 4478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Harries C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) dated 5th January 1948 which varied a judgment passed by a single Judge l sftting_m the Original Side of the same High Court\n\n(Gentle J:) dated 11th June, 1945.", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) dated 5th January 1948 which varied a judgment passed by a single Judge l sftting_m the Original Side of the same High Court\n\n(Gentle J:) dated 11th June, 1945."}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4898, "end_char": 4912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4914, "end_char": 4923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad (A. K. Sen with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5025, "end_char": 5033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C. J., and Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Kania C."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C. J., and Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.,", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C. J., and Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Patanja.li Sastri"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C. J., and Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Patanja.li Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5099, "end_char": 5116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Patanja.li Sastri J.: Mahajan J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "Patanja.li Sastri"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5121, "end_char": 5128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Patanja.li Sastri J.: Mahajan J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "Mahajati"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSastri J,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal dated 5th January, 1948, which varied a judgment and decree passed by a single Judge on 11th June, 1945, on the Original Side of the same Court."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5334, "end_char": 5389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSastri J,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal dated 5th January, 1948, which varied a judgment and decree passed by a single Judge on 11th June, 1945, on the Original Side of the same Court."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th<> appellant who is carrying on business as an estate broker in Calcutta was employed by the respondent on the terms mentioned in a commission letter dated the 5th May, 194-3, to \"negotiate the sale\" of premises No."}}, {"text": "5th May, 194-3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th<> appellant who is carrying on business as an estate broker in Calcutta was employed by the respondent on the terms mentioned in a commission letter dated the 5th May, 194-3, to \"negotiate the sale\" of premises No."}}, {"text": "2nd June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5976, "end_char": 5990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l,10,000, and by letters ex<lhanged with them on 2nd June, 1943, he purported to eoncl ude a con tract for the sale of the property and communicated the same to the respondent by a letter of even date."}}, {"text": "!lth .Tune, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, however, entered into an agreement on !"}}, {"text": "8th December, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l,05,000 and eventually executed a conveyance in their favour on 8th December, 1943."}}, {"text": "2nd .June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I , I0,000 on the 2nd .June, 1943, was binding on the respondent and claimed that he was entitled to the payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd , June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7465, "end_char": 7481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nGentle J. who tried the suit found that the terms of the appellant's employment did not authorise him to conclude a contract of sale and that the letters of 2nd , June, 1943, did not effect a contract of sale binding on the respondent."}}, {"text": "9th June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7875, "end_char": 7889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge, however, rejected the respondent's case that the purchasers refused to purchase on the ground of any fraudulent misrepresentation by the appellant and that the negotiations were later resumed afresh directly between the respondent and the purchasers, and came to the conclusion that the agreement to sell of the 9th June, 1943, and the subsequent conveyance of 8th December, 1943, were due solely to the efforts of the appellant in bringing the parties together as potential buyers and seller."}}, {"text": "HarriesC.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8670, "end_char": 8681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench (HarriesC.J. and Mukherjea J.) which heard the appeal of the respondent, agreed with the trial Judge that the appellant's authority did not extend to the concluding of a binding contract for sale of the property, but differed from his view that all that the appellant was required to do was to introduce a purchaser who was ready and willing to buy for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9191, "end_char": 9198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They held, following certain observations of Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer in the case next mentioned, that the appellant, having undertaken to \"negotiate .the sale\" and to \"secure a buyer'', - could not be said to have either secured a buyer or negotiated the sale \"unless the sale actually took place or at least a contract had been entered into\".", "canonical_name": "Russell"}}, {"text": "Killowen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9202, "end_char": 9210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They held, following certain observations of Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer in the case next mentioned, that the appellant, having undertaken to \"negotiate .the sale\" and to \"secure a buyer'', - could not be said to have either secured a buyer or negotiated the sale \"unless the sale actually took place or at least a contract had been entered into\"."}}, {"text": "Romer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9220, "end_char": 9225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They held, following certain observations of Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer in the case next mentioned, that the appellant, having undertaken to \"negotiate .the sale\" and to \"secure a buyer'', - could not be said to have either secured a buyer or negotiated the sale \"unless the sale actually took place or at least a contract had been entered into\"."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10104, "end_char": 10111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As.to why the respondent accepted a reduced P, rice, Harries C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observlld: \"All\n\nthat is known is that persons who undoubtedly ma.de a firm offer of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13378, "end_char": 13386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated already, the first of these interpretations was rejected by the learned trial Judge as well as by the Appellate Bench, but it was pressed upon us by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the appelant."}}, {"text": "Kekewich", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14494, "end_char": 14502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Kekewich J. in Chadburn v.\n\nMoore(') a house or estate agent is in a differeu t position from a broker at the stock exchange owing to the peculiarities of the property with which he is to deal which does not pass by a short instrument as stocks and shares do but has to be transferred after investigation of title as to which various special stipulations, which might be of particular concern to the owner, may have to be inserted in a concluded contract relating to such property."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15152, "end_char": 15159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why it has been held, both in England and here, that authority given to a broker to negotiate a sale and find a pnrchaser, without furnishing him with all the terms, means \"to find a man willing to become a purchaser and not to find him and make him a purchaser\": see Rosenbaum v. Belson(') and Ditrya Charan 11!/itra v. Rajendra Narayan Sinha(')."}}, {"text": "Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18802, "end_char": 18807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Simon put it \" The agent is promised a reward in return for an event and the event has not happened\".", "canonical_name": "Simpson"}}, {"text": "Killowen", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19133, "end_char": 19141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Lord Russell of Killowen in the same case, \"where a contract is concluded with the purchaser, the event has happened upon the occurrence of which a right to the promised commission has become vested in the agent."}}, {"text": "Animendra Kissen Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21209, "end_char": 21232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Animendra Kissen Mitter, resides in No.", "canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter"}}, {"text": "5th May, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21668, "end_char": 21681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated 5th May, 1943, the appellant was employed by the respondent for arranging a sale of the premises above mentioned."}}, {"text": "5th May 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22717, "end_char": 22729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As recited in the letter, the authority given to the appellant was to remain in force for one month from 5th May 1943."}}, {"text": "2nd June 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22798, "end_char": 22811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three days before the termination of the appellant's authority, on 2nd June 1943 the plaintiffappellant obtained an offer from two persons, namely,\n\nAbd,.lla Ahmed v.\n\nAnimendra Kissen Mitter."}}, {"text": "Kishorilal Mahawar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22994, "end_char": 23012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan j.\n\nKishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor, for the purchase of the premises regarding which the plaintiff had been authorized to arrange a sale.", "canonical_name": "Kishorilal Mahawar"}}, {"text": "Ramkumar Mahor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23017, "end_char": 23031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan j.\n\nKishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor, for the purchase of the premises regarding which the plaintiff had been authorized to arrange a sale.", "canonical_name": "Ram KumarMahorof"}}, {"text": "A. K. Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23387, "end_char": 23399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hereby authorize you to accept the offer for sale of the above permises from Mr. A. K. Mitter for Rs.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Mitter"}}, {"text": "A. K. Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23476, "end_char": 23488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,10,000 on our behalf and send the confirma.tion to the vendor Mr. A. K. Mitter on our behalf.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Mitter"}}, {"text": "Ram KumarMahorof", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24049, "end_char": 24065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously with the issue of this letter he gave intimation of this contract to the respondent in the following terms :-\n\n\" Under the authority given to me by you I made an offer for the sale of the above premises to Messrs.\n\nKishorilal Maha war and Ram KumarMahorof No.27, Amratolla Street, Calcutta, for rupees on lakh and ten thousand only and they have accepted the offer and they have authorized me to send a confirmation to you of the said offer.", "canonical_name": "Ram KumarMahorof"}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal Maha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24479, "end_char": 24495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the letter of Messrs. Kishori Lal Maha war and Ram Kumar l\\Iahor accepting your offer is enclosed herewith.\"", "canonical_name": "Kishorilal Mahawar"}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24504, "end_char": 24513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the letter of Messrs. Kishori Lal Maha war and Ram Kumar l\\Iahor accepting your offer is enclosed herewith.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram KumarMahorof"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24596, "end_char": 24602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lettel', Was received by Mitter on 3rd June 1943, two days bo'fore the termination of the plaintiff's authority."}}, {"text": "3rd June 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24606, "end_char": 24619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lettel', Was received by Mitter on 3rd June 1943, two days bo'fore the termination of the plaintiff's authority."}}, {"text": "3rd June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25113, "end_char": 25127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd June, 1943, the solicitor for the purchasers wrote to the solicitor for the agent that as the offer of his client for the purchase of 27, Amratolla Street had already been accapted and acceptance communicated to him, the title deeds should be sent so thata conveyance may be prepared."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Alimed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27053, "end_char": 27067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th June the date of the alleged\n\n19li0\n\nAbdulla Alimed\n\nAnimendra Kissen Milter.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "Animendra Kissen Milter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27069, "end_char": 27092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th June the date of the alleged\n\n19li0\n\nAbdulla Alimed\n\nAnimendra Kissen Milter.", "canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter"}}, {"text": "Animendra K issen Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27122, "end_char": 27146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nAbdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter.", "canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter"}}, {"text": "Animendra Kissen Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27236, "end_char": 27259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan/.\n\ncancellation of the bargain already made, an agreement was executed between Animendra Kissen Mitter, the vendor, and Makkanlal, a benamidar of Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor (the purchasers) for sale of the premises for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter"}}, {"text": "Makkanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27277, "end_char": 27286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan/.\n\ncancellation of the bargain already made, an agreement was executed between Animendra Kissen Mitter, the vendor, and Makkanlal, a benamidar of Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor (the purchasers) for sale of the premises for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kishorilal Mahawar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27303, "end_char": 27321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan/.\n\ncancellation of the bargain already made, an agreement was executed between Animendra Kissen Mitter, the vendor, and Makkanlal, a benamidar of Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor (the purchasers) for sale of the premises for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Kishorilal Mahawar"}}, {"text": "Ramkumar Mahor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27326, "end_char": 27340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan/.\n\ncancellation of the bargain already made, an agreement was executed between Animendra Kissen Mitter, the vendor, and Makkanlal, a benamidar of Kishorilal Mahawar and Ramkumar Mahor (the purchasers) for sale of the premises for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ram KumarMahorof"}}, {"text": "14th August, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28201, "end_char": 28218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14th August, 1943, the appellant filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd and 3rd June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29097, "end_char": 29119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that the appellant I.ad no authorit.y to conclude a contract of sale and no binding contract of sale was made on 2nd and 3rd June, 1943, that the transaction effected nominally in the name of Makkanlal and completed on 8th December, 1943, in favour of Kishorilal Mahawar and Rarnkumar Mahor, was effected solely through the intervention of the appellant who brought\n\n.. •\n\nthe parties together in the capacity at least of a potential buyer and seller, that the reduction of the price by Rs."}}, {"text": "Rarnkumar Mahor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29259, "end_char": 29274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that the appellant I.ad no authorit.y to conclude a contract of sale and no binding contract of sale was made on 2nd and 3rd June, 1943, that the transaction effected nominally in the name of Makkanlal and completed on 8th December, 1943, in favour of Kishorilal Mahawar and Rarnkumar Mahor, was effected solely through the intervention of the appellant who brought\n\n.. •\n\nthe parties together in the capacity at least of a potential buyer and seller, that the reduction of the price by Rs."}}, {"text": "Mahaj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31552, "end_char": 31557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaj\"\" J.\n\n for the sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Mahajati"}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32353, "end_char": 32367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor, in Luxor (Eastbourne), Ltd.\n\nv. Cooper('), contracts with commission agents do not follow a single pattern and the primary necessity in each instance is to ascertain with precision what are the express terms of the particular contraut under discussion.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simon L. C."}}, {"text": "Gentle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34778, "end_char": 34784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gentle J. observed that the word \"securing\" here had the meaning of \"obtaining a. buyer\"."}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36915, "end_char": 36929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subsequent conduct of both the parties to the agreement very strngly supports this view The evidence of such conduct is relevant in this case because, as pointed out by Viscount Simon, L. C., in the case already referred to, the phrase \"finding a purchaser\" is itself not without ambiguity.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simon L. C."}}, {"text": "Kishoribabu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40043, "end_char": 40054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also admitted that he took no objection to the letter written by the broker before Kishoribabu had told him the story about the commission of two per cent."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Al1mcd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40490, "end_char": 40504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite clear from his deposition that the respondent accepted the contract made by the a.gent and was clearly under the\n\n19!50\n\nAbdulla Al1mcd\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter,\n\nMaha jail j.\n\n\\, 1950\n\n.Ablulla Ahmtid\n\nv. .AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "Animendra K issen Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40506, "end_char": 40530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite clear from his deposition that the respondent accepted the contract made by the a.gent and was clearly under the\n\n19!50\n\nAbdulla Al1mcd\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter,\n\nMaha jail j.\n\n\\, 1950\n\n.Ablulla Ahmtid\n\nv. .AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter.", "canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter"}}, {"text": ".Ablulla Ahmtid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40556, "end_char": 40571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite clear from his deposition that the respondent accepted the contract made by the a.gent and was clearly under the\n\n19!50\n\nAbdulla Al1mcd\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter,\n\nMaha jail j.\n\n\\, 1950\n\n.Ablulla Ahmtid\n\nv. .AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter."}}, {"text": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40576, "end_char": 40601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite clear from his deposition that the respondent accepted the contract made by the a.gent and was clearly under the\n\n19!50\n\nAbdulla Al1mcd\n\nAnimendra K issen Mitter,\n\nMaha jail j.\n\n\\, 1950\n\n.Ablulla Ahmtid\n\nv. .AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter.", "canonical_name": ".AnimenJ,.a Kissen Milter"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41148, "end_char": 41167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned single Judge and the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal found otherwise on this part of the case in view ot certain decisions of English Courts and a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Kissen Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42987, "end_char": 43000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering whether the instructions - Animendra of October, 1872, were a sufficient authority to the agent Kissen Mitter."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44863, "end_char": 44876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdulla Ahmed\n\nAnimt!ndra\n\nKissn Mitter.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45505, "end_char": 45511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case an advertisement appeared in the Daily Telegraph in these words:-\n\n\" Forced sale by order of the niortgagees-thirtyfour well built houses, situated at Grays, closa to the station on the London, Tilbury, and '<ISouthend Railway, within easy reach of the docks, all let to respectable tenants at rents amounting to £ 620 per annum."}}, {"text": "Tilbury", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45513, "end_char": 45520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case an advertisement appeared in the Daily Telegraph in these words:-\n\n\" Forced sale by order of the niortgagees-thirtyfour well built houses, situated at Grays, closa to the station on the London, Tilbury, and '<ISouthend Railway, within easy reach of the docks, all let to respectable tenants at rents amounting to £ 620 per annum."}}, {"text": "Pinder", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45811, "end_char": 45817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For further particulars apply to Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, 33 and 34, Savilerow, London, W.\"\n\nIn response to this advertisement the plaintiff in that case, James Chadburn, called on Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, a firm of surveyors and estate agents, for further information."}}, {"text": "Simpson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45819, "end_char": 45826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For further particulars apply to Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, 33 and 34, Savilerow, London, W.\"\n\nIn response to this advertisement the plaintiff in that case, James Chadburn, called on Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, a firm of surveyors and estate agents, for further information.", "canonical_name": "Simpson"}}, {"text": "Newman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45831, "end_char": 45837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For further particulars apply to Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, 33 and 34, Savilerow, London, W.\"\n\nIn response to this advertisement the plaintiff in that case, James Chadburn, called on Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, a firm of surveyors and estate agents, for further information."}}, {"text": "James Chadburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45936, "end_char": 45950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For further particulars apply to Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, 33 and 34, Savilerow, London, W.\"\n\nIn response to this advertisement the plaintiff in that case, James Chadburn, called on Messrs. Pinder, Simpson and Newman, a firm of surveyors and estate agents, for further information."}}, {"text": "Moore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47711, "end_char": 47716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It might be that a different colour would be put upon the matter by the cross-examination of Mr. Moore, but this was not done, and he is entitJed to have judgment upon the point of law."}}, {"text": "Ahdulla Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48894, "end_char": 48907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ahdulla Ahmed\n\nA11i1ncndra Ii issen Mitter.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "Martin and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51217, "end_char": 51231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these terms:- \"I hereby authorize you to negotiate the sale of the lands at Tolligunge I have recently purchased from Messrs. Martin and Co. If you can secure a purchaser to purchase the same at the gross value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Asutosh Mookerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51939, "end_char": 51956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Asutosh Mookerjee who delivered the judgment of the Bench referred to the cases of Hamer v.\n\nSharp (1), Prior v. Moore (2), Chadburn v. Moore (3), and also Rosenbaum v. Bel8on ('), and observed that it was well settled that an estate or house-agent, authorized to procure a purchaser, has no implied authority to enter into an open contract of sale, because the transaction mentioned is as specified in the letter, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Abdulla Altmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53274, "end_char": 53288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mt1ht1jt1t1 J.\n\n19ll0\n\nAbdulla Altmed\n\nAnimendra l\\\"issen Mitter.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55144, "end_char": 55150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference in this connection may be made to Wragg v. Lovett('), where Lord Greene, M.R., put the proposition in these words:-\n\n\" Whether or not the ."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Aluned", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57487, "end_char": 57501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaja11 J.\n\n1911()\n\nAbdulla Aluned\n\n•• Animendf'a I( i.-rsen Mittr.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon L. C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58288, "end_char": 58308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this very case it was pointed out by Viscount Simon L. C. that there were at least three different classes of cases in which the question of a right to commission could arise.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simon L. C."}}, {"text": "Willes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60041, "end_char": 60047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oo.(1) Willes J,."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Ahmul", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61654, "end_char": 61667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1915()\n\nAbdulla Ahmul\n\nA.nime•ldra K isseu Jlfittcr.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}, {"text": "Mahajati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61700, "end_char": 61708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajati J.\n\n1911()\n\nAb:lulla AJ11ned\n\nAfiintendra Ki.ssen ,\\fitter.", "canonical_name": "Mahajati"}}, {"text": "Afiintendra Ki.ssen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61739, "end_char": 61758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajati J.\n\n1911()\n\nAb:lulla AJ11ned\n\nAfiintendra Ki.ssen ,\\fitter."}}, {"text": "Russell of Killowen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 62102, "end_char": 62121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is now convenient to consider the case of Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper(') in some detail because certain observations made by Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Romer are the basis of the decision of the learned Chief Justice.", "canonical_name": "Russell of Killowen"}}, {"text": "Russell of Killowen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 64007, "end_char": 64026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Russell of Killowen in his opinion said that the only right of the plaintiff was to receive his commissi_on out of the purchase moneys if and when received.", "canonical_name": "Russell of Killowen"}}, {"text": "Trollope", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64637, "end_char": 64645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the case the action was bound to fail and no occasion arose for pronouncing on the correctness or otherwise of the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Trollope & Sonav."}}, {"text": "Sonav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64648, "end_char": 64653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the case the action was bound to fail and no occasion arose for pronouncing on the correctness or otherwise of the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Trollope & Sonav."}}, {"text": "Martyn Brothera(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64656, "end_char": 64673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Martyn Brothera(1)."}}, {"text": "September 23, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65623, "end_char": 65641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the plaintiff his contract was made on September 23, 1935; his client's offer was made on October 2, 1935."}}, {"text": "October 2, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65674, "end_char": 65689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the plaintiff his contract was made on September 23, 1935; his client's offer was made on October 2, 1935."}}, {"text": "Russell ofKillowen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 66862, "end_char": 66880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jized by Lord Russell ofKillowen in the earlier part of this quotation with specific reference to the facts found in that case and cannot apply to all cases where the word ' purchaser' or 'buyer' has been loosely used in a different context.", "canonical_name": "Russell of Killowen"}}, {"text": "Hilbery", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70042, "end_char": 70049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jones v. Lowe(1), wherein the instrument was in these terms-\n\n\"In the event of my introducing a purchaser, I shall look to you for the payment of the usual commission in accordance with the scale fixed by the Auctioneers and Estate Agents Institute'', Hilbery J. said that hadhebeenfreeofauthority, he should have thought that there were strong grounds for saying that what every owner of a house who desired to\n\n11) [19, ll] 1 K.B. 78."}}, {"text": "Abdulla Ahmeil\n\nAnimenilra l(issen MUler", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 70234, "end_char": 70274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19&0\n\nAbdulla Ahmeil\n\nAnimenilra l(issen MUler."}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71646, "end_char": 71653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not feel, however, that it is open to.me to put thp.t construction on the words of the contract in the present case because I think that the observations made in the House of Lords, and particularly those of Lord Russell ofKillowen and Lord Romer in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper('), ahow that they were clearly of opinion that if an agent is employed to introduce a purchaser for a house and before the purchaser has entered into a binding and legal contract, the house is withdrawn from the market, the agent cannot say that he has earned his commission.\"", "canonical_name": "Russell"}}, {"text": "Luxor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73530, "end_char": 73535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my judgment, therefore, on the alternative interpretation which has been placed by the two courts below on the commission note the word \"purchaser\" cannot be read in the strict sense in which it was read in Luxor's case (1), but should be read in the sense in which it is loosely used in common parlance, and that being so, the decision under appeal cannot be sustained."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74317, "end_char": 74333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons given above I agree with the conclusion reached by my brother, Patanjali Sastri, in the judgment just delivered by him, that the appeal be allowed with costs throughout.", "canonical_name": "Patanja.li Sastri"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 74516, "end_char": 74527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "AbduJla Ahtned", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 74554, "end_char": 74568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19!50\n\nAbduJla Ahtned\n\nAni11iettclra Kissen Mitter.", "canonical_name": "Abdulla Alimed"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_335_390_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 335\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY\n\nAHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA G~ SAIYID F AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.]\n\nE.vcess Prnjits Tax Act (XV of 1940), s. 5, Third Ptoviso- Indian Incom$-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 42 (8)-Article manufactttred otttside British India-Sale in British India-Whethu whole profits accriie or arise in British India-Liability to excess ptofits tax- Manufacturing operations, whether \"part of !msiness \" - Aprortionment of profits between place of mamifact11re and place of sale- Permissibility-Applicability r>f s. 42 (8}.\n\nSection 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, provided that \"the Act shall apply to awry business of which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period was chargeable to income-tax.\" There was also a proviso to the effect that \"the Act shall not apply to any business, the whoie of the profits of which accrued or arose in an Indian State and that where the profits of a part of a business aoorued or arose in an Indian State, such part shall for the purpose of this provision be deemed to be a separate business, the whole of the profits of which accrued or arose in an Indian State, and the other part of the business shall be deemed to be a separate business.\" A firm which was resident in British India and carried on the business of manufacturing and selling groundnut oil, owned some oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil was manufactured.\n\nThe oil manufac tured in Raichur was sold partly within the State of Hyderabad and partly in Bombay :\n\nHelil,. lnJ the Fitll Comt (KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.)- The expression \"part of a business\" in the provieo to section 5 does not necessarily mean a separate composite unit of all the constituent activities of the business or a complete crosssection of the entire business operations but is wide enough to mean one or more of the operations of the business, and that the manufacturing operations which the firm carried on at Raichur were \"a part of tho business\" of the assessees within the meaning of the proviso. to section 5 of the Act.\n\nHeld also pe1 K~NIA C .. J., FAZL ALI, :\\IEHH CHAND l\\LULUAN, l\\11..\"KHEHJEA and DAS J.J.-that the profits of that part of the business, namely, the manufacture of oil at the mill in Raichur accrued or arose in Haichur within the meaning of the said proviso, even though Lhe manufactured oil was sold in Bombay and the price\n\nwas received there, and accordingly, that part of the profits derived from sales in Bombay which was attributable to the manufacture of the oil in Haichur was exempt from excess profits tax nnder the proviso to section 5 of the Act.\n\n~2-A\n\n195fl\n\nMay 4\n\nCo111111issio1tcr of /Jtco1uc-tax,\n\nBo111fJay\n\nAluucdbhai U111arbhai & Co.\n\nPer P.\\TANJALI SAS TRI J.-The first part of sub-section (1) of section 42 of the Income-tax A.ct was applicable to the assessees, the expressions \"business connection in British India\" and '\"asset or source of income in British India'' being wide enough to cover their selling organisation at Bombay ; and as a xesult, the profits received in Bombay from the sale of the oil manufactured in Haichur had to be apportioned under sub-section (3) of section 42 bet\\veen the two operations of manufacture and sale, and only such portion of the profits as was attributable to the sale in Bombay should he deemed to have accrued or arisen in British India.\n\nIt followed as a corollary that the rest of the profits attributable to the 1nanufacture at Raicbur rnust he regarded as accruing or arising in the Hyderabad State and ws therefore exempt under the proviso to s. 5 of the Act.\n\nQtae9e: \\Vhether it is in consonance with business principles or prA.ctice in the absence of any statutory requirement to that effect to cut business operations arbitrarily into two or more por .. tions and to 11pportion as between the1n the pro5Js resulting frorn one continuous process ending in a sale and \\vhether Kirk's case is applicable to assessments under the Indian Acts as laying down any general principle of apportionment.\n\nPer MAHAJAN J.-Though profits may not be realised until a manufactured article is sold, profits are not wholly made by the act of sale and do not necessarity accrue a.t the place of sale a.nd to the extent profits are attributable to the manufacturing operations, profits accrue at the place where the operations are carried on.\n\nPer :i\\fUKHERJEA J.-\\Vhere raw material is worked up into a new prorluct by process of manufacture, it obviously increases in value and this increase in value represents the income or profit which is the result of the 1nanufacture, and a.s this profit accrues by rea.son of the tnanufacture it cannot but be locn.ted at the place \\Vhere the inanufacturing process is gone through. It is im1naterial that the manufactured goods are sold later on at various places.\n\nIf tho manufacturer is himself the seller, it might be that he receives the entire profits including that of the manufacture only at the tin1e of sale; but in an inchoate shape a portion of the profits does accrue at the pln.ce of manufacture, the exact a1nount of which is only n.scertrdned after the Sale takes place.\n\nFor purposes of com pntation the two parts of the business may be conceived of e.s being carried on by two different sets of persons.\n\nAPPEAL [Civil Appeal No. LXVIII of 1949] from a Judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 18th l\\Iarch 1948 (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in a Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.\n\nJYI. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (B. Sen with him) for the appellant.\n\nICM. JY!unshi (S. K. Aiyar and N. K. Gamadia with him) for the respondents.\n\n1950. )lay 4.\n\nThe Court delivered the following Judgments:-\n\nKANIA C.J .-This is an appeal from a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, under section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act.\n\nThe respondent firm, the assessees, carried on business of manufacturing and dealing in oil during the relevant accounting periods. They are a registered ' firm under the Income-tax Act and are residents in Bombay. They own three mills at Bombay and one at Raichur for manufacturing oil from groundnuts.\n\nThe oil produced at Raichur is sold partly at Raichur and partly in Bombay. Their liability to pay incometax in respect of their whole profits is not disputed under the Incom~-tax Act. The question is in respect of their liability under the Excess Profits Tax Act for the oil manufactured at Raichur, but sold in Bombay.\n\nThe assessees contend that in respect of such oil a portion of the profits earned by them is o.ttributable to theipbusiness of manufacturing oil at Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act. The taxing authorities rejected the contention of the assessees.\n\nThe Income-tax Tribunal agreed with them. On a reference the High Court disagreed with the view of the Tribunal and held that the assessees' contention was correct.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax has come in appeal from that decision. In the Excess Profits Tax Act, section 2 (5) defines \"business\" as follows :-\n\n\"'Business' includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture ..... .\n\nProvided further that all businesses to which this Act applies carried on by the same person shall be treated as one business for the purposes of this Act.\"\n\nSection 5 of the Act runs as follows :- \"5. This Act shall apply to every business of which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that subsection: Provided that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or\n\nCo1n1nissioncf' of Inconie-tax 1\n\nBombay\n\nAll11iedbhai V111arbliai & Co.\n\n:cania C. J.\n\n]950\n\nCo111111 issio1£cr of lncotne-tax,\n\nBo111bay , ..\n\nAltuzedbl1ai Umarb/iai & Co.\n\nl(ania CJ.\n\narise without British India where such business is carried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in British India unless the business is controlled in India : Provided further that where the profits of a part only of a business carried on by a person who is not resident in British India or not ordinarily so resident , accrue or arise in British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, so to accrue or arise, then except where the business being the business of a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in British India is controlled in India, this Act shall apply on! y to such part of the business, and such part shall for all the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a separate business : Provided further that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State ; and where the profits of a part of a business accrue or arise in an Indian State, such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be deemed to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and the other part of the business shall for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate. business.\"\n\nSection 21 of the Act, which was not referred to in the course of the arguments before us, runs as follows:-\n\n\" 21. The provisions of sections 4-A, 4-B, 10, 13, 24-B, 29, 36 to 44-C (inclusive), 45 to 48 (inclusive), 49-E, 49-F, 50, 54, 61 to 63 (inclusive), 65 to 67-A\n\n(inclusive) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, shall apply with such modifications, if any, as may be prescribed as if the said provisions were provisions of this Act and referred to excess profits tax instead of to income-tax, and every officer exercising powers under the said provisions in regard to income-tax may exercise the like powers under this Act in regard to excess profits tax in respect of cases assigned to him under sub.section (3) of section 3 as he exercises in relation to income-tax under the said Act : Provided that references in the said provisions to the assessee shall be construed as references to a person to whose business this Act applies.\"\n\nThe relevant portion of section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act is in these terms :-\n\n\" 42. (1) All income, profits or gains accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in - British India, or through or from any property in British India, or through or from any asset or source of income in British India, or through or from any money lent at interest and brought into British India in cash or in kind, shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising within British India, and where the person entitled to the income, profits or gains is not resident in British India, shall be chargeable to income-tax either in his name or in the name of his agent ....\n\n(2) Where a person not resident or not ordinarily resident in British India, carries on business with a person resident in British India, and it appears to the Income-tax Officer that owing to the close connection between such persons the course of business is so arranged that the business done by the resident person with the person not resident or not ordinarily resident produces to , fhe resident either no profits or less than the ordinary profits which might be expected to arise in that business, the profits derived therefrom or which may reasonably be deemed to have been derived therefrom, shall be chargeable to income-tax in the name of the resident _.Jerson who shall be deemed to be, , for all the purposes of this Act, the assessee in respect of such income-tax.\n\n(3) In the case of a business of which _all the operations are not carried out in British India, the profits and gains of the business deemed under this section to accrue or arise in British India shall.be only such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to that part of the operations carried out in British India.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it - was contended that in order to _ get exemption from the\n\nExce::s Profits Tax -Act the assessee has to show that his case is covered by section 5 proviso 3.\n\nIt \\vas argued on behalf of the appellant that in the\n\nCo111111issio11cr of /11co111c-tax,\n\nBo111l1ay\n\nAl1111cdblitri Untarb/Jai [ .. Ca.\n\nff ania C. J.\n\nCo11iu1issioner .of lnco111c-f11x,\n\nBo111!1ay\n\nAh1111dl1hai {/11tafbl1ai & Co.\n\n]{ a1tia C. J.\n\npresent case the business of the assessee consisted of manufacturing and selling oil and unless each of those operations took place at Raichur, \"a part of the business\" of the assessee was not at Raichur in the Hyderabad State and therefore he was not entitled to the exemption claimed by him. It was secondly contended that even assuming that this was not correct the profits of that part of the business, which was carried on at Raichur, did not accrue or arise in the Hyderabad State because the profits arose on the sale of the oil in Bombay and therefore the assessee's contention was incorrect.\n\nProviso 3 to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act requires the assessee to fulfil three conditions to secure the exemption. They are (I) there should be a part of a business ; (2) that must be in an Indian State ; and (3) profits in respect of which exemption is claimed must accrue or arise .from that part of the business. The appellant's contention is that the part of the business must be a complete unit or as described on his behalf a complete cross-section of the business.\n\nIt is argued that inasmuch as the sale of the oil in question took place in Bombay the cross-section composed of manufacture and sale did not take place at Raichur in the Hyderabad State and therefore the as sessee's contention must fail. In my opinion this conten~ tion is unsound. The definition of business in the Excess Profits Tax Act clearly envisages manufacture as a business by itself. It is not necessary that a manufacturer must be a trader in the commodity he manufac- tures. Similarly because he is a manufacturer and a trader it does not follow that the two activities necessarily become one indissoluble business of which the profits c:rnnot be separately ascertained. Because a man is a mannfacturer, a trader and even an exporter it is not correct to say that unless all the three activities take place in an Indian State he is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso because a part of his busi- ·\n\nness is not in the Indian State. The argument of the appellant is that there should not be only a separate composite unit of the assessee's business in an Indian State but that each operation making up the assessee's business must take place in an Indian State. I find no\n\njustification for putting such construction on proviso 3 to section 5.\n\nNo authority is cited to support such interpretation of the proviso. It is not contended in the present case that the activities of the assessee as a manufacturer are so spread out as to beincapable of being ascertained as one unit of business in an Indian State. For instance, difficulties may arise if a manufacturer buys groundnuts in one place, has a crushing mill in another place, has a refinery in the third place and packing etc. in a fourth place. .Jt is not disputed here that the assessee's activities as a manufacturer are all in Raichur and ; f so, that set of activities under the definition of \" business \" in the Excess Profits Tax Act is a complete unit. I have no doubt that on the facts of the present case the manufacturing operations of the assessee are \"a part of his business in an Indian State.'.' Those conditions of the proviso are therefore fulfilled.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was pointed out that under section 42 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act the legislature had made a provision for allocation of profits in respect of different operations of a business, but there was no such corresponding provision in the Excess Profits Tax Act. This contention overlooks section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act which expressly makes, amongst others, section 42 (3) a part of the Excess Profits Tax Act for assessing the profits of an assessee. If, therefore, profits can be allocated to the manufacture of oil in Raichur it seems to me clear that the manufacturing activity will be a part of the assessee's business in an Indian State.\n\nThe next contention of the appellant was that even if a part of the business was in an Indian State the profits accrued or arose only on the sale of the oil in Bombay and no part of the profits of manufacture therefore arose in an Indian State. In my opinion this argument is also unsound. On the sale of goods the assessee receives money. While the receipt of the price is thus in B01µbay it is an entirely different thing to say that therefore the whole profits of the manufacture and sale arose in Bombay. This argument sverlooks the distinction between accruing or arising on the one\n\nCmn111issio11er Of Income-tax;\n\nBombay\n\nAJ1medbhai Vmarbhai & Ci>.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nCo111111i.-1sioner <8f Inco11i:!-fax1\n\nBo111'1ay\n\nAh11i:•dl1hai U111arbltai & Co.\n\nJ{auia C. J.\n\nhand and receipt on the other. Again, the question of profits has to be determined not on receipt of the price of each lot sold by the assessee but the result of all the operations in connection with the manufacture and sale of oil during the accounting year. An individual transaction may result in profit but that will not make the assessce liable if the result of his accounting year's activities is a loss. It is therefore improper in a case of this kind to consider the sale of oil as the deciding factor either to ascertain profits or to determine the place of the accrual of profits.\n\nSeveral cases were cited at the.Bar dealing with a trader's business where he bought and sold goods. In my opinion those are not relevant to determine the question before us because in the present case the business is of a different nature. In The Commissioner of Taxation v. Kirk (1 ), Lord Davey distinguished Sulley v. Attorney-General (2 ) and Grai?l-ger & Son v. Gough(\") on this ground.\n\nThe place of.sale was not considered the test when the business was of manufacturing and sale.\n\nSimilarly cases which deal with the liability of the assessee under the Indian Income-tax Act because the profits were received (and not only accrued or arose) in India are also unhelpful. The Judges of the High Court strongly relied on The Commissioner of Taxation v.\n\nKirk ( ') for their conclusion in favour of the assessee.\n\nIt was a case of mining operations where the mines were in one colony and the sale of the ore in another.\n\nUnder the Taxing Act in that case, it was observed that it was wholly immaterial whether the person to be taxed resided in the colony or not. Nor was it material whether the income was received in the colony or not, if it was earned outside the colony. The Board attached no importance to the word \" derived \" which was treated as synonymous with arising or accruing. The real question was what income was arising or accruing to the assessee from the business oprations carried on by him in the colony.\n\nThis was considered a question of fact.\n\nUnder the New South Wales Act the liability to tax has to be decided on the existence of the source of the income in the particular colony and\n\n(!) (1900] A.C. 588.\n\n(2) (1860] 5 H. & N; 711.\n\n(3) (1896] A.C. 325.\n\nto that extent the liability to tax is based on a different basis. While accepting this distinction, I am how- .ever unable to accept the contention that the source of income can never be the place where the income accrues or arises. In my opinion there is nothing to prevent income accruing or arising at the place of the source.\n\nTf!e question where the income accrued has to be determined on the facts of each case. The income may accrue or arise at the place of the source or may accrue or arise elsewhere, but it does not follow that the income cannot accrue or arise at the place where the source exists. Therefore it is necessary to ascertain whether that part of the business which is capable of being treated as one separate unit in the Hyderabad State has given rise to the income or profit sought by the assessee to be exempted from taxation in the. present case. On behalf of the respondents our attention was drawn to the International Harvester Company of Canada v. The Provincial Tax Commissioner (1 ).\n\nIn that case the question was of the liability to tax of a resident outside the province of S, under the Incometax Act of S, in respect of profits arising from the sale in that province of agricultural implements which were manufactured outside the province. Under the relevant Act the tax was leviable on a person residing outside S who was carrying on business in S on the net profit or gain arising from the business of such person in S.\n\nThe Board held that although te profits were all received in S, where the goods were sold, the profits liable to taxation were only the net profits arising from the business in S and therefore the manufacturing profits should be excluded from the assessment. They referred to sections 23 and 24 of the Taxing Act, under which a non-resident person was charged to tax on an apportioned part of profit, which although it might be received outside the province of S cou1d fairly be regarded as having been partially earned inside that province. In my opinion that case substantially helps the contention of the respondents and negatives the appellant's contention. It shows that when the manufacturing portion of the activity of the assessee is in\n\n(1) [19,9) A.C. 39.\n\nCoH1111isstoner of l11co111e-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nAll 111ctlhlia i\n\nU111arMuri & Co.\n\nl\\a11ia C. ].\n\nCo1n111issioner of Inco1nc-ta:i:,\n\nBmnbay\n\nAh1n<>db/lai U11urrbhai & Co.\n\n/( auia C. J.\n\nPaz( Ali J.\n\none province and the sale is in another province, the whole profits are not necessarily considered as arising from the sale or at the place of sale although they may be treated as received on sale of the products. Secondly, it shows that profits could be apportioned between the manufacturing and trading activities, particularly when the assessee carried on the business of a manufai:turer and trader together. This decision was sought to be distinguished by the Attorney-General on the ground that sections 23 and 24 of the Taxing Act of that colony made it a completely different scheme of taxation. I do not think that is a good point of distinction, because pro\\iso 2 to section 5 of the Indian Excess Profits Tax Act, read with section 21, prescribes also a scheme in respect of a non-resident although not in the same details or with the same results under •the Indian Act.\n\nThe expression \"part of a business\" must in my opinion be read with the same meaning and implication in provisos (2) and (3) to section S of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nI am also unable to accept the contention of the. Attorney-General that under our Act there is no scheme of apportionment. -That overlooks, as pointed out above, the provisions of section 21 of the Act, which incorporates by reference amongst others section 42 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, proceeding on the footing that there can arise or accrue profits of the manufacturing activity of the assessee, profits ha Ye accrued to the assessee of a part of the business in an Indian State and they having accrued out of such business carried on in such State are exempted under the third proviso to section S of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nFor these reasons, in my opinion, the conclusion of the.\n\nHigh Court is correct and the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nFAZL Au .J.-I agree fully with the judgment of Mahajan J.\n\n>atanjali sastri J.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate-\n\nTribunal, Bombay, under section 66 (1) of the Indian 1950 Income-tax Act, 1922, read with section 21 of the Co11-u1iission-er Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. of bu:ome-t\"x, The respondent firm (hereiafter referred to as the Bombay \"assessees \") are carrying on the business of manufacv. turing ana dep.ling in oil at Raichur in the Hyderabad Ahmedbhai State and at Bombay which, during the relevant Umarbhai & Co. period, was part of what was then known as British Patanjastri J.\n\nIndia. The assessees are resident in Bombay and are registered for income-tax purposes, under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, under the name of Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., while their branch at Raichur is run under the name of Ahmed & Sons. They own three mills at Bombay and one at Raichur for manufacturing oil from groundnuts, and they sell the oil partly af\n\nRaichur and partly at Bombay. For the chargeable .accounting period commencing from 31st October, 1940, .and ending on 20th October, 1941, the assessees were assessed to excess profits tax in a sum of Rs. 1,61,807 on their business income of Rs. 6,08,761, including a sum of Rs. 2,49,615 which was said to have accrued or arisen from sales in Bombay of oil manufactured at Raichur. Part of such oil was also sold at Raichur, but the profits derived from such sales were not included in the assessment, and no question now arises in regard to such profits.\n\nFor the succeeding period commencing from 21st October,\n\n1941, and ending on 8th November, 1942, a tax of Rs- 2,55,485-1-0 computed on the same basis, was also imposed . on the assessees.\n\nThe assessees contended that a part of the profits derived from sales in British India of the oil manufactured at Raichur was attributable to the manufacturing operations at H.aichur which are an essential part of their business, and that such profits must be excluded from the assessment, under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, as having accrued or arisen in the Hyderabad State. The contention was rejected and the whole of the profits arising out of the sales in British India of the oil produced in Raichur were included in the assessments.\n\nAfter unsuccessful appeals to the Appellate\n\n1950 Assistant Commissioner, Bombay, the assessees carried the matter to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Conunissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, but with no better result. The assessees Bomhay thereupon applied to the Tribunal requiring them to •· draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the Ahmcdbl•ai High Court at Bombay for decision of the question of U:aarbT1ai & Co. l d h ' 1 h _ aw mvolve , and t e Tnbunal according y stated t e\n\nPatanja!i sastri J. case and referred the following question: \"v\\'hether\n\non the facts stated above income accruing or arising to the assessees on sales made in British India of goods manufactured in Raichur situated outside British India has been rightly held by the Tribunal as income accruing or arising in British India and was liable to excess profits tax.\" In the letter of reference they indicated their view on the question referred by stating that the manufactured article received or brought into British India did not include any income, profits or gains, and that such profits and gains, having accrued only after the sale had taken place, accrued or arose in British India.\n\nThe reference was heard by Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J. and they were of opinion that the question as framed by the Tribunal \" did not really bring out the controversy between the parties.\" The learned Judges, after stating the facts of the case,. framed the question thus : \" Whether on the facts stated above the profits of a part of the business of the assessees accrued or arose in an Indian State.\" The question as reframed is also open to similar criticism, for, it assumes that the manufacture of oil at Raic:hur is \" a part of the business\" of the assessees, whereas the Commissioner of Income-tax has been seriously contesting that position as the judgment under appeal itself shows.\n\nExcess profits tax is a charge on the profits arising out of a business in excess of its normal or standard profits, a business being regarded as the unit of assessment. . \" Business\" is defined in section 2 (5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act as inclucling, among other\n\nthings, \"11ianufacture,\" and a proviso to the clause\n\ns; iys that \"all businesses to which this Act applies\n\ncarried out by the same person shall be treated as one business for the purposes of this Act.\" Section 4 provides for the charge of tax in respect of any business to which the Act applies on the amount by which\n\nC01111nissio11er of Iuco111e-tax~\n\nBombay the profits during any chargeable accounting period\n\nv. exceed the standard profits. Section 5, on the true Alzmcdb/Jai U111arbhtri & Co~ interpretation of which the question for determination in this appeal turns, runs thus : Patanjali Sastri J. \"5. This Act shall apply to every business of which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause\n\n(ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that sub-section: Provided that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise without British India where such business is carried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in British India unless the business is controlled in British India :\n\nProvided further that where the profits of a part only of a business carried on by a person who is not resident in British India or not ordinarily so resident accrue or arise in British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, so to accrue or arise, then, except where the business, being the business of a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in British India is controlled in India, this Act shall apply only to such part of the business, and such part shall, for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate business : Provided further that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and where the profits of a part of business accrue or arise in an Indian State, such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be deemed to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and the other part of the busilless shall, for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate business.''\n\n1950 As the assessees are resident in British India and the profits of their business in the Hyderabad State Commi<sfo\"\" made during the relevant periods were charged to <lf liico111eta:c,\n\nBm'wy income-tax under section 4 (I) (b) (ii) of the Income- ,.. tax Act, that business was brought under charge to Ahmc.tMai excess profits tax by section 5 of the Excess Profits VmarMai l' Ca. Tax Act, and the duty would be leviable on the\n\nPatanjali Sastri J. pro1 fitds dofh the said. busfinhessA unless h probvis? (3) exc u e t e applicat10n o t e ct to t at usmess, in which case the proviso to section 2 (5) which operates to consolidate only those businesses to which the Act applies would also not take effect. It appears to have been conceded by the taxing authority that no excess profits tax was leviable on the profits derived from the sales in the Hyderabad' State as they were profits of a part of the assessees' business accruing or arising in an Indian State and as such were exempted under proviso (3) to section 5, for these profits, as already stated, were not subjected to tax for the two chargeable accounting periods in question.\n\nBut it was contended on their behalf by the Attorney-General that the proviso had no such operation in respect of the profits made by sales of the oil in British India, and that for two reasons: Firstly, because the manufacturing operations carried on in the Hyderabad State\n\ndid not constitute a \" part \" of the assessees' business within the meaning of the proviso, and, secondly, because even if such operations could be regarded as a part of the business, the profits derived from the sales of the oil in Bombay could not be said to have accrued or arisen in that State. Both these propositions were held to be untenable by the learned Judges of the High Court and were contested before us by Mr. Munshi on behalf of the assessees.\n\nOn the first point, the Attorney-General insisted that a \" part \" of a business meant a fraction of the aggregate of all the constituent activities of the business or, as it has been put during the argument, a \" cross-section\" of the entire business operations, and not one or more of such operations, however essential for the production of the resulting profits.\n\nIt is difficult to see how this construction will assist the\n\ntaxing authority in the present case, for, as already stated, the assessees were selling at Raichur, part of\n\nC0111111issio1ter the oil manufactured there, and there was thus at that of Inco\"'\"ta:r, place a complete cross-section of their business which Bo111bay consists of manufacturing and s'elling oil.\n\nApart from v. this consideration, I can find nothing in the context of _ Ahm, dbluri section 5 to exclude the ordinary meaning of the words ( marblrar & Co. \"part of a business\" and to compel the somewhat Patmrj,;;,.~, stri J strained and artificial interpretation sought to be put upon them which, it may be observed in passing, seems inconsistent with the view which left untaxed the profits derived from the sales at Raichur. Furthermore, section 5 is to be read with the provisions of section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act which has been made applicable, with1 certain modifications not material here, to excess profits tax by section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act \" as if the said provisions were provisions of this Act and refer to excess profits tax instead of to income-tax.\" That section has, in my opinion, an important bearing on the issues involved in this appeal and deserves carefuJ consideration. So far as material here it reads thus :\n\n\"42. (1) All income, profits or gains accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in British India, or through or from any property in British India, or\n\nthroug~ or from any asset or source of income in British India, or through or from any money lent at interest and brought into British India in cash or in kind, shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising withinBritish.India, and where the person entitled to the income, profits or gains is not resident in British India, shall be chargeable to income-tax either in his name or in the name of his agent, and in the latter case such agent shall be deemed to be, for all the purposes of this Act, the assessee in respect of such income-tax: Provided that where the person entitled to the income, profits or gains is not resident in British India. the income-tax so chargeable may be recoverei by deduction under any of the provisions of section 18 ..... .\n\n(3) In the case of a business of which all the :>perations are not carried out in British India, the\n\n1950 profits and gains of the business deemed under this\n\nCmwui,, foncr section to accrue or arise in British India shall be only cf Incom:-tax, such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable Bom'>as to that part of the operations carried out in British v.\n\nIndia.\" ·\n\nAhm_dbluri It will be seen that these provisions, read together, Umarbhai & Co. lay down a rule of apportionment for ascertaining the\n\nPat,,,,1,-;;,.-;\"'''' J. profits of a business. art only of whose \"operations \"\n\nare earned out m Bnhsh India where such part could be n!garded as either \" a business connection in British India \" or \" a source of income in British India.\" They also provide machinery for facilitating collection of the tax from the resident agent where the person entitled to such income is a non-resident. :Now, these provisions are obviously complementary to section 5 proviso (2) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, and unless we read \" part of a business \" in that proviso as meaning one or more \" operations \" of the business referred to in sub-section (3) of section 42, the machinery provided in the latter section for collection of the tax leviable on a non-resident person by virtue of proviso\n\n(2) will not be applicable, and the scheme of charge and collection in such cases wfll be rendered incoherent. A harmonious interpretation of the scheme requires that the words \" part of a business \" in proviso (2) must be taken to signify one or more of the operations of the business, and, if so, the same expression used in proviso (3), with which we are here concerned, must also have the same connotation. It follows that the manufacture of oil in the mill at Raichur is a part of the assessees' business.\n\nThe question next arises whether the profits derived from such manufacture, other than those arising from sales at Raichur which are not now in question, accrued or arose in Raichur, so as to bring the case within proviso (3). It is clear that the oil manufactured at Raichur cannot itself be regarded as income, profits or gains within the meaning of the • Indian Income-tax Act or the Excess Profits Tax Act any more th<:1n the green coffee in Mathias' case (1) which the Privy Council held could not be so regarded.\n\nIll l.l .R. (1939] Mad.178.\n\nThe oil is manufactured for purposes of sale in order 1950 that profits may be earned, and such profits are realised Commis.,,. 011,., only when the commodity is sold and not before. But, of Income-tax, as the test of non-liability under proviso (3) is the ac- Bombay cruing or the arising of the profits in an Indian State, v. the question is whether the profits, when they do arise Alimet11~1,'.'; from the sales at Bombay of the product of the mill at Umar/Jhm t, Co.\n\nRaichur, arose in whole or in part a.t Raichur? Asp tan 7astri J pointed out by the Privy Council in Chunilal lvfehta's a ia'. . . case(1 ), the words \"profits accruing or arising in\" {a country) require a place to be assigned as that at which the trading operations come, whether gradually or suddenly, into existence, and they involve a notion difficult to apply; to particular transactions. The words \"ac .. crue or arise,\" too, have been variously interpreted, and no conclusive or clear test of when or where income can be said to accrue has been formulatetl in the decided cases. The learned Judges in the Court below solved the problem by invoking what they conceived to be the general principle underlying the decision in Kirk's case ( 2 ), namely, the principle of apportioning profits r' as between the different processes employed in producing those profits and the different places where they are employed. The learned Judges disagreed with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Re Mohanpura Tea Co. (s) that the profits accrue or arise only when the goods are sold and at the place where they are sold, and that the decision in Kirk's case ( 2 ) laid down no principle of general application but proceeded on the language of an Australian statute. The question in Kirk's .\n\ncase(~) related to the assessment of the profits of a mining company which extracted ore and converted it into a merchantable product in one colony and sold it in another. Under1:he relevant statute, tax was leviable in respect, of income \"arising or accruing from any ..................... trade ........................ carried on\" in the colony or \" derived from lands,\" or \"arising or accruing from any kind of property ................... or from any other source whatsoever,\" in the colo11y, but no tax was payable in respect of income \"earned\" outside the\n\n(1) I.L.H.. (1938) Born. 752.\n\n(2) [I £00] A.C. 588. (3) [1937) I.L.R. 2 Cal. 201.\n\n1950 colony. The Board held that the profits, having been\n\nCommissfoncr produced by the combined operations of extraction, of Income-tax, manufacture and sale, were assessable to tax in the Bombay colony either as derived from land by reason of the v. extraction or as \"arising or accruing, \" if not from a\n\nA11111cdbliai \"trade, \" certainly from a \"source, \" by reason of L'111arbhai & Co, _ the manufacture in the colony, and were therefore Patanjali s\"stri J. \" earned \" in the colony, though the profits were received outside the colony.\n\nWhile it may well be a \"fallacy,\" while in applying a taxing 'statute which directs attention to the situation of the source of income as the test of chargeability, to ignore the initial stages in the production of the income and fasten attention on the last stage when it is realised in money, it may be open to question whether it is in consonance with business principles or practice, in the absence of any statutory requirement to that effect, to cut business operations arbitrarily into two or more portions and to apportion, as between them, the profits resulting from one continuous process ending in a sale. It appears, however, unnecessary, in the present case, to consider the applicability of the decision in Kirk's case ( 1) to assessments arising under the Indian Act which makes the place at. which the profits accrue or arise the test of liability Oi' non-liability, as the case may be, as I am of opinion that section 42 of the Income-tax Act which, as. already stated, has been incorporated in the Excess Profits Tax Act, is applicable here and sanctions such apportionment.\n\nIt is noteworthy that the first part of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 42 providing that certain classes of income arP, to be deemed to accrue or arise in British India is not confined in its application to non-residents, but is in general terms so as to be applicable to both residents and non-residents.\n\nBefore its amendment in 1939 the sub-section began with the words \"in the case of any person residing out of British India\" which obviously restricted the application of the provision to non-resident persons, but in its amended form the subsection has been recast into two distinct parts, the first of which is not so restricted, and the second part\n\n(1) (1900] A.C. 588.\n\nalone, which begins with the words -'and where the 1950 person entitled to the income, profits and gains is not Commission., resident in British India,\" is made applicable to of bzcome-ta.r, non-resident persons, thereby showing that the former Bombay part applies to both residents and'non-residents. The v. -Opening words of the first proviso also point to the Alwzedbhai 1 ' f h d ld b 1 U111arbll11i & Co. same cone us10n, or t ese wor s wou e surp usage __ _ if the sub-section as a whole applied only to non-resi- Patanjali sastri J. dents. A contrary view has, no doubt, been expressed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nWetern India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. ( t). Though reference was made in that <.:ase to the alteration in the structure of sub-section (1) its significance, as it seems to me, was not properly appreciated. The facts that the marginal note to the whole section refers to \"non-residents\" and that the section itself finds a place in Chapter V headed \"Liability in Special Cases\" were relied upon as supporting the view that sub-section { 1) as a whole applies only to non-residents. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Ba/raj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh( 2 ), marginal notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act of Parliament, cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute, and it may be mentioned in this connection that the marginal note relied on has since been replaced by the words \" Income deemed to accrue or arise within British India,\" which makes it clear that the main object of sub-section (1) wa5 to define that expression [see section 12 (a) of Act XXII of 1947].\n\nNor can the title of a chapter be legitimately used to restrict the plain terms o( an enactment. I am therefore of opinion that the first part of sub-section (1) is applicable to the assessees, the expressions \" business connection in British India\" and \" asset or source of income in British India \" being wide enough to cover their selling organisation at Bombay. The result is that the profits received at Born bay from the sale of the oil manufactured at Raichur have to be apportioned under sub-sect ion ( 3) between the two operations of manufactnre and sale, and only such portion of the profits as is reasonably attributable to the sale should\n\n{I) [1945] 13 J.T.R. 405.\n\n(2) LL.R. Z6 All. 393 at ~06.\n\n1950 be deemed to accrue or arise in British India. It must follow, as a corollary, that the rest of the profits, Co1111nissi01wr attributable to the manufacture at Raichur, must be of /nco111e4ax, n0 ,,,1..,). regarded as accruing or arising in the H yd era bad\n\nState. Therefore proviso (3) to;; ection 5 of the Excess\n\nAhmcdr.hm Profits Tax Act becomes applicable to the case and\n\nUmar/~,: r- Co. exempts the manufacturing part of the assessees'\n\nPatanjali sasfri .J. business from the operation of the Act.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, Mr. Munshi called attention to certain observations of the Privy Council\n\nin Chunilal Mehta' s case ( 1 ) as supporting his contention that, although all the operations of a business must be completed before profit is received, the accrual of the profits begins with the first operation and continues cumulatively till the goods are finally sold, and that, therefore, the expression \"accruing or arising in\" a place must be applied distributively to the different operations and the places where such operations are carried out. The observations relied on are as follows : \"But the legislature-has chosen a different test and applied it to all kinds of profits accruing or arising in British India. It may even have chosen it as fairer because it can be applied distributively to the profits of a single source \" (p. 765), and again, \"no doubt if it can be held that under the Indian Act profit in the case of a business must be taken so strictly that it is not to be iinderstood distributively at all the profit of the assessee's business would become an ultimate and single figure irreducible and referable only to Bombay, but such a high doctrine cannot be read into the Indian statute without violence not only to its language but to its scheme:\" (p. 767). These passages may, at first sight, appear to lend some support to Mr. Munshi's thesis. But on closer examination in their context they do not, in my opinion, warrant any such general theory. Their Lordships were dealing with a case where the .assessee, resident in Bombay, derived profits from speculative contracts for purchase and sale of commodities carried out through brokers in various foreign markets such as Liverpool; London and New York.\n\nThe assessee\n\n(I' I.L.R .. [1938] Bom. 752.\n\n...\n\ncontended that he was not liable to pay Indian income-tax in respect of such profits, which were not received in British India, on the ground that they were not profits accruing or arising in British\n\nCo111111issioner of lncomefa-<.\n\nBombay India, and their Lordships upheld that contention. v.\n\nJt is with reference to such transactions which Alimcdbliai c:marbhai l; Co. individually contributed to the surplus arising in the various places abroad, that their Lordships spoke Patrmjati sastri J. of the profits accruing or arising distributively and not in a single place. That they were not thinking of the profits resulting from a single composite process such as manufacture and sale, and their disintegration and apportionment as between the different operations is shown by their further observation that\n\n\"profits are frequently, if not ordinarily, regarded as arising from many transactions each of which has a result not as if the profits need to be disintegrated with difficulty but as if they were an aggregate of the particular results:\" (p. 767).\n\nReference was also made to a recent decision of the same Tribunal in International Harvester Co. of Canada\n\nv. The Provincial Tax Commission ( 1 ) • The case arose out of the assessment of the profits of a non-resident to income-tax, under a provincial Income-tax Act in respect of the profits arising from the sale within the province of goods manufactured outside the province.\n\nThe tax was leviable, in_ the case of a non-resident person, on the \"net profit or gain arising from the business of such person in\" the province.\n\nTheir Lordships held that, although the profits sought to be assessed were all received in the province where the goods were sold, as the profits brought under charge under the Act was only the net profit arising from the business in the province, the manufacturing profits should be excluded from the assessment. Their Lordships referred to other provisions of the Act \\vhich, in the converse case, sought to charge a proportionate part of any profit derived from sale outside the province of goods produced in the province as being \"earned\" within the province, and inferred from those provisions that the intention of the legislature in the\n\n(I) (19•9) A.C. 36.\n\n1950 charging section was to bring within the ambit of tax-\n\nCou•uissioncr ation only an apportioned part of the profit.\n\nSuch a of Income-tax, construction, they thought, would \"result in a fair and n0,,,,,,, Y reasonable scheme of taxation in accordance with that\n\nv. comity which naturally prevails between one province Ahmedhlwi and another.\" Referring to Kirk's case(') their Lord- L'niarbhai & Co. h k d h 1 h h h d ___ s rps remar e \"t at at oug t e sections un er con- PMtanjali sastri J. sideration in Kirk's case ( 1 ) differed in their language from the provisions which their Lordships were considering, the reasoning which appears in the judgment in that case was helpful to the appellants' contention in the present case.\" This was, presumably, because chargeability in j:Joth cases depended not on the income accruing or arising in the country, but, on the source of the income being in the country. The decision was based on the language of the statute and the scheme of taxation disclosed thereby, and what I have said about Kirk's case( 1 ) equally applies to it.\n\nThe other cases cited by Mr. Munshi do not call for any special notice.\n\nI agree with the conclusion reached by the High Court, though on different grounds, and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nMahajan}.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a case stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, and it raises a question as to the liability of the respondent, Messrs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., for excess profits tax.\n\nExcess profits tax is levied under section 4 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, XV of 1940, \"in respect of any business to which the Act applies on the amount by which the profit during any chargeable accounting period exceeds the standard profits ........ \" The respondent is a registered firm resident in British India and owns three oil mills in Bombay and one oil mill in Raichur in Hyderabad State and the question to be decided in the appeal is whether the profits which were received or realized by the respondent on the sale of\n\n(!) [19CO] A.C. 588.\n\noil manufactured in Raichur and sold in British India are liable to excess profits tax.\n\nBy an order dated 27th March, 1944, the. Excess Profits Tax Officer, Circle III, Bombay, assessed the respondent to excess profits tax in the sum of Rs. 1,61,807 for the chargeable accounting period commencing from 31st October, 1940 and ending on 20th October, 1941 on the business income of Rs. 6,08,761, which included a sum of Rs. 2,49,615, being profits accruing or arising in British India in respect of the respondent's branch at Raichur in Hyderabad State and run in the name of Messrs. Ahmed & Sons. By another order dated 28th March, 1944 the ame officer assessed the firm to excess profits tax in a sum of Rs. 2,55,485-1-0 for the chargeable accounting period commencing from 21st October, 1941 and ending on 8th November, 1942 on the business income of Rs. 7,46,561, which included a sum of Rs. 2,34,785, being the profits accruing or arising in British India in respect of the Raichur branch. Both the assessment orders were appealed against to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but without any success. The Incometax Appellate Tribunal on appeal drew up a statement of case and referred the following question of law to the High Court :-\n\n\"Whether on the facts as stated above income accruing or arising to the assessee on sales made in British India of goods manufactured in Raichur situated outside British India has been rightly held by the Tribunal as income accruing and arising in British India and was liable to excess profits tax? \"\n\nThe High Court re-framed the question as follows:-\n\n\"Whether on the facts as stated above profits of a part of the business of the assessee accrued or arose in an Indian State \"\n\nand answered it in the affirmative. It held that the activity which the respondent carried on at Raichur was a part of its business within the meaning of the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act and that the profits of a part of the business accrued or arose in an Indian State and that\n\nCotn111.issipnc I' of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nAlimrdhhai Umarbliai &- Co_\n\nlifaliajan J.\n\nJ 950\n\nCn111111issioncr\n\n()/ b~CIJ/llC-tax,\n\nBo111'1a y v.\n\nAl11u:dhl1ai U111arbliai {;. Cv.\n\nJl111t11fa11 J.\n\nthe said profits were not assessable to excess profits tax.\n\nThis order of the High Court is being contested in the present appeal and it has been urged that as regards the oil manufactured in Raichur but sold in British India, no profits accrued or arose in the Indian State, but the profits accrued or arose in British India and are subject to excess profits tax. It was further contended that the construction put by the High Court on the third proviso to section 5 and on the phrase\n\n\" part of a business \" is erroneous and is not justified on the language of the proviso and the context. It was suggested that in order to constitute \"a part of the\n\nbusiness\" within the meaning of that proviso it must be a complete cross-section of the whole business and not merely one or more of the operations of that business.\n\nSection 5 of the Act on the true construction of which depends the decision of the appeal is in these terms:- \" This Act shall apply to every business of which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause\n\n(ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that sub-section.\"\n\nIn other words, the Act brings within its ambit all income in the case of a person resident in British India which accrues or arises or which is deemed to accrue or arise to him in British India during the accounting year, as also all income which accrues or arises to him without British India during such year ; and if such person is not resident in British India during that year, then all income which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise in British India during such year. If section 5 of the Act stopped short at that stage, it is undoubted that in the case of the respondent who is a resident in British India all his income, no matter where it arose, within British India or without British India, would be chargeable to excess profits tax just in the same way as it is chargeable to income-tax under the Indian Income-tax Act. The whole of his income arising\n\nin Raichur has legitimately beentaxed under t.hat Act.\n\nSection 5 however has three provisos which limit\n\nCo11unissioner its scope and take certain incomes outside its ambit. of focome-tax, The first proviso is to the following effect : Bombay \"Provided that this Act shall not apply to any v. business the whole of the profits of which accrue or Ahmedbhai arise without British India where such business is car- Umarbhai & Co. ried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident but Mahajan}. no.t ordinarily resident in _British India unless the business.is controlled in British India.\"\n\nThis exception has no bearing to the facts of the present case. The second proviso is in these t, erms :-\n\n\"Provided further that where the profits of a part , only of a business carried on by a person who is not resident in British India or. not ordinarily so resident accrue or aristl in British India or are deemed under -the Indian Income-tax Act; 1922, so to accrue or arise, then, except where the business being the business of a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in British India is controlled in India, this Act shall apply only to such part of the business, and such part shall for all the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a separate business.\" This proviso also concerns a person nof resident in British India and does not touch the present case .. It however furnishes a clue to the meaning of the following proviso inasmuch as it attracts the application of section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act to the case of a non-resident and contemplates the. apportionment of income between part of a business _ controlled in British India and a part not so controlled.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 42 of the Income-tax Act enacts thus:\n\n\" In the case of a business of which all the operations are not carried out in British India,. the profits and gains of the business deemed under this section to accrue or arise in British. India shall be only such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to that part of the operations carried out in British India.\"\n\n Under the second proviso by reason of the application of section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act, if the manufacturing business of the assessee was in British\n\nCo11111iissioncr of brco11ic-tax,\n\nBouibay\n\nAlunedbhai U111arbhai & Co.\n\nf.IallajanJ,\n\nIndia and all his sales took place in Raichur, then excess profits tax could only be chargeable on such profits as would really be attributable to his manufacturing operations in British India and the manufacturing operations would be treated as part of the business of the assessee under the proviso. It is the third proviso to which the controversy in the case is limited and this proviso is in these terms :-\n\n\"Provided further that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise .in an Indian State, and where the profits of a part of business accrue or arise in an Indian State, such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be deemed to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and the other part of the business shall, for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate business.\"\n\nWe have firstly to determine the meaning of the words \"part of a business \"in this proviso; does it mean, as argued on behalf of the Commissioner, that the business must be a complete cross-section of the whole business and not merely one or more of the operations of that business, or, does it mean, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, a continued and severable business activity of which the profits could be apportioned or ascertained separately.\n\nSecondly, we are called upon to determine at what place do the profits accrue or arise in respect of the part of such business. Do . they arise at the place where in the case of a manufacturer his goods are sold, or can they be said to accrue or arise at the place of manufacture?\n\nThe word \"business\" has been defined by the Act in section 2 (5) as follows :-\n\n\" 'Business' includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventme in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation .... \"\n\nIt means any continued activity of a person which yields profits and which is in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. It may even be any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or\n\nmanufacture. A proviso was added to this definition in the year 1940 in these terms :--\n\n\"Provided further that all businesses to which this Act applies carried on by the same person shall be treated as one business for the purposes of this Act.\"\n\nThe effect of the proviso is that if a man is carrying on a number of activities, whether of the same or of different natures, all these various businesses are treated as one.\n\nThe same person, if engaged in the manufacture of hardware, oils, textiles, motor tyres, bicycles and owning mills for his diverse activities in different places and also trading in merchandise and doing contract business, is deemed to carry on a single business. All the businesses that he carries on are. lumped together and treated as one business for the purpose of levying the tax and calculating the profits.\n\nThe proviso has made an amalgam of all the businesses of one individual and it is in view of this amalgam that proviso 3 of section 5 has to be considered.\n\nIt seems to me that what has been amalgamated by the definition has again been made separate by .the proviso to section 5. If a number of businesses carried on by a person are situate in different places, then the effect_ of the proviso is to again treat them as separate business under the description of the phrase \"part of a business.\" In other wor<ls, if a man is carrying on manufacture in textiles in Bombay, a shop at Mysore, has a distillery in Allahabad and has an oil mill in Gwalior, then for the purpose of section-Sall these four trades are part of the business within the meaning of proviso 3 to section 5, one part situate in one place and another part situate at another place and if any of these parts produce profits at the place of the business, that place being in an Indian State, then proviso (3) would have application.\n\nI think that the effect of the language of proviso (2) of section 5 is to giy-e colour to proviso (3) as being complementary to it and providing for converse cases to those arising under this proviso concerning non•residents.\n\nIllustratively it may be said that proviso (2) would cover the case if the manufacturing business of the\n\nCo11uniss''l1t11r of Inconw-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nAlimedbhai Umarbhai & Co.\n\nMahajau J.\n\nCo1111nissioncr of lnc01ne-tax,\n\nBonibay\n\nAhniedbhai Uniarbliai & Co\n\nrespondent was situate in Bombay and his sales exclusively were made at Raichur provided he was a non-resident. In that event excess profits duty would be chargeable on a part of the profits attributable to the part of the business in Bombay, or in other words, to those business operations that were being carried on in Bombay. The converse case where the manufacturing operations are being carried on in Raichur by a resident in India and the sales are made exclusively in Bombay is apparently covered by proviso (3) because a part of the business being situate in Raichur profits attributable to that part of the business out of the total sale proceeds could only be said to accrue at the place of manufacture.\n\nThe present assessee has three mills in British India and a mill at Raichur. He has also a sales depot at Bombay. In his case but for the proviso to the definition of \"business\" it could be said that he was carrying on five businesses, three of manufacture of oil in India and one of manufacture of oil in Hyderabad and a fifth businesi'l' as trader at Bombay. By reason of the proviso to the definition, all these .businesses become a single business. But for the purposes of provisos (2) and (3) of section S all these are part of a business and have to be treated as separate bu.sinesses. The theory of cross-section of a business con tended by the appellant is not very intelligible. It was contended that if a man is a manufacturer as well as a seller of goods and also an importer of goods, then in his case the term \"part of a business \" means the carrying on of all the three activities together and that unle:os he carries on all the three activities, it cannot constitute \" part of business\" under the proviso. This contention to my mind is untenable. The only construction which in the context of the Act can be reasonably placed on the proviso to section S and on the words \" part of a business\" is the one suggested above. I am therefore of the opinion that the learned Chief Justice was right when he held that the activities which the assessee carried on at Raichur are certainly a partof the business of the assessee.\n\nMr. Justlce Tendolkar on thi~ part of the case observed as follows :-\n\n\" The normal meaning of the word is a ' portion ' in whatever way carved out and I have no doubt in my mind that any of the operations that go towards a complete business are a part of that business.\n\nThe contention of the Advocate-General becomes the more untenable when one looks at the second proviso to section 2 (5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act. ..... ..\n\nNow, under this proviso you may have several businesses of a totally different character carried on by the same person and they, all together constitute\n\noe business for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act, if the contention of the Advocate-General is right, even if one of these different businesses in the ordinary sense of the term was wholly carried out in a Native State, it would still not be a part of the whole business in the sense of being a cwss-section of all the businesses which together constitute one business under the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nI am, therefore, of opinion that the manufacture of oil was part of the business of the assessee firm.\"\n\nI am in complete agreement with the observations cited above.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether that part of the business situate in Hyderabad gives any profits, in other words, whether any profits of the manufacturing business of the assessee at Hyderabad accrue or arise in that State.\n\nOn behalf of the Commissioner it was contended that the place where the profits accrue or arise is not ordinarily the place where the source that produces the profits is situate and that the High Court had erred in taking the view that in respect of sales of oil in British India produced by the mill at Raichur any profits accrued at the pl<rce of manufacture. It was said that profits in such a case only accrue at the _place of sale and not at the place of manufacture. I am unable to accede to this contention. It is true that no profits are realized until the oil is sold but the act of sale merely fixes .the time and place of. receipt of profits, profits are not whoily made by the act of sale and do not necessarily accrue at the place of rnle.\n\nCo11uut'.s.'lio1ter of I1rc01>1:•-tax,\n\nBo111hay\n\nAli1ucdbhai U111arb/1ai l; Ca ..\n\nMalirrjau J.\n\nCouullissioucr of lncontc-tax,\n\nBo111'1ay\n\nv Ah11icd!JJ1ai Untarbltai & Co.\n\n.; faliajanJ,\n\nAct of sale is the culminating process in the earning of profits but it goes without saying that the act of sale could not be performed unless the goods were produced at Raichur and it would be wrong from a business point to say that all the profits resulted from that operation. It was the operation of manufacture at Raichur that enabled the assessee to sell oil and some portion of the profits must necessarily be attributable to the-manufacturing process.\n\nTo the extent that the profits are attributable to the manufacture of oil it is not possible to say that,-they accrue or arise at any place different from the place where the manufactured article came into existence.\n\nIt was not denied that the business of manufacture at Raichur may produce profits or it may even earn profits and it wa:s conceded that it may also be said that profits are derived from that process of manufacture but it was strenuously argued that earning of profits is not the same thing as the accrual of profits and no profits could be said to accrue or arise at a place where the profits may well have been earned or produced and that the place of accrual of profits must necessarily be the place where the sale proceeds are received or realized.\n\nOn behalf of the assessee it was urged that the words \"derived,\" \"earn,\" \"accrue\" or \"arise\" are synonymous and it is immaterial which word is used indicating the result of the activities of various business operations.\n\nThe totality of profits that accrues to a business or is earned by it may be ascribed to a number of operations; though it is .ascertained at the place where the produce is sold, it accrues where it is earned. Whether the words\n\n\"derive\" and \"produce\" are or are not synonymous with the words \"accrue\" or \"arise,\" it can be said without hesitation that the words \"accrue \" or \" arise \" though not defined in the Act are certainly synonymous and are used in the sense of \" bringing in as a natural result.\" Strictly speaking, the word \" accrue \" is not synonymous with \"arise,\" the former connoting idea of growth or accumulation and the latter of the growth or accumulation with a tangible shape so as to be receivable.\n\nThere is a distinction in the dictionary\n\nmeaning of these words, but throughout the Act they seem to denote the same idea or ideas very similar and the difference only lies in this that one is more appropriate when applied to a particular casi. In the case of a composite business, i.e., in the case of a person who is carrying on a number ofbusinesses, it is always difficult to decide as to the place of the accrual of profits and their apportionment inter se.\n\nFor instance, where a person carries on manufacture, sale, export and import, it is not possible to say that the place where the profits accrue to him is the place of safo.\n\nThe profits received relate firstly to his business as a manufacturer, secondly to his trading operations, and thirdlv to his business of import and exp::irt.\n\nProfit or foss has to be apportioned between these businesses in a businesslike manner and according to well-established principles of accountancy. In such cases it will be doing no violeJ; J.ce to the meaning of the words \" accrue \" or \" arise \" if the profits attributable to the manufacturing business are said to arise or accrue at the place where the manufacture is being done and the profits which arise by reason of the sale are said to arise at the place where the sales are made and the profits in respect of the import and export business are said to arise at the place where the business is conducted. This apportionment of profits between a number of businesses which are carried on by the same person at different places determines also the place of the accrual of profits. To hold that though a businessman has invested millions in establishing a bm.iness of manufacture, whether in the nature of a textile mill or in the nature of steel works, yet no profits are attributable to this business or can accrue or arise to the business of manufacture because the produce of his mills is sold at a different place and that it is only the act of sale by which profits accrue and they arise only at that place is to confuse the idea of receipt of inconte and realization of profits with the idea of the accrual of profits. The act of sale is the mode of realizing the profits. If the goods are sold tv a third person at the mill premises no one could have said that these profits arose merely by reason of\n\nCo1n1nissioner of Income-tax.\n\nBombay\n\nA/1mdbhai U111a, rb/zai & Co ..\n\nMahajan .f.\n\nCo1n11tissioner of lnco;1t::-t, r:c,\n\nBo11i?ay\n\nA11111::.dbhai V1narl1hai [;.\"Co.\n\ni.IahajanJ.\n\nthe sale.\n\nProfits would only be ascribed to the business of manufacture and would arise at the mill premises.\n\nMerely because the mill owner has started another business organization in the nature of a sales depot or a shop, that cannot wholly deprive the business of manufacture of its profits, though there may have to be apportionment in such a case between the bu>iness of manufacture and business of shopkeeping.\n\nIn a number of cases such apportionment is made and is also suggested by the provisions of section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act, reference to which •has also been made in proviso (2) of section 5 of the Excess\n\nProfits Tax Act.\n\nIn Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Maxse (1 ),\n\nfaxse purchased a monthly magazine for £ 1,500-and was the sole proprietor, editor and publisher thereof.\n\nThe earnings were derived from sales of the magazine, from advertisements and from reprints of articles mostly written by him. Before thi> war Maxse wrote a large part of each number, and, though some of the matter was contributed by others, the sales were largely due to the popularity of his own writings.\n\nWhen war broke out, he increased his personal contributions and did most of the wr'iting. At that time he required practically no capital.\n\nHaving been assessed to excess profits duty for the year ending May 31, 1915, he appealed to the General Income Tax Commissioners and contended that the profits were earned by reason of his personal qualifications, that the capital expenditure was small in comparison with the personal qualifications required to earn the profits, and that he was exempt from duty by virtue of para.\n\n(c) of section 39 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915.\n\nTh~ General Commissioners having discharged the assessment, their decision was reversed by Sankey J. who held that Maxse was carrying on a commercial business and not a profession within para. ( c) and therefore he was liable to duty. The Coart of appeal held that Maxse was carrying on the profession of a journalist, author or man of letters, and also the business of publishing his own periodical. The publishing\n\n(1) [1919] 1 K.B. 6,7.\n\nbusiness should be debited with a fair and reasonable allowance in respect of Maxse's contributions, and .a proper sum for his remuneration as editor, and on that footing he would be liable to duty in respect of his business but exempt therefrom in respect of his profession.\n\nThis is a case of a combination of a profession with a business. .Under the law no excess profits duty could be levied on his professional income but his business income was liable to such duty and. the duty was so levied by making the apportionment. The rule laid down in this tase, though it has special reference to the scheme of the English statute, can appositely be laid down for the apportionment of profits qua parts of a business of an ssessee.\n\nA similar view was expressed by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Killing Valley Tea Cotttpany v. The Secretary of State for India( 1 ).\n\nThere the question arose whether the income from a tea garden where tea was grown and made ready for the market by mechanical process, was assessable. It was held that the income was to be apportioned and so much of it as was obtained by 'the manufacturing process was assessable. The principle of Maxse' s case and of other English cases was applied to the facts of that particular case. In cases where a person is (4rrying on composite businesses which for purposes of section 5 are regarded as one business and for purposes of the proviso as several parts of a business, it may be said that there are two stages in the production. of the net profit, ( 1) the manufacture of the article, and (2) the sale of the article and that part of the net profit should be attributed to each stage, the part. attributed to the earlier stage being described as a manufacturing profit. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of International Harvester Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Provincial TfJ, x Commission (2 ). In that case it was argiled that when money was received by the appellant in Saskatchewan as a result of a sale in Saskatchewan the whole of the net profit on the sale arose from the business of the appellant in Saskatchewan; and no apportionment was necessary:. This contention\n\n(1) I.L.R. •s Ca!.161.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 19•9 P.O. 72.\n\nConituissfotter of Income-tux,\n\nBombay\n\nAhmedbhai Umarbhai Ii- Co.\n\nMa/iajanJ,'\n\nCo1n11iissioner of f11co111e-tax,\n\nHo1nbay v.\n\nAhnt('dbliai U11tarbhai & Co,\n\nAfahajan J.\n\nwas described by their Lordships as fallacious and untenable.\n\nTheir Lordships quoted with approval the following observations from the minority judgment of Sir Lyman Duff C. J.\n\nThe quotation is in these terms:-\n\n\"Nowhere does the statute authorise the Province of Saskatchewan to tax' a manufacturing company, situated as the appellant company is, in respect of the whole of the profits received by the company in Saskatchewan. It is not the profits received in Saskatchewan that are taxable, it is the profits arising from its business in Saskatchewan not the profits arising from the company's manufacturing business in Ontario and from the company's operations in Saskatchewan taken together, but the profits arising from the company's operations in Saskatchewan.\" The question in the present case in whether in respect of the manufacturing business of the assessee in Raichur profits accure or arise a.nd if so, at what place.\n\nMy answer unhesitatingly is that the manufacturin~ profits arise at the place of manufacture.\n\nThey could arise nowhere els~. The sale profits arise at the , place of sale and apport10nment has to be made between the two, though the place of receiptg and realization of the profits is the place where the sales are made. The manufacturing profits could not be said to have accrued or arisen at that place because there was nothing done from which they could accrue or arise as natural accrual or as an increase. The increase only took place at the place of manufacture and if there was any accrual over the production cost, that accrual was at the place of the production itself.\n\nMr. Seta:lvad for the Commissioner placed reliance on a number of cases, inter alia, The Board of Revenue\n\nv. The Madras Export Company('), ]iwan Das v.\n\nIncome-tax Commissioner, Lahore(~). In re Port Said Salt Association Limited (3 ), and Sudalaimani Nadar\n\nv. Income-tax Commissioner (4 ).\n\nAll these cases fall in one category: These are cases where-raw materials\n\n(l) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 36~. (3i I.LR. 59 Cal. 12~6.\n\n(21I.L.R.10 Lah. 657. (<)A.LR. 19U Mad. 229.\n\nwere purchased at one place and sold at another and it was held that in such cases it was.the act of sale from which the profits accrued or arose. In most of these\n\nses the goods as purchased were sold without going through any manufacturing process. It was observed that mere act of purchase produces no profit. This proposition has been doubted in a later case. But it is unnecessary to go into this matter. In the case of a trading business, like purchase and sale, it may be said that the business of a person is one operation and the nature and character of the business is such that the profits arise at the place of sale and that in such a case it is not possible to ascribe any profits to the act of purchase and it is still more difficult to apportion them. These cases are no guide for the decision of cases of manufacturing business or business of a like nature. Observations made in these cases must be limited to the facts of each particular case. A number of cases were cited for the proposition that under the Indian Act. it is not the place where a person carries on business (as it is under the English law) whe're necessarily profits can be said to arise, because the Indian Act takes notice only of the place of accrual of profits and not of the place where the business is carried on or where the source which produces profit is situate. The matter was discussed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in C ommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Chitnilal B. Mehta ( 1 ).\n\nThe assessee in that case was carrying on buying and selling operations in commodities in various foreign markets. No delivery was ever given or taken and the profits of such forward contracts were not received in fact in British India, and it was held that the contracts having been neither ftamed nor carried out in British India, the profits derived from the contracts did not accrue or arise in British India within the meaning of section 4, sub-section (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The contention raised in that case on behalf of the Commissioner was that these profits resulted from the exercise of skill and judgment in Bombay by the assessee and by the giving of directions\n\n(1) 65 I.A. 33f.\n\nCo1111nissionf.!r of Jnconic-tax.\n\nB01uba y v.\n\nAlunedb!tai U11zarbhai & Co.\n\nMa/zaja11 ].\n\nCoi11111issioncr of /11co111c-fax,\n\n1Jo111bay\n\nv. Al11ncdbliai l.h:za1bl1ai & Co.\n\nt\\lahaja11 J.\n\nfrom Bombay. This contention was negatived and it was observed that to determine the place at which such a profit arises not by reference to the transactions, or to any feature of the transactions, but by reference to a place in India at which the instructions therefor were determined on and cabled to New York is, in their Lordships' view, to proceed in a manner which cannot be supported if the transactions are to be looked at separately and the profits of each transaction considered by themselves. It was said that there is a distinct paradox in the contention that the profits resulting from an order placed in New York would have accrued or arisen in the same place (Bombay) had the order been sent to Liverpool with a like result, but that had the assessee decided on and directed the same New York transaction when in Hyderabad the same profits would have arisen in a different place (Hyderabad). It may be observed that the business of the forward contracts was not being conducted in Bombay at all in this case.\n\nThe whole argument was . based on the ground that the assessee, a big business magnate, was directing and controlling that business.\n\nSuch direction and control could hardly be said to be the place of the accrual of profits on the transactions done elsewhere. It was next argued in that case that these foreign transactions were part of the profits of the Bombay business carried on by the assessee and all the profits of the business must be computed as a whole.\n\nTheir Lordships negatived this contention and observed as follows :-\n\n\"But the legislature has chosen a different test, and applied it to all kinds of profits-' accruing or arising in British India.' It may even have chosen it as fairer because it could be applied distributively to the profits of a single source.\n\nHowever that may be, the profits of each particular business are to be computed wherever and by whomsoever the business . is carried on, but only on condition that they arc profits ' accrning or arising or received in British India,' etc.\n\nWhat connection exists, if any, between place of direction and place at which the profits arise is a matter not touched by sections 4, 6 or 10.\n\nNot only\n\ndo they lay no stress upon the place at which the business is carried on, they make no mention of it. In these circumstances it cannot be held that it is itself the test of chargeability by virtue of a rule, not men.\n\ntion(!d either, that profits arise or accrue at the place where the business is carried on.\"\n\nLater in the same judgment it was observed that there seemed to be no necessity arising out of the general conception of a business as an organization that profits should arise only at one place, that profits are frequently, if not ordinarily, regarded as arising from many transactions, each of which have a resultnot as if the profits need to be disintegrated with difficulty, but as if they were an aggregate of the particular results. It was said that the assessment order had discriminated between the Bombay and the foreign business income and that to discriminate between all kinds of profits according to the place at which they accrue or arise was a plain dictate of the statute, other discrimination was involved in the exemptions, and in such sections as section 42. In the concluding part of the judgment their Lordships said as follows :-\n\n\" These considerations lead their Lordships to the conclusion that under the Indian Act a person resident . in British India, carrying on business there and controlling transactions abroad in the course of such business, is not by these mere facts liable to tax on the profits of such transactions. If such profits have not been received in or brought into British India, it becomes, or may become necessary to consider on the facts of the case where they accrued or arose.\n\nTheir Lordships are not laying down any rule of general application to all classes of foreign transactions, or even with respect to the sale of goods. To do so would be nearly impossible, and wholly unwise. They are not saying that the place of formation of the contract prevails against everything else.\n\nIn some circumstances it may be so, but other matters-acts done under the contract, for example-cannot be ruled out a priori.\n\nIn the case before the Board the contracts were\n\nCo1111nissio1ter of luc:onie-tax.\n\nBo111fJay\n\nAl1111cdbl1ai\n\nfahnjan j.\n\nCo111111issio11cr of lnco11ic-tax, Bo11i!Jay\n\nAhn1cdhhai V1narbha i & Co.\n\nMaliajan J.\n\nneither framed nor carried out in British India, the High Court's conclusion that the profits accrued or arose outside British India is well founded.\"\n\nIn my view this decision does not make us any the wiser for the decision of the present case. It is true that the Indian Act does not lay down that profits necessarily arise or accrue at the place where the business is carried on or that they necessarily arise at the place where the source which produces the profit is situate but at the same time the Act does not lay down that the profits nec<:ssarily accrue or arise at the place where only one operation, namely of sale is performed. Place of accrual of profits cannot necessarily be determined on the test of receivability.\n\nIn certain cases the place of origin of the profits may be the determining factor while in others the test of receivability may have application. Profits of a trade or business are what is gained by the business.\n\nThe term implies a comparison between the state of business at two specific dates separated by an interval of an year and the fundamental meaning is the amount of gain made by the business during the year and can only be ascertained by a comparison of the assets of the business at the two dates, the increase shown at a later date compared to the earlier date represents the profits of the business. In this concept of the term the place of business or the source from which they originate would in the case of certain businesses .be the place where they can he said to accrue or arise. In this situation t_he profits realized at sale have to be apportioned between the different business operations which have produced them and those apportioned to the part of business of manufacture at Raichur can only be said to arise at the place of manufacture as no other activity has produced those profits. No other place can be suggested where this increase can be said to have arisen. In the view that I have taken it is unnecessary to refer to all the cases that were cited at the Bar, for most of these cases concerned the interpretation of the various sections of the Indian Income-tax Act and none of them concerned the interpretation ploiced on the Act with which we are concerned.\n\nThe result therefore is that in my opinion the High Court was right in answering the question. in favour of the assessee and no grounds exist for reversing that decision in appeal, which is therefore dismissed with costs.\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-I agree that this appeal should be dismissed and I would indicate briefly the reasons which have weighed with me in affirming the judgment of the High Court.\n\nThe question which was referred by the Incornetax Commissioner, Bombay, to the High Court under the provision of section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922 and which. the latter reframed for the purpose of bringing out clearly the real controversy between the parties, turns upon the applicability of the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act (Act XV of 1940) to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe facts are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows :\n\nThe respondents assessees are a firm, resident in British India. and they are registered for income-tax purposes under section 26A of the Income-tax Act.\n\nTheir business consists in manufacturing and selling groundnut oil and they have three mills in Bombay and one at Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil is manufactured. During the chareable accounting period, the oil that was manufactured at Raichur was sold partly in Raichur itself and partly in Bombay, and what the Income-tax Officer did was to ascertain the income arising to the assessees out of the Raichur business and apportion the same on the basis of sales made in Raichur and Bombay respectively. The profits arising out of sales made in Bombay were held by the Income-tax Officer to be assessable both to income-tax and excess profits tax. There is no doubt as to the propriety of his decision so far as income-tax is concerned. The only question that is 'raised relates to the liability of the firm to pay excess profits tax in respect of income arising out of the sales made in Bombay of the oil manufactured at Raichur. The contention put forward\n\n' 1950\n\nCo1n1nissio1ter of Inco11u?-tax.\n\nBombay\n\nAhmcdhhai Umarbhai & C<>,\n\nCon1111issioner of lnco11w-tc1x,\n\nBo111bay\n\nAl111tcdbl1ai Vnzarb/Jai & Co,\n\nMuklierjca J.\n\nby the assessees is that although the oil was sold in Bombay, it was manufactured at Raichur and a portion of the profits ultimately made must be allotted to the manufacturing process that was carried on at Raichur.\n\nThe manufacture of the oil, therefore, must be regarded as a part of the business and as the profits of this part accrued at Raichur, it has to be treated as a separate business for purposes of excess profits tax under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. The High Court answered this question in favour of the assessees and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, has come up on appeal to this Court.\n\nWith a view to appreciate the contentions that have been raised by the learned counsel on both sides, it will be convenient, first of all, to advert to the provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act which have a bearing on the point. Section 2, sub-section (5), of the Act defines \"business\" as including any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation but does not include a profession carried on by an individual or by individuals in partnership if the profits of the profession depend wholly or mainly on his or their _personal qualifications ......... One of the provisos attacl!ed to this definition provides that all businesses to which this Act applies carried on by the same person shall be treated as one business for the purposes of this Act. Section 4 is the charging section and under it any business to which this Act applies is subject , to payment of excess profits tax in the manner and to the extent indicated in the section.\n\nSection 5 lays down to what businesses the Act will apply.\n\n\" This Act shall apply \" so runs the section, \" to every business of which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-clause\n\n(i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that sub-section.\" There are three provisos attached to this section ;\n\nwe are concerned fot our present purposes with the third proviso which is worded as follows :\n\n\" Provided further that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and where the profits of a part of a business accrue or arise in an Indian State, such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be deemed to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and the other part of the business shall, for all the purpoes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate business.\"\n\nThe point for consideration is whether on the facts of this case which have been stated above, this third proviso to section 5 can be invoked by the assessees and it is open to them to claim that the work of manufacture of groundnut oil carried on by them at Raichur should be treated as a separate business within the meaning of this proviso. To succeed in their claim, it is incumbent upon the assessees to show that there was in fact a part of a business in the present case and that profit accrued or arose to this part in an Indian State. If both these elements are found to exist then and then only the part of the business could be treated as a separate business for purposes of the Act.\n\nIt is contended by the assessees that though they carry on the business of manufacturing and selling oil, the process of manufacture apart from the sale is itself a business and can be treated as a separate part of the trade that the assessees are carrying on. As the profits of this part arose or accrued at Raichur, both the conditions of the proviso are fulfilled in the present case.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General appearing for the Commissioner of Income-tax has, on the other hand, argued that the expression \" part of a business \" occurring in the proviso does not refer to or contemplate one of the many activities or processes thatare comprised in a business. It can only mean a cross-section of the entire business, complete in itself and including parts of each of the processes that are comprised in the same. It is next said that even assuming that the manufacturing operation can be treated as a part of the business, the\n\nCo111111issionc r of In.co111e-tax,\n\nBont!Jay\n\nAJ1111cdbhai U111arbhai & Co.\n\n!950\n\nCo1n11iissio11cr of btco111c-tax,\n\nBo1nbay\n\nAJ11nr:dbhai\n\nftlukhl'rja J.\n\nprofits of the same could and did accrue only at the place of sale and hence the proviso could not be attracted to the facts of the present case.\n\nAs regards the first part of Mr. Setalvad's contention, I do not think that it can be accepted as sound.\n\n\"Business\" is defined in the Act to include any trade, commerce or manufacture.\n\nA man may carry on the trade of a seller or purchaser of goods ; he may be a manufacturer of goods' or an exporter or importer of the same. Each of these would be a business within the meaning of the Act.\n\nSuppose, for example, that he combines all these activities and carries on a buiness which includes manufacturing, selling.and also exporting and importing of goods.\n\nCan it not be said that each one of these activities is a part of the business which he carries on? I agree with Mr. Munshi that if a particular process or activity of a continuous character can be distinguished from other processes and if a separate profit can be ascertained and allotted in respect to the same, there is no reason why it shopld not be regarded as a part of the business which yields income or profits.\n\nThe question has been raised in several cases in English Courts regarding liability to excess profits duty when a person carries on a trade or business liable to duty in connection with another business which is not so liable. It has been held that if separation is possible in such cases the proper course to follow is to sever the profits of the two businesses and assess accordingly.\n\nIn the case of Commissioners of Inland Revenue\n\nv. Ransom( 1 ) the respondents carried on the business as manufacturing chemists and growers of medicinal herbs; they owned a factory where the manufacture and distillation of herbs were carried on and they also occupied a farm on which they grew herbs for treatment in the factory.\n\nThe respondents were assessed to excess profits duty and on appeal against the assessment, the General Commissioners held that although the respondents occupied the farm mainly for the purpose of the factory, which was excluded from excess\n\n(I) [191~] 2 K.B. 709.\n\nprofits duty, as separation was possible, the profits of the farm were excluded and they were only assessed on the profits of the factory. This view of the General Commissioners was upheld by Sankey J. on appeal.\n\nThe same question arose in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. 2\\1axse( 1 ), where the Court of appeal reversed the decision of Sankey J. In that case the appellant was the sole proprietor, editor and publisher -0f the \" National Review \" and was asessed on the profits of the publication. The General Commissioners held that the appellant was exempt from duty as he carried on the profession of a journalist, the profits of which depended mainly upon his personal qualifications within the meaning of the Finance Act. On appeal, Sankey J. reversed the decision of the General Commissioners and held that the assessee was not in the position of an ordinary journalist but derived his profits by the sale of a commodity, thereby carrying on an -0rdinary commercial business. The Court of appeal upset this decision of Sankey J. and held that the .assessee was really carrying on two businesses, one that of a journalist, author and a man of letters and the other that of publishing his periodical. The result was that the profits of the two businesses were directed to be apportioned, though the process was by no means an easy one. The same principle was applied by the Calcutta High Court in a case where the growing of tea as an agricultural produce, which was not liable to income-tax wq.s carried on along with the business of manufacturing tea [vide Killing Valley Tea Co. v. Secretary of State (2 )]. It is true that these are cases where several businesses were amalgamated and carried on together, or more of which were not liable to tax or exc; ess profits duty ; but the principle of apportionment upon which these cases were decided -could, in my opinion, be applied with equal propriety to cases where one part of the busine!\"s is distinct and separate from the other parts and is capable of earning profits separately.\n\nThat profits could and should be allotted to and\n\n.(1) [1919] 1. K.B. 6{7. m I.L; R . .(8 Cal.161.\n\nCo1111n.; ssionet' of Incoffi -tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nAhmcdbhai U111arbluri & Co.\n\nM11khcrjea J.\n\nCo11111iissiu11er of !11co111c-fax,\n\n110111'1(!}'\n\nA/J111 .. :dbhai U111arbhai (.:Co.\n\napportioned between different parts of a business of a composite character is fully illustrated by the decision of the Privy Council in the Commissioner of Taxation\n\nv. Kirk('). In that case the assessees were a mining company who had mines in the colony of New South Wales.\n\nThe ore was extracted in New South V.'ales and was converted there into merchantable product.\n\nThe product, however, was sold not in New South \\; I/ales but in Victoria.\n\nUnder section 15 of the New South \\\\Tales Land and Income Tax Assessment Act, the following incomes were liable to be taxed :-\n\n\" Sub-section ( 1).\n\nArising or accruing to any person wheresoever residing from any profession, trade, employment or vocation carried on in New South \\Vales, whether the same be carried on by such person or on his behalf wholly or in part by any other person ...... (3) Derived from lands of the Crown held under lease or licence issued by or on behalf of the Crown. ( 4) Arising or accruing to any person wheresoever residing from any kind of property except from land subject to land tax as hereinafter specifically excepted, or from any other source whatsoever in New South Wales not included in the preceding sub-sections.\" It was held by the New South Wales Court that the assessee was not liable to tax under any of the above provisions. This decision was reversed by the Judicial Committee.\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships,\" so runs the judgment of the Judicial Committee, \" that there are four processes in the earning or production of this income- ( 1) the extraction of the ore from the soil ; (2) the conversion of the crude ore into a merchantable product, which is a manufacturing process; (3) the sale of the merchantable product; (4) the receipt of the moneys arising from the sale. All these processes are necessary stages which terminate in money, and the income is the money resulting less the expenses attendant on all the stages ...... The fallacy of the judgment of the Supreme Court in this and in Tindal's case is in leaving out of sight the initial stages, and fastening their attention\n\n111 [1 DJQJ A.C. 588.\n\nexclusively on the final stage in the production of the income.\"\n\nThus according to the Judicial Committee it was a fallacy to regard the profits as arising solely at the place of sale. It is to be noted that under the provisions of the New South Wales Act referred to above, the liability to tax depended not whether the income arose or accrued in New South Wales but whether it accrued from a source in New South Wales. This distinction is undoubtedly important and the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court was not, it seems, right in laying no stress upon it and in observing in course of his judgment that income accrues or arisEs only at the place where its source is situated. This aspect of the case I will . discuss later on in connection with the second point that arises for consideration in this case.\n\nIt is enough to state at the present stage that bn the authority of Kirk's case it would be quite legitimate to hold that a portion of the net profit that the assessees in the present case made out of their total business could and should be allotted to the manufacturing process that was carried on at Raichur. The view is strengthened by two recent pronouncements of the Judicial Committee, the earlier of which reported in International Harvester Company of Canada v.\n\nProvincial Tax Commission (1 ) discusses the point in great details 'and was followed in its entirety in the later decision in Provincial Treasurer of Manitoba v.\n\nWrigley Jr. Co. Ltd. (2 ). lri International Harvester Co. of Canada v. Provincial Tax Commission (1 ), the question for decision turned upon the construction of section 21 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1932 of Saskatchewan which after amendment was in the same terms as section 23 of the later Act of 1936.\n\nThe section provides that \" the income liable to taxation under this Act of every person residing outside of Saskatchewan who is carrying on business in Saskatchewan either directly or through or in the name of any other person shall be the net profit or gain arising from the business of such person in Saskatchewan.\" The .appellant company had its Head Office in Hamilton,\n\n(1) (194.9) A.O. 36.\n\n(21 (1950) A.I.R. 1950 P.O. 53.\n\n4.S\n\nCc.:1n1nissio11er of Inco1ne-tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nA/1medb/1ai Umarbhai &- CA>.\n\nMuklrcrjeaj.\n\nCo1J1111issioncr 'lJj lm.:01111.:.fax,\n\nBo1u.'n1y\n\nAlitHr:clbliai Vnurrbhai & Go.\n\n.. \\luldh'rjca J.\n\nOntario, and was for income-tax purposes resident outside of Saskatchewan.\n\nIts business was that of manufacturing and selling agricultural implements, the manufacturing operations being carried on entirely outside the province of Saskatchewan and the selling operations partly in that province and partly in other provinces and countries.\n\nThe selling business in Saskatchewan was carried on at Branch Offices, all moneys received by the appellant in Saskatchewan being deposited in separate bank accounts and remitted in full to the Head Office which sent to the Saskatchewan branches such moneys as were required for operating and incidental expenses. It was held by the Judicial Committee that any part of the appellant's net profit which might fairly be attributed to its manufacturing operations outside the.province of Saskatchewan was not profit arising from the business of the appellant in Saskatchewan within the meaning of section 21 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1932, as amended, and must be excluded in ascertaining the income of the appellant liable to taxation under that section.\n\nThe Judicial Committee in course of its judgment referred to the following passage occurring in the judgment of Duff C .• J. in the Supn: ne Court of Canada.\n\n\"The profits of the company are derived from a series of operations, including the purchase of raw materials or partly manufactured articles, completely manufacturing its products and transporting and selling them, and receiving the proceeds of such sales.\n\nThe essence of its profit-making business is a series of operations as a whole.\n\nThat part of the proceeds of sales in Saskatchewan which is profits is received in Saskatchewan, but it does not follow, of course, that the whole of such profit ' arises from ' that part of the company's business which is carried on there within contemplation of section 21 (a).\"\n\nTheir Lordships agreed with the appellant that a portion of the money received in Saskatchewan which represents net profit should be sub-divided and part of it should be treated as a ' manufacturing profit '\n\narisirig from the manufacturing business of the appellant outside Saskatchewan.\n\nThere was no insuperable difficulty according to their Lordships in making this apportionment.\n\nThis reasoning applies fully to the facts of the present case, though here again I should point out that the scheme of the Saskatchewan Act was to tax profits arising from a business in a particular place and to that extent the language of the Indian Act is undoubtedly different.\n\nLike the Kirk's case, it can, however, be taken as an authority for the proposition that in cases like the one we have before us, there <:ould be apportionment of the net profits that accrue to the business of the assessee and one portion of it could be allotted to that part of the business which relates to the manufacture of commodities which arc ultimately sold in the market.\n\nTJ.i.e later decision of the Judicial Committee referred to above simply follows the International Harvester Company's case without any further discussion.\n\nMr. Munshi in course of his arguments has referred to the provisions of section 42 (3) of the Indian Incometax Act and he contends that the language of this sub-section clearly indicates that in the contemplation of the legislature certain operatiot1s of a business could be regarded as a part of the business and the principle. of apportionment which this sub-section provides can very properly be made applicable to a case coming under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. Section 42, sub-section (1), provides inter alia that the whole of the income and profits accruing or arising whether directly or indirectly through business connection in British India would be deemed to be income accruing within British India so as to be liable to tax in this country. The scope of this provision is narrowed down by sub-rule (3) which provides that where all the operations of the business are not carried on in British India, the pr6fits and gains of the business deemed to accrue or arise in this country are limited to such profits or gains as can reasonably be attributed to the part of the\n\nCom.missione,.. of 1\"come-tax,\n\n&mba; y\n\nAhmedbhai Umarbhai & Co.\n\nM11kl1e1jea J.\n\nCo1J1111i.<; siont!r of Inco11tc+tax,\n\nBon1!ury\n\nv •\n\n. Al111ie:ll1/111 i Uniarbhai & Co.\n\n.Uuli!terj<'n J.\n\noperations carried on in this oountry. The Raichur factory certainly has business connection in British India for a part of the oil manufactured by it is sold through the Bombay establishment of the assessees.\n\nIt is clear also that all the operations of the Raichur business are not carried on in Bombay. Therefore, the profits that would be deemed under this section. to accrue or arise in Bombay will only be the profits which may reasonably be attributed to that part of the operations carried on in Bombay, tnat is to say, to sale of part of its oil in Bombay. As section 42 applies to an assessee who is a resident in India, there is no reason why this principle of apportionment should not apply to a case falling within the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nMr. Setalvad points out that section 42 contemplates income or profits not actually arising or accruing in British India but only deemed to arise or accrue in this country under the circumstances specified in the section, and therefore no such question can arise under proviso (3) to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. It appears, however, that in enacting proviso (2) to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act which relates to business carried on by a non-resident, the legislature had in mind the provision of section 42 of the Income-tax Act. The expression \" part of a business \" occurring in proviso (2) to section 5 can, therefore, be taken legitimately to mean such operations of the business to which separate profits are attributable as laid down in sub-section (3) of section 42. Although proviso (3) is applicable to a different set of circumstances, the words \" part of a business \" as used in that proviso must be taken to have been used in the same sense as in the earlier proviso and to this extent, at any rate, it favours the contention of the respondents that no cross-section of the entire business was meant by that expression.\n\nAgain it is quite true that there is no express direction as to apportionment in the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act as there is in sub-section (3) of section 42 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nHowever, pr')fits can accrue in respect to a part of a business only when apportionment is possible and it is\n\non this assumption that this proviso is based. If no apportionment can be made in respect of the processes or activities of a particular business, they will not be considered to be a part of the business at all and the proviso will not apply. The principle of apportionment, therefore, is implied in the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nI now come to the other question as to whether the profits of the manufacturing part of the assessees' business did arise or accrue at Raichur within the Hyderabad State. The point is not altogether free from difficulty and although a large number of decided authorities have been placed before us in this connection by the learned counsel on both sides, none of them seems to be directly in point. The cases cited relate mostly to different provisions of the Income-tax Act which make income taxable if it arises, accrues or is received in British India or is deemed under the provisions of law to arise, accrue or to be received in British India. So far as the third provirn to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act is concerned, it is to be noted that it uses the expression \"accrue\" and\" arise\" but not the word \"received \" and further there is no provision here under which income could be deemed to arise or accrue at a particular place even if it does not actually do so.\n\nProfits of a business are undoubtedly not \" received\" till the commodities are sold and they are ascertained only when the sale takes place, but the question is that if a part of the business which consists of manufacturing goods and is carried on prior to the sale, yields profits, do these profits accrue or arise only at the place where the manufactured goods are sold? We have been referred to a number of decided authorities, where the assessee carried on the business of buying and selling and the goods and raw materials were purchased in one place and sold in another and the question arose whether for purposes of taxation portion of the profits could be held to aris~ at the place of buying also.\n\nThe decision of the Madras High Court in Secretary, Board of Revenue, .Madras v. lvfadras Export\n\nCou11ui:>sio1Zcr of lncmm .. ·· t,1.-.:,\n\nBo:ubay\n\nV11larbllai & Co.\n\n.1luklw\"j, a J.\n\nCom1nissionef' of Income-tax,\n\nBo11ibay\n\nAfi1nr:dfJhai U111arbliai & Co.\n\nllfuklierjca J.\n\nCompany ( 1 ) is one of the leading pronouncements in this line of authorities. The question for decision in that case was whether the profits of a firm which had its headquarters in Paris and purchased raw skins through an Agent in Madras which were exported to and sold .in Paris were taxable in British India under section 33 (1) of the Income-tax Act of 1918 which corresponded, though not identically, to section 42 of the present Act. The question was answered in the negative. The learned Judges held that section 33 was not a charging but a machinery section and relied on the decision of the English Court i.n Greenwood v.\n\nSmidth and Company('), which laid down thata trade is exercised in the place where the business transactions are closed ; and in the case of a selling business, that place would be where the sales are effected and the profits realised. The propriety of the Madras decision was questioned by the Calcutta High Court in Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Company v. Secretary of State for India (•), and it was pointed out that the Judges of the Madras Court wholly overlooked a vital distinction between Indian and English Income Tax Law in so far as the former lays down that certain profits, though not actually arising or accruing in British India, should be deemed to arise or accrue in this country.\n\nUnder the English law, the essential thing for purposes of taxation was that profit should accrue from trade exercised within the United Kingdom and there was no provision there corresponding to that contained in section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThe decision in the Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v.\n\nMadras Export Company (1 ) was, however, followed by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in jiwandas\n\nv. Income-tax Commissioner, Lahore (4). In that case, the question arose as to whether a person residing and carrying on business in British India and purchasing goods there which were sold in Kashmir was liable to assessment on the ground that a part of the profits accrued within British India. The Full Bench gave a negative answe;: to this question and the basis.\n\n(I) l.L.R. 46 Mad. 36P. (2)\n\n[1922] I A.C. 417.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 52 Cal. I.\n\n(4) I.L.R. 10 Lah. 657.\n\n~ I\n\ni I\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME. CQ.cyT REPORTS 385\n\n-of the decision was that mere purchase of goods\n\nin British Indi~ had too remote a connection to justify the conclusion that a part o.f the pi; ofits should be held to have \"accrued\" in this country. As the business was one of buying and selling, it was held that the profits accrued or arose actually at the place where the g?ods were sol~ and not at t, he place where they\n\nwere merely purchased for export. It should be noted -that .this case was decided pr, or to 1939 and the -changes that were introduced into section 42 ..of the Income-tax Act by the Amending' Act of 1939 were not in existence at that time. The assessee was a resident of British India and tbe only question for deci- sion in that case was Whether the profits''did actually .arise or accrue in British India. It was held. that they did not. Both these cases were followed with .approval by a Mdras Special Bench in the subsequent .case of S. V. P. Sudalainiani Nadar v. Commissioner .of Income-tax, Madras( 1 ).\n\nThat was also a case where the assessee was a resident of British India and h::..viD; g-purchased animals in Briti$h India exported them to foreign countries for sale. It was held that he was not assessable to income-tax, as ' the profits were not received or brought into British India. , All these cases were. reviewed by a Division B.ench of the Oriss':l High COurt, consisting of Chief Justice Ray and 'Narasimham J. ij1 Rahim v. Commissioner oj Income- .tax (le).\n\nHere tpe assessee used to buy hides, horns, etc. in the Orissa State and sell them in British India and the q'uestion was whether any part of the profits .accrued or arose within an Indian State. The answer given by the Court was in the negative, though the Chief Justice in a separate judgment observed that he was not prepared to lay down as a proposition of law - that in all businesses of buying and selling, the entire profits necessarµy accrue at the place where the sales , take place. Each case would depend upon its own\n\ncircum$tnces and there may be cases where the place where tne commodities are purchsed pas an im'portance of its o\\VJl.\n\nOn the 'facts. of the ase which they were actually deciding it was said that the act of buying\n\n(1) A.LR. [19•11 Mad. 229. ('l) A.I.R. 119,9) Ori~ GO.\n\n1950\n\nCot11111issioucr of l11co111e:t<1x,\n\nBombay_ '\n\nAhmerlbli a i Vmarbhai &- Co.\n\n, U11kl1crjca J.\n\nContmissiancr of Inc01ne-tax,\n\nBmnbay\n\nAhniedbhai Umarbhai & Co.\n\nJ.Iuklzerjc11 J.\n\nwas so negligible a part of the operation of the business. as not to make any appreciable difference in the appor-· tionment of the amount that accrued or arose in British.\n\nIndia. , It will .be seen that none of these decisions are .really of any assistance to the appellant in the present case. All of them proceeded on the footing that no appreciable profit resulted from the operation of buying when the goods were purchased at one place and exported in a raw state to another place for sale. In the- Orissa case referred to above, Narasimham J. expressly observed in course of his judgment that the position. might be different if. the materials purchased underwent any manufacturing process_ before they. wereexported. If no profits really resulted - from .the purchasing part of the business; obviously the question of the place where~ such profits arise or accrue does not. become material at all.\n\nAs against these cases, several authorities havebeen cited to us which have proceeded on the footing that even purchase of raw materials could be an operation in connection with a business and if it was carried. on in British India, it might make the profits attributable to such operation taxable under. section 42 of - the Indian Income-tax Act. ·· The case of Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Company v. Secretary ojState for India(') is one of the leading decisions on this point. In that case, a company incorporated in U.S. A. and having its Head Office in New York, and Branch Offices, Agencies and factories in Calcutta, London, etc. pur~· chased goods in India for sale in America. It had also _ a factory in l:he United Provinces where raw produce\n\nwas bought locally and worked up into a form suitablefor exports to America. It was held that the company was not exempt fromassessment. to income-tax or super-tax in India.\n\nThis case was decided under section 33 of the'lncome-tax Act of 1918 and the judg-• ment shows that the principle followed in the case was similar to that which was subsequently embodied in section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act of 1922. The• - same line of reasonng was adopted by the Rangoon.\n\n(1) I.L.R. 52 Cal. 1.\n\nHigh Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v.\n\nMessrs. Steel Brothers and Company ( 1 ). Among recent cases, on this point, which were decided under section 42 of the Income-tax Act of 1922, can be mentioned the case of Motor Union Insurance Co.\n\nLtd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Bombay ( 2 ) and that of Webb Sons and Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax, East Punjab (a).\n\nIn the last case, the assessee company which was incorporated in the United States of America, was carrying on in America the business of manufacturing carpets. Its only business in India was the purchase of wool as raw material for the carpets. It was held that the purchase was an operation within the meaning of section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act and profits from such purchases could be deemed to arise in British India and was consequently assessable under section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nThese cases, jt must be admitted, are not of much assistance to the respondents in this case, though they do not help the appellant either. They were decided on the express language of section 42 of the Incometax Act, 1922, as it then stood or the section corresponding to it in the earlier Act. There remains for me to refer to the other line of authorities upon which the judgment of the High Court seems to be primarily based.\n\nIn my opinion, they cannot also be regarded as direct authorities on the. point requiring consideration in the present case. In Commissioner of Income- Tax v. Kirk l 4), the profits derived frnm extraction of ore from the soil and also from the conversion of the crude ore into merchantable product were held to be taxable, as the source of these profits was situated in New South Wales and that was the basis of taxation\n\nnder the New South Wales Act. The High Court was not right in holding that as a matter of law, profits must be held to arise at the place where the source of the profit is situated.\n\nThe Privy Council clearly laid. down in the case of the Commissioner of Incometax1 v. Cltunilal(5) that income from business does not\n\nCl) I.L.R. 3 Rang. 614.\n\n(2) A.I.R. [19,5] Born. 285 •\n\n.(3) [1950) 18 I.TR. 33.\n\nC'l [1900] A.C. 588.\n\n(5) 65 I.A. 332. ,9\n\nCo111111issioner of Inco111e-tax,\n\nB0111bay\n\nAl1111cdf>11ai U111arbhai & Co.\n\nCo11unissioncr of Jnconu:.tax,\n\nBonibay\n\nAJ1111edbhai Umarbliai &- Co.\n\nM'ikhcrfca /.\n\nnecessarily arise or accrue at the place from which directions are given or skill and judgment exercised, although the operat1ons may take place elsewhere ; and it is not the scheme of the Income-tax Act that the profits in the case of a business cannot be taken distributably but must be taken as a single indivisible result accruing at one place.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice of Bombay in support of his judgment relied strongly upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v . • Uathias('). In that case, the assessee, who was a resident of Mangalore in British India, owned coffee plantations in Mysore.\n\nThe harvested crops were brought to Mangalore to be dried and cleansed there in the factory of the selling agents of the assessee and sold there by that company, the sale proceeds being received and retained at Mangalore by the assessee himself. The question was whether the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit of the second proviso to\n\nection 4 (2) of the Income-tax Act and if so, to what extent? It was held by the learned Judges that the\n\nassess~~ was entitled to exemption of the whole profits earned 'by the sale of the produce at Mangalore, and the ground upon which the decision rested was that the agricultural produce itself could be taken to be income in kind which accrued at Mysore outside British India. On appeal to the Privy Council, this decision was reversed and the Privy Council took the view that as the income was received in British India, the proviso to sction 4 (2) had no application(•). The particular point upon which the Madras High Court based its decision was not considered by the Judicial Committee and was left open. Obviously in the case before us the manufactured oil that was produced at Raichur could not be taken to be income or profits in kind.\n\nThe manufactured products themselves cannot be regarded as income though the process of manufacture yields profits which form a portion of the profits ultimtely realised at the time of the sale. The question before\n\n(1) I.L.R. (1938] Mad. 25.\n\n(2) Vide Co1111nissioncr of lncometax v. Matltias-66 I.A. 23.\n\nus is, where do the profits resulting from the manufacturing process accrue or arise ?\n\nIt was pointed out by Muherji J. in Re Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Co. v. Secretary of State for India ( 1 ) that etymologically the word \"accrues\" connotes the idea of a growth, addition or increase by way of accession or advantage, while the word \" arises \" suggests the idea of growth or accumulation with a -tangible shape so as to be receivable. The two expressions denote almost the same idea and the difference only lies in the fact that one is more appropriate than the other when applied to particular cases. It is clear, however, as the learned Judge pointed out that these words have been used in contradistinction to the word \" received \" and both of them represent a stage anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable ; they connote a character of income which is more or less inchoate. As I have stated already, in proviso (3) to section 5 of the. Excess Profits Tax Act, the legislature has deliberately left out the word \"received\" and has spoken only of \" accruing\" or \"arising.\" This shows that the legislature l).ad in \"'.ind cases where profits could accrue to parts of a busmess before they were actually received. When a raw material is worked up into a new product by process of manufacture, it obviously increases in value ; in other words, there is an accretion of profit to it and the increased value represents this income or profit which is the result of manufacture.\n\nAs these profits accrue by reasW>n of manufacture, the accrual, in my opinion, cannot but be located at the place where the manufacturing -process is gone through. It is immaterial that the manufacture:d goods are sold later on at various places. If the manufacturer is himself the seller, it might be that he receives the entire profits including that of the manufacture only at the time of the sale ; but in an inchoate shape, a portion of the profits does accrue at the place of manufacture, the exact amount of which is 0•1~, y ascertained after the sale takes place. For purposes of computation, the two parts of the business may be conceived of as being carried on by two\n\n(1) 'I.L.R. 52 Cal. 1 at p. 30.\n\nCou111iissioner of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nAlwicdbhai Umarbhai &o Co,\n\n.llukherjea J.\n\nCommissioner of lncomctax,\n\nBombay\n\nAhmedbliai Umarbllai & Co.\n\nMt4khcrjea /.\n\nDas/.\n\ndifferent sets of persons. As soon as the manufacture is complete, that part of the business is finished and the profits that accrue to that part certainly arises at the place where the manufacture is carried on and not where the sale ultimately takes place. As the principle of section 42 of the Income-tax Act applies to this case the profits to be deemed under that section to accrue or arise in British India would only be the profits that may reasonably be attributed to one part of the operations, namely, sales of part of the oil; and the profits accruing or arising out of the other part of the operation, namely, the manufacture of the oil which takes place outside India could not be deemed to accrue or arise in In'dia. Where then these profits would arise or accrue or be deemed to arise or accrue except at the place of manufacture?\n\nMy conclusion, therefore, is that the profits of the manufacturing part of the assessees' business did accrue and arise at Raichur and the judgment of the High Court should be affirmed, though I do not concur in all the reasons given by the learned Judges.\n\nDAS J.-1 substantially agree with the .reasonings given in the judgment just delivered oymy learned brother Mukherjea and concur in dismissing this appeal.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the Appellant: P.A. Alehta.\n\nAgent for the Respondents: Ranjit Singh Narula.\n\n' '", "total_entities": 308, "entities": [{"text": "335\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA G~ SAIYID F AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 196, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 208, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prnjits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 249, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prnjits Tax Act", "statute": "Prnjits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prnjits Tax Act", "statute": "Prnjits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 634, "end_char": 639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prnjits Tax Act", "statute": "Prnjits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 646, "end_char": 655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prnjits Tax Act", "statute": "Prnjits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1372, "end_char": 1377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm which was resident in British India and carried on the business of manufacturing and selling groundnut oil, owned some oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil was manufactured."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1478, "end_char": 1491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm which was resident in British India and carried on the business of manufacturing and selling groundnut oil, owned some oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil was manufactured."}}, {"text": "Raichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm which was resident in British India and carried on the business of manufacturing and selling groundnut oil, owned some oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil was manufactured."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm which was resident in British India and carried on the business of manufacturing and selling groundnut oil, owned some oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil was manufactured."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1659, "end_char": 1665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The oil manufac tured in Raichur was sold partly within the State of Hyderabad and partly in Bombay :\n\nHelil,."}}, {"text": "Helil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1669, "end_char": 1674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The oil manufac tured in Raichur was sold partly within the State of Hyderabad and partly in Bombay :\n\nHelil,."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnJ the Fitll Comt (KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.)- The expression \"part of a business\" in the provieo to section 5 does not necessarily mean a separate composite unit of all the constituent activities of the business or a complete crosssection of the entire business operations but is wide enough to mean one or more of the operations of the business, and that the manufacturing operations which the firm carried on at Raichur were \"a part of tho business\" of the assessees within the meaning of the proviso.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1728, "end_char": 1736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnJ the Fitll Comt (KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.)- The expression \"part of a business\" in the provieo to section 5 does not necessarily mean a separate composite unit of all the constituent activities of the business or a complete crosssection of the entire business operations but is wide enough to mean one or more of the operations of the business, and that the manufacturing operations which the firm carried on at Raichur were \"a part of tho business\" of the assessees within the meaning of the proviso.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1738, "end_char": 1757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnJ the Fitll Comt (KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.)- The expression \"part of a business\" in the provieo to section 5 does not necessarily mean a separate composite unit of all the constituent activities of the business or a complete crosssection of the entire business operations but is wide enough to mean one or more of the operations of the business, and that the manufacturing operations which the firm carried on at Raichur were \"a part of tho business\" of the assessees within the meaning of the proviso.", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1773, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnJ the Fitll Comt (KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.)- The expression \"part of a business\" in the provieo to section 5 does not necessarily mean a separate composite unit of all the constituent activities of the business or a complete crosssection of the entire business operations but is wide enough to mean one or more of the operations of the business, and that the manufacturing operations which the firm carried on at Raichur were \"a part of tho business\" of the assessees within the meaning of the proviso."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1837, "end_char": 1846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244, "end_char": 2253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2283, "end_char": 2286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also pe1 K~NIA C .. J., FAZL ALI, :\\IEHH CHAND l\\LULUAN, l\\11..\"KHEHJEA and DAS J.J.-that the profits of that part of the business, namely, the manufacture of oil at the mill in Raichur accrued or arose in Haichur within the meaning of the said proviso, even though Lhe manufactured oil was sold in Bombay and the price\n\nwas received there, and accordingly, that part of the profits derived from sales in Bombay which was attributable to the manufacture of the oil in Haichur was exempt from excess profits tax nnder the proviso to section 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "\\IEHH CHAND l\\LULUAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2307, "end_char": 2327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also pe1 K~NIA C .. J., FAZL ALI, :\\IEHH CHAND l\\LULUAN, l\\11..\"KHEHJEA and DAS J.J.-that the profits of that part of the business, namely, the manufacture of oil at the mill in Raichur accrued or arose in Haichur within the meaning of the said proviso, even though Lhe manufactured oil was sold in Bombay and the price\n\nwas received there, and accordingly, that part of the profits derived from sales in Bombay which was attributable to the manufacture of the oil in Haichur was exempt from excess profits tax nnder the proviso to section 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "\"KHEHJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also pe1 K~NIA C .. J., FAZL ALI, :\\IEHH CHAND l\\LULUAN, l\\11..\"KHEHJEA and DAS J.J.-that the profits of that part of the business, namely, the manufacture of oil at the mill in Raichur accrued or arose in Haichur within the meaning of the said proviso, even though Lhe manufactured oil was sold in Bombay and the price\n\nwas received there, and accordingly, that part of the profits derived from sales in Bombay which was attributable to the manufacture of the oil in Haichur was exempt from excess profits tax nnder the proviso to section 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Haichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2478, "end_char": 2485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also pe1 K~NIA C .. J., FAZL ALI, :\\IEHH CHAND l\\LULUAN, l\\11..\"KHEHJEA and DAS J.J.-that the profits of that part of the business, namely, the manufacture of oil at the mill in Raichur accrued or arose in Haichur within the meaning of the said proviso, even though Lhe manufactured oil was sold in Bombay and the price\n\nwas received there, and accordingly, that part of the profits derived from sales in Bombay which was attributable to the manufacture of the oil in Haichur was exempt from excess profits tax nnder the proviso to section 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2804, "end_char": 2813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2986, "end_char": 2996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3369, "end_char": 3379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raicbur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It followed as a corollary that the rest of the profits attributable to the 1nanufacture at Raicbur rnust he regarded as accruing or arising in the Hyderabad State and ws therefore exempt under the proviso to s. 5 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3783, "end_char": 3787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4242, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MAHAJAN J.-Though profits may not be realised until a manufactured article is sold, profits are not wholly made by the act of sale and do not necessarity accrue a.t the place of sale a.nd to the extent profits are attributable to the manufacturing operations, profits accrue at the place where the operations are carried on."}}, {"text": "i\\fUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per :i\\fUKHERJEA J.-\\Vhere raw material is worked up into a new prorluct by process of manufacture, it obviously increases in value and this increase in value represents the income or profit which is the result of the 1nanufacture, and a.s this profit accrues by rea.son of the tnanufacture it cannot but be locn.ted at the place \\Vhere the inanufacturing process is gone through."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LXVIII of 1949] from a Judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 18th l\\Iarch 1948 (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in a Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LXVIII of 1949] from a Judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 18th l\\Iarch 1948 (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in a Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LXVIII of 1949] from a Judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 18th l\\Iarch 1948 (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in a Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940."}}, {"text": "Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5634, "end_char": 5682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "JYI. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JYI."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (B. Sen with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "ICM. JY!unshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ICM."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5784, "end_char": 5795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JY!unshi (S. K. Aiyar and N. K. Gamadia with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "N. K. Gamadia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5800, "end_char": 5813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JY!unshi (S. K. Aiyar and N. K. Gamadia with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5961, "end_char": 5995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered the following Judgments:-\n\nKANIA C.J .-This is an appeal from a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, under section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6025, "end_char": 6062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered the following Judgments:-\n\nKANIA C.J .-This is an appeal from a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, under section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6301, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act", "statute": "Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7664, "end_char": 7673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act", "statute": "Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7955, "end_char": 7964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act", "statute": "Raicbur and that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax under the Excess Profits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7972, "end_char": 7999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "cania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act shall apply to every business of which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that subsection: Provided that this Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or\n\nCo1n1nissioncf' of Inconie-tax 1\n\nBombay\n\nAll11iedbhai V111arbliai & Co.\n\n:cania C. J.\n\n]950\n\nCo111111 issio1£cr of lncotne-tax,\n\nBo111bay , ..\n\nAltuzedbl1ai Umarb/iai & Co.\n\nl(ania CJ."}}, {"text": "British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9576, "end_char": 9586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "sections 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9710, "end_char": 9720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "British India or are deemed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9866, "end_char": 9893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10543, "end_char": 10553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10568, "end_char": 10582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": ".Jerson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11889, "end_char": 11896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) All income, profits or gains accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in - British India, or through or from any property in British India, or through or from any asset or source of income in British India, or through or from any money lent at interest and brought into British India in cash or in kind, shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising within British India, and where the person entitled to the income, profits or gains is not resident in British India, shall be chargeable to income-tax either in his name or in the name of his agent ....\n\n(2) Where a person not resident or not ordinarily resident in British India, carries on business with a person resident in British India, and it appears to the Income-tax Officer that owing to the close connection between such persons the course of business is so arranged that the business done by the resident person with the person not resident or not ordinarily resident produces to , fhe resident either no profits or less than the ordinary profits which might be expected to arise in that business, the profits derived therefrom or which may reasonably be deemed to have been derived therefrom, shall be chargeable to income-tax in the name of the resident _.Jerson who shall be deemed to be, , for all the purposes of this Act, the assessee in respect of such income-tax."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12500, "end_char": 12509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13387, "end_char": 13396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15111, "end_char": 15120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16060, "end_char": 16070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16089, "end_char": 16103, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16320, "end_char": 16330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16400, "end_char": 16410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AJ1medbhai Vmarbhai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17316, "end_char": 17335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument sverlooks the distinction between accruing or arising on the one\n\nCmn111issio11er Of Income-tax;\n\nBombay\n\nAJ1medbhai Vmarbhai & Ci>."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17344, "end_char": 17349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C.J.\n\nCo111111i.-1sioner <8f Inco11i:!-fax1\n\nBo111'1ay\n\nAh11i:•dl1hai U111arbltai & Co.\n\nJ{auia C. J.\n\nhand and receipt on the other.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "Similarly cases which deal with the liability of the assessee under the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18535, "end_char": 18628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21468, "end_char": 21486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22655, "end_char": 22673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22831, "end_char": 22840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22889, "end_char": 22899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23387, "end_char": 23397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23457, "end_char": 23467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23486, "end_char": 23500, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "FAZL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23997, "end_char": 24001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au .J.-I agree fully with the judgment of Mahajan J.\natanjali sastri J.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate-\n\nTribunal, Bombay, under section 66 (1) of the Indian 1950 Income-tax Act, 1922, read with section 21 of the Co11-u1iission-er Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate-\n\nTribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24202, "end_char": 24241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au .J.-I agree fully with the judgment of Mahajan J.\natanjali sastri J.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate-\n\nTribunal, Bombay, under section 66 (1) of the Indian 1950 Income-tax Act, 1922, read with section 21 of the Co11-u1iission-er Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24249, "end_char": 24259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24283, "end_char": 24303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24315, "end_char": 24325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24351, "end_char": 24379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24798, "end_char": 24808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24818, "end_char": 24832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24852, "end_char": 24876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees are resident in Bombay and are registered for income-tax purposes, under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, under the name of Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., while their branch at Raichur is run under the name of Ahmed & Sons."}}, {"text": "Ahmed & Sons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24933, "end_char": 24945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees are resident in Bombay and are registered for income-tax purposes, under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act, under the name of Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., while their branch at Raichur is run under the name of Ahmed & Sons."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25153, "end_char": 25171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the chargeable .accounting period commencing from 31st October, 1940, .and ending on 20th October, 1941, the assessees were assessed to excess profits tax in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "20th October, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25188, "end_char": 25206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the chargeable .accounting period commencing from 31st October, 1940, .and ending on 20th October, 1941, the assessees were assessed to excess profits tax in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "21st October,\n\n1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25668, "end_char": 25687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the succeeding period commencing from 21st October,\n\n1941, and ending on 8th November, 1942, a tax of Rs- 2,55,485-1-0 computed on the same basis, was also imposed ."}}, {"text": "8th November, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25703, "end_char": 25721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the succeeding period commencing from 21st October,\n\n1941, and ending on 8th November, 1942, a tax of Rs- 2,55,485-1-0 computed on the same basis, was also imposed ."}}, {"text": "H.aichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25989, "end_char": 25997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees contended that a part of the profits derived from sales in British India of the oil manufactured at Raichur was attributable to the manufacturing operations at H.aichur which are an essential part of their business, and that such profits must be excluded from the assessment, under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, as having accrued or arisen in the Hyderabad State."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26132, "end_char": 26141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Conunissioner of Income-tax, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26512, "end_char": 26578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After unsuccessful appeals to the Appellate\n\n1950 Assistant Commissioner, Bombay, the assessees carried the matter to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Conunissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, but with no better result."}}, {"text": "Ahmcdbl•ai High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26735, "end_char": 26766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees Bomhay thereupon applied to the Tribunal requiring them to •· draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the Ahmcdbl•ai High Court at Bombay for decision of the question of U:aarbT1ai & Co. l d h ' 1 h _ aw mvolve , and t e Tnbunal according y stated t e\n\nPatanja!i sastri J. case and referred the following question: \"v\\'hether\n\non the facts stated above income accruing or arising to the assessees on sales made in British India of goods manufactured in Raichur situated outside British India has been rightly held by the Tribunal as income accruing or arising in British India and was liable to excess profits tax.\""}}, {"text": "Patanja!i sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26882, "end_char": 26898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees Bomhay thereupon applied to the Tribunal requiring them to •· draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the Ahmcdbl•ai High Court at Bombay for decision of the question of U:aarbT1ai & Co. l d h ' 1 h _ aw mvolve , and t e Tnbunal according y stated t e\n\nPatanja!i sastri J. case and referred the following question: \"v\\'hether\n\non the facts stated above income accruing or arising to the assessees on sales made in British India of goods manufactured in Raichur situated outside British India has been rightly held by the Tribunal as income accruing or arising in British India and was liable to excess profits tax.\"", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Raic:hur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28081, "end_char": 28089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as reframed is also open to similar criticism, for, it assumes that the manufacture of oil at Raic:hur is \" a part of the business\" of the assessees, whereas the Commissioner of Income-tax has been seriously contesting that position as the judgment under appeal itself shows."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28462, "end_char": 28471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28738, "end_char": 28747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28982, "end_char": 28991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29395, "end_char": 29404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29412, "end_char": 29439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30006, "end_char": 30020, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31051, "end_char": 31060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31176, "end_char": 31185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31271, "end_char": 31287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tax Act, and the duty would be leviable on the\n\nPatanjali Sastri J. pro1 fitds dofh the said.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31429, "end_char": 31438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31851, "end_char": 31860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Munshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32683, "end_char": 32689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both these propositions were held to be untenable by the learned Judges of the High Court and were contested before us by Mr. Munshi on behalf of the assessees."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33540, "end_char": 33549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33897, "end_char": 33906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33944, "end_char": 33954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33969, "end_char": 33983, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34088, "end_char": 34098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34839, "end_char": 34845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) All income, profits or gains accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in British India, or through or from any property in British India, or\n\nthroug~ or from any asset or source of income in British India, or through or from any money lent at interest and brought into British India in cash or in kind, shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising withinBritish."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35356, "end_char": 35366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Umarbhai & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35819, "end_char": 35833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ahm_dbluri It will be seen that these provisions, read together, Umarbhai & Co. lay down a rule of apportionment for ascertaining the\n\nPat,,,,1,-;;,.-;\"'''' J. profits of a business."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36334, "end_char": 36343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36533, "end_char": 36543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act or the Excess Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37542, "end_char": 37593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mathias", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37630, "end_char": 37637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear that the oil manufactured at Raichur cannot itself be regarded as income, profits or gains within the meaning of the • Indian Income-tax Act or the Excess Profits Tax Act any more th<:1n the green coffee in Mathias' case (1) which the Privy Council held could not be so regarded."}}, {"text": "Umar/Jhm t, Co.\n\nRaichur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38188, "end_char": 38212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the sales at Bombay of the product of the mill at Umar/Jhm t, Co.\n\nRaichur, arose in whole or in part a.t Raichur?"}}, {"text": "Chunilal lvfehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38306, "end_char": 38322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asp tan 7astri J pointed out by the Privy Council in Chunilal lvfehta's a ia'. . .", "canonical_name": "Chunilal lvfehta"}}, {"text": "Kirk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38935, "end_char": 38939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges in the Court below solved the problem by invoking what they conceived to be the general principle underlying the decision in Kirk's case ( 2 ), namely, the principle of apportioning profits r' as between the different processes employed in producing those profits and the different places where they are employed."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39174, "end_char": 39193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges disagreed with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Re Mohanpura Tea Co. (s) that the profits accrue or arise only when the goods are sold and at the place where they are sold, and that the decision in Kirk's case ( 2 ) laid down no principle of general application but proceeded on the language of an Australian statute."}}, {"text": "Mohanpura Tea Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39200, "end_char": 39217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges disagreed with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Re Mohanpura Tea Co. (s) that the profits accrue or arise only when the goods are sold and at the place where they are sold, and that the decision in Kirk's case ( 2 ) laid down no principle of general application but proceeded on the language of an Australian statute."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41610, "end_char": 41620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41628, "end_char": 41642, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41837, "end_char": 41847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43074, "end_char": 43091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A contrary view has, no doubt, been expressed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nWetern India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. ( t)."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43736, "end_char": 43746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by the Privy Council in Ba/raj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh( 2 ), marginal notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act of Parliament, cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute, and it may be mentioned in this connection that the marginal note relied on has since been replaced by the words \" Income deemed to accrue or arise within British India,\" which makes it clear that the main object of sub-section (1) wa5 to define that expression [see section 12 (a) of Act XXII of 1947]."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44080, "end_char": 44090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45161, "end_char": 45176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chunilal Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45447, "end_char": 45461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Munshi called attention to certain observations of the Privy Council\n\nin Chunilal Mehta' s case ( 1 ) as supporting his contention that, although all the operations of a business must be completed before profit is received, the accrual of the profits begins with the first operation and continues cumulatively till the goods are finally sold, and that, therefore, the expression \"accruing or arising in\" a place must be applied distributively to the different operations and the places where such operations are carried out.", "canonical_name": "Chunilal lvfehta"}}, {"text": "Liverpool", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47048, "end_char": 47057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships were dealing with a case where the .assessee, resident in Bombay, derived profits from speculative contracts for purchase and sale of commodities carried out through brokers in various foreign markets such as Liverpool; London and New York."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47059, "end_char": 47065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships were dealing with a case where the .assessee, resident in Bombay, derived profits from speculative contracts for purchase and sale of commodities carried out through brokers in various foreign markets such as Liverpool; London and New York."}}, {"text": "New York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47070, "end_char": 47078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships were dealing with a case where the .assessee, resident in Bombay, derived profits from speculative contracts for purchase and sale of commodities carried out through brokers in various foreign markets such as Liverpool; London and New York."}}, {"text": "Patrmjati sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47609, "end_char": 47625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nJt is with reference to such transactions which Alimcdbliai c:marbhai l; Co. individually contributed to the surplus arising in the various places abroad, that their Lordships spoke Patrmjati sastri J. of the profits accruing or arising distributively and not in a single place."}}, {"text": "Provincial Tax Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48308, "end_char": 48333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was also made to a recent decision of the same Tribunal in International Harvester Co. of Canada\n\nv. The Provincial Tax Commission ( 1 ) • The case arose out of the assessment of the profits of a non-resident to income-tax, under a provincial Income-tax Act in respect of the profits arising from the sale within the province of goods manufactured outside the province."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48446, "end_char": 48460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Their Lordships referred to other provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49036, "end_char": 49091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ahmedhlwi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49711, "end_char": 49720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. comity which naturally prevails between one province Ahmedhlwi and another.\""}}, {"text": "L'niarbhai & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49775, "end_char": 49791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to Kirk's case(') their Lord- L'niarbhai & Co. h k d h 1 h h h d  s rps remar e \"t at at oug t e sections un er con- PMtanjali sastri J. sideration in Kirk's case ( 1 ) differed in their language from the provisions which their Lordships were considering, the reasoning which appears in the judgment in that case was helpful to the appellants' contention in the present case.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50739, "end_char": 50750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a case stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, and it raises a question as to the liability of the respondent, Messrs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., for excess profits tax."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50892, "end_char": 50902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50914, "end_char": 50940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51014, "end_char": 51038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a case stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, and it raises a question as to the liability of the respondent, Messrs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., for excess profits tax.", "canonical_name": "AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51100, "end_char": 51109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "27th March, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51727, "end_char": 51743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated 27th March, 1944, the."}}, {"text": "28th March, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52241, "end_char": 52257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By another order dated 28th March, 1944 the ame officer assessed the firm to excess profits tax in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "21st October, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52396, "end_char": 52414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,55,485-1-0 for the chargeable accounting period commencing from 21st October, 1941 and ending on 8th November, 1942 on the business income of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53522, "end_char": 53531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54116, "end_char": 54128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order of the High Court is being contested in the present appeal and it has been urged that as regards the oil manufactured in Raichur but sold in British India, no profits accrued or arose in the Indian State, but the profits accrued or arose in British India and are subject to excess profits tax."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54312, "end_char": 54321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54674, "end_char": 54683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55033, "end_char": 55042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55050, "end_char": 55077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55613, "end_char": 55622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55952, "end_char": 55966, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56057, "end_char": 56066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "British India or are deemed under -the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56882, "end_char": 56942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57484, "end_char": 57494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India or are deemed under -the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "British India or are deemed under -the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57509, "end_char": 57523, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57707, "end_char": 57717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India or are deemed under -the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "British India or are deemed under -the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57725, "end_char": 57739, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "British.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57935, "end_char": 57943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the profits and gains of the business deemed under this section to accrue or arise in British."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58139, "end_char": 58149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58161, "end_char": 58175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Alunedbhai U111arbhai & Co.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58283, "end_char": 58310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the second proviso by reason of the application of section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act, if the manufacturing business of the assessee was in British\n\nCo11111iissioncr of brco11ic-tax,\n\nBouibay\n\nAlunedbhai U111arbhai & Co.\n\nf.IallajanJ,\n\nIndia and all his sales took place in Raichur, then excess profits tax could only be chargeable on such profits as would really be attributable to his manufacturing operations in British India and the manufacturing operations would be treated as part of the business of the assessee under the proviso.", "canonical_name": "Alunedb!tai U11zarbhai & Co."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60032, "end_char": 60041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61378, "end_char": 61387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61523, "end_char": 61532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61836, "end_char": 61842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other wor<ls, if a man is carrying on manufacture in textiles in Bombay, a shop at Mysore, has a distillery in Allahabad and has an oil mill in Gwalior, then for the purpose of section-Sall these four trades are part of the business within the meaning of proviso 3 to section 5, one part situate in one place and another part situate at another place and if any of these parts produce profits at the place of the business, that place being in an Indian State, then proviso (3) would have application."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61864, "end_char": 61873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other wor<ls, if a man is carrying on manufacture in textiles in Bombay, a shop at Mysore, has a distillery in Allahabad and has an oil mill in Gwalior, then for the purpose of section-Sall these four trades are part of the business within the meaning of proviso 3 to section 5, one part situate in one place and another part situate at another place and if any of these parts produce profits at the place of the business, that place being in an Indian State, then proviso (3) would have application."}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61897, "end_char": 61904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other wor<ls, if a man is carrying on manufacture in textiles in Bombay, a shop at Mysore, has a distillery in Allahabad and has an oil mill in Gwalior, then for the purpose of section-Sall these four trades are part of the business within the meaning of proviso 3 to section 5, one part situate in one place and another part situate at another place and if any of these parts produce profits at the place of the business, that place being in an Indian State, then proviso (3) would have application."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62021, "end_char": 62030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62313, "end_char": 62322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alimedbhai Umarbhai & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62630, "end_char": 62655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustratively it may be said that proviso (2) would cover the case if the manufacturing business of the\n\nCo11uniss''l1t11r of Inconw-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nAlimedbhai Umarbhai & Co.\n\nMahajau J.\n\nCo1111nissioncr of lnc01ne-tax,\n\nBonibay\n\nAhniedbhai Uniarbliai & Co\n\nrespondent was situate in Bombay and his sales exclusively were made at Raichur provided he was a non-resident.", "canonical_name": "AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "Ahniedbhai Uniarbliai & Co", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62711, "end_char": 62737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustratively it may be said that proviso (2) would cover the case if the manufacturing business of the\n\nCo11uniss''l1t11r of Inconw-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nAlimedbhai Umarbhai & Co.\n\nMahajau J.\n\nCo1111nissioncr of lnc01ne-tax,\n\nBonibay\n\nAhniedbhai Uniarbliai & Co\n\nrespondent was situate in Bombay and his sales exclusively were made at Raichur provided he was a non-resident."}}, {"text": "Justlce Tendolkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64893, "end_char": 64910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justlce Tendolkar on thi~ part of the case observed as follows :-\n\n\" The normal meaning of the word is a ' portion ' in whatever way carved out and I have no doubt in my mind that any of the operations that go towards a complete business are a part of that business."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65267, "end_char": 65276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malirrjau", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67136, "end_char": 67145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'lio1ter of I1rc01>1:•-tax,\n\nBo111hay\n\nAli1ucdbhai U111arb/1ai l; Ca ..\n\nMalirrjau J.\n\nCouullissioucr of lncontc-tax,\n\nBo111'1ay\n\nv Ah11icd!JJ1ai Untarbltai & Co.\n\n.;"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72422, "end_char": 72432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72447, "end_char": 72461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72520, "end_char": 72529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "faxse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72614, "end_char": 72619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Maxse (1 ),\n\nfaxse purchased a monthly magazine for £ 1,500-and was the sole proprietor, editor and publisher thereof."}}, {"text": "Maxse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72864, "end_char": 72869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before thi> war Maxse wrote a large part of each number, and, though some of the matter was contributed by others, the sales were largely due to the popularity of his own writings."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73234, "end_char": 73246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having been assessed to excess profits duty for the year ending May 31, 1915, he appealed to the General Income Tax Commissioners and contended that the profits were earned by reason of his personal qualifications, that the capital expenditure was small in comparison with the personal qualifications required to earn the profits, and that he was exempt from duty by virtue of para."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73561, "end_char": 73571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sankey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73698, "end_char": 73704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ General Commissioners having discharged the assessment, their decision was reversed by Sankey J. who held that Maxse was carrying on a commercial business and not a profession within para. ("}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75393, "end_char": 75402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saskatchewan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76011, "end_char": 76023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case it was argiled that when money was received by the appellant in Saskatchewan as a result of a sale in Saskatchewan the whole of the net profit on the sale arose from the business of the appellant in Saskatchewan; and no apportionment was necessary:."}}, {"text": "Conituissfotter of Income-tux,\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76264, "end_char": 76302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conituissfotter of Income-tux,\n\nBombay\n\nAhmedbhai Umarbhai Ii- Co.\n\nMa/iajanJ,'\n\nCo1n11iissioner of f11co111e-tax,\n\nHo1nbay v.\n\nAhnt('dbliai U11tarbhai & Co,\n\nAfahajan J.\n\nwas described by their Lordships as fallacious and untenable."}}, {"text": "Ahmedbhai Umarbhai Ii- Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76304, "end_char": 76330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conituissfotter of Income-tux,\n\nBombay\n\nAhmedbhai Umarbhai Ii- Co.\n\nMa/iajanJ,'\n\nCo1n11iissioner of f11co111e-tax,\n\nHo1nbay v.\n\nAhnt('dbliai U11tarbhai & Co,\n\nAfahajan J.\n\nwas described by their Lordships as fallacious and untenable.", "canonical_name": "AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "Lyman Duff", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76597, "end_char": 76607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships quoted with approval the following observations from the minority judgment of Sir Lyman Duff C. J.\n\nThe quotation is in these terms:-\n\n\"Nowhere does the statute authorise the Province of Saskatchewan to tax' a manufacturing company, situated as the appellant company is, in respect of the whole of the profits received by the company in Saskatchewan."}}, {"text": "Ontario", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77060, "end_char": 77067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not the profits received in Saskatchewan that are taxable, it is the profits arising from its business in Saskatchewan not the profits arising from the company's manufacturing business in Ontario and from the company's operations in Saskatchewan taken together, but the profits arising from the company's operations in Saskatchewan.\""}}, {"text": "Seta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78055, "end_char": 78059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Seta:lvad for the Commissioner placed reliance on a number of cases, inter alia, The Board of Revenue\n\nv. The Madras Export Company('), ]iwan Das v.\n\nIncome-tax Commissioner, Lahore(~).", "canonical_name": "Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Port Said Salt Association Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78247, "end_char": 78281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re Port Said Salt Association Limited (3 ), and Sudalaimani Nadar\n\nv. Income-tax Commissioner (4 )."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80442, "end_char": 80451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80476, "end_char": 80503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Alunedb!tai U11zarbhai & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80767, "end_char": 80795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B01uba y v.\n\nAlunedb!tai U11zarbhai & Co.\n\nMa/zaja11 ].", "canonical_name": "Alunedb!tai U11zarbhai & Co."}}, {"text": "Al11ncdbliai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80861, "end_char": 80873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coi11111issioncr of /11co111c-fax,\n\n1Jo111bay\n\nv. Al11ncdbliai l.h:za1bl1ai & Co.\n\nt\\lahaja11 J.\n\nfrom Bombay."}}, {"text": "sections 4, 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83078, "end_char": 83091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84188, "end_char": 84198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "These considerations lead their Lordships to the conclusion that under the Indian Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84277, "end_char": 84362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "fahnjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85293, "end_char": 85300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bo111fJay\n\nAl1111cdbl1ai\n\nfahnjan j.\n\nCo111111issio11cr of lnco11ic-tax, Bo11i!Jay\n\nAhn1cdhhai V1narbha i & Co.\n\nMaliajan J.\n\nneither framed nor carried out in British India, the High Court's conclusion that the profits accrued or arose outside British India is well founded.\""}}, {"text": "Maliajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85380, "end_char": 85388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bo111fJay\n\nAl1111cdbl1ai\n\nfahnjan j.\n\nCo111111issio11cr of lnco11ic-tax, Bo11i!Jay\n\nAhn1cdhhai V1narbha i & Co.\n\nMaliajan J.\n\nneither framed nor carried out in British India, the High Court's conclusion that the profits accrued or arose outside British India is well founded.\""}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87514, "end_char": 87528, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88132, "end_char": 88142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88154, "end_char": 88180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88347, "end_char": 88356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88631, "end_char": 88642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88650, "end_char": 88664, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90259, "end_char": 90268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90679, "end_char": 90688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91280, "end_char": 91289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91471, "end_char": 91480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91805, "end_char": 91814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91822, "end_char": 91849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92645, "end_char": 92654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94498, "end_char": 94506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the first part of Mr. Setalvad's contention, I do not think that it can be accepted as sound.", "canonical_name": "Setalvad"}}, {"text": "New South", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99166, "end_char": 99175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The product, however, was sold not in New South \\; I/ales but in Victoria."}}, {"text": "Victoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99193, "end_char": 99201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The product, however, was sold not in New South \\; I/ales but in Victoria."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99210, "end_char": 99220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tales Land and Income Tax Assessment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99240, "end_char": 99280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "New South \\Vales", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99473, "end_char": 99489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arising or accruing to any person wheresoever residing from any profession, trade, employment or vocation carried on in New South \\Vales, whether the same be carried on by such person or on his behalf wholly or in part by any other person ...... (3) Derived from lands of the Crown held under lease or licence issued by or on behalf of the Crown. ("}}, {"text": "New South Wales", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99900, "end_char": 99915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) Arising or accruing to any person wheresoever residing from any kind of property except from land subject to land tax as hereinafter specifically excepted, or from any other source whatsoever in New South Wales not included in the preceding sub-sections.\""}}, {"text": "New South Wales Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 99980, "end_char": 100001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the New South Wales Court that the assessee was not liable to tax under any of the above provisions."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 100724, "end_char": 100737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these processes are necessary stages which terminate in money, and the income is the money resulting less the expenses attendant on all the stages ...... The fallacy of the judgment of the Supreme Court in this and in Tindal's case is in leaving out of sight the initial stages, and fastening their attention\n\n111 [1 DJQJ A.C. 588."}}, {"text": "Tindal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100753, "end_char": 100759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these processes are necessary stages which terminate in money, and the income is the money resulting less the expenses attendant on all the stages ...... The fallacy of the judgment of the Supreme Court in this and in Tindal's case is in leaving out of sight the initial stages, and fastening their attention\n\n111 [1 DJQJ A.C. 588."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102490, "end_char": 102500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102512, "end_char": 102532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102596, "end_char": 102606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1932", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Hamilton", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 102999, "end_char": 103007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .appellant company had its Head Office in Hamilton,\n\n(1) (194.9) A.O. 36."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104197, "end_char": 104207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104219, "end_char": 104239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Duff", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104470, "end_char": 104474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Committee in course of its judgment referred to the following passage occurring in the judgment of Duff C .• J. in the Supn: ne Court of Canada."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105120, "end_char": 105130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1932", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "International Harvester Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 106273, "end_char": 106304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TJ.i.e later decision of the Judicial Committee referred to above simply follows the International Harvester Company's case without any further discussion."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106417, "end_char": 106427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106804, "end_char": 106813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106845, "end_char": 106855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108222, "end_char": 108232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108402, "end_char": 108411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108473, "end_char": 108483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108728, "end_char": 108737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108822, "end_char": 108831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108963, "end_char": 108973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108981, "end_char": 108995, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109063, "end_char": 109072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109229, "end_char": 109239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109702, "end_char": 109711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109776, "end_char": 109786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109794, "end_char": 109808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110243, "end_char": 110252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110745, "end_char": 110759, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110965, "end_char": 110974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 111995, "end_char": 112012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Madras High Court in Secretary, Board of Revenue, .Madras v. lvfadras Export\n\nCou11ui:>sio1Zcr of lncmm .. ·· t,1.-.:,"}}, {"text": "V11larbllai & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 112124, "end_char": 112141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bo:ubay\n\nV11larbllai & Co.\n\n.1luklw\"j, a J.\n\nCom1nissionef' of Income-tax,\n\nBo11ibay\n\nAfi1nr:dfJhai U111arbliai & Co.\n\nllfuklierjca J.\n\nCompany ( 1 ) is one of the leading pronouncements in this line of authorities."}}, {"text": "Paris", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 112434, "end_char": 112439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question for decision in that case was whether the profits of a firm which had its headquarters in Paris and purchased raw skins through an Agent in Madras which were exported to and sold .in Paris were taxable in British India under section 33 (1) of the Income-tax Act of 1918 which corresponded, though not identically, to section 42 of the present Act."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 112484, "end_char": 112490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question for decision in that case was whether the profits of a firm which had its headquarters in Paris and purchased raw skins through an Agent in Madras which were exported to and sold .in Paris were taxable in British India under section 33 (1) of the Income-tax Act of 1918 which corresponded, though not identically, to section 42 of the present Act."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112569, "end_char": 112579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112591, "end_char": 112605, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112661, "end_char": 112671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112764, "end_char": 112774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 113318, "end_char": 113330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The propriety of the Madras decision was questioned by the Calcutta High Court in Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Company v. Secretary of State for India (•), and it was pointed out that the Judges of the Madras Court wholly overlooked a vital distinction between Indian and English Income Tax Law in so far as the former lays down that certain profits, though not actually arising or accruing in British India, should be deemed to arise or accrue in this country."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 113709, "end_char": 113723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the English law, the essential thing for purposes of taxation was that profit should accrue from trade exercised within the United Kingdom and there was no provision there corresponding to that contained in section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113792, "end_char": 113802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113817, "end_char": 113831, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 113967, "end_char": 113984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in the Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v.\n\nMadras Export Company (1 ) was, however, followed by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in jiwandas\n\nv. Income-tax Commissioner, Lahore (4)."}}, {"text": "Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 114191, "end_char": 114198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the question arose as to whether a person residing and carrying on business in British India and purchasing goods there which were sold in Kashmir was liable to assessment on the ground that a part of the profits accrued within British India."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115028, "end_char": 115038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115048, "end_char": 115062, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115898, "end_char": 115901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reviewed by a Division B.ench of the Oriss':l High COurt, consisting of Chief Justice Ray and 'Narasimham J. ij1 Rahim v. Commissioner oj Income- .tax (le)."}}, {"text": "Narasimham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115907, "end_char": 115917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reviewed by a Division B.ench of the Oriss':l High COurt, consisting of Chief Justice Ray and 'Narasimham J. ij1 Rahim v. Commissioner oj Income- .tax (le)."}}, {"text": "J.Iuklzerjc11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116942, "end_char": 116955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950\n\nCot11111issioucr of l11co111e:t<1x,\n\nBombay_ '\n\nAhmerlbli a i Vmarbhai &- Co.\n\n, U11kl1crjca J.\n\nContmissiancr of Inc01ne-tax,\n\nBmnbay\n\nAhniedbhai Umarbhai & Co.\n\nJ.Iuklzerjc11 J.\n\nwas so negligible a part of the operation of the business."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118172, "end_char": 118182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118199, "end_char": 118213, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "U.S. A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 118384, "end_char": 118391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, a company incorporated in U.S. A. and having its Head Office in New York, and Branch Offices, Agencies and factories in Calcutta, London, etc."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 118478, "end_char": 118486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, a company incorporated in U.S. A. and having its Head Office in New York, and Branch Offices, Agencies and factories in Calcutta, London, etc."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 118541, "end_char": 118548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pur~· chased goods in India for sale in America."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118821, "end_char": 118831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118983, "end_char": 118993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119005, "end_char": 119019, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rangoon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119077, "end_char": 119084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The• - same line of reasonng was adopted by the Rangoon."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119264, "end_char": 119274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119282, "end_char": 119296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 119563, "end_char": 119587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the last case, the assessee company which was incorporated in the United States of America, was carrying on in America the business of manufacturing carpets."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119809, "end_char": 119819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119831, "end_char": 119845, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119958, "end_char": 119968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119980, "end_char": 119994, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120182, "end_char": 120192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120200, "end_char": 120219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "nder the New South Wales Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120851, "end_char": 120879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121648, "end_char": 121662, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 122029, "end_char": 122038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the assessee, who was a resident of Mangalore in British India, owned coffee plantations in Mysore."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122458, "end_char": 122472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Muherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123704, "end_char": 123711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Muherji J. in Re Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Co. v. Secretary of State for India ( 1 ) that etymologically the word \"accrues\" connotes the idea of a growth, addition or increase by way of accession or advantage, while the word \" arises \" suggests the idea of growth or accumulation with a -tangible shape so as to be receivable."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124543, "end_char": 124552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124561, "end_char": 124583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126257, "end_char": 126267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126275, "end_char": 126289, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127191, "end_char": 127200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-1 substantially agree with the .reasonings given in the judgment just delivered oymy learned brother Mukherjea and concur in dismissing this appeal.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "P.A. Alehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 127284, "end_char": 127295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Appellant: P.A. Alehta."}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 127325, "end_char": 127344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Respondents: Ranjit Singh Narula."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_391_434_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 391\n\nNANALAL ZAVER AND ANOTHER\n\nBOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and DAS, JJ.]\n\nIndian Companies Act (VII of 1913), s. _ 105-C-Company- Outsidet trying to get control of management by p11rchasing shores\n\n-Issue of further shares-Offer of new shares to es; isting shareholders-Validity of resolution and offer-Company in need of funds-Additional motit1e to pret1ent outsidet getting control-Bona fides of resolution-Scope of s. 105-C.\n\nA company was incorporated with a capital divided into 10,000 shares. After 5,404 shares had been subscribed, the directors of the company, finding that a businessman. who had several other businesses and who was likely to use the funds of this company for his own businesses, was trying to get control of this company by purchasing its shares, resolved to issue the remaining 4,596 shares and qffered . these shares to the existing shareholders in the proportion of four new shares for every five she.res held by them.\n\nTwo of the shareholders of the company instituted .a suit age.inst the company and the directors for the following reliefs: (i) a. declaration that the resolution of the directors and the offer of shares contravened the provisions of section 105.c of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and was therefore ultra vires and illegal; (ii) a. declaration that the. offer of she.res was not made bona fide or in the interests of the company and was therefore illegal ; a.nd (iii) to restre.in the defenda.nts from allotting any shares in pursue.nee of their offer :\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAB JJ.- that inasmuch as the sh!Lres resolved to be issued were offered to the existing shareholders only, and not to any outsider a.nd these shares were also offered to the existing shareholders in proportion to the she.res held by each member without making any discriminatior.<,, between them the two requirements of section 105-C were complied with and the resolution e.nd offer did not contravene tba.t section even though 272 shares remained undistributed as a. result of the offer of four new shares for every five shares.\n\nMay 4.\n\nN anal al Zaver\n\nAnd A1wther\n\nBo1nba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nA.nd Others\n\nI<an; a C. J.\n\nHeld also per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, Mux1rnRJEA and DAS JJ.-that the fact that one of the motives of the directors in issuing further shares was to prevent an outsider who ha.d not yet become a shareholder, from getting control of the company did not render the resolution or the offer illegal inasmuch as such a motive could not in itself be said to be not in the inherests of the company and even assuming that such a. motive was bad this n.dditional motive could not render the resolution and offer illegal as the company was in fact in need of further funds and it was necessary in the interests of the company to issue further shares.\n\nJ., dgment of th• Bombay High Co!f.rt affirmed.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay: (Civil Appeal No. LXIX of 1949).\n\nThis was an appeal from the judgment and decree of thE: High Court of Bombay dated 1 lth March, 1949,\n\n(Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Appeal No. 85 of 1947, confirming a \"decree of the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction dated 10th November, 1947. The facts of the case and arguments of the counsel are set out in the judgment.\n\nN. P. Engineer (M. !JI. Desai and H.]. Umrigar with him) for the appellants. -\n\nl\\f. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi with him) for respondents Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 and 9.\n\n1950. May 4.\n\nThe Court delivered the following Judgments:\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The respondent company was incorporated in 1908 with an authorised capital of Rs. IO lakhs divided into 10,000 shares of Rs. 100 each. By 1945, 5,404 .shares were subscribed and Rs. 25 per share were called on each of them. Four thousand five hundred and ninetysix shares out of the authorised capital thus remained unissued. From about July, 1944, Mr. Padampat\n\nSinghania, a businessman interested in many companies, began to purchase shares of the company from the holders thereof on a large scale. This naturally •\n\nput up the price of the shares considerably. On the 18th September, 1944, at a board meeting of the directors the chairman drew attention of his co-directors to the attempt thus made by an outsider to corner the shares of the company. In pursuance of a resolution passed at the meeting, the chairman issued a circular to the existing shareholders acquainting them of the true . position and suggesting that if they wanted to part with the shares they might get in touch with the chairman. A circular was accordingly issued with the result that two rival groups were thus offering to buy shares from those who were desirous of selling them.\n\nThe shares on which about Rs. 12 or 14 were paid per annum as dividend began to be quoted in the market at about Rs. 2,000 per share in March, 1945. Mr. , Singhania had not submitted to the company for registration of the transfers to his name the shares purchased by him. In the meantime on the 8th January, 1945, an application was submitted by the company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for sanction of a fresh issue of capital. Several reasons were mentioned in that application to show why the company iequired additional capital. Such application had become necessary owing to war regulations. The Government granted the sanction on the 16th February, 1945, and the communication was received by the company on the 20th of February. On the next day a board meeting was held at which the directors decided to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of Rs. 75 per share and to call Rs. 25 per share on them.\n\nPursuant to this resolution a circular was issued to the shareholders on the same day with copies of the form of application . and renunciation referred to in the resolution and in the circular. The shares were offered to the shareholders shown on the register of members in the proportion of four further shares for every five shares held by them .. ·· The last date for submission of the application and payment was 10th March, 1945.\n\nThe Uirectors and their friends in the next few days applied and were allotted 1,648 shares. By the 6th of March, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to shareholders who had applied for the same.\n\nNanalal Zaver\n\n, tfld Anothe 1 .\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nKanta C.J.\n\nN an.alal Z ave,.\n\nAnd Another\n\nBoin.bay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nl{ania C. J.\n\nThe appellants are two shareholders of the company. They filed the suit, out of which this present appeal has arisen, \" for themselves and all other aggrieved shareholders of the company.\" The defendants are the company and eight directors.\n\nIt is contended in the plaint that the whole issue of these further shares and the idea of increasing the capital of the company was mala fide and with the object of retaining the control and management of the company in the hands of defendants 2 to 9. It is further contended that the resolution of the directors and the offer of shares contained in the circuluar letter were in contravention of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. There were further prayers restraining the company and directors from proceeding with the allotment of shares. It was contended that the com- . pany was not in need of capital and the issue of further\n\nshares was not made bona fide for the benefit or in the interest of the company but had been made \" merely with the object of retaining or securing the second defendant and his friends the control of the first defendant company.\"\n\nConsiderable evidence was led in the trial Court on rhe question of bona fides.\n\nThe trial Court held that the issue of new shares was bona fide and the appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that the object of the directors in issuing the new shares was not merely with the object of retaining or securing to the second defendant and his friends the control of the first defendant company. They held that the company was in need of capital. The suit was consequently dismissed and that decision was affirmed by the High Court on appeal.\n\nThe decision of the appellate Court has been challenged before us on both grounds. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants did not contest the concurrent finding of fact of both the lower Courts to the effect that the company was in need of ctlpital.\n\nIt was however urged on their behalf that as the issue of these shares, although not admitted in the written\n\nstatement but admitted in the course of evidence, was for the purpose of preventing the control of the company going in the hands of Mr: Singhania, the directors had not acted bona' fide and solely in the interest of the company. I have read the judgment prepared by Das J. and I agree with his conclusion and line of reasoning on this part of the case. In my opinion, the contention of the appellants on this point was rightly rejected by both the lower Courts and that contention must fail.\n\nThat leaves the question whether the issue of these shares was in contravention of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. That section rnns as follows:-\n\n\" Where the directors decide to increase the capital of the company by the issue of further shares such shares shall be offered to the members in propor. tion to the existing shares held by each member (irrespective of class) and such offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares fo which the member is entitled and 1imiting a time within which the offer if not accepted, Will be deemed to be declined ; and after the expiration of such time, or on receipt of an intimation from the member to whom, such notice is given1hat he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose of the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company.\"\n\nOn behalf of the respondents three answers were submitted. The first was that the section deals with the -case of increase of capital by the directors beyond the authorised limit and as in the present case the new shares were issued within the authorized limit of capital, the section has no application. The second was that the terms of the section should be construed in a practical way . and. there was no. difference between Regulation 42 in Table A of the Companies Act and section 105-C in respect of the scheme to offer the proportion_ of shares to the existing shareholders. It was iifgued that so long as they were offered \" as nearly as circumstances admit \" the directors had complied with the requirements of the section and therefore their action was not illegal. The third answer was that in fact the directors had not committed any\n\n19;;0\n\nN a1Url al Z aver\n\nA11d Aflother\n\nBomb\" y I; ife Assurance Ca..\n\n;\\ nd Others\n\n/(ania C. J.\n\nNanalal Za1•cr\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo1nba y L(fe Assuran:c Co.\n\nA1td Others\n\nJ(auia C. J.\n\nbreach of the terms of section 105-C up to now and therefore their action cannot be held to be illegal. In view of my conclusion on the third point it is not necessary to express any opinion on the first two answers. submitted on behalf of the respondents. It seems to me that section 105-C, interpreted strictly as contended by the appellants, casts on the directors two obligations. They have to offer the shares issued to the shareholders on the register of the company and not to anyone else, and secondly, the offer must be ' in the same proportion to all the shareholders and there should be no discrimination amongst them. It is not contended that by the offer made by the directors fo the shareholders there has been any discrimination amongst the shareholders on the register of the company. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the directors had failed to offer all the shares resolved to be issued by them to the existing shareholders and therefore the requirements of the section had not been complied with. It was argued that the directors having resolved to issue 4,596 shares, they had to offer that whole lot at once to the shareholders on the register and the result of the offer made by them was to retain in their hands 272-4/5 shares. In my opinion, this contention is unsound.\n\nBy their resolution of the 21st February, 1945, the directors.resolved to issue.4,596 shares out of the authorized capital of the company. They have offered shares to the existing shareholders in the proportion of four new shares to five shares held by them. Inasmuch as the offer does not absorb the whole lot of 4,596 shares I am unable to construe the offer as an offer of the whole fot at once to the existing shareholders.\n\nUnless the whole lot of shares in pursuance of the offer could be accepted and taken up I am unable to consider the offer contained in the circular as an offer of the 4,596 shares.\n\nThat however does not establish the contention of the appellai:its. I find notin? in the section to justify the conclusion that the directors must offer all the shares resolved to be issued in one lot to the shareholders.\n\nI can conceive of numerous cases where a _; limited company with a growing business does not\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUP~EME COURT REPORTS 397\n\nrequire its capital to be called up at once. For instance, soon aftel a company is formed it may issue shares of, say a lakh of rupees required for the construction of the buildings, and after . a year when it requires ft'.lrther capital for payment of machinery etc. it can issue further shares. I do not think the section as worded prevents the directors from issuing shares to existing sharholders from time to time in that way. As noticed before, the object of the section is to prevent discrimination amongst shareholders and prevent the djrectors from offering shares to outsiders before they are offered to the shareholders. So long as these two requirements are complied with, the action of the directors in selecting the time when they will issue the shares as also the proportion in which they should be issued is a matter left to their discretion and it is not the province ; of the Court to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. This is of course subject to the general exception that the directors are not to act against the interest of the company or mala fide.\n\nNo such question arises in this case and therefore it is unnecessary to discuss that aspect of the situation.\n\nIn my opinion tp.erefore on this. third ground this contentio~. of the appellants should be rejcted.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nN anal al Z avu\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Llfe Assu,.an -:e Co-.\n\nAnd Ot/lus\n\n[(a11ia C. J,\n\nMAHAJAN J .-This is an appeal by special leave M11T1ajm1 J from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. arid Tendolkar J.) dated 11th March, 1948, confirming the judgment of the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction (Bhagwati J.) dated IGth Novmber, 1947.\n\nThe two questions canvassed in this appeal are:\n\n(1) whether the issue of further shares by the directors was in contravention of the provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act, and (2) whether this issue was not made bona fide.\n\nBoth these questions 'were answered in favour of the respondents by the High Court.\n\n'~ The Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., the first c; iefendant in the case, was incorporated in the year --\n\nJo.ia11al11l Zl1't't'I\"\n\nAnd A11otlter\n\nBo111hay l.rje Ass11ranc.! Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\n1908 as a limited company with an authorized capital of ten lakhs. Five thousand four hundred and four shares had been issued till the year 1945 and they were paid up to Rs. 25 each. The second defendant is the chairman of the board. of directors which is comprised of defendants 2 to 9. The company has a life fund of Rs. 230 lakhs.\n\nIn the year 1944 Sir Padampat Singhania, an industrialist of Kanpur, attracted by the soundness of this concern, began purchasing the shares of the company with a view to acquiring a controlling interest in its management.\n\nSoon after competition started for the purchase of the shares of the company between the Singhania group and the Maneklal Premchand group who were in management of this company.\n\nThe result of this competition was that shares which .were ordinarily quoted at 250 went up as much as to\n\n2,000 in March, 1945.\n\nA circular was issued by the directors to the shareholders apprising them of the activities of the Singhania party and suggesting that those who wanted to sell their shares should sell them in the first instance to the chairman. This circular does not seem to have had much effect as the shareholders wanted to reap the maximum benefit which would come to them as a result of this competition between two rich parties. By the end of December, 1944, the Singhania group had purchased 2,517 shares as against 2,397 held by Maneklal Premchand's party.\n\nThe Singhania group had thus acquired a majority of the shares in the company though these had not yet been transferred in their name. On 8th January, 1945, the chairman at his own instance and after consulting some of the directors made an application to the Examiner of Capital Issues for permission for a fresh issue of capital. This was allowed on 20th February,\n\n1945. As soon as sanction of the Examiner of Capital Issues was obtained for increasing the capital of the company, a meeting of the directors was held OJ} 21st February, 1945, and it adopted the following resolution:--\n\n1. That the capital of the company be increased from Rs. 5,40,400 to Rs. 10,00,000 by the issue of the\n\n' /\n\nremaining 4,596 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each at a premium of Rs. 75 per share.\n\n2. That as on the existing shares of Rs. 100 each Rs. 25 is paid up, to call Rs. 22 per, share on these new shares also.\n\n3. That these new shares shall rank pari passu in all respects with the existing shares ofthecompany, but they shall be entitled to rank for dividend as from 1st April, 1945.\n\n4. That these new shares shall be offered in the first instance by a circular to the shareholders of the\n\nompany as shown on the register of members on 20th February, 1945, in the proportion of four new shares to every five shares held by them in the capital of the company on that date.\n\n5. That in the case of any shareholder holding less than five shares, or whose holding of shares shall not be complete multiples of five shares, then fractional certificates shall be issued to such shareholders in respect of their rights for fraction of a share, each fractional certificate representing one-fifth of a share.\n\n6. That a sum of Rs. 100 per share (Rs. 25 towards capital and Rs. 75 for premium) shall be payable along with application for these new shares.\n\n7. That all applications for shares in accordance with this offer (including applications for shares made in respect of and accompanied by fracticmal certificates and applications for shares accompanied by a renunciation) must be presented to and payment made at the registered office of the company in Bombay on or before the 10th March, 1945. . Any shareholder or person in whose favour a renunciation has been signed not applyin, g Qil or before the 10th March, 1945, in terms of tlie{(Tfer shall be deemed to have declined to participate in tliis new issue and all fractional certificates not presented as required on or before 10th March, 1945, will case to have any validity and will not entitle the hC\\Jder to any rights.\n\n~· That any balance of the shares remaining out Of this issue not applied for by the: 10th March, 1945, shall be disposed of by the directors as they may consider best in the interests of the company.\n\nNanalal Zaver\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBomhay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA11tl Others\n\n.UahajanJ.\n\nNanalal Zavcr\n\nAnd Another\n\nY, &tuba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\nJ\\lahajanJ.\n\n 9. That the draft circular to the shareholders with the enclosures (form A being the form of application, form B form of renunciation and form of fractional certificates with application form) placed on the table by the manager and actuary be approved and initialled by the chairman.\n\n10. That the manager and actuary be and is hereby directed to issue forthwith the necessary circulars to the shareholders.\n\n11. That a committee consisting of the chairman and any one of the directors or the chairman and any two of the directors be and are hereby appointed to scrutinise the application for the new shares which may be received and to make allotment of these new shares. * * * * .\" It is the validity of this resolution that is the subject matter of the present dispute; The plaintiffs, who are two shareholders of the company owing allegiance to the Singhania group, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises challenging this issue of further shares, principally on two grounds, viz. (1) that. the new issue contravenes the provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act, and (2) that the issue of shares was not bona fide made in the interests or for the benefit of the first defendant company, but was resolved upon merely with the object of retaining or securing to the second defendant and his friends control of the first defendant company.\n\nAs already stated, both these contentions were negatived by the trial Judge and the suit was dismissed and this decision was affirmed on appeal.\n\nThe answer to the first question pepends on the meaning to be given to the words used in section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act as to its scope.\n\nThe section was introduced in the Indian Companies Act in the year 1936.\n\nAntecedent to this period the question of issue of new shares by the directors was dealt with by article 42 of the Articles of Assqciation given in the schedule to the Indian Companies Act,\n\n1913. The article was in these terms:- ' \" Subject to any directions to the contrary that ' may be given by the resolution sanctioning the ..\n\nincrease of share capital, allnew shares shall, before issue, be offered to such persons as at the date of the offer are entitled to receive notice from the company of general meetings in proportion, as nearly as the drcumstances admit, to the amount of the existing shares to which they are entitled.\"\n\nAs its language indicates, the article only applied to cases where the capital of the company was increased by a resolution of the company. It had no application to cases where the directors issued further\n\nshares within the authorised limits. The new section introduced in 1936 is in these terms:-.\n\n\"Where the directors decide to increase the capi., tal of the company by the issue of further shares such shares shall be offered to the members in proportion to the existing shares held by each member (irrespective of class) and such offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares to which the member is entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted will be deemed to be declined, and .after the expiration of such time or on receipt of an intimatiou from the member to whom such notice is given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose of the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company.\"\n\nIt qualifies the discretion of the directors in the matter of issue .of capital by enjoining on them that if they decide to issue further shares, the existing shareholders should be given the first option to buy them.\n\nThe language employed in th~ section admits of. three possible interpretations : ( 1) that its scope is limited tQ cases where there is an increase in the capital of the -company according to the provisions of section 50; (2) that the section covers within its ambit all issue of further qi.pital whether made by increasing the nominal capital or by. issuing further shares with.in the authorised capital ; (3) that the section has appllcation only to , cases where the directors issue further shares within the authorized limit. \\ The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the whole int(lnt and purpose of the section was to limit the discretion 'of directors in' regard fo the issue\n\nNana/al Zavcr\n\nAnd 111zotlla\n\n\\', Bombay Ufe A ssurancc Co.\n\nA>ul Others\n\nltlalinja\"l\n\nNanalal Zaver\n\nAnd Anotlu1\n\nBoiirba y Life Asst'1ance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMahajan J.\n\nof further shares in those cases alone where there was\n\nan increase in the nominal capital of the company by recourse to the provisions of section 50 of the Indian Companies Act. It was argued that the phrase \"increase of capital\" has been employed by the legislature in section 50 and some other sections preceding section 105-C with reference only to the nominal capital of a company and' that this expression had not been used with reference to the subscribed capital anywhere in the Act and therefore the scope of section 105-C should be limited to cases where the increase in the capital is brought about under section 50 of the Act and new shares are created and issued by the directors. In Sircar and Sen's Indian Companies Act, 1937 Edn. at page 309 the learned authors observe as follows :-\n\n\" The words •further shares' must be read in conjunction with the words 'decide to increase the capital of the company.' They must mean shares which are issued for the purpose of increasing the capital beyond the authorized capital.\" .\n\nMr. Ghosh on Indian Company Law, 8th Edn. at page 263 has stated as follows :-\n\n\" The object of this new section appears to be to make the salient provisions of Regulation 42 in Table A compulsory. The section as drafted is liable to the construction that whenever the directors !lecide to increase the capital of the company by the issue of further shares, even if it be a part of the authorized capital, the new shares must be first offered to the existing shareholders. But this section should be read in conjunction with clause (a) of section 50 under subsection (2) of which the directors have no power to increase the share capital of the company. Therefore it seems that the words •further shares' mean shares beyond the authorized capital of the company.\"\n\nWhatever might be the opinion expressed by these commentators, the matter has to be decided on the language of the Act itself. As already pointtd out,. the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the above was the correct view as to the scope of the ,\n\n' section. The learned counsel for the appellants however urged that on a proper interpretation of the\n\n...\n\nsection its scope could not be limited only to cases of issue of further shares by creation of new shares by increasing the nominal capital of the company, but that the language employed in the section also included within its ambit cases where there was a further issue of shares by the directors, within the authorized capital. The learned counsel laid considerable emphasis on the expression \" further shares \" used in the section and suggested that these words have been used advisedly instead of the expression \"new shares \" in order to bring within the scope of the section increases in the capital of a company whether within the authorised limit or outside it.\n\nThe third interpretation of the section finds support from the language employed by the legislature in the opening part of the section, wherein it is said : \" Where the directors decide to increase the capital of the company by the issue of further shares ....... \" The directors can only decide to increase the capital at their own initiative when they issue further shares out of the authorised capital. In no other case can the directors themselves decide as to the increase in the capital ot a company. Under section 50 the capital can only be increased by a resolution of the company. Once the company has increased the nominal capital, then the directors can issue shares within the new limit. Therefore the authority of the directors, strictly speaking, in respect to the increase of capital is limited to an increase within the authorised limit. They cannot by their own decision increase the nominal cap-ital of the company. In view of this language the third interpretation of the section seems more plausible.\n\nThe expression \"capital of a company \" is an ambiguous phrase and may mean either issued capital or authorized capital according to the context. It has been used in different senses in various parts of the Act. In what sense it has been used in this section is by no means an easy matter to decide, particularly in view of the fact that in spite of the introduction of this ction in the Indian Companies Act in the year 1936r article 42 still remains as one of the articles to be adopted by companies if they do not choose otherwise 51\n\nNana/al Zat'el\"\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance C<>..\n\nA11tl Others\n\nMahaja1'].\n\n!950\n\nNa1ialal Zavcr\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBoml1a y Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMahajan/,\n\nand this refers to cases of increase in the nominal capital of a company. In my opinion, for the purpose of deciding the present case it is not necessary to pronounce on the question as to the precise scope of the section because I consider that on any interpretation of it the appellants' contention has to be negatived. If the interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, then the plaintiffs' contention on the first question fails, because here there has been no increase in the capital of the company under section 50. Conceding however for the sake of argument (but not deciding) that the scope of the section is as it has been contended for by Sir Noshirwan, the question still remains \" To what extent has there been a contravention of its provisions by the directors in the present case.\" So far as I have been able to see, the resolution passed by the directors is in accordance with the provisions of the section and does not injuriously affect the shareholders or the company, and they cannot be said to have any cause of grievance against it.\n\nIn other words, in my opinion, the resolution substantially complies with the provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. The directors offered all the new shares to the shareholders in the ratio of 4 to 5, as the shares of the company were held in multiples of five to a larger extent than in any other multiple. The result of fixing this ratio is that 272 shares remain outside the offer. In whatever other proportion the shares were offered, still a few shares were.bound to remain unoffered. If a liberal interpretation is placed on the section, then it has to be held that the directors' resolution substantially complies with its provisions. On the other hand, if a technical and literal interpretation is placed on the section, then the directors were bound to offer the shares in the ratio of 4596/5404 in spite of the practical difficulties that might result in the actual working out of such a proportion, and irrespective also of whatever absurdities or anomalies might thus result. I am of the opinion that the section has to be given a workable construction and a. construction that is businesslike in preference to a literal construction which might lead to a deadlock. In each .\n\ncase it should be seen whether the directors have substantially complied with the provisions of the section or not.\n\nThe basic idea underlying the section is that whatever is given, is given to all the existing shareholders and is distributed equally and equitably between them.\n\nIt cannot be denied that all the shareholders were offered the further shares arid that they were offered equally and equitably. Whatever is the balance remains with the company with the result that the capital remains unincreased to this extent. In such a situation it is difficult to hold that the resolution passed by the directors has contravened the provisions of section 105-C and has caused any detriment or injury either, to the company or to the shareholders. Even if the resolution passed by the directors is held to be in technical breach of the section, as it has caused no injury to anybody, the resolution cannot be held to be void. Under the law as it existed prior to 1936, if a company iecorporated in its Articles of Association article 42 mentioned in the schedule to the Indian Companies Act, then in the case of issua of new shares the directors' discretion was curtailed inasmuch as they were bound to offer these shares in the first instance in proportion as nearly as the circumstances admitted to the amount of the existing shares to the existing shareholders but in all other cases their discretion remained unfettered. It was open to a company not to adopt article 42 and thus fetter the discretion of the directors even in the case of the issue of new capital.\n\nAfter 1936. it has been made obligatory on the directors to give the first option to buy further shares to the existjng shareholders and without any favour to anyone. That being the intent and purpose of the section, it has been fully carried out by the directors in the present instance and has been carried out in a businesslike way because the ratio in which they offered the shares is the ratio which works to the convenience of the largest number of shareholders as the shares of the company are held mostly in multiples of five. If the\n\nshares were issued in any other ratio, that would have created some difficulty in the way of shareholders who held shares in multiples of five and who owned 2, 110\n\nN anal al Z aver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Ufe Assurn1t -; e Co-.\n\nAnd Others.\n\nM alwjan J.\n\n] 950\n\nNanalal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo11iba y Life Ass11ran ; e Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMahajan}.\n\nshares. They would have been obliged to collect fractions before they could claim a whole share and thus make an application within the time allowed to exercise the option. Where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. In my opinion, the section when it says \"such. shares shall be offered to the members \" should be construed liberally and not literally, as such an interpretation would make th~ section workable and would not in any way affect its intent and purpose, the phrase \"such. shares\" meaning those shares which admit of being so offered in a businesslike way.\n\nIt was argued that a liberal interpretatibn of the section would result in the directors allottii:ig the balance of shares remaining out of the further shares unoffered to their own friends and relations and it would operate to the detriment of the other shareholders. In this connection reference was made to para 8 of the resolution above mentioned. In my opinion this paragraph does not bear out the contention of the appellants because it has reference only 'to shares not applied for, obviously shares not offered and which could not be taken up by the shareholders cannot fall under that description. That paragraph applies only to cases where the shares could be applied for and then no application was made in respect of them. It was not disputed that the directors in., the present case had not sold these shares to any one and that these have remained unissued. It was urged strongly by the learned counsel for the appellants that the section being imperative and its language being unambiguous, the Court was bound to place a literal interpretation on it and 'the argument of. hardship or inconvenience should not weigh with it. It was further suggested that the directors could always give effect to.,\n\nthe provisions of the section by increasing the capital in a manner and to the extent that the further shares\n\n<:ould be offered to the shareholders in such a proportion that all the shares offered could be taken up by them. In other words, it was contended that the section not only fetters the powers of the directors in the matt- er of sale of shares but it also restricts their discretion in the matter of increase of capital and as to the number of further shares. This contention, if accepted, would mean that the legislature by enacting section\n\n105-C indirectly enjoined on the directors that when- ever they decide to increase capital by issue of further shares they should make the increase only to such an extent and in a manner as to enable the existing shareholders to take the whole of it. If that was the\n\nintenion of the section, there was nothing easier for the legislature to say so. The section, on the other\n\n1 hand, recognizes that the directors have a discretion in the matter of the increase of capital when it says, \"'' when the directors decide to increase the capital of a company.\" It means that it is within their absolute discretion to take the decision whether to increase the capital or not. It is also within their discretion to say to what limit and to what extent they will increase the -capital. It is also for them to decide how many shares and of what value ±h.ey will issue. Once they have taken their decision, it is then and then only that. section 10sc comes into operation. At that stage they have to offer the new shares to the shareholders and at that stage they can offer them i.J; i a businesslike manner io all of them equitably and equally and if out of the shares offered some cannot be taken up by the shareholders as they do not fit in the ratio in which th~ Offer ha:; been made, the only result isthat those shares Temain unoffered and thus unissued. I am therefore -0f the opinion that the learned Judges of the Court of appeal were right when they held that under section\n\n105-C the shares have to be offered to the existing shareholde1s as nearly as the circumstances would admit and that the section has to be given a businesslike construction and should be construed liberally and\n\ni. that the charge of contravention of section 105-C cannot be levelled against the directors -so long as they .ha, ve not disposed of the unoffered balance contrary tb\n\nN analal Z aver\n\nA11d Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA\".d Others\n\nlYlahajan J.\n\nN anal al Z aver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo111!Jay Life Assrv-t11icc Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMaliajanJ.\n\nthe provisions of the section. The result . is that the first contention of the learned counsel stands negatived.\n\nThe next question whether the action of the directors in passing the resolution was not bona fide seems to be concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the\n\nCourts below to the effect that the resolution was passed because the company needed additional funds at the moment when the new issue was decided upon and that the issue of shares was not due solely to the desire on the part of the directors to keep themselves in the saddle.\n\nIt is not the practice of this Court ordinarily to interfere with concurrent conclusions on questions of fact reached in the Courts below unless those conclusions have been reached on extraneous considerations or by violating rules of procedure or by committing any breach of some provision of law : vide Srirnati Bibhabati Devi v. K urnar Rarnendra Narayan Roy ( 1 ).\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants while conceding that it was not open to him to challenge concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below, urged that the whole case has been looked at by them from an erroneous angle. It was contended that the Courts below had misdirected themselves in their approach to the\n\ndecision of the issue of bonafides. In this connection emphasis was laid on the following observations in the\n\njudgment of the learned Chief Justice and on similar observations occurring elsewhere :-\n\n\"In this particular case it is urged and urged with considerable force that the reason whiCh actuated the directors on the 21st February, 1945, in resolving to issue new shares was the fear that the Singhania group would capture the company and oust the present directors from their vantage point and take control of the company itself. It may be that one of the factors that weighed with the directors was that consideration. It may even be that it weighed with them a great deal.\n\nIt may also be that the directors selected this particular time viz. the 21st February, 1945, for the issue of •\n\nthese shares because of the impending danger of the\n\n(1) 73 I.A. H6.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l<.EPORTS 409\n\nmajority of shares going into the hands of the Singhania group with the necessary consequences. If, with all that, it is established before the Court that in fact on the 21st February, 1945, the company was in need -of funds, that the funds were required for the working of the company, then the Court will not interfere with -the discretion exercised by the directors, because the principle is obvious that if the new shares have been issued because the company needs funds, then it cannot be said that the discretion vested in the directors has been exercised not in the interests of the company or for the purpo$e of the company. It is only when that discretion is exercised solely for the personal ends -of directors, for their personal aggrandisement, for keeping themselves in power, then undoubtedly that discretion cannot be said to have been exercised for -the purpose of or in the interests of the company.\"\n\nReference was also made to the concluding part of the same judgment which runs thus :-\n\n\"Undoubtedly this is a case of high finance and. we have been given a glimpse of what high finance can be and there is great justification in what Mr. Amin .has said as tq the manner in which some of the things were done with regard to the affairs of this company. :But ultimately we must come down to the one short and simple question, was the company in need of funds at the time when the directors decided upon the issue of new shares, and in my opinion there can be no doubt on the evidence led this case that the answer to that question must be in the affirmative. If that be the position all other consideratio_ns can be of no avail or -Of very little avail as against this central fact in this\n\nase and as I am satisfied as to the central fact, I would agree with the learned judge who took the same view and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden which lily upon theni of establishing that the issue of new shares was\n\nnot bona fide and not in the interests of and for the benefit of the compan:y.\"\n\nIt was argued that the learned Judges were not -right in thinking that all other considerations were of\n\nN analal Z er-Jet\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMahajauJ.\n\nNanalal Zaver\n\n;.lnd Anotlii.:r\n\nBo1111'ay lzfe Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nr.talu1ja11 J.\n\nno avail and shoqlg be practically kept out of consideration once it was-established that the company needed funds. It was said that it having been found that at the time of the aforesaid resolution the directors were considerably influenced by the consideration of keep- - ing out the Singhania group from capturing the company, and by the consideration of keeping themselves in the saddle, it should have been held that they were acting with an ulterior motive, and that their decision as to the need of the company for further funds was. vitiated by reason of the ulterior motive.\n\nIt is convenient here to state what the true approach should be to a question of this nature when it arises in a case. It is well settled that in exercisingtheir powers whether general or special, the directors must always bear in mind that they hold a fiduciary position and must exercise their powers for the benefit of the company and for that alone and that the Court can intervene to prevent the abuse of a power whenever such abuse is held proved, but it is equally settled that where directors have a discretion and are bona fate' acting in the exercise of it, it is not the habit of the Court to interfere with them. When the company is in no need of further capital, directors are not entitled to use their power of issuing shares merely for thepurpose of maintaining themselves and their friends in management over the affairs of the company, or merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority of shareholders.\n\nIt appears to me that the learned Judges in the Court below approached the decision of this question in the light of the principles stated above and thecontention of the learned counsel therefore does not seem right. Where the directors are not chargeable for breach of trust so far as the company is concerned and where their action is for the benefit of the company, then merely because in promoting the interests of the company they also promte their own interests it cannot be held that they have not acted bona fide.\n\nAs it has been said in Hirsche v. Sims (1 ), if the true effect of the whole evidence is that the defendants truly\n\n(1) (189') A.C. 65•.\n\nand reasonably believed at the time that what they did was for the interest of the company, they are not chargeable with dolus malus or breach of trust merely because in promoting the interest of the company they were also promoting their own, or because they afterwards sold shares at prices which gave them large profits.\n\nBoth the Courts below have found as a fact that to a certain extent in resolving to issue new shares the directors were actuated by a fear that the Singhania group would capture the company and oust the present directors from their vantage point and take control of the company itself. It was argued that this motive was an ulterior motive and the exercise of power by the directors to achieve this objective by the issue of further shares was an exercise of power for the purp.::>se for which it was not conferred. This argument would have had force if this was the main purpose of the directors in issuing the further shares, but this is not the case here. As found by the High Court, the central fact working in the mind of the directors was the necessity of further funds for the company at the moment they passed the resolution. That being so, it seems to me that the existence of the other motive does not make the action of the directors in respect of the issue of further shares mala fide.\n\nMoreover, in the present case it seems to me that the directors were on the defensive. They felt that the attempt of the Singhanias to capture the controlling interest in the company by paying high prices for its shares must have been with a purpose, i.e., to make use of the funds of the company in their own concerns.\n\nSome evidence of this exists on the record. They thought that it was their duty as directors to protect the company from such an attack and they felt that it was beneficial to the company to protect it from such an attack. They did not keep the matter in secret but informed all the shareholders about it. They first attemptea to enter into the field of competition with the Singhanias but it seems that they were not wholly successful in their objective. They then decided to issue further capital 'by taking into consideration the\n\n/Ii .. a1u1lal Za'f)r•'\"\n\nA11d Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co ..\n\nA11d Others\n\nMahajan/.\n\n.Nana/al Zav11r\n\n1-111d AnothiJr\n\nBonzba y Life .Assurtu1ce Co,\n\nAnd Otltcrs\n\nMal1ajanJ.\n\ninterest and the needs of the company and its requirements in respect of capital at the moment. They also thought that by this action they would also be able to keep out the Singhanias from capturing the company. They were under no obligation to Singhanias who had not yet even been entered as shareholders on the register of shareholders. There was no dolus malus in their mind as directors of the company, as affecting the company or its shareholders. On the other hand, they honestly considered it to be in the best interests of the company to meet such an attack.\n\nThe result therefore is that it cannot be held that this is one of those unusual cases where this Court should not give weight to the concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below, or that it is a case where it can be held that the High Court in arriving at its findings has committed a breach of any rule of procedure or law and that there is no evidence to support the findings that have been arrived at.\n\nThe result therefore is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nDasJ.\n\nDAS J.-1 agree that this appeal must be dismissed. As, however, my decision rests on slightly different reasons, I desire to state them in my judgment.\n\nFor the purpose of appreciating the questions involved in this appeal which has been brought by the plaintiffs it will suffice to set out the following facts.\n\nThe Bombay Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as \" the company \") was incorporated in 1908 with an authorised capital of Rs. 10,00,000 divided into 10,000 shares of Rs. 100 each. By 1945, 5,404 shares in all were subscribed, and Rs. 25 per share had been paid on them.\n\nThis left 4,596 shares out of the total authorised capital yet to be issued. The plaintiffs are two of the shareholders of the company.\n\nRespondents 2 to 9 are the.directors of the company of whom respondent 2 is the chairman of the board of directors.\n\nIt appears that\n\nfrom July, 1944, shares in the company began to be purchased from the holders thereof by or in the interest of SrFPadampat Singhania. This attempt to buy up the shares on a large scale naturally resulted in a sudden rise in the price of tP.e shares. This abnormal rise in the price could not but attract the attention of the board of directors. On September 18, 1944, a board meeting was held at which the chairman drew the attention of his co-directors to the serious implications of the attempt of an outsider group to corner the shares of the company. It was decided at that meeting that a circular should be issued to the shareholders acquainting them of the tru\"; l position and the chairman was authorised to sign the circular.\n\nAccordingly, on September 19, 1944, a circular was issued to the shareholders drawing their attention to what was happening and exhorting them, in case they wanted to dispose of their holdings, to offer them to the chairman. The result of the chairman and other directors entering the arena was a race for purchase of shares of the company which inevitably led to a pheno- menarrise in the price of the shares. The shares which in 1944 were quoted at Rs. 250 per share went up to Rs. 2,000 per share in March, 1945. I.t may be noted here that the shares purchased by the Singhania group were not submitted for registration of the transfers with the result that their names have not yet been entered on the register of members. In the meantime, on January 8, 1945, an applic;, i.tion was submitted by the company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for sanction for a. fresh issue of capital, setting forth several reasons for whieh such . capital was required by the company. The required sanction dated :February 16, 1945, was received by the company on February 20, 1945, and on the next day (February 21, 1945) a board meeting was held at which the directors decided to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of Rs. 75 per share and to call-up Rs. 25 per share on them. The minutes of the board meeting (Ex. 0) are printed at pages 301-2 of the Paper Book. Pursuant to this resolution of the board a circular (Ex. Q) was issued to the shareholders on the same day with copies\n\n!950\n\nNaualal Zat1£r\n\nAIJd An-0tlter\n\nBombay Life AsSt11a1tce C0r.\n\nAud Others\n\nDas/.\n\nNa1tt1lal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo1nba y Lift Assurance Co.\n\nArid Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nof the form of application and form of renunciation referred to in the resolution and in the circular.\n\nThese further shares, were offered to the shareholders shown on the.register of members in the proportion of four further shares to every five shares then held .by them.\n\nThe last date for submission of the applications and necessary payments for the shares so offered was fixed for March IO, 1945. It is said that on the very next day after the board meeting 1,648 shares were allotted and that between February 22, and March 6, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to the shareholders who had applied for the same.\n\nThe suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed on March 5, 1945.\n\nThe plaintiffs are two of the members of the company suing \" for themselves and all other aggrieved shareholders\" of the company. The defendants are the company and the eight directors.\n\nThe reliefs prayed for are as follows, inter alia :\n\n(a) That it may be declared that the resolution of the directors and the offer referred to in para 6 hereof contravenes the provisions of section 105-C of Indian Companies Act and was and is ultra vires, and illegal ;\n\n(b) That it may be declared that the said offer of shares referred to in para 6 hereof is not bona fide or in the interest of the defendant company and is ultra vires and illegal ;\n\n(c) That the defendants 2 to 9 may be restrained by an injunction from allotting any shares or doing any further act in pursuance of the said offer.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that none of the shareholders other than the directors to whom further shares had been allotted before the filing of the suit has been made a party to the suit. Further, even as against the defendants 2 to 9 the consequential relief by way of cancellation of the allotments of further shares to them and the rectification of the register in respect thereof has not been prayed for by the plaintiffs.\n\nThe contentions of the plaintiffs as set forth in the plaint on which the above prayers were founded may be summarised shortly as follows :\n\n(i) the company was not in need of capital,\n\n(ii) the issue of further shares was not made bona fide for the benefit or in the interest of the company but had been made \" merely with the object of retaining or secqring to the second defendant and his friends the control of the first defendant company,\" and\n\n(iii) the issue and offer of farther shares are illegal and void for contravention of the provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. It is necessary to examine each of these contentions and to ascertain their effect. - Re (i): Both the Courts below.have found it as a fact that at the time the directors resolved upon the issue of further shares the company was in need of capital for the purposes mentioned in the company's application to the Examiner of Capital Issues referred to above. This concurrent finding of fact has not been contested before us and the next contention of the appellants will have to be examined in that light.\n\nRe (ii) : It is not disputed that the company's need for funds standing by itself will afford a good motive to the directors to issue further shares. The contention, however, is that if that motive was not the sole motive but was mixed up with any other motive, it was an abuse of the powers of the directors to issue further shares. This plea is clearly a departure from the case made in the plaint. There the case was that there was no need for funds at all and the sole motive of the directors was merely to retain their own control over the affairs of the company. It will, however, be a hypertechnicality to shut out this piea altogether.\n\nThe plea of mixed motive raises three questions, namely- ( a) whether apart from the motive of finding further capital for the company, there was any, and, if so, what_ other motive,\n\n(b) was that other motive vitiated by bad faith, and -\n\n(c) if it was so vitiated, whether the presence of it nullified the good motive and rendered the issue of further shares illegal and void.\n\nN analal Z ave1'\n\nAnd Another\n\n'I• BombP:V Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas.].\n\nN analal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo1nbay Life Assurance Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas].\n\nThe contention of the plaintiffs before Bhagwati J. as before us, was that the company was not in need of any further capital in February, 1945, and that the directors of the company decided to issue the further capital merely with a view to retain control of the management of the company in their hands. On the evidence before him, Bhagwati J. found that the motive of the directors was rather to keep the Singhania group out of the control of the company than to retain their own control. The race for the purpose of purchasing the shares was not merely for the purpose of increasing their holdings for holdings' sake but was really with a view to prevent the Singhania group from obtainirig a majority of shares which would give them the control of the management of the company and enable them to utilise the life funds of the company for the purposes of the various industrial concerns of the Singhania group.\n\nThe result of keeping out the Singhania group might well be_ to strengthen the position of the directors and to keep them in the saddle, but the proximate motive was to exclude the Singhanias. The distinction is real and quite understandable. The appeal Court does not appear to have dissented from this view of the matter .and I do not see any reason to take a different view.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that apart from the rrtotive of raising fresh capital for the purposes and benefit of the company, the directors also had another motive, namely, to prevent the Singhania group, who are strangers to the company, from intruding into its affaii:s so as to be able to assume a controlling hand in its management for their own purposes rather than for the benefit of the company.\n\nOn the evidence on record the existence of this motive side by side with the motive of raising further capital cannot be denied.\n\nThe question then arises whether in acting up to it the directors were actuated by bad faith. In coming to a conclusion on this point it has to be borne in mind_ that the Singhania group had only purchased some shares from various existing shareholders but did not submit the transfers of registration so q.s to get their names put upon the register of members: It is clear that until the Singhania group get their names\n\nentered in the register of members, they are not shareholders but are complete strangers to the company.\n\nIt has been held in Percival v. Wright( 1 ) that ordinarily the directors are not trustees for individual shareholders.\n\nEven if the directors owe some duty to the existing shareholders on the footing of there being some fiduciary relationship between them as stated in some cases [see for example In re Greshain Life Assurance Society] ( 2 ), I see no cogent reason for extending this principle and imputing any kind of fiduciary relationship between the directors and persons who are complete strangers to the company. In my judgment, therefore, the conduct of the respondents 2 to 9 cannot be judged on the basis of any assumed fiduciary relationship existing between them and the Singhania group. In my opinion, the respondents 2 to 9 owed no duty to the Singhania group and, therefore, the motive to exclude them cannot be said to be 1nala fide . per se. In North-West Transportation Company, Ltd.\n\nv. Beatty (3 ) the Judicial Committee observed at p. 601:\n\n\" But the constitution of the company enabled the defendant J.H. Beatty to acquire this voting power; there was no limit upon the number of shares which a shareholder might hold, and for every share so held he was entitled to vote, tbe charter itself recognised the defendant as a holder of 200 shares, one-third of the aggregate number; he had a perfect right to acquire further shares, and to exercise his voting power in such .a manner as to secure the election of directors whose views upon policy agreed with his own, and to support those views at any shareholders' meeting.\"\n\nBeatty referred to in the above passage was a director. It follows therefore, that the fact of the directors entering into a competition with the Singhania group in purchasing the shares of the company was quite legitimate and was not mala fide. It was urged, however, that the issuing of further shares, although the company required further capital, was, in the circumstances, evidence of bad faith. Bhagwati J. dealt (I) L.R. (1902) 2 Ch. ,21. (2) L.R. S Ch. App. 4'6 at p. ~~9.\n\n(3) L.R. 12 A.O. 589.\n\nNana/al Zavc1\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Life Assura11.ci! Co.\n\nA1'd Others\n\nDasJ.\n\n!950\n\nN analal Zaver\n\nA11d Another\n\nB0111ba y Life Assurance Co.\n\nAud Others\n\nDas}.\n\nwith the various acts of the directors relied upon by the plaintiffs as indicating bad faith on the part of the directors and on a consideration of all of them was \" unable to come to the conclusion that the issue of new shares was decided upon by the directors not bona fide in the interests of the company and merely with a view to keep the control of the affairs of the company in their hands.\" The learned Judge, therefore, came to the conclusion that the :issue of further shares and the offer thereof made on the 21st February, 1945, was. not ultra vires and illegal. Some of these facts on which the charge of mala fide was sought to be founded were urged before the appeal Court by learned counsel for the appellants. The learned Chief Justice discussed the matters and concluded by saying that he agreed with the trial Judge that the plaintiffs had failed to discharge the burden which lay upon them of establishing that the issue of new shares was not bona fide and not in the interests, and for the benefit, of the company_ I do not see any cogent reason for taking a different view on the facts.\n\nThe position, shortly put, was that the Singhania group, who were outsiders and to whom the directors owed no duty, were out to corner the shares of the company for their own ends. To thwart that object of the Singhania group by making it more and more difficult for them to acquire more shares the directors took advantage of the existing needs of the company for further capital and decided µpon to issue further shares. The issue of further shares served tw<> purposes, namely, the purpose of finding the necessary finance, and to exclude the interlopers, both of which purposes, according to the directors, were for the benefit of the company. Rightly or wrongly, the directors felt that it was not in the interests of the company t<> allow the Singhania group a controlling hand in the management of the affairs of the company. Their apprehension evidently was that the Singhania group, f and when they became shareholders, would use their voting power in their own interests and to the detriment of the company by utilising the life fund of the company for the purposes of their various other industrial concerns. I find nothing in the evidence on\n\nrecord to doubt the honesty of the directors in holding this view and, that being so, I see nothing improper if the directors in the interests of the company and the existing shareholders tried to prevent what, according to them, would be a catastrophe. Indeed, if the directors honestly held that view-and as already stated I have no reason to think that they did not-· they would, in my opinion, have been guilty of dereliction of duty to the company and to the existing shareholders if they did not exert themselves to prevent such evil. In my judgment the motive to prevent the Singhania group, who \\Vere outsiders, from acquiring a control over the company cannot, as between the directors and the company and the existing shareholders, be stigmatised as mala fide. .\n\nAt two places in his judgment the learned Acting Chief Justice expressed the view that if it were established before the Court that the company needed further capital, all other considerations could be of no avail or of very little avail as against that central fact.\n\nTendolkar J. did not consider it necessary to deal with tht various acts of the directors relied upon as evidence of their mala fules, because he was of the view that assuming that the directors did all those acts with the object of keeping the Singhania group out of control of the company, the moment it was established that the company was in need of further capital for legitimate purposes, the fact that the directors utilised such need for the purpose of establishing themselves more firmly in the saddle did not render the issue of further capital either ultra vires or invalid.\n\nLearned counsel for the plaintiffs contends that the learned Judges in the Courts below entirely overlooked the point that the presence of such bad motive would nullify the good motive of finding capital necessary for the company and this mixture of motives would render the issue of further shares illegal and void. This leads me to a consideration of the third sub-head on the assumption that what I have called the additional motive was a bad motive.\n\nIt is well established that directors of a company are in a fiduciary pJsition vis-a-vis the company and\n\nN analal Zavcy\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Li/• Assurance Co ..\n\nAnd Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nNana/al Zaver\n\nAncl Another\n\nBo1nba y Life .Assiirance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas J,\n\nmust exercise their power for the benefit of the company. If the power to issue further shares is exercised by the directors not for the benefit of the company but simply and solely for their personal aggrandisement and to the detriment of the company, the Court will interfere and prevent the directors from doing so. The very basis of the Court's interference in such a case is the existence of the relationship of a trustee and of ces(ui que trust as between the directors and the company.\n\nThe first case to be referred to is that of Fraser\n\nv. Whalley('). In that case a new company was incorporated in 1859 by an Act of Parliament. By that Act also certain existing railway companies were authorised \"to acquire, take and hold shares in the undertaking of the company, and for such purpose to create new shares in their undertakings.\" The existiQg companies in 1861 passed resolutions authorising their directors to exercise this power. The resolutions were, however, not acted upon and the existing companies did not iEsue n w shares in their undertakings for the purpose of taking up any share in the new company and all the shares of the new company were issued to persons other than the existing companies.\n\nIn short, the shares which it was contemplated would be taken up by the existing companies were no longer available.\n\nSubsequently, in 1862, another Act of Parliament was passed authorising the new company to make a branch line and for that purpose to raise fresh capital by the creation and issue of new shares.\n\nBut this new Act gave no fresh power to the existing companies to toke up any of these new shares to be issued by the new company.\n\nOne Savin held the majority of shares in the existing companies and there was dispute between him and the directors. The general meeting of the company was shortly going to be held and the directors knew that at the ensuing general meeting their policy would be repudiated by the majority of shareholders and they would be turned out. from their office. It was in these circumstances thaf the directors purporting to act on the resolutiens of\n\n(1) (186l) 2 H. & M. 10.\n\n' \\,\n\n~ ('\n\n'\\-\n\n1861, resolved to issue new shares. Suit was filed on behalf of the shareholders to restrain the directors from issuing any new shares. On a motion for injunction Wood V. C. granted an interlocutory injunction. In course of his judgment the learned Judge observed:\n\n\" The directors are informed that at the next general meeting they are likely to be removed, and, . therefore, on the very verge of a general meeting, they, without giving notice to anyone, with this indecent haste and scramble which is shewn by the times at which the meetings were held, resolve that shares are, on the faith of this obsolete power entrusted to them for a different purpose, to be issued for the very purpose of controlling the ensuing general meeting.\n\nI have no doubt that the Court will interfere to prevent so gross a breach of trust. I say nothing on the question whether the policy advocated by the directors, or that which I am told is to be pursued by Savin, is the more for the interest of the company.\n\nThat is a matter wholly for the shareholders. I fully concur in the principle laid down in Foss v. Harbottle (2 Hare, 461) as to that, but if the directors can clandestinely and at the last moment use a stale resolution for the express purpose of preventing the free action .of the shareholders, this Court will take care that, when the company cannot interfere, the Court will do so.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that this decision proceeds entirely on the grounds tha~ the resolutions of 1861 on which the directors purported to act were obsolete, for they had not so long been acted upon and also because the shares contemplated by that resolution were not availaHc, and that even if the resolutions were still effective and gave authority to the directors to issue new shares, the directors could only do so for the purpose of acquiririg shares in the new company and not for the purpose of controlling the ensuing general meeting and preventing the free action of the shareholders. There was no evidence whatever in that case that the issue of shares was at all for the benefit of the company. The issue of shares in that case was not for the purpose of taking up shares in the new company for which purpose alone the power conld be. exercised,\n\nNa11a/al Zav<:I'\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Life Assttra11cc COi..\n\n1lnd Others\n\nDas/.\n\nNana/al Zavcr\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo11zba y Lif~ Assuran::e Co\n\nAn, I Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nbut that it was being exercised, wholly and solely for quite a different purpose, namely, of maintaining themselves in office.\n\nPunt v. Symons & Co. Limited ( 1 ) was a motion for an interim injunction to restrain the holding of a meeting of the defendant company for confirming the resolution for issue of shares. On the evidence it was quite clear \" that these shares were not issued bona fide for the general advantage of the company, but that they were issued with the immediate object of controlling the holders of the greater number of shares in the company, and of obtaining the necessary statutory majority for passing a special resolution while, at the same time, not conferring upon the minority the power to demand a poll.\" Byrne]. granted an injunction restraining the defendant from holding the confirmatory meeting and observed :\n\n\" I am quite satisfied that the meaning, object, and intention of the issue of these shares was to enable the shareholders holding the smaller amount of shares to control the holders of a very considerable majority.\n\nA power of the kind exercised by the directors in this case, is one which must be exercised for the benefit of the company ; primarily it is given them for the purpose of enabling them to raise capital when required for the purposes of the company. There may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue shares in the case of a company constituted like the present for other reasons. For instance, it would not be at all an unreasonable thing to create a sufficient number of shareholders to enable sta, tutory powers to be exercised, but when I find a limited issue of shares to persons who are obviously meant and intended to secure the necessary statutory majority in a particular interest, I do not think that is a fair and bona fal, P exercise of the power.\"\n\nThe learned Judge concluded with the following words:\n\n\" If I find as I do that shares have been issued under the general and fiduciary power of the directors for the express purpose of acquiring an unfair majority\n\n(I) L.R. (1903] 2 Ch. 506.\n\n...\n\nfor the purpose of altering the rights of parties under the articles, I think I ought to interfere.\"\n\nPiercy v. S. Mills & Co. Ltd. (1 ) was a witness action before Peterson J. It was indeed a gross case.\n\nOn the evidence Peterson .J. found that it was manifest \" that the shares were allotted simply and solely for the purpose of retaining control in the hands of the existing directors.\" After stating the facts, the learned Judge said:\n\n\" The question is whether the directors were justified in acting as they did, or whether their conduct was a breach of the fiduciary powers which they possessed under the articles. What they did in fact was to override the wishes of the holders of the majority of the shares of the company for the time being by the issue of fresh shares issued solely for that purpose.\"\n\nThen after referring.to Fraser v. Whalley and Pmit\n\nv. Symons & Co. Ltd. (supra), the learned Judge concluded:\n\n\"The basis of both cases is, as I understand, that directors are not entitled to use their powers of issuing shares merely for the purpose of maintaining their control or the control of themselves and their friends -0ver the affairs of the company, or merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority of shareholders. That is, however, exactly what has happened in the present case. With the merits of the dispute as between the directors and the\n\nplaintiff I have no concern whatever. The plaintiff and his friends held a majo; rity of the shares of the company, and they were entitled, so long as that majority remained, to have their views prevail in accordance with th{)regulations of the company, and it was not, in my opinion, open to the directors, for the purpose of -conyerting a minority into a majority, and solely for the , purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority, to issue the shares which are in dispute in the present , action;\"\n\nIn the result, the shares allotted to the defendants were declared void.\n\n(1) L.R. (ltiOJ 1 Ch. 77.\n\nN a11al al Z avc1\"\n\n; ind Anotlrcr\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA1'd Others\n\nDas J.\n\nN analal Z aver\n\nAna Another\n\nBot1WaJ' Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas/.\n\nIt will oe noticed that in each of the: three cases the act of the directors was not only not of advantage to the company but was in essence to its detriment in that it was calculated to reduce the existing majority into minority and to prevent the majority of the existing shareholders from exercising their discretion. with respect to what they conceived to be in the best interests of the company. Those cases we not cases of mixed motives at all. The only motive operating in those cases in the minds of the directors was detrimental to the interests of existing shareholders and, therefore, to the company itself. Our attention was drawn to .Palmer's Company Law, 18th Edition, p. 183, where it is stated that\n\n\"in exercising their powers, whether general or special, directors must always bear in mind that they are in a fiduciary position, and must exercise their powers for the benefit of the company, and for that alone.\" Relying on the words \"and for that alone,\" it is urged that the power to issue shares must be exercised wholly and solely for the benefit of the company, that there must not be any other motive whether or not that other motive is injurious to the company and that if that power is exercised for that purpose and also for some other purpose then irrespective of the nature of that other purpose the directors would be guilty of an abuse of their power. I am not prepared to read the passage in the way urged by learned counsel for the plaintiffs. None of the cases cited on that point in Palmer's Company Law was concerned with mixed motives at all. In none of th.em was there any motive beneficial to the company or to the existing shareholders. In my view what that passage means is that the power must be exercised for the benefit of the company and that as between the directors and the company there must be no other motive which may operate to the detriment of the company. If the directors exercise the power for the benefit of the company and at the same time they have a subsidiary motive which in no way affects the company or its interests or the existing shareholders then the very basis of interference of the Court is absent, for, as I have pointed out, the Court of equity only intervenes in order I r\n\nto prevent a breach of trust on the part of the directors .and to protect the cesliti que trust, namely the company and possibly the existing shareholders. If as between the directors and the company and the existing shareholders there is no breach of trust or bad faith there can be no occasion for the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. I find support for my views in the following observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Hirsche v. Sims( 1 ):\n\n\"If the true effect of the whole evidence is, that the defendants truly and reasonably believed at the time that what they did was for the interest of the company, they are not chargeable with dolus nialus or breach of trust merely because in promoting the interest of the company they were also promoting their own, or because they afterwards sold shares at priCes which gave them large profits.\"\n\nOri the facts of this case the concurrent finding is that the company was in need of funds and, therefore, the issue of further shares was clearly necessary and is referable to such need. The further motive of keeping out the Singhania group, who are not yet shareholders but are strangers, does not prejudicially affect the company or the existing shareholders and the presence of such further moti\\'e cannot vitiate the good motive of finding the necessary funds for the company. In my judgment it is impossible to hold that the issue of fresh shares was, in the circumstances, illegal or v0id.\n\nRe (iii) :-Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contends that both the Courts below were in error in holding that there has been no contravention of the provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. That section is in the following terms:-\n\n\" vVhere the directors decide to increase the capital of the company by the issue of further shares snch shares shall be offered to the memlwrs in proportion to the existing shares held by each member (irrespective of class) and such offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares to which the member is entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if\n\n(1) (1894] A.C. 654, at pp. 660.GGl.\n\nNana/al Zat't'r\n\nAnd Anotlic•\n\nBombay L1je Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nN analal Z aver\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas].\n\nnot accepted, will be deemed to be declined ; and after the expiration of such time, or on receipt of an intimation from the merober to whom such notice. is given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose of the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company.\"\n\nThis section was added to the Indian Companies.\n\nAct in 1936.\n\nThe first question is whether the section contemplates increase of capital above the authorised limit, or only below the authorised limit. Learned Attorney~ General appearing for the company urges that the words\n\n\"further shares\" must be read in conjunction with the words \" decide to increase the capital of the company \" and, so read, must mean shares which are issued for the purpose of increasing the capital beyond the authorised capital.\n\nHe contends that section )05-C has no application to this case. Section 50 deals with, among other things, alteration of the conditions of the Memorandum of Association of the company by increasing its share capital by the issue of new shares.\n\nThe very idea of alteration of the memorandum by the issue of new shares clearly indicates that it contemplates an increase of the share capital above the authorised capital with which the company got itself registered. This increase can only be done by the company in a general meeting as provided in sub-section (2) of section 50.\n\nThis increase above foe authorised limit cannot possibly be done by the directors on their own responsibility.\n\nSection 105-C, however, speaks of increase of capital by the issue of further shares. The words used are capital and not share capital and further shares and not new shares. It speaks of increase by the directors.· Therefore, the section only contemplates such increase of capital as is within the competence of the directors to decide upon. It clearly follows from this that the section is intended to cover a case where the directors decide to increase the capital by issuing further shares within the authorised limit, for it is only within that limit that the directors can decide to issue further shares, unless they are precluded from doing even that by the regulations of\n\nthe company. It is said that section 105-C becomes applicable after the company in a general meeting has decided upon altering its memorandum by increasing its . share capital by issuing new shares.\n\nIf the company at a general meeting has decided upon the increase of its share capital by the issue of new shares, then it is wholly inappropriate to talk of the directors deciding to increase capital, because the increase has already been decided 'upon by the company itself. Further, after the company has at a general meeting decided to increase its share capital by the issue of new shares, the increased capital becomes its authorised capital and then if the directors under section 105-C decide to increase the capital by the issue of further shares, then this decision is nothing more than a decision to raise capital within the newly authorised limit.\n\nFinally, if section 105-C were to be held applicable to the case of an increase of capital above the authorised limit then such construction will lead to anomalous results so far as the companies which have adopted Table A, for the section is not consonant with Regulaticn 42 of Table A which, as will be shown hereafter, applies to increase of capital beyond the authorised limit. If the Legislature intended that sedion 105-C should apply to all companies in the matter of increase of capital above the authorised limit, then the simplest thing would have been to make Regulation 42 a compulsory regulation, instead of introducing a section which in its terms differs from Regulation 42 an<l which therefore makes the position of companies which have adopted Table A anomalous. It appears to me, tbc.:rdore, for reasons stated above, that section 105-C becomes applicable only when the directors decide to\n\nncrease capital \\Vithin the authorised limit by the issue of further shares. In this view of the matter that section is clearly applicable to the facts of this case.\n\nThe next question is whether the directors have, in t11e matter of issuing and offering further shares in the pre::ent case, been guilty of any contravention of the provisions of this section. Learned counsel for\n\nN anal al Zave,.\n\nAnd Another\n\nv, Bombay Life\n\nA.surance C<A\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas}.\n\nNana/al Ztroer\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Life .Asstwance C:o.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas}.\n\nthe plaintiffs contends tpat they have, because they have not offered the whole lot of shares to the shareholders in proportion to the existing shares held by them. It is pointed out that although the directors decided to issue 4,596 further shares they have only offered four shares to every five shares held by the shareholders which works out at 4,323~ shares which leaves 272i shares in the hands of the directors which they have reserved power unto themselves ti;> dispose of in such manner as they think fit.\n\nLearned Attorney-General appearing for the company submits:\n\n(a) That section 105-C should be construed in the light of Regulation 42 in Table A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 ;\n\n(b) That in order to prevent absurdity and to give business efficacy to the section, the words \" as nearly as circumstances admit \" should be read into the section ; and\n\n( c) That in any event the directors have not contravened the provisions of the section even if the same be literally construed.\n\nEach of these points requires serious consideration.\n\nAs to the first point it should be remembered that section 105-C was introduced in thi: .Act only in 1936.\n\nThere is no counterpart of it in the English Act even now.\n\nPrior to 1936 there was no check on the powers of the directors to issue blocks of shares, within the authorised limit, to themselves or to their nominees, unless their powers were circumscribed by the Articles of Association.\n\nOne of the mischiefs of the managing agency system which prevails in this country was that the managing agents, who usually dominated the board of directors, could, to secure their own position, induce the board to issue blocks of preference shares to the managing agents or their nominees. To check this mischief section 105-C was introduced in the Indian Act in 1936.\n\nAs regards the increase of capital beyond\n\nthe authorised limit it could only be done by the coµJ.pa.ri.y. The shareholders could, while sanctioning such increase, protect themselves by giving special directions to the directors as to the mode of disposal of the new shares. In the model Regulations set forth in Table A of the 1882 Act under the heading '' Increase of Capital\" are grouped three Regulations 26 to 28.\n\nRegulation 27 was in. the following terms :\n\n\"(27) Subject to any directions to the contrary that may be given by the meeting that sanctions the increase of capital, all new shares shall be offered to the members in proportion to the existing shares held by them, and such offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares to which the member is entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if\n\nnot accepted; will be deemed to be declined, and after the expiration of such time, or on the receipt of an intimation from the member to whom such notice is given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose of the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company.\"\n\nIn Table A of our present Act under the heading \"Alteration of Capital \" are to be found three corresponding Regulations 41 to 43.\n\nRegulation 42 is as follows:-\n\n\" (42) Subject to any direction to the contrary that may be given by the resolution sanctioning the increase of share capital, all new shares shall, before issue, be offered to such persons as at the date of the offer are entitled to receive notices from the company of general meetings in proportion, as nearly as the circu.mstances admit, to the amount of the existing shares tO Wpich they are entitled. The offer shall be made by n0tice specifying the number of shares offered, and limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to be declined, and after the expiration of that time, or on the receipt of an intimation from the person to }Vhom the offer is made that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose\n\n1~50\n\nNana/al Z<nnr\n\nAnd Anuthi:r\n\nBombay Lift .Assurance Co,\n\nA\"d Oth•rs\n\nDas].\n\nNarzalul Znt•.:r\n\nAnd Aiiotl1cr\n\nof the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company. The directors may likewise so dispose of any new shares which (by reason of the ratio which the new shares bear to shares held by persons entitled to an offer of new shares) cannot, in the opinion of the directors, be conveniently offered under this article.\"\n\nBo111b11 v Life\n\nAss11ra11e Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDosJ.\n\nThe words underlined are new and are not to be found in Regulation 27 of Table A of the 1882 Act.\n\nThe scheme of the 1882 Act, as of our present Act, and the language used in the two regulations quoted above clearly indicate, to my mind, that they deal with that kind of increase of share capital which involves an alteration of the conditions of the memorandum which the company alone can do by issuing new shares.\n\nThese Regulations do not purport to deal with increase of capital which is within the competency of the directors to decide upon. In that kind of increase of capital beyond the authorised limits these regulations give the directors certain latitude, subject, of course, to any directions to the contrary that may be given by the resolution of the shareholders in general meeting sanctioning such increase. The only difference between Regulation 27 of 1882 and Regulation 42 of our present Act is that under the last mentioned Regulation, in the absence of any direction to the contrary, the discretion of the directors has been widened by the introduction of the words underlined above. This company was incorporated in 1908 under the Act of 1882. It did not adopt the Regulations of Table A of the 1882 Act but article 45 of\" its Articles of Association proceeds more or less on the lines of Regulation 27 of Table A of the 1882 Act. The discretion given to the directors under article 45 is, therefore, obviously narrower than that left to the directors under Regulation 42 of Table A of the present Act. Then came section 105-C in\n\n1936. As already pointed out, that section deals with . increase of capital within the authorised limit which the directors can decide upon without reference to the . shareholders in a general meeting of the company. :; i.:he\n\nlegislature had before it both Regulation 27 of Table\n\nA of 1882 and Regulation 42 of Table A of the Act of\n\n1913. It chose to adopt the language of Regulation 27 in preference to that of Regulation 42. The absence in section 105-C of the words I have underlined in Regulation 42 cannot but be regarded as deliberate. And I can conceive of very good reasons for this departure.\n\nIn the case of increase beyond the authorised limit, that can be done only by the company in general meeting and the shareholders can protect themselves by giving directions to the contrary and, therefore, subject to such directions a wider latitude may safely be given to the directors. But in the case of increase of capital within the authorised limit which the directors may do without reference to the shareholders the legislature did not think it safe to leave an uncontrolled discretion to the directors. The mischief sought to be remedied required this curtailing of the directors' discretion. In my judgment it is impossible to construe section 105-C /\n\nin the light of Regulation 42 for several reasons.\n\nRegulation 42 and section 105-C do not cover the same field and cannot be said to be in pari materia. The omission of the underlined words was obviQusly deliberate. The difference in the language of the two provisions in the same statute cannot be overlooked as merely accidental. And lastly the reading of these words of Regulation 42 in section 105-C will frustrate what I conceive to be the undertying reason for the introduction of the section. In my judgment the first point urged by the learned Attorney-General which found favour with the Courts below cannot be accepted.\n\nThe second point urged by the learned Attorney- General is founded on the supposed necessity of introducing the words \"as nearly as the circumstances admit\" to avoid the absurdity which may flow from a literal construction of section 105-C. It must be remembered that the cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. It is only when such a construction leads to an obvious absurdity which the legislature cannot be supposed to have intended that the Court in\n\nN a11alal Zavcr'\n\n, fotl Another\n\nBombay Life , i:\\ssura1tce Co.\n\nAnti Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nNanulal Zawr\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBo1nbay Life Asslfran:e: Co.\n\nAndOtrs\n\nDasJ.\n\ninterpreting the section may introduce words to give effect to what it conceives to be the true intention of the 'legislature. It is not any and every inconvenience that justifies adoption of this extreme rule of construction. The section literally construed is quite intelligible and may easily be applied to many cases where the further shares issued bear a uniform and round proportion. Merely because a literal construction of the section leads to inconvenient result in a particular case cannot, in my opinion, justify the application of such a drastic rule of construction as is urged by the Attorney-General. Even in this case there would have been no inconvenience if the directors decided for the issue of 4,053 shares which could have been offered in the proportion of three shares to every four shares held by each shareholder. It is true that ordinarily it is for the directors to judge as to the exact amount of capital needed by the company but in arriving at their decision they cannot overlook the limitations put upon their power by the section with respect to the proportion in which the further shares are to be offered by them to the shareholders. Further, the supposed inconvenience can be easily avoided by a reference to the shareholders in a general meeting by asking them to increase the share capital beyond the authorised limit to such an amount as would permit proportionate disposal of the further and new shares. In my opinion there is not sufficient force in the contention which should induce the Court to depart from the ordinary and golden rule of interpretation I have mentioned above.\n\nThe last point urged by the Jearned Attorney- General appears to me to be of substance. On a strictly literal construction of the section the directors must perforce offer all the further shares to the shareholder& in proportion to their respective holdings. Section\n\n105-C comes into operation after the directors have decided to issue further shares. The section does not in terms provide that such offer must be made all at once or at any particular point of time and I see no reason to import any such requirement in .the section.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPH.EME COURT REPORTS 433\n\nThe underlying object of the section is to effect equitable distribution of the further shares.\n\nHere the shares have been offered in the proportion of four shares to every five shares. There can be no suggestion of favouritism in this offer. Every shareholder will get his proportion if he so desires.\n\nThe majority will ren.ain the majority if every one takes up the shares offered to him. It is true that 272-4/5 shares remain in hand.\n\nAt best although issued they have not been offered to anyone.\n\nI do not agree that under clause 8 of the directors' resolution the directors can dispose of those 272-4/5 shares i.n any manner they please before offering them proportionately to the existing shareholders.\n\nThat clause, on a true construction of the resolution as a whole, covers only those shares which have been actually issued but have not been applied for. In point of fact the directors have not yet allotted any of these 272-4/5 shares. If and when the directors allot these shares otherwise than in due course of law, i.e., without offering them to the shareholders, the shareholders will then have cause for complaint and may then come to Court for redress. It is said that 272-4/5 shares cannot in.future be offered to so many shareholders in a reasonable proportion. If it cannot be done, these odd shares will remain in hand until the company at a general meeting decides to increase the share capital by issuing new shares and then these odd shares together with new shares will be easily capable of being offered to the shareholders proportionately. These special considerations which arise in the case of this company by reason of its own peculiar -circumstances cannot, in my opinion, affect or alter the meaning and effect of the section.\n\nFrom all that I can see, up to the present time, there has been no contravention of the provisions of section 105-C. In my view the directors have substantially complied with the requirements of the section and the plaintiffs can have no grievance.\n\nThey rushed to Court prematurely.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, I am clearly of -0pinion that the conclusions of the Courts below were\n\nNana/al Z,1cr\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Life\n\nt1.<1s1iraucc Co .\n\n.-1nd Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nN anal al Z avct'\n\nAnd Anotl1cr\n\nBonibay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMuklierjca J,\n\ni:ight and no ground has been made out for interfering with the same. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed and I concur substantially in the reasons which have been given by my learned brother Mr.\n\nJustice Das in his judgment.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the Appellants: 5. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the Respondents: Rajinder Narain.", "total_entities": 186, "entities": [{"text": "391\n\nNANALAL ZAVER AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NANALAL ZAVER AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 178, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1291, "end_char": 1302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1312, "end_char": 1338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1635, "end_char": 1642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "offer of she.res was not made bona fide or in the interests of the company and was therefore illegal ; a.nd (iii) to restre.in the defenda.nts from allotting any shares in pursue.nee of their offer :\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAB JJ.- that inasmuch as the sh!Lres resolved to be issued were offered to the existing shareholders only, and not to any outsider a.nd these shares were also offered to the existing shareholders in proportion to the she.res held by each member without making any discriminatior.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1644, "end_char": 1653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "offer of she.res was not made bona fide or in the interests of the company and was therefore illegal ; a.nd (iii) to restre.in the defenda.nts from allotting any shares in pursue.nee of their offer :\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAB JJ.- that inasmuch as the sh!Lres resolved to be issued were offered to the existing shareholders only, and not to any outsider a.nd these shares were also offered to the existing shareholders in proportion to the she.res held by each member without making any discriminatior.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "DAB", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1658, "end_char": 1661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "offer of she.res was not made bona fide or in the interests of the company and was therefore illegal ; a.nd (iii) to restre.in the defenda.nts from allotting any shares in pursue.nee of their offer :\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAB JJ.- that inasmuch as the sh!Lres resolved to be issued were offered to the existing shareholders only, and not to any outsider a.nd these shares were also offered to the existing shareholders in proportion to the she.res held by each member without making any discriminatior."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "N anal al Zaver", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N anal al Zaver\n\nAnd A1wther\n\nBo1nba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nA.nd Others\n\nI<an; a C. J.\n\nHeld also per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, Mux1rnRJEA and DAS JJ.-that the fact that one of the motives of the directors in issuing further shares was to prevent an outsider who ha.d not yet become a shareholder, from getting control of the company did not render the resolution or the offer illegal inasmuch as such a motive could not in itself be said to be not in the inherests of the company and even assuming that such a. motive was bad this n.dditional motive could not render the resolution and offer illegal as the company was in fact in need of further funds and it was necessary in the interests of the company to issue further shares.", "canonical_name": "N anal al Zaver"}}, {"text": "Bo1nba y Life Assurance Co", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N anal al Zaver\n\nAnd A1wther\n\nBo1nba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nA.nd Others\n\nI<an; a C. J.\n\nHeld also per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, Mux1rnRJEA and DAS JJ.-that the fact that one of the motives of the directors in issuing further shares was to prevent an outsider who ha.d not yet become a shareholder, from getting control of the company did not render the resolution or the offer illegal inasmuch as such a motive could not in itself be said to be not in the inherests of the company and even assuming that such a. motive was bad this n.dditional motive could not render the resolution and offer illegal as the company was in fact in need of further funds and it was necessary in the interests of the company to issue further shares.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mux1rnRJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2320, "end_char": 2330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N anal al Zaver\n\nAnd A1wther\n\nBo1nba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nA.nd Others\n\nI<an; a C. J.\n\nHeld also per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, Mux1rnRJEA and DAS JJ.-that the fact that one of the motives of the directors in issuing further shares was to prevent an outsider who ha.d not yet become a shareholder, from getting control of the company did not render the resolution or the offer illegal inasmuch as such a motive could not in itself be said to be not in the inherests of the company and even assuming that such a. motive was bad this n.dditional motive could not render the resolution and offer illegal as the company was in fact in need of further funds and it was necessary in the interests of the company to issue further shares."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Co!f.rt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2942, "end_char": 2961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J., dgment of th• Bombay High Co!f.rt affirmed."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 3023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay: (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3115, "end_char": 3135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from the judgment and decree of thE: High Court of Bombay dated 1 lth March, 1949,\n\n(Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3163, "end_char": 3174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from the judgment and decree of thE: High Court of Bombay dated 1 lth March, 1949,\n\n(Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3179, "end_char": 3188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from the judgment and decree of thE: High Court of Bombay dated 1 lth March, 1949,\n\n(Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N. P. Engineer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer (M. !"}}, {"text": "M. !JI. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3416, "end_char": 3429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer (M. !"}}, {"text": "H.]. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desai and H.]."}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3485, "end_char": 3496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered the following Judgments:\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Padampat\n\nSinghania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From about July, 1944, Mr. Padampat\n\nSinghania, a businessman interested in many companies, began to purchase shares of the company from the holders thereof on a large scale.", "canonical_name": "SrFPadampat Singhania"}}, {"text": "18th September, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th September, 1944, at a board meeting of the directors the chairman drew attention of his co-directors to the attempt thus made by an outsider to corner the shares of the company."}}, {"text": "Singhania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5028, "end_char": 5037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. , Singhania had not submitted to the company for registration of the transfers to his name the shares purchased by him.", "canonical_name": "Singhanias"}}, {"text": "8th January, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on the 8th January, 1945, an application was submitted by the company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for sanction of a fresh issue of capital."}}, {"text": "16th February, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government granted the sanction on the 16th February, 1945, and the communication was received by the company on the 20th of February."}}, {"text": "20th of February", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5597, "end_char": 5613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government granted the sanction on the 16th February, 1945, and the communication was received by the company on the 20th of February."}}, {"text": "10th March, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6213, "end_char": 6229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shares were offered to the shareholders shown on the register of members in the proportion of four further shares for every five shares held by them .. ·· The last date for submission of the application and payment was 10th March, 1945."}}, {"text": "Uirectors", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Uirectors and their friends in the next few days applied and were allotted 1,648 shares."}}, {"text": "6th of March, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the 6th of March, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to shareholders who had applied for the same."}}, {"text": "Bombay Life Assurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nKanta C.J.\n\nN an.alal Z ave,.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Kanta C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6499, "end_char": 6509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nKanta C.J.\n\nN an.alal Z ave,."}}, {"text": "Boin.bay Life Assurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6543, "end_char": 6570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And Another\n\nBoin.bay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nl{ania C. J.\n\nThe appellants are two shareholders of the company.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "l{ania", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6584, "end_char": 6590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And Another\n\nBoin.bay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nl{ania C. J.\n\nThe appellants are two shareholders of the company."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7237, "end_char": 7248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7265, "end_char": 7278, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have read the judgment prepared by Das J. and I agree with his conclusion and line of reasoning on this part of the case."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9209, "end_char": 9220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Table A of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10414, "end_char": 10442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10447, "end_char": 10458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11278, "end_char": 11289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "21st February, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12339, "end_char": 12358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their resolution of the 21st February, 1945, the directors.resolved to issue.4,596 shares out of the authorized capital of the company."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J. arid Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14851, "end_char": 14877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And Ot/lus\n\n[(a11ia C. J,\n\nMAHAJAN J .-This is an appeal by special leave M11T1ajm1 J from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. arid Tendolkar J.) dated 11th March, 1948, confirming the judgment of the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction (Bhagwati J.) dated IGth Novmber, 1947."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14983, "end_char": 14991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And Ot/lus\n\n[(a11ia C. J,\n\nMAHAJAN J .-This is an appeal by special leave M11T1ajm1 J from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. arid Tendolkar J.) dated 11th March, 1948, confirming the judgment of the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction (Bhagwati J.) dated IGth Novmber, 1947."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15171, "end_char": 15182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15199, "end_char": 15212, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15358, "end_char": 15388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'~ The Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., the first c; iefendant in the case, was incorporated in the year --\n\nJo.ia11al11l Zl1't't'I\"\n\nAnd A11otlter\n\nBo111hay l.rje Ass11ranc.!", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Padampat Singhania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15899, "end_char": 15917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1944 Sir Padampat Singhania, an industrialist of Kanpur, attracted by the soundness of this concern, began purchasing the shares of the company with a view to acquiring a controlling interest in its management.", "canonical_name": "SrFPadampat Singhania"}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15939, "end_char": 15945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1944 Sir Padampat Singhania, an industrialist of Kanpur, attracted by the soundness of this concern, began purchasing the shares of the company with a view to acquiring a controlling interest in its management."}}, {"text": "Singhania group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16191, "end_char": 16206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after competition started for the purchase of the shares of the company between the Singhania group and the Maneklal Premchand group who were in management of this company."}}, {"text": "Maneklal Premchand group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16215, "end_char": 16239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after competition started for the purchase of the shares of the company between the Singhania group and the Maneklal Premchand group who were in management of this company."}}, {"text": "Singhania party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16510, "end_char": 16525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A circular was issued by the directors to the shareholders apprising them of the activities of the Singhania party and suggesting that those who wanted to sell their shares should sell them in the first instance to the chairman."}}, {"text": "Maneklal Premchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16932, "end_char": 16950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the end of December, 1944, the Singhania group had purchased 2,517 shares as against 2,397 held by Maneklal Premchand's party."}}, {"text": "January, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17103, "end_char": 17116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8th January, 1945, the chairman at his own instance and after consulting some of the directors made an application to the Examiner of Capital Issues for permission for a fresh issue of capital."}}, {"text": "20th February,\n\n1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17313, "end_char": 17333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was allowed on 20th February,\n\n1945."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18022, "end_char": 18037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That these new shares shall rank pari passu in all respects with the existing shares ofthecompany, but they shall be entitled to rank for dividend as from 1st April, 1945."}}, {"text": "20th February, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18192, "end_char": 18211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That these new shares shall be offered in the first instance by a circular to the shareholders of the\n\nompany as shown on the register of members on 20th February, 1945, in the proportion of four new shares to every five shares held by them in the capital of the company on that date."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19105, "end_char": 19111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That all applications for shares in accordance with this offer (including applications for shares made in respect of and accompanied by fracticmal certificates and applications for shares accompanied by a renunciation) must be presented to and payment made at the registered office of the company in Bombay on or before the 10th March, 1945. ."}}, {"text": "Nanalal Zaver", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19734, "end_char": 19747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanalal Zaver\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBomhay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA11tl Others\n\n.UahajanJ.\n\nNanalal Zavcr\n\nAnd Another\n\nY, &tuba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\nJ\\lahajanJ.\n\n 9.", "canonical_name": "Na1ialal Zavcr"}}, {"text": "Bomhay Life Assurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19765, "end_char": 19790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanalal Zaver\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBomhay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA11tl Others\n\n.UahajanJ.\n\nNanalal Zavcr\n\nAnd Another\n\nY, &tuba y Life Assurance Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\nJ\\lahajanJ.\n\n 9.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. 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e Co-."}}, {"text": "Nanalal Zaver", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33600, "end_char": 33613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M alwjan J.\n\n] 950\n\nNanalal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo11iba y Life Ass11ran ; e Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMahajan}.", "canonical_name": "Na1ialal Zavcr"}}, {"text": "section\n\n105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36333, "end_char": 36345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37270, "end_char": 37280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37808, "end_char": 37820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38068, "end_char": 38079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lYlahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38270, "end_char": 38279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am therefore -0f the opinion that the learned Judges of the Court of appeal were right when they held that under section\n\n105-C the shares have to be offered to the existing shareholde1s as nearly as the circumstances would admit and that the section has to be given a businesslike construction and should be construed liberally and\n\ni. that the charge of contravention of section 105-C cannot be levelled against the directors -so long as they .ha, ve not disposed of the unoffered balance contrary tb\n\nN analal Z aver\n\nA11d Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA\".d Others\n\nlYlahajan J.\n\nN anal al Z aver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo111!Jay Life Assrv-t11icc Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMaliajanJ.\n\nthe provisions of the section."}}, {"text": "MaliajanJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38360, "end_char": 38370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am therefore -0f the opinion that the learned Judges of the Court of appeal were right when they held that under section\n\n105-C the shares have to be offered to the existing shareholde1s as nearly as the circumstances would admit and that the section has to be given a businesslike construction and should be construed liberally and\n\ni. that the charge of contravention of section 105-C cannot be levelled against the directors -so long as they .ha, ve not disposed of the unoffered balance contrary tb\n\nN analal Z aver\n\nA11d Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nA\".d Others\n\nlYlahajan J.\n\nN anal al Z aver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo111!Jay Life Assrv-t11icc Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMaliajanJ.\n\nthe provisions of the section."}}, {"text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40477, "end_char": 40498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l<.EPORTS 409\n\nmajority of shares going into the hands of the Singhania group with the necessary consequences."}}, {"text": "Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41672, "end_char": 41676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we have been given a glimpse of what high finance can be and there is great justification in what Mr. Amin .has said as tq the manner in which some of the things were done with regard to the affairs of this company. :"}}, {"text": "Bombay Life Assurance Co", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47261, "end_char": 47285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They then decided to issue further capital 'by taking into consideration the\n\n/Ii .. a1u1lal Za'f)r•'\"\n\nA11d Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co ..\n\nA11d Others\n\nMahajan/.\n\n.Nana/al Zav11r\n\n1-111d AnothiJr\n\nBonzba y Life .Assurtu1ce Co,\n\nAnd Otltcrs\n\nMal1ajanJ.\n\ninterest and the needs of the company and its requirements in respect of capital at the moment.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bonzba y Life .Assurtu1ce Co", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47348, "end_char": 47376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They then decided to issue further capital 'by taking into consideration the\n\n/Ii .. a1u1lal Za'f)r•'\"\n\nA11d Another\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co ..\n\nA11d Others\n\nMahajan/.\n\n.Nana/al Zav11r\n\n1-111d AnothiJr\n\nBonzba y Life .Assurtu1ce Co,\n\nAnd Otltcrs\n\nMal1ajanJ.\n\ninterest and the needs of the company and its requirements in respect of capital at the moment.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bombay Life Assurance Company, Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48784, "end_char": 48819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as \" the company \") was incorporated in 1908 with an authorised capital of Rs.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "SrFPadampat Singhania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49451, "end_char": 49472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from July, 1944, shares in the company began to be purchased from the holders thereof by or in the interest of SrFPadampat Singhania.", "canonical_name": "SrFPadampat Singhania"}}, {"text": "September 18, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49688, "end_char": 49706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 18, 1944, a board meeting was held at which the chairman drew the attention of his co-directors to the serious implications of the attempt of an outsider group to corner the shares of the company."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50091, "end_char": 50109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, on September 19, 1944, a circular was issued to the shareholders drawing their attention to what was happening and exhorting them, in case they wanted to dispose of their holdings, to offer them to the chairman."}}, {"text": "January 8, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50822, "end_char": 50837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, on January 8, 1945, an applic;, i.tion was submitted by the company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for sanction for a. fresh issue of capital, setting forth several reasons for whieh such ."}}, {"text": "February 16, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51078, "end_char": 51095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The required sanction dated :February 16, 1945, was received by the company on February 20, 1945, and on the next day (February 21, 1945) a board meeting was held at which the directors decided to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 20, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51128, "end_char": 51145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The required sanction dated :February 16, 1945, was received by the company on February 20, 1945, and on the next day (February 21, 1945) a board meeting was held at which the directors decided to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 21, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51168, "end_char": 51185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The required sanction dated :February 16, 1945, was received by the company on February 20, 1945, and on the next day (February 21, 1945) a board meeting was held at which the directors decided to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of Rs."}}, {"text": "Naualal Zat1£r", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51566, "end_char": 51580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950\n\nNaualal Zat1£r\n\nAIJd An-0tlter\n\nBombay Life AsSt11a1tce C0r."}}, {"text": "Bombay Life AsSt11a1tce", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51598, "end_char": 51621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950\n\nNaualal Zat1£r\n\nAIJd An-0tlter\n\nBombay Life AsSt11a1tce C0r.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Na1tt1lal Zaver", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51647, "end_char": 51662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aud Others\n\nDas/.\n\nNa1tt1lal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo1nba y Lift Assurance Co.\n\nArid Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nof the form of application and form of renunciation referred to in the resolution and in the circular."}}, {"text": "February 22, and March 6, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52234, "end_char": 52264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that on the very next day after the board meeting 1,648 shares were allotted and that between February 22, and March 6, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to the shareholders who had applied for the same."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52409, "end_char": 52422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed on March 5, 1945."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52803, "end_char": 52814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52820, "end_char": 52840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54191, "end_char": 54202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54219, "end_char": 54232, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N analal Z", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55764, "end_char": 55774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N analal Z ave1'\n\nAnd Another\n\n'I• BombP:V Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas.].", "canonical_name": "N anal al Zaver"}}, {"text": "V Life Assurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55805, "end_char": 55825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N analal Z ave1'\n\nAnd Another\n\n'I• BombP:V Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas.]."}}, {"text": "N analal Zaver", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55847, "end_char": 55861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N analal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo1nbay Life Assurance Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "N anal al Zaver"}}, {"text": "Bo1nbay Life Assurance Co", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55876, "end_char": 55901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N analal Zaver\n\nAnd Another\n\nBo1nbay Life Assurance Co,\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Singhanias", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57021, "end_char": 57031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of keeping out the Singhania group might well be_ to strengthen the position of the directors and to keep them in the saddle, but the proximate motive was to exclude the Singhanias.", "canonical_name": "Singhanias"}}, {"text": "Greshain Life Assurance Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58581, "end_char": 58612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if the directors owe some duty to the existing shareholders on the footing of there being some fiduciary relationship between them as stated in some cases [see for example In re Greshain Life Assurance Society] ( 2 ), I see no cogent reason for extending this principle and imputing any kind of fiduciary relationship between the directors and persons who are complete strangers to the company."}}, {"text": "J.H. Beatty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59300, "end_char": 59311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In North-West Transportation Company, Ltd.\n\nv. Beatty (3 ) the Judicial Committee observed at p. 601:\n\n\" But the constitution of the company enabled the defendant J.H. Beatty to acquire this voting power; there was no limit upon the number of shares which a shareholder might hold, and for every share so held he was entitled to vote, tbe charter itself recognised the defendant as a holder of 200 shares, one-third of the aggregate number; he had a perfect right to acquire further shares, and to exercise his voting power in such .a manner as to secure the election of directors whose views upon policy agreed with his own, and to support those views at any shareholders' meeting.\""}}, {"text": "Beatty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59822, "end_char": 59828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beatty referred to in the above passage was a director."}}, {"text": "Bombay Life Assura11.ci! Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60356, "end_char": 60384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nana/al Zavc1\n\nAnd Another\n\nBombay Life Assura11.ci!", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "N analal Zaver", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60412, "end_char": 60426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950\n\nN analal Zaver\n\nA11d Another\n\nB0111ba y Life Assurance Co.\n\nAud Others\n\nDas}.", "canonical_name": "N anal al Zaver"}}, {"text": "B0111ba y Life Assurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60442, "end_char": 60470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950\n\nN analal Zaver\n\nA11d Another\n\nB0111ba y Life Assurance Co.\n\nAud Others\n\nDas}.", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65729, "end_char": 65739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case a new company was incorporated in 1859 by an Act of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Savin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66771, "end_char": 66776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Savin held the majority of shares in the existing companies and there was dispute between him and the directors."}}, {"text": "Wood V. C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67417, "end_char": 67427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a motion for injunction Wood V. C. granted an interlocutory injunction."}}, {"text": "Byrne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70390, "end_char": 70395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Byrne]."}}, {"text": "Peterson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71913, "end_char": 71921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Piercy v. S. Mills & Co. Ltd. (1 ) was a witness action before Peterson J. It was indeed a gross case."}}, {"text": "Palmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75438, "end_char": 75444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "None of the cases cited on that point in Palmer's Company Law was concerned with mixed motives at all."}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77816, "end_char": 77827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77844, "end_char": 77857, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay L1je Assurance Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78347, "end_char": 78372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nana/al Zat't'r\n\nAnd Anotlic•\n\nBombay L1je Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nN analal Z aver\n\nAnd Another v.\n\nBombay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. 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LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83557, "end_char": 83568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Table A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83624, "end_char": 83665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84075, "end_char": 84086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Table A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "is no counterpart of it in the English Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84138, "end_char": 84180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84734, "end_char": 84745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no counterpart of it in the English Act", "statute": "There is no counterpart of it in the English Act"}}, {"text": "Vhom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86769, "end_char": 86773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The offer shall be made by n0tice specifying the number of shares offered, and limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to be declined, and after the expiration of that time, or on the receipt of an intimation from the person to }Vhom the offer is made that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose\n\n1~50\n\nNana/al Z<nnr\n\nAnd Anuthi:r\n\nBombay Lift .Assurance Co,\n\nA\"d Oth•rs\n\nDas]."}}, {"text": "Bombay Lift .Assurance Co", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86901, "end_char": 86926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The offer shall be made by n0tice specifying the number of shares offered, and limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted, will be deemed to be declined, and after the expiration of that time, or on the receipt of an intimation from the person to }Vhom the offer is made that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose\n\n1~50\n\nNana/al Z<nnr\n\nAnd Anuthi:r\n\nBombay Lift .Assurance Co,\n\nA\"d Oth•rs\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. 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LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Muklierjca", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96049, "end_char": 96059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".-1nd Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nN anal al Z avct'\n\nAnd Anotl1cr\n\nBonibay Life Assurance Co.\n\nAnd Others\n\nMuklierjca J,\n\ni:ight and no ground has been made out for interfering with the same."}}, {"text": "P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 96432, "end_char": 96440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Varma."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 96470, "end_char": 96485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Respondents: Rajinder Narain."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_435_452_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.~.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL\n\nINCOME-TAX, BENGAL V.\n\nSRI KESHAB CHANDRA MANDAL\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA\n\nand DAS JJ.]\n\nBdngal Agriciiltiiral Income-tax Act, (IV of 1944), ss. 24, 57- Riiles u.nder the Act, r. 11, Forni No. 5-Ret11rn of illiterate assessee -Declaration signed by pen of son of a.ssessee-Va.Z-.-dity of ret11rn- Signature by Agent-Permissibility-\"· Qui facit per alium far.it\n\nper se, \" applicability of.\n\nThe Rules. framed under the Bengal Agricultural Incometax Act, 1944, provided that the declaration in a return of income !; ad to be signed \"in the case of an individual, by the individual himself.\" A return of au illiterate assessee, Keshab Chandra l\\fandal, was signed in the vernacular as follows : \" Sri Keshab Chftndrn l\\Iandal Ba Sri J ugal Chandra Manda!,\" the latter being the son of the asseosee.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal referred to the High Court the question \"whether in the circumstances of the case, the dech1l'ation\n\nin the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return.\" The Higa Court answered the question in the atlinnativo.\n\nOn appeal :\n\nHeld, per F.AZL ALI, PATANJALI SAS'.l'HI, IIIGKHEHJEA and DAS JJ. ('.\\1.AHAJAN J. dissenting)-that the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, and the Rules framed thereunder contained provisions indicating an intention to exclude the common law rule qui facit per alium facit per se in the matter of affixing signature to the return of income made by an assessee who was an individual, and, as it was abundantly clear on the records that there was no physical contact between the assessee and the signature appoating on the return, the return was not properly signed and was not a valid return.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-As the question referrnd was whether the return \" signed by the illiterate assessee with the pen of his son \" was valid, it must be assumed that there was such contact, and as there was nothing whatso.ever on the record to establish that the assessee did not touch the pen or the hand of the son when the signature \\'Ill.to 11ffmid, ttle High Court was right in answering the question in the affirmative.\n\nJudgment of the Calcutta High Court revrrsed.\n\nMay 9\n\n1950 APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at\n\n'Commissioner Fort William: (Civil Appeal No. LXXXVUI of 1949.)\n\n-of Agricultural This was an appeal from the judgment and order Incom, tax of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta dated 16th\n\ni<cs,, b •Chandra :; epteRmbfer, 1948, d(G. N, hDaHs '.lnhdCR. P. Moodkerjee .i.J.)\n\nMandal m a e erence ma e to t e 1g ourt un er section 63 (1) of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, by the Appellate Tribunal of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal. The facts are set out in the judgment.\n\nK. P. Khaitan (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent was not represented.\n\n1950. May 9.\n\nThe following judgments were delivered :-\n\n.DasJ.\n\nDAS ].-There is no serious dispute as to the facts leading up to this appeal. They are shortly as follows: In response to a notice issued under section 24 (2) of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, the assessee, who is the respondent before us, submitted a return showing his total agricultural ins; ome for the assessment year 1944-45 to be Rs. 335.\n\nThis return is dated the 3rd April, 1945, and just below the declaration appears the following writing in vernacular :\n\n\"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal.\" On the 18th April, 1945, the Agricultural Incometax Officer noted on the order sheet that the case would be taken up at Bankura Dak Bungalow on 6th May, 1945, and directed the office to inform the party to appear with all settlement records, vouchers etc.\n\nOn the 6th May, 1945, the assesseefiledapetition before the Agricultµral Income-tax Officer who had gone to Bankura stating inter alia that he had been advised that the return which he had submitted before under the advice of a Headmaster of a school was not a proper return, that there were many mistakes in the return and many things had been omitted and that, therefore, it .was absolutely necessary for him to submit a fresh return and praying for fifteen days' time for doing so and\n\n....\n\nalso for a form of return.\n\nThis petition was signed in 1950 vernacular as follows : - commissioner \"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal x of Agricultural , Income-tax Ba: Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal' . v.\n\nBelow that was the signature of his pleader H. Keshab Chandra Nandi. \\Vith this petition was attached a Vakalat- Mandal nama signed in vernacular in the manner following :\n\n\"Sri Keshab C]landra Mandal x Ba : Sri J ugal Chandra Manda! of Bal ya. J.L It will be noticed that in both the signatures, against the name of Sri Keshab Chandra Manda} there was a cross mark. The vakalatnama contained the following entry:-\n\n•:I hereby appoint on my behalf Srijukta Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi, Pleader, to do all works in connection with this case and as I do not know to read and write I put in x mark in the presence of the undermentioned persons as a token thereof.\"\n\nB:is son Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal attested the cross mark in the vakalatnama.\n\nOn receipt of this petition the Agricultu'ral Incometax Officer allowed time for one day and fixed the case for the 7th May, 1945, at 10 a.m. The assessee was directed to submit a fresh return and to produce account books and other necessary papers. It was also stated in the order sheet that if the assessee failed to comply with the order, assessment would be made under section 25 (5) of the Act.\n\nOn the 7th May, 1945, the assessee did not appear personally. His son Jugal Chandra Manda! appeared with pleader Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi. The son, Jugal Chandra Mandal, had not brought any letter of authority from the assessee. A return was submitted which was signed in vernacular as follows :- .\n\n\"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal Ba: Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal.\" .\n\nIt will be noticed that in this last signature there was no cross mark.\n\nDasJ.\n\nKuhdb Chandra\n\nMandal\n\nV..s J.\n\nThe Agricultural Income-tax Officer stated in his assessment order as follows :-\n\n\"A fresh return is submitted to-day. A remarkable difference is noticeable between the two returns.\n\nFi:rstTeturn shows total agricultural income of Rs. 335 whereas the revised or the fresh one shows an income of Rs. 1,077-12.'...6. This is really strange. The first one appears to have been signed by the assessee him- self but the second one has been signed by Jugal his son for the assessee. Under the circumstances, I can put no reliance on any of these returns. I do not make any assessment based on these returns.\" .\n\nThe Agricultural Income-tax Officer thereafter immediately proceeded with the assessment and assessed Rs. 4,968-12-1 as the assessable income.\n\nThe assessee preferred an appeal from this order to the Assistant Commissioner, Agricultural Incometax, Bengal.\n\nThe Assistant Commissioner by his order dated the 14th August, 1945, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the assessment under section 35 (4) (a) (i).\n\nThe assessee thereupon preferred a further appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on the 9th December, 1947, accepted the appeal on the ground, amongst others, that the return filed on the 7th May, 1945, was a proper return and should have been treated as such.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax thereupon appli• ed under section 63 ( 1) of the Act for a reference of certain questions of law to the High Court. The Appellate Tribunal by its order dated the 22nd April, 1948, referred the following question of law to the High Court :-\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return.\"\n\nThe reference came up before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court (G. N. Das J, and R. P. Mooe kerjee J .) who, for rea?ons stated in their judgment\n\ndated the 16th September, 1948, answered the question in the affirmative. The Commissioner thereupon applied to the High Court for a certificate under section 64 (2) of the Act which having been granted the appeal has now come up before us for final disposal. In this appeal we are only called upon to judge whether the. answer given by the High Court to the question of law formulated by the Appellate Tribunal is well-founded.\n\nIt is abundantly clear on the records that there was no physical contact between the asscssee and the signature appearing on the return as filed on the 7th :i\\Iay, 1945, and the fact is referred to by the words \"in the circumstances of this case\" at the beginning of the question.\n\nIndeed the whole of the proceedings have proceeded on this footing.\n\nI desire to make it clear that in this appeal we are not concerned with the propriety of the Income-tax Officer in proceeding to assessment without giving the assessee a further opportunity to put his mark onthe return.\n\nThe High Court quoted the following <; ibservations of Blackburn J. in The Queen v. The justices of Kent (1 ):\n\n\"No doubt at common law, where a person authorises another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person . authorising it; nevertheless, there may be cases in which a statute may require personal signature.\"\n\nThen, after stating that the Courts ought not to restrict the common law rule qui Jacit per alfrtm Jacit per se, unless the statute makes a personal signature indispensable, and referring to certain decided cases, enunciated the proposition that when the word sign\" or \"signature\" is used by itself and unless there be a clear indication requiring the personal signature by the hand of the person concerned, the provision would be satisfied by a person signing by the hand of an agent.\n\nApplying this test the High Court 'came to the conclusion that there was not only not anything in the Act or the rules requiring the personal signature of the individual assessee\n\n(1) (18!6) L.R. 8 Q.B. 305 at p. 307.\n\nCo111111.iss/011-cr of A.ricu!tural\n\nb1Lo:ncfax ,, .\n\njfn11dal\n\nDas.f.\n\nCo1111nissio11:!r\n\nf Agriculftt1'al\n\nlnco1n:!-fa:c\n\nKeshab Chantl1'a\n\nlUandat\n\nDasJ.\n\nbut that insistence on such a requirement would create an anomaly, in that while an assessee who is an individual will have to sign personally, the persons authorised to sign for the other categories of assessees, namely, a Hindu undivided family, a company, the Ruler of an Indian State, a firm or any other association will not be compellable to sign personally. The High Court took the view that to avoid such a patent anomaly which woul.d inevitably result if the interpretation proposed by the department were to be accepted, the Court should follow the common law rule mentioned above.\n\nIn the result, the High Court answered the point of law referred to them in the affirmative.\n\nThe learned Standing Counsel to the Government of Bengal (Mr. K. P. Khaitan) in the course of a fair ' and lucid argument contended before us that the Court should give effect to the plain meaning of the words of the statute and the rules which have statutory force whatever might be the consequences and that on a plain reading of the Act and the rules there could be no doubt that the legislature intended the return of an individual assessee to be signed by himself, i.e., personally.\n\nLearned counsel referred us to a number of decisions, both Indian and English, where personal signature had been held indispensable.\n\nThere is no doubt that the true rule as laid down in judicial decisions and indeed, as recognised by the High Court in the case before us, is that unless a particular statute expressly or by necessary implication or intendment excludes the common law rule, the latter must prevail. It is, therefore, necessary in this case to examine the Act and the rules to ascertain whether there is any indication therein that the intention of the legislature is to exclude the common law rule.\n\nTurning first to the Act, it will be found that by section 2 (14) the word \"received\" used with reference to the receipt of agricultural income by a person has been defined to include receipt. by an agent or servant on behalf of a principal or master respectively.\n\nIf the legislature intended that a signature by an agent would be permissible it could easily Lave defined the\n\nword \"sign\" so as to include the signature by an 1950 agent. Section 25 (2) of the Act requires that if the Commissio1tci Agricultural Income-tax Officer is not satisfied without of Agri<tt!ltural requiring the presence of the person who made the 1nco111c-tax return or the production of evidence that a return v. made under section 24 is correct and complete, he Keshal> C(handra\n\nh 11 h t . · h\" Mane/al s a serve on sue person a no ice reqmrmg 1m, on a date to be therein specified, either to attend at Das.f. the Agricultural Income-tax Officer's office or to produce or to cause to be there produced any evidence on which such person may rely in support of the return. This section expressly permits production of evidence by an agent.\n\nSection 41 gives to the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, the Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal for the purposes of Chapter V, and to the Commissioner for the purposes of section 37, the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of certain specified matters only namely, enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation, compelling production of documents and ir; suing commissions for the examination of witnesses, and the proceedings before those officers are to be deemed to be \" judicial proceedings\" within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAgain, section 60 of the Act permits a notice or requisition under the Act to be served as if it were a summons issued by a Court\n\nunder the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and specifies the person on whom such service may be effected.\n\nThere is nothing in the Act making the provisions of the Code relating to the signing or verification of pleadings applica-ble to the returns to be filed by any assessee. If the Legislature intended that the return might be signed by the assessee or by his authorised agent 1'.nere could have been no difficulty in inserting a section in the Act adopting the provisions of the Code relating to the signing and verification of pleadings as if the return was a pleading in a suit. Sections 35 and 58 expressly permit an assessee to attend before the Assistant Commissioner and the AppeUate Tribunal or\n\nCo1n11iiss!cncr cf Agricu!tural\n\nlnconw-tax\n\nK cshab Chandra\n\nMandal\n\nDas].\n\nany Agricultural Income-tax authority in connection with any . proceeding under the Act, otherwise than when required .under section 41 to attend personally for examination, to attend by a person authorised by him in writing in this. behalf, being a relative of, or a person regularly employed by, the assessee, or a lawyer or accountant or agricultural income-tax practitioner.\n\nIt should be noted that even under this section any and every agent cannot represent the assessee but only certain specified kinds of agents can do so.\n\nTo summarise, the omission of a d;; finition of the word \" sign\" as including a signature by an agent, the permission under section 25 for production of evidence by an agent and under sections 35 and 58 for attendance by an agent and the omission of any provision in the Act applying the P' ovisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the signing and verification of pleadings to the signing and verification of the return while expressly a:lopting the provisions of that Code relating to-the attendance and examination of witnesses, production of documents and issuing of commission for examination and for service of notices under sections 41 and 60 respectively, cannot be regarded as wholly without significance. The matter, however, does not rest there.\n\nSection 24 of the Act requires the Agricultural Income-tax Officer to call for a return in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner.\n\nRule 11 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944, framed under section 57 of the Act prescribes that the return required under section 24 must be in Form 5 and shall be verified in the manner indicated therein.\n\nThere is a footnote in Form 5 to the following effect:\n\n\" The declaration shall be signed- ( a) in the case of an individual by the individual himself ;\n\n(b) in the case of a Hindu undivided family by the Manager or Karta ;\n\n(c) in the case of a company or the Ruler of an Indian State by the principal officer ;\n\n(d) in the case of a firm by a partner;\n\n(e) in the case of any other association by a member of the association.\n\nThere is also a note that the signatory should satisfy himself that the return is correct and complete in every respect before signing the verification, and the alternatives which are not required should be scored out. It will be interesting to compare the requirements of rule 11 and Form 5 with those of other rules dealing. with appeals and other proceedings. Section 34 allows an appeal from the Agricultural Income-Tax Officer to the Assistant Commissioner. Sub-section (3) of that section requires that the appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. Likewise section 36 provides for a further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (4) of that section also requires that such an appeal must be in the prescribed form .and be verified in the prescribed manner. l{ule 13 prescribes the forms of appeals under section 34 and rule 14 prescribes the forms of appeals under section 63 of the Act.\n\nRule 15 is as follows:- \" The forms of appeal prescribed by rules 13 and 14 and the forms of verification appended thereto shall be signed-\n\n(a) in the case of an individual, by the individual himself ;\n\n(b) in the case of a Hindu undivided family, by the Manager or Karta thereof ;\n\n(c) in the case of a company, by the principal officer of the company ;\n\n(d) in the case of a firm, by a partner of the firm; ( e) in the case of a Ruler of an Iru::lia1i State, by the principal officer of the State; and\n\n(f) in the case of any other association of individuals, by a member of the association, .and such forms of appeal shall be also signed by the authorised representative, if any, of the appellant.\"\n\nRule 17 deals with applications for refund of tax.\n\nSub-rule (2) requires every such application to be signed by the claimant and his authorised representa.tive, if any, and allows such application to be presented by the applicant either in person or through\n\nConuuissz'un.cr of Agricultur,:J\n\nInco111lJ-ta:1::\n\nv. lfrsliab Chandra\n\n;<, fandal\n\nDas J.\n\nConunissioncr of Agricultural\n\nI nco11ic-ta x ., Keshab Chandra\n\nMand al\n\nDasJ.\n\nsuch authorised representative. Rule 22 requires that where an application or memorandum of appeal is signed by an authorised representative, the latter must annex to it the writing constituting his authority and his acceptance of it. Under rule 25 an appeal to the Tribunal has to be presented in person or by an authorised representative and under rule 28 every such appeal has to be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant and his authorised representative, if any, and verified by the appellant.\n\nEach of the forms, from Form 7 to Form 20, contains. separate spaces for the signatures of the appellant or the applicant or the claimant as the case may be and the authorised representative, if any. Form 23 which is notice of hearing of appeal under section 36 requires the attendance of the appellant or respondenteitherinperson or by an authorised representative. Rule 47 provides that, subject to certain special provisions, the provisions contained in Part II of the rules relating to the presentation, notices and hearing of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal shall apply to the presentation, notices and hearing of a section 63 reference application as if it were an appeal. Rule 53 empowers the Tribunal, if it considers it necessary, to hear the applicant or his authorised representative. A perusal of the several rules referred to above will show that while rules 15, 17 (2), 28 and the forms thereunder require the appeal or application to be sigi:ted by the appellant or applicant or claimant as well as by his authorised representative, if any, rule 11 and Form 5 require only the signature of the assessee in the manner therein prescribed for different categories of assessees. Again rules 17 (2), 25 and 47 permit presentation of applications and appeals by the authorised representative of the assessee wh.ereas there is no sucli provision for the presentation by an authorised agent of a return under rule 11 which could easily be inserted in the rules if the Legislature so intended. That wherever the assessee or the appellant or the applicant is required to sign he must sign personally, is also borne out by note (1) at the foot of Form 20 which is for refund of tax under section 48 (2). It runs as follows :\n\n''In the case of a person not resident in British India, 1950 the above declaration shall be sworn(a) before a Justice Comtnissioner -0£ the Peace, a Notary Public, a Commissioner of Oaths, of Agricult,.rat if the applicant resides in any part of His Majesty's Income-tax Dominions outside British India, (b) before a Magisv. trate or other official of the State or a Political Officer, Keshab c1ia .. <1ra if he resides in a State in India, and ( c) before a British Mandal Consul, if he resides elsewhere.\" DasJ.\n\nThis does not mean that only the claimant for refund under section 48 (2) who resides outside India must sign his application personally and other assessees Or appellants or applicants or claimants need not sign their return or appeal or application personally. All that it means is that such a claimant for refund under section 48 (2) must have his signature authenticated by certain public officers by swearing the declaration in their presence. This clearly indicates that personal signature of the assessee, the appellant or' applicant is necessary in all cases wherever his signature is required and authentication of such signature is required only in the case of a claimant for refund of tax under section 48 (2). There are yet other reasons why personal signature of an assessee, appellant, applicant or claimant is necessary. It has been seen that under the Act and/or the rules several acts can be done by or through the authorised representative, namely, production of doc1:Jments, presentation of appeal or application and attendance in proceedings before the authorities. The expression \"authorised representative\" is defined in rule 2 (a). It will be noticed that in each case the authorised representative has to be duly authorised in writing.\n\nUnder rule 22 the authorised representative has to file the writing constituting his authority and his acceptance of it. If it were intended that the •signature by an agent on a return or a memorandum of appeal or other application will suffice as the signa- , ture of the assessee or the appellant or the applicant or the claimant, there would certainly have been some rule for constitution of such agency in writing and for the filing of the writing constituting such agency and the agent's acceptance of it. If an agent for mere__ pre~ sentation of an appeal is expressly required by the\n\nCou1111is . ., ion _'r of A._f}ric11ltural\n\n/t\".:0111.·-f:ax\n\nAushab Clurndra\n\nManda/\n\nDasJ.\n\nrules to be duly authorised in writing and such writing has to be filed on record I cannot think that the Act or the rules contemplate or permit the employment of an agent to sign an important document, namely a return or an appeal or application without any written authority and that such agent may sign without producing any such written authority. And yet that would be the result, for there is no provision in that behalf in the Act or in the rules. On a consideration of the provisions of the Act and of the rules and the forms and for reasons stated above there appears to be many clear indications of an intention on the part of the Legislature to insist on the personal signature of the assessee, appellant or applicant whenever his signatu:e is required by the Act or the rules and the common law rule qui facit per alium f acit per se is excluded by necessary implication or intendment of the Act and the rules.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal and the High Court have referred to certain difficulties in arriving at this conclusion which may now be considered.\n\nIt is pointed out that to insist on the personal signature of ail individual assessee will result in the anomaly that persons authorised to sign for the assessees of other categories will be free to get the returns signed by their own agents. This argument really begs the question. For reasons stated above none of the persons designated in the footnote to Form 5 are authorised to employ an agent to sign for him and therefore no anomaly can arise. If anything, the use of the word \"himself\"\n\nwith reference to an individual makes the position clearer so far as such individual is concerned. There is an argument based on hardship or inconvenience.\n\nHardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute or the rules.\n\nFurther, there is no hardship or inconvenience.\n\nIn the case of an illiterate person, he can put his mark which, by the Bengal General Clauses Act, is included in the definition of\" sign.\" If claim Form 20 for re- fund of tax under section 48 ( 2) can be sent to a claimant abroad for his signature before certain public\n\nofficer for authentication, there can be no hardship or inconvenience in sending to him abroad the return in Form 5 for his signature without the necessity of any authentication thereof. It is said that such a construction will prevent a leper who, by reason of the loss of his fingers, cannot even put his mark. Such cases will indeed be rare and in anv event it will be for the Legislature to rectify thiS.defect. Not to insist on personal signature on returns or appeals or applications will Jet in signature by agent not duly authorised in writing and without production of such writing. In that case the provisions for penalty for filing false returns may quite conceivably be difficult of application. The omission of a definition of the expression \"sign\" so as to include the signature of an agent, the presence of the provisions permitting only certain specified acts, other than signing, to be done by or through an authorised agent are significant and indicate that the intention of the Legislature is not to permit signature by an agent so as to exclude the common law rule referred to above.\n\nTurning now to the judicial decisions cited before us it will be found that Courts have insisted on personal signature even when there were not so many clear indications in the statutes under consideration in those cases as there are in the statute and the rules before us. Thus in Monls v. ]ackson( 1 ), which was a case under section I (3) of the Municipal Elections Act (38 nd ~9 Vic., c. 40) which required delivery of the nommahon paper \" by the candidate himself or his proposer or seconder to the Town Clerk\" it was held\n\ntht this requirement was not satisfied by the delivery of it by an agent. In The Qiteen v. JY!ansel jones(2), it\n\nas held tha! a person charged with any corrupt or\n\nillegal practice at a municipal election who was entitled, under section 38 of the Corrupt and Illegal\n\nP.ractice,~ Prevention. Act, 1883, to be \"hear.d by h1mse.lf. was not entitled to be .heard by his counsel or sohc1tor.\n\nIn In re Prince Blucher( 3 ), the English Court of Appeal held that a proposal of composition\n\n(1) (1876) L.R. 1 C.P.D. 683\n\n(2) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 29\n\n(3) L.R. (1931) 2 Ch. 70\n\nCo11uuissio11er of Agricultural\n\nInconwtax\n\nJ{cshab Chandra\n\nMand al\n\nDas].\n\n1950 signed by the solicitors of a debtor, who was, by reason of his serious illness, unable to sign it, did not c; omply Cmnmissloner -0/ Agdc•dtural with the requirements of section 16 (1) of the Bank-\n\n1,, comc-ta.< ruptcy Act, 1914, which required \"a proposal in\n\nv. writing signed by him.\" The Court of Appeal applied Keshab Chandra the principles of the decision in Hyde v. Johnson( i) and Mandal in In re Whitley Partners Ltd.( 2 ).\n\nIn Luckman Buksh\n\n;;~-;:,.\n\nRoy v. Runjeet Ram Panday(\"), a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that an acknowledgment by a Mooktear was not sufficient for the purposes of section 1 (5) of the Limitation Act (XIV of 1859) which required an acknowledgment signed by the mortgagee. Rankin C. J. held in japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd. v. Jajodia Cotton Nlills, Ltd.(•) that a demand Jetter signed by the solicitors of the petitioning creditor was not a notice under section 163 of the Indian Companies Act which as it then stood required a demand\" under his hand.\" A similar view was taken by the Rangoon High Court in Ji, fanjeebhai Khataw & Co. v. Jamal Brothers & Co. Ltd.(•) and M.A. Kureshi v. Argus Footwear, Ltd. ( 6 )._ See also Wilsonv. Wallani( 7 ).\n\nInC.T.A.C.T.Nachiappa Chettyar v. Secretary of State for India(•), it was held that the registration of a firm on an application signed by the agent of the partners was ultra vires inasmuch as the rules framed under section 59 of the Income-tax Act required an application signed by at least one of the partners. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v.\n\nSubba Rao (9 ), it was held that by reason of the word\n\n\" personally\" occurring in rule 6 of the Income-tax Rules framed under section 59 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, a duly authorised agent of a partner was precluded from signing on behalf of the partner an application under section 26-A of the Act for registration of the firm.\n\nIn all-these cases the common law rule was not applied, evidently because the particular statutes were held to indicate that the intention was to exclude that rule. This intention was gathered from the use of the\n\n(1) {1836J 2 Bing. (N.C.) 776\n\n(2) (1886) L.R. 32 Ch. D. 337\n\n(3) (1873) 20W.R. 375 (') (1926) I.L.R. 5' Cal._341i\n\n(5) I.L.R. 5 Rang. '83\n\n(6) I.L.R. 9 Rang. 323 (7l (1~80) L.R. 5 Ex. D. 155\n\n(8) (193~ I.L.R. 11 Rang. 380\n\n(9) I.L.R. (19'7) Mad.167\n\nword \"himself\" or \"by him\" or \"under his hand\" 1950 -0r \"personally.\" It is needless to say that such an f Commissionet' intention may _als_o be gathered from the nature o the of Agricultural\n\nparticular statute or inferred from the different provi- Income-tax sions of the statute and the rules framed -thereunder. v.\n\nAs already stated, there are many indications in the Keshab Chandt'a Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, and the Mat rules made thereunder evidencing an intention to Das J. exclude the common law rule in the matter of the -signature of the assessee, appellant or applicant on the return, appeal or application.\n\nThe High Court referred to the case of In the matter of Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. & U.P. (1 ) and sought to find support for its views from the circumstance that the Court in that case rejected the return not on the ground that it was bad because it was signed by an agent but on the ground that the power of attorney did not authorise the agent to sign\n\nit. It is quite clear that the Court in that case found it easier to decide the case on the latter ground than to enter upon a discussion of the first ground. It is impossible to read that case as an authority for the proposition that the signature of an agent was permissible at all. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High ..Court in Deo Narain Rai v. Kukur Bind(~) referred to in the High Court judgment before us does not appear to milit_ate against the views expressed , above. On a construction of section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act it was held that there was nothing in the Act to exclude the application of the common law rule.\n\nThe 011ly provision of that Act on which reliance was placed in establishing such exclusion was section 123.\n\nStanley C. J. pointed out that the language of the last mentioned section was elliptical and was not accurate draughtsmanship and, therefore, it could not be relied upon in construing section 59. The judgment Qf Banerjee J. also makes it clear that he found,\n\nnothing in th.e Act to exclude signature -by an agent and that the words '' on behalf of\" in section 123 were surplusage. -It is quite true that when sigiiature by an agent is permissible, the writing ofthe name Qf\n\n(1) A.IR. (1935) Oudh. 305\n\n(2) (1902) I.L.R. 24 AIL 319.\n\n1950 the principal by the agent is regarded as the signature of the principal himself. But this result only follows Co11l1nissio1ic•r of Agricultural when it is permissible for the agent to sign the name\n\nIncome-tax of the principal. If on a construction of a statute v. signature by an agent is not found permissible then Kcshab Chandra the writing of the name of the principal by the agent\n\nMa1tdal however clearly he may have been authorised by th~\n\nDas 1_ principal cannot possibly be regarded as the signature of the principal for the purposes of that statute. If a statute requires personal signature of a person, which includes a mark, the signature or the mark must be that of the man himself. There must be physical contact between that person and the signature or the mark put on the document.\n\nFa>l Ali/.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must be accepted and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in the negative. There will be no order for costs against the assessee and the appellant Commissioner must bear his own costs throughout.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nFAZL Au J.-I agree.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-I agree.\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-I agree.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nMahajan/.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The question of law referred to the High Court and answered by it in the affirmative is in these terms :-\" Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return.\" The Hi;; h Court was not called upon to answer the question whether an income-tax return could be validly signed by an agent in the name of the principal ; on the other -hand, the question as framed assumes that the return was signed by the illiterate assessee but that the pen affixing the signature was that of his son. The physical act of putting the mark was made by the pen or possibly by the hand of the son who was not the agent appointed by the father and was not otherwise authorised by him to sign for him.\n\nNo evidence was led and there is nothing whatsoever on the record to establish that this illiterate assessee did not touch the pen or the hand of the son when the signature was affixed on the return. No precise definition of the word \" signature\" is given in the Indian Income-tax Act or in any other law. In the General Clauses Act there is no exhaustive definition of the word. It merely says what the word \"signature\" shall include. It includes the affixing of a mark. In India it is a well known practice that when the executant of a document is illiterate he simply touches the pen wherewith someone else signs his name for him. Reference in this connection may be made to page 972, para. 1659, of Gour on The Law of Transfer. The signature niade in these circumstances is personal signature of the executant. It is his autograph. No question of agency arises in such a situation. This is what seems to have happened here as one can guess from the frame of the question.\n\nBe that as it may, without any enquiry into the circumstances in which the pen of the son affixed the signature of the assessee on the return it could not be assumed that the son acted as the agent of the father and signed his name in that capacity.\n\nIn my opinion the discussion of the question whether an agent can sign a return for an assessee was outside the scope of the question which the High Court was called upon to answer. The answer given in my view was a correct one.\n\nAfter considerable thought I am disinclined to reverse the decision of the High Court by placing an interpretation on the question which it does not bear.\n\nIn an ex parte hearing we had not the advantage of hearing any arguments in support of the view taken by the High Court as the respondent did not appear.\n\nIt is unnecessary to express any opinion on the question whether an agent can sign for the principal a form of return under the Indian Income-tax Act as that enquiry is outside the scope of the question referred to the High Court as already pointed out.\n\nIn the absence of any material to the contrary I am satisfied that the assessee signed the return\n\nCo111nr.isslo11c,·· of Agrirnlturaf\n\nlncottw-tax\n\nKcs/iab Clumdr<&\n\nMandal\n\nMahajan].\n\nCmn11iissioner -of Agricultural\n\nloco1nc-tax\n\nKesl1ab Chandra\n\n1lla11dal\n\n}lfnhajan J.\n\npersonally. If the Income-tax Officer felt that the assessee had not touched the pen or the hand of the person who put the signature on the return he should have called upon the assessee to appear before him and ascertain from him the circumstances in which the son's pen was used for the signature. In In the matter of Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. & U.P.('), it was observed that it is the duty of the Income-tax Officer before he accepts a return signed by an agent to satisfy himself about the authority of the agent to do so.\n\nIn my opinion, it is equally the duty of an Income-tax Officer before he rejects a return of an illiterate assessee or a person such as a leper, to satisfy himself that there was no physical contact of the person with the mark or the signature put on the form.\n\nI agree with my brother Das that there should be physical contact between the person and the signature or the mark put on the document, but I am afraid I cannot agree with him that in this case that has not happened. The question to a certain extent assumes the contact of the assessee with the pen of his son when it states . that the illiterate assessee's signature was put with the pen of the son.\n\nBe that as it may, that circumstance has not been eliminate<! in the case and that being so, the question cannot be answered in the manner proposed by my learned brother. I am further of the opinion that the ncome tax Officers should not while administering the law create unnecessary problems for the Courts.\n\nIn the present case if there was any doubt in the mind of the Income-tax Officer, he should have ca, lled upon the illiterate assessee to put his mark in his presence on the return and he should not have acted hastily in assessing him under t_he penal provisions of the Act.\n\nIgnorant and illiterate people who are not well versed with the law of income-tax should be dealt with more sympathetically than was done here. They should not be penalised in the manner that the present assessee was penalised. In the result I would dismiss this appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for appellant: P. K. Bose.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1930 Oudh. 305.", "total_entities": 130, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL\n\nINCOME-TAX, BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX, BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SRI KESHAB CHANDRA MANDAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI KESHAB CHANDRA MANDAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 178, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bdngal Agriciiltiiral Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 24, 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246, "end_char": 256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bdngal Agriciiltiiral Income-tax Act", "statute": "Bdngal Agriciiltiiral Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Incometax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 524, "end_char": 563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Keshab Chftndrn l\\Iandal Ba Sri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 804, "end_char": 835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A return of au illiterate assessee, Keshab Chandra l\\fandal, was signed in the vernacular as follows : \" Sri Keshab Chftndrn l\\Iandal Ba Sri J ugal Chandra Manda!,\""}}, {"text": "ugal Chandra Manda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 838, "end_char": 856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A return of au illiterate assessee, Keshab Chandra l\\fandal, was signed in the vernacular as follows : \" Sri Keshab Chftndrn l\\Iandal Ba Sri J ugal Chandra Manda!,\"", "canonical_name": "Jugal Chandra Mandal"}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1337, "end_char": 1377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-As the question referrnd was whether the return \" signed by the illiterate assessee with the pen of his son \" was valid, it must be assumed that there was such contact, and as there was nothing whatso.ever on the record to establish that the assessee did not touch the pen or the hand of the son when the signature \\'Ill.to 11ffmid, ttle High Court was right in answering the question in the affirmative."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2266, "end_char": 2285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Calcutta High Court revrrsed."}}, {"text": "May 9\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2297, "end_char": 2308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 9\n\n1950 APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at\n\n'Commissioner Fort William: (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at\n\n'Commissioner Fort William", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 9\n\n1950 APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at\n\n'Commissioner Fort William: (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "P. Moodkerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Moodkerjee .i."}}, {"text": "section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2681, "end_char": 2691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2703, "end_char": 2743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Appellate Tribunal of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2752, "end_char": 2810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.)\n\nMandal m a e erence ma e to t e 1g ourt un er section 63 (1) of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, by the Appellate Tribunal of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal."}}, {"text": "K. P. Khaitan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2852, "end_char": 2865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. Khaitan (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "K. P. Khaitan"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2867, "end_char": 2873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. Khaitan (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": ".DasJ.\n\nDAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2999, "end_char": 3010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following judgments were delivered :-\n\n.DasJ.\n\nDAS ].-There is no serious dispute as to the facts leading up to this appeal."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944", "statute": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3173, "end_char": 3213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "3rd April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3394, "end_char": 3409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This return is dated the 3rd April, 1945, and just below the declaration appears the following writing in vernacular :\n\n\"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal.\""}}, {"text": "Keshab Chandra Mandal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This return is dated the 3rd April, 1945, and just below the declaration appears the following writing in vernacular :\n\n\"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal.\"", "canonical_name": "Keshab C]landra Mandal"}}, {"text": "18th April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th April, 1945, the Agricultural Incometax Officer noted on the order sheet that the case would be taken up at Bankura Dak Bungalow on 6th May, 1945, and directed the office to inform the party to appear with all settlement records, vouchers etc."}}, {"text": "Bankura Dak Bungalow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th April, 1945, the Agricultural Incometax Officer noted on the order sheet that the case would be taken up at Bankura Dak Bungalow on 6th May, 1945, and directed the office to inform the party to appear with all settlement records, vouchers etc."}}, {"text": "6th May, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3662, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th April, 1945, the Agricultural Incometax Officer noted on the order sheet that the case would be taken up at Bankura Dak Bungalow on 6th May, 1945, and directed the office to inform the party to appear with all settlement records, vouchers etc."}}, {"text": "Bankura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th May, 1945, the assesseefiledapetition before the Agricultµral Income-tax Officer who had gone to Bankura stating inter alia that he had been advised that the return which he had submitted before under the advice of a Headmaster of a school was not a proper return, that there were many mistakes in the return and many things had been omitted and that, therefore, it .was absolutely necessary for him to submit a fresh return and praying for fifteen days' time for doing so and\n\n....\n\nalso for a form of return."}}, {"text": "Keshab Chandra Mandal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was signed in 1950 vernacular as follows : - commissioner \"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal x of Agricultural , Income-tax Ba: Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal' .", "canonical_name": "Keshab C]landra Mandal"}}, {"text": "Jugal Chandra Mandal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4436, "end_char": 4456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was signed in 1950 vernacular as follows : - commissioner \"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal x of Agricultural , Income-tax Ba: Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal' .", "canonical_name": "Jugal Chandra Mandal"}}, {"text": "H. Keshab Chandra Nandi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nBelow that was the signature of his pleader H. Keshab Chandra Nandi."}}, {"text": "Keshab C]landra Mandal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vith this petition was attached a Vakalat- Mandal nama signed in vernacular in the manner following :\n\n\"Sri Keshab C]landra Mandal x Ba : Sri J ugal Chandra Manda!", "canonical_name": "Keshab C]landra Mandal"}}, {"text": "J ugal Chandra Manda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4676, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vith this petition was attached a Vakalat- Mandal nama signed in vernacular in the manner following :\n\n\"Sri Keshab C]landra Mandal x Ba : Sri J ugal Chandra Manda!"}}, {"text": "Keshab Chandra Manda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L It will be noticed that in both the signatures, against the name of Sri Keshab Chandra Manda} there was a cross mark.", "canonical_name": "Keshab C]landra Mandal"}}, {"text": "Srijukta Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The vakalatnama contained the following entry:-\n\n•:I hereby appoint on my behalf Srijukta Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi, Pleader, to do all works in connection with this case and as I do not know to read and write I put in x mark in the presence of the undermentioned persons as a token thereof.\""}}, {"text": "Jugal Chandra Mandal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B:is son Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal attested the cross mark in the vakalatnama.", "canonical_name": "Jugal Chandra Mandal"}}, {"text": "7th May, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5318, "end_char": 5331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of this petition the Agricultu'ral Incometax Officer allowed time for one day and fixed the case for the 7th May, 1945, at 10 a.m. The assessee was directed to submit a fresh return and to produce account books and other necessary papers."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5575, "end_char": 5585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jugal Chandra Manda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His son Jugal Chandra Manda!", "canonical_name": "Jugal Chandra Mandal"}}, {"text": "Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5716, "end_char": 5739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeared with pleader Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi."}}, {"text": "DasJ.\n\nKuhdb Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ.\n\nKuhdb Chandra\n\nMandal\n\nV..s J.\n\nThe Agricultural Income-tax Officer stated in his assessment order as follows :-\n\n\"A fresh return is submitted to-day."}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income-tax Officer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6079, "end_char": 6110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ.\n\nKuhdb Chandra\n\nMandal\n\nV..s J.\n\nThe Agricultural Income-tax Officer stated in his assessment order as follows :-\n\n\"A fresh return is submitted to-day."}}, {"text": "Jugal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first one appears to have been signed by the assessee him- self but the second one has been signed by Jugal his son for the assessee."}}, {"text": "14th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 7005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Commissioner by his order dated the 14th August, 1945, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the assessment under section 35 (4) (a) (i)."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7063, "end_char": 7073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7221, "end_char": 7239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on the 9th December, 1947, accepted the appeal on the ground, amongst others, that the return filed on the 7th May, 1945, was a proper return and should have been treated as such."}}, {"text": "section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7452, "end_char": 7462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7588, "end_char": 7604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Tribunal by its order dated the 22nd April, 1948, referred the following question of law to the High Court :-\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return.\""}}, {"text": "G. N. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference came up before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court (G. N. Das J, and R. P. Mooe kerjee J .)"}}, {"text": "R. P. Mooe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7946, "end_char": 7956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference came up before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court (G. N. Das J, and R. P. Mooe kerjee J .)"}}, {"text": "16th September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8022, "end_char": 8042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who, for rea?ons stated in their judgment\n\ndated the 16th September, 1948, answered the question in the affirmative."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8163, "end_char": 8173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court quoted the following <; ibservations of Blackburn J. in The Queen v. The justices of Kent (1 ):\n\n\"No doubt at common law, where a person authorises another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person ."}}, {"text": "Government of Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10963, "end_char": 10983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Standing Counsel to the Government of Bengal (Mr. K. P. Khaitan) in the course of a fair ' and lucid argument contended before us that the Court should give effect to the plain meaning of the words of the statute and the rules which have statutory force whatever might be the consequences and that on a plain reading of the Act and the rules there could be no doubt that the legislature intended the return of an individual assessee to be signed by himself, i.e., personally."}}, {"text": "K. P. Khaitan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10989, "end_char": 11002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Standing Counsel to the Government of Bengal (Mr. K. P. Khaitan) in the course of a fair ' and lucid argument contended before us that the Court should give effect to the plain meaning of the words of the statute and the rules which have statutory force whatever might be the consequences and that on a plain reading of the Act and the rules there could be no doubt that the legislature intended the return of an individual assessee to be signed by himself, i.e., personally.", "canonical_name": "K. P. Khaitan"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12084, "end_char": 12093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12472, "end_char": 12482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12736, "end_char": 12746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13153, "end_char": 13163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13339, "end_char": 13349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13402, "end_char": 13431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 193 and 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 196", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13833, "end_char": 13844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13852, "end_char": 13869, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13879, "end_char": 13889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14013, "end_char": 14042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 35 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14587, "end_char": 14605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14911, "end_char": 14921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15443, "end_char": 15453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 35 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15503, "end_char": 15521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15622, "end_char": 15649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 41 and 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15960, "end_char": 15978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16087, "end_char": 16097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16253, "end_char": 16295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16310, "end_char": 16320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944", "statute": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16374, "end_char": 16384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944", "statute": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17251, "end_char": 17261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944", "statute": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17497, "end_char": 17507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17755, "end_char": 17765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17816, "end_char": 17826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lfrsliab Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18859, "end_char": 18875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-rule (2) requires every such application to be signed by the claimant and his authorised representa.tive, if any, and allows such application to be presented by the applicant either in person or through\n\nConuuissz'un.cr of Agricultur,:J\n\nInco111lJ-ta:1::\n\nv. lfrsliab Chandra\n\n;<, fandal\n\nDas J.\n\nConunissioncr of Agricultural\n\nI nco11ic-ta x .,"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19752, "end_char": 19762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20130, "end_char": 20140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21201, "end_char": 21211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21626, "end_char": 21632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "trate or other official of the State or a Political Officer, Keshab c1ia .. <1ra if he resides in a State in India, and ( c) before a British Mandal Consul, if he resides elsewhere.\""}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21674, "end_char": 21679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "trate or other official of the State or a Political Officer, Keshab c1ia .. <1ra if he resides in a State in India, and ( c) before a British Mandal Consul, if he resides elsewhere.\""}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21814, "end_char": 21824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22076, "end_char": 22086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22460, "end_char": 22470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aushab Clurndra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23669, "end_char": 23684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ion 'r of A.f}ric11ltural\n\n/t\".:0111.·-f:ax\n\nAushab Clurndra\n\nManda/\n\nDasJ.\n\nrules to be duly authorised in writing and such writing has to be filed on record I cannot think that the Act or the rules contemplate or permit the employment of an agent to sign an important document, namely a return or an appeal or application without any written authority and that such agent may sign without producing any such written authority."}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25707, "end_char": 25726, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25812, "end_char": 25822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27766, "end_char": 27776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28353, "end_char": 28363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshab Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28500, "end_char": 28514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Appeal applied Keshab Chandra the principles of the decision in Hyde v. Johnson( i) and Mandal in In re Whitley Partners Ltd.( 2 ).", "canonical_name": "Keshab C]landra Mandal"}}, {"text": "Luckman Buksh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28621, "end_char": 28634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Luckman Buksh\n\n;;~-;:,."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28797, "end_char": 28806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28818, "end_char": 28832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28905, "end_char": 28911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rankin C. J. held in japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd. v. Jajodia Cotton Nlills, Ltd.(•) that a demand Jetter signed by the solicitors of the petitioning creditor was not a notice under section 163 of the Indian Companies Act which as it then stood required a demand\" under his hand.\""}}, {"text": "section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29087, "end_char": 29098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29113, "end_char": 29126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rangoon High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29218, "end_char": 29236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was taken by the Rangoon High Court in Ji, fanjeebhai Khataw & Co. v. Jamal Brothers & Co. Ltd.(•) and M.A. Kureshi v. Argus Footwear, Ltd. ( 6 )._"}}, {"text": "Ji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29240, "end_char": 29242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was taken by the Rangoon High Court in Ji, fanjeebhai Khataw & Co. v. Jamal Brothers & Co. Ltd.(•) and M.A. Kureshi v. Argus Footwear, Ltd. ( 6 )._"}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29598, "end_char": 29608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29616, "end_char": 29630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29864, "end_char": 29874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29882, "end_char": 29902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30014, "end_char": 30024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30923, "end_char": 30963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High ..Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31850, "end_char": 31872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High ..Court in Deo Narain Rai v. Kukur Bind(~) referred to in the High Court judgment before us does not appear to milit_ate against the views expressed , above."}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32044, "end_char": 32054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32062, "end_char": 32086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32281, "end_char": 32292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stanley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32295, "end_char": 32302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stanley C. J. pointed out that the language of the last mentioned section was elliptical and was not accurate draughtsmanship and, therefore, it could not be relied upon in construing section 59."}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32479, "end_char": 32489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qf Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32504, "end_char": 32515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment Qf Banerjee J. also makes it clear that he found,\n\nnothing in th.e Act to exclude signature -by an agent and that the words '' on behalf of\" in section 123 were surplusage."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32648, "end_char": 32659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33907, "end_char": 33923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J.\n\nFAZL Au J.-I agree.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33979, "end_char": 33988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUKHERJEA J.-I agree.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34002, "end_char": 34011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\nMahajan/.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The question of law referred to the High Court and answered by it in the affirmative is in these terms :-\" Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return.\"", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35128, "end_char": 35142, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35171, "end_char": 35190, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36762, "end_char": 36776, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "lfnhajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37143, "end_char": 37151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cmn11iissioner -of Agricultural\n\nloco1nc-tax\n\nKesl1ab Chandra\n\n1lla11dal\n\n}lfnhajan J.\n\npersonally."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37977, "end_char": 37980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree with my brother Das that there should be physical contact between the person and the signature or the mark put on the document, but I am afraid I cannot agree with him that in this case that has not happened."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39252, "end_char": 39262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: P. K. Bose."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_453_459_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 453\n\nPRITAM SINGH\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 136 (1)-Special leave to appeal- Granting of leave-Guiding principles-Final hearing-Nature of.\n\nThe Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and\n\ngrave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.\n\nThe view that once an appeal has been admitted by special leave, the entire case is at large and the appellant is free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court is wrong. Only those points can be urged at the final hearinl( of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for.\n\nIbrahim v. Rex ([1914] A. C. 615) referred to.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at East Punjab : Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950.\n\nThis was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for the Province of East Punjab at Simla (Falshaw and Soni JJ.) dated the 23rd November, 1949, in Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 1949 upholding the conviction of the appellant on a charge of murder and confirming a sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge .of Ferozepore. ]ai Gopal Sethi (H.]. Umrigar, with him) for the appellan.t.\n\nBasant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. May 5. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of\n\nMay S\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nPrit111n Si11gh\n\nT'111 State\n\n. Fazl A?i J.\n\nmurder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The prosecution case, which has been found to be substantially true by both the trial judge and the High Court may be shortly stated as follows .\n\nOn the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra Chamar, who had been brought into the village by Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.\n\nButa Singh, on learning of this incident, spoke to Pritam Singh, but finding that his attitude was uncompromising, he advised Kakarra to go to the police station to report the matter.\n\nOn the next day, while Kakarra was going to the police station, Mal Singh, the first prosecution witness m the case, brought him back telling him that Pritam Singh had apologized and the matter shoulc1 ncit be pursued.\n\nOn the 30th December, at about 5 p.m., just when Buta Singh came out of his house, Pritam Singh came up with a double barrelled 12-bore gun an.d shot him in the abdomen, and Buta Singh died a short time thereafter.\n\nShortly after the occurrence, Punjab Singh and Na! Singh, who had both witnessed the occurrence, went to the police station at Abohar, which is at a distance of 13 miles from the place of occurrence, and lodged th~ first information report regarding the murder. In this report, Punjab Singh reported the facts as already stated, but he also added that Pritam Singh was drunk when he fired the gun and his younger brother, Hakim Singh, who was also drunk was standing at a short distance from him and shouting \"Kill, don't care.\" None of the other witnesses however supported Punjab Singh as to the part attributed by him to Hakim Singh or as to the drunken condition of the appellant or Hakim Singh, and the police after due investigation of the case sent up a charge sheet against the appellant only. The appellant was thereafter put on his trial before the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the prosecution witnesses, of whom five were eye-witnesses, viz., Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal\n\nSingh), and Mst. Phoolan, mother of the deceased, came t<t-the conclusion, in agreement with 4 assessors who were present at the trial, that the version given by the prosecution witnsses was substantially true. In support of his conclusion, he referred to the following facts among others:- (1) that the first information report had been lodged at the police station without any delay, (2) that the names of at least 4 of the alleged eye-witnesses were mentioned in the report, and (3) that no sufficient reason had been shown as to why the prosecution witnesses should have conspired - to falsely implicate the accused in a murder case, if he had been innocent. The High Court on appeal agreed with the Sessions Judge, and the learned Judge who delivered the judgment of the High Court observed as follows in , the concluding part of his judgment :-\"I have given the case every consideration and I have come to the conclusion that the learned Sessions Judge was right in holding that the case against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.\"\n\nThe appellant thereafter obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, and Mr. Sethi, the learned counsel appearing for him, has in support of the appeal, addressed to us very elaborate arguments to show that the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is 'not correct. He has argued that the alleged eye-witnesses were intimately connected with each other and with the deceased, that they and the accused belonged to two mutually hostile factions, that these witnesses had made discrepant statements as to the respective places from where they claimed to have seen the occurrence, some of them making discrepant statements about their own position before the police officer who drew up. the plan of the scene of occurrence and before the trial\n\nCourt and also making discrepant statements about the position of the other witnesses, and that they should not be held to be tru.thful witnes5es inasmuch as they had denied certain previous statements made by them either before the police or before the Committing Magistrate. Mr. Sethi also put forward the theory, which has been discredited by both the Courts below on grounds which prima Jacie do not appear to be\n\nPritam Singh\n\nThe State\n\nFllzl AJiJ.\n\nPritam Singh\n\n~- The State\n\nF .. lAUJ.\n\nunreasonable, that the occurrence must have taken place late at night, that there were probably no eye-witnesses to identify the real assailant and that the appellant had been falsely implicated on account of enmity.\n\nThe obvious reply to all these arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that this Court is not an ordinary Court of criminal appeal and will not, generally speaking, allow facts to be reopened, especially when two Courts agree in their conclusions in regard to them and when the conclusions of fact which are challenged are dependent on the credibility of witnesses who have been believed by the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing them and hearing their evidence. In the present case, the story for the prosecution, which is neither incredible nor improbable, is supported by no less than 5 witnesses including the mother of the deceased, and their evidence, in spite of its infirmities, has impressed 4 assessors and the two Courts below, who, in appraising its reliability, have given due weight to certain broad features of the case which, according to . them, negative the theory of conspiracy or concoction. In thes{! circumstances, it would be opposed to all principle~ and precedents if we were to constitute ourselves into a third Court of fact and, after re-weighing the evidence, come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial Judge and the High Court.\n\nIn arguing the appeal, Mr. Sethi proceeded on the assumption that once _an appeal had been admitted by special leave, the entire case was at large and the appellant was free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which couid be raised in the High Conrt or the trial Court.\n\nThis assumption is, in our opinion, entirely unwarranted. The misconception involved in the argument is not a new one and had to be dispelled by the Privy Council in England in Ibrahim v. Rex(') in these words:-\" ....... . the Board has repeatedly treated applications for leave to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals\n\n(!) [19U] A.C. 615.\n\n1950 as being upon the same footing: Riel's Case; Ex-parte Deeming. The Board cannot give leave to appeal • Pritam Si1rgh where the grounds suggested could not sustam the appeal itself; and, conversely, it cannot allow an appeal on grounds that would not have sufficed for the grant of permission to bring it.\"\n\nThe rule laid down by the Privy Council is based on sound principle, and, in our opinion, only those points can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for, and it would be illogical to adopt different standards at two different stages of the same case.\n\nIt seems also necessary to make a few general observations relating to the powers of this Court to\n\ngra1, t special leave to appeal in criminal cases.\n\nThe relevant articles of the Constitution dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are articles 132 to 136. Article 132 applies both to civil and criminal cases and under it an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree ...... or final order ofa High Court, whether in a civil, criminal or , other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Article 133 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in civil matters only, and it has been drafted on the lines of sections 109 and 1 IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.\n\nArticle 134 constitutes the Supreme Court as a Court of criminal appeal_ in a limited class of cases only, and clearly implies that no appeal lies to it as a matter of course or right except in cases specified therein. Article 135 merely provides that the ;; upreme Court shall have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to wl.Jich the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matterwere exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under any existing law. The last article, with which we are concerned is article 136 and it runs thus :-\n\n\" 136. {l) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nPrifa11t Singh\n\ngrant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India, v.\n\nTile State\n\nFaz! Ali J.\n\n(2) .................. \" The points to be noted in regard to this article are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined merely to criminal cases, as is evident from the words \"appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order\" which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide range of matters; secondly, that the words used in this article are \"in any cause or matter,\" while those used in articles 132 to 134 are \"civil, criminal or other proceeding,\" and thirdly, that while in articles 132 to 134 reference is made to appeals from the High Courts, under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or tribunal in the terr1tory of India.\n\nOn a careful examination of article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested , under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article.\n\nBy virtue of this article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal c8ses, in income-tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist.\n\nThe Privy Council have ttied to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court in Kapildeo v. The King.\n\nIt is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the reasons, coru; titutional and administrative, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases\n\na sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave.\n\nGenerally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere w.ith the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta.\n\nTHE BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI\n\nEMPLOYEES OF THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,\n\nDELHI\n\nand\n\nTHE BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,\n\nDELHI\n\nUNION OF INDIA: INTERVENER.\n\n(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTR, I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and M UKHERJEA J J.]\n\nConititution of In&ia, A.rt. 136-Siiprc~ Court-Appellate Jurisdiction-Award of Industri~ Tribw1al-Whether appealablel950\n\nPritam Singh\n\nV; The Stal<J\n\nFa:t .UiJ.\n\nMay 26.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "453\n\nPRITAM SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "453\n\nPRITAM SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M UKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 270, "end_char": 283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at East Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at East Punjab : Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature for the Province of East Punjab at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1192, "end_char": 1257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for the Province of East Punjab at Simla (Falshaw and Soni JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Basant Kishan Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1560, "end_char": 1580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1615, "end_char": 1626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of\n\nMay S\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nPrit111n Si11gh\n\nT'111 State\n\n.", "canonical_name": "453\n\nPRITAM SINGH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1793, "end_char": 1822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of\n\nMay S\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nPrit111n Si11gh\n\nT'111 State\n\n."}}, {"text": "Fazl AliJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1874, "end_char": 1884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of\n\nMay S\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nPrit111n Si11gh\n\nT'111 State\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of\n\nMay S\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nPrit111n Si11gh\n\nT'111 State\n\n."}}, {"text": "Fazl A?i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl A?i J.\n\nmurder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore.", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "Buta Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1945, "end_char": 1955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl A?i J.\n\nmurder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore."}}, {"text": "28th December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra Chamar, who had been brought into the village by Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago."}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra Chamar, who had been brought into the village by Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.", "canonical_name": "453\n\nPRITAM SINGH"}}, {"text": "Punni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra Chamar, who had been brought into the village by Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago."}}, {"text": "Kakarra Chamar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2282, "end_char": 2296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra Chamar, who had been brought into the village by Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.", "canonical_name": "Kakarra Chamar"}}, {"text": "Kakarra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2518, "end_char": 2525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Buta Singh, on learning of this incident, spoke to Pritam Singh, but finding that his attitude was uncompromising, he advised Kakarra to go to the police station to report the matter.", "canonical_name": "Kakarra Chamar"}}, {"text": "Mal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2641, "end_char": 2650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, while Kakarra was going to the police station, Mal Singh, the first prosecution witness m the case, brought him back telling him that Pritam Singh had apologized and the matter shoulc1 ncit be pursued."}}, {"text": "Punjab Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3043, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly after the occurrence, Punjab Singh and Na!"}}, {"text": "Na! Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3060, "end_char": 3069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly after the occurrence, Punjab Singh and Na!"}}, {"text": "Abohar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3140, "end_char": 3146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, who had both witnessed the occurrence, went to the police station at Abohar, which is at a distance of 13 miles from the place of occurrence, and lodged th~ first information report regarding the murder."}}, {"text": "Hakim Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3435, "end_char": 3446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this report, Punjab Singh reported the facts as already stated, but he also added that Pritam Singh was drunk when he fired the gun and his younger brother, Hakim Singh, who was also drunk was standing at a short distance from him and shouting \"Kill, don't care.\""}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Ferozepore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was thereafter put on his trial before the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore."}}, {"text": "Punjab Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal\n\nSingh), and Mst."}}, {"text": "Mitta Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4036, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal\n\nSingh), and Mst."}}, {"text": "Nikka Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal\n\nSingh), and Mst."}}, {"text": "Mal\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal\n\nSingh), and Mst."}}, {"text": "Phoolan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4106, "end_char": 4113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Phoolan, mother of the deceased, came t<t-the conclusion, in agreement with 4 assessors who were present at the trial, that the version given by the prosecution witnsses was substantially true."}}, {"text": "Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5229, "end_char": 5234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, and Mr. Sethi, the learned counsel appearing for him, has in support of the appeal, addressed to us very elaborate arguments to show that the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is 'not correct."}}, {"text": "Fllzl AJiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6341, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sethi also put forward the theory, which has been discredited by both the Courts below on grounds which prima Jacie do not appear to be\n\nPritam Singh\n\nThe State\n\nFllzl AJiJ.\n\nPritam Singh\n\n~- The State\n\nF .. lAUJ."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8287, "end_char": 8294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The misconception involved in the argument is not a new one and had to be dispelled by the Privy Council in England in Ibrahim v. Rex(') in these words:-\" ....... ."}}, {"text": "Riel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8505, "end_char": 8509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950 as being upon the same footing: Riel's Case; Ex-parte Deeming."}}, {"text": "articles 132 to 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9379, "end_char": 9398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9400, "end_char": 9411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9750, "end_char": 9761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 109 and 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9877, "end_char": 9895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9896, "end_char": 9932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9935, "end_char": 9946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10154, "end_char": 10165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10298, "end_char": 10309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10313, "end_char": 10324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10559, "end_char": 10570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10699, "end_char": 10707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nPrifa11t Singh\n\ngrant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India, v.\n\nTile State\n\nFaz!", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10924, "end_char": 10932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nPrifa11t Singh\n\ngrant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India, v.\n\nTile State\n\nFaz!"}}, {"text": "articles 132 to 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11344, "end_char": 11363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 132 to 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11434, "end_char": 11453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11591, "end_char": 11596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J.\n\n(2) .................. \" The points to be noted in regard to this article are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined merely to criminal cases, as is evident from the words \"appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order\" which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide range of matters; secondly, that the words used in this article are \"in any cause or matter,\" while those used in articles 132 to 134 are \"civil, criminal or other proceeding,\" and thirdly, that while in articles 132 to 134 reference is made to appeals from the High Courts, under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or tribunal in the terr1tory of India."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11627, "end_char": 11638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "P, A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13540, "end_char": 13551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13558, "end_char": 13581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,"}}, {"text": "BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13635, "end_char": 13663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DELHI\n\nand\n\nTHE BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,\n\nDELHI\n\nUNION OF INDIA: INTERVENER."}}, {"text": "liARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13708, "end_char": 13722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTR, I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and M UKHERJEA J J.]\n\nConititution of In&ia, A.rt."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13747, "end_char": 13762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTR, I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and M UKHERJEA J J.]\n\nConititution of In&ia, A.rt.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "M UKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13791, "end_char": 13801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTR, I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and M UKHERJEA J J.]\n\nConititution of In&ia, A.rt.", "canonical_name": "M UKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13931, "end_char": 13943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136-Siiprc~ Court-Appellate Jurisdiction-Award of Industri~ Tribw1al-Whether appealablel950\n\nPritam Singh\n\nV; The Stal<J\n\nFa:t .UiJ.\n\nMay 26.", "canonical_name": "453\n\nPRITAM SINGH"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_459_519_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "~.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 459\n\na sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave.\n\nGenerally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere w.ith the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta.\n\nTHE BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI\n\nEMPLOYEES OF THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,\n\nDELHI\n\nand\n\nTHE BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,\n\nDELHI\n\nUNION OF INDIA: INTERVENER.\n\n(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTR, I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and M UKHERJEA J J.]\n\nConititution of In&ia, A.rt. 136-Siiprc~ Court-Appellate Jurisdiction-Award of Industri~ Tribw1al-Whether appealablel950\n\nPritam Singh\n\nV; The Stal<J\n\nFa:t .UiJ.\n\nMay 26.\n\n1950 Applicatio1' f<Yr special leave-Maintainability-Nai!tre of functiois of Industrial. Tribmial-Industrial Di•putes Act, 19'17, ss. 8, 16- Bhural Ba\"k Ud. Case heard by Bench of three memb, rs.\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, and\n\nMAHAJAN J, T,\n\nBh~;!loi::=~ 'f.d. (MUKHERJEA and PATANJALI SASTRI J.J. dissenting).-The functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions although it is not a Court, and under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal ftom a decision of the Tribunal, even though It will be very reluctant to entertain such an application. ·\n\nKaia C.J.\n\nPer 'MUKHERJEA J. (PATANJALI SASTRI J. concurring).-An Industtial Tribunal functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act is not a judicial tribunal. The nature of the i!eterminations made by it and the materials and considerations on which it has to decide a dispute are also such that the powers of an appellate court cannot be exercised fully and effectively in respect of them and such determinations are therefore ontside the pur\\'iew of Art. 136 of the Constitntion. Even assuming that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, 'the present case was not a fit one for enter~ taining an appeal from the determination of the Tribunal.\n\n[On the merits KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI and MUKHERJEA, JJ. were of opinion that there was no ground for admitting the appeal.\n\nMAHAJAN J. was of opinion that the award was bad and must be set aside.)\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.\n\nXXXIV of 1950.\n\nAppeal by special leave from an Award of the All-Ind1a Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) Bombay, dated 1st January, 1950. The facts of the case are set out in the judgment.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tek Chand (Veda Vyas and S. K.\n\nKapur, with him) for the appellant.\n\nB. Sen for the respondents.\n\nAlladi Krishnaswami Aiyar (Jindra Lal, with him) for the Union of India.\n\n1950. May 26. The Court delivered judgment as follows:-'\n\nKANIA C.J- I have read the judgments prepared by Messrs. Fa1ll Ali, Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ.\n\nin this case.\n\nAs the views in those judgments in 1950 respect of the nature of the duties and functions of the Industrial Tribunal do not show agreement I Bharat Bank r.u. consider it necessary to add a few words of my own.\n\nEmf>l;·.ces 01 In my opinion, the functions and duties of the Bharat ia111, cu.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging j\\;1dicial fuqctions, although it is not -a /{auia c .f.\n\nCourt. The rules framed by the Tribunal require evidence to be taken and witnesses to be examined, cross-examined and re-examined. The Act constituting the Tribunal imposes penalties for incorrect statements made before the Tribunal. While the powers of the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from those of an ordinary civil Court and it has jurisdiction and powers to give reliefs which a civil Court administering the law of the land (for instance, ordering the reinstatemwt of a workman) does not possess in the discharge of its duties it is essentially working as a judicial body. The fact that its determination has to be followed by an order df the Government which makes the award binding, or that in cases where Governme_nt is a party the legislature is. permitted to revise the decision, or that the Government is empowered to fix the period of the operat_ion of the award do not, to my mind, alter the nature and character of the functions of the Tribunal. Having considered all the provisions of the Act it seems to me clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near those of a Court, although it is not a Court in the technical sense of the word.\n\nThe next question is whether under 2.rtide 136 the Court hris jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal against the decision of such a body .. It is not disputed that the Court has power to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition in re.3pect of the work\n\nof the Tribunal. The only question is whether there is a right of appeal also. In my opinion the wording of article 136 is wide enough to give jurisdiction to the Court to entertain an application for leave to appeal, although it is obvious that having regard to the nature of the functions of the Tribunal, this Court will be very reluctant to entertain such an application.\n\n1950 As regards the merits, I do not think this is a case\n\nBharat Bank Ud. in which I would admit the appeal.\n\nThe aggrieved parties may apply for redress by adopting other appropriate proceedings. The appeal therefore should be dismissed with costs.\n\nv. ' Eu1filoyecs of Bharat B1111k Ltd.\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nF AZL Au J .-The important question to be decided in this case is whether the present appeal lies at all to this Court. The question is not free from difficulty, but on the whole I am inclined to think that the appeal does lie. It is fully recognized that the scope of article 136 of the Constitution is very wide, but the significance of the language used in the section can be appreciated only by comparing it with the articles which precede it. Article 132 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and the words used in that article are: \"appeal. ..... from any judgment, decree or final order.\" Article 133 deals with appeals in civil matters and the same words are used here also. Article 134 deals with appeals iri criminal matters, and the words used in it are: \"appeal.. .... from any judgment, final order or sentence.\" In article 136, the words \"judgment\" and \"decree,\" which are used in articles 132 and 133 are retained. Similarly, the words \"judgment\" and \"sentence\" occurring in article 134 are also retained. But the expression \"final order\" becomes \"order,\" and, instead of the High Court, reference is made to \"any court.\" Certain other words are also used in the article which seem to me to have a special significance, these being \"determination,\" \"cause or matter\" and \"tribunal.\" It is obvious that these words greatly widen the scope of article 136.\n\nThey show that an appeal will lie also from a determination or order of \"any tribunal\" in any cause or matter.\n\nCan we then say that an Industrial Tribunal does not fall within the scope of article 136 ? If we go by a mere label, the answer must be in the affirmative.\n\nBut we have to look further and see what are the main functions of the Tribunal and how it proceeds to discharge those functions.\n\nThis is necessary because\n\nI take it to be implied that before an appeal can lie to 1950 this Court frcm a tribunal it must perform some kind Bl B k Ud.\n\n1 of judicial function and partake to some extent of the wrat /n\n\ncharacter of a Court.\n\nEmployees of Now there can be no doubt that the Industrial Bharat Bank ua.\n\nTribunal has, to use a well-known expression, \"all the\n\nC · Fazl Ali J. trappings of a ourt \" and performs functions wh1oh cannot but be regarded as judicial. This is evident from the rules by which the proceedings before the Tribunal are regulated. It appears that the proceeding before it commences on an application which in many respects is in the nature of a plaint. It has the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of discovery, inspection, granting adjournment, reception of evidence taken on affidavit, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the production of documents, issuing commissions, etc. It is to be deemed to be a civil Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It may admit and call for evidence at any stage of the proceeding and has the power to administer oaths. The parties appearing before it have the right of examination, cross-examination and re-examination and of addressing it after all evidence has been called.\n\nA party may also be represented by a legal practitioner with its permission. .\n\nThe matter does not rest there. The main function of this Tribunal is to adjudicate on industrial disputes which implies that there must be two or more parties before it with conflicting cases, and that it has also to arrive at a conclusion as to how the dispute is to be ended. Prima f acie, therefore, a Tribunal like this cannot be excluded from the scope of article 136, but before any final conclusion can be expressed on the subject certain contentions which have been put forward on behalf of the respondents have to be disposed of..\n\nThe first contention is that the Industrial Tribunal cannot be said to perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function, since it is not required to be guided by any recognized substantive law in deciding disputes\n\nBharat Bani: Ud,\n\nE111j, loyees of Bharat 8.?nk Ud\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nwhich come before it. On the other hand, in deciding industrial disputes; it has to override contracts and create rights which are opposed to contractual rights.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is said that the very questions which arose before the Privy Council in Moses v.\n\nParker, Ex parte 1'1oses (') arise in this case, these questions being:-\n\n(1) How can the propriety of the Tribunal's deGision be tested on appeal, and\n\n(2) \\Vhat are the canons by which the appellate\n\nCourt is to be guided in deciding the appeal?\n\nTheir Lordships of the Privy Council undoubtedly felt that these were serious questions, but they had no hesitation in saying that \"if it were clear that appeals ought to be allowed. such difficulties woul_d doubtless be met somehow.\" This, in my opinion, i? a sufficient answer to the difficulty raised. The Tribunal has to adjudicate in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It may sometimes override contracts, but so can a Court which has to administer law according to the Bengal or Bihar Moneylenders Act, Encumbered Estates Act and other similar Acts. The Tribunal has to observe the provisions of the special law which it has to administer though that law may be different from the law which an ordinary Court of justice administers.\n\nThe appellate Court, therefore, can at least see that the rules <iccortling to which it has to act and the provisions which are binding upon it are observed, and its powers are not exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.\n\nThe second contention, which is\" a more serious one, is that the ad judicatjQn of the Tribunal has not all the attributes of a judicial decision, because the adjudication cannot bind the parties until it is declared to be binding by the Government under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nIt is said that the ad- . judication is really in the nature of an advice or report which is not effective until made so by the Government. It appears that a similar objection was raised\n\nin Rexv. Electricity Commissioners, London Electricity\n\n(1) (1896] A.O. 2a.\n\n') v\n\n\" -\n\njoint Committee Co. (1920) Ex Parte (1 ) for the purpose of deciding whether a writ of certiorari should be issued in the circumstances of the case but was disposed of in these words :-\n\n\"It is necesary, however, to deal with what I think was the main objection of the Attorney-General.\n\nIn this case he said the Commissioners come to no decision at all. They act merely as advisers. They recommend an order embodying a scheme to the .Minister of Transport, who may confirm it with or without modifications. Similarly the Minister of Transport comes to no decision. He submits the order to the Houses of Parliament, who may approve it with or without modifications. The Houses of Parliament may put anything into the order they please, whether consistent with the Act of 1919, or not. Until they have approved, nothing is decided, and in truth the whole procedure, draft scheme, inquiry, order, confirmation, approval, is only part of a process by which Parliament is expressing its will, and at no stage is subject to any control by , the Courts. It is unnecessary to emphasize the constitutional importance of this contention ......... In the provision that the final decision of the Commissioners is not to be operative until it has been approved by the two Houses of Parliament I find nothing inconsistent with the view that .in arriving at that decision the Commissioners themselves are to act judicially and within the limits prescribed by Act of Parliament, and that the Courts have power to keep them within those limits. It is to be noted that it is the order of the Commissioners that eventually takes effect; neither the Minister of Transport who confirms, nor the Houses of Parliament who approve, can under the statute make an order which in respect of the matters in question has any operation. I know of no authority which compels me to hold that a proceeding cannot be a judicial proceeding subject to prohibition or certiorari because it is subject to confirmation or approval, even where the approval has to .be that of the Houses of Parliament. The authorities are to the contrary.\"\n\n(1) {1924) 1 K.D. 171 .•\n\nBharat Bank Ud.\n\nEmpioy\"<'S of Bharat Ba1ik Ltd.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n1950 It is well-known that a writ of certiorari can issue\n\n81 -;;- 1, / 1 only against an order of a judicial or <JUasi-judicial \"\"\"' v~'\" ,,, . tribunal and if it is permissible for the High Court to Employees of issue a writ of certiorari against an Industrial Tribunal, Bharat Ba\"k Ltd. which fact was not seriously disputed before us, I find\n\nFaz1 Afi J. it difficult to hold that the tribunal does not come within the purview of article 136. If a subordinate Court acts in excess of its jurisdiction or assumes a jurisdiction which it does not possess, the appellate Court can always interfere and do what is contemplated to be done by a writ of certiorari.\n\nIt is to be noted that under section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in cases where the appropriate Government is not a party to the dispute, aJI that the Government has to do on receiving the award of the Tribunal is to declare it to be binding and to state from what date and for what period it will be binding. Section 15(2) is mandatory and it provides :\n\n\"On receipt of such award, the appropriate Government shall by order in writing declare the award to be bmding ........ \"\n\nThus the Government cannot alter, or cancel, or add to the award, but the award must be declared to be binding as it is. In substance, therefore, the adjudication of the Tribunal amounts to a final determination of the dispute whiCh binds the parties as well as the Government.\n\nOur attention was however drawn to the proviso to section 15 (2), which runs as follows:-\n\n\"Provided that where the appropriate Government is a party to the dispute and in Its opinion it would be inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, it shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with the statement of its reasons for not making a declaration as aforesaid before the Legislative Assembly of the Province, or where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, before the Central Legislative Assembly, and shall, as soon as may be, cause to be moved therein a resolution for the consideration of the\n\naward, and the Legislative Assembly may. by its resolution, confirm, modify, or reject the award.\"\n\n. This proviso was relied upon by the respondents to show that the right to appeal from the award could not have been contemplated in any case. But the Act itself makes a distinction between cases in which the Government is a party and those in which the Government is not a party.\n\nThe proviso relates to a very special type of case and as at present advise~ I do not wish to express any opinion as to whether an appeal lies to this Court or not in such a case, but, in my judgment, where the Government has only to declare\n\nthe award to be binding, an appeal shall lie.\n\nIt is necessary here to say a few words as to the scope of the appeal. As was pointed out by this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State (1), the power under article 136 of the Constitution being a special power is to be exercised only in special cases. The rule so laid down is bound to restrict the scope of the appeal in practice in almost all the cases which fall under article 136. . But in some cases a limitation will be imposed on the scope of the aP.peal by the very nature of the case and of the tribunal from which an appeal is sought to be brought, and a case under the Industrial Disputes Act seems to be an example of such a case.\n\nDealing now with the merits of the appeal, I am not prepared to h9ld that this is a proper case for interference with the adjudication of the Tribunal.\n\nThe pow.er of this Court was invoked by the appellants on four grounds .. These grounds have been elaborately examined by Mahajan J. and two of them have been pronounced to be wholly inadequate for justifying om: interference. My view with regard to these two grounds is identical with that of Mahajan J. and I do not wish to add to hat he has already said on the subject.\n\nThe remaining two grounds also are, in my opinion, wholly insufficient to justify the exercise of our special power under article 136. One of these grounds is that the award of the Tribunal - is based on no evidence whatsoever. I do not, however, find that this ground\n\n(1) (1950] S.C.R. •ss.\n\nBha1at lJanh l.ld\n\nE111p/oyc•s of Bltaraf Rani: Uri\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n1950 was urged in this form in the application for special\n\nBl H k Ud leave to appeal to this Court. All that was intended to iarat an , h v be urged wast at the appellants wanted to adduce Empzo; ees of evidence but were not allowE!d to do so.\n\nFrom fhe Bha\"\" Hank ua decision of the Tribunal however, it appears that the evidence that was shut out related to one isolated point Faz! AhJ. only and the Tribunal might well have been justified in not allowing evidence to be admitted on a point which in its opinion had no direct bearing on the issue before them. After hearing the respondents on this particular point, I am not disposed to hold that the Tribunal has committed such an error as would justify the interference of this Court.\n\nThe last ground urged is that the award has been signed by only two members of the Tribunal though it originally consisted of three persons and though the entire hearing of the dispute had taken place before all the three persons. This objection does not appear to me to be fatal to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, because under section 8 of the Act it is not obligatory on the Government to appoint a new member to fill a vacancy if one of the members ceases to be available at any time during the proceedings. Under that section, if the Chairman ceases to be available, the Government must appoint his successor, whereas if a member ceases to be available the Government may or may not appoint any one to fill his place. [n the present case, our attention was drawn to some correspondence which shows that one of the members was called upon to act as.a member of another Tribunal and the award in question was pronounced after informing the Govern- ment of the procedure which the Chairman and the remaining members intended to adopt.\n\nIn the view I have taken, this appeal must fail, and I would accordingly dismiss it with costs .\n\n• '1ahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the determination of an industrial dispute by the Industrial . Tribunal appointed under Ordinance VI of 1949.\n\nBharat Bank Limited,· Delhi, the appellant, is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act.\n\nIts employees made certain demands and as a result 1950 of an unfavourable response from the bank it appears Bl -B k k th 9 h M h 19 9 Th\n\n1arat ank Ucl. that they struc wor on e t arc , 4 . e , v. bank in its turn served notices on them to resume E111p1oy.-cs of work and .proceeded to discharge a number of them Bharat Bank IM. between the 19th March and 24th March as they failed --:- to do so. The Central Government constitued a Tri- Malia; m• J. bunal consisting of three persons for the adjudication of industrial disputes in banking companies under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947).\n\nThe disputes mentioned in schedule II of the notification were referred under section 10 of the Act to this Tribunal. Item 18 of this schedule reads as follows:-\n\n, 'Retrenchment and victimization (Specific cases to be cited by employees).\"\n\nThe dispute under this item between the Bharat Bank and its employees was heard by the Tribunal at Delhi and its award was made on the 19th January,\n\n1950. It was published in the Government of India Gazette dated 4th February, 1950, and was declared to be binding for a period of one year. The award of the Tribunal was signed by two out of its three members.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Central Government as well as on behalf of the respondents that this Court had no jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal against the determination of an Industrial Tribunal inasmuch as it did not exerdse the judicial powers of the State and that its determination was not in the nature of a judgment, decree _'or order-of a Court so as to be appealable. This being the first case in_which special leave was granted from the_ determination of an Industrial Tribunal, it is necessary Jo examine the provisions of the Constitution dealing with this matter and if possible, to define the limits.of the juri, sdicUon of this Court under article 136.\n\nThis article.is in th, ese terms :-\n\n\" (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal f.rom any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed\n\nor made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. l hart1t Ban!i Ud.\n\n(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any Jomployees of judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or Btwat Bank Ltd. made by any court or tribunal constitutj!d by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.\"\n\nThe article occurs in Chapter IV of Part V of the Co11stitution: \"The Union Judiciary.\" Article 124 deals with the establishment and constitution of the Supreme Court. Article 131 confers original jurisdiction on this Court in certain disputes arising between the Government of India and the States etc.\n\nArticles 132 and 133 deal with the appellate jurisdiction of the\n\nCourt in appeals from High Courts within the territory of India in civil matters. By article 134 limited right of appeal in criminal cases has been allowed. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which was the highest Court of appeal for India prior to 10th October, 1949, was not a Court of criminal appeal in the sense in which this Court has been made a Court of criminal appeal under article 134. It could only entertain appeals on the criminal side in exercise of the prerogative of the King.\n\nArticle 135 empowers this Court to hear all appeals which under existing laws could be heard by the Federal Court of India. By the Abolition \"of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, which came into force on the 10th October, 1949, all the powers that were possessed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in regard to cases or matters arising in India became exercisable by the Federal Court of India wheth11r thos.e powers were exercisable by reason of statutory authority or under\n\nthe prerogative of the King. The powers of the Judicial Committee were conferred upon it by the Judicial Committee Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Viet., C. 69). Appeals lay to His Majesty in Council from judgments, sentences, decrees or orders of any Court of justice within any British colony or possession abroad. Closely following article 135 which confers all the powers of the Judicial Committee on the Supreme Court comes article 136.\n\nThe language employed in this article is very wide and is of a comprehensive . character. Powers given\n\n..: .\n\nS.C.R;\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS .. 471\n\n' . . are of an overriding nature.\n\nTh~ .. article commences 1950 with.the words \"Notwithstanding anything in this 8 J, at-;; k ua Chapter.\" These words indicate that the intention of ar v\":n . the Constitution was to disregard in extraordinary EmpZoym of cases the limitations contained in the previous articles Bharat Bonk u.1. -0n this Court's power to entertain appeals. These articles dealt with the right of appeal against final.\n\nMahajan J. decisions of.High_ Courts within the territory of India.· Article 136, however, .overrides that qualification and empowers this Court to grant special leave even in cases .. where the judgment has not been given bya High\n\n Court but ha~ been given by any Court in the territory of India ; in other words, it contemplates grant, of special leave in cases where a Court subordinate. to a.\n\nHigh Court.has passed or made any order and the situation demands that the order should_ be quashed or reversed even without having recourse to the usual procedure provided by l:iw in the nature of an appeal,· etc. The .word\"order\" in article 136 has not been' qualified by the word \"final.\" It is clear, therefore, that the power to grant special leave under this article against an order of a Court could be exercised with respect to . interlocutory orders also. Another new feature introduced in article 136 is . the power given to grant special leave against orders and determinations etc. of any tribunal in the territory of India.· This word did not find place in the Judicial\n\nCommittee Act; where the phrase used was \"a Court: -of justice.\"- It is the introduction of this new expression in article 136 .that has led to considerable argu- ment as to its scope. Another expression . that did not : find place in theJudiciaI Committee Act but has been ·\n\nintroduced in article 136 is the word \"determination.\" A question has been raised as to the meaning to be . . given to these words in the article. On the one hand, ·\n\nit was contended that the words \"determination\" and '\n\n\"tribunal\" . were introduced in the article in order to bring within the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of ·\n\nthis Court all orders of tribunnls of different varieties and descriptions. On the other hand, it was said that ·\n\nthe words \"determination\" and \"tribunal\" were added in.the article. by way of abundant caution and ·\n\nBharat Batik Ltd, v.\n\nEnijJloyees. of Bharat Bank Ltd.\n\n472 SUPREllIE COURT REPORTS (1950]\n\nthe intention was that if a tribunal exercised the judicial powers of the State and the decision was passed in the exercise of that power, this Court as the highest judicial Court in the Republic would have power, if it considered, necessary in the ends of justice, to grant special leaYe.\n\nClause (2) of article 136 excludes the jurisdiction of this Court in. respect of military Courts or Tribunal.\n\nIt is interesting to observe that in articles 138, 139 and 140 the Constitution has conferred powers on Parliament for further enlargement of the powers of this Court.\n\nTwo points arise for determination in this case: (I) whether the word \" tribunal.\" in this article has been used in the same sense as \"Court,\" or whether it has been used in a wider sense, and (2) whether the word \"determination \" in the article includes within its scope the determinations made by Industrial Tribunals or other. similarly constituted bodies or whether it has reference only to determinations of a Court or a tribunal of a purely judicial character.\n\nIt was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the Central Government, Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, that if any tribunal, whether ad!Jlinistrative, domestic or quasi-judicial, acts in excess of its jurisdiction, then it can be controlled by the High Courts under the powers conferred on them by article 226 by the issue of a writ of certiorari. It was said that if the Industrial Tribunal in this case could be proved to have trespassed beyond the limits of its statutory jurisdiction, then the remedy lies elsewhere and not by a petition of special leave under article 136.\n\nMr. Alladi's contentions may be briefly summarized as follows: ( 1) The expression \" tribunal \" means seat of a judge, or a court of justice. Its necessary attribute is that it can give a final judgment between two partie§ which carries legal sanction by its own force.\n\nThat the word \" tribunal \" in juxtaposition to the word \" court \" could only mean a tribunal which exercised judicial functions of the State and did not include within its ambit a tribunal which had quasi-judicial or administrative powers.\n\n(2) The kinds of orders against which special leave to appeal could be given under article 136\n\nhave to be of the same nature as passed by a Court; 1950 in other words, it was said that unless there was a Bhnrat Bank Ud. judicial determination of a controversy between two v. parties, the order would not be appealable.\n\nThat in E:11p1oyccsof the case of an Industrial Tribunal what gives binding Bharat Bank Ud. force to the award is the declaration of the government, that the spark of life to it is given by that declaration MalzajanJ. and without that, the award of the Tribunal is lifeless . and lias no enforceability and hence cannot be held. to be of an appealable nature. It was further said that in cases between the Government and its employees, by the procedure prescribed in the Act the award co.uld also be rejected, and that being so, by its own determination a tribunal could not impose a liability or affect rights. Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand, appearing for the bank, on the other hand argued that whenever a tribunal, whether exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, determined a matter in a judicial manner, then s.uch a determination is within article 136. It was said that an Industrial Tribunal has no administrative or executive functions, that its duty is to adjudicate on an industrial dispute, i.e., to act as a Judge, on certain kinds of disputes between employers and employees and that its functions are of a judicial nature, though the ambit of the powers conferred is larger than that of an ordinary Court of law inasmuch as it can grant reliefs which no Court of law could give, but that is because of the powers conferred on it by law. It was argued that the plain words of the article should not be given a narrow meaning when the intention of the Constitution was to confer the widest power on this Court. It was further contended that as between private employers and employees and even in certain cases between Government and its employees the decision of the Tribunal was binding on the Government and Government had no power either to affirm, modify or reject it. All that it was authorised to do was to announce it and by its declaration give it enforceability; that fact, however, could not affect the question of appealability of the determination under article\n\n136. It was finally argued that powers should be exercised by this Court wherever there is a miscarriage\n\nof justice by a determination of any tribunal and that if the intention of the Constitution by use of Bharat Bc:nk Ltd.\n\nv. the word \"tribunal\" was in the same sense as \"court,\"\n\nt950\n\nEmptoy<\"CS of then it was not n.cessary to import it in article 136, Bharat Ban\" u.i. because all tribunals that exercise judicial functions\n\nAfahafanJ fall within the definition of the word \"court\" though they may not have been so described.\n\nAfter considerable thought I have reached the conclusion that the preliminary objection should be overruled. I see no cogent reasons to limit the plain words of the statute and to place a narrow interpretation on words of widest. amplitude used therein. In construing the articles of the Constitution it has always to be remembered that India has been constituted into a sovereign democratic republic in order to ensure justice to all its citizens. In other words, the foundations of this republic have been laid on the bedrock of justice.\n\nTo safeguard these foundations so that they may not be undermined by injustice occurring anywhere this\n\nCourt has been constituted. By article 32 of the Constitution the Court is empowered to see that the fundamental rightg conferred on the citizens by the Constitution are not in any way affected.\n\nBy article 136 it has been given overriding power to grant special leava to appeal against orders of courts and tribunals which go against the principle of natural justice and lead to grave miscarriage of justice.\n\nThe exercise. of these powers could only have been contemplated in cases which affect the rights of people living within the territory of India in respect of their person, property or status. The question, therefore, for consideration is whether the jurisdiction conferred by use of unambiguous phraseology and by words which have a plain grammatical meaning and are of the widest amplitude should be limited and restricted on considerations suggested by Mr. Alladi. The construction suggested by the learned counsel, if accepted, would in the first instance make the use of certain words in the article unnecessary and redundant and would run counter to the spirit of the Constitution. It must be presumed that the draftsmen of the Constitution knew well the fact that there were a number of tribunals constituted in this country\n\nprevious to the coming into force of the Constit'ution 1950 which were performing certain administrative, quasiniwat Srtnk 1.td. judicial or domestic functions, that some of them had v. even the trappings of a Court but in spite of those E111ptoym of trappings could not be given that description. It must Rhal'at llaulc Ud.\n\n:~reolr~~mf~tthtatthheCo~~~~~io~~r~:eri~1 '~~1~~ u,,,:j''\" J. country had held that all tribunals that discharged judicial functions fell within the definition of the expression \"Court.\" If by the use of the word\n\n\" tribunal \" in article 136 the intention was to give it the same meaning as \"Court,\" then it was redundant and unnecessary to import it in the article because, by whatever name described, such a tribunal would fall within the definition of the word \" Court.\" The word \"Court\" has a well-known meaning in legislative history and practice.\n\nAs pointed out in Halsbury's Laws of England, the word \"Court \" originally meant the King's Palace but subsequently acquired the meaning of (1) a place where justice was administered, and (2) the person or persons who administer it. In the Indiian Evidence Act it is defined as including all judges and magistrates and all persons except arbitrators legally authorized to take evidence. This definition is by no means exhaustive and has been framed only for the purposes of the Act. There can be no doubt that to be a Court, the person or persons who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of deciding litigated questions according to law. However, by agreement between parties arbitrators may be called upon to exercise judicial powers and to decide a dispute according to law but that would not make the arbitrators a Court. It appears to me that befo, re a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and ii.re exercising the judicial powers of the State. In R. v. London County Council (1 ), Saville L. J. gave the following meaning to the word \"Court \" or \" judicial authority\":-\n\n(1) [193t) 2 K.B. 215.\n\nSUPRE?IIE COURT REPORTS (1950) \\ ,· . 1950 ' \"It is not necessary tha(it should be a Court in . the sense that this Court is a Court, it is enough if it is Bharat Bank Lid, • • ft h 'd d' 1 f t' v. exercising, a er earmg ev1 ence, JU 1c1a unc 10ns 1n Employees of the sense that it has to decide 'on evidence between a Bharat Bank u, l proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to · be strictly a Court if it is a tnbunal which has to Mahajan J. I decide rightly after hearing evidence and opposition.\" As pointed out in picturesque . language by Lord Sankey L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(•), there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which,· nevertheless, are not Courts in the .strict sense of exercising judicial power. It seems to me that such tribunals though they are not full-fledged Courts, set exercise quasi-judicial functions and are within the ambit of the word \"tribunal\"in article 136 of the Constitution. It was pointed out in the above casethat a-tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision, nor because it hears witnesses on oath, nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide, nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of sub- jects nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor because it is a body to which. a matter is referred by. another body. The intention of the Constitution by the use of the word\"tribunal\" in the article seems to have been to_ include within the scope of article 136 tribunals adorned with similar trappings as Court but strictly not coming within that definition. . Various definitions of the phrase \"judicial power\" have been given from time to time.\n\nThe best definifion of it on high authority is the one given by Griffith C.J. in Huddart, Parker G Co. v. :Moorehead(•), wherein it is defined as follows:-\n\n.. \"The words ' judicial power' as used in section. 71. of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin\n\n(I) [1931] A.C. 275.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.R. 330, 357.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE CllURT REPORTS== 477 ., until some tdbuual which has po\\ver_ to give a binding 1950 and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal Bharat Bank Ud. or not) is called upon to take action.\" v.\n\nIt was conceded that a tribunal constituted under Emproyus of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, exercises quasi- Bharat Bank u,1. ]. udicial powers. That phrase implies that a certain - l.Iahajanj. content of.the judicial power of the State is vested in it and it is called upon to exercise it.\n\nAn attempt was made to define the words \"judicial\" and \"quasijudicial\" in the case of Cooper v. TVilson ( 1 ) .. The relevant quotation reads thus :-\n\n\"A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites:- (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute betwe!\"n them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact-by means of evidence adduced by the parties to. the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on.behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the. dispute be- .· tween them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties, and (4) a decision which\\ disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. A quasi-judicial . decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves ( 1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4).\n\nThe place of ( 4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is determined by the :Minister's free choice.\"\n\n ·· The extent of judicial power exercised by an Industrial Tribunal will be considered hereinafter in the light of the observations cited above.\n\nReference was made to certain passages from Professor Allen's book on Law and Order, Chapter IV, page 69, where mention is made of the kindS' of ad- ·· -·- ministrative tribunals functioning in various countries today. Porter on .. Administrative Law, 1929 Edn.,\n\n(I) [1937) 2 K. B. 309, at p. 3~0.\n\n]Jl1arat H101h Ltd, v.\n\npage 194, was also relied upon. There can be no doubt that varieties of administrative tribunals and domestic tribunals are known to exist in this country as well as\n\nEmp1u; ws of in other countries of the world but the real question to Bha\"\" Ban/, Ud. decide in each case is as to the extent of judicial power\n\n,1Iahajan ]. of the State exercised by them. Tribunals which do not derive authority from the sovereign power cannot fall within the ambit of article 136. The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the ambit of article 136 is that it should be constituted by the State.\n\nAgain a tribunal would be outside the ambit of article 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties. Tribunals, however, which are found invested with certain functions of a Court of justice and have some of its trappings also would fall within the ambit of article 136 and would be subject to the appellate control of this Court whenever it is found necessary to exercise that control in the interests of justice.\n\nIt is now convenient to consider whether a tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, exercises all or any one of the functions of a Court of justice and whether it discharges them according to law or whether it can act-as it likes in its deliberations and is guided by its own notions of right and wrong.\n\nThe phrase \" industrial dispute \" has been defined in section 2 clause (k) of the Act as follows:-\n\n\" any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person:\"\n\nSuch a dispute concerns the rights of employers ;.tnd employees. Its decision affects the term$ of a contract of service or the conditions of employment.\n\nNot only may the pecuniary liability of an employer be considerably affected by the adjudication of such dispute but it may even result in the imposition of punishments on him. It may adversely\n\n1950 affect the employees as well.\n\nAdjudication of such a dispute affects valuable rights.\n\nThe dispute and its Bharat Bank UJ. result can always be translated in terms of money. The v. point for decision in the dispute Usually is how rriUCh Employees of money has to pass out of the pocket of the employer Bharat Bank Ud. to the pocket of the employee in one form or another and to what extent the right of freedom of contract Mahajan}\\ stands modified to bring about industrial peace. Power to adjudicate on such a dispute is given by section 7 of the statute to an Industrial Tribunal and a duty is cast on it to adjudicate it in accordance with the provisions of Act. The words underlined dearly imply that the dispute has to be adjudicated according to la.w and not in any other manner. When the dispute has to be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it follows that the tribunal has to adhere to law, though that law may be different from the law that an ordinary Court of justice admin)sters: It is noteworthy that the tribunal is to consist of experienced judicial officers and its award is defined as a determination of the dispute. The expression \"adjudication\" implies that the tribunal is to act as a judge of the dispute; in other words, it sits as a Court of justice and does not occupy the chair of an adminis- trator. It is pertinent to point out that the tribual is not given any executive or administrative powers.\n\nIn section 38 of the Act power is given to make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Such rules can provide in respect of matters which concern the powers and procedure of tribunals induding rules as to the summoning of witnesses, the production of documents relevant to the subject-matter . .and as to appearance of legal practitioners in proceedingsunder this Act.\n\nRule 3 of these rules provides that any application for. the reference of an industrial <lispute to a tribunal shall be made in form (A) and shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth, inter alia, the names of the parties to the dispute and the specific matters of dispute. It is in a sense in the nature of a plaint in a suit. In rule 13 power is given to administer oaths. Rule 14 provides as follows :-\n\n\"A tribunal may accept, admit or call for\n\nBharat Ran/;: Ltd v.\n\nevidence at any stage of the proceedings before it and in such manner as it may think fit.\"\n\nRule 17 provides that at its first sitting the tribu- Empto.v\"\"'°/ nal is to call upon the parties to slate their case.\n\nIn Bharat Bauk Ltd. rule 19 provision has been made for proceedings ex parte. Rule 21 provides that in addition to the powers Mahafau .f. conferred by sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act, a tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely, (a) discovery and inspection; (b) granting of adjournment ; (c) reception of evidence taken on affidavit ; and that the tribunal may summon and examine\n\nsuo motu any person whose evidence appears to it to be material. It further says that the tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.\n\nH.ule 21 says that the representatives of the parties, appearing before a tribunal, shall have the right of examination, cross-examination and re-examination and of addressing the Court or Tribunal when all evidence has been called. In rule 30 it is provided that a party to a reference may be represented by a legal practitioner with the permission of the tribunal and subject to such conditions as the tribunal may impose. In section 11 (3) it is laid down that a tribunal shall.have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely, (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; ( c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses ;\n\n(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed; and every inquiry or investigation by a tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. It is difficult to conceive in view of these provisions that the Industrial Tribunal performs any functions other than that of a judicial nature. The tribu- . nal has certainly the first three requisites and characteristics of a Court as defined above. It has certainly a considerable element of the fourth also inasmuch <.s\n\nthe tribunal cannot take any administrative action, 1950 the character of which is determined by its own choice.\n\nB u• h d. d\" . . d \"th Blrarat cnk \"• It as to make the a JU 1cahon m accor ance w1 v. the provisions of the Act as laid down in section 7. It Employees of <:onsists of persons who are qualified to be or have Blrarat Bank Ud.\n\nbeen judges. It is its duty to adjudicate on a serious dis- . -:- pute between employers and employees as affecting MallaianJ. their right of freedom of contract and it can impose liabilities of a pecuniary nature and disobediene of its award is made punishable. The powers exercisable by a tribunal of this nature were considered in a judgment of the Federal Court of India in Western India Automobile Association v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Bombay (1 ), and it was observed that such a tribunal can do what no Court can, namely, add to or alter the terms or conditions of the contract of service. The tribunal having been . entrusted with the duty of adjudicating a dispute of a peculiar character, it is for this reason that it is armed with extraordinary powers. These powers, however, are derived from the statute. These are the rules of the game and it has to decide according to these rules. The powers conferred have the sanction of law behind it and are not exercisable by reason of any discretion vested in the members of the tribunal. The adjudication of the dispute has to be in accordance with evidence legally adduced and the parties have a right to be heard and being represented by a legal practitioner. _Right to examine and cross-examine witnesses has been given to the parties and finally they can address the tribunal when evidence is closed. The whole procedure adopted by the Act and the rules is modelled on the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal has all the necessary attributes of a Court of justice. It has no other function except that of adjudicating on a dispute. It is no doubt true that by reason of the nature of. the dispute that they have to adjudicate the law gives them wider powers than are possessed by ordinary Courtsoflaw, but powers of such a nature do not affect\n\n(l) (1949) F. C.R. 5!!.\n\nJ9j0 h . d t e question that they are exercising ju icial power.\n\nBJ; arat Bauk Ud. Statutes like the Relief of Indebtedness Act, or the\n\nEncumbered Estates Act have conferred powers on Employees of Courts which are not ordinarily known to law and Bharat Ba111, Ud. which affect contractual rights. That circumstance 'does not make them anything else but tribunals exer- Ara1iaja11 j. . . d. . f h S h c1smg JU 1cial power o t e tate, t ough in a degree different from the ordinary Courts and to an extent which is also difierent from that enjoyed by an ordinary Court of law.\n\nThey may rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because they are out of the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system but that circumstance cannot affect the question of their being within the ambit of article 136.\n\nIt may also be observed that the tribunal is deemed to be a ci vii Court for certain purposes as laid down in rule 21 of the rules above cited and in section 11(3) of the Act.\n\nAs a civil Court if it exercises any of the powers contemplated by this section its decisions would become subject to appeal to a District Judge and a fortiori this Court's power under article 136 would at once be attracted in any case in respect of these matters.\n\nAgain, in Chapter VI of the Act breach of the terms of an award has been made punishable by section 29 of the Act .. The result therefore, is that disobedience of the terms of an award is punishable under the Act. That being so, a determination of the tribunal not only affects the freedom of contract and imposes pecuniary liability on the employer or confers pecuniary benefits on the employees, but it also involves serious consequences as failure to observe those terms makes a person liable to the penalties laid down in Chapter VI. An award which has these serious consequences can hardly be said to have been given by a tribunal which does not exercise some of the most important judicial functions of the State.\n\nConsiderable stress was laid by Mr. Alladi on the provisions of sections 15 and 19 of the Act. Section 15 enacts as follows:--\n\n\"(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its\n\nproceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as practica:bie on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate Government. .\n\n(2) On receipt of such award, the appropriate Government shall by order in writing declare the a ward to be binding.\n\nProvided that where the appropriate Government is a party to the dispute and in its opinion it would be inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, it shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with the statement of its reasons for not making a declaration as aforesaid before the Legislative Assembly of the province, or where the appr<?priate Government, is the Central Government, before the Central Legislature, and shall, as soon as may be, cause to be moved therein a resolution for the consideration .of the award; and the Legislative Assembly or as the case may be, the Central Legislature, may by its resolution confirm, modify or reject the award.\n\n(3) On the passing of a resolution under the proviso to sub-section (2), unless the award is rejected thereby, the appropriate Government shall by order in writing declare the award as cqnfirmed or modified by the resolution, as the case may be, to be binding.\n\n(4) Save as provided in the proviso to subsection (3) of section 19, an award declared to be binding under this section shall not be called in question in any manner.\" As regards clause ( 4 ), it was conceded rightly that a law dealing with industrial disputes and enacted in the year 1947 could not in any wayaffect the provisions of the Constitution laid down in article 136. It was however, strenuously urged that the award of the tribunal had no binding force by itself and unless the appropriate Government made a declaration in writing under clause (2) of section 15, this award was a lifeless document and had no sanction behind it and therefore it could not have been contemplated that it would be appealable even by special leave. In my opinion, this contention is unsound. The provisions of clause (2) of\n\n6t!\n\nBharat Bauk Ud.\n\nmployces of Bilarat Bank Ud.\n\n!tlailajanJ.\n\n484 SUPREME COuRT J{EPORTS [1950]\n\n1950 section 15 leave no discretion in the Go, crment either\n\nBha.-at lla\"k u.1, to affirm, odfy or reject the <nard: It is bound to v. declare 1t bmdmg. It has no option m tlie matter.· In Bmptoy\"\"' of su::h a situation it is the determination by the tribunal HhaMt n,,,.,, u.i. that matters. 'Vithout that determination Government\n\ncann)t function. It does not possess the power either Mai.a; an J. to adjudicate the dispute or to alter it in any. manner whatsoever. That power vests in the tribunal alone.\n\nThe rights of the parties are really affected by the adjudication contained in the award, not by the Government's declaration which is automatic. It is no don bt true that announcement of the award by the Government gives it binding torce but that does not affect the question of the appealability of the determination under article 136 of the Constitution. The apposite answer to this contention may be given in the language of the decision in Rex v. Electricity C ommissioners ( 1).\n\nThe relevant passage runs thus :- \"It is necessary, however, to deal with what I think was the main objection of the Attorney-General.\n\nIn this case he said the Commissioners come to no decision at all.\n\nThey act merely as advisers. They recommend an order embodying a scheme to the Minister of Transport, who may confirm it with or without modifications. Similarly the Minister of Transport comes to no decision. He submits the order to the Houses of Parliament, ,,·]Jo may approve it with or without modifications. The Houses of Parliament may put anything into the order they please, whether consistent with the Act of 1919, or not. Until they have approved, nothing is decided, and in truth the whole procedure, draft scheme, inquiry, order, confirmation, approval, is only part of a process by which Parliament is expressing its will, and at no stage is subject to any control by the Courts. It is unnecessary to emphasize the constitutional importance of this contention. Given its full effect, it means that the checks and safeguards which have been imposed by Act of Parliament, including the freedom from compulsory taking, can be removed, and new and onerous and\n\nill [1924.] 1 K.13. 171, at 207.\n\ninconsistent obligations imposed without an Act of Parliament, and by simle resolution of both Houses of Parliament. I do not find it necessary to determine whether, on the proper construction of the statute, resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament could have the effect claimed. In the provisicm that the final decision of the Commissioners is not to be operative until it has been approved by the two Houses.of Parliament I find nothing inconsistent with the view that they act judici'¥1ly and within the limits prescribed by . .\\ct of Parliamnt, and that the Courts have power to keep them within those limits. It is to be noted that it is the order of the Commissioners that eventually takes effect, neither the Jfinister of Transport who confirms, nor the Houses of Parliament who approve. can itnder the statute make an order which in respect of the matters in question has any operation. I know of no authority which compels me to hold that a proceeding cannot be a judicial proceeding subject to confirmation or approval, even where the approval has to be that of the Houses of Parliament.\n\nTlze authorities are to the contrary.\" The observations, though they relate to a case which concerns the issue of a writ of prohibition and certiorari, have application to the present case. Here no discretion whatsoever has been left in the Government in ordinary cases to either modify or to reject the determination of the tribunal. The fact that the Government has to make a declaration after the final decision of the tribunal is not in any way inconsistent with the view that the tribunal acts judicially. It may also be pointed out that within the statute itself a clue has been provided which shows that the circumstance that the award has to be declared by an order of Government to be binding does not affect the question of its appealability. In article 136 clause (2) express provision has been made for excepting from the ambit of article 136 the decisions of military courts and tribunals. It follows that but for the exception it was considered that these would be within article 136 clause \\1). It is quite clear from the various provisions of the Army Act that the decisions of military tribunals or courts are s':1bject to confirmation either by\n\nBharat Ba11k U!I.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Bank Uc!\n\nMahajan}.\n\n486 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1950}\n\n1950 the Commander-in-Chief or various otter military\n\nI I I authorities. It is only after such corlfirmation that JJ!un, d a11k .J, . h I . v. t at can operate. t has never been considered that Bmploym of that fact in any way affects the question of their Bh,, rat Book Ud. appcalabi!ity . . u\"'\"'i'\"' J.\n\nRex v. i'vlinister of Health(') also supports this view.\n\nThere by the Housing Act, 1925, by sedion 40, a local authority which had prepared an improvement scheme was required to present a petition to the Minister praying that an order should be made confirming such scheme. Sub-section (3) provided that the :\\Iinister after considering the petition may cause a local inquiry to be made and may by order confirm the scheme with or without conditions or modifications.\n\nIn sub-section (5) it was stated that the order of the Minister when made shall have effect as if enacted in th is Act. It was held by the Court of Appeal that as the order made by the Minister was made without the statutory conditions having been complied with it was ultra vires and therefore a writ of certiorari should issue for the purpose of quashing it. Reliance was placed by Scrutton L. J. on Rex v. Electricity Commissioners(\")- The same view was expressed in Minister of Health v. The King(•). It was observed that judicial review by prohibition or a writ of certiorari was\n\npermissible if the Minister of Health in confirming the order exceeded his statutory powers. It is clear therefore that simply because an order has to be confirmed by a Minister or by the Government it in any way affects the power of judicial review.\n\nReference may also be made to the observations in Smith v. The <Jueen ( 4 ). At page 623 it was observed that it is a common principle in every case which has in itself the character of a judicial proceeding_ that the party against whom a judgment is to operate shall have an opportunity of being heard. In this sense it can hardly be disputed that the proceeding before an industrial Tribunal is a judicial proceeding. In my judgment, therefore, the contentio~ raised by Mr. Alladi that this\n\n{1) [1939] 2 K. B. 98.\n\n(2) [192•11 K.B.171.\n\n(3) [1931] A.C. •9•.\n\n(•) 3 A.C. 2•5.\n\nCourt cannot exercise its powers under article 136 because the decision of the tribunal has no force till a declaration is made by the Government cannot be sustained. As regards section 19, it was contended that an award declared by the appropriat~ Government under section 15 to be binding can only come into operation on such date as may be specified by the appropriate Government and can only remain in operation for such period not exceeding one year, as may be fixed by that Government and it was said that herein the Government had the power to state the period from which the award was to commence and the time for which it was to remain in force. This section does not, in my opinion, affect the question of the appealability of the determination of the tribunal. Government has certain functions to perform in its own sphere after the award is made. In certain cases it is bound to declare that award binding. In other cases, when it is itself a party to the dispute, it has certain overriding powers and these overriding powers are that if it considers that the award is not in public interests it may refer it to the legislature. The legislature, however, has the power to modify, accept or reject the award. These overriding powers presuppose the existence of a valid determination by a tribunal. If that determination is in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise proceeds in a manner that offends against the rules of natural justice and is set aside by exercise of power under article 136, then no occasion arises for exercise of governmental power under the Act. Given a valid award, it could not be denied that the Government could exercise its powers in any manner it considered best and the exercise of that power is out.side the constitution of this Court. In this connection reference was made to Moses v. Parker (1 ). The passage on which emphasis was laid reads as follows:-\n\n\" The Court has been substituted fot the commissioners to report to the governor. The difference is that their report is to be binding on him. Probably it was\n\n(1) [1896) A.C. 245.\n\nBltarat Bank L.td.\n\nB111ptoyn'.' nf Bharat lank I .. td.\n\niUaltnjroz J.\n\nBharat Bank Ltd.\n\nBniployees of B!1arat Banh Lt, l.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nthought that the status and training of the judges made them the most proper depositaries of that power.\n\nBut that does not make their action a judicial action in the sense that it can be tested and altered by appeal. It is no more judicial than was the action , of the commissioners and the governor. The Court is to be guided by equity and good conscience and the best evidence. So were the commissioners. So every public officer ought to be. But they are expressly exonerated trom all rules of law and equity, and all legal forms.\n\nHow then can the propriety of their decision be tested on appeal ? What are the canons by which this Board is to be guided in advising Her Majesty whether the Supreme Court is right or wrong?\n\nIt seems almost impossible that decisions can be varied except by reference to some rule, whereas the Court making them is free from rules.. If appeals were allowed, the certain result would be o establish some system of rules, and that is the very thing from which the Tasmanian Legislature has desired to leave the Supreme Court free and unfettered in 'each case. If it were clear that appeals ought to be allowed such difficulties would doubtless be met somehow. But there are strong arguments to show that the matter is not of an appreciable nature.\"\n\nOne would have expected that after this opinion the decision would have been that the Judicial Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain theappeal but their Lordships proceeded to base their decision not on this ground but on the ground that this was not a fit case for the exercise of the prerogative of the King.\n\nIn my opinion, the observations made in that case have no apposite application to the provisions of the statute with which we are concerned. I do not see any difficulty in thffi case in testing the prnpriety of the determination of the tribunal. This Court is not to substitute its decision for the determination of the tribunal wben granting relief under article 136. \\\\'hen it chooses to interfere in the exercise of these extraordinary powers, it does so because the tribunal has either exceeded its jurisdiction or has approached the questions referred to it in a manner which is likely to\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS 489\n\nresult in injustice or has adopted a procedure which 1950 runs counter to the well established rules of natural Bharat Ban/, UJ. justice. In other words, if it has denied a hearing to v. a party or has refused to record his evidence or has F.mJ>loy.zes of acted in ny other manner, in an arbitrary or despotic Bharat Bank u.1. fashion.\n\nIn such circumstances no question arises of h. C · f 'b l d MalwjanJ. t 1s ourt constituting 1tsel mto a tn una an assuming powers of settling a dispute. All that the Court\n\nwhen it entertains an appeal would do is to quash the award and direct the tribunal to proceed within the powers conferred on it and approach the adjudication of the dispute according to principles of natural justice.\n\nThis Court under article 136 would not constitute itself into a mere court of error. Extraordinary powers have to be exercised in rare and exc.eptional cases and on well known prindples. Considered in the light of these. principles, there is no insuperable difficulty in the present case of the nature pointed out in the passage cited above. It was conceded that the High Court could exercise powers under section 226 and could quash an award but it was said that under article 136 this power should not be exercised in an appeal. I do not see why ? Particularly when after the High Court has passed any decision on an application made to it in exercise of the powers under section 226, that decision could be brought to this Court in appeal. In the matter of an industrial dispute where expedition is the crux of the matter, it is essential that any abuse of powers by such tribunals is corrected as soon as possible and with expedition.\n\nIt may be mentioned that it is no novel practice for a court empowered to grant special leave to exercise its powers even though there may be intermediate rigl).ts of appeal or other remedies available, if it is considered essential to do so in extraordinary situations. Vide Bentwick's Privy Council Practice, 3rd Edn., page 125.\n\nTherein it is stated as follows :- \"In several cases from Jamaica, the Privy Council granted leave to appeal to the Queen in Council dire\"Ctly from the Supreme Court, ,, ithout an intermediate appeal (which would have been attcuded with much\n\n1950 expense and delay) to the Court of Error in the island,\n\n81 tB k Ltd there being in each of those cases manifestly some point iara /\" of law raised which deserved discussion.\"\n\nEmployees of Th I\n\nR B tt( 1 ) H . 81 1 8 k Lt 1 e cases were n e arne , arrison v. •ara_::_n '\"Scott(•), and Attorney-General of ]amacia v. 11fander- Mahajan J. son {3 ). The phraseology employed in article 136 itself justifies this course. The article empowers this Court to grant special leave against sentences or orders made by any court. In all other articles of the Constitution right of appeal is conferred against final decisions of the highest . court of appeal in the country but under this article power is given to this Court to circumvent that procedure if it is considered necessary to do so.\n\nI am, therefore, of the opinion that the mere circumstance that a remedy i.n the nat, ure of a writ of certiorari is open to the petitioners does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the power of this Court under article 136 is circumscribed by that circumstance. \\Vhenever judicial review is permissible in one form or another, this Court as the highest Court in the land can exercise its special powers and circumvent ordinary procedure by granting special leave.\n\nWhat it has to ultimately decide it can decide earlier.\n\nI now proceed to examine some of the cases to which reference was made by Mr. Alladi.\n\nThree Australian cases were cited which concern the construct.ion of sections 51, 71 and 72 of the Australian Constitution (63 and 64 Viet., c. 12).\n\nSection 72 requires that every Justice of the High Court and every Justice of any other Court created by the Parliament of the Commonwealth shall snbject to the power of removal contained in the section be appointed for life. Section 71 confers the whole judicial power of the Commonwealth upon the Courts therein mentioned and no other tribunal or body can exercise that power.\n\nEvery Court referred to in section 71 has to be constituted in the manner provided by section 72. The question in these 'cases was as to the meaning of the phrase \"judicial power of the Commonwealth.\" Similar\n\n(2J 5 Moo. 357. \\3) 6 Moo. 239.\n\n...\n\nphraseology has not been used in any part of the Con- 1950 stitution of India and in these circumstances t _is di~- Bilamt ua,,•k Utf. cult to derive any assistance from these dec1s1ons m v. solving the problem before us.\n\nThe Constitution of Bmptoy, csof India is not modelled on the Constitution of Australia. Blwmt Uauk I.id. and that being so, any observations ipade in decisions Me1/1ajm1 J. given under that Constitution cannot be held to be a safe guide in the interpretation of language employed in a Constitution differently drafted. .\n\nThe first of these cases is Waterside Worhers' Federation of Australia v. ]. W. Alexander Ltd. ( 1 ).\n\nTherein it was held that the power conferred by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904- 1915 upon the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to enforce awards made by it is part of \"the judicial power of the Commonwealth \"within tRe meaning of section 71 of the Constitution, and can . only be vested in the courts mentioned in that section.\n\nMr. Alladi placed reliance on a passage at page 467 in the judgment of Isaacs and Rich JJ., which reads as follows:- , \" The arbitral part of the Act, therefore, is quite within the power of pl. xxxv, and is not intended by the Act to be exercised by an ordinary Court of Justice, which, it is suggested, Parliament by some strange perversity proceeded to destroy at birth. It is true that enforcement provisions are found ........ But all this was in imitation of the State Acts of Arbitration, and not in reliance on the .Judicature Chapter of the Federal Constitution. The arbitral portion of the Act i;;, in our opinion, perfectly good, subject to its severability from any other portion which may be bad.\"\n\nIt was argued that the Industrial Tribunal here was an arbitration tribunal of the same kind as in\n\nustralia and exercises similar functions. It is ho\"·- ever pertinent to observe that the phraseology employed in section 15 of the Indian Act is different from that used in the Australian statute. The Indian statute has constituted different bodies for different purposes. An Industrial Tribunal has been constituted\n\n(1) 25 C.L.R; 4.34.\n\nBharat .1'1arik Ud.\n\nEniployces of Bharat Han}~ l.td.\n\nonly to discharge one function of adjudication. It is not described as an arbitral tribunal. The Act has avoided the use of the word \" arbitration\" either in its preamble or in any of its relevant provisions though the determination has been named as an award. In these circumstances it is unsafe to seek any guidance from observations made in this case.\n\nThe next case to which reference was made is Rola Co. (Australia) Proprietary Ltd. v. The Commonwealth\n\n( 1 ).\n\nThe question here was whether the Women's Employment Board constituted under the Women's Employment Act, 1942, did not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. It was held that the Board exercised functions which were arbitral in character. Emphasis was laid on a passage occurring in page 198 of the report which reads as \"follows:-\n\n\"An industrial award lays down rules of conduct for the future. 1t does not purport to ascertain and enforce existing rights ; it js directed to the creation of new rights. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that a determination of the Committee does not <'reate a rule of conduct binding the parties for the future, but that it authoritatively determines a possibly controverted question of fact and that the making of such an authoritative determination is necessarily an exercise of judicial power. Reference is made to the frequently quoted statement of Griffith C. J. in Huddart Parker & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. lvloorehead (2 ), approved by the Privy Council in Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. v.\n\nFederal Commissioner of Taxation (8 ) :-\n\n\" I am of opinion that the words 'judicial power' as used in section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide contr;:iverises between its subjects or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.\"\n\n(I) 69 C.L.R. 185.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.R. 330 at 357.\n\n(3) [1931] A.C. 275.\n\nReg. SC gives Committees power: to decide con- 195·0 troversies between subjects relating to thei~-ights :ind Bharat Bank ur1. the regulation purports to make those dec1s1ons bmd- '\" ing and authoritative.\n\nEmployees of I am not. satisfied that the words of Griffith C. J. Bliarat Rank LI.I. are properly interpreted when it is said that they mean Maliaja,, J. that a power to make binding and authoritative decisions as to facts is necessarily judicial power. I direct attention to the concluding words-\" is called upon to take action. \" In my opinion these words are directed to action to be taken by a tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision. The mere giving of the decision is not the action to which the learned Chief Justice referred. If a body which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision is able to take action so as to enforce that decision, then, but only then, according to the definition quoted, all the attributes of judicial powr are plainly present.\n\nI refer to what I say more in detail hereafter, that the Privy Council, in the Shell case (1), in which approval was given to the definition quoted, expressly held that a tribunal was not necessarily a Court because it gave decisions (even final decisions) between contending parties which affected their rights.\n\nIn Huddart Parker's case (2 ), Isaacs J. referred to the.statement of Palles C. B. in R. v. Local Government Board for Ireland (3 ) \"to erect a tribunal into a\n\n•Court' or 'jurisdiction', so as to make its determinations judicial, the essential element is that it should have power, by its determination within jurisdiction, . to im, Pose liability or affect rights.\" \"By this,\" said the learned Chief Baron, \"I mean that the liability is imposed, or the right affected by the determination only, and not_ by the fact determined, and so that the liability will exist, or the right will be affected, although the determination be wrong in law or in fact. It is otherwise of a ministerial power. If the existence of such a power depends upon a contingency, although it may be necessary for the officer to determine whether\n\n(1) [1931] A.O. 275.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.R. 330 at 383.\n\n(3) [1902] 2 I.R. 3~9 at p. 373.\n\n1950 • the contingency has happened, in order to know\n\nBit -;;; k ua whether he shall exercise the power, his determination nra v. \"\" does not bind. The happening of the contingency\n\nRmp1oyccs of may be questioned in an action brought to try the Bharat Bank Ltd. legality of the act done under the alleged exercise of the power. But where the determination binds, al- Mal1<rjan J. though it is based on an erroneous view of facts or law, then the power authorizing it is judicial. There we get a modern use of the term 'judicial power'.\" This statement of the characteristics of judicial power looks to what, in Waterside 'Workers' Federation of Australia v. Gilchrist, Watt & Sanderson Ltd.( 1 ), Isaacs and Rich JJ. referred to as the creation of iµstant liability in specified persons as distinct from laying down a rule or standard of conduct for the future.\n\nThe decision of an ordinary Court that B is bound to pay money to A applies a pre-existing standard of rights and duties not created by the Court itself, with the result that there is an immediately enforceable liability of B to pay to A the sum of money in question.\n\nThe decision of the Women's Employment Board does not create any such liability, nor does the determination of a Committee of Reference create any such liability. In order to impose an immediately enforceable liability upon any employer, for example, to pay wages to a particular female, it would be necessary for the female or some person on her behalf (see reg. 9 A) to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction.\n\nIf such a proceeding succeeded there would then be a liability created by the determination of the court. In . such a proceeding the determination of the Committee of Reference would be evidence of the facts to which it related, but that determination would not in itself create \" liability.\" The concluding words of the passage quoted above at once distinguish the present case from the Australian case. The award given by an Industrial Tribunal in respect either of bonus or higher wages, etc. is enforceable by its own force and by the coercive machinery of the Act and it is not merely a declaration of a character that furnishes a cause of action to the employee to bring a suit on its foot to recover the\n\n (6) 3' C.L.R. '82, 512.\n\nwages.\n\nAn arbitral tribunal's decision cannot be enforced unless it has the sanction of a Court of justice behind it but the award of the Tribunal is enforceable under the Act itself by the coercive machinery provided therein. It is the terms of the award that are enforceable and not the terms of the order made by the Government. It is the breach of the terms of the award that is punishable and not any breach of Government's order. The Government itself is bound to declare the award binding and it has no option whatsoever in the matter. It is no doubt true that the tribunal has not only to decide the existing rights and liabilities of the parties and it can lay down rules of conduct for the future but it does so because by law it is authorised to do so. Its decision carries the sanction with it. The Government is bound to give effect to it and the statute enforces it by coercive machinery. In my view, therefore, this decision again has no relevancy to the present case.\n\nThe third case to which reference was made is Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1 ). That was an income-tax matter and the decision has been considered in an earlier part of this judgment. Reference was also made to Mohammad Ahmad v. Governor-General iii Council (2 ), in which it was held that an improvement trust was not a civil Court subordinate to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That has no bearing to the matter in issue here.\n\nSimilar point was discussed in Hari v. Secretary of State for India (3 ). Labour Relations Board v. john East lron Works Ltd. ( 4 ) is a Canadian case and the decision proceeded on the same lines as in the Australian cases.\n\nMr. Sen appearing for the respondents placed reliance on O'Connor v. Waldron ( 5 ). The relevant passage occurs at page 81 which runs thus:-\n\n\"The law as to judicial privilege }).as in process of time developed.\n\nOriginally it was intended for the protection of judges sitting in recognised Courts of\n\n!1) [1931) A.O. 275.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 27 Born. 424.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 19!6 Lah. 16.\n\n(4) A.I .. R. 19'9 P.O. 129.\n\n(5) [1935] A.C. 7S.\n\nBharat Bank LJ, I,\n\nEmployees of Bharat Ba11k U, f,\n\nMa/1aja11J.\n\n19so Justice established as such. The object no doubt was\n\nBharat Renk Utl. that judges might exercise their functions free from\n\n•. any danger that they\"llright be called to account for Employees of any words spoken as judges. The doctrine has been Bharnt Bank Ud. extended to tribunals exercising functions. equivalent\n\nf.Jahajan J. to those of an established Court of Justice. In their Lordships' opinion the law on the subject was accurately stated by Lord Esher in Royal Aquarium etc. Ltd.\n\nv. Parkinson (' ), where he says that the privilege applies wherever there is an authorized inquiry which, though not before a Court of Justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes ... This doctrine has never been extended further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals acting in a manner similar to that in which such Courts act' .\"\n\nThe learned counsel contended that the word \" tribunal\" in article 136 could only have reference to those tribunals which exercise functions equivalent to that of a Court of Justice. I have no hesitation in holding that the Industrial Tribunal has similar attributes as that of a Court of Justice in view of the various provisions to which I have made reference. Reference was also made to certain passages occuring in pages 422 and 428 of Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation ( 2 ). That was a case of the Municipal Board of Ontario. It was held there that the Board was merely an administrative tribunal. Next reliance was placed on R. v. National Arbitration Tribunal, Ex parte\n\nHoratio Crowther & Co. Ltd.(•). That dealt with the powers of the National Arbitration Tribunal. In my opinion this citation also is not of much assistance.\n\nIt was again urged by Mr. Alladi that the word \" tribunal \" was introduced in the article to provide for cases of tribunals like the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe suggestion does not appear to be sound, becaµse a Revenue Board has all the attributes of a Court of justice and falls within the definition of the word \" Court\" in matters where it adjudicates on rights of parties.\n\n(61 (189!] 1. Q.B. '31.\n\n(7) [1938] A.C. '15.\n\n(8) (19,7] A.E.R. 693.\n\nThe word \" tribunal \" has been used in previous 1950 legislation in a number of statutes and it is difficult to 8 -;; k u.i. think that the Constitution when it introduced this 1iarat v~\" word in article 136 intended to limit its meaning to Employers cf only those tribunals which though not described s Bharat Bank Lta.\n\nCourts strictly speaking, were discharging the same br analogous functions as were being discharged by CouJitS.\n\nMahajan].\n\nFor the reasons given above I am of the opin'ion that the word \" tribunal \" in article 136 has to be construed liberally and not in any narrow sense and an Industrial Tribunal inasmuch as it discharges functions of a judicial nature in accordance with law comes within the ambit of the article and from its determination an application for special leave is competent.\n\nThe question now to determine is whether the exercise of overriding powers of this Court can be justified on any ground whatsoever in the present case. As I have already said, exceptional and extraordinary powers of this character can only be justifiably used where there has been a grave miscarriage of justice or where the procedure adopted by the Tribunal is such that it offends against all notions of legal procedure.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tek Chand for the petitioner-bank urged four grounds justifying exercise of the special jurisdiction of this Court. Firstly, he contended that the word \" victimization\" used in clause 18 of the reference had been interpreted in such a manner by the Tribunal that it had usurped jurisdiction to decide disputes which were never referred to it. In my view this is not a matter which can justify the exercise of the powers under article 136. This Court is not a mere Court of error. 'The word \"victimization\" has not been defined in the statute and is not in any sense a term of law or a term of art. It is an ordinary English word which means that a certain person has become a victim, in other words, that he has been unjustly dealt with. It was argued that the word has acquired a special meaning in regard to industrial disputes and connotes a person who becomes a victim of the employer's wrath by reason of his trade union activities and that the word cannot relate to a person who has been merely unjustly dismissed. Be that as it may.\n\n19li0\n\nBharat Bank Ltd.\n\nE111ptoyces of Bliarat Banll Ltd.\n\nflfallajau J.\n\nThe determination of the Tribunal has not been materially affected by this interpretation of the word to any large extent and that being so, it does not call for the exercise of the special power.\n\nThe second ground urged was that the Tribunal has erred in ordering reinstatement of persons who were guilty of an illegal strike. It was contended that section 23 (b) of the Act has been wrongly construed by it and as a result of this misconstruction persons who were guilty of a wrong and who could not have been reinstated have been reinstated.· In brief, the argument was that under section 23(b) when a matter has been referred to a tribunal in respect of an earlier strike, any strike during the pendency of that dispute is an illegal strike and that was the situation here. The employees of the bank had struck work in December, 1948.\n\nThat dispute had been referred to an Industrial Tribunal. It was durin'l\" the pendency of that dispute that another £trike took place which led to the dismissal of the employees who have now been reinstated by the present award. The Calcutta High Court has held that a strike during the pendency of the period of truce and during the pendency of an eailier dispute before a tribunal is illegal even if it is brought about as a result of fresh and new demands which are not covered by the earlier diopute.\n\nOne of the members of the Tribunal thought that the decision laid down the law correctly on the point, but the other member thought that the decision was erroneous. Both of them, however, agreed that whether the strike was legal or illegal that point did not in any way affect the question that they had to decide under issue 18.\n\nThe consequences of an illegal strike are laid down in the Act and certain penalties are provided therein. The Act nowhere states that persons guilty of illegal strike cannot be reinstated. Be that as it may. The reference to the Tribunal was made by the Government in respect of an illegal strike and the Tribunal was bound to give its decision on the refi; rence. I tern 18 of schedule II clearly empowers the tribunal to deal with cases of victimization as a result of the third strike which the petitioner described as -illegal.\n\nThe Tribunal may be\n\nwrong in the view they have taken but it seems to me this is again not a question of that vital character\n\nwhich would justify the grant of special leave under article 136.\n\nThe next question raised by the learned counsel was that the award of the Tribunal is based on no evidence whatsoever. This contention requires serious consideration. I have exartl.ined.the proceedings of the Tribunal and it appears that all it did was that as required by rule 17 at the first sitting it called upon the parties to state their cases.\n\nMr. Parwana on behalf of the employees stated their respective cases and Mr. Ved Vyas who represented the bank stated the bank's case and after the cases had been stated the proceedings terminated and both parties addressed arguments and the Tribunal proceeded to give its award. Whether the cl; large of victimization in individual cases Was proved or not depended on proof of certain facts which had to be established by evidence. The onus of proving victimization clearly rested on tne employees. No evidence whatsoever was Jed on their behalf. The statement of the case by Mr. Parwana was not on oath.\n\nThere was no examination or cross.examination of Mr. Parwana. No affidavit supporting the facts stated b; x Mr. Parwana was filed by him or by any employee.\n\nMr, Parwana produced an abstract of the correspondence but the original correspondence was not produced.\n\nThe bank disputed the facts stated by Mr. Parwana oy\n\nmeans of a lengthy affidavit. It seems no reference was made even to this affidavit by the Tribunal. No counter affidavit was filed in reply to the fact.s stated in this affidavit. The bank wanted to call some evidence.\n\nParticular reference was made in respect of a scurrilous letter issued by one Bhattacharya on behalf of the employees and distributed by them, which it is alleged considerably shook the credit of the bank.\n\nThis opportunity was denied to it. It was contended before us that the bank wanted to lead evidence on certain matters and that the opportunity to lead it was denied. There is nothing on the record to support this contention. The result therefore is that the facts on the basis of which allegations of victimization have been\n\n64 .\n\n!Jharat Ba\"k Ud.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Bank Ud.\n\nMahajan}.\n\n1950 made are neither supported by an affidavit nor by any evidence and the award is based on no evidence what- SJiarat Ban,~ Ud,\n\nv. soever. The Act as well as the rules framed under it Employees of contemplate a proper hearing, discovery and inspection llharat Bank Ltd. of documents and production of evidence, etc. None of this procedure was followed by the Tribunal. It is M.ahlrjan J. d\"ffi 1 h h T · 1 cu t to see on w at matenal t e nbunal has given its award as there is none existing on the present record and the respondents' counsel could not point out to any such material. At one time during the argument I was inclined to think that possibly both parties by agreement consented to treat the statement . of case as evidence in the case and did not wish to produce any other evidence, but the affidavit filed on behalf of the bank disputes all the facts stated by Mr. Parwana.\n\nThe only evidence on the record is the bank's affidavit and if the facts contained in the aflj.davit are accepted, then the determination made by the Tribunal cannot stand. It seems to me therefore that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal was against all principles of natural justice and the award is thereby vitiated and should be set aside. It happens that when the safeguard of an appeal is not provided by law the tendency sometimes is to act in an arbitrary manner like a benevolent despot.\n\nBenevolent despotism, however, is foreign to a democratic Constitution. The members of the Tribunal seem to have thought that hav.ing heard the statement of the cases of the parties they could proceed to a judgment on their own view of its right or wrong unaided by any material. That kind of procedure to my mind is unwarranted by the statute ai:id is foreign to a democratic Constitution. In these circumstances it is the compelling duty of this Court to exercise its extraordinary powers and to quash such an award. ..\n\nThe last contention raised by Bakshi Tek ChJJ, nd was that though a Tribunal consisting of three persons was appointed to adjudicate on the dispute, the awai; d has only been signed by two of them.\n\nReference m this connection was made to section 16 of the Act which says that the award of a Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by all the members of the\n\nTribunal and that nothing in the section shall be deemed to prevent any member of the Tribunal. from recording a minute of dissent. The provisions of the section are mandatory and have not been complied with. It is cqnmon ground that the case was stated by the parties at a sitting when all the members of the Tribunal were present and the arguments were heard by all of them. No sitting took place subsequent to this which would have necessitated the carrying on of proceedings by two members of the Tribunal by a quorum.\n\nWhen the matter has been heard by all the three members, the award should have been given by all of them.\n\nTherefore the award given by two of them is not the award of the Tribunal constituted by the Government.\n\nIt is therefore vitiated and has to be quashed.\n\nReference in this connection was made to section 8 of the Act which reads as follows:--\n\n\" If the services of the chairman of a Board 0r of the chairman or other member of a Court or Tribunal cease to be available at any time the appropriate Gov-· ernment shall, in the case of a chairman, and may in the case of any other member, appoint another independent person to fill the vacancy, and the proceedings shall be continued before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted.\"\n\nThe Tribunal was never reconstituted by the Gov~ emment by any notification. Under section 7 a Tribunal has to be constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act by the Government. The Government having constituted a Tribunal of three persons it had power under section 8 to reconstitute it but did not exercise that power. The result therefore is that the Tribunal as originally constituted was not the Tribunal which gave the award in this reference.\n\nOnly two members have given the award. It was said that one of the members ceased to be available and the Government was not bound to fillup. that vacancy. There is no material on the record to prove whether any member became unavailable and if so, when. But even if a member becomes unavailable and the Government does not choose to fill up the vacancy, still the Government has to reconstitute the Tribunal by saying that\n\nig50\n\nBharat 8<mk Utl.\n\nE111j>/oyces of Bhamt Rani: Ud.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n195fl\n\nB/Jarat Hank f..td.\n\nE11iPloyl'es of Blurrat !Jank l.Jd,\n\niia/iajau J,\n\ntwo members will now constitute the Tribunal. An affidavit with two telegrams annexed was filed before us on behalf of the respondents which disclosed that l\\lr. Chandrasekhar a Aiyar who was one of the members of the Tribunal, in November, 1949, was appointed a melI)ber of the Boundary Commission in Bengal and thattfreother two members sent a telegram to the Labour Ministry asking it to fill up the vacancy or to reconstitute the Tribunal. The advice given by the Ministry was that they could proceed as they were and that the Government would later on, if necessary, fill up the vacancy. We are not concerned whether the advice given was right or wrong. But the fact remains that the Tribunal was never reconstituted and it was not denied that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar is now sitting in the same Tribunal without being again nominated to it and the Tribunal is hearing the same reference under the other issues referred to it.\n\nMoreover, I do not see why after having heard the reference he could not give the award even if he was in Calcutta or sign the award given by the other two members. The idea of three persons hearing a case and two of them deciding it is repugnant to all notions of fairness. It may well have been that the opinion of the third may have influenced the other two or the decision arrived at may have been quite different. It so happened in this case that two members of the Tribunal differed on an important question of law but somehow adjusted their differences and gave a unanimous award. The presence of the third in such a situation may have very vitally affected the result. After a good deal of thought I feel that it would be most dangerous for this Court to condone proceedings of this character. If exceptional powers are not exercised even when a body legally constituted under the statute does not function according to the statute, then they defeat the very purpose of the Constitution.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Fakira v. King Emperor( 1). In that case section 377\n\n(1) A.I.R.1937 P.C.119.\n\nof the Code of Criminal Procedure as modified and as applicable to Hyderabad stood as follows:-.\n\n\"In every case so submitted, the confirmation of the sentence or order passed by the Court of the\n\nH.esident at Hyderabad shall, when such Court consists of two or more Judges, be made, passed and signed by at least two of them.\"\n\nIn Fakira's case the order of confirmation was only made, passed and signed by one of them, though the Court of the Resident consisted of two Judges.\n\nTheir Lordships held that the peremptory provisions of section 377 had not been complied with and that the sentence passed had not been validly confirmed. The appeal was allowed and the case was remitted to the Court of the Resident. The provisions of section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act are also of a peremptory nature. Reference may also be made to a case arising under the Bar Councils Act reported in 1 n re An Advocate, Madras( 1 ), where one member of the tribunal under that Act had died and had not signed the report.\n\nIt was held that the tribunal ceased to be properly constituted and that the report could not be considered.\n\nFor the reasons given above I would quash this award and direct that the Tribunal which is still functioning should readjudge item 18 of the reference and then submit its award on this point to Government.\n\nThe employees cannot be held responsible for the method of procedure adopted by two members of the Tribunal. Each party will have to bear their own costs in this Court. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.\n\nJ 950\n\nBlzarat Bank Ud.\n\nEmpio yees of Bharat Batik Ud,\n\nMalzajan}.\n\nl UKHERJ EA J .-This appeal, which has come up Jiuld1crjea J. before us on special leave, is directed against an award made by the All India Industrial Tribunal, dated the 19th of January, 1950.\n\nThe Tribunal was constituted by the Central Goyernment under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act and a large number of disputes\n\n(1 A.LR. 19'2 Mad. 267.\n\n1900 between several Banking companies and their em-\n\nB ployees were referred to it for adjudication. Amongst B/, arat ank Ud, h B k · ' h B v t ese an mg compames were t e harat Bank Empto; ees of Limited, the appellants before us, and the disputes Bharat Bank ua. between them and their employees, who are respondents in this appeal, related inter alia to a number of M\"khccj, a J. cases of retrenchment and victimization which the latter alleged against the former.\n\nThe Tribunal held its enquiry in Delhi in respect to the cases which were connected with the Ddhi Branch of the appellants and as a result of the same, made their award on 19th January, 1950, holding that 26 persons, who were employees under the appellants, were improperly dismissed. by the latter and should be reinstated. Further directions were given in the award regarding the salaries and allowances that were to be paid to the dismissed employees.\n\nThis award was declared to be binding in terms of the provisions of sections 15 and 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Central Government on 30th of January, 1950, and it was directed to remain in operation for a period of one year. It is against this award that the present appeal has been preferred.\n\nOn behalf of the Indian Union which appeared as an intervener in this appeal, as also on behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection was taken challenging the competency of the appeal.\n\nThe contention put forward by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, who appeared for the intervener, in substance, is that article 136 of the Indian Constitution, under which special leave was prayed for and obtained by the appellants in this case, does not contemplate or include within its scope an appeal against an award of an Industrial Tribunal which is not vested with, and cannot exercise, judicial powers, and the decision of which cannot, therefore, rank as a judicial determination.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, it is said, is an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions and this Court cannot be called upon to exercise the powers of an appellate Court in respect to the decision of a tribunal which is really a part of the administrative machinery of the Government.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1IE COURT REPORTS 505\n\nIn reply to this objection, it has been urged by Sir Tek Chand that the Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is really and in substance, a Court or judicial tribunal which is invested with the power and authority to exercise judicial functions; and in any event, the language of article 136 of the Constitution is wide enough to include an appeal from the award or determination of any tribunal, be it judicial or not.\n\nThere are two questions which require consideration on this preliminary point. The first is, whether the award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a judicial decision in the proper sense of the expression or is it the pronouncement of an administrative or quasi-judicial body which may exercise some of the functions of a Court of law but is really not so? The other question turns upon the construction to be put upon article 136 of the Constitution particularly on the meaning to be given to the words 'tribunal' and ' determination ' occurring therein ; and the question is whether the language is wide enough to include an adjudication or award of an Industrial Tribunal.\n\nAs regards the first question, it is to be noticed that owing to the intricate and complex system of Government that exists in a modern Btate and the vast expansion of social legislation of all sorts that have taken place in England and in other countries including our own, within the last few decades, the so-called administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals have come to be a permanent feature of our social and political system.\n\nThey function as adjudicating bodies in disputes concerning a large number of economic and social affairs.\n\nIn a sense they are governmental bodies appertaining to the executive and not to the judicial branch of the State, though in various matters they are armed with judicial po\\vPrs analogous to those normally carried out by Courts of law.\n\nThe question is, what are the tests or distinguishing feaJures, if any, which distinguish an administrative tribunal from a Court of law.\n\nOnce we are able to formulate these tests, we would be\n\nBharat Batill Ltd.\n\nv. . Emptoy\"s of Bharat Ba1tk Ud.\n\n.ll 11khafca J.\n\n1950 in a position to determine whether a Tribunal function-\n\n& 8 k Ltd ing under the Industrial Disputes Act is or is not a arat /\" • judicial tribunal properly so called.\n\nEmployees of.\n\nWhether a particular function or activity is judi- Bharat Ba11k ua. cial or not is often a difficult question to decide.\n\nThe - point was elaborately dealt with by Lord Sankey who Mukherjca J.\n\nC delivered the judgment of the Privy ouncil in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation\n\n( 1 ) •. The question raised in that case was whether the Board of Review, which was set up in 1925 under the Commonwealth Income Tax legislation, was a Court exercising judicial powers of the Commonwealth ? The High Court of Australia decided by a majority that it was an administrative and not a judicial tribunal and this majority judgment was affirmed in appeal by the Privy Council. Lord Sankey remarked in course of his judgment that \" the decided cases show that there . are Tribunals which possess many of the trappings of a Court but which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power.\n\nMere externals do not make a direction by an ad hoc tribunal to an administrative officer, an exercise by a Court of judicial power.\" The actual decision in the case rested on the ground tbat the Board of Review could not be a judicial tribunal, as its orders were not conclusive for any purpose whatsoever. The decision, it sc:ems, has only a negative value. The Lord Chancellor enumerated a series of negative propositions which stated inter alia that a tribunal is not necessarily a Court because two or more contending parties appear before it, nor because it hears witnesses, or gives a final decision which affects the right of the parties. What the real or positive test is, the Privy Council did not care to formulate, though the judgment quoted, with approval, certain observations of Griffith C. J. given in another Australian case, namely, Huddart Parker & Co. v.\n\nMoorehead(•), which to some extent neutralised the effect of the negative tests enumerated in the judgment.\n\nThe observations of Griffith C.]. are as follows:-\n\n(1) (1931] A.O. 276.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.R. 330, at p. 357.\n\n\" lam of opinion that the words • judicial power' ...... mean the power which every sovereign authority must have of necessity to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjcets, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.\"\n\nIt may be stated that the authority to hear and decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition though it is one of the most essential of judicial powers, may be present is an administrative tribunal also. In the majority of cases, administrative bodies are also armed with the powers of a Court of Justice in summoning withesses, administering oaths and punishing disobedience to its order made for the purpose of effecting its enquiries (1 ). As a matter of fact, it is usual to find that those features which were at one time attached exclusively to activities carried on in a Court of law are being extended to committees, commissions or boards conducting enquiries under directions or supervisi:m of the Government. The presence or absence of these features, therefore, does not furnish any conclusive test to determine whether a particular body is a judicial boay or not. In the observations of Griffith C. J. quoted above, the learned Chief Justice laid stress on the power to make a binding and authoritative decision as the essential element in the exercise of judicial power. The exact meaning and implication of these expressions were the subject mat~\n\nter of discussion in later Australian cases and it was held by the majority of the Judges in Rola Co. (Australia) Pty. Limited v. The Commonwealth (2 ), that they do not simply mean that if an authority is given power to dec!ide controverted questions of fact and its determination is made binding on the parties to the controversy, it would be sufficient to show that judicial power was entrusted to such authority. A determination, it was pointed out, may be binding on the parties\n\n(1) Vide W F. O'Co1'1'or v. Wald1'01' [1935) A.C. 67 at p. 82.\n\n12) 69 C.L.R. 185. 65 I\n\nBl!mat Bcmk Uct.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Ba11/1 LU\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1 so in the same sense as a contract is binding on them.\n\nE•1 -n- 1 vVhat is necessary is that the determination by its own ''\"'\"' \"\"'' .ta. f d h th d · t t l't f v. orce an wit out e a1 or ms rumen a 1 y o any Emp1oym of other authority or power must affect the rights and w .. nat Hauk ua. obligations of the parties ; or in other words, the decision itself irrespective of the facts decided, must create .llahajauJ. rights and impose obligations; and it should be enforceable as such under the ordinary law of the land.\n\nThis undoubtedly is one of the fundamental tests which distinguishes a judicial body from one which exercises administrative or quasi-judicial functions.\n\nSometimes the decision or report of the administrative tribunal becomes operative after it is accepted by the head of the department under which the tribunal conducted its enquiries and it is then enforced by some sort of administrative process; or it might create rights between the parties which have to be sued upon in the ordinary way in a Court of law and it is only on the basis of a judgment or decree that is obtained in such action that relief could be had by the party.\n\nThe essence of judicial determination is that nothing further remains to be done except thP, enforcement of the judgment, a step which is compelled automatically by the law of the land.\n\nThe other fundamental test which distinguishes a judicial from a quasi-judicial or administrative body is that the former decides controversies according to law, while the latter is not bound strictly to follow the law for its decision. The investigation of facts on evidence adduced by the parties may be a common feature in both judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals, but the difference between the two lies in the fact that in a judicial proceeding the Judge has got to apply to the facts found, the law of the land which is fixed and uniform.\n\nThe quasi judicial tribunal on the other hand gives its decision. on the differences between the parties not in accordance with fixed rules of law but on principles of administrative policy or convenience or what appears to be just and proper in the circumstances of a particular case. In other words, the process employed by an administrative tribunal in coming to its decision i.s not what is known as 'judicial\n\nprocess' ( i ). Sir Maurice Gwyer in his deposition be- 1950 fohreEthe\n\n1 ohmPmit 1 ee on im 1\n\n s9t2e9r' s Pt otwdersthappo_i, nted1 by Bharut~--;;,, k Ud. t e ng is ar iament m s a e at a c ear v. distinction is to be drawn between judicial and quasi- Employm of judicial powers.\" The 'judicial power' was defined Bharat Bank u by the witness as a power to decide a question of legal right in a dispute between parties involving either a Muhh\"rj<'n I finding of fact or the application of a fixed rule or principle of law or involving both. \" The quasi-judicial power,\" he defined as meaning \"the power of giving decisions on questions of differences of an administrative and not justiciable character which cannot be determined by reference to any fixed law or principle of law but are matters of administrative discretion and judgment\" ( 11 ). In Cooper v. Wilson (3), Scott L. J. quoted with approval and adopted as the basis of his judgment the followfog passage from the report of the above committee :\n\n\" A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites :-(1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute ; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence ; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of ltgal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any !disputed question of law.\n\nA quasi-judicial decision\n\n(qually presupposes an existing dispute between two\n\nor more parties and involves (1) and (2) but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4).\n\nThe place of (4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is determined by the Minister's free choice.\"\n\n(1) See Robson's Justire and Administrative Law, p. H.\n\n(2) Vide Committee of Minister's Powers, Minutes of Evd., Vol. II, pages 15-16 and also Robson's Justice and Administrative Law, p. 319.\n\n(3) (1937] 2 K.B. 309.\n\nBl1arat Bank I..td.\n\nE1up!oyc.'s of B.'iarat Baul: Ltd.\n\n.\\l11kherjec1 /\n\nIn our opinion these statements correctly bring out the distinction between a judicial tribunal and an administrative body which exercises quasi-judicial functions.\n\nThese being the essential features which distinguish the two classes of tribunals, we would have to ascertain with reference to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which class or category of tribunals an Industrial Tribunal comes under.\n\nThe object of the Industrial Disputes Act, as set out in the preamble, is \"to make provisions for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing.\" The word \"settlement\" suggests the idea of establishing compromise between the interests of disputing parties.\n\nThere are three classes of authorities provided for by the Act who are entrusted with the powers and duties of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. First of all, there are conciliation officers or Boards of Conciliation, whose duties mainly are to induce parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement amongst themselves. Secondly, there are Courts of Enquiry and though they are described as Courts, their duties end with investigation into the matters referred to them and submitting reports thereupon to the appropriate Government. Lastly, there are Industrial Tribunals composed of independent persons whn either. are or had been Judges of a High Court or District Judges or are qualified for appointment a, High Court Judges.\n\n It will be seen from the descriptions given above that the Board of Conciliation or Court of Enquiry constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act coulq, on no account, be regarded as judicial tribunals. To enable them to investigate facts they are however armed with certain powers of compelling attendance of witnesses and production of documents etc_ These provisions are to be found in section 11 of the Act.\n\nThe significant thing to note is, that there is no distinction made in this respect between Conciliation Boards and Courts of Enquiry on the one hand and Industrial Tribunals on the other. The same powers are conferred\n\non the three classes of authorities without any distinc- 1950 tion whatsoever and sub-section (3) of section 11 further Bharat Bank UJ.\n\nIays down that any .enquiry ?r investigation by a v.\n\nBoard, Court of Enqmry or Tribunal shall be deemed Employees of to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sec- Bharat Bank UJ. tions 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. This means that proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal .\\Tutdwr;\"a J. -0r for the matter of that before the other two bodies also could be deemed to be judicial proceedings only for certain specified purposes. The express provision making the proceedings judicial proceedings for those purposes only emphasises that they are not judicial proceedings otherwise. Under section 15 (1), the Industrial Tribunal has got to submit its award to the appropriate Government and sub-section (2) lays down that on receipt of such an award, the appropriate Government shall by order in writing declare the award to be binding. A different provision has been made in regard to cases where the Government itself figures as a party to the dispute. In such cases. if the Government considers it inexpedient On public grounds to give effect to the award either in whole or in part, it may, at the earliest opportunity, lay the award for consideration before the Provincial or Central Legislative Assembly as the case may be and the Legislative Assembly may by its resolution .confirm, modify or reject the award.\n\nAfter the resolution is passed, the Government is to declare the award so confirmed or modified to be binding [see sub-section (3)]. Sub-section (4) of section 15 expressly lays down that an award declared to be binding under any two of the previous sub-sections shall not be called into question in any manner whatsoever. The Government is not merely to declare the award binding but under section 19 (3), it has got to specify the date when the award would come into force and also to fix the period during which it would remain binding, and this period shall not exceed one year.\n\nIt will be seen, therefore, that there is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act from \\vhich it could be inferred that the Industrial Tribunal really functions as a Court exercising judicial functions.\n\nRegarding\n\nBharat Bank Ud.\n\nBr11Ployees of Blzarat Bank Ltd.\n\nthe trappings or the external indicia of a Court, its position is almost the same as that of the Board of Conciliation or Court of Enquiry and Bakshi Sir Tek Chand concedes that the latter are not judicial tribunals at all. The powers of an Industrial Tribunal are certainly wider than those of the other bodies, but it has no power to make a final pronouncement which would proprio 11igore be binding on, and create rights and obligations between the parties. It is for the appropriate Government to declare the award to be binding and the part which the Government plays in such matters is not a mechanical part merely, for the award can really become operative only when the date of its commencement and the period of its duration are fixed, and it is for the Government and Government alone to fix the same. With regard to the other class of cases, where the Government itself is one of the parties to the dispute, the position is still worse .. An award in such cases is always subject to the contingency of being rejected or modified by the legislature before whom it could be placed for.consideration at the option of the Government. Where a contingency like this is attached to an award, it can never be regarded as a final or binding decision which is of the essence of a judicial proceeding. The fact that in cases of disputes between private employers and their workmen, the Government has to accept the award as it is, makes no difference in principle.\n\nPossibly, this rule was made in con sideration of the status and training of the people who constitute the Tribunal, but nevertheless the determination cannot acquire any authority or force, so long as the appropriate Government does not make the declaration and fix the time of its operation as mentioned above.\n\nIn regard to the other class of awards, where the Government is one of the disputing parties, the award on the face of it is neither the final nor the authoritative pronouncement on the matter in dispute, and it is always in the powers of one of the disputing parties to subject it to further scrutiny at the hands of the legislature who can reject the whole award or effect such changes in it as it considers proper.\n\nThis shows the real naturn of the Tribunal and it is not and\n\nould not be suggested that the Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal which exercises judicial functions when the dispute is only between private employers and their workmen, and it ceases to be such when the employer is the Government itself.\n\n\\Ve would now examine the process by which an Industrial Tribunal comes to its decisions and I have no hesitation in holding that the process employed is not judicial process at all.\n\nIn settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function -of the Tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement.\n\nIt has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace.\n\nAn industrial dispute as has been said on many occasions is nothing but a trial of strength between the employers on the one hand and the workmen's organization on the other and the Industrial Tribunal has got to arrive at some equitable arrangement for averting strikes and lock-outs which impede production of goods and the industrial development of the country.\n\nThe Tribunal is not bound by the rigid rules of law.\n\nThe process it employs is rather an extended form of the process of collective bargaining and is more akin to administrative than to judicial function.\n\nIn describing the true position of an Industrial 'l'ribunal in dealing with labour disputes, this Court in Wes tern India Automobile Assoct'.ation v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Bombay, and others( 1 ) quoted with approval .a passage from Ludwig Teller's well known work on the subject, where the learned author observes that \"industrial arbitration may involve the extension of existing agreement or the making of a new one or in\n\ngeneral the creation of new obligations or modification of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally\n\n(1) [1949] F. C.R. 321 at p. 345.\n\nBharat Bank Lt.I.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Bank Ltd.\n\nMahajan].\n\n195o concerns itself with interpretation of existing obliga-\n\nBharat 8 \"'''' Ltd. hons ad disputes rdating to existing agreements. \"\n\n\"· The views expressed m these observations were Employees of adopted in its entirety by this Court. Our conclusion, Bhurat Ba\"'' Ud. therefore, is that an Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act is not a judicial tribunal\n\n~Inkhnj<a .I and its determination is not a judicial determination in the proper sense of these expressions.\n\n\\Ve now come to the other question as to whether an appeal could be taken to this Court against an award of an Industrial Tribunal by special leave under article 136 of the Constitution. Article 136 is a part of Chapter IV of the Constitution which deals with the Union Judiciary. The different jurisdictions of the Supreme Court have been prescribed in a series of articles commencing from article 131.\n\nArticle 131 defines the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. ' Article 132 deals with its appellate powers in cases where substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution are involved.\n\nArticle 133 contains the provision relating to appeals in civil cases from judgments, decrees and orders of the High Courts ; and article 134 makes provisions relating to criminal appeals.\n\nArticle 135 lays down that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter not covered by articles 133 and 134, if such jurisdiction and power could have been exercised by the Federal Court prior to the coming into force of the present Constitution. Then comes article 136 which runs as follows:\n\n\"(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.\"\n\nThe article is worded in the widest terms possible.\n\nIt vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by granting of special leave against any kind. of judment, decree or order made by any Court or tribunal m any\n\ncau5e or matter and the powers could be exercised in spite of and overriding the specific provisions .for appeal contained in the previous articles. The controversy so far as the present case is concerned mainly centers round the interpretation to be put up!;>n two words, namely, \"determination\" and \"tribunal\" used in the article. Does the word \"tribunal\" mean a judicial tribunal only and is the expression \"determination\" restricted to what is known as \"judicial determination\"?\n\nSir Alladi's contention is that in interpreting these words we should follow the principle of ejusdem\n\ngen.ris. \"Determination,\" he says, must be taken to be judicial-determination which is of the same nature as decree, judgment, order or sentence; and ... tribunal \" associated with the word \" Court \" could not but\n\nmean \"judicial tribunal.\"\n\nBakshi Sir Tek Chand on the other hand lays stress on the fact that the word \" determination \" was not in the original draft Constitution, and it was, subsequently added, presumably with a vjew to widen the scope of article 136 and include within it, the decisions of administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals also.\n\nHe :points out that according to the definition given in section 2 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, \"award \" means a determination either interim or final of an industrial dispute by an Industrial Tribunal.\n\nThere is undoubtedly something to be said in favour of both these views.\n\nThe difficulty, in our opinion, arises from the fact that neither of these terms \"determination \" or \" tribunal\" has a fixed or definite connotation in ordinary language. The word \" determination'' means and signifies the ending of a controversy or litigation by the decision of a Judge or Arbiltrator. It cannot be said that it is restricted exclusively to proceedings in court. Likewise, the dictionary meaning of the word \" tribunal \" is ' court of justice' or 'seat of a Judge.' By 'Judge' we mean some authority by which contested matters are decidecJ, .between rival parties: Here again, it is not possible to say that the expression is applicable only to a\n\nBh({rat Bank Utl.\n\nEmployees of Bharat Ba111' Ltd.\n\n1950 regular court of, law. If the tribunal is a full-fledged ludicial tribunal, it is not disputed that its decisions CJ/iarat Bank Ltd. v would be proper subject-matter of appeal under article Emplo; ccs of 136 of the Constitution. The question is whether this nharat Rauk Ud. article. includes within its scope the determinations of\n\nAlukhe1jea J. quasi-judicial tribunals as well.\n\nOur view is that ordinarily we should not put any restricted interpretation upon the plain words of an article in the Constitution and thereby limit our powers of granting special leave for appeals, which the Constitution for best of reasons did not choose to fetter or circumscribe in any way. At the same time, we must admit that some sort of restricted interpretation may be unavoidable in view of the context in which particular words appear ; and certain restrictions may be implicit in the very purpose for which article 136 has been framed.\n\nArticle 136 empowers us in our discretion to hear appeals from pronouncements of all inferior courts and tribunals. With regard to law courts, no difficulty arises. As regards tribunals which are not courts in the proper sense of the expression, it lllay not be proper, in our opinion, to lay down a hard and fast rule that no appeals could, on any account, be allowed against determinations of such tribunals.\n\nThere are numerous varieties of these adjudicating bodies, whose structures vary greatly in character and composition and so do the powers and functions which they exercise.\n\nThe best thing to do would be to examine each type of cases as it arises and if we find that with regard to determinations emanating from certain tribunals it is not possible for us to exercise fully and effectively the powers of an appellate Court, such determinations must be held to lie outside the purview of article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nThis disability in the matter of exercising our powers as an appellate Court might arise from the fact that the rules and principles by which we ordinarily judge the soundness or otherwise of judicial decisions are not capable of being applied to the determinations of certain administrative tribunals. It might also arise from the fact that the law under which the\n\ntribunal functions prevents us from making any effective order which woutd be binding and operative of its own force without the intervention of some other power or authority; or there may be some kind of contingency attached to it.\n\nIn our opinion, these difficulties do confront us in the entertaining or hearing of an appeal against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal. In the first place, as we have said above, the determination of an Industrial \"Tribunal does not become complete and binding unless and until it is declared to be so by the appropriate Government. Till the Government makes such declaration, neither of the parties to the dispute can have any real reason for filing an appeal. An appeal,. if it lies, could be filed after the determination has been declared binding.\n\nBut in such cases, is it the determination of the Tribunal merely which is challenged by way of appeal or is it the determination by the Tribunal to which has been super-added a declaration by the Government ? The decision in the appeal would undoubtedly affect not merely the decision of the Tribunal but that of the Government as well which is certainly not . a tribunal within the meaning of article I 36.\n\nAssuming again that the award is set aside and we substitute our own determination in place of the award given by the Tribunal, will our award be enforceable by itself or will it require a declaration by the Government to make it binding ? If Government is itself a party to the disute, will it , he op.en to Governmen~ to place our decision for consideration by the Legislative Assembly?\n\nAnd will tqe Legislative Assembly be competent to reject or modify our award ? These problems arise because under section 15 the award under the Act becomes binding only when the Government declares it to be so and if our judgment takes the place of the award of the , Tribunal, all the infirmities that attach to the award must necessarily attach to our judgment also.\n\nThe other difficulty is no less formidable.\n\naid above, the Tribunal is not bound to decide the disputes by application of the ordinary law of the land. A good deal depends upon questions of policy\n\nBharat Banlc Lid\n\nEmployus of Bharat Bank Lid.\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nu; o and public convenience. It is not possible for us to\n\n81 ;-;; k Ud judge the propriety of the decision by a reference to iara •• \"\" some standard or fixed rules and we think that the\n\nEmPlosccs of very policy of the law prevents us from interfering Bharat Bank ua. with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal.\n\nAfok\"\"\"i\"\" J. \\Vhere the direction is committed to any body or a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions which are not fettered by ordinary rules of law, the tribunal should in the absense of any provision to the contrary be deemed to have the final authority in the exercise of that discretion. \\Ve cannot sit in appeal over their decision and substitute our own discretion for theirs.\n\nQuestions, however, may and do arise where such .quasi-judicial body attempts to usurp jurisdiction which it does not possess. It may assume jurisdiction under a mistaken view of law or refuse to exercise jurisdiction properly by adoption of extraneous or irrelevant considerations ; or there may be cases where in its proceedings the tribunal violates the principles of natural justice. In all such cases the most proper and adequate remedy would be by writs of certiorari or prohibition and the Court having authority may direct that the decision of the body or tribunal might be brought up to be quashed for Jack of jurisdiction or for mistake apparent on the face of it ; and if the proceedings had not terminated at that time, a writ of prohibition may also be issued for preventing the tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction. The issuing of such writs would not be an exercise of appellate powers which means the rehearing of the case and passing of such judgment which in the opinion of the appellate Court the original tribunal should have made.\n\nThe object of these writs is simply to keep the exercise of powers by these quasi-judicial tribunals within the limits of jurisdiction assigned to them by law and to restrain them from acting in excess of their authority. These principles are well settled and require no elucidation( 1 ).\n\nOur conclusion, therefore, is that article 136 of the Constitution does not contemplate a determination given by the Industrial Tribunal.\n\n(1) J?.ex v. Eh'ctric{fy Co111111issioncrs {192~1 1 K. B. 171; lloanf of Education v. Rfrc [1911) A.C.179.\n\nEven assuming for argument's sake that we have got jurisdiction under article 136, the exercise of which would , depend upon the circumstances of each case, in view of the reasons which we have set out above, this is not an appeal which, in our opinion, should be a9mitted even if we have the power to do so.\n\n-The result is that tlie preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal fails and dismissed with costs.\n\nBharat Bank Ltd\n\nEmployeu •f Bharat Bllllk\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 entirely agree with the PAiar!iali Sa11ri, judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J. and I have oothing to add.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai for Tanubhai C. Desai.\n\nAgent for the respondents : R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.\n\nDR. N. B. KHARE\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF DELHI\n\n, SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art 19, els. (1)\n\n(d) and (5)-Fundamental rights-Freedom of movement-Law imposing restrictions- V alidity -Reasonableness of restrictions-Scope of enquiry-East P11n1ab Public Safety Act, 1949, s. 4(1) (c), (3), (6)-Provisions empowering Provincial Government or District Magistrate to extern persons mqking satisfaction of externing authority final, authorising e:rternment for indefinite period, and directing that authority \"may communicate\" grounds of e:rternment-Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act.\n\nMay 26.", "total_entities": 321, "entities": [{"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "P, A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P, A. 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' Eu1filoyecs of Bharat B1111k Ltd.\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\nF AZL Au J .-The important question to be decided in this case is whether the present appeal lies at all to this Court."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6166, "end_char": 6177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6345, "end_char": 6356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6609, "end_char": 6620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6696, "end_char": 6707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the 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party to the dispute and in Its opinion it would be inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, it shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with the statement of its reasons for not making a declaration as aforesaid before the Legislative Assembly of the Province, or where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, before the Central Legislative Assembly, and shall, as soon as may be, cause to be moved therein a resolution for the consideration of the\n\naward, and the Legislative Assembly may."}}, {"text": "Central Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16337, "end_char": 16365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was however drawn to the proviso to section 15 (2), which runs as follows:-\n\n\"Provided that where the appropriate Government is a party to the dispute and in Its opinion it would be inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, it shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with the statement of its reasons for not making a declaration as aforesaid before the Legislative Assembly of the Province, or where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, before the Central Legislative Assembly, and shall, as soon as may be, cause to be moved therein a resolution for the consideration of the\n\naward, and the Legislative Assembly may."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17293, "end_char": 17304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17509, "end_char": 17520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17717, "end_char": 17740, "source": "gazetteer", 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AhJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19048, "end_char": 19057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From fhe Bha\"\" Hank ua decision of the Tribunal however, it appears that the evidence that was shut out related to one isolated point Faz!"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1ahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20550, "end_char": 20568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• '1ahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the determination of an industrial dispute by the Industrial ."}}, {"text": "Bharat Bank Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20723, "end_char": 20742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bharat Bank Limited,· Delhi, the appellant, is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act.", "canonical_name": "Bharat Bank Limited"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", 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{"in_sentence": "Article 131 confers original jurisdiction on this Court in certain disputes arising between the Government of India and the States etc."}}, {"text": "Articles 132 and 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23604, "end_char": 23624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23755, "end_char": 23766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "10th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23928, "end_char": 23946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which was the highest Court of appeal for India prior to 10th October, 1949, was not a Court of criminal appeal in the sense in which this Court has been made a Court of criminal appeal under article 134."}}, {"text": "article 134", 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"metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24987, "end_char": 24998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The powers of the Judicial Committee were conferred upon it by the Judicial Committee Act, 1844", "statute": "The powers of the Judicial Committee were conferred upon it by the Judicial Committee Act, 1844"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25081, "end_char": 25092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The powers of the Judicial Committee were conferred upon it by the Judicial Committee Act, 1844", "statute": "The powers of the Judicial Committee were conferred upon it by the Judicial Committee Act, 1844"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25750, "end_char": 25761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The powers of the Judicial Committee were conferred upon it by the Judicial Committee Act, 1844", "statute": "The powers of the Judicial 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there is a miscarriage\n\nof justice by a determination of any tribunal and that if the intention of the Constitution by use of Bharat Bc:nk Ltd.\n\nv. the word \"tribunal\" was in the same sense as \"court,\"\n\nt950\n\nEmptoy<\"CS of then it was not n.cessary to import it in article 136, Bharat Ban\" u.i."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32476, "end_char": 32487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33340, "end_char": 33350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33508, "end_char": 33519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35108, "end_char": 35119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35469, "end_char": 35476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out in Halsbury's Laws of England, the word \"Court \" originally meant the King's Palace but subsequently acquired the meaning of (1) a place where justice was administered, and (2) the person or persons who administer it."}}, {"text": "Saville", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36524, "end_char": 36531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In R. v. London County Council (1 ), Saville L. J. gave the following meaning to the word \"Court \" or \" judicial authority\":-\n\n(1) [193t) 2 K.B. 215."}}, {"text": "Sankey L. C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37200, "end_char": 37212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "language by Lord Sankey L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(•), there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which,· nevertheless, are not Courts in the .strict sense of exercising judicial power.", "canonical_name": "Sankey L. 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{"text": "flfallajau", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85704, "end_char": 85714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19li0\n\nBharat Bank Ltd.\n\nE111ptoyces of Bliarat Banll Ltd.\n\nflfallajau J.\n\nThe determination of the Tribunal has not been materially affected by this interpretation of the word to any large extent and that being so, it does not call for the exercise of the special power."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86070, "end_char": 86080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86304, "end_char": 86317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 86793, "end_char": 86812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court has held that a strike during the pendency of the period of truce and during the pendency of an eailier dispute before a tribunal is illegal even if it is brought about as a result of fresh and new demands which are not covered by the earlier diopute."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88112, "end_char": 88123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parwana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88482, "end_char": 88489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Parwana on behalf of the employees stated their respective cases and Mr. Ved Vyas who represented the bank stated the bank's case and after the cases had been stated the proceedings terminated and both parties addressed arguments and the Tribunal proceeded to give its award."}}, {"text": "Ved Vyas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88555, "end_char": 88563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Parwana on behalf of the employees stated their respective cases and Mr. Ved Vyas who represented the bank stated the bank's case and after the cases had been stated the proceedings terminated and both parties addressed arguments and the Tribunal proceeded to give its award.", "canonical_name": "Veda Vyas"}}, {"text": "Bhattacharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 89702, "end_char": 89714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Particular reference was made in respect of a scurrilous letter issued by one Bhattacharya on behalf of the employees and distributed by them, which it is alleged considerably shook the credit of the bank."}}, {"text": "Jharat Ba\"k Ud", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 90165, "end_char": 90179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jharat Ba\"k Ud."}}, {"text": "M.ahlrjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90601, "end_char": 90610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is M.ahlrjan J. d\"ffi 1 h h T · 1 cu t to see on w at matenal t e nbunal has given its award as there is none existing on the present record and the respondents' counsel could not point out to any such material."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek ChJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92167, "end_char": 92182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last contention raised by Bakshi Tek ChJJ, nd was that though a Tribunal consisting of three persons was appointed to adjudicate on the dispute, the awai; d has only been signed by two of them.", "canonical_name": "Bakshi Sir Tek Chand"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92376, "end_char": 92386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93332, "end_char": 93341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93856, "end_char": 93865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94044, "end_char": 94053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95562, "end_char": 95582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the fact remains that the Tribunal was never reconstituted and it was not denied that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar is now sitting in the same Tribunal without being again nominated to it and the Tribunal is hearing the same reference under the other issues referred to it."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 95848, "end_char": 95856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, I do not see why after having heard the reference he could not give the award even if he was in Calcutta or sign the award given by the other two members."}}, {"text": "section 377", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96880, "end_char": 96891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96925, "end_char": 96951, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 96985, "end_char": 96994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Code of Criminal Procedure as modified and as applicable to Hyderabad stood as follows:-."}}, {"text": "Fakira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97250, "end_char": 97256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fakira's case the order of confirmation was only made, passed and signed by one of them, though the Court of the Resident consisted of two Judges."}}, {"text": "section 377", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97453, "end_char": 97464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97650, "end_char": 97660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97668, "end_char": 97691, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Reference may also be made to a case arising under the Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97725, "end_char": 97796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Blzarat Bank Ud", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 98478, "end_char": 98493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J 950\n\nBlzarat Bank Ud."}}, {"text": "UKHERJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98542, "end_char": 98548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l UKHERJ EA J .-This appeal, which has come up Jiuld1crjea J. before us on special leave, is directed against an award made by the All India Industrial Tribunal, dated the 19th of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "All India Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 98671, "end_char": 98700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l UKHERJ EA J .-This appeal, which has come up Jiuld1crjea J. before us on special leave, is directed against an award made by the All India Industrial Tribunal, dated the 19th of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "19th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 98712, "end_char": 98733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l UKHERJ EA J .-This appeal, which has come up Jiuld1crjea J. before us on special leave, is directed against an award made by the All India Industrial Tribunal, dated the 19th of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98797, "end_char": 98806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98814, "end_char": 98837, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "19th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99537, "end_char": 99555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held its enquiry in Delhi in respect to the cases which were connected with the Ddhi Branch of the appellants and as a result of the same, made their award on 19th January, 1950, holding that 26 persons, who were employees under the appellants, were improperly dismissed."}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99889, "end_char": 99907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99915, "end_char": 99938, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "30th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99968, "end_char": 99989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This award was declared to be binding in terms of the provisions of sections 15 and 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Central Government on 30th of January, 1950, and it was directed to remain in operation for a period of one year."}}, {"text": "Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100353, "end_char": 100382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention put forward by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, who appeared for the intervener, in substance, is that article 136 of the Indian Constitution, under which special leave was prayed for and obtained by the appellants in this case, does not contemplate or include within its scope an appeal against an award of an Industrial Tribunal which is not vested with, and cannot exercise, judicial powers, and the decision of which cannot, therefore, rank as a judicial determination."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100439, "end_char": 100450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sir Tek Chand that the Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101193, "end_char": 101270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101441, "end_char": 101452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sir Tek Chand that the Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Sir Tek Chand that the Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101711, "end_char": 101776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102052, "end_char": 102063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Bharat Batill Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 103285, "end_char": 103303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once we are able to formulate these tests, we would be\n\nBharat Batill Ltd.\n\nv. .", "canonical_name": "Bharat Bank Limited"}}, {"text": "Ltd ing under the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103425, "end_char": 103466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sankey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103715, "end_char": 103721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - point was elaborately dealt with by Lord Sankey who Mukherjca J.\n\nC delivered the judgment of the Privy ouncil in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation\n\n( 1 ) •. The question raised in that case was whether the Board of Review, which was set up in 1925 under the Commonwealth Income Tax legislation, was a Court exercising judicial powers of the Commonwealth ?", "canonical_name": "Sankey L. C."}}, {"text": "Mukherjca", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103726, "end_char": 103735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - point was elaborately dealt with by Lord Sankey who Mukherjca J.\n\nC delivered the judgment of the Privy ouncil in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation\n\n( 1 ) •. The question raised in that case was whether the Board of Review, which was set up in 1925 under the Commonwealth Income Tax legislation, was a Court exercising judicial powers of the Commonwealth ?", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea"}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 104060, "end_char": 104083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Australia decided by a majority that it was an administrative and not a judicial tribunal and this majority judgment was affirmed in appeal by the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Sankey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104241, "end_char": 104247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sankey remarked in course of his judgment that \" the decided cases show that there .", "canonical_name": "Sankey L. C."}}, {"text": "Griffith", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 105483, "end_char": 105491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of Griffith C.]."}}, {"text": "Bl!mat Bcmk Uct", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 107769, "end_char": 107784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65 I\n\nBl!mat Bcmk Uct."}}, {"text": "Maurice Gwyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 110163, "end_char": 110176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Maurice Gwyer in his deposition be- 1950 fohreEthe\n\n1 ohmPmit 1 ee on im 1\n\n s9t2e9r' s Pt otwdersthappo_i, nted1 by Bharut~--;;,, k Ud."}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110240, "end_char": 110242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Scott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111016, "end_char": 111021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Cooper v. Wilson (3), Scott L. J. quoted with approval and adopted as the basis of his judgment the followfog passage from the report of the above committee :\n\n\" A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites :-(1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute ; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence ; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of ltgal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any !"}}, {"text": "Robson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112258, "end_char": 112264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) See Robson's Justire and Administrative Law, p. H.\n\n(2) Vide Committee of Minister's Powers, Minutes of Evd.,"}}, {"text": "Bl1arat Bank", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112468, "end_char": 112480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bl1arat Bank I..td.", "canonical_name": "Bharat Bank Limited"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112858, "end_char": 112881, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112975, "end_char": 112998, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114149, "end_char": 114172, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114416, "end_char": 114426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114761, "end_char": 114771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharat Bank UJ", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 114780, "end_char": 114794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same powers are conferred\n\non the three classes of authorities without any distinc- 1950 tion whatsoever and sub-section (3) of section 11 further Bharat Bank UJ."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115011, "end_char": 115028, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115400, "end_char": 115410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116282, "end_char": 116292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116521, "end_char": 116531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116771, "end_char": 116794, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Blzarat Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 116960, "end_char": 116977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Br11Ployees of Blzarat Bank Ltd.\n\nthe trappings or the external indicia of a Court, its position is almost the same as that of the Board of Conciliation or Court of Enquiry and Bakshi Sir Tek Chand concedes that the latter are not judicial tribunals at all."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Sir Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 117122, "end_char": 117142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Br11Ployees of Blzarat Bank Ltd.\n\nthe trappings or the external indicia of a Court, its position is almost the same as that of the Board of Conciliation or Court of Enquiry and Bakshi Sir Tek Chand concedes that the latter are not judicial tribunals at all.", "canonical_name": "Bakshi Sir Tek Chand"}}, {"text": "Ludwig Teller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121013, "end_char": 121026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In describing the true position of an Industrial 'l'ribunal in dealing with labour disputes, this Court in Wes tern India Automobile Assoct'.ation v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Bombay, and others( 1 ) quoted with approval .a passage from Ludwig Teller's well known work on the subject, where the learned author observes that \"industrial arbitration may involve the extension of existing agreement or the making of a new one or in\n\ngeneral the creation of new obligations or modification of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally\n\n(1) [1949] F. C.R. 321 at p. 345."}}, {"text": "[1949] F. C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 121319, "end_char": 121337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bharat Bank", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 121350, "end_char": 121361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bharat Bank Lt.", "canonical_name": "Bharat Bank Limited"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121701, "end_char": 121761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122054, "end_char": 122065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122087, "end_char": 122098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122291, "end_char": 122302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122305, "end_char": 122316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122375, "end_char": 122386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122523, "end_char": 122534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122653, "end_char": 122664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122713, "end_char": 122724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "articles 133 and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122835, "end_char": 122855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123006, "end_char": 123017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124626, "end_char": 124637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124786, "end_char": 124795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124807, "end_char": 124830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bharat Ba111' Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125711, "end_char": 125729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Employees of Bharat Ba111' Ltd.\n\n1950 regular court of, law."}}, {"text": "Alukhe1jea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126068, "end_char": 126078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "includes within its scope the determinations of\n\nAlukhe1jea J. quasi-judicial tribunals as well."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126636, "end_char": 126647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126666, "end_char": 126677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127566, "end_char": 127577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129674, "end_char": 129684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharat Banlc Lid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 130130, "end_char": 130146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A good deal depends upon questions of policy\n\nBharat Banlc Lid\n\nEmployus of Bharat Bank Lid.", "canonical_name": "Bharat Bank Limited"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132285, "end_char": 132296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132567, "end_char": 132578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bharat Bank Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 132911, "end_char": 132926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bharat Bank Ltd\n\nEmployeu •f Bharat Bllllk\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 entirely agree with the PAiar!iali Sa11ri, judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J. and I have oothing to add.", "canonical_name": "Bharat Bank Limited"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 133136, "end_char": 133146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai for Tanubhai C. Desai."}}, {"text": "Tanubhai C. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 133151, "end_char": 133168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai for Tanubhai C. Desai."}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 133199, "end_char": 133211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 133244, "end_char": 133255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P, A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "N. B. KHARE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 133262, "end_char": 133273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. B. KHARE\n\nfl."}}, {"text": "STATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 133284, "end_char": 133298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF DELHI\n\n, SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133307, "end_char": 133320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF DELHI\n\n, SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133328, "end_char": 133342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF DELHI\n\n, SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133390, "end_char": 133399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF DELHI\n\n, SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.]", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133407, "end_char": 133428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133430, "end_char": 133436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133598, "end_char": 133621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133623, "end_char": 133630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133897, "end_char": 133948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_519_536_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 519\n\nEven assuming for argument's sake that we have got jurisdiction under article 136, the exercise of which would , depend upon the circumstances of each case, in view of the reasons which we have set out above, this is not an appeal which, in our opinion, should be a9mitted even if we have the power to do so.\n\n-The result is that tlie preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal fails and dismissed with costs.\n\nBharat Bank Ltd\n\nEmployeu •f Bharat Bllllk\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 entirely agree with the PAiar!iali Sa11ri, judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J. and I have oothing to add.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai for Tanubhai C. Desai.\n\nAgent for the respondents : R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.\n\nDR. N. B. KHARE\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF DELHI\n\n, SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, ' and MuKHERJEA, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art 19, els. (1)\n\n(d) and (5)-Fundamental rights-Freedom of movement-Law imposing restrictions- V alidity -Reasonableness of restrictions-Scope of enquiry-East P11n1ab Public Safety Act, 1949, s. 4(1) (c), (3), (6)-Provisions empowering Provincial Government or District Magistrate to extern persons mqking satisfaction of externing authority final, authorising e:rternment for indefinite period, and directing that authority \"may communicate\" grounds of e:rternment-Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act.\n\nMay 26.\n\nDr. N. B. Khart v.\n\nT ht St alt of Delhi\n\nSection 4, sub-s. (I) (c), of the East Punjab Public Safety Act of 1949 which was passed on the 29th March, 1949, and was to be in force until the 14th August, 1951, provided that ''The Provincial Government or the District Mag.lstratC. if satisfied \\Vith respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing hirn from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary to do so, 1nay, by order in writing, give a direction that such person shall rcn1ove himself fron1, and shall not return to, any area that 1nay oe specified in the order.\" Sub-section (3) of s. 4 provided that \"an order under sub-s. (I) made by the District Magistrate shall not, unless the Provincial Government by special order othe, wise\n\ndirects, remain in force for more than three months fron1 the n1aking thereof,\" and sub-s. ( 6) laid down that \"when an order has been macle in respect of any person under any of the clauses under s. 4, sub-s. (!) or sub-s. (2), the grounds of it may be communicated to him by the authority making the order, and in any case when the order is to be in force tor more than three months, he shall have a right of maki1'.g a representation which shall be referred to the Advisory Tribunal constituted under s. 3, subs. ( 4) .\" The petitioner, against whom an order under s. 4 (I) ( c) of the Act was passed applied to the Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of cntiorari contending that the order was illegal inasmuch as the provisions of t_he above mentioned Act under wliich the order was made infringed the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India which was guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (d) of the Constitution and were accordingly void under Art. 13 (I) of the Constitution : Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL ALI and PATANJALI SAsTRI, JJ-\n\n(MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA, JJ. dissenting)-(i) that there was nothing unreasonable in the provision contained in sub-s. (I) (c) of s. 4 empowering the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate to make an extcrnment order, and making their satisfaction as to the necessity of making such an order final, or in the provisions contained in sub-s. ( 3) of s. 4 that an order of a District Magistrate may remain in force for three months and that the Provincial Government may make an order, or keep alive an order made by a District Magistrate, for a period exceeding three months without fixing any time limit; (ii) with regard to stJb-s. ( 6), the word \"may\" in the expression \"may communicate\" must, in the context, be read as meaning \"shall\" and under the subscction it is obligatory on the authority making an order to communicate the grounds to the externec; (iii) the restrictions imposed by the above-mentioned. provisions of the Act upon the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. (19) (!) (d) were not, therefore, unreasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art. 19 (5) and the provisions of the Act were not void under Art. 13 (I ), and the order of externment was not illegal.\n\nPer MuKHERJEA J. (MlliAJAN J. concurring)-Though cercain authorities can be invested with power to make\n\ninitial orders on their own satisfaction in cases of this descrip- 1950 tion, and s. 4 ( 1) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act cannot be pronounced. to be unreasonable simply because an order Dr. N. B. Khm• could be passed by the Provincial Government or the District v.\n\nMagistrate on their own personal satisfaction and not on The State of Delh7 materials, which satisfy certain objective' tests, yet, the position would be different if the order thus made is allowed to continue for any indefinite period of time without giving the aggrieved person an opp<lrtunity to say what he has got to say against the order; and inasmuch as sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 4 prescribes no limit to the period of time during which an externment order would remain in force if it is made by the Provincial Government, and the Provincial Government is also given power to keep an order made by a District Magistrate in force for an indefinite period, the provisions of sub-s. (3) are manifestly unreasonable. The provisions of sub-s. ( 6) of s. 4 are also unreasonable as they make it entirely optional with the authorities to communicate to the person affected, the grounds upon which the order is made.\n\nNeither sub-s. ( 3) nor sub-s. ( 6) of s. 4 can, therefore, be said to have imposed restrictions which are reasonable in the i1tterests of the general public within the meaning of Art. 19 (5) and these provisions of the Act were consequently void and inoperative under Art. 13 ( 1) of the Constitution, and the externment order was illegal.\n\nHeld also, per KANIYA C. ]., F.1zL ALI,\n\nMAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA ]].-Whether the restrictions imposed by legislative enactment upon the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19\n\n(l) (d) are reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19 (5) of the Constitution would depend as much on the procedural portion of the law as the substantive part of it, and in considering whether such restrictions are reasonable the Court is not therefore bound to confine itself to an examination of the reasonableness of the restrictions in the abstract with reference to their duration and territorial extent. The Court can also consider the reasonableness of Lhe procedural part of the law and the circumstances under which, and the manner in which, the restrictions have been imposed. [PATANJALI SAsTR1 J. did not express any opinion on this point.]\n\nORIGINAL of 1950.\n\nJURISDICTION:\n\nPETITION\n\nApplication under article 32 of India for a writ of certiorari and facts are set out in the judgment.\n\nB. Banerji for the petitioner.\n\nNo.\n\n:XXXVII\n\nthe Constitution of prohibition.\n\nThe\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Gyan Chand, with him) for the opposite party.\n\n1950 &. N. B. KJi., e\n\n1950.\n\nMay 26.\n\nThe following judgments were delivered :-\n\nTiu S1att ef Delhi KANIA C. J .-This is an application for a writ of Certiorari and prohibition under article 32 of the Kania c. J.\n\nConstitution of India.\n\nThe petitioner who is the President of the All- India Hindu Mahasabha since December, 1949, was served with an order of externment dated the 31st of March, 1950, that night.\n\nBy that order he is directed by the District Magistrate, Delhi, not to remain in the Delhi District, and immediately to remove himself from the Delhi District and not to return to the District.\n\nThe order was.to continue in force for three months.\n\nBy another. order of the Madhya Bharat Government he was directed to reside in Nagpur.\n\nThat order has been recently cancelled.\n\nThe petitioner disputes the validity of the first order on the ground that the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, under which the order was made, is an infringement of his fundamental right given under article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Constitution of India.\n\nHe further contends that the grounds of the order served on him are vague, insufficient and incomplete.\n\nAccording to him the object of the externment order passed by the District Magistrate, Delhi, was to suppress political opposition to the policy of the Government in respect of Pakistan and the Muslim League.\n\nIt i; alleged that because the petitioner and the Hindu Mahasabha are against the Government policy of. appeasement this order is served on him.\n\nIt is therefore mala fide and illegal.\n\nIn support of his contention. about the invalidity of the East Punjab Public Safety Act and its provisions as regards externment, counsel for the petitioner relied on the recent unreported judgments of the Patna High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 29 of 1950, Brijnandan v. The State of Bihar, and of the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Application No. 114 of 1950, re /aisinghbhai Ishwarlal Modi.\n\nIt is necessary first to ascertain the true meaning of article 19 (1) (d) read with clause (5) of the same article There is no doubt that by the order of externment the right of the p.:titioner to freedom of movement throughout the territory of India is abridged.\n\nThe only question is whether the limits of µermissible\n\nlegislation under clause (5) arc exceeded.\n\nThat clause provides as follows :- \"19.\n\n(5) 'Nothing in suh clauses (d), ( e) and ( f) of the said clause .shall effect the opertion of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing,, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of . the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\" It is clear that the clause permits imposition of reasonable restriction.s on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-clause (d) in the interests of the general public.\n\nThe rest of the provision of clause. (5) is not materiil. and neither side relies on it.\n\nTwo interpretations of the clause are put before the Court.\n\nIt is argued that grammatii:ally understood the only question before the Court is whether the impugnep legislation imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right.\n\nTo put it in other words, the only justiciable issue to be decided by the Court is whether the restrictions imposed by the legislation on the exercise of the right arc reasor1able.\n\nIf those restriction.s on the exercise of the right are reasonable, the Court has not to consider whether the law imposing the restrictions is reasonable.\n\nThe other interpretation is that while the Constitution premits a law laying down reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights mentioned in sub-clause 19\n\n(1) (d),\n\n1 the reasonableness has to be of the law also.\n\nIt is submitted that in de.ciding whether the restrictions, on the exercise of the right are reasonable, the Court has to decide not onlv on the extent and nature of .the restrictions on the exercise of the right but also as to whether the conditions under which the right is restricted are reasonable.\n\nThe majority judgments of the Patna and the Bombay High Courts, although the impugned Acts of the State Legislatures before them were, materially different on certain important points, have given __ c; lause (5) of article 19 the latter mea!ling. -\n\n19.W\n\nDr. }(. B. Khan\n\n'1.· T Ill State of Dtlhi\n\nKa,, U. C.].\n\nDr. , Y. B. Khare\n\nThe State f Delhi\n\nKaniaC. J.\n\nIn my opm10n, clause (5) must be given its full meaning. The question which the Court has to consider is whether th<lol restrictions put by the impugned legislation on the exercise of the right are reasonable or not.\n\nThe question whether the provisions of the Act provide reasonable safeguards against the abuse of the power given to the executive authority to administer the law is not relevant for the interpretation of the clause.\n\nThe Court, on either interpretation. will be entitled to consider whether the - restrictions on the right to move throughout India, 1.e., both as regards the territory and the duration, are reasonable or not.\n\nThe law providing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by article 19 may contain substantive provisions as well as proedural provisions.\n\nWhile the reasonableness of the restrictions has to be considered with regard to the exercise of the right, it does not necessarily exclude from the consideration of the Court the question of reasonableness of the procedural part of the law.\n\nIt is obvious tl1at if the law prescribes five years externment or ten years externment, the question whether such period of extcrnment is reasomble, being the substantive part, is necessarily for the consideration of the court under clause (5).\n\nSimilarly, if the law provides the procedure under which the exercise of the right may b> restricted, the same is also for the consideration of the Court, as it has to determine if the exercise of the right has been reasonably restricted.\n\nI do not think by this interpretation the scope and ambit of the word \"reasonable\" as applied to restrictions on the exercise of the right, is in any way unjustifiably enlarged. It seems that the narrow construction sought to be put on the expression, to restrict the Court's power to consider only the substantive law on the point, is not correct.\n\nIn my opinion this ospect of tlie construction of article 19 (5) has escaped the minority judgment in the two matters mentioned above.\n\nI am. not concerned with the conclusions of the two Courts about the invalidity of the provisions of the Acts they were asked to consider.\n\nTo the extent they help in the interpretation of article 19 (5) only they are helpful.\n\nThe next question is whether the impugned Act contains reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rigbt given under article 19 (1) (d) or (e). Itwas argiied on behalf of the petitioner that under sec tion 4the power to make the order of extern .. ment was given to the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate, whose satisfaction was final.\n\nThat decision was not open to review by the Court.\n\nOn that ground it was contended that there was an un reasonable restriction on the exercise of the citizen's right.\n\nIn my opinion, this argument is unsound.\n\nThis is not legislative delegation.\n\nThe desirability of passing an individual order of externment against a citizen has to be left to an officer.\n\nIn the Act such a provision cannot be made. - The satisfaction of the officer Jhus does not impose an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the citizen's right.\n\nSo far as f4e Bombay Highl Court is concerned Chagla C. J. appears to have decided this point against the contention of the petitioner.· It was next urged that under section 4 (3) the order made by the District Magistrate shall not, unless the Proviricial Government by special order otherwise direct, remain in force for more than three months. It was argued that the period of three months itself was unreasonable as the externee had no remedy during that time. [ - It was contended that when the Provincial Governmefit directed the renewal of the order no limit of time was prescribed by. the legislature for the duration of the order.\n\nThe order therefore can be in operation for ari indefinite period.\n\nThis was argued to be an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a citizen's right.\n\nIn this connection it may be pointed out that in respect of preventive detention, which is a more severe restiction on the right of the citizen, the Constitution itself under article 22 (4) to (7) permits preventive detention for three months without any remedy.\n\nThe period of three months therefore prim a f acie does\n\nnot appear unreasonable.\n\nUnder the proviso to section 4 (5) the Provincial Government is not permitted to direct the exclusion or removal from the Province of a person ordinarily residing in the Province, and similarly\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe State of Dtilii\n\nKania C.J.\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe Stak of Dllhi\n\nKania C.].\n\nthe District Magistrate is not permitted to order the exclusion or removal of a person ordinarily resident in his district from that district.\n\nThis is a great safeguard provided under the East Punjab Public Safety Act.\n\nThe further extension of the exter1.1ment order beyond three months may be for an indefinite period, but in that connection the fact that the whole Act is to\n\nremain in force only up to the 14th August, 1951, cannot be overlooked.\n\nMoreover, . this whole argument is based on the assumption that the Provincial Government when making the order will not pe, form its duty and may abuse the provisions of the sect10n.\n\nIn my opinion, it is improper to start with such an assumption and decide the legality of an Act on that basis.\n\nAbuse of the power given by a law. sometimes occurs ; but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, this contention of .the petitioner cannot be accepted.\n\nIt \"was next argued that there is no provision in the Act for furnishing grounds of externment to the citizen.\n\nSection 4 (6) provides that when an externment order has been made its grounds may be communicated to the externee by the authority making the order and in any case when the order is to be enforced for more than three months he shall have a right of making a representation which shall be referred to the advisory tribunal constituted under section 3 ( 4).\n\nWhile the word \"may\" ordinarily conveys the idea of a discretion and not compulsion, reading it with the last part of the clause it seems that when an externment order has to be enforced for more than three months an absolute right is given to the externee to make a representation.\n\nHe cannot make a representation unless he has been furnished grounds for the order.\n\nIn no other part of the Act a right to obtain the grounds for the order in such a case is given to him.\n\nTherefore, that right has to be read as given under the first part of section 4 (6).\n\nThat can be done only by reading the word \"may\" for that purpose as having the meaning of \"shall\".\n\nIf the word \"may\" has to be so read for that purpose, it appears to be against the well-recognised canons of construction to\n\nread the same \"may\" as having a different meaning when the order is to be in force for less than three months.\n\nI do not think in putting the meaning of \"shall\" on \"may\" in the clause, I am unduly strainc ing . the language used in the clause. So read this argument must fail.\n\nIt was next argued that there is no provision in the Act showing what the advisory board has to do when it receives a representation. A reference to the advisory board necessarily implies a consideration of the case by s1,1ch board.\n\nThe absence of an express statement to that effect in the impugned act does not invalidate the Act.\n\nIt was finally contended on behalf of the petitioner that the grounds for the externment 011der supplied to him are vague, insufficient and incomplete.\n\nThe grounds are stated as follows :-\n\n\"Your activities generally and particularly . since the recent trouble in East and West Bengal have been of a communal nature tending to excite hatred between communities and whereas in the present composition of .the population of Delhi and the recent communal disturbances of Delhi feelings are roused be.tween the majority and minority communities your presence and activities in Delhi are likely to prove prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, it is considered necessary to order you to leave Delhi.\n\nThese grounds cannot be described as vague, insufficient or incomplete.\n\nIt is expressly stated that the activities of the petitioner, who is the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, since the recent disturbances between two communities in the East and West Bengal have particularly been of a communal riature which excites hatred between the communities.\n\nIt is\n\nrther stated that having regard to the recent disturbance in Delhi, the population of which is composed of both these communities, the excitement of such hatred . is likely to be dangerous to the peace and maintenance\n\nof law and order.\n\nApart from. being vague, I think that these grounds are specific and if honestly believed can support the order.\n\nThe argument that lhe order\n\nDr. Jt. B. Kht11t-\n\nK•aC.J.\n\nDr. N. B. n.,.,\n\nTh• SlaJt of DI/hi\n\nXatriaC.J.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nPatmfiali SGltri].\n\nMul<Mrjea].\n\nwas served to stifle oppostition to the Government policy of appeasement has little bearing because the District Magistrate of Delhi is not concerned with the policy of the Government of appeasement or otherwise.\n\nThe order is . made because the activities of the petitioner are likely to prove prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order and the grounds specified have a direct bearing on that conclusion of the District Magistrate. I therefore think that this contention of the petitioner must be rejected.\n\nThe result is that the petition fails and is dismissed.\n\nFAzL Au J.-I agree.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-I agree that this application must fail.\n\nAs I share the views expressed by my Lord in the judgment just delivered by him on the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned legislation whichever construction of article 19\n\n(5) of the Constitution is adopted, I consider it unnecessary to express any opinion on the true scope of the judicial review permitted under that article, and I hold myself free to deal with that point when it becomes necessary to do so.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-1 concur in the judgment which my brother Mukherjea is delivering and for the reasons given hy him I allow the petition and quash the order of externment.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution, praying for quashing of an externment order made by the District Magistrate of Delhi, against the petitioner Dr. N. B. Khare, on 31st March, 195p,. by which the latter was directed to remove himself immediately . from the Delhi District and not to return to that District so long as the order remained in force.\n\nThe order is for three months at present.\n\nComplaint was also made in the petition in respect of another and a subsequent order passed by the Government of Madhva Bharat which was served on the petitioner on his way to Nagpur and which\n\ndirected him to reside within the limits , of the Nagpur Muriicipality and not to leave that area without the permission of the District Magistrate of that place.\n\nThis order of the Government of Madhya Bharat, we are told, has since been withdrawn and we are not concerned with that order or the Act under which it was passed in the present proceeding.\n\nThe substantial contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the particular provision of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 194j, under which the District Magistrate of Delhi purported to make the externment order, became void and ceased to be operative after the new Constitution came into force, by reason of these provisions being inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Constitution read with clause (5) of the same article.\n\nThe argument is that any order passed under such void legislative provisions must necessarily be void and of no effect in law.\n\nIn order to appreciate the merits of this contention, it may be convenient to advert to the material provisions of the East Punjab Public Safety Act which are alleged to have become void as well as to the articles of the Constitution, upon which reliance has been placed by the learned, counsel for the petitioner.\n\nThe East Punjab Public Safety Act came into force on 29th March, 1949, and its object; as stated in the preamble, is to provide for special measures to ensure public safety and maintenance of public order.\n\nSection 4 ( 1) of the Act provides :\n\n\"The Provincial Government or the District Magistrate, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that . with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary so to do, may, by order in writing, give anyone or more of the following directions, namely that such person ......... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( c) shall remove himself from, and shall not return to, any area that may be specified in the order.\"\n\nDr. N. B. Khtm\n\nThi Slate of D_•lhi\n\nMukher:iea j\n\nDr: JV. B: lrhare\n\nT Stal• of Delhi\n\nSub-section (3) of the section lays down that\n\n\"An order under sub-section\n\n(1) made by the District Magistrate shall not, unless the Provincial Government by special order otherwise directs, remain in force for more than three months from the making thereof.\"\n\nThe contention of the petitioner is that the restrictive provisions mentioned above, under which a person could be removed from a particular area or prohibited from returning to it are inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Constitution under which all citizerts shall have the right \"to move freely throughout the territory of India.\" This right indeed is not absolute and the extent to which it could be curtailed by .legislation is laid down in clause (5) of article 19 which runs as follows:\n\n\"Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (£) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State frotn making any law imposing reasonable restictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Schedule•!\n\nTribe.\"\n\nThus the primary question which requires consideration is, whether the impugned legislation which apparently seems to be in conflict with the fundamental right enunciated in article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Constitution is pro.tected by clause (5) of the article, under which a law would be valid if it imposes reasonable restncttons on the exercise of the right . in the interests of the general public.\n\nIt is not disputed that the question of reasonableness is a justiciable matter which has to be determined by the Court.\n\nIf the Courts hold the restrictions imposed by the law to be reasonable, the petitioner would certainly have no remedy.\n\nIf, one the other hand, they are held to be unreasonable, article 13 (1) of the Constitution imposes a duty upon the Court to pronounce the law to be invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under J>art III of the Constitution.\n\nIt has been urged, though somewhat faintly, by the learned Attorney-General that the; right of free movement throughout the Indian territory as enunciated in article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution contemplates nothing else but absence of inter-State restrictions, which might prevent citizens of the Indian Union from moving from one State to another.\n\nA law which does not impose barriers of this kind, it is said, cannot be inconsistent with the fundamental right secured by this clause.\n\nSuch a restricted interpretation is, in my opinion, not at all warranted by the language of the sub-clause.\n\nWhat article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution guarantees is the free right of all citizens to go wherever they like in the Indian territocywithout any kind of restriction whatsoever.\n\nThey can move not merely from one State to another but from one place to another within the same State ind what the Constitution lays stress upon is that the entire Indian territory is one unit so far as the citizens arc concerned.\n\nClause (c) of section 4 (1) of the Eaet Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, authorises the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate to direct any person to remo\\'e himself from any area and prohibit him from entering the same.\n\nOn the face of it such provision represents an interference with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution.\n\nThe controversy, therefore, narrows down to this, whether the impugned legislation is saved by reason of its being within the permissible limits prescribed by clause (5) of article 19 ..\n\nWith regard to clause (5), the learned Attorney- General points out at the outset that the word \"reasonable\" occurring in the clause qualifies \"restrictions\" and not \"law\". It is argued that in applying the clause,. all that we haye to see is whether 'the restrictions that are imposed upon the exercise of the right by law are reasonable or not and we have not to enquire into the reason; ibleness or otherwise of the law itself.\n\nThe reasonableness of the restrictions can be judged, according to the learned Attorney-General from the nature of the restrictions themselves and not from the manner in which or the authorities by which they are\n\n2-5 S.C. Indiil (N.D.)(~\n\n195ct\n\nDr. J'{. JJ. KIJMr\n\nT& Siau of Delhi\n\nMherjea].\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nTiu State of Delhi\n\nMuti...jea J.\n\nimposed.\n\nThe question whether the operation of the law produces hardship in individual cases is also a matter which is quite irrelevant to our enquiry.\n\nI do agree that in clause (5) the adjective 'reasonable' is predicated of the restrictions that are imposed by law and not of the law itself ; but that does not mean that in deciding the reasonableness or otherwise of the restrictions, we have to confine ourselves to an examination of t'he restrictions in the abstract with reference merely to their duration or territorial extent, and that it is beyond our province to look up to the circumstances under which or the manner in whicl\\ the n; strictions have been imposed.\n\nIt is not possible to formulate an effective test which would enable us to pronounce any particular restriction to be reasonable or unreasonable per se.\n\nAll the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration and one cannot dissociate the actual contents of the restnct1ons from the manner of their imposition or the mode of 1ft1tting them into practice. The question of reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by. a law may arise as much from the substantive part of the law as from its procedural portion.\n\nThus, although I agree with the learned Attorney-General that the word \"reasonable\" in clause (5) of article 19 goes with \"restrictions\" and not with \"law\", I cannot accept his suggestion as regards the proper way of determining the reasonableness of the restrictions which a legislation might impose upon the exercise of the right of free movement.\n\nComing now to the provisions of the impugned Act, Mr. Banerjee's main contention is that section 4\n\n(1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, which provides for passing of orders removing a person from a particular area, on the satisfaction of the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate, cannot be a reasonable piece of legislation inasmuch as the only pre-requisite for imposition of the restrictions is the personal satisfaction of certain individuals or authorities, the propriety or reasonableness of which cannot be tested by the application of any external rule or standard.\n\nIt is said that any law which places the liberty\n\nof a subject at the mercy of an executive officer, however high placed he might be and whose action 'Cannot\n\nbe reviewed by a judicial tribunal, is an arbitrary and not a reasonable exercise of legislative powers.\n\nThe contention requires careful examination.\n\nIt is not disputed that under clause (5) of article 19, the reasonableness of a challenged legislation has to be determined by a Court and the Court decides such matters by applying some objective standard which is said to be the standard of an average prudent man.\n\nJudged by such standard which is sometimes described as an external yard-stick, the vesting of authority in particular officers to take prompt action under emergent circumstances, entirely on their own responsibility or personal satisfaction, is not necessarily unreasonable.\n\nOne has to take into account the whole scheme of the legislation and the circumstances under which the restrictive orders could be made.\n\nThe object of the East Punjab Public Safety Act is to provide for special measures to ensure public safety . and maintenance of public order. Under section 4 (1) (c) of the Act, the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate may make an order directing the removal of a certain person from a particular area, if they are satisfied that such order is necessary to prevent such person from acting in any way prejudicial to public safety . or maintenance of public order.\n\nPreventive orders by their very nature cannot be made after any judicial enquiry or trial. If emergent steps have got to be taken to prevent apprehended acts which are likely to jeopardise the interests or safety of the public, somebody must be given the power of taking the initial steps ori his own responsibility ; and no reasonable objection could be taken if the authority, whp is given the power; is also entrusted with the responsibility of iµaintaining order and public-. peace in any particular district or province.\n\nThe preventive provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are based on similar principle.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, the provision of section 4 ( 1)\n\n(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act cannot be pronounced . to be um:easonable, simply because the order could be passed by the Provincial Government\n\nDr. N. B. Khan\n\nThe Stau of Delhi\n\nl'rfukknjeaJ.\n\nDr. N. B. Khar•\n\nTiu Stall of Delhi\n\nor the District Magistrate on their own personal satisfaction and not on materials which satisfy certain objective tests.\n\nBut though certain authorities can be invested with powers to make the initial orders on their own satisfaction in cases of this description, the position would certainly be different if the order thus made is allowed to continue for any indefinite period of time without giving the aggrieved person an opportunity to say what he has got to say against the order.\n\nI have already set out the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 4 which deals with duration of the orders made under the various clauses of sub-section (1).\n\nIt will be seen from this sub-section that there is absolutely no limit as to the period of time during which an externment order would remain in force if the 9rder is made by the Provincial Government.\n\nThe Provincial Government has been given unlimited authority in this respect and they can keep the order in force as long as they chose to do so.\n\nAs regards orders made by a District Magistrate, the period indeed has been fixed at three months; but Cllen here the Provincial Government is competent to extend it to any length of time by means of a special order.\n\nThe law does not fix an¥ maximum period beyond which the order cannot continue ; and the fact that the Act itself would expire in August, 1951, is, in my op1ruon, not a relevant matter for consideration in this connection at all.\n\nI have no hesi(lltion in holding that the provision of sub-section (3) of section 4 is manifestly unreasonable and cannot be supportc:d on . any just ground.\n\nOne could understand that . the exigencies of circumstances might justify. the vesting of plenary powers on certain authorities which could pass -0rders on their own personal satisfaction temporarily and for a short period of time; but if these orders are to continue indefinitely, it is only fair that an opportunity should be given to the person against whom such order is made to say what he has to say in answer to the allegations made against him.\n\nThere may riot be an investigation by a regular Court but it is necessary that the aggrieved person should be given a fair hearing and that by an\n\nimpartial tribunal.\n\nThe provision of the impugned Act which has bearing on this point is contained\" in sub-sectioh (6) of section 4 and it runs as follows :\n\n\"When an order has been made in respect of any person under any of the clauses under section 4, sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) the grounds of it may be communicated to him by the authority making the order and in any case, when the order is to be in force for more than three months, he shall have a right of making a representation which shall be referred to the Advisory Tribunal, constituted under section 3, sub-section ( 4) ,\"\n\nIt will be noted that the first part of the subsection makes it entirely optional with the authorities to communicate the grounds, upon which the order is made, to the person affected by it.\n\nThe grounds need not be communicated at all if the authorities so desire.\n\nAs regards the right of representation the latter part of the sub-section seems to imply that when the order is to remain in force for more than three months, the right of representation should be given to the aggrieved person and the representation shall be referred for consideration to the advisory tribunal constituted under section 3, sub-section ( 4), of the Act.\n\nThe right, however, is purely illusory as would appear from the fact that even in cases where the order is to be operative for more than three . months, there is no obligation on the part of the authorities o communicate to _ the person the grounds upon which the order was made.\n\nThe aggrieved person consequently may not at all be apprised of the allegations made against him and it will be impossible for him to make any adequate or proper representation, if he is not told on what grounds the order was passed. In my opinion, this is an equally unreasonable provision and neither sub-section (3) nor sub-section (6) of. section 4 of the Act can be said to have imposed restrictions which are reasoriable in the interests of the general public.\n\nMy conclusion, therefore, is that under article 13 ( 1) of the Indian. Constitution, these provisions of the Act became void and inoperative after the Constitution came into\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\n.v.\n\nThe State of Delhi\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nDr.N.B. Khare v.\n\nThe Stale of Delhi\n\nMukhnjea].\n\nforce, and consequently the order made by the District Magistrate in the present case cannot stand.\n\nI would, therefore, allow the application and quash the externment order that has been passed against the petitioner.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Gan pat Rai.\n\nAgent for the opposite party: P. A. Mehta.\n\nCHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY\n\nAND\n\nSUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS\n\nti.\n\nMAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS\n\nLTD.\n\n[SHR1 HARILAL KANg C. J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN\n\nand MUKHERJEA J J.)\n\nIndian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 57, 59 (2)-Reference lo High Court-Nature of power .to refer-Duty to refer on reque.11\n\nof party affected-Order directing Chief Controlling Authority to refer-Whether \"matter concerning revenues\"-furisdiction of Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935, s. 266(1).\n\nThe power conferred on the Chief Revenue Authority by Sec. 57 of the Indian Stamp Act, to make a reference to the High Court is not intended for the benefit of the Revenue Authority alone, but ensures, also for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment. It is threforc coupled with a duty to make a reference when he is called upon to do so by the party affected, and if he declines to do so, it is within the power of the Court to direct him to discharge that ducy and make a reference to the Court.\n\nAlcock Ashdown & Co., Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority (SO I.A. 227) and /ulius v. Bishop of Orford (5 A.C. 214) applied.", "total_entities": 147, "entities": [{"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bharat Bank Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bharat Bank Ltd\n\nEmployeu •f Bharat Bllllk\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 entirely agree with the PAiar!iali Sa11ri, judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J. and I have oothing to add."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 512, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "judgment just now delivered by Mukherjea J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 558, "end_char": 601, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai for Tanubhai C. Desai.", "canonical_name": "Gan pat Rai"}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 737, "end_char": 749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "N. B. KHARE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 811, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 818, "end_char": 836, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 858, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 920, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 968, "end_char": 974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. B.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1502, "end_char": 1507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. B. Khart v.\n\nT ht St alt of Delhi\n\nSection 4, sub-s. (I) (c), of the East Punjab Public Safety Act of 1949 which was passed on the 29th March, 1949, and was to be in force until the 14th August, 1951, provided that ''The Provincial Government or the District Mag.lstratC. if satisfied \\Vith respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing hirn from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary to do so, 1nay, by order in writing, give a direction that such person shall rcn1ove himself fron1, and shall not return to, any area that 1nay oe specified in the order.\"", "canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1540, "end_char": 1549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act", "statute": "Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act"}}, {"text": "29th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. B. Khart v.\n\nT ht St alt of Delhi\n\nSection 4, sub-s. (I) (c), of the East Punjab Public Safety Act of 1949 which was passed on the 29th March, 1949, and was to be in force until the 14th August, 1951, provided that ''The Provincial Government or the District Mag.lstratC. if satisfied \\Vith respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing hirn from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary to do so, 1nay, by order in writing, give a direction that such person shall rcn1ove himself fron1, and shall not return to, any area that 1nay oe specified in the order.\""}}, {"text": "14th August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1687, "end_char": 1704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. B. Khart v.\n\nT ht St alt of Delhi\n\nSection 4, sub-s. (I) (c), of the East Punjab Public Safety Act of 1949 which was passed on the 29th March, 1949, and was to be in force until the 14th August, 1951, provided that ''The Provincial Government or the District Mag.lstratC. if satisfied \\Vith respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing hirn from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary to do so, 1nay, by order in writing, give a direction that such person shall rcn1ove himself fron1, and shall not return to, any area that 1nay oe specified in the order.\""}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2166, "end_char": 2170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act", "statute": "Whether reasonable-Construction and Validity of Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2821, "end_char": 2825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2885, "end_char": 2889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2948, "end_char": 2955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3200, "end_char": 3205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution for a writ of cntiorari contending that the order was illegal inasmuch as the provisions of t_he above mentioned Act under wliich the order was made infringed the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India which was guaranteed by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3342, "end_char": 3347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 (I) of the Constitution : Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL ALI and PATANJALI SAsTRI, JJ-\n\n(MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "KANIYA C."}}, {"text": "FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3355, "end_char": 3363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 (I) of the Constitution : Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL ALI and PATANJALI SAsTRI, JJ-\n\n(MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 (I) of the Constitution : Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL ALI and PATANJALI SAsTRI, JJ-\n\n(MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI J."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3392, "end_char": 3399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 (I) of the Constitution : Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL ALI and PATANJALI SAsTRI, JJ-\n\n(MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA, JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3519, "end_char": 3523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4523, "end_char": 4530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MlliAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4601, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MuKHERJEA J. (MlliAJAN J. concurring)-Though cercain authorities can be invested with power to make\n\ninitial orders on their own satisfaction in cases of this descrip- 1950 tion, and s. 4 ( 1) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act cannot be pronounced."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4770, "end_char": 4774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. B. Khm•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be unreasonable simply because an order Dr. N. B. Khm• could be passed by the Provincial Government or the District v.\n\nMagistrate on their own personal satisfaction and not on The State of Delh7 materials, which satisfy certain objective' tests, yet, the position would be different if the order thus made is allowed to continue for any indefinite period of time without giving the aggrieved person an opp<lrtunity to say what he has got to say against the order; and inasmuch as sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 4 prescribes no limit to the period of time during which an externment order would remain in force if it is made by the Provincial Government, and the Provincial Government is also given power to keep an order made by a District Magistrate in force for an indefinite period, the provisions of sub-s. (3) are manifestly unreasonable.", "canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5343, "end_char": 5347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5712, "end_char": 5716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5915, "end_char": 5919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6056, "end_char": 6063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6145, "end_char": 6152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIYA C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also, per KANIYA C. ].,", "canonical_name": "KANIYA C."}}, {"text": "F.1zL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6247, "end_char": 6256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.1zL ALI,\n\nMAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA ]].-Whether the restrictions imposed by legislative enactment upon the fundamental right guaranteed by Art."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6271, "end_char": 6280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.1zL ALI,\n\nMAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA ]].-Whether the restrictions imposed by legislative enactment upon the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6384, "end_char": 6391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6981, "end_char": 6997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTR1 J. did not express any opinion on this point.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI J."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7108, "end_char": 7118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Banerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7193, "end_char": 7203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Banerji for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7278, "end_char": 7292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Gyan Chand, with him) for the opposite party."}}, {"text": "Gyan Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nM. C. 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The State of Bihar, and of the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Application No."}}, {"text": "/aisinghbhai Ishwarlal Modi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9298, "end_char": 9325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114 of 1950, re /aisinghbhai Ishwarlal Modi."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9383, "end_char": 9393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11124, "end_char": 11133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna and the", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11528, "end_char": 11541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgments of the Patna and the Bombay High Courts, although the impugned Acts of the State Legislatures before them were, materially different on certain important points, have given  c; lause (5) of article 19 the latter mea!ling. -"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11542, "end_char": 11560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgments of the Patna and the Bombay High Courts, although the impugned Acts of the State Legislatures before them were, materially different on certain important points, have given  c; lause (5) of article 19 the latter mea!ling. -"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11713, "end_char": 11723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11762, "end_char": 11769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Khan\n\n'1.·"}}, {"text": "Y. B. Khare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. , Y. B. Khare\n\nThe State f Delhi\n\nKaniaC. J.\n\nIn my opm10n, clause (5) must be given its full meaning.", "canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12592, "end_char": 12602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14077, "end_char": 14087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14236, "end_char": 14246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15043, "end_char": 15049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as f4e Bombay Highl Court is concerned Chagla C. J. appears to have decided this point against the contention of the petitioner.·"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15163, "end_char": 15172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15969, "end_char": 15979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16162, "end_char": 16171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. B. Khare", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16340, "end_char": 16351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the proviso to section 4 (5) the Provincial Government is not permitted to direct the exclusion or removal from the Province of a person ordinarily residing in the Province, and similarly\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe State of Dtilii\n\nKania C.J.\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe Stak of Dllhi\n\nKania C.].", "canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE"}}, {"text": "State of Dtilii", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16357, "end_char": 16372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the proviso to section 4 (5) the Provincial Government is not permitted to direct the exclusion or removal from the Province of a person ordinarily residing in the Province, and similarly\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe State of Dtilii\n\nKania C.J.\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe Stak of Dllhi\n\nKania C.]."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16374, "end_char": 16379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the proviso to section 4 (5) the Provincial Government is not permitted to direct the exclusion or removal from the Province of a person ordinarily residing in the Province, and similarly\n\nDr. N. B. Khare\n\nThe State of Dtilii\n\nKania C.J.\n\nDr. N. B. 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Indiil", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29263, "end_char": 29274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasonableness of the restrictions can be judged, according to the learned Attorney-General from the nature of the restrictions themselves and not from the manner in which or the authorities by which they are\n\n2-5 S.C. 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B. Khan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33844, "end_char": 33854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be um:easonable, simply because the order could be passed by the Provincial Government\n\nDr. N. B. Khan\n\nThe Stau of Delhi\n\nl'rfukknjeaJ.\n\nDr. N. B. Khar•\n\nTiu Stall of Delhi\n\nor the District Magistrate on their own personal satisfaction and not on materials which satisfy certain objective tests.", "canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE"}}, {"text": "N. B. Khar•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33894, "end_char": 33905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be um:easonable, simply because the order could be passed by the Provincial Government\n\nDr. N. B. Khan\n\nThe Stau of Delhi\n\nl'rfukknjeaJ.\n\nDr. N. B. Khar•\n\nTiu Stall of Delhi\n\nor the District Magistrate on their own personal satisfaction and not on materials which satisfy certain objective tests.", "canonical_name": "N. B. KHARE"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34475, "end_char": 34484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35451, "end_char": 35460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36260, "end_char": 36269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36381, "end_char": 36390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36702, "end_char": 36711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37330, "end_char": 37339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37996, "end_char": 38005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38161, "end_char": 38171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38322, "end_char": 38336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Delhi\n\nMukherjea ]."}}, {"text": "Gan pat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38669, "end_char": 38680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Gan pat Rai.", "canonical_name": "Gan pat Rai"}}, {"text": "CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38727, "end_char": 38762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY\n\nAND\n\nSUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS\n\nti."}}, {"text": "MAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38800, "end_char": 38823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS\n\nLTD."}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38837, "end_char": 38849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHR1 HARILAL KANg C. J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN\n\nand MUKHERJEA J J.)\n\nIndian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss."}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38857, "end_char": 38871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHR1 HARILAL KANg C. J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN\n\nand MUKHERJEA J J.)\n\nIndian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38916, "end_char": 38925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHR1 HARILAL KANg C. J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN\n\nand MUKHERJEA J J.)\n\nIndian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38933, "end_char": 38949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 57, 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38964, "end_char": 38974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Stamp Act", "statute": "Indian Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39180, "end_char": 39237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 266(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39239, "end_char": 39248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sec. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39305, "end_char": 39312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39320, "end_char": 39336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_536_547_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "Dr.N.B. Khare v.\n\nThe Stale of Delhi\n\nMukhnjea].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19501\n\nforce, and consequently the order made by the District Magistrate in the present case cannot stand.\n\nI would, therefore, allow the application and quash the externment order that has been passed against the petitioner.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Gan pat Rai.\n\nAgent for the opposite party: P. A. Mehta.\n\nCHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY\n\nAND\n\nSUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS\n\nti.\n\nMAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS\n\nLTD.\n\n[SHR1 HARILAL KANg C. J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN\n\nand MUKHERJEA J J.)\n\nIndian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 57, 59 (2)-Reference lo High Court-Nature of power .to refer-Duty to refer on reque.11\n\nof party affected-Order directing Chief Controlling Authority to refer-Whether \"matter concerning revenues\"-furisdiction of Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935, s. 266(1).\n\nThe power conferred on the Chief Revenue Authority by Sec. 57 of the Indian Stamp Act, to make a reference to the High Court is not intended for the benefit of the Revenue Authority alone, but ensures, also for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment. It is threforc coupled with a duty to make a reference when he is called upon to do so by the party affected, and if he declines to do so, it is within the power of the Court to direct him to discharge that ducy and make a reference to the Court.\n\nAlcock Ashdown & Co., Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority (SO I.A. 227) and /ulius v. Bishop of Orford (5 A.C. 214) applied.\n\nThe order of a High Court to a revenue officer to do his duty would not be the exercise of original jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue within the meaning of Sec. 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to direct the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to make a reference under Sec. 57 of the Stamp Act was not barred by Sec. 226 of the Government of India Act.\n\nThe fact that the proceedings had passed beyond the stage -:if enforcing payment does not preyent the High Court from directing the Revenue Authority to make a reference, for, if the opinion of the Court on the reference is against the Revenue Autho- . rity he will have to refund whatever has been recovered in excess, under Sec. 59 (2) of the Act.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay : Civil Appeal No. XII of 1950.\n\nThis was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Chagla, Acting C. J. and Bhagwati J.) dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No. 60 of 1946.\n\nThe facts are fully set out in the judgment.\n\nK. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay (M. M. Desai, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S.S.\n\nRagnekar, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950.\n\nMay 27.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by . ·\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is an appe-al from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to direct the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the Superintendent of Stamps at Bombay to state a case for the opinion of the Court under section 57 of the Stamp Act.\n\nThe respondent company, for its business, borrowed money from the Central Bank of India Ltd. at Bombay.\n\nIn order to secure the loan a document was executed on the 22nd of March, 1945, with a stamp of Rs. 16-8-0, on the footing that it was a deed of hypothecation without possession of the goods.\n\nWhen the deed was sent to the Sub-Registrar for registration he impounded the same and sent it to the Stamp Office.\n\nThe Assistant Superintendent of Stamps\n\nChief Conli'ollina\n\nRev. Authority\n\nMaharashlTa Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nCliiAJ ConJrol/ing\n\nRev. Aflthori!J\n\nVo Maharashlr• Gug\"r Mills-W.\n\nEam•C.J.\n\nwrote to the respondent that the document was a mortgage with possession, chargeable with duty under article 40 (a) of the Schedule and inquired why it was not duly stamped before execution.\n\nThe respondent's solicitors in their reply contended that the document was not, and was never intended by the parties to be, a mortgage with possession.\n\nThey pointed out that no possession of the property had been given or was intended to 'be given, except in certain contingencies and therefore the document was properly stamped.\n\nIn reply the Assistant Superintendent intimated that the document was chargeable with duty of Rs. 56,250 and a penalty of Rs. 5,000\n\nhad been imposed.\n\nThe respondents were asked to pay the amount forthwith.\n\nOn the 27th July, 1945, the respondent filed a suit against the Central Bank contending that the document was not a mortgage with possession.\n\nIt was alleged that since a doubt had arisen as to whether the document gave effect to the common intention of the parties the Court's directions were sought for and if the Court found that the document as framed did not give effect to the said common intention of the parties the instrument may be rectified.\n\nOn 9th August, 1945, the respondent's solicitors informed the Assistant Superintendent that such a suit had been filed and requested that the demand for payment of stamp duty and penalty may not be pressed under the circumstances.\n\nIn the further correspondence, on behalf of the appellant, the demand was reiterated and resort to the coercive procedure of section 48 of the Stamp Act was threatened.\n\nThe Collector thereafter sent a letter to the respondents on the 17th January, 1946, demanding payment. On the 25th of January, 1946. the suit filed by the respondent was disposed of by the Court and the rectification as prayed was ord. ered.\n\nThe respondent's solicitors immediately intimated the result of the suit to the Assistant Superintendent and sent a copy of the deed showing the rectifications made in the original document.\n\nA similar letter was also sent to the Collector of Bombay.\n\nOn the Jst February, 1946, the respondent's solicitors enquired of\n\nthe Assistant Superintendent of Stamps whether he was agreeable to make a reference under section 56 (2) to the appellant, as the question of liability to pay the stamp duty and penalty involved important questions of law.\n\nA petition on behalf of the respondent to the appellant was also filed on the 5th of February in which it was prayed that either the order of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps be rescinded or in the alternative a case may be referred under section 57 of the Stamp' Act for the opinion of the High Court.\n\nThis petition was rejected on the 4th July, 1946.\n\nThe respondent thereupon filed a petition in the High Court on the 19th of July, i94b, praying that a writ of certiorari way be issued against the appellant, or an order may be made against him under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, to cancel the levy of the stamp duty and penalty as claimed on behalf of the appellant or in the alternative the appellant may be ordered under section 57 of the Stamp Act to refer the matter to the High Court for its opinion.\n\nThe matter came for hearing before Mr. Justice Blagden who did not grant the first relief but directed the appellant to state a case under section 57 of the Stamp Act to the Court for its opinion.\n\nThe appellant filed an appeal but failed. He has now co.me . in appeal to this Court.\n\nTwo points have been urged on behalf of the appellant.\n\nThe first is whether under section 57 of the Stamp Act there is an obligation on the appellant to state a case, and if not whether the High Court had jurisdiction to give a direction to that effect. The second point is whether having regard to the terms of section 226 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, ' the High Court had jurisdiction to order the appellant to state the case, it being a matter relating to the revenue.\n\nUnder this head it is also argued that the matter had proceeded beyond the stage of assessment and had reached the stage of recovery.\n\nTherefore, the High Court of Bombay had no jurisdiction to pass the order it did.\n\nThe material part of section 57 of the Stamp Act runs as follows :\n\n\"57. (1) The Chief Controlling Revenue-authority\n\nChief Conlrolling\n\nRev. Authoriv\n\nMaharasMra Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nC/JUf ConJrolliog\n\na ••. AuJiiorit7\n\nY, Maharashtra Sugar Mills Lid.\n\nKaiaC.J.\n\nmay state any case referred to it under section 56. sub-section (2), or otherwise coming to its notice, and refer such case, with its own opinion thereon-\n\n* * * •\n\n(b) if it arises in the Province of Bombay, to the High Court at Bombay; ...... \"\n\nSection 226 (l) of the Government of India Ac~, 1935, runs as follows :-\n\n\"226. (l) Until otherwise provided by Act of the appropriate -legislature, no High Court shall have any original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue, or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appeilant it is contended that the very words of section 57 of the Stamp Act show that it is a power given to the appellant to _state a case and it is not an obligation.\n\nThe section is framed and worded only to give the benefit thereof to the appellant and it is not for the benefit of any other party.\n\nThe word \"may\" used in the section was deliberately used for that purpose.\n\nIt was pointed out that under section 56 (2) of the Stamp Act if the Collector felt doubt as to the amount of duty with which the instrument was chargeable \"he may draw up a statement of the case and refer it with his opinion for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority\". Similarly under section 60 if any Court felt doubt as to the amount of .!uty to be paid it was given power to draw up a statement of case for the opinion of_ the High Court.\n\nIt was argued that both these sections gave only power to the Collector and the Court to make a reference for their own benefit.\n\nSection 57, it was argued, was on the same lines for the benefit of the appellant.\n\nIn none of these, any other party had any right to insist on a reference.\n\nIt was pointec\\ out that under the Stamp Act a Collector could certify that the document was properly stamped, although it was not sufficiently stamped oh a true construction, and when such a certificate was given the Controlling Authority could do nothing.\n\nHe had not even the\n\npower to refer that case to the Court to levy a higher stamp duty.\n\nFor these reasons, it was contended that the scheme of the Stamp Act was materially different from the scheme of the Income Tax Act.\n\nIn our opinion the appellant's contentions are unsound.\n\nThe first contention that section 57 of the Stamp Act gives only a discretion and does not cast a duty on the appellant to make a reference overlooks the fact that the appellant has not to make a reference only when he is in doubt about his decision or conclusion.\n\nIn his conclusion the party liable to pay the assessed stamp duty is materially interested.\n\nThe appellant's decision is not necessarily based only on the reading of the entries in the Schedule to the Stamp Act.\n\nAs in the present case, the question under what item stamp duty is levia:ble may depend on tfie true construction of a document.\n\nIt may also involve the decision of the question, as in the present case, as to what is the effect of the .Court's order directing a rectification of the instrument.\n\nIt does not appear, on principle, sound to hold that these difficult questions should be left under the Stamp Act to the final decision of the appellant, and if the party affected by the assessment has a grievance there is no relief at all in law for him.\n\nThe construction of a document is not always an easy matter and on the ground that it is a substantial question of law, parties have been permitted to take the matter up to the highest Court.\n\nIf so, it appears difficult to start with the assumption that because this is a Revenue Act the decision of the appellant should be considered final and conclusive.\n\nThe provisions of section 56 (2) afid section 60 giving power to the Collector and the Court to send a state- . ment of case to the appellant and the High Court respectively, in our opinion, instead of helping the appellant, go against his contention.\n\nIn those two sections this power is given when the referring authority has a doubt to solve for himself.\n\nThe absence of the words \"feels doubt as to the amount of d.uty to be paid\n\nn respect of an instrument\" . in section 57 supports the , view that the reference contemplated under that section is not for the benefit of the appellant only but , enures\n\nChief Controlling\n\nRev. Authority\n\nMaharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nCloiefConfrollillg\n\n.Rto. Authoritf\n\nv. .Maharashlra Sugar Mills Lid.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nalso for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment.\n\nIn our opinion, the power contained in section 57 is in the rtature of an obligation or is coupled with an obligation and undor the circumstances can be demanded to be used' also by the parties affected by the assessment of the stamp duty.\n\nOur attention has been drawn in this connection to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Alcock, Ashdown & Co. Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bobmay ( 1 ). In that case a question arose about an .assessee's right to ask the Commissioner of Income Tax to state a case for the opinion of the Court under section 51 of the Indian Income Ta.J, C Act, 1918.\n\nThe material part of that section was in these terms :-\n\n\"51. (1) If, in the course of any assessment under this Act or any proceeding in connection therewith other than]. proceeding uilder Chapter VII, a question has arisen with reference to the interpretation of any of the ptovisions of this Act or of any rule thereunder, the Chief Revenue Authority may, either on its own motion or on reference from any Revenue officer subprdinate\"to it, draw up a statement of the case, and refer it, with its own opinion thereon, to the High Court, . and shall so refer any such question on the l)pplication of the assessce, unless it is satisfied that the application is frinolous or . that a reference is unnecessary.\n\n(3) The High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall decide the questions raised thereby, and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded, and shall send to the Revenue authority by which the case was stated a copy of such judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar, and the Revenue-authority shall dispose of the case accordingly, or, if the case arose on reference from any Revenue-0flicer subordinate to it, _ shall forward a copy of such judgment to such officer who shall dispose of the case conformably to such judgment\".\n\nIn that case, . after the a§CSSlllent was made and\n\n(') 50 I.A,227.\n\nthe proceedings went to the Commissioner of Income Tax, the assessee requested that a case may be stated for the opinion of the Court under the aforesaid section, but the Commissioner refused to do so.\n\nThereupon, a Rule was obtained from the High Court calling upon the hief Revenue Authority; Bombay, to show cause why a case should not be so stated.\n\nIt was argued. before the High Court that . the Court had no jurisdiction to order the Commissioner to state a case for its opm1on.\n\nWhen the matter reached the Privy Council the objection to the jurisdiction was p, ut more broadly.\n\nBefore the High Court the only question raised was whether the Authority had a duty, in the ircum stances, to state a case.\n\nThe point raised before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council took the form of saying that even if the Authority had a duty, the Court could not require him to exercise it ; and for this purpose reliance was placed upon the well-known general purview of the Indian Legislation which excludes matter of revenue from the consideration of the ordinary civil Courts,. the principle being exemplified in the case of Spooner v. /t1ddotli (1) and upon section 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915. The judgment of the Board consisting of Viscount Haldane, Lord Phillimore and Lord Carson was delivered by Lord Phillimore.\n\nIn the judgment it is stated as follows :-\"It is Sjlid that, though under this section, the Chief Revenue Authority may, if he thinks fit, draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court he is not bound to do so even on the appli- 1.:atlon of the person to be assessed, if he is satisfied that the application is frivolous or that the reference is unnecessary and that the Authority has in the present case shown that he is satisfied that the application was frivolous and the reference was unnecessary.\".\n\nThis argument was rejected by the High Court.\n\nTheir Lordships of the Privy Council agreed with the view of the High Court that this was too narrow a construction of the section.\n\nThey observed : \"Take first the case which is last in the -clause. If the assessee applies for a case the Authority must state it unless he can\n\n(1} (1850) 4 Moo. I.A. 353.\n\nChief Controllin8\n\nRtv. Authority\n\nM ahara.rhlra Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nKaniaC.]-\n\nChUf Controlling\n\nRe~. Authori!1\n\nMah11Tashlra .Sugar Mills Lid.\n\nEania C. ].\n\nsay that it is frivolous or unnecessary.\n\nHe 1s not .to wait for the court to order him to do it ; it will be a misfeasance and a breach of the statutory duty if he does not do it.\" The judgment did not end by relying only on that portion of section 51 (!) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1918.\n\nIt proceeds to state as follows :-\"Put that case aside.\n\nThe rule here is supported upon the earlier part of the section.\n\nNo doubt that part does not say that he shall state a case, it only says that he may.\n\nAnd as the learned counsel for the respondent rightly urged, may does not mean 'shall'.\n\nNeither are the words 'it shall be lawful' those of compulsion.\n\nOnly the capacity or power is given to the Authority.\n\nBut when a capacity or power is given to a public authority there may be circumstances which couple with the power a duty to exercise it.\n\nTo use the language of Lord Cairns in the case of /ulius v. Bishop of Oxford ( 1 ): 'There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so.' In their Lordships' view, always supposing. that there is a serious point of law to be considered, there does lie a ducy upon the Chief Revenue Authority to state a case for the opinion of the Court, and if he does not apyreciate that there is such a serious point, it is in the power of the Court to control him and to order him to state a case.\"\n\nThis reasoning and conclusions, although they have not now the compelling force they had before the 26th of January, 1950, are entitled to great respect.\n\nApart from that, we entirely agree with that line of reasoning and the conclusion.\n\nIn our opinion, in the present case the power to make a reference under section 57 is not only for the benefit of the appellant.\n\n(') 5 A.C. '214, 222.\n\nIt is coupled with a duty cast on him, as a public -0flicer to do the right thing and when an important and\n\nintricate question of law in respect of the construction of a document arises, as a public servant it is his duty to make the reference.\n\nIf he omits to do so it is w, ithin the power of the Court to direct him to discharge that duty and make .a reference to the Court.\n\nMr. Daphtary on behalf of the appellant tried to distinguish ' this case on the ground that the scheme -of the Income Tax Act was different from the scheme\n\n-Of the Stamp Act.\n\nIn our opinion, . the observations quoted above and the principles underlying the same are applicable to the duty cast on the am>ellant under section 57 of the Stamp Act and minor points of distinction between the schemes of the two Acts are immaterial for the present discussion.\n\nIn t;.he words of Lord Cairns the very nature. of the thing empowered to be. done by t; he appellant and the conditions under which he has to fix the amount of the duty, couple the power with the duty to state a case for the opinion of the Court.\n\nThe provisions of section 51 (1) and (3) run on the same lines as section 59 of the Stamp Act.\n\nMr.\n\nDaphtary next pointed out that there was a difference in the scheme of the Act, because when the Collector issued a certificate under section 32, even though his assessment might be faulty and against the interest of the State, the State or the appellant had no remedy.\n\nThis overlooks the provisions of the . section empowering the Collector to issue the certificate.\n\nThe scheme of the Stamp Act may be briefly noticed. Chapter II • contains provisions about the liability of instruments 'tq duty, of the time of stamping instruments, of valuations for duty and provisions as to the person by whom duty is payable.\n\nChapter III which contains only two .. sections deals with the adjudication as to stamps.\n\nThe first (section 31) is where an instrument, whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not, is brought to the Collector with an application to have his opinion as to the duty with which it is chargeable.\n\nFor obtaining that opinion the applicant has to pay a \"fee. , The Collector mav call for information and t.akc evidence. After he has done so he determines the\n\nChief Controlling\n\nRiv. Authoril.J\n\nv •.\n\nMaharashtra Sugar Mills Lid.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nChief CmitrDlling\n\n&f}. Authority\n\nv. ftlaharashlra S•gar MiJu Ltd.\n\nSUJ,>REME COURT REPORTS [19501\n\namount of the stamp duty and certifies under section 32 thar the full duty with which it is chargeable has been paid, It is obvious that the party applying is interested in obtaining the opinion and therefore he cannot object to the certificate of the Collector.\n\nIf the Collector himself is in doubt he has the power under section 56 (2) to ask for the opinion of the appellant.\n\nIt is therefore clear that in respect of these two provisions under Chapter III no grievance could exist on either side.\n\nFrom section 33 and Chapter IV onwards there are provisions in which the opinion of the Stamp Officer and of the party interested in paying the stamp duty may come in conflict.\n\nThe sections in Chapters IV, V and VI ending with section 61, deal with situations arising from such difference of opinion.\n\nSection 57 (!) falls under this .heading.\n\nIn our opinion, there fore, this contention of the aP, pellant fails.\n\nThe next point urged was whether tl'ie High Coun has jurisdiction to order the Revenue Authority to state a case in face of the provisions of section 226 of the Government of India Act,\n\n1935. The argument was urged in two parts : Firstly, that this being a revenue matter, the jurisdiction of the Court was excluded.\n\nSecondly, that the matter had ceased to be in the stage of assessment but had reached the stage of collection of stamp duty.\n\nOn that ground the present case was sought to be distinguished from A/cock's case ( ').\n\nIn our opinion this argument of the appellant must also fail.\n\nA similar argument based on the wording of the corresponding section 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, as mentioned above, was urged in Alcock'; case ( 1 ). On that point their Lordships observed i!S follows :-\"Upon the point thus broadly stated their Lordships have no difficulty in pronouncing a decision.\n\nTo argue that if the legislature says that a public officer. even a revenue officer, shall do a thing and he, without cause or justification, refused to do that thing, yet the Specific Relief Act would not be applicable and there would be no power in the Conn to compel him to give relief to the subject is to state a\n\n(') 50 I.A. 227.\n\nproposition to which their Lordships must refuse assent.\" In dealing with the argument that because of section 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915 the High Court had no jurisdiction to make the order, the Board observed as follows :-\"In their Lordships' view the order of a High Court to a revenue officer to do his statutory duty would not be the exercise of original . jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue.\" In our opi_n_ion, in the present case also the respondent seeks the Court's intervention to make the appellant perform his statutory duty to state a case.\n\nThat is not exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court in any matter concerning the revenue.\n\nIt is only asking the appellant to perform his statutory duty. The further argument that the proceedings in this case had passed beyond . the stage of assessment and had reached the stage of\n\n. enforcing payment is again irrelevant because by the -relief granted by the High Court no attempt is made\n\nto obstruct the Revenue Authority in the discharge of his duties.\n\nAt one stage an injunction was granted _ against the appellant but that has been cancelled.\n\nIn fact, this aspect of the discussion is only academic because if payment .is enforced and the opinion of the Court, on the statement of the case is against the appellant, he will have to act in conformity with that . opinion under section 59 (2) of the Stamp Act and refund whatever may be held to be recovered in excess.\n\nIn our opinion therefore the contentions of the: appellant fail and the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R. S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Tanuhhai C. Desai.\n\n3-5 S. C India (N.D.> 58\n\nChief Con1,,, l/ing\n\nRtv. Authorit.7\n\nMaharashtra Sugar Mills lJd.\n\nKaniaC.J.", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "Gan pat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Gan pat Rai."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the opposite party: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 440, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AND\n\nSUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS\n\nti.\n\nMAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS\n\nLTD.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 442, "end_char": 507, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS AND MAHARASHTRA SUGAR MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 552, "end_char": 568, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 570, "end_char": 588, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 594, "end_char": 605, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 57, 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Stamp Act", "statute": "Indian Stamp Act"}}, {"text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 266(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sec. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 983, "end_char": 990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 998, "end_char": 1014, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1733, "end_char": 1741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Original Side of High Court-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1895, "end_char": 1902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sec. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sec. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2467, "end_char": 2487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Chagla, Acting C. J. and Bhagwati J.) dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2489, "end_char": 2495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Chagla, Acting C. J. and Bhagwati J.) dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Chagla, Acting C. J. and Bhagwati J.) dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2533, "end_char": 2552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Chagla, Acting C. J. and Bhagwati J.) dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2627, "end_char": 2638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay (M. M. Desai, with him) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "K. Daphtary"}}, {"text": "M. M. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2668, "end_char": 2679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay (M. M. Desai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S.S.\n\nRagnekar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S.S.\n\nRagnekar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S.S.\n\nRagnekar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2866, "end_char": 2871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANIA C. J.-This is an appe-al from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to direct the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the Superintendent of Stamps at Bombay to state a case for the opinion of the Court under section 57 of the Stamp Act.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company, for its business, borrowed money from the Central Bank of India Ltd. at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3259, "end_char": 3265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company, for its business, borrowed money from the Central Bank of India Ltd. at Bombay."}}, {"text": "22nd of March, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to secure the loan a document was executed on the 22nd of March, 1945, with a stamp of Rs."}}, {"text": "Assistant Superintendent of Stamps\n\nChief Conli'ollina", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Superintendent of Stamps\n\nChief Conli'ollina\n\nRev. Authority\n\nMaharashlTa Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nCliiAJ ConJrol/ing\n\nRev. Aflthori!J\n\nVo Maharashlr• Gug\"r Mills-W.\n\nEam•C.J.\n\nwrote to the respondent that the document was a mortgage with possession, chargeable with duty under article 40 (a) of the Schedule and inquired why it was not duly stamped before execution."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Superintendent of Stamps\n\nChief Conli'ollina\n\nRev. Authority\n\nMaharashlTa Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nCliiAJ ConJrol/ing\n\nRev. Aflthori!J\n\nVo Maharashlr• Gug\"r Mills-W.\n\nEam•C.J.\n\nwrote to the respondent that the document was a mortgage with possession, chargeable with duty under article 40 (a) of the Schedule and inquired why it was not duly stamped before execution.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "article 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3875, "end_char": 3885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th July, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4515, "end_char": 4530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th July, 1945, the respondent filed a suit against the Central Bank contending that the document was not a mortgage with possession."}}, {"text": "Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4572, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th July, 1945, the respondent filed a suit against the Central Bank contending that the document was not a mortgage with possession."}}, {"text": "9th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th August, 1945, the respondent's solicitors informed the Assistant Superintendent that such a suit had been filed and requested that the demand for payment of stamp duty and penalty may not be pressed under the circumstances."}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector thereafter sent a letter to the respondents on the 17th January, 1946, demanding payment."}}, {"text": "25th of January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5475, "end_char": 5496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th of January, 1946."}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6018, "end_char": 6028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th of February", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6230, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition on behalf of the respondent to the appellant was also filed on the 5th of February in which it was prayed that either the order of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps be rescinded or in the alternative a case may be referred under section 57 of the Stamp' Act for the opinion of the High Court."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was rejected on the 4th July, 1946."}}, {"text": "19th of July, i94b", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent thereupon filed a petition in the High Court on the 19th of July, i94b, praying that a writ of certiorari way be issued against the appellant, or an order may be made against him under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, to cancel the levy of the stamp duty and penalty as claimed on behalf of the appellant or in the alternative the appellant may be ordered under section 57 of the Stamp Act to refer the matter to the High Court for its opinion."}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6713, "end_char": 6723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6750, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6896, "end_char": 6906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blagden", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter came for hearing before Mr. Justice Blagden who did not grant the first relief but directed the appellant to state a case under section 57 of the Stamp Act to the Court for its opinion."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7348, "end_char": 7358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7578, "end_char": 7589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7601, "end_char": 7630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7991, "end_char": 8001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8282, "end_char": 8292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8490, "end_char": 8501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Ac~, 1935", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8513, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sub-section (2), or otherwise coming to its notice, and refer such case, with its own opinion thereon-\n•\n\n(b) if it arises in the Province of Bombay, to the High Court at Bombay; ...... \"\n\nSection 226 (l) of the Government of India Ac~, 1935, runs as follows :-\n\n\"226. ("}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8951, "end_char": 8961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9313, "end_char": 9323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9587, "end_char": 9597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9876, "end_char": 9886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10600, "end_char": 10610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11984, "end_char": 11994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12004, "end_char": 12014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12434, "end_char": 12444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Maharashlra Sugar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12691, "end_char": 12709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Authoritf\n\nv. .Maharashlra Sugar Mills Lid."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12835, "end_char": 12845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13366, "end_char": 13376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15975, "end_char": 15986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15998, "end_char": 16027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16069, "end_char": 16085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Board consisting of Viscount Haldane, Lord Phillimore and Lord Carson was delivered by Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Phillimore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16092, "end_char": 16102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Board consisting of Viscount Haldane, Lord Phillimore and Lord Carson was delivered by Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Carson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16112, "end_char": 16118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Board consisting of Viscount Haldane, Lord Phillimore and Lord Carson was delivered by Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17429, "end_char": 17439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17451, "end_char": 17478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18067, "end_char": 18073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To use the language of Lord Cairns in the case of /ulius v. Bishop of Oxford ( 1 ): 'There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so.'"}}, {"text": "Chief Revenue Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18687, "end_char": 18710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that there is a serious point of law to be considered, there does lie a ducy upon the Chief Revenue Authority to state a case for the opinion of the Court, and if he does not apyreciate that there is such a serious point, it is in the power of the Court to control him and to order him to state a case.\""}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19006, "end_char": 19027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This reasoning and conclusions, although they have not now the compelling force they had before the 26th of January, 1950, are entitled to great respect."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19217, "end_char": 19227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19682, "end_char": 19690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Daphtary on behalf of the appellant tried to distinguish ' this case on the ground that the scheme -of the Income Tax Act was different from the scheme\nOf the Stamp Act.", "canonical_name": "K. Daphtary"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19997, "end_char": 20007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20403, "end_char": 20413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20451, "end_char": 20461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20620, "end_char": 20630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21206, "end_char": 21216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Sugar Mills Lid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21621, "end_char": 21648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J\n\nv •.\n\nMaharashtra Sugar Mills Lid.", "canonical_name": "Maharashtra Sugar Mills Lid"}}, {"text": "ftlaharashlra S•gar MiJu Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21700, "end_char": 21729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Authority\n\nv. ftlaharashlra S•gar MiJu Ltd.\n\nSUJ,>REME COURT REPORTS [19501\n\namount of the stamp duty and certifies under section 32 thar the full duty with which it is chargeable has been paid, It is obvious that the party applying is interested in obtaining the opinion and therefore he cannot object to the certificate of the Collector."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21808, "end_char": 21818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22087, "end_char": 22097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22271, "end_char": 22281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22494, "end_char": 22504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22569, "end_char": 22579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22825, "end_char": 22836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22844, "end_char": 22867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23341, "end_char": 23352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23364, "end_char": 23393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Alcock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23428, "end_char": 23434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument based on the wording of the corresponding section 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, as mentioned above, was urged in Alcock'; case ( 1 )."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23777, "end_char": 23796, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24041, "end_char": 24052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24064, "end_char": 24093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25321, "end_char": 25331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25562, "end_char": 25574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R. S. Narula."}}, {"text": "Tanuhhai C. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25603, "end_char": 25620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Tanuhhai C. Desai."}}, {"text": "S. C India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25627, "end_char": 25637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3-5 S. C India (N.D.> 58\n\nChief Con1,,, l/ing\n\nRtv."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Sugar Mills", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25687, "end_char": 25710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Authorit.7\n\nMaharashtra Sugar Mills lJd.", "canonical_name": "Maharashtra Sugar Mills Lid"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_548_553_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "M<g 5\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRACHPAL MAHRAJ\n\nBHAGW ANDAS. DARUKA and OTHERS\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI and DAs J J.]\n\n(1950]\n\nIndian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), s. 17-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 58 (f)-Memorandum of deposit of title deeds-When compulsorily registrable.\n\nThe question whether a memorandum of deposit of title deeds is compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as an instrument creating an interest in immoveable property, depends on whether the parties intended to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit to the form of a document.\n\nIf so, the document requires registration. If, on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circun1stances lead to the conclusion that the oarties did not intend to do so, there being no express bargain; the contract to create the mortgge arises by implication of the law from the deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document, being merely evidential does not require registration. The time factor is not decisive.\n\nWhere accounts relating to the appeilant's dealings with the respondents were taken on a certain date and the appellant gave certain title dee9s to the respondents for being held as security for the amounts then found due and \\.vhich may become due, and on the satne day the appellant gave a memorandum to the respondents in the form of a letter addressed to tlie respondents \\.Vhich stated : \"We write to put on record that to secure the repay1nent of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transactions bet\\veen yourselves and ourselves and the monev that mav hereafter beco1ne due on account of such transactios we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds relating to our properties at ...... with i11tent to create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all moneys including interest that may be found due .... \" ·\n\nHeld that the parties <lid not intend to create a charge by the • execution of the document, but merelv to record a transaction which had already been concluded and under which rights and liabilities had already been created and the document did not require registration. '\n\nObla Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar (58 I. A. 68) and Hari Sank,_ar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha (66 I. A. 184) referred to.\n\nAPPEAL (Civil Appeal No. LXVII of 1949 from a Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated the 11th March, 1947, in F. A. No. 218 of 1944. The material facts appear from the judgment.\n\nShiva Prasad Sinha (Sri Kishan, with him) for the appellant.\n\nB. K. Saran for the 1st respondent.\n\nRespondents 2 to 13 did not enter appearance.\n\n1950. May 5.\n\nThe jtidgrµent of the Court was delivered by\n\n19\"50\n\nRach pa!, Mahraj v.\n\nBha.wandas\n\nDarUka And Others\n\nPATANJALI\n\nSASTRI J.-This appeal arises out of Pataiyali Sn, tri ]. a suit brought by the respondents against the appellant and other members of 11is joint family to enforce a mortgage alleged to have been created by the a11pellant by deposit of title deeds on the 23rd October, 1936, at Calcutta.\n\nThe short point for determination in the appeal 1s whether the memorandum signed and delivered by the appellant on 23rd October, 1936, and relied upon by the respondents as evidencing the cre:.ll ion of tne mortgage was compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1903, and, not ha1ing been registered, was inadmissible in evidence to prove the mortgage.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge of Darbha!1ga who tried the suit, and the High Court at Patna on appeal, held that the document did not require registration 1md was admissible in evidence, and accordingly <lecrcnl the suit.\n\nThe question turns on the proper construction ot die memorandum and the circumstances under which it was delivered to the respondents.\n\nAccorrling to the evidence of the respondents' witnesses which has been accepted by the Courts below, the accounts relating to the appellant's dealings were examined on the 23rd October, 1936, and a large sum was found due to the respondents who deman<lcJ payment.\n\nThe appelhnt thereupon brought aml gave certain documents, being\n\nRach pal Mahraj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nDaruka And Others\n\nPatanjali Sastri ].\n\ntitle deeds relating to immovable properties belonging to his family, for the purpose of being held as security for the amounts then due and to become due on further dealings.\n\nA draft of the memorandum was thereafter prepared which the appellant took with him to be shown to his lawyer and he returned in the afternoon, and signed and delivered it to the respondents.\n\nAll this took place in Calcutta.\n\nThe memorandum is in the form of a letter addressed to the respondents' firm and is in the following terms :\n\n\"We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business . transactions between yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds in Calcutta at your . place of business at No. 7\n\nSambhu Mullick Lane, relating to our properties at Samastipur with intent to create an. equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all moneys including interest that may be found due and payable by us to you on account of the said transactions ........ \"\n\nA mortgage by deposit of title deeds is a form of mortgage recognised by section 58 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that it may be effected in , certain towns (including Calcutta) by a person \"delivering to his creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property with intent tg create a security thereon.\" That is to say, when the debtor deposits with the creditor the title deeds of his property with intent to create a security, the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is required under Section 59 as in other forms of mortgage.\n\nBut if the parties choo, se to reduce the contract to writing, the implication is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms.\n\nIn such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage.\n\nAs the deposit alone is not intended to create the charge and the document, which\n\n...\n\nconstitutes the bargain regarding the ecurity, is also necessary arid operates to create the charge in conjunction with the deposit, it requires registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards.\n\nThe time factor is not decisive.\n\nThe document may be handed over to the creditor along with the titl, e deeds and yet may not be registrable, as in Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar ( 1 ) Or, it may be delivered at a later dated and nevertheless be registrable, as in Hari Sankar Paul v.\n\nKedar Nath Saha (2 ) The crucial question is: Did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of the title deeds to the form of a document ?\n\nIf so, the document requires registration.\n\nIf, on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, t; Jien, there being no express bargain, the contract to create the mortgage arises by implication of the . law from . the deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document, being merely evidential does not require registration.\n\nThere are numerous decisions, some of them not easy to reconcile, where this question was considered with reference to the document concerned in the particula:r case.\n\nIt is unnecessary to review them, as the two latest pronouncements of the Privy Council, to which reference has been made, aptly illustrate cases falling on either side of the line.\n\nIn Obla Sundarachariar v.\n\nNarayana Ayyar ( 1 ) a signed memorandum was delivered to the mortgagee along with the title deeds of cei:tain i; roperties deposited as security.\n\nThe merrioran-. dum stated \"As agreed upon in person, I have delivered to you the under-mentioned documents as security,\" and listed the title deeds deposited.\n\nIt was held that the memorandum was no more than a mere record of the particulars of the deeds and did not require registration.\n\nThe criterion. applied was : \"No such memorandum can be within the section (section 17 of the Registration i\\ct) unless on its face it embodies such terms\n\n( 1) 58 I.A. 68.\n\n(') 66 I.A 184.\n\nRochJal Ma/irqj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nD41'11ko And Othtrs\n\nPatanjali Saslri J.\n\nRoehpal MalrT'!f\n\nBlu1gwandas\n\nDOTuka And Others\n\nPaJahjali Sastri J.\n\nand is signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that, so far as the deposit is concerned, it constitutes the agreement between the parties.\" In Hari Sankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha (') the title deeds were deposited accompanied by a memorandum 'part of the advance arranged for was made.\n\nSo!lle days later when the balance was advanced, another memorandum was delivered superseding the earlier one, and this was a formal document stating the essential terms of the transaction \"hereby agreed\" and referred to the moneys \"hereby secured\".\n\nIt also conferred an express power of sale on the mortgagee.\n\nLord Macmillan, after reviewing the eariler decisions of the Board, held that the document required registration, observing, \"where, as here, the parties professing to create a mortgage by a deposit of title deeds contemporaneously enter into a contractual agreement, in writing, whiih is made an integral part of the transaction, and is itself an operative instrument and not merely evidential, such a document must. under the statute, be registered.\"\n\nTurning now to the memorandum before us, 1t 1s clear, on the face of it, that the parties did not intend thereby to create the charge.\n\nThe document purports only to record a transaction which had been concluded and under which the rights and libilities had been orally agreed upon.\n\nNo doubt it was taken by the respondents to show that the title deeds of the appellant's properties were deposited with them as security for the moneys advanced by them, and to obviate a possible plea that the deeds were left with them for other purposes, as indeed was contended by the appellant in his written statement, taking. advantage of the non-registration of the memorandum in question.\n\nBut that is far from intending to reduce the bargain to writing and make the document the basis of the rights and liabilities of the parties.\n\nIn agreement with the High Court, we are of opinion, that the memorandum delivered by the appellant along with the title deeds\n\n('). 66 LA. 1~4.\n\ndeposited with the respondents did not require registration and was properly admitted in evidence to prove the creation of the charge.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Tarachand Brijmohanlal.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : S. P. Varma.\n\nTHE NEW PIECEGOODS BAZAR CO., LTD.,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 9(1) (iv)-Income from pt\"Operty-Computation-Deductions-\"Annual charge .not being capital charge\"-\"Annual charge\" and 'capital .charge\", mean-· ittgi of-Charge for. municipal . property tax and urban immoveable pro,, my tax-Whether deductible--City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, s. 212--,-Bombay Finance Act, I 932, s. 22.\n\nThe charge created in respect of municipal property tax by s. 212 af the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, is an \"annual charge not being a capital charge\" within the meaning of s. 9 ( 1)\n\n(it) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the amount of such charge should therefore be deducted in computing the income from such property for the purposes of .s- 9 of the Indian Income tax Act.\n\nThe charge in . respect of urban immoveable property tax created by the Bombay Finance Act, 1932, is similar in character\n\nand the amount of such charge should also be deducted_\n\nTl* expression \"capital charge\" in s. 9 (1) (iv) means a charge created for a capital sum, that is to say, a charge created to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature; and an\n\n\"annual charge\" means a charge to secure an annual liability.\n\nR~ Mfl\"'qj\n\nv. Bliagwandas Daruka AtttJ Othm\n\nP atanjali Sastri J.\n\nMay26", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "RACHPAL MAHRAJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RACHPAL MAHRAJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGW ANDAS. DARUKA and OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGW ANDAS. 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A. No."}}, {"text": "Shiva Prasad Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2563, "end_char": 2581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiva Prasad Sinha (Sri Kishan, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2587, "end_char": 2593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiva Prasad Sinha (Sri Kishan, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran for the 1st respondent."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3116, "end_char": 3124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a suit brought by the respondents against the appellant and other members of 11is joint family to enforce a mortgage alleged to have been created by the a11pellant by deposit of title deeds on the 23rd October, 1936, at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "23rd October, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3242, "end_char": 3260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short point for determination in the appeal 1s whether the memorandum signed and delivered by the appellant on 23rd October, 1936, and relied upon by the respondents as evidencing the cre:.ll ion of tne mortgage was compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1903, and, not ha1ing been registered, was inadmissible in evidence to prove the mortgage."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3378, "end_char": 3388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3396, "end_char": 3425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Darbha!1ga who", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge of Darbha!1ga who tried the suit, and the High Court at Patna on appeal, held that the document did not require registration 1md was admissible in evidence, and accordingly <lecrcnl the suit."}}, {"text": "Daruka", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appelhnt thereupon brought aml gave certain documents, being\n\nRach pal Mahraj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nDaruka And Others\n\nPatanjali Sastri ]."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 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"Indian Registration Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8579, "end_char": 8589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RochJal Ma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RochJal Ma/irqj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nD41'11ko And Othtrs\n\nPatanjali Saslri J.\n\nRoehpal MalrT'!f\n\nBlu1gwandas\n\nDOTuka And Others\n\nPaJahjali Sastri J.\n\nand is signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that, so far as the deposit is concerned, it constitutes the agreement between the parties.\""}}, {"text": "Patanjali Saslri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8744, "end_char": 8760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RochJal Ma/irqj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nD41'11ko And Othtrs\n\nPatanjali Saslri J.\n\nRoehpal MalrT'!f\n\nBlu1gwandas\n\nDOTuka And Others\n\nPaJahjali Sastri J.\n\nand is signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that, so far as the deposit is concerned, it constitutes the agreement between the parties.\"", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Roehpal MalrT'!f", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8765, "end_char": 8781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RochJal Ma/irqj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nD41'11ko And Othtrs\n\nPatanjali Saslri J.\n\nRoehpal MalrT'!f\n\nBlu1gwandas\n\nDOTuka And Others\n\nPaJahjali Sastri J.\n\nand is signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that, so far as the deposit is concerned, it constitutes the agreement between the parties.\""}}, {"text": "DOTuka", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8796, "end_char": 8802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RochJal Ma/irqj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nD41'11ko And Othtrs\n\nPatanjali Saslri J.\n\nRoehpal MalrT'!f\n\nBlu1gwandas\n\nDOTuka And Others\n\nPaJahjali Sastri J.\n\nand is signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that, so far as the deposit is concerned, it constitutes the agreement between the parties.\""}}, {"text": "PaJahjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8815, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RochJal Ma/irqj\n\nBhagwandas\n\nD41'11ko And Othtrs\n\nPatanjali Saslri J.\n\nRoehpal MalrT'!f\n\nBlu1gwandas\n\nDOTuka And Others\n\nPaJahjali Sastri J.\n\nand is signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that, so far as the deposit is concerned, it constitutes the agreement between the parties.\"", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9513, "end_char": 9522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Macmillan, after reviewing the eariler decisions of the Board, held that the document required registration, observing, \"where, as here, the parties professing to create a mortgage by a deposit of title deeds contemporaneously enter into a contractual agreement, in writing, whiih is made an integral part of the transaction, and is itself an operative instrument and not merely evidential, such a document must."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brijmohanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11159, "end_char": 11181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Tarachand Brijmohanlal."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11213, "end_char": 11224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "NEW PIECEGOODS BAZAR CO., LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11231, "end_char": 11260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE NEW PIECEGOODS BAZAR CO.,"}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11281, "end_char": 11316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11319, "end_char": 11334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11336, "end_char": 11352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11355, "end_char": 11373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]"}}, {"text": ", MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11379, "end_char": 11390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11397, "end_char": 11418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11433, "end_char": 11440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Whether deductible--City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11659, "end_char": 11713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11715, "end_char": 11721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether deductible--City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888", "statute": "Whether deductible--City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888"}}, {"text": "Bombay Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11752, "end_char": 11757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Finance Act", "statute": "Bombay Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11819, "end_char": 11825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Finance Act", "statute": "Bombay Finance Act"}}, {"text": "City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11833, "end_char": 11867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11940, "end_char": 11944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888", "statute": "the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11963, "end_char": 11990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay Finance Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12365, "end_char": 12369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Finance Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bombay Finance Act, 1932"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_553_563_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "$.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 553\n\ndeposited with the respondents did not require registration and was properly admitted in evidence to prove the creation of the charge.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Tarachand Brijmohanlal.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : S. P. Varma.\n\nTHE NEW PIECEGOODS BAZAR CO., LTD.,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\n, MUKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 9(1) (iv)-Income from pt\"Operty-Computation-Deductions-\"Annual charge .not being capital charge\"-\"Annual charge\" and 'capital .charge\", mean-· ittgi of-Charge for. municipal . property tax and urban immoveable pro,, my tax-Whether deductible--City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, s. 212--,-Bombay Finance Act, I 932, s. 22.\n\nThe charge created in respect of municipal property tax by s. 212 af the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, is an \"annual charge not being a capital charge\" within the meaning of s. 9 ( 1)\n\n(it) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the amount of such charge should therefore be deducted in computing the income from such property for the purposes of .s- 9 of the Indian Income tax Act.\n\nThe charge in . respect of urban immoveable property tax created by the Bombay Finance Act, 1932, is similar in character\n\nand the amount of such charge should also be deducted_\n\nTl* expression \"capital charge\" in s. 9 (1) (iv) means a charge created for a capital sum, that is to say, a charge created to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature; and an\n\n\"annual charge\" means a charge to secure an annual liability.\n\nR~ Mfl\"'qj\n\nv. Bliagwandas Daruka AtttJ Othm\n\nP atanjali Sastri J.\n\nMay26\n\n.N n11 Pieugoods\n\nBaz; ar Co. Lid.\n\nCo.unissioner .of lnamu-lax,\n\nBomb47\n\nMa/iqjan ].\n\nAPPELLATE LXVI of 1949 .\n\nJuR1so1cnoN: Civil Appeal\n\n(1950}\n\nNo.\n\nAppea~ from the High Court of Judicature, Bombay, m a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act,. 1922.\n\nK. M. Munshi (N. P. Nathvani, with him), for the appellant.\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (H. J. Umrigar, with him), for the respondent.\n\n1950.\n\nMay 26.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN J.--This is an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in an income-t:\\X matter and it raises the question whether municipal property tax and urban immoveable property tax payable under the relevant Bombay Acts are allowable deductions under section 9\n\n(1) (iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThe assessee company is an investment company deriving its income from properties in the city of Bombay.\n\nFor the assessment year 1940-41 the net income of the assessee under the head \"property\" was computed by the Income-tax Officer in the sum of Rs. 6,21,764 after deducting from gross rents certain payments.\n\nThe company had paid during the releva year Rs. 1,22,675 as municipal property tax Rs. 32,760 as urban property tax.\n\nDeduction of t two sums was claimed under the provisions of section 9 of the Act.\n\nOut of the first item a deduction in the sum of Rs. 48,572 was allowed on the ground that this item represented tenants' burdens paid by the assesscc, -0therwise the cl.aim was disallowed.\n\nThe appeals of the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal were unsuccessful.\n\nThe Tribunal, however, agreed to refer two questions of law to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, namely,- ·\n\n(1) Whether the munic; ipal taxes pai(l by the :; ipplicant-company are an anwable deductio11 under\n\nthe provisions of section . 9 ( 1) (iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act ;\n\n(2) Whether the urban immoveable property taxes paid by the applicant-company are an allowable deduction under section ? (1) (iv) or under section 9\n\n(1) (v) .of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nA supplementary reference was made covering a third question which was not raised before us and it is not therefore necessary to refer to it.\n\nThe High Court answered all the three questions in the . negative .and hence this appeal.\n\nThe question forour determination is whether the municipal property tax and urban immovable property tax can b~ deducted as an alfowance under clause\n\n(iv) of sub-section (1) 9£ section 9 of the Act.\n\nThe decision of the point depends firstly on the construction of the language employed in sub-clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act, and secondly, on a. finding as to the true nature arid character of the liability of the owner under the relevant Bombay Acts for the payment of these taxes.\n\nSection 9 along with the relevant clause runs thus:-\n\n\"9. ( 1) The tax shall be pa, yable by an assessee under the head 'income from property' in respect of the bona fide annual value of property consisting of any buildings or lands appurtenant thereto of which he is the owner, ...... subject to the following allowances, namely:-\n\n(iv) where. the property is subject to a mortgage or other capital charge, the amount of any interest on such mortgage or charge ; where the property is subject to an annual charge not being a capital charge, the amount of such charge ; where the property is subject to a ground rent, the amount of such ground rent: and, where the property has been acquired, constructed, repaired, renewed or reconstructed with borrowed capital, the amount of any interest payable on such • \\ II ap1ta : ......... .\n\nIt will be seen that clause\n\n(iv) consists of four subclauses corresponding to the four deductions allowed\n\nNew Pi4cegoods Baz:ar Co. Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of Incorne-t1J1<,\n\nBombay\n\nMllMjan].\n\nNew Piectgoods Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissionn of /n1; omt-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajma].\n\nunder the the clause.\n\nBefore the amending Act of 1939, clause (iv) contained only the first, third and fourth sub-clauses.\n\nUnder the first sul>-clause interest is deductible whether the amount borrowed on the security of the property was spent on the property or not.\n\nThere is no question of any capital or other expenditure on the property.\n\nThe expression \"capital charge\" in the sub-clause cannot connote a charge on the capital, that is, the property assessed.\n\nThat would be a redundancy as the opening words themselves clearly indicate that the charge is on the property.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that capital charge here could only mean a charge created for a capital sum, i.e., a charge to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature.\n\nIn 1933 the Privy Council decided the case of Biioy Singh Dud huria v. Commissioner of Income-tax Calcutta (1 ).\n\nIt was not an assessment under section 9 but an assessment on the general income of an assessee who was liable to pay maintenance for his step-mother which had been charged on all his assets by a decree of Court.\n\nIt was not a liability voluntarily incurred by him but one cast on him by law. The Privy Council held that the amount paid by him in discharge of that liability formed no part of his real income and so should not be included in his assessment. Though the deci, ion proceeded on the principle that the outgoings were not part of the assessee's income at all, the framers of the amending Act of 1939 wanted, apparently, to extend the principle, so far as the assessment of property was concerned, even to cases where obligatory payments had to be made out of the assessee's income from the property charged with such payments, and the second sub-clause, namely, \"where the property is subject to an annual charge not being a capital charge, the amount of such charge\" was added.\n\nIt is this sul>-clause which the appellant invokes in support of its claim to deduction of the municipal and urban property taxes in the present case.\n\nIn view of the opening words of the newly added sul>-clause, the expression \"capital charge\" also used therein cannot have reference to a charge on the property, and we think it must\n\n(1) T.t •. R. 6o Cal. 1029.\n\nbe understood in the same sense as in sub-clause ( 1); that is to say, the first sub-clause having provided for deduction of interest where a capital sum is charged on the property, this sub-clause provides for adeduction of annual sums so charged, such sums not being capital sums, the limiting words being intended to exclude cases where capital raised on the securiy of the property is made repayable in instalments.\n\nIn Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v.\n\nMahomedbhoy Rowji (1), a Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the meaning of these words.\n\nAs regards \"annual charge,\" Beaumont C. J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"The words, I think, would cover a charge to secure an annual liability.\"\n\nKania J ., as he then was, said as follows :-\n\n\"I do not see how a charge can be annual unless it rnearis a charge in respect of a payment to be made a nmw ll v.\"\n\nThis construction of the words has been followed in the iudgment under appeal.\n\nIn Gappumal Kanhaiya Lal v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax (2) (the connected appeal before use), the Bench of the Allahabad High Court agreed with the construction placed on these words in the Bombay case, i.e., the words \"annual charge\" mean a charge to secure an annual liabilitv.\n\nIt is therefore clear that there is no conflit of jdicial decisions as to the meaning of the phrase \"annual charge\" occurring in sectian 9 (1) (iv) and the meaning given is the natural meaning of these words.\n\nAs. to the phrase \"capital charge\", Beaumont C. J. in the case above referred to took the view that the words mean a charge on capital.\n\nKania J., however, took a different view and observed that he was not prepared to accept the suggestion that a document which provides for a certain payment to be made monthly or annually and charged on immoveable propel:ty or the estate of an individual becomes a capital charge.\n\nIn the Allahabad judgment under appeal these\n\nNtt11 Pieugoods Bazar Co. Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of lncMm-lfVI,.\n\nBomh<ry\n\nMahajan].\n\nCommissioner ef /nfOme-tax,\n\nBomb9\n\nwords were considered as not meaning a charge on capital.\n\nIt was said that if an annual charge means a chrage to secure the discharge of an annual liability, then, capital charge means a charge to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature.\n\nWe think this construction is a natural onstruction of the section and is right.\n\nThe determination of the point whether the taxes in dispute fall within the ambit of the phrase \"annual charge not being a capital charge\" depends on the provisions of the statutes under which they are levied.\n\nSection 143 of the City of Bombay Municipl Act, 1888, authorises the levy of a general tax on all buildings and lands in the city.\n\nThe primary responsibility to pay Jhis property tax is on the lessor (vi de section 146 of the Act).\n\nIn order to assess the tax provision has been made for the determination of the annual rateable value of the . building m section 154.\n\nSection 156 provides for the maintenance of an assessment book in which entries have to be made every official year of all buildings in the cit)', their rateable value, the names of persons primarily liable for payment of the property tax on such buildings and of the amount for which each building has been assessed.\n\nSection 167 lays down that the assessment book need not be prepared every official year but public notices shall be given in accordance with sections 160 to 162 every year and the provisions of the said sections an<l of sections 163 and 167 shall be applicable each year.\n\nThese sections lay down a procedure for hearing objections and complaints agamst entries in the assessment book.\n\nFrom these provisions it is clear . that the liability for the tax 1s determined at the 'beginning of each official year and the tax is an annual one.\n\nIt recurs from year to year.\n\nSections 143 to 168 concern themselves with the imposition, liability and assessment of the tax for the year.\n\nThe amount of the tax for the year and the liability for its payment having been determined, the Act then prescribes for its collection in the chapter \"The collection of taxes\". Section. 197 provides that each of the property taxes shall be payable in\n\nadvance in half yearly instalments on each first day of April and each first day of October. The provision as to half yearly instalment necessarily connotes an annual liability.\n\nIn other words, it means that the annual liability can be discharged by half yearly payments. Procedure has also been prescribed for recovery of the instalments by presentment of a. bill, a notice of demand and then distress, and sale. Finally section 212 provides as follows:-\n\n\"Property taxes due under this Act in respect of any building or land shall, subject to the prior payment of th_e land revenue, if any, due to the provincial Government thereupon, be a first charge ...... upon the said building or land ......... \"\n\nIt creates a statutory charge on the building.\n\nUrban immoveable property tax is leviable under section 22 of Part VI of the Bombay Finance Act, 1932, on the annual letting value of the property.\n\nThe duty to collect the tax is laid on the munic!pality and it does so in the same manner as in the case of the municipal property tax.\n\nSection 24 (2) (b) is in terms similar to section 212 of the Bombay Municipal Act.\n\nIt makes the land or the building security for the payment of this tax also.\n\nFor the purposes of section 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act both these taxes namely, the municipal property tax as well as the urban immoveable property tax are of the same character and stand on the same footing.\n\nMr. Munshi, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the taxes are assessed on the annual value of the land or the building and are annual taxes, although it may be that they are collected at intervals of six _ months for thi:: sake of convenience, that the income-tax itself is assessed on an annual basis, that in allowing deductions all payments made or all liabilities incurred during the ' prc; vious year of assessment should be allowed and that the taxes in question fell clearly within the language of section 9 (1) (iv).\n\nThe. learned Attorney-General, on the other hand, argued that although the taxes are assessed for the year the liability to pay them arUc:t at the beginning\n\nV111J Piecegoods, Baz.ar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissi'lNr ?f ln&Omt-lax,.\n\nBombay\n\nMahqjan].\n\n!(,.. Piee•& cods JJ\"rw Co. l.J4.\n\nv. of l\"'601'WIO¥,\n\nBomb\".1\n\nMahajan].\n\nof each half year and unless a notice of demand is issued and a bill presented there is no liability to pay them and that till then no charge under section 212 of the Act could possibly arise and that the liability to pay being half yearly in advance, the charge is not an anRUal charge.\n\nIt was also suggested that the taxes were a capital charge in the sense of the property being security for the payment.\n\nWe are satisfied that the contentions raised by the learned Attorney-General are not sound.\n\nIt is apparent from the whole tenor of the two Bombay Acts that the t axes are in the nature of an annual levy on the property and are assessed on the annual value of the property each year.\n\nThe annual liability can be discharged by half yearly instalments.\n\nThe liability being al} annual one and the property having been subjected to it, the provisions of clause (iv) of sub-section ( 1) of section 9 are immediately attracted.\n\nGreat emphasis was laid on the word \"due\" used in section 212 of the Municipal Act and it was said that as the taxes do not become due under the Act unless the time for the payment arrives, no charge comes into existence till then and that the charge is not an annual charge.\n\nWe <lo not think that this is a correct construction of section 212.\n\nThe words \"property taxes due under this Act\" mean property taxes for which a person is liable under the Act.\n\nTaxes payable during the year have been made a charge on the property.\n\nThe liability an<l the charge both co-exist and are co-extensive.\n\nThe provisions of the Act affording facilities. for the discharge of the liability do not in any way affect their true nature and character.\n\nIf the annuaf liability is not discharged in the manner laid down by section 197, can it be said that the property cannot be sold for recovery of the whole amount due for the year ?\n\nThe answer to this query can only be in the affirmative, i.e., that the property is liable to sale.\n\nIn Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Mahomedhov Rowji ( 1 ) Beaumont C. J., while rejecting the claim for the deduction of the taxes, placed reliance on\n\nsection 9 (1) (v) which allows a deduction in respect of any sums paid on account of land revenue.\n\nIt was observed that land revenue stands on the same footing as municipal taxes and that as the legislature made a special provision for deduction of sums payable in regard to land revenue but not in respect of sums paid on account of municipal taxes that circumstance indicated that the deduction was not allowable.\n\nFor the same purpose reference was also made to the provisions of section 10 which deal with business allowances and wherein deduction of any sum paid on account of land revenue, local rates or municipal taxes has been allowed.\n\nIn the concluding part of his judgment the learned Chief Justice said that it was not necessary for him . to consider what the exact meaning of the words was and that it was sufficient for him to say that it did not cover municipal taxes which are made a charge on the property under section 212 of the Bombay Municipal Act.\n\nWithout <leterminirig the exact meaning of the words used by the statute .jt seems to us it was not possible to arrive at the conclusion that the taxes were not within the ambit of the clause.\n\nIt is elementary that the primary duty of a Court is to give effect tO' the intention of the legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find that intention.\n\nAgain reference to clause ( v) of the section is not very helpful. because land revenue is a .charge of a paramount nature on all buildings and lands and that being so, a deduction in respect of the amount was mentioned in express terms.\n\nMunicipal taxes, on the other hand, do not stand on the same footing as land revenue.\n\nThe law as to them varies from province to province and they may 1wt be necessarily a charge on property in all cases.\n\nThe legislature eems to have thought that so far as municipal taxe~ on property . Are concerned, if they fall within the ambit of clause (iv), deduction will be claimable in respect of them but not otherwise.\n\nThe deductions alfowed in section\n\n11) under the head \"Income from business\" proceed on a different footing and construction of section 9 with the aid of section 10 is apt to mislead.\n\nNew Pm, gOf/ds Bazar Co. Ltd.\n\nCommissiOlllr of Income-It\"<,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan].\n\nNew Pitcegoods Bazar Co. 1.Jd.\n\nCommissiuner of lncometax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan].\n\nKania J. in the above case in arriving at his conclusion was influenced by the consideration that these taxes were of a variable character, i.e., liable to be increased or reduced under the various prov1s10ns of the Municipal Act and that the charge was in the natu\"re of a contingent charge.\n\nWith great respect, it may be pointed out that all charges in a way may be or arc of a variable and contingent nature.\n\nIf no default is made, no charge is ever enforceable and whenever there is a charge, it can be increased or reduced during the year either by payment or hy additional borrowing.\n\nIn Moss Empires Ltd. v. Inland Rvenue Commissioners ( 1 ) it was held by the House of Lords that the fact that certain payments were contingent and variable in amount did not affect their character of being annual payments and that the word \"annual\" must be taken to have the quality of being recurrent or being capable of recurrence.\n\nIn Cunard's Trustees v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ( 2 ) it was held that the payments were capable of being recurrent and were therefore annual payments even though they were not necessarily recurrent year by year and the fact that they varied in amount was immaterial.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General in view of these decisions did not suppor~ the view expressed by Kania J.\n\nReliance was placed on a decision of the High Court of Madras in Mamad Keyi v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (..~,) in which moneys paid as urban immoveable property tax under the Bombay Finance Act were disallowed as inadmissible under section 9 (1) (iv) dt 9 (1) (v) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThis decision merely followed the view expressed in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Mahomed within the meaning of schedule D case III, rule 1 ( 1 ), bhov Rowji ( •) • and was not arrived at on any independent or fresh reasoning and is not of much assistance in the decision of the case.\n\nThe Allahabad High Court\n\nin Gappumal Kanhaiya Lal v. Commissioner of Jncometax ( 1 ) (the connected appeal took a correct view of this matter and the reasoning given therein has our approval.\n\nThe result is that this appeal is allowed and the two questions which were referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Tribunal and cited above are answered in the affirmative. The appellants will have their costs in the appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : M. S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri.\n\n. Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax (XI of 1922), s. 9 (1) (iv)-lncome from p1\"Dperty-Computation of annual value-Deduction of \"annual charges not being capital charges\"-Municipa/ house-tax and watertax-Whether deductible-Nature of such charges-U.P. Municipalities Act (II of 1916), ss. 128, 149, 177.\n\nThe amount of house-tax and the amount of water-tax imposed by the municipal board of Allahabad under s. 128 of the Unit¢ Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, and paid by the owner as a lessor under .s. 149 of the said Act are \"annual charges not being capital _ charges to which the property is subject,\" within the meaning of s. 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and should therefore be deducted from the bona fide ai; mual value of the property determined under sub-sections ( l) and -(2) of s. 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act\n\nJudgment of the Allahabad High Court affirmed.\n\nNew Pieccgoods. Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay fl950l S. C. R. 553) followed.\n\n( 1 ) I.L.R. 1943 Born. 628. . 4-5 S, C. Tndia (N. D )/58\n\nNew Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of fn, ome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan].\n\nMay26", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "Tarachand Brijmohanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 262, "end_char": 284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Tarachand Brijmohanlal."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 316, "end_char": 327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : S. P. 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Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (..~,) in which moneys paid as urban immoveable property tax under the Bombay Finance Act were disallowed as inadmissible under section 9 (1) (iv) dt 9 (1) (v) of the Indian Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20508, "end_char": 20517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20554, "end_char": 20568, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21334, "end_char": 21361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : M. S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21393, "end_char": 21404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21407, "end_char": 21439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21441, "end_char": 21462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21465, "end_char": 21479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21481, "end_char": 21497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21524, "end_char": 21533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21572, "end_char": 21576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 128, 149, 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21805, "end_char": 21822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21927, "end_char": 21933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21947, "end_char": 21981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22024, "end_char": 22030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22152, "end_char": 22156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22173, "end_char": 22200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22332, "end_char": 22336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22351, "end_char": 22365, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_563_565_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 563\n\nin Gappumal Kanhaiya Lal v. Commissioner of Jncometax ( 1 ) (the connected appeal took a correct view of this matter and the reasoning given therein has our approval.\n\nThe result is that this appeal is allowed and the two questions which were referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Tribunal and cited above are answered in the affirmative. The appellants will have their costs in the appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : M. S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri.\n\n. Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.\n\nGAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN ; nd MuKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax (XI of 1922), s. 9 (1) (iv)-lncome from p1\"Dperty-Computation of annual value-Deduction of \"annual charges not being capital charges\"-Municipa/ house-tax and watertax-Whether deductible-Nature of such charges-U.P. Municipalities Act (II of 1916), ss. 128, 149, 177.\n\nThe amount of house-tax and the amount of water-tax imposed by the municipal board of Allahabad under s. 128 of the Unit¢ Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, and paid by the owner as a lessor under .s. 149 of the said Act are \"annual charges not being capital _ charges to which the property is subject,\" within the meaning of s. 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and should therefore be deducted from the bona fide ai; mual value of the property determined under sub-sections ( l) and -(2) of s. 9 of the Indian Income-tax Act\n\nJudgment of the Allahabad High Court affirmed.\n\nNew Pieccgoods. Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay fl950l S. C. R. 553) followed.\n\n( 1 ) I.L.R. 1943 Born. 628. . 4-5 S, C. Tndia (N. D )/58\n\nNew Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of fn, ome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan].\n\nMay26\n\nCommissioner of Income-lax,\n\nU.P.\n\nGappumal Kanhai:1a Lal\n\nMahajan].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS fl9SO)\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Civil Appeal No. VI of 1949).\n\nThis was an appeal from the High Court, Allahabad (Iqbal Ahmad C. J. and Allsop J.) dated 31st August, 1944, in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe facts are set out in the judgment.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for Indill (H. /. Umrigar, with him), for the appellant.\n\nGopi Nath Kunzru (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the respondent.\n\n1950 May 26.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMEHR CH~ND MAHAJAN ).-This appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 31st August, 1944, raises the same Qoints as have been discussed in Civil Appeal No. 66 of .1949 ( 1).\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal referred four questions to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. These questions related to the year of assessment 1939-40.\n\nThe High Court answered two of the questions in the affirmative and two in the negative.\n\nThe two questions relating to the appeal are those that were answered in the affirmative and are as follows :-\n\n\"Whethe1 ( 1) the amount of house-tax and (2) the amount of water-tax, imposed by the Municipal Board of Allahabad under section 128, sub-section ( l) clauses\n\n(i) and (x), respectively of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, and paid by the owner as a lessor under section 149 of that Act should be deducted as an allowance from the bona fide annual value of the property determined under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of secticm (9) of the Act, on the ground that such amount is an annual charge, which is not a capital charge to which the property is subject within the meaning of clause (iv) of sub-section ( 1) of section o of the Al:t.\"\n\n{1 )New Piecef!oods Bazar eo. lid. \". Commissioner of I~.\n\nBtm1(Jtt\n\n[1950] S.C.R. 553\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 565\n\nUnder section 128 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, the municipality can. impose a tax :in the whole or any part of the municipality on the annual value of buildings or Janel or of both, and a water-tax on the annual value of buildings or land or d both.\n\nEvery such tax on the annual value of buildings or land or both is leviable on the actual occupier of the property upon which the said taxes are assessed,. if he is the owner of the buildings or lands or holds them on a building or other lease from the Crown or from the Board, or on a building lease from any person. In any other case the tax is leviable from the lessor, if the property is let (vide sectfon 149).\n\nSection 177 enacts that all sums due on account of a tax imposed on the annual vall!e of buildings or lands or both shall 'Subject to the prior payment of the lnd revenue, if any, due to His Majesty thereupon, be a first charge upon such buildings or lands. ·\n\nIt is apparent therefore that die prov1S1ons of the United Provinces Act in respect of the levy of the taxes :are substantially similar to the provisions of the Bombay Act discussed in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1949 ( 1 ) For the reasons given in that appeal and as a result of that decision this appeal stands dismissed with com . and we consider that the High Court of Allahabad has answered the questions above mentioned correctly.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. P. Varma.\n\n(') [1950] S.C.R. 55l\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax,\n\nU.P. v.\n\nGappumal K anhaiya Lal\n\nMahajan].", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "Agent for the appellants : M. S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 451, "end_char": 505, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 537, "end_char": 548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 551, "end_char": 580, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Commissioner of Income-lax,\n\nU.P.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 585, "end_char": 606, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAPPUMAL KANHAlYA LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 662, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "nd MuKHERJEA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 681, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 716, "end_char": 720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 128, 149, 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 949, "end_char": 966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount of house-tax and the amount of water-tax imposed by the municipal board of Allahabad under s. 128 of the Unit¢ Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, and paid by the owner as a lessor under .s."}}, {"text": "s. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1071, "end_char": 1077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1317, "end_char": 1344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1476, "end_char": 1480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1495, "end_char": 1509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "New Pieccgoods. Bazar Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New Pieccgoods.", "canonical_name": "New Pieccgoods. Bazar Co. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay fl950l S. C. R. 553)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1594, "end_char": 1649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay fl950l S. C. R. 553) followed."}}, {"text": "New Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-5 S, C. Tndia (N. D )/58\n\nNew Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of fn, ome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan].", "canonical_name": "New Pieccgoods. Bazar Co. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of fn, ome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan]", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1754, "end_char": 1800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-5 S, C. Tndia (N. D )/58\n\nNew Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of fn, ome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nMahajan]."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-lax,\n\nU.P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1810, "end_char": 1843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May26\n\nCommissioner of Income-lax,\n\nU.P.\n\nGappumal Kanhai:1a Lal\n\nMahajan].", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of Income-lax,\n\nU.P."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1926, "end_char": 1963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl9SO)\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2024, "end_char": 2045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from the High Court, Allahabad (Iqbal Ahmad C. J. and Allsop J.) dated 31st August, 1944, in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Ahmad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2047, "end_char": 2058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from the High Court, Allahabad (Iqbal Ahmad C. J. and Allsop J.) dated 31st August, 1944, in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."}}, {"text": "Allsop", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2069, "end_char": 2075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal from the High Court, Allahabad (Iqbal Ahmad C. J. and Allsop J.) dated 31st August, 1944, in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2126, "end_char": 2136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2144, "end_char": 2171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2214, "end_char": 2222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for Indill (H. /. Umrigar, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopi Nath Kunzru", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2299, "end_char": 2315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2317, "end_char": 2330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MEHR CH~ND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2422, "end_char": 2440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMEHR CH~ND MAHAJAN ).-This appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 31st August, 1944, raises the same Qoints as have been discussed in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2736, "end_char": 2746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2766, "end_char": 2780, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Allahabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two questions relating to the appeal are those that were answered in the affirmative and are as follows :-\n\n\"Whethe1 ( 1) the amount of house-tax and (2) the amount of water-tax, imposed by the Municipal Board of Allahabad under section 128, sub-section ( l) clauses\n\n(i) and (x), respectively of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, and paid by the owner as a lessor under section 149 of that Act should be deducted as an allowance from the bona fide annual value of the property determined under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of secticm (9) of the Act, on the ground that such amount is an annual charge, which is not a capital charge to which the property is subject within the meaning of clause (iv) of sub-section ( 1) of section o of the Al:t.\"\n\n{1 )New Piecef!oods Bazar eo."}}, {"text": "section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3237, "end_char": 3278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3320, "end_char": 3331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3839, "end_char": 3850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and we consider that the High Court of Allahabad has answered the questions above mentioned correctly."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5301, "end_char": 5312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. P. Varma."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_566_572_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "May 19\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950 l\n\nRASHID AHMED\n\nfl.\n\nTHE MUNICIPAL BOARD,\n\nKAIRANA.\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA and THE STATE OF\n\nUTT AR PRADESH : lNTERVENERS.\n\n[SHRt HARILAL KANIA C. J., SAtYm FAzL Au,\n\nPATA>iJALI SASTRI MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN\n\nMuKHERJEA and DAs J J. J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 19 (1), 19 (6), 32-Fundamental right to carry on trade-Reasonableness of restrictions imposed- U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, s. 241\n\n(2) (a)-Municipal bye/aw prohibiting carrying on u1holesale trade without permission-Absence of provisions for issuing license to old traders-Provisfons permitting grant of monopoly-Lt:gality of bye/aw.\n\nByelaw No. 2 of the byclaws of a municipal board, which came into force on the 1st January, 1950, provided that\n\n0 no person shall establish any new n1arket or place for wholesale transactions without obtaining the previous permission of the board, and no person shall sell or expose for sale any vegetable, fruit, etc. at any Place other than -that fixed by the board for. the purpose\"; and byelaw No. 4 permitted the grant of a monopoly to a contractor to deal in wholesale transactions at the place fixed as a market.\n\nIn anticipation of these byclaws the monopoly right to do wholesale business in vegetable for three years was auctioned by the municipal board and granted to the highest bidder and a place was also fixed as the market where such business could be carried on. The petitioner who had been carrying on wholesale business in vegetables at a rented shop with:.o the mtµticipality for two years before the byelaws came into force applO!:d for a license to carry on his business at his shop but this was rejected on the ground that there was no provision in the byelaws authorising the grant of any . such license, and he was prosecuted for contravention of th'c byelaws.\n\nHe applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of his fundamental right as a citizen to carry on his busincsa which was gaaranteed by Art. 19 (1) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld\n\n(i) . that the prohibition in byelaw No. 2 became absolute in the absence of provision authorising the issue of a license, and inasmuch as the municipal board had, further, put it out of its power to grant a license to the petitioner by granting a monopoly, the restrictions imposed \\Vere not reasonable within\n\nthe meaning of Art. 19 ( 6) of the Constitution, and the byelaws were accordingly void and the prosecution of the petitioner illegal, (ii) that the fact that the Constitution came into force only after the byelaws had come into force did not affect the petitioner's right to carry on his business.\n\nHeld also, that an appeal under section 318 of the U. P.\n\nMunicipalities Act was not _in the circumstances an adequate legal remedy the_ existence of which would disentitlc the petitioner from maintaining this application.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION: Petition No. X of 1950\n\nThis was an application under article 32 (1) of the Constitution for the enforcement of the applicant's fundamental right to carry on his businss which was guaranteed by article 19 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe facts of the case appear in the judgment.\n\nNur-ud-din, for the petitioner.\n\nRadhelal Agaruiala, for the opposite prty.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, ( S. M.\n\nSikri, with him), for the Union of India.\n\nPearylal Banerji, Advocate-General of U. P. ( Shri Ram, with him), for the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\n1950.\n\nMay 19. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs J.~I am reading the judgment of the Court.\n\nThis i§ an application under article 32 of the Constitution of India made by Rashid Ahmed for enforcement of his fundamental right to carry on his business which is said to have _been completely stopped by the respondent, the Municipal-- Board of K.airana.\n\nThe facts shortly are as follows:\n\nThe petitioner is an Aratia (commission agent) carrying on wholesale business in vegetables and fruits at Kairana in the District of Muzaffarnagar in the\n\nRashid Ahnid\n\nMunicipal Board,\n\nKair1111a\n\nDos].\n\nDas].\n\nSUPREME COL?RT REPORT~ f 1950 J\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nHe has been carrying on this business for the last two years at a rented shop in Bazar Jama Masjid in the town of Kairana.\n\nUntil recently there were no bye-laws of the respondent Board regulating the sale of vegetables and fruit within the limits of the municipality.\n\nIn March, 1949, the respondent Board published certain proposed bye- .laws made under section 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916.\n\nThese bye-laws were passeJ by the respondent Board on the 19th April, 1949.\n\nAfter confirmation by the Commissioner these bye-laws came into operation on anJ from 1st January 1950.\n\nIn anticipation of these new bye-laws coming into effect the respondent Board on the 21st May, 1949, auctioned \"the contract for wholesale of vegetables\", presumably meaning 'thereby the monopoly right to do wholesale business in vegetables.\n\nThe contract was given to one Habib Ahmad, who was the highest bjdder for three years at and for Rs. 72,750 payable in equal quarterly instalments in advance.\n\nOn the 31st December, 1949, respondent BoarJ notified a place near Police Post Imam as the market for wholesale pur.chase and sale of vegetables and fruits.\n\nThe petitioner applied for a license to carry on his wholesale Aratia business at his shop.\n\nOn or about the 22nd December, 1949, the respondent Board by resolution No. 188 rejected the petitioners application. This decision was. communicated to the petitioner on the 9th February 1950. The order of the Chairman of the respond- . ent Board was in these terms : \"According to resolution No. 188 dated 22-12-49 the application of Mr. Rashid Ahmed is rejected and he be informed accordingly\".\n\nNo reason was. assigned by the respondent Board's resolution for the rejection of the petitioner's application.\n\nWe are now informed by the learned Advocate tor the respondent Board that the application was rejected as there was no bye-law for entertaining such application or granting such license as was prayed for.\n\nThe fact that the respondent Board had already auctioned the conHact to Habib Ahmad might conceivably have had some bearing on this refusal to grant a license to the petitioner.\n\nIn the meantime on the 28th\n\nJanuary, 1950. a notice was served on the petitioner in the following terms :\n\n\"You are liereby informed that the Municipal Board, Kairana, have given the contract of wholesale .purchase and sale of the vegetables, which is in force from the 1st day of January, 1950.\n\nIt has been repeatedly promulgated, in the city by the beat of drum, through a Khakrob (sweeper) that excepting the contractor of vetables the Municipal Board, Kairana, nobody shall deal in wholesale purchase and sale of vegetables at a place other than the one approved by the Municipal Board aforesaid (i.e. the place near Police rost Imam).\n\nAs against this, you in the first place kept selling vegetables by wholesale, at the house near Jama Masjid otherwise known as Qaziwala, despite occasional verbal warnings requiring you to desist therefrom, which were conveyed through an employee of the Board. On your failure tG comply, you were warned by a notice in writing, dated the 3rd January, 1950.\n\nThat notice was duly served on you.\n\nBut still you paid no heed.\n\nAccordingly a complaint was lodged against you, under the bye-laws, quoted above, in the Court of Pargana Officer, Tahsil Kairana.\n\nThe com- .Plaint is still pending.\n\nNow you are selling wholesale by auction, vegetable at another place in Jama Masjid Bazar, which is a thoroughfare.\n\nYour above conduct is unlawful and in contravention of the Municipal Board's Bye-law 2 pertaining to vegetable contract.\n\nMoreover, highly prejudicial as it is to the interests of both the contractor and the Board, you are warned that after this notice has been served on you, you should cease to sell any more ffgetable in breach of the bye-laws above mentioned.\n\nHerein fail not.\"\n\nThis notice is rather disingenous in that while it • suggests that everybody can deal in wholesale purchase and sale of vegetables at the place approved by the Board, i.e., at the place near Police Post Imam, the , fact, as we are now told by the learned Advocate for the i:espondent BOard, is entirdy contrary for it is\n\nRashid Ahmed\n\n\"· Municipal Board,\n\nEairana\n\nDas}.\n\nRashid Ahmed\n\nMunicipal Board,\n\nKaiTtma\n\nDas).\n\nonly the contractor Habib Ahmad who can carry on wholesale business at that place.\n\nThe position, therefore, is that the petitioner cannot do any wholesale business either at the appointed marktit or at his own shop where he had admittedly been doing wholesale business for two years prior to the bye-laws coming into force.\n\nIn short, the petitioner's business has been wholly stopped and he is being prosecuted for alleged breach of the bye-laws.\n\nThe above notice was headed as \"Notice under bye-law 2 of the bye-laws pertaining to contract of vegetables.\" Bye-law 2 runs thus :\n\n\"No person shall establish any new market or\n\nplcc for wholesale transaction without obtaining the previous permission of the Board and no person shall sell or expose for sale any vegetable, fruit, etc., at any place other than that fixed by the Board for the purpose.\"\n\nThe second part of this bye-law clearly contemplates that everybody will be entitled to do business at the place fixed by the respondent Board, but as a result of a monopoly in favour of the contractor Habib Ahmad having been created, nobody else can do business at that place as conceded by the learned Advocate for the respondent Board.\n\nUnder the first part of this bye-law no person can establish a new market or place for wholesale transaction wit.hout obtaining the permission of the respondent Board.\n\nThis part of the bye-law clearly contemplates that the Board may permit the establishment of a new market for wholesale dealings in vegetables.\n\nThe petitioner applied for this permission but it was refused.\n\nBye-law 2 is still in force.\n\nIf it requires a license then under section 241 (2) (a) the respondent Board cannot refuse such license except on the ground that the place where the market or shop is established fails to comply with any condition prescribed by, or under, the Act.\n\nIt is conceded that the rejection of the petitioner's application. was not based on any such ground but that it was because there was no bye-law authorising the issue of any license.\n\nThe Constitution by article 19 ( 1) guarantees\n\nto the Indian citizen the right to ca.rry on trade or business subject to such reasonable restrictions as are mentioned in clause ( 6) of that article.\n\nThe position, however, under bye-law 2 is that while it provided that no person shall establish a market for wholesale transactions in vegetables except with the permission of the Board, there is no bye-law authorising the respondent Board to issue the license.\n\nThe nett result is that the prohibition of this bye-law, in the absence of any provision for issuing license:, becomes absolute.\n\nFurther, bye-law 4 contemplates the grant of a monopoly to a contractor to deal in wholesale transactions at the place fixed as a market.\n\nActing up, on that provision, the respondent Board has granted monopoly to Habib Ahmad and has put it out of its power to grant a license to the petitioner to carry dn wholesale business in vegetables either at the fixed market place or at any other place within the municipal limits of Kairana.\n\nThis certainly is much more than reasonable restrictions on the petitioner as are contemplated by clause (6) of article 19.\n\nThis being the position, the bye-laws would be void under article 13 (1) of the Constitution.\n\nOn the other hand, if there is no bye-law requiring . the petitioner to take out license, then there can' be no justification for the respondent Board to stop the petitioner's business or to prosecute him.\n\nr\" Learned counsel tor the respondent Board faintly contended that the bye-laws having come into force on 1st January, 1950, i.e., before the Constitution came into force, the petitioner no longer had any right to continue the business and, therefore, his case is not governed by article 19(1) (g).\n\nThere is no substance in this argument for, if it were sound, article 19 (1) (g) would only protect persons who were carrying on business before the Constitution came into force.\n\nLearned Advocate-General of Uttar Pradesh appearing for the intervener drew our attention to section 318 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and submitted that the petitioner haviJ:ig adequate remedy by way of appeal, this Court should not grant any writ in the nature of the prerogative writ of mandamus\n\nMuniripal Botmf\n\nKairana\n\nDas].\n\nMunicipal Board,\n\nKairana\n\nDas].\n\nor certiorari.\n\nThere can be no question th.at the aistence of an adequate legal remedy is ; i thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs, but the powers given to this Court under article 32 are much wider and are not confined to issuing prerogative writs only.\n\nThe respondent Board having admittedly put it out of its power to grant a license and having regard to the fact that there is no specific bye-law authorising the issue of a license, we do not consider that the appeal under section 318 to the local Government which sanctioned the bye-laws is, in the circumstances of this case, an adequate legal remedy.\n\nWe are satisfied that in this case the petitioner's fundamental rights have been infringed and he is entitled to have his grievance redressed.\n\nThe proper order in such circumstances would be to direct the respondent Board not to prohibit the petitioner from carrying on the trade of wholesale dealer and commission agent of vegetables and fruits within the limits of the Municipal Board of Kairana, except in accordance with the bye-laws as and when framed in future according to law and further to direct the respondent Municipal Board to withdraw the pending prosecution of the petitioner and we order accordingly.\n\nThe respondents to pahthe costs of the petitioner ..\n\n' ,.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner : Narmitlal.\n\nAgent for the opposite party : Tarachand Bri; mohanlal.\n\nAgent for the Union of India : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for Uttar Pradesh : Tarachand Bri; mohan/al.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "l\n\nRASHID AHMED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "l\n\nRASHID AHMED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE MUNICIPAL BOARD,\n\nKAIRANA.\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA and THE STATE OF\n\nUTT AR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MUNICIPAL BOARD, KAIRANA, THE UNION OF INDIA and THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRt HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 177, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATA>iJALI SASTRI MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 237, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239, "end_char": 248, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 253, "end_char": 258, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288, "end_char": 296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421, "end_char": 427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "1st January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 of the byclaws of a municipal board, which came into force on the 1st January, 1950, provided that\n\n0 no person shall establish any new n1arket or place for wholesale transactions without obtaining the previous permission of the board, and no person shall sell or expose for sale any vegetable, fruit, etc."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1838, "end_char": 1845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1973, "end_char": 1980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2340, "end_char": 2347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 318", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2925, "end_char": 2935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Radhelal Agaruiala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Radhelal Agaruiala, for the opposite prty."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, ( S. M.\n\nSikri, with him), for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "S. M.\n\nSikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3273, "end_char": 3285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, ( S. M.\n\nSikri, with him), for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Pearylal Banerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3323, "end_char": 3339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pearylal Banerji, Advocate-General of U. P. ( Shri Ram, with him), for the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Ram, with", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pearylal Banerji, Advocate-General of U. P. ( Shri Ram, with him), for the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3559, "end_char": 3569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3577, "end_char": 3598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rashid Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3607, "end_char": 3619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This i§ an application under article 32 of the Constitution of India made by Rashid Ahmed for enforcement of his fundamental right to carry on his business which is said to have _been completely stopped by the respondent, the Municipal-- Board of K.airana.", "canonical_name": "l\n\nRASHID AHMED"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COL?RT REPORT~ f 1950 J\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4449, "end_char": 4460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4473, "end_char": 4497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4663, "end_char": 4679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After confirmation by the Commissioner these bye-laws came into operation on anJ from 1st January 1950."}}, {"text": "21st May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4767, "end_char": 4781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In anticipation of these new bye-laws coming into effect the respondent Board on the 21st May, 1949, auctioned \"the contract for wholesale of vegetables\", presumably meaning 'thereby the monopoly right to do wholesale business in vegetables."}}, {"text": "Habib Ahmad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contract was given to one Habib Ahmad, who was the highest bjdder for three years at and for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Habib Ahmad"}}, {"text": "31st December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 31st December, 1949, respondent BoarJ notified a place near Police Post Imam as the market for wholesale pur.chase and sale of vegetables and fruits."}}, {"text": "BoarJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5124, "end_char": 5129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 31st December, 1949, respondent BoarJ notified a place near Police Post Imam as the market for wholesale pur.chase and sale of vegetables and fruits."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On or about the 22nd December, 1949, the respondent Board by resolution No."}}, {"text": "9th February 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5511, "end_char": 5528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "communicated to the petitioner on the 9th February 1950."}}, {"text": "22-12-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5644, "end_char": 5652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "188 dated 22-12-49 the application of Mr. Rashid Ahmed is rejected and he be informed accordingly\"."}}, {"text": "Rashid Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5676, "end_char": 5688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "188 dated 22-12-49 the application of Mr. Rashid Ahmed is rejected and he be informed accordingly\".", "canonical_name": "l\n\nRASHID AHMED"}}, {"text": "28th\n\nJanuary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime on the 28th\n\nJanuary, 1950."}}, {"text": "1st day of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6504, "end_char": 6528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a notice was served on the petitioner in the following terms :\n\n\"You are liereby informed that the Municipal Board, Kairana, have given the contract of wholesale .purchase and sale of the vegetables, which is in force from the 1st day of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "3rd January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7214, "end_char": 7231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On your failure tG comply, you were warned by a notice in writing, dated the 3rd January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Court of Pargana Officer, Tahsil Kairana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly a complaint was lodged against you, under the bye-laws, quoted above, in the Court of Pargana Officer, Tahsil Kairana."}}, {"text": "Rashid Ahmed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8291, "end_char": 8303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notice is rather disingenous in that while it • suggests that everybody can deal in wholesale purchase and sale of vegetables at the place approved by the Board, i.e., at the place near Police Post Imam, the , fact, as we are now told by the learned Advocate for the i:espondent BOard, is entirdy contrary for it is\n\nRashid Ahmed\n\n\"· Municipal Board,\n\nEairana\n\nDas}."}}, {"text": "Rashid Ahmed", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8342, "end_char": 8354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rashid Ahmed\n\nMunicipal Board,\n\nKaiTtma\n\nDas).", "canonical_name": "l\n\nRASHID AHMED"}}, {"text": "Habib Ahmad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8410, "end_char": 8421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "only the contractor Habib Ahmad who can carry on wholesale business at that place.", "canonical_name": "Habib Ahmad"}}, {"text": "section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10028, "end_char": 10039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10446, "end_char": 10456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kairana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11446, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting up, on that provision, the respondent Board has granted monopoly to Habib Ahmad and has put it out of its power to grant a license to the petitioner to carry dn wholesale business in vegetables either at the fixed market place or at any other place within the municipal limits of Kairana."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11568, "end_char": 11578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11639, "end_char": 11649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12245, "end_char": 12255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12391, "end_char": 12404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Advocate-General of Uttar Pradesh appearing for the intervener drew our attention to section 318 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and submitted that the petitioner haviJ:ig adequate remedy by way of appeal, this Court should not grant any writ in the nature of the prerogative writ of mandamus\n\nMuniripal Botmf\n\nKairana\n\nDas]."}}, {"text": "section 318", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12456, "end_char": 12467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12480, "end_char": 12504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12944, "end_char": 12954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "section 318", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13250, "end_char": 13261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Narmitlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14107, "end_char": 14116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner : Narmitlal."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Bri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14150, "end_char": 14163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the opposite party : Tarachand Bri; mohanlal."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14207, "end_char": 14218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Union of India : P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_573_593_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "s. c. R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nDR. BABU RAM SAKSENA\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE r SttRI HARILAL KANIA c. J ., SAIYID F AZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.]\n\nConstitutioll of India-Merger of. States-Effect-Treaty of Extradition between British Government and Indian State-Whether subsists after merger-Extradition Act 1903, ss. 7, IS-Provision i11 Act for extradition for additional offences-Whether \"derogates\" from Treaty-F.xtradition warrant for additional offences-Legality.\n\nIn 1869 the British Government and Qie State of Tonk entered into treaty which provided for the extradition of offenders in respect of certain offe11ces specified therein called \"heinous offences,\" which did not include the offences of chcati ng and extortion. In 1903 the Indian Extradition Act was passed which provided for extradition in respect of cheating and extortion also, but s. 18 of the Act provided that nothing contained in the Act \"shall derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders.\" Under the Independence of India Act, 1947, the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed ana with it all reaties and agreements in force; but under a \"standstill agreement,\" between the Indian Dominion and the States (including Tonk) all agreements between His Majesty and the States were continued, including agreements in respect of extradition. Tonk acceded to the Dominion of lridia in 1947 and became a member State of the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nThe appellant was a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service and his services were lent to the State of Tonk in\n\n1948. After he had reverted to the Uttar Pradesh he was charged with the offences of cheating and extortion alleged to have been committed while he was in Tonk and was arrested under an extradition warrant issued under s. 7 of the Extradition Act,\n\n1903. He applied under ss. 491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for his release, contending that in view of the provisions of s. 18 of the Extradition Act and the Trety of Extradition of 1869, his arrest was illegal :\n\n Held per KANIA C. J. and PATANJALI SAsTRI J. (FAzL ALI J. concurring).-Even assuming that the Extradition Treaty of 1869 subsisted after the merger of the Tonk State, by providing for extradition for additional offences the Extradition Act of 1903 did not derogate . from the provisions of the Treaty of 1869 or the rights of Indian citizens thereunder, and the arrest and surrender of the appellant under s. 7 of the Act was not, therefore, rendered unlawful by anything contained in the said Treaty.\n\nltlig 5.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSalama\n\nThe Siok.\n\nPatdnjali\n\nSastri].\n\nPer MuKHERJEA J.\n\n(FAZL\n\nAL1, ivfAHAJAN an<l DAs JJ. concurring).-The Extradition Treaty of 1869 \\Vas not capable of being given effect to in vie'v of the n1erger of the Tonk State ; n the United State of Rajasthan, and, as no enforceable treaty right existed, s. 18 of the Extradition Act of 1903 had no application ; and inasn1uch as the conditions of s. 7 of the said Act had been complied with, the warrant of arrest issued under s. 7 of the Act \\Vas not illegal.\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cTroN: Criminal Appeal No. II of 1949.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Harish Chandra J.) dated 11th November, 1949, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 960 of 1949. The facts of the case and the arguments of coumel are set out fully in the judgment.\n\nAlladi, Krishnaswami /year (Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n(V.\n\nSethi, with him) for the respondent. 1950.\n\nMay 5. The judgment of Kania C.J. and Patanjali Sastri J. was delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court at Allahabad dismissing an application under sections 491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for release of the appellant who was arrested in pursuance of an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner of the United State of Rajasthan who is the principal officer representing the Crown in tbe territory of that State.\n\nThe appellant who is a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service was appointed in 1948 to serve what was then known as the Tonk State in various capacities, and during such service he is alleged to have helped the Nawab in obtaining the sanction of tbe Government of India to the payment of Rs. 14 lakhs to the Nawab out of the State Treasury for the discharge of his debts, and to have induced the Nawab bv threats and deception to pay the appellant, in return. for such help, sums totalling Rs. 3 lakhs on various dates. On these allegations the appellant is charged with having committed offences under section 383 (Extortion) and\n\nsection 420 (Cheating) of the Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\"). The warrant was issued under section 7 of the Act to the District Magistrate, Nainital, where the appellant was residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar Pradesh Government, to arrest and deliver him up\n\nto the District Magistrate of Tonk.\n\nThe appellant's case is th:it the sum of Rs. 3 lakhs was paid to him by the Nawab to be kept in safe deposit in a bank for the Nawab's use in Delhi, that no offence was committed and that the amount was returned when demanded by the authorities of. the Tonk State. The warrant was issued mala fide on account of enmity. Various technical objections were also raised to the validity of the warrant and to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Nainital to take cogmsance of the matter and rrest the appellant: The High Court overruled all the objections and dismissed the. application for the release of the appellant.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar contended that section 7 of the Act under which the warrant purports to have been issued had no application to the case and that the ' entire proceedings before the Magistrate were illegal and without jurisdiction and should be quashed. Learned counsel, relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall \"derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders,\" submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the \"Standstill Agreement\" entered into on the 8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \\>c demanded or ordered.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSahtna\n\nThe Stott.\n\nPatwifoli Sastri].\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksnld\n\nT/,. Statt.\n\nPatalljllli Sanri ].\n\nThe Attorney-General appearing for the Government advanced three lines of argument in answer to that contention.\n\nIn the first place, the standstill agreement entered into with the various Indian States were purely temporary arrangements designed to maintain the status quo ante m respect of certain administrative matters of common concern pending the accession of those States to the Dominion of India, and they were superseded by the Instruments of Accession executed by the Rulers of those States. Tonk having acceded to the Dominion on the 16th August, 1947, the standstill agreement relied on by the appellant must be taken to have lapsed as from that date.\n\nSecondly, the treaty was no longer subsisting and its execution became impossible, as the Tonk State ceased to exist politically and such wvereignty as it possessed was extinguished, when it covenanted with certain other States, with the concurrence of the Indian Government ·\"to unite and integrate their territories in one State, with a common executive, legislature and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan,\" the last of such covenants, which superseded the earlier . ones, having been entered into on the 30th March, 1949. ' Lastly, even assuming that the treaty was still m operation as a binding executory contract, its prov1s10ns were in no way derogated from by the application of section 7 of the Act to the present case, and the extradition warrant issued under that section and the arrest made in pursuance thereof were legal and valid and cou Id not be called in question under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nAs we are clearly of opm10n that the appellant's contention must fail on this last ground, we consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the other points raised by the Attorney- .\n\nGeneral especially as the issues involved are not purely legal but partake also of a political character, and we have not had the views of the Governments concerned on those points.\n\nIt was not disputed before us that the present case would fall within section 7 of the Act, all the requirements thereof being satisfied, if only the applicability of\n\nthe section was not excluded, under section 18, by reason of the Extradition Treaty of 1869, assuming that it still subsists. The question accordingly arises whether extradition under section 7 for an offence which is not extraditable under the treaty is, in any sense, a derogation from the provisions of the treaty, which provides for the extradition of offenders for certain specified offences therein called \"heinous offences,\" committed in the respective territories of the high contracting parties. Under article 1 the Government of the Tonk State undertakes to extradite any person, whether a British or a foreign subject, who commits a l_leinous offence in British territory.\n\nA reciprocal obligation is cast by article 2 on the British Government to extradite a subject of Tonk committing such an offence within the limits of that State. Article 3 provides, inter alia, that any person other than a Tonk subject committing a heinous offence within the limits of the Tonk State and seeking asylum in British territory shall be apprehended and the case investigated by such Court as the British Government may direct. Article 4 prescribes the procedure to be adopted and the conditions to be fulfilled before extradition could be had, and :article 5 enumerates the offences which are \"to 1)e deemed as coming within the category of heinous offences\" which, however, do not include the offences charged against the appellant.\n\nThe argument on behalf of appellant was put thus: The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is :applicable, as pointed out by McNair on The Law of Treaties, (1938-pp. 203, 204), to the interpretation of treaties. According to that rule the treaty in question should be read as allowing extradition only for the specified offences and for no others, that is to .say, as implying a prohibition of extradition by either State for any other offence than those enumerated in article\n\n5. Further, while the treaty entitled each of the high contracting parties to demand extradition on a reciprocal basis; an unilateral undertaking by the Indian Government to grant extradition for an offence for which it could not claim extradition under the treaty\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksenu\n\nTk State.\n\nPatanjali Sastrij.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksena\n\nTk Stale.\n\nPat1171iali Sas1ri].\n\nviolates the principal of reciprocity which is the recognised basis of all international compacts for extradition.\n\nSuch an arrangement places the State of Tonk in a more advantageous position which was not contemplated by the framers of the treaty. And whre, as here, the person whose surrender is demanded is an Indian subject who is not liable to be , extradited under the treaty, his surrender under section 7 trenches upon the liberty of the subject. In so far, therefore, as that sec. tion authorises extradition of a person, especially when he is an Indian subject, for an offence which is not extraditable under the treaty, it derogates from the provisions of the treaty within the meaning of section 18, and its application to the present case is thereby excluded. The argument proceeds on a misconception and cannot be accepted.\n\nNo doubt the enumeration of \"heinous offences\" in article 5 of the treaty is exhaustive in the sense that the high contracting parties are not entitled, under the treaty, to claim extradition of criminals in respect of other offences.\n\nBut we cannot agree that such enumeration implies a prolzibition against either of those parties providing by its own municipal laws for the surrender of criminals for other offences not covered by the treaty. It is difficult to imagine why the contracting States should place such a fetter on their respective legislatures in advance not only in regard to their subjects but also in regard to alien offenders, for, if such prohibition is at all to be implied, it should cover both.\n\nAs pointed out in Wheaton's International Law, there is no universally recognised practice that there can be no extradition except under a treaty, for some countries grant extradition without a treaty : (Fourth Edition, sections 116 (a) to (d), pp. 186-189).\n\nNo doubt the constitutional doctrine 'in England is that the Crown makes treaties with foreign States for extradition of criminals but those treaties can only be carried into effect by Act of Parliament : (Ibid-section 116 (b ), p. 187). Accordingly, the extradition Acts arc made applicable by an. Order in Council in the case of each State which enters into an extradition treaty\n\nwith the Crown, and they are made applicable only so far as they can be applied constently with the terms and conditions contained in the treaty.\n\nUnder such a system where the high contracting parties expressly provide that their own subjects shall not be delivered up, as in the case of the treaty between England and Switzerland, the power to arrest and surrender does not exist: Regina v. Wilson(1 ). This it was observed by Cockburn C.J. in that case, was a \"serious\n\nblot\" on the British system of extradition, and the Royal Commission on Extradition, of which he was the chairman, recommended in their report that \"reciprocity in this matter should no longer be insisted upon whether the criminal be a British subject or not. If he has broken the laws of a foreign country his liability to be tried by them ought not to depend upon his nationality ...... The convenience of trying crimes in the country where they were committed is obvious. It is . very much easier to transport the criminal to the place of his offence than to carry all the witnesses and proofs to some other country where the trial is to be held :\" (Wheaton, section 120 (a), pp. 197, 198).\n\nEvidently, similar considerations led to the passing of the Act by the Indian Legislature providing for the surrender of criminals, including Indian subjects, for a wide variety of offences, with power to the Governor-General in Council to add to the list by notification in the Gazette generally for all States or specially for any one or more States. This statutory authority to surrender cannot of course enlarge the obligation of the other party where an extradition treaty has been entered into, and this is made clear by section 18. But it is equally clear that the Act does not derogate from any such treaty when it authorises the Indian Government to grant extradition for some additional offences, thereby enlarging, not curtailing, the power of the other party to claim surrender of criminals. Nor does the Act derogate, in the true sense of the term, from the position of an Indian subject under the treaty of 1869.\n\nThat treaty created no right in the subjects of either\n\n(11\n\n3 Q B. D. 42. 5--5 S. C. India ; N.D.)/58\n\n19So\n\nDr. Babu Rom\n\nSaksma\n\nThi State.\n\nPaJanjali • .\n\nSastri J.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksma\n\nThe Stau.\n\nPatanjali Sastri j.\n\nF., J Ali j.\n\nMalrf!ia; o j.\n\nMuk/rerfea].\n\nState any more than in fugitive aliens not to he extradited for other than \"heinous offences\".\n\nIt is noteworthy that even in Wilson's case, (ubi supra) where there was an exception in the treaty in favour of the subjects of the contracting States, the decision was based not on the ground that the treaty by itself conferred any right or privilege on English subjects not to be surrendered but on the ground that the Order in Council applying the Extradition Act, 1870, to Switzerland limited its operation, consistently with the terms of the treaty, to persons other than English subjects. It is, therefore, not correct to say that, by providing for extradition for additional offences, the Act derogates from the rights of Indian citizens under the treaty or from the provisions of the treaty.\n\nWe are accordingly of opinion that the arrest and surrender of the appellant under section 7 of the Act is not rendered unlawful by anything contained in the treaty of 1869, assuming that it still subsists.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nFAzL Au J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by my brothers, Sastri and Mukherjea, who have given different reasons for arriving at the same conclusion. As I am inclined to agree with the line of reasoning in both the judgments, I concur in the order that this appeal should be dismissed.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-I agree with the judgment going to be delivered by my brother Mukherjea. For the reasons given therein this appeal should be dismissed.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come up before us on special leave granted by this Court, is directed against a judgment of Harish Chandra J. of the Allahabad High Court dated 11th of November, 1949, by which the learned Judge dismissed an application of the appellant under sections 491 and 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe facts which are material for purposes of this appeal are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows: The appellant Dr.\n\nBabu Ram\n\nSaksena, who is a resident of the United Provinces, was a member of the Executive Civil Service in that province, and during his official career, extending over 30 years, held various important posts, both in and outside that province. In January, 1948, he was appointed Administrator of the Tonk State, where a\n\ndisp.ute was going on at that time regarding succession to the rulership of the State between -two rival claimants. On 11th of February, 1948, the dispute was settled and Ismail Ali Khan was recognised as the Nawab or the Ruling Prince of the State and appellant was then appointed Dewan and Vice-President of the State Council, of which the Nawab was the President. In April, 1948, the Tonk State, together with several other States in Rajputana, integrated and formed together the United State of Rajasthan and the appellant thereupon became the Chief Executive Officer of the Rajasthan Government.\n\nTowards the end of July, 1948, he got a'nother special post under the Rajasthan Governtllent, but soon afterwards, he took leave and proceeded to Naini Tai, where he has been residing since then. On 23rd May, 1949, he was arrested at Naini Tai on the strength of a warrant issued under section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act,\n\n1903, by Shri V. K. B. Pillai, Regional Commissioner and Political Agent of the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nThe warrant, which is dated the 8th of May, 1949, was addressed to the District Magistrate of Naini Tai and directed to the arrest of Dr. Saksena and his removal to Rajasthan, to be delivered to the District Magistrate of Tonk for enquiry into certain offences :igainst the laws of that State which he was alleged to have committed. After his arrest, the appellant was released on bail in terms of the warrant itself and was directed to be present before the District Magistrate of Tonk on the 7th of June, 1949.\n\nThe allegations against the appellant in substance are, that while he was the Dewan of the Tonk State and Vice-President of the State Council, the Nawab, being in urgent need of money to meet his personal demands, requested Dr. SakSena to help him in obtaining for his own use\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nS.7kstna\n\nThe Stair.\n\nMukhtrjea ].\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nsots ... v.\n\nTM Slat<.\n\nMuklrerjea ].\n\na sum of Rs. 14 lakhs from the State Treasury.\n\nDr. Saksena promised his assistance on condition that the Nawab would give him a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs out of this amount as his share. By dint of his efforts, the appellant succeeded in inducing the State Ministry to pay the full amount of Rs. 14 lakhs to the Nawab in different instalments.\n\nThe first instalment, amounting to over Rs. 2} lakhs was paid on 31st March, 1948, and a further sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was paid on 21st of April following. On that date, it is said, the Nawab paid to Dr. Saksena a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 which was only half of the promised amount. A few days later, Dr. Saksena pressed for payment of the balance and held out threats to the Nawab that in case the money was not paid, the latter would find himself in serious difficulties as his position as a Ruling Prince of the State was not at all secure and there were grave charges against him. As a result of these threats and misrepresentations, the Nawab was induced .to pay .to the appellant the balance of Rs. 1,50,000 m two mstalments. The matter became known to the Regional Commissioner some time in November 1948 and he called Dr. Saksena for an interview and succeeded in getting back from him the entire sum of Rs. 3 lakhs which the Nawab had paid. On the basis of these facts, Dr. Saksena has been accused of having committed offences under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn 3rd June, 1949, Dr. Saksena filed an application in the High Court of Allahabad under sections 491 and 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, complaining of illegal and unauthorised detention under the warrant of the Regional Commissioner of Rajputana dated the 8th of May, 1949. The legality of the warrant and of arrest thereunder was attacked on a number of grounds.\n\nIt was contended, first of all, that the applicant was falsely implicated by the Nawab on account of enmity which grew up between them for various reasons and the allegations made were totally false. It was next said that the District Magistrate of Naini Tai could not take cognizance of the matter without the previous\n\nsanction of the U. P. Government under section 197 'of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the sanction of the Rajpramukh of the United State of Rajasthan was also necessary before any proceeding could be initiated.\n\nThe third and the main contention was that the alleged offences being said to have been committed in the State of Tonk, the case would be governed by the provisions of the Extradition Treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on 28th of January, 1869, and as neither \"extortion\" nor \"cheating\" was mentioned in the list of offences for which extradition was permissible under that Treaty, the warrant .of arrest issued under sectio~ 7 of the Extradition Act was wholly illegal and unauthorised.\n\nIt is admitted that these offences are specified in the Schedule to the Inclan Extradition Act of 1903, but it was said that section 18 of the Extradition Act expressly made the Act inapplicable when its provisions \"derogated\" from those of a Treaty. Lastly, it was urged that the extradition warrant was a mala fide step taken by the Nawab of Tonk with the help of his friend the Regional Commissioner of Rajasthan for ulterior purposes and that it constituted a fraud upon the Statute and an abuse of the processes of law.\n\nThe application was head by Harish Chandra, J. sitting singly, and by a judgment dated 11th of November, 1949, which fully and elaborately discussed the different points raised in the case, the learned Judge rejected the application of the petitioner.\n\nNo certificate was given by the High Court u_nder section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the present appeal has been, brought to this Court on the strength of special leave granted by it.\n\nSir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, who appeared in support of the appeal, has very properly not pressd before us all the points that were canvassed on behalf of his client in the Court below. His contention, in substance, is that the rights of extradition in the present case should be regulated exclusively by the provisions of the Extradition Treaty that was entered into\n\nbetween the 1'onk State and the British Government\n\nDt. Babu Ram\n\nSoa\n\nTire State\n\nMulr.her:ita},\n\n-Or. Babu Ram Sahma\n\nThe Stau Muk/ie, j.a J.\n\non 28th of January, 1869, and was subsequently modified by a supplementary Treaty in the year 1887.\n\nThis Treaty, it is argued, has not been abrogated or rendered ineffective in any way by reason of the merger of the Tonk State in the United State of Rajasthan, and the decision of the High \"Court on this point is erroneous.\n\nAccording to the provisions of this Treaty, no extradition is permissible in respect to offences of \"extortion\" and \"cheating\" with which the appellant is charged and the warrant of arrest issued by the Political Agent is consequently illegal and ultra vires. It is conceded by Sir Alladi that if section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, is held to be applicable to the facts of the present case, the warrant of arrest issued bv the Political Agent of Rajasthan could not be assaifed as invalid or inoperative; but his contention is that section 18 of the Extradition Act makes an express reservation in cases where Treaty rights exist and to the extent that the provisions of Chapter III of the Extradition Act derogate from those of any Treaty relating to extradition of offenders, the Treaty is entitled to prevail.\n\nTo appreciate the merits of this contention, it may be convenient to refer at this stage to a few sections of the Indian Extradition Act of 1903 as well as to the material provisions of the Extradition Treaty between the Toni( State and the British Government which have a bearing upon the present question.\n\nChapter III of the Indian Extradition Act deals with surrender of fugitive criminals in case of States other than foreign States and section 7, with which this chapter opens, provides as follows :\n\n\" (I) Where an extradition offence has been committed or is supposed to have been committed by a person, not being a European British subject, in the territories of any State not being a foreign State, and such person escapes into or is in British India, and the Political Agent in or for such State issues a warrant, addressed to the District Magistrate of any district in which such person is believed to be, (or if such person is believed to be in any Presidency town\n\nto the Chief J>residency Magistrate of such town), for his arrest and delivery at a place and to a person for authority indicated in the W'iffitllt such Magistrate shall act in pursuance of such warrant and may give directions accordingly.\"\n\n• • • •\n\nThe expression \"extradition offence\" has be.::n defined in section 2(b) and means \"any such offence as is described in the First Scheme to the Act.\" The First Schedule gives a catalogue of offences described with reference co specific sections of the Indian Penal Code and it includes offences punishable under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code prima facie, it seems therefore that all the conditions laid down in section 7 of the Extradition Act are fulfilled in the present case. The warrant has been issued by the Political Agent of a State which is not a \"foreign State\" as defined by the Act and the offences with which the appellant is charged are \"extradition offences\" as specified in Schedule I. Sir Alladi's contention, as stated above, is that section 7, which is in Chapter III of the Extradition Act, is controlled by section 18 which lays down that \"nothing in this chapter shall derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders, and the procedure provided by any such treaty shall be followed in any case to which it applies, and the provisions of this Act shall be modified accordingly.\"\n\nTurning now to the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government, it will be seen that the First Article of the Treaty provides for extradition, where a British subject or a foreign subject commits a \"heinous\" offence in British territory an<l seeks shelter within the limits of the Tonk State.\n\nThe Second Article deals with an offender who is a subject of the Tonk State and having committed a \"heinous\" offence within the State seeks asylum in British territory; while the Third Article relates to a person other than a Tonk subject who commits a \"heinous\" offence within the limits of the Tonk State a!lc seeks asylum in British territory. The conditions\n\nDr. BabulRam\n\nSaksma\n\nThe State •\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nDr.BU..R,,,,.\n\nSobtta\n\nT/w SloU.\n\nunder which extradition could be . had in all such cases and the procedure to be followed ate laid down in article 4. Article 5 then gives a list of offences which would be deemed as coming within the category of \"heinous\" offences. It is not disputed that neithe{ \"cheating\" nor \"extortion\" are mentioned in this list. The whole controversy, therefore, centers round the point as to whether in view of the provisions of the Extradition Treaty mentioned above, extradition could legally be made or demanded in respect of offences coming under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code which are mentioned in the list of offences speci1ied in Schedule I to the Extradition Act but do not find a place in article 5 of the Treaty. Could it be said that the provisions of the Extradition. ,:\\ct, derogate in this respect from the Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government and consequently, the terms of the Treaty would override the statute as indicated in section 18 of the Extr:iR, ition Act?\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, whc appeared £01 the Goverhment of India, put forward a two-fold argument in reply to the contention of Sir Alladi. He argued in the first place, that section 18 of the Indian Extradition Act has no application to the present case inasmuch as the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government, upon which the appellant relies, does not subsist and cannot be enforced, at the present day. The other contention is that even if the Treaty still subsists, there is nothing in its terms which prohibits extradition for offences other than those described as heinous offences in article\n\n5. It is argued that \"to derogate~· \"to . detract\" or \"to take away\" and the Schedule to the Extradition Act by mentioning certain offences, which do not occur in the list of \"heinous offences\" as given in the Treaty, cannot be said to have derogated from the terms of the Treaty. Both these points were fully argued on both sides and it is clear that if on either of these points a decision is reached adverse to the appellant, the appeal is bound to fail.\n\nS.C:R.\n\nSUPREl\\1E COURT REPORTS 587 -. , So far as the first point is concerned, Mr. Setalvad t950 has drawn our attention to various political changes --,. that have come over the Tonk State since the con- Dr.s~'t' R•m clusion of the Extradition Treaty in 1869. In 1869 :'.no Tonk was one of the Native States in India with a -Tl .. Stat•. \"separate'' political existence of its own and the Treaty that was entered _into. in that year was meant to Mukhorje• J. regulate exclusively the rights and obligations in matters of extradition of offenders as between the Tonk State on the one hand and the British Government on the other. In 1887 there was a modification of the Treaty but it is not disputed that the modifica- ·\n\ntion made certain alterations in the procedure which are not material for our present purpose.\n\nThe major political change with regard to _all Indian States which vitally affected their existing Treaties with the British Government occurred on th\" 15th of August, 1947, when India became an Independent Dominion. Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act provided inter alia that :\n\n\", (1) As from the appointed day-\n\n (b) The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States ..........\n\nAs a result of this provisiOn, the Extraqition Treaty between Tonk and the British Government must be deemed to have lapsed with effect\\ from the 15th of August, 1947 .. If matters stood there, obviously there would be nothing left upon which section 18 of the Indian Extradition Act could possibly operate. There was, howevei:, a Standstill Agreement entered into by the Indian Dominion with the Indian States, the first article of which runs as follows : \"l. (1) Until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern now existing between the Crown and any Indian State shall, in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of\n\nDr. Ba/Ju Ram\n\nSahma\n\nv. n. si.,,.\n\nIndia or, as the case may be, the part thereof, and the State.\n\n(2) In particular, and witfi2ut derogation from the generality of sub-clause (1) of this clause the matters referred to above shall include the matters specified in the Schedule to this agreement.\"\n\nThe Schedule does mention \"extradition\" as one of the matters to which the Standstill Agreement is applicable. This was certainly intended to be a temporary arrangement and Mr. Setalvad argues that as there was no Treaty in the proper sense of the term. but only a substitute for it in the shape of a temporary arrangement, section 18 of the Extradition Act which expressly mentions a Treaty cannot be applicable.\n\nWhile conceding that prima facie there is force in the contention, I think that this would be taking a too narrow view of the matter and I should assume for the purposes of this case that under the Standstill Agreement the provisions of the Treaty of 1869 still continued to regulate matters of extradition of criminals as between the Tonk State on the one hand and the Indian Dominion on the other till any new agreement was arrived at between them.\n\nThough the Standstill Agreement was to take effect after the establishment of the Indian Dominion, the Instrument was actually signed on 8th of August, 1947.\n\nOn the 16th of August, 1947, Tonk acceded to the Dominion of India and one of the terms. in the Instrument of Accession is that the \"Ruler accepts the pos1t1on that with regard to matters specified in the Schedule to the Instrument, the Dominion Legislature would be entitled to make laws for the State\". \"Extradition including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's Dominion outside India\" is one of the matters specified in the Schedule. Thus the State gave up and surrendered in favour of the Dominion Legislature its right to legislate in respect to extradition after the date of accession.\n\nWhether the existing Extradition Treaty was ipso facto abrogated by this Instrument of Acces-- sion is not so clear. Obviously, the Indian Dominion:\n\ncould pass any legislation it liked regarding matters of extradition between the Tonk State, and any other State, either Indian or Foreign.\n\nNo such law was, however, passed by the Indian Legislature except that very recently under an Adaptation Order the Extradition Act of 1903 has been made applicable to States under Group B in the Indian Constitution in which Rajasthan is included.\n\nIt is to be noted that the Extradition Act itself, which is made applicable to the United State of Rajasthan, contains an xpress provision m section 18 which safeguards ex1stmg treaty rights.\n\nIt 1s somewhat unusual that an Extradition Treaty would be subsisting even after the State had acceded to India but we have no materials before us upon which we could definitely hold that the Treaty has been expressly superseded or abrogated by the Indian Legislature.\n\nThe next important thing is that in April, 1948, there was a Covenant entered into by the Rulers of nine States including Tonk, by which it was agreed by and between the covenanting parties that the territories of these nine States should be integrated into one State by the name of the United State of Rajasthan. This was done with the concurrence of the Dominion of India.\n\nLater on, on 12th of May, 1949, Mewar also became a party to this Covenant and the United State of Rajasthan was reconstituted by the integration of the territories of all the ten States.\n\nBy the Covenant of merger, the Covenanting States aweed to unite and integrate their territories in one State known as the United State of Rajasthan and to have a common executive, legislature and judiciary.\n\nThe Rulers of all the States became members of the Council of Rulers and the President was designated as the Raj Pramukh of the United State. Article VI of the Covenant of Merger runs as follows :\n\n\"(I) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as practicable and in any event not later than the first day of May, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramuh; and thereupon-\n\nDr. Bab11 Rarrr\n\nSakseno.\n\nThe Stau.\n\nMukher.fea].\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksoia\n\nMu.t,.,, j.a ].\n\n(a) all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall vest in the United State and shall hereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder ;\n\n(b) all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall devolve on the United Sta~ and shall be discharged by it ; and\n\n( c) all the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting State shall be the assets and liabilities of the United State.\"\n\nThe question now is how far was the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government affected by reason of the merger of the State into the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nWhen a State relinquishes its life as such through incorporation into or absorption by another State either voluntarily or as a result of conquest or annexation, the general opinion of International Jurists is that the treaties of the former are automatically terminated.\n\nThe result is said to be produced by reason of complete loss of personality consequent on extinction of State life('). The cases discussed in this connection are generally cases where independent States have ceased to be such through constrained or voluntary absorption by another with attendant extinction of the former's treaties with other States. Thus the forceable incorporation of Hanover into the Prussain Kingdom destroyed the previous treaties of Hanover.\n\nThe admission of Texas into the United States of America by joint resolution extinguished the. Treaties of thr Independent Republic of Texas('). The position is the same when Korea merged into . Japan.\n\nAccording to Oppenheim, whose opinion has been relied upon by Sir Alladi, no succession of rights and duties ordinarily takes place in such cases, and as political and personal treaties presuppose the existence of a contracting State,\n\n(1) Vide Hyde on International Law, Vol. III, p. 1529.\n\n(1) Vidt Hyde on International Law, Vol. Ill, p. 1531,\n\nthy are altogether extinguisheJ. It is a debatable pomt whether succession takes place in cases of treaties relating to commerce or extradition but here again the majority of writers are of opinion that they do not survive merger or annexation (1 ).\n\nThe remarks quoted above do not, however, seem quite appropriate to a case of the present description.\n\nHere there was no absorption of one State by another which would put an end to the State life of the former and extinguish its personality.\n\nWhat happened here was that several States voluntarily united together and integrated their territories so as to form a larger and composite State of which every one of the covenanting parties was a component part. There was to be one common executive, legislature and judiciary and the Council of Rulers would consist of the Rulers of all the Covenanting States. It may not be said, therefore, that the Covenanting States lost their personality altogether and it is to be noted that for purposes of succession of Ru!ership and for counting votes on the strength of population and other purposes the Covenant of Merger recognises a quasi-separation between the territories of the different States.\n\nBut although such separation exists for some purposes between one State\n\nterritory and another. it is clear that the inhabitants of all the different States became. from the date of merger, the subjects of the United State of Rajasthan and they could not be described as subjects of any particular State.\n\nThere is no such thing as subject of the Tonk. State existing at the present day and the Ruler of Tonk cannot independently and in his own right exercise any form of sovereignty or control over the Tonk territory. The Government, which exercises sovereign powers, is only one, even though the different Rulers may have a voice in it.\n\nIt seems to us that in those altered circumstances the Extradition Treaty of 1869 has become entirelv incaoable of execution.\n\nIt is not possible for the Tnk St; te, which is one of the contracting parties to act m accordance with the terms of the treaty, for it has no longer any independent\n\n(') Oppenhein on International Law. Vol. I, p. 152.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksma\n\nThe Stale.\n\nMulclrerjea]\n\nDr. Babu Ra,.\n\nSalrs.na\n\nTl14 Stat\"\n\n592 srJPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\nauthority or sovereign rights over the Tonk territory and can neither make nor demand extradition. When as a result of amalgamation or merger, a State loses its full and independent power of action over the subject-matter of a treaty previously concluded, the treaty must necessarily lapse( 1).\n\nIt cannot be said that the sovereignty of the Tonk State in this respect is now vested in the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nThe authority, so far as extradition was concerned, was already surrendered by the Tonk State in favour of the Dominion Government by the Instrument of Accession.\n\nBut even assuming that these treaty rights could devolve upon the United State of Rajasthan by reason of article 6 of the Covenant of Merger, the latter, it seems to me, could be totally incapable of giving effect to the terms of the treaty.\n\nAs has been said already, there could be no such thing as a subject of the Tonk State at the present moment and article 2 of the Treaty which provides for extradition of Tonk subjects accused of having committed heinous offences within Tonk territory and seeking asylum elsewhere would be wholly infructuous. The United State of Rajasthan could not possibly demand extradition on the basis of this article, and if reciprocity, which 1s the essence of an Extradition Agreement, is gone, the Treaty must be deemed to be void and inoperative.\n\nThe decision in Terlinden v. Ames(•) which was relied upon by Sir Alladi in course of his arguments, rather fortifies the view that I have taken. The question there was whether an Extradition Treaty between Prussia and the U nitcd States of America, wJ1ich was entered into in 1852, could be given effect to after the incorporation of Prussia into the German Empire.\n\nThe question was answered in the affirmative. It was pointed out inter alia that the Constitution of the German Empire left sufficient independent power and sovereignty to the States composing the confederation to enable them to act upon these treaties and il was observed by Chief Justice Fuller, who delivered the opinion of the Court, that where sovereignty in respect\n\n(1) VUle Hyde on International Law, VoL III, p. 153.'1. (') 184 u. s. 270.\n\nto the execution of treaties is not extinguished and the power to execute remains unimpaired, outstanding treaties cannot be regarded as void. This is the real criterion and as obviously the power of the Tonk State to execute the treaty is altogether gone after the Covenant of Merger, the treaty cannot but be regarded as void.\n\nThe other case cited by Sir Alladi, viz., that of Lazard Brothers v. Midland Bank Ltd.(1) has absolutely no bea, ring on this point. It laid down the well accepted proposition of International Law that a change in the form of government of a contracting State does not put an end to its treaties.\n\nThe treaty entered into by the Czarist Russia could be given effect to after the Revolution, once the new government was recognised as a person in International Law.\n\nMy conclusion, therefore, is that the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the Btitish Government in 1869 is nc,>t capable of being given effect to in the present day in view of the merger of the Tonk State in the United State of Rajasthan.\n\nAs no treaty rights exist, section 18 of the Indian Extradition Act has no application and sction 7 of the Act has been complied with, there is no ground upon which we can interfere.\n\nIn view of my decision on the first point, the second point does not require determination and I refrain from expressing any opinion upon it.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nOAS J.-1 substantially agree with the reasonings given in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Mukherjea and concur in dismissing this application.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respndent : P. A. Mehta.\n\n(') (1933) A. C. 289.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaluma\n\nTill Stak.\n\nDM].", "total_entities": 220, "entities": [{"text": "BABU RAM SAKSENA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE r SttRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastrij", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 178, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 340, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States-Effect-Treaty of Extradition between British Government and Indian State-Whether subsists after merger-Extradition Act 1903", "statute": "States-Effect-Treaty of Extradition between British Government and Indian State-Whether subsists after merger-Extradition Act 1903"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 783, "end_char": 798, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States-Effect-Treaty of Extradition between British Government and Indian State-Whether subsists after merger-Extradition Act 1903", "statute": "States-Effect-Treaty of Extradition between British Government and Indian State-Whether subsists after merger-Extradition Act 1903"}}, {"text": "Independence of India Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "and the States", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1249, "end_char": 1263, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tonk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1275, "end_char": 1279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Independence of India Act, 1947, the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed ana with it all reaties and agreements in force; but under a \"standstill agreement,\" between the Indian Dominion and the States (including Tonk) all agreements between His Majesty and the States were continued, including agreements in respect of extradition."}}, {"text": "Dominion of lridia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1415, "end_char": 1433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tonk acceded to the Dominion of lridia in 1947 and became a member State of the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tonk acceded to the Dominion of lridia in 1947 and became a member State of the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Civil Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1537, "end_char": 1564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service and his services were lent to the State of Tonk in\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "State of Tonk", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1599, "end_char": 1612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service and his services were lent to the State of Tonk in\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1652, "end_char": 1665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he had reverted to the Uttar Pradesh he was charged with the offences of cheating and extortion alleged to have been committed while he was in Tonk and was arrested under an extradition warrant issued under s. 7 of the Extradition Act,\n\n1903."}}, {"text": "Tonk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1772, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After he had reverted to the Uttar Pradesh he was charged with the offences of cheating and extortion alleged to have been committed while he was in Tonk and was arrested under an extradition warrant issued under s. 7 of the Extradition Act,\n\n1903."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1836, "end_char": 1840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Independence of India Act, 1947", "statute": "Under the Independence of India Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1848, "end_char": 1863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 491 and 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1889, "end_char": 1904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Extradition Act,\n\n1903", "statute": "the Extradition Act,\n\n1903"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1940, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2003, "end_char": 2008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Extradition Act,\n\n1903", "statute": "the Extradition Act,\n\n1903"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2016, "end_char": 2031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for his release, contending that in view of the provisions of s. 18 of the Extradition Act and the Trety of Extradition of 1869, his arrest was illegal :\n\n Held per KANIA C. J. and PATANJALI SAsTRI J. (FAzL ALI J. concurring).-Even assuming that the Extradition Treaty of 1869 subsisted after the merger of the Tonk State, by providing for extradition for additional offences the Extradition Act of 1903 did not derogate .", "canonical_name": "Kania C.J."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2122, "end_char": 2138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for his release, contending that in view of the provisions of s. 18 of the Extradition Act and the Trety of Extradition of 1869, his arrest was illegal :\n\n Held per KANIA C. J. and PATANJALI SAsTRI J. (FAzL ALI J. concurring).-Even assuming that the Extradition Treaty of 1869 subsisted after the merger of the Tonk State, by providing for extradition for additional offences the Extradition Act of 1903 did not derogate .", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastrij"}}, {"text": "FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2143, "end_char": 2151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for his release, contending that in view of the provisions of s. 18 of the Extradition Act and the Trety of Extradition of 1869, his arrest was illegal :\n\n Held per KANIA C. J. and PATANJALI SAsTRI J. (FAzL ALI J. concurring).-Even assuming that the Extradition Treaty of 1869 subsisted after the merger of the Tonk State, by providing for extradition for additional offences the Extradition Act of 1903 did not derogate ."}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2321, "end_char": 2336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2503, "end_char": 2507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Extradition Act,\n\n1903", "statute": "the Extradition Act,\n\n1903"}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2614, "end_char": 2622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Babu Ram\n\nSalama\n\nThe Siok.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "ivfAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MuKHERJEA J.\n\n(FAZL\n\nAL1, ivfAHAJAN an<l DAs JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2925, "end_char": 2930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2938, "end_char": 2953, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3018, "end_char": 3022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Harish Chandra J.) dated 11th November, 1949, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3261, "end_char": 3275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Harish Chandra J.) dated 11th November, 1949, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No."}}, {"text": "Alladi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alladi, Krishnaswami /year (Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Alladi"}}, {"text": "Alladi Kuppuswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3469, "end_char": 3486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alladi, Krishnaswami /year (Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n(V.\n\nSethi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "V.\n\nSethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n(V.\n\nSethi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J. and Patanjali Sastri J. was delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court at Allahabad dismissing an application under sections 491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for release of the appellant who was arrested in pursuance of an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner of the United State of Rajasthan who is the principal officer representing the Crown in tbe territory of that State.", "canonical_name": "Kania C.J."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J. and Patanjali Sastri J. was delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court at Allahabad dismissing an application under sections 491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for release of the appellant who was arrested in pursuance of an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner of the United State of Rajasthan who is the principal officer representing the Crown in tbe territory of that State.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastrij"}}, {"text": "sections 491 and 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3817, "end_char": 3837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3847, "end_char": 3873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant who is a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service was appointed in 1948 to serve what was then known as the Tonk State in various capacities, and during such service he is alleged to have helped the Nawab in obtaining the sanction of tbe Government of India to the payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 383", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4719, "end_char": 4730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4778, "end_char": 4866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4936, "end_char": 4945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Nainital", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant was issued under section 7 of the Act to the District Magistrate, Nainital, where the appellant was residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar Pradesh Government, to arrest and deliver him up\n\nto the District Magistrate of Tonk."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5066, "end_char": 5090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant was issued under section 7 of the Act to the District Magistrate, Nainital, where the appellant was residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar Pradesh Government, to arrest and deliver him up\n\nto the District Magistrate of Tonk."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Tonk", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5129, "end_char": 5156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant was issued under section 7 of the Act to the District Magistrate, Nainital, where the appellant was residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar Pradesh Government, to arrest and deliver him up\n\nto the District Magistrate of Tonk."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5301, "end_char": 5306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 lakhs was paid to him by the Nawab to be kept in safe deposit in a bank for the Nawab's use in Delhi, that no offence was committed and that the amount was returned when demanded by the authorities of."}}, {"text": "Tonk State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Tonk State."}}, {"text": "Nainital", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5601, "end_char": 5609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various technical objections were also raised to the validity of the warrant and to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Nainital to take cogmsance of the matter and rrest the appellant: The High Court overruled all the objections and dismissed the."}}, {"text": "Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5808, "end_char": 5833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar contended that section 7 of the Act under which the warrant purports to have been issued had no application to the case and that the ' entire proceedings before the Magistrate were illegal and without jurisdiction and should be quashed."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6180, "end_char": 6189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel, relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall \"derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders,\" submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the \"Standstill Agreement\" entered into on the 8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \\>c demanded or ordered."}}, {"text": "Tonk State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6354, "end_char": 6364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel, relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall \"derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders,\" submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the \"Standstill Agreement\" entered into on the 8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \\>c demanded or ordered."}}, {"text": "28th January, 1869", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel, relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall \"derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders,\" submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the \"Standstill Agreement\" entered into on the 8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \\>c demanded or ordered."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel, relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall \"derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders,\" submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the \"Standstill Agreement\" entered into on the 8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \\>c demanded or ordered."}}, {"text": "8th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel, relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall \"derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders,\" submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the \"Standstill Agreement\" entered into on the 8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \\>c demanded or ordered."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksnld\n\nT/,.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "16th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7504, "end_char": 7521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tonk having acceded to the Dominion on the 16th August, 1947, the standstill agreement relied on by the appellant must be taken to have lapsed as from that date."}}, {"text": "Indian Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7881, "end_char": 7898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the treaty was no longer subsisting and its execution became impossible, as the Tonk State ceased to exist politically and such wvereignty as it possessed was extinguished, when it covenanted with certain other States, with the concurrence of the Indian Government ·\"to unite and integrate their territories in one State, with a common executive, legislature and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan,\" the last of such covenants, which superseded the earlier ."}}, {"text": "30th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8152, "end_char": 8168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ones, having been entered into on the 30th March, 1949. '"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8332, "end_char": 8341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8533, "end_char": 8544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9009, "end_char": 9018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9143, "end_char": 9153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9291, "end_char": 9300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9618, "end_char": 9627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the Tonk State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9632, "end_char": 9660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 1 the Government of the Tonk State undertakes to extradite any person, whether a British or a foreign subject, who commits a l_leinous offence in British territory."}}, {"text": "British", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9772, "end_char": 9779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 1 the Government of the Tonk State undertakes to extradite any person, whether a British or a foreign subject, who commits a l_leinous offence in British territory."}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9827, "end_char": 9836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9954, "end_char": 9963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10232, "end_char": 10241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "McNair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10672, "end_char": 10678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument on behalf of appellant was put thus: The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is :applicable, as pointed out by McNair on The Law of Treaties, (1938-pp."}}, {"text": "article\n\n5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11016, "end_char": 11026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastrij", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11325, "end_char": 11342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastrij.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastrij"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11805, "end_char": 11814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12102, "end_char": 12112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12291, "end_char": 12300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wheaton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12979, "end_char": 12986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out in Wheaton's International Law, there is no universally recognised practice that there can be no extradition except under a treaty, for some countries grant extradition without a treaty : (Fourth Edition, sections 116 (a) to (d), pp."}}, {"text": "sections 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13432, "end_char": 13443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England is that the Crown makes treaties with foreign States for extradition of criminals but those treaties can only be carried into effect by Act", "statute": "England is that the Crown makes treaties with foreign States for extradition of criminals but those treaties can only be carried into effect by Act"}}, {"text": "Switzerland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13924, "end_char": 13935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under such a system where the high contracting parties expressly provide that their own subjects shall not be delivered up, as in the case of the treaty between England and Switzerland, the power to arrest and surrender does not exist: Regina v. Wilson(1 )."}}, {"text": "Cockburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14033, "end_char": 14041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This it was observed by Cockburn C.J. in that case, was a \"serious\n\nblot\" on the British system of extradition, and the Royal Commission on Extradition, of which he was the chairman, recommended in their report that \"reciprocity in this matter should no longer be insisted upon whether the criminal be a British subject or not."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14739, "end_char": 14750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15299, "end_char": 15309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Babu Rom", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15814, "end_char": 15822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5--5 S. C. India ; N.D.)/58\n\n19So\n\nDr. Babu Rom\n\nSaksma\n\nThi State.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15859, "end_char": 15865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastri J.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksma\n\nThe Stau."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15874, "end_char": 15890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastri J.\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksma\n\nThe Stau.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16416, "end_char": 16431, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16849, "end_char": 16858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "English subjects not to be surrendered but on the ground that the Order in Council applying the Extradition Act, 1870", "statute": "English subjects not to be surrendered but on the ground that the Order in Council applying the Extradition Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "FAzL Au J.-I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17010, "end_char": 17022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by my brothers, Sastri and Mukherjea, who have given different reasons for arriving at the same conclusion."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17107, "end_char": 17116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by my brothers, Sastri and Mukherjea, who have given different reasons for arriving at the same conclusion.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17325, "end_char": 17332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-I agree with the judgment going to be delivered by my brother Mukherjea."}}, {"text": "11th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17653, "end_char": 17675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come up before us on special leave granted by this Court, is directed against a judgment of Harish Chandra J. of the Allahabad High Court dated 11th of November, 1949, by which the learned Judge dismissed an application of the appellant under sections 491 and 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "sections 491 and 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17752, "end_char": 17772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17945, "end_char": 17962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts which are material for purposes of this appeal are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows: The appellant Dr.\n\nBabu Ram\n\nSaksena, who is a resident of the United Provinces, was a member of the Executive Civil Service in that province, and during his official career, extending over 30 years, held various important posts, both in and outside that province.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "11th of February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18387, "end_char": 18409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th of February, 1948, the dispute was settled and Ismail Ali Khan was recognised as the Nawab or the Ruling Prince of the State and appellant was then appointed Dewan and Vice-President of the State Council, of which the Nawab was the President."}}, {"text": "Ismail Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18439, "end_char": 18454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th of February, 1948, the dispute was settled and Ismail Ali Khan was recognised as the Nawab or the Ruling Prince of the State and appellant was then appointed Dewan and Vice-President of the State Council, of which the Nawab was the President."}}, {"text": "Rajputana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18705, "end_char": 18714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In April, 1948, the Tonk State, together with several other States in Rajputana, integrated and formed together the United State of Rajasthan and the appellant thereupon became the Chief Executive Officer of the Rajasthan Government."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18751, "end_char": 18776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In April, 1948, the Tonk State, together with several other States in Rajputana, integrated and formed together the United State of Rajasthan and the appellant thereupon became the Chief Executive Officer of the Rajasthan Government."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18847, "end_char": 18867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In April, 1948, the Tonk State, together with several other States in Rajputana, integrated and formed together the United State of Rajasthan and the appellant thereupon became the Chief Executive Officer of the Rajasthan Government."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Governtllent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18940, "end_char": 18962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Towards the end of July, 1948, he got a'nother special post under the Rajasthan Governtllent, but soon afterwards, he took leave and proceeded to Naini Tai, where he has been residing since then."}}, {"text": "Naini Tai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19016, "end_char": 19025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Towards the end of July, 1948, he got a'nother special post under the Rajasthan Governtllent, but soon afterwards, he took leave and proceeded to Naini Tai, where he has been residing since then."}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19069, "end_char": 19083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23rd May, 1949, he was arrested at Naini Tai on the strength of a warrant issued under section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act,\n\n1903, by Shri V. K. B. Pillai, Regional Commissioner and Political Agent of the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19156, "end_char": 19165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19173, "end_char": 19195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "V. K. B. Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19212, "end_char": 19227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23rd May, 1949, he was arrested at Naini Tai on the strength of a warrant issued under section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act,\n\n1903, by Shri V. K. B. Pillai, Regional Commissioner and Political Agent of the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "8th of May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19338, "end_char": 19354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant, which is dated the 8th of May, 1949, was addressed to the District Magistrate of Naini Tai and directed to the arrest of Dr. Saksena and his removal to Rajasthan, to be delivered to the District Magistrate of Tonk for enquiry into certain offences :igainst the laws of that State which he was alleged to have committed."}}, {"text": "Saksena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19444, "end_char": 19451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant, which is dated the 8th of May, 1949, was addressed to the District Magistrate of Naini Tai and directed to the arrest of Dr. Saksena and his removal to Rajasthan, to be delivered to the District Magistrate of Tonk for enquiry into certain offences :igainst the laws of that State which he was alleged to have committed.", "canonical_name": "Saksena"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19471, "end_char": 19480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The warrant, which is dated the 8th of May, 1949, was addressed to the District Magistrate of Naini Tai and directed to the arrest of Dr. Saksena and his removal to Rajasthan, to be delivered to the District Magistrate of Tonk for enquiry into certain offences :igainst the laws of that State which he was alleged to have committed."}}, {"text": "7th of June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19800, "end_char": 19817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his arrest, the appellant was released on bail in terms of the warrant itself and was directed to be present before the District Magistrate of Tonk on the 7th of June, 1949."}}, {"text": "SakSena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20048, "end_char": 20055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations against the appellant in substance are, that while he was the Dewan of the Tonk State and Vice-President of the State Council, the Nawab, being in urgent need of money to meet his personal demands, requested Dr. SakSena to help him in obtaining for his own use\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nS.7kstna\n\nThe Stair.", "canonical_name": "Saksena"}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20102, "end_char": 20110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations against the appellant in substance are, that while he was the Dewan of the Tonk State and Vice-President of the State Council, the Nawab, being in urgent need of money to meet his personal demands, requested Dr. SakSena to help him in obtaining for his own use\n\nDr. Babu Ram\n\nS.7kstna\n\nThe Stair.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "S.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20112, "end_char": 20115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Extradition Act,\n\n1903", "statute": "the Indian Extradition Act,\n\n1903"}}, {"text": "Muklrerjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20186, "end_char": 20196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklrerjea ]."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20605, "end_char": 20621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2} lakhs was paid on 31st March, 1948, and a further sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "21st of April", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20668, "end_char": 20681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 lakhs was paid on 21st of April following."}}, {"text": "sections 383 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21575, "end_char": 21595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21603, "end_char": 21620, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "3rd June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21626, "end_char": 21640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd June, 1949, Dr. Saksena filed an application in the High Court of Allahabad under sections 491 and 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, complaining of illegal and unauthorised detention under the warrant of the Regional Commissioner of Rajputana dated the 8th of May, 1949."}}, {"text": "sections 491 and 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21712, "end_char": 21732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Naini Tai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22222, "end_char": 22254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next said that the District Magistrate of Naini Tai could not take cognizance of the matter without the previous\n\nsanction of the U. P. Government under section 197 'of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the sanction of the Rajpramukh of the United State of Rajasthan was also necessary before any proceeding could be initiated."}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22333, "end_char": 22349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next said that the District Magistrate of Naini Tai could not take cognizance of the matter without the previous\n\nsanction of the U. P. Government under section 197 'of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the sanction of the Rajpramukh of the United State of Rajasthan was also necessary before any proceeding could be initiated."}}, {"text": "section 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22356, "end_char": 22367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th of January, 1869", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22792, "end_char": 22813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third and the main contention was that the alleged offences being said to have been committed in the State of Tonk, the case would be governed by the provisions of the Extradition Treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on 28th of January, 1869, and as neither \"extortion\" nor \"cheating\" was mentioned in the list of offences for which extradition was permissible under that Treaty, the warrant .of arrest issued under sectio~ 7 of the Extradition Act was wholly illegal and unauthorised."}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23005, "end_char": 23020, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23138, "end_char": 23153, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23184, "end_char": 23194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23202, "end_char": 23217, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 205(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23888, "end_char": 23902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23910, "end_char": 23939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24472, "end_char": 24480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babu Ram\n\nSoa\n\nTire State\n\nMulr.her:ita},\nOr.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Babu Ram Sahma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24520, "end_char": 24534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babu Ram Sahma\n\nThe Stau Muk/ie, j.a J.\n\non 28th of January, 1869, and was subsequently modified by a supplementary Treaty in the year 1887.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Alladi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25170, "end_char": 25176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is conceded by Sir Alladi that if section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, is held to be applicable to the facts of the present case, the warrant of arrest issued bv the Political Agent of Rajasthan could not be assaifed as invalid or inoperative; but his contention is that section 18 of the Extradition Act makes an express reservation in cases where Treaty rights exist and to the extent that the provisions of Chapter III of the Extradition Act derogate from those of any Treaty relating to extradition of offenders, the Treaty is entitled to prevail.", "canonical_name": "Alladi"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25185, "end_char": 25194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Extradition Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25202, "end_char": 25230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25432, "end_char": 25442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Extradition Act, 1903", "statute": "the Indian Extradition Act, 1903"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25450, "end_char": 25465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25590, "end_char": 25605, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25835, "end_char": 25850, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Toni( State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25935, "end_char": 25946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To appreciate the merits of this contention, it may be convenient to refer at this stage to a few sections of the Indian Extradition Act of 1903 as well as to the material provisions of the Extradition Treaty between the Toni( State and the British Government which have a bearing upon the present question."}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26023, "end_char": 26064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26156, "end_char": 26165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27003, "end_char": 27015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27097, "end_char": 27111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27195, "end_char": 27212, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 383 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27255, "end_char": 27275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27283, "end_char": 27300, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27370, "end_char": 27379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27387, "end_char": 27402, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27649, "end_char": 27659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27711, "end_char": 27720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27734, "end_char": 27768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27787, "end_char": 27797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Extradition Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "BabulRam\n\nSaksma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28775, "end_char": 28791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conditions\n\nDr. BabulRam\n\nSaksma\n\nThe State •\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nDr.BU..R,,,,.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28806, "end_char": 28815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conditions\n\nDr. BabulRam\n\nSaksma\n\nThe State •\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nDr.BU..R,,,,.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Sobtta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28835, "end_char": 28841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sobtta\n\nT/w SloU.\n\nunder which extradition could be ."}}, {"text": "article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28961, "end_char": 28970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28972, "end_char": 28981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 383 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29397, "end_char": 29417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29425, "end_char": 29442, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29500, "end_char": 29533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29561, "end_char": 29570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29826, "end_char": 29836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30046, "end_char": 30056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30071, "end_char": 30086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article\n\n5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30491, "end_char": 30501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Extradition Act"}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30593, "end_char": 30608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31044, "end_char": 31052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the first point is concerned, Mr. Setalvad t950 has drawn our attention to various political changes --,."}}, {"text": "15th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31931, "end_char": 31951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The major political change with regard to _all Indian States which vitally affected their existing Treaties with the British Government occurred on th\" 15th of August, 1947, when India became an Independent Dominion."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31996, "end_char": 32005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32562, "end_char": 32572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32587, "end_char": 32602, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33661, "end_char": 33671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33679, "end_char": 33694, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "8th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34341, "end_char": 34360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the Standstill Agreement was to take effect after the establishment of the Indian Dominion, the Instrument was actually signed on 8th of August, 1947."}}, {"text": "16th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34370, "end_char": 34390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th of August, 1947, Tonk acceded to the Dominion of India and one of the terms."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34412, "end_char": 34429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th of August, 1947, Tonk acceded to the Dominion of India and one of the terms."}}, {"text": "Dominion Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34600, "end_char": 34620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Instrument of Accession is that the \"Ruler accepts the pos1t1on that with regard to matters specified in the Schedule to the Instrument, the Dominion Legislature would be entitled to make laws for the State\". \""}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35399, "end_char": 35414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35559, "end_char": 35574, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35673, "end_char": 35683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th of May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36384, "end_char": 36401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, on 12th of May, 1949, Mewar also became a party to this Covenant and the United State of Rajasthan was reconstituted by the integration of the territories of all the ten States."}}, {"text": "Mewar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36403, "end_char": 36408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, on 12th of May, 1949, Mewar also became a party to this Covenant and the United State of Rajasthan was reconstituted by the integration of the territories of all the ten States."}}, {"text": "United State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36897, "end_char": 36909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rulers of all the States became members of the Council of Rulers and the President was designated as the Raj Pramukh of the United State."}}, {"text": "Bab11 Rarrr\n\nSakseno", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37179, "end_char": 37199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article VI of the Covenant of Merger runs as follows :\n\n\"(I) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as practicable and in any event not later than the first day of May, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramuh; and thereupon-\n\nDr. Bab11 Rarrr\n\nSakseno."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksoia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37231, "end_char": 37248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksoia\n\nMu.t,.,,", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Hanover", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38710, "end_char": 38717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the forceable incorporation of Hanover into the Prussain Kingdom destroyed the previous treaties of Hanover."}}, {"text": "Texas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38806, "end_char": 38811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The admission of Texas into the United States of America by joint resolution extinguished the."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38821, "end_char": 38845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The admission of Texas into the United States of America by joint resolution extinguished the."}}, {"text": "Korea", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38964, "end_char": 38969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position is the same when Korea merged into ."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38984, "end_char": 38989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Japan."}}, {"text": "Oppenheim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39005, "end_char": 39014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Oppenheim, whose opinion has been relied upon by Sir Alladi, no succession of rights and duties ordinarily takes place in such cases, and as political and personal treaties presuppose the existence of a contracting State,\n\n(1) Vide Hyde on International Law, Vol."}}, {"text": "Vide Hyde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39232, "end_char": 39241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Oppenheim, whose opinion has been relied upon by Sir Alladi, no succession of rights and duties ordinarily takes place in such cases, and as political and personal treaties presuppose the existence of a contracting State,\n\n(1) Vide Hyde on International Law, Vol."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 41527, "end_char": 41543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Babu Ram\n\nSaksma\n\nThe Stale.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "Babu Ra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 41575, "end_char": 41582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mulclrerjea]\n\nDr. Babu Ra,.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}, {"text": "article 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42330, "end_char": 42339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42580, "end_char": 42589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prussia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43216, "end_char": 43223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question there was whether an Extradition Treaty between Prussia and the U nitcd States of America, wJ1ich was entered into in 1852, could be given effect to after the incorporation of Prussia into the German Empire."}}, {"text": "U nitcd States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43232, "end_char": 43257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question there was whether an Extradition Treaty between Prussia and the U nitcd States of America, wJ1ich was entered into in 1852, could be given effect to after the incorporation of Prussia into the German Empire."}}, {"text": "Fuller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43667, "end_char": 43673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out inter alia that the Constitution of the German Empire left sufficient independent power and sovereignty to the States composing the confederation to enable them to act upon these treaties and il was observed by Chief Justice Fuller, who delivered the opinion of the Court, that where sovereignty in respect\n\n(1) VUle Hyde on International Law, VoL III, p. 153.'1. (')"}}, {"text": "s. 270", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43817, "end_char": 43823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Btitish Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44709, "end_char": 44727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My conclusion, therefore, is that the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the Btitish Government in 1869 is nc,>t capable of being given effect to in the present day in view of the merger of the Tonk State in the United State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44899, "end_char": 44909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44924, "end_char": 44939, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45456, "end_char": 45471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45500, "end_char": 45511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respndent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram\n\nSaluma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45541, "end_char": 45557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Babu Ram\n\nSaluma\n\nTill Stak.", "canonical_name": "Babu Ram\n\nSaksena"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_594_605_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "May26.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nROMESH THAPPAR\n\nI/.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS [SHR1 HAR1LAL KANIA C. J., SA1Y1D FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI ~ASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.]\n\n[1950}\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 19, els. {I) (a) and (2), 32-Application under Art. 32-Preliminary ob1ection-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression-Law imposing restrictions for securing public order and maintenance of public safety-Validity-- Seuerability of Act-Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act tXXXIll of 1949), s. 9 ( 1-A)-Validity.\n\nHeld, by the Full Court (i) (overruling o preliminary objections) -TJnder the Constitution the Supreme Court is constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, con sistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking prota:tion against infringement of such right$,. although such applications are made to the Court in the first instance without resort to a High Court having concurrent juris-diction in the matter.\n\nUrguhar v. Brown (205 U. S. 179.) and Hooney v. Kolohan (294 U. S. 103) distinguished.\n\n(ii) Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propogation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation.\n\nEx parte /ackson (96 U. S. 727) and Lovell v. City of Griffin (303 U. S. 444) referred to.\n\nHeld per\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J.,\n\nPATANJAL.I SAsTRJ,\n\nMEHR CttAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs IJ.-(FAzL Au J. dissenting):\n\n(i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expressiofi is directed solely against the undermining of the: st:curity of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of the Art. 19 of the Constitution, although the restrictions \\vhich it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. Section 9 0-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXlll of 1949, which authorises impositions of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under cl. (2) and is therefore void and unconstitutional; (ii) Where a la\\\\' purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in langauge wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative actiOft. affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so I far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is1 not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled o~\n\nit must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Section 9 (1-A) is therefore wholly unconstitutional and void.\n\nPer FAZL Au J.-Rcstrictions which s. 9 (1-A) authorised arc within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution and s. 9 (1-A) is not therefore uncoqstitutional or void. (1)\n\nBrij BhuJhan and Another v. The State (1950) S.C.R. 60) referred to. . .\n\nORIGINAL Ju&Is01c110N: Petition No. XVI of 1950.\n\nApplication under article 32 of the Constitution for a. writ of prohibition and certiorari.\n\nThe facts are set out in the judgment.\n\nC. R. Pattabhi Ra1nan, for the petitioner.\n\nK. Rajah Ayyar, Advocate-Gene; al of Madras, (Ganapathi Ayyar, with him) fQr the opposite party.\n\n1950. May 26. The Judgment of Kania C. J., Mehr Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ. Was delivered by Patanjali Sastri, J. Fazl Ali. J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-The petitioner is the printer, publisher and editor of a recently started weekly journal in English called Cross. Roads printed and published in Bombay.\n\nThe Government of Madras, the respondents herein, in exercise of their powers under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) purported to issue an order No. MS. 1333 dated 1st March, 1950, whereby they imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal in that State. The order was published in the Fort St.\n\nGeorge Gazette and the notification ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXlII of 1949) His Excellency the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securring the public safety and the maintenance of puolic order, it is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the, date of publication of this order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross\n\nRoads an English weekly published at Bombay.\"\n\nThe petitioner cl; iims that the said order contravenes the fundamental right of the petitioner to freedom of . (1) Sec the .headnote to Brij Bhus.%an v. The Stale of Delhi, p. 60~ Infra. 6-5 S. C. India 1N.Dl 58\n\nRamesh Thappar.\n\nThe Stat• a} Madras.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSast1iJ.\n\nR..., sh 1'happar\n\nT \"- Slau of\n\nMadras.\n\nPalanjali Sastri].\n\nspeech and expression conferred on him by article 19 ( 1) (a) of the Constitution and he challenges the validity of section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act as being void undr article 13 ( 1) of the Constitution by reason of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right aforesaid.\n\nThe Advocate-General of Madras appearmg on behalf of the respondents raised a prelimmary objection, not indeed to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under article 32, but to the petitioner resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the first instance. He contended that, as a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to the High Court at Madras which under article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He cited criminal revision petitions under section 435 ot the Criminal Procedure Code, applications for bail and applications for transfer under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code as instances where, concurrent jurisdiction having been given in certain matters to the High Court and the Court of a lower grade, a rule of practice has been established that a party should proceed first to the latter Court for relief before resorting to the High Court. He referred to Emperor v.\n\nBishes11Jar Prasad Sinha( 1 ) where such a rule of practice was enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our attention also to certain American decisions Urquhart v.\n\nBrown(') and Hooney v.\n\nKolohan( ') as showing that the Supreme Court of the United States ordinarily required that whatever judicial remedies remained open to the applicant in Federal . ancl State Courts should be exhausted before the remedy in the Supreme Court-be it habeas corpus or certiorariwould be allowed.\n\nWe are of opinion that neither the instances mentioned by the learned Advocate-General nor the American decisions referred to by him are really analogous to the remedy afforded by article 32 of the Indian Constitution. That article does not merely confer power on this Court, as article 226 does on the\n\n(') I. L, R. 56 All. l58. i'j 20s u. 5. 179.\n\n(') 294 U.S. W\n\nHigh Courts, to issue certain writs for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose, as part of its general jurisdiction.\n\nIn that case it would have been more appropriately placed among articles 131 to 139 which define that jurisdiction. Article 32 provides a \"guaranteed\" remedy for the enforcement of those rights, and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental right by being included in Part UL This Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection\n\nagain.t infringements of such rights. No similar provision is to be found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider that the American decisions are in point.\n\nTurning now to the merits, there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that . freedom is ensurt:d / by the freedom of circulation. \"Liberty of circulation is as esscn tia I to that freedom as the liberty of publication.\n\nIndeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value\". Ex parte fackso11(1 ). Sec also Lovell v. City of Griffin( 2). It is therefore perfectly clear that the order of the Government of Madras would be a Yiolation of the petitioner's fundamental right under article 19(1) (a), unless section 9 (I-A) of the impugned Act under which it was made is saved by the reservations mentioned in clause (2) of article 19 w!iich (omitting immaterial words regarding laws relating to libel, slander, etc., with which we are not concemed in this case) saves the operation of any \"existing law in so far as it relates to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.\" The question accordingly arises whether the impugned Act, in so far as it purpo:-ts by section 9(1-A) to authorise the Provincial Government \"for the purpose of ''ecming the public safety or tlie maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into\n\n( 1) 96 u, s. 727.\n\n(') 303 U.S. 444.\n\nRomesh T happar v.\n\nThe Stale of Madras.\n\nPatanjali Sastri, J.\n\nRonush T happar v.\n\nTiu State of\n\nMadras.\n\nPatanjali Sastri, J.\n\nor the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents\" is a \"law relating. to any matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State.\"\n\n. The impugned Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon it by section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act, which comprises among other matters, \"public order.\" Now \"public order\" is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among titc members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the government which they have established.\n\nAlthough section 9 (1-A) refers to \"securing the public\n\nsafety\" and \"the maintenance of public order\" as distinct purposes, it must be taken that \"public safety\" is used as a part of the wider concept of public order, for, if public safety were intended to signify any matte1 distinct from and outside the content of the expression \"public order,\" it would not have been competent for the Madras Legislature to enact the provision so far as it relates to public safety. This indeed was not disputed on behalf of the respondents.\n\nBut it was urged that the expression \"public safety\" in the impugned Act, which is a statute relating to law and order, means the security of the Province, and, therefore, \"the security of the State\" within the meaning of article 19 (2) as \"the State\" has been defined in article 12 as including, among other things, the Government and the Legislature of each of the erstwhile Provinces.\n\nMuch reliance was placed in support of this view on Rex v. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison(') where it was held that the phrase \"for securing the public. safety and the defence of the realm\" in section I of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, was not limited to securing the cuntry against a foreign foe but included also protection against internal disorder such as a rebellion. The decision is not of much assistance to the respondents as the context in\n\n(') L.R. [1920] 2 K.B. 305.\n\nwhich the words \"public safety\" occurred in that Act showed unmistakably that the security of the State was the aim in view. Our attention has not been drawn to any definition of the expression \"public safety,\" nor does it appear that the words have acquired an.y technical signification as words of art.\n\n\"Public safety\" ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as securing , public safety . . The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context. In the classification of offences in the Indian Penal Code, for instance, Chapter XIV enumerates the \"offences affecting the public health, safety, convenience, decency, and morals\" and it includes rash driving or riding on a public way (section 279) and rash navigation of a vessel (section 280), among others, as offences against public safety, while Chapter VI lists waging war against the Queen (section 121), sedition (section 124-A) etc. as \"offences against the State\", because they are calculated to undermine or affect the security of the State, and Chapter. VIII defines \"offences against the public tranquillity\" which include unlawful assembly (section 141) rioting (section 146), prmoting enmity between classes (section 153-A), affray (section 159) etc. Although in the context of a statute relating to law and order \"securing public safety\" may not include the securing of public health, it may well mean securing the public against rash driving on a public way and the like, and not necessarily the security of the State.\n\nIt was said that an enactment which provided for drastic remedies like preventive detention and ban on newspapers must be taken to relate to matters affecting the security of the State rather than trivial offences like rash driving or an affray.\n\nBut whatever ends the impugned Act. may have been intended to subserve, and whatever aims its framers may have had in view, its application and scope cannot, in the absence of limiting words in the statute itself, be restricted to those aggravated forms of prejudicial activity which are calculated to\n\nRomnh T hap/HJ\n\nThe S1aJe of Madras.\n\nPaJanjali Sastri, J.\n\nRo\"\"'h Thappar\n\nThe Stall of\n\nMadras.\n\nPatanjali Sastri, J.\n\nendanger the security of the State. Nor is there any guarantee that those authorised to exercise the powers under the Act will in using them discriminate between those who act prejudicially to the security of the State and those who do not.\n\nThe Government of India Act, 1935, nowhere used the expression \"security of the State\" though it made provision under section 57 for dealing with crimes of violence intended to overthrow the Government.\n\nWhile the administration of law and order including the maintenance of public order was placed in charge of a Minister elected by the people, the Governor was entrusted with the responsibility of combating the operations of persons who \"endangered the peace or tranquillity of the Province\" by committing or attempting \"to commit \"crimes of violence intended to overthrow the Government.\"' Similarly, article 352 of the Constitution empowers the President to make a.\n\nProclamation of Emergency when he is satisfied that the \"security of India or any part of the territory thereof is thratene<l by war or bv external aggression or by internal disturbance.\" These provisions recognise that disturbance of public peace or tranquillity may assume such grave proportions as to threaten the security of the State.\n\nAs Stephen in his Criminal Law of England ( 1 ) observes : \"Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defined boundaries. All of them have in common one feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least bv the show and threat of it.\" Though all these offences thus involve disturbances of public tranqua.\n\nlity and are in theory offences against public order, the difference between them being only a difference of degree, yet for the purpose of grading the punishment to be inflicted in respect of them they may be classified into different minor categories as has been done by (')Vol. TT, p. 242.\n\nthe Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Constitutiop., in formulating the varying criteria for permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in article 19 (1), has placed in a distinct category those offences against public order which aim at undermining the security of the State or overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justification for legislative abridgement of. freedom of speech and expression, that is to say, nothing lcrs than endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of peaceable assembly \"sub-clause (b )\" and the right of association \"sub-clause ( c)\" may be restricted under clauses ( 3) and ( 4) of article 19 in the interests of \"public order\", which in those clauses includes the security of the State.\n\nThe differentiation is also noticeable in Entry 3 of List Ill (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which refers to the \"security of a State\" and \"maintenartce . of public order\". as. distinct subjects of legislation.\n\nTh~ Constittio~ thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance, treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind.\n\nIt is also worthy of note that the word \"sedition\" which occurred in article ,13 (2) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the article was finally passed as article 19 (2).\n\nIn this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendtt Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor( 1), held that \"the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency'', but the Privy Council overruled that\n\n(1) [1912] F.C.R. 38.\n\nllomesh ThaptmT\n\nThe Stale oj\n\nMadras.\n\nPatlllijali Sastri, ].\n\nTlw S<a1< ef\n\nMatku.\n\nP°'flllia/i Sanri, ].\n\ndecision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak's case( 1 ) to the effect that \"the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small\"-· King Emperor v.\n\nSadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (').\n\nDeletion of the word \"sedition\" from the draft article 13 (2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground . for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State.\n\nIt is also significant that the corresponding Irish formula of \"undermining the public order or the authority of the State\" [article 40 (6) (i) of the Constitution of Eire, 1937] did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is pos, ible. A freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse.\n\nBut the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison who was \"the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution,\" that \"it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits\": [Quoted in Near v. Mi1111esotta (')].\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech '11<1 expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of article 19, although the\n\n( 1) 22 Botn. 112.\n\n(z) L.R. 74 I. . .\\. $9.\n\n') 282 U.S. 607. 717-8\n\nrestrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. It follows that section 9 (1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.\n\nIt was, however, argued that section 9 (1-A) could not he considered wholly void, as, under article 13(1 ), an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent of the inconsistency and no more. In so far as the securing of the public safety or the maintenance of public order would include the security of the State, the impugned provision, as applied to the latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of article 19 and must, it was said, be held to he valid. We are unable to accede to this contention. 'Vhere a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the lirpits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting_ such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as if may be applied within the constitutional limits, a:s it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.\n\nIn other words, clause (2) of article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment, which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent.\n\nThe application is therefore allowed and the order of the respondents prohibiting the entry and circulatton of the petitioner's journal in the State of Madras is hereby quashed.\n\nFAZL Au J.-For the reasons given by me in B1'ij Bhushan and Another v. The State( t ), which practically\n\n( 1) [19:0] S.C.R. 601.\n\nRomesh T happat\n\nThe Slate of Madras.\n\nPatanjali Sastri, ].\n\nFal Ali ].\n\nRonush Thappar\n\nTi.. Sia/I of\n\nMadras.\n\nFad Ali,].\n\ninvolves the same question as is involved in this case,.\n\nI hold that the reliefs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted. In this view, I would dismiss this . petition, but I should like to add a few observations to supplement what I have said in the other case.\n\nIt appears to me that in the ultimate analysis the real question to be decided in this case is whether\n\n\"disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province\" and ailecting \"public safety\" will be a matter which undermines the security of the\n\nState or not.\n\nI have borrowed the words quoted within inverted commas from the preamble of the Act which shows its scope and necessity and the question raised before us attacking the validity of the Act must be formulated in the manner I have suggested.\n\nIf the answer to the question is in the affirmative, as\n\nI think it must be, then the impugned law which prohibits entry into the State of Madras of \"any document or class of documents\" for securing public safety and maintenance ofpublic order ,, hould satisfy the requirements laid down in article 19 (2) of the Constitution. From the trend of the arguments addressed to us, it would appear that if a document is seditious, its entry could be validly prohibited, because sedition is a matter which undermines the security of the State ; but if, on the other hand, the document is calculated to disturb public tranquillity and affect public safety, its entry cannot be prohibited, because public disorder and disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State. Speaking for myself, I cannot understand this argument.\n\nIn Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State( 1), I have quoted good authority to show that sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorders and an authority on criminal law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence against public tranquillity. If so, how could sedition be a matter which would undermine the security of the State and public disorders and disturbance of public safety will not be such a matter? It was argued that a small riot or a affray will not\n\n(1) [19;0) S.C.R. 605.\n\n) -!\n\nundermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer :- ( 1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There arc degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also ahd an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, frotn the layman's point of view, be -a matter which undermines the securitv of the State, but that would not affect the law whih aims at checking sedition.\n\nIt was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another.\n\nWe are here concerned with the latter aspect only.\n\nI shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected cse.\n\nPetition allotved.\n\nAgent for the petitioner :-K. /. Kale.\n\nAgent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta.\n\nBRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF DELHI. [SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India. A1t. 19. els. (I )(a) and (2)-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expreuion-Law imposing pre-censorship on newspapers for securing public safety and preventing public disorder-Validity-Matter disturbing public safety or causing public disorder, whether \"undermines the secutity of, or tends to overthrow, the State\"-Scope of Art. 19. cl. (2)-East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, sec. 7 (I) (c)-Validity.\n\nSection 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that \"the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a\n\nRomtsh T hap/HJ•\n\nThe Stau qf\n\nMadras.\n\nFaz.I Ali,].\n\n1950 May 26.", "total_entities": 122, "entities": [{"text": "ROMESH THAPPAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ROMESH THAPPAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHR1 HAR1LAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 261, "end_char": 268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518, "end_char": 522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, by the Full Court (i) (overruling o preliminary objections) -TJnder the Constitution the Supreme Court is constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, con sistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking prota:tion against infringement of such right$,."}}, {"text": "S. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090, "end_char": 1096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 727", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1277, "end_char": 1283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 444", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1717, "end_char": 1724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1866, "end_char": 1875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2828, "end_char": 2832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2890, "end_char": 2897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "C. 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J., Mehr Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "~1ahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Mehr Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Mehr Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Mehr Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3483, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Was delivered by Patanjali Sastri, J. Fazl Ali.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3504, "end_char": 3512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Was delivered by Patanjali Sastri, J. Fazl Ali.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3549, "end_char": 3565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI J.-The petitioner is the printer, publisher and editor of a recently started weekly journal in English called Cross.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Madras, the respondents herein, in exercise of their powers under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) purported to issue an order No."}}, {"text": "section 9(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3829, "end_char": 3873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1333 dated 1st March, 1950, whereby they imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal in that State."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949", "statute": "the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was published in the Fort St.\n\nGeorge Gazette and the notification ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXlII of 1949) His Excellency the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securring the public safety and the maintenance of puolic order, it is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the, date of publication of this order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross\n\nRoads an English weekly published at Bombay.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was published in the Fort St.\n\nGeorge Gazette and the notification ran as follows :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXlII of 1949) His Excellency the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securring the public safety and the maintenance of puolic order, it is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the, date of publication of this order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross\n\nRoads an English weekly published at Bombay.\""}}, {"text": "Ramesh Thappar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6-5 S. C. India 1N.Dl 58\n\nRamesh Thappar.", "canonical_name": "ROMESH THAPPAR"}}, {"text": "Palanjali Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5081, "end_char": 5097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palanjali Sastri].", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5143, "end_char": 5153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5272, "end_char": 5282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5764, "end_char": 5784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contended that, as a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to the High Court at Madras which under article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6027, "end_char": 6037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6596, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to Emperor v.\n\nBishes11Jar Prasad Sinha( 1 ) where such a rule of practice was enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our attention also to certain American decisions Urquhart v.\n\nBrown(') and Hooney v.\n\nKolohan( ') as showing that the Supreme Court of the United States ordinarily required that whatever judicial remedies remained open to the applicant in Federal ."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7036, "end_char": 7046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7135, "end_char": 7146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 131 to 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7442, "end_char": 7461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No similar provision is to be found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider that the American decisions are in point."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8517, "end_char": 8537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore perfectly clear that the order of the Government of Madras would be a Yiolation of the petitioner's fundamental right under article 19(1) (a), unless section 9 (I-A) of the impugned Act under which it was made is saved by the reservations mentioned in clause (2) of article 19 w!iich (omitting immaterial words regarding laws relating to libel, slander, etc.,"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8629, "end_char": 8638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 9(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9119, "end_char": 9133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 727", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 444", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9327, "end_char": 9333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9799, "end_char": 9810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9859, "end_char": 9913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "statute": "Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act"}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10609, "end_char": 10627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although section 9 (1-A) refers to \"securing the public\n\nsafety\" and \"the maintenance of public order\" as distinct purposes, it must be taken that \"public safety\" is used as a part of the wider concept of public order, for, if public safety were intended to signify any matte1 distinct from and outside the content of the expression \"public order,\" it would not have been competent for the Madras Legislature to enact the provision so far as it relates to public safety."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10972, "end_char": 10982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11022, "end_char": 11032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12267, "end_char": 12284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 279", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12464, "end_char": 12475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 280", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12510, "end_char": 12521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12626, "end_char": 12637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12883, "end_char": 12894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12905, "end_char": 12916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12952, "end_char": 12963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12976, "end_char": 12987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13835, "end_char": 13837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PaJanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13853, "end_char": 13869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PaJanjali Sastri, J.\n\nRo\"\"'h Thappar\n\nThe Stall of\n\nMadras.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14182, "end_char": 14211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14296, "end_char": 14306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14783, "end_char": 14794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14919, "end_char": 14924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, article 352 of the Constitution empowers the President to make a.\n\nProclamation of Emergency when he is satisfied that the \"security of India or any part of the territory thereof is thratene<l by war or bv external aggression or by internal disturbance.\""}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15194, "end_char": 15201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Stephen in his Criminal Law of England ( 1 ) observes : \"Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defined boundaries."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15225, "end_char": 15232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Stephen in his Criminal Law of England ( 1 ) observes : \"Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defined boundaries."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16014, "end_char": 16031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16189, "end_char": 16199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16794, "end_char": 16804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 17004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1912] F.C.R. 38", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18109, "end_char": 18125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "llomesh ThaptmT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18128, "end_char": 18143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llomesh ThaptmT\n\nThe Stale oj\n\nMadras."}}, {"text": "Tilak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18296, "end_char": 18301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak's case( 1 ) to the effect that \"the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small\"-· King Emperor v.\n\nSadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (')."}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18660, "end_char": 18670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19086, "end_char": 19096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19771, "end_char": 19778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison who was \"the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution,\" that \"it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits\": [Quoted in Near v. Mi1111esotta (')]."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20343, "end_char": 20353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 607", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20424, "end_char": 20430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20561, "end_char": 20570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20847, "end_char": 20856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20910, "end_char": 20924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21251, "end_char": 21261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21923, "end_char": 21933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22405, "end_char": 22412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au J.-For the reasons given by me in B1'ij Bhushan and Another v. The State( t ), which practically\n\n( 1) [19:0] S.C.R. 601.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Romesh T", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22536, "end_char": 22544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Romesh T happat\n\nThe Slate of Madras.", "canonical_name": "ROMESH THAPPAR"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23740, "end_char": 23750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "James Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24501, "end_char": 24514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State( 1), I have quoted good authority to show that sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorders and an authority on criminal law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence against public tranquillity."}}, {"text": "-P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25814, "end_char": 25826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "BRIT BHUSHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25829, "end_char": 25841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25864, "end_char": 25878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF DELHI. ["}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25886, "end_char": 25899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25906, "end_char": 25920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "MuxHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25961, "end_char": 25970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25984, "end_char": 26005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26339, "end_char": 26346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26356, "end_char": 26391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26393, "end_char": 26399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26419, "end_char": 26428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26445, "end_char": 26480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26513, "end_char": 26518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that \"the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a\n\nRomtsh T hap/HJ•\n\nThe Stau qf\n\nMadras."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_605_620_EN", "year": 1950, "text": ") -!\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 605\n\nundermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer :- ( 1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There arc degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also ahd an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, frotn the layman's point of view, be -a matter which undermines the securitv of the State, but that would not affect the law whih aims at checking sedition.\n\nIt was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another.\n\nWe are here concerned with the latter aspect only.\n\nI shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected cse.\n\nPetition allotved.\n\nAgent for the petitioner :-K. /. Kale.\n\nAgent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta.\n\nBRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF DELHI. [SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India. A1t. 19. els. (I )(a) and (2)-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expreuion-Law imposing pre-censorship on newspapers for securing public safety and preventing public disorder-Validity-Matter disturbing public safety or causing public disorder, whether \"undermines the secutity of, or tends to overthrow, the State\"-Scope of Art. 19. cl. (2)-East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, sec. 7 (I) (c)-Validity.\n\nSection 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that \"the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a\n\nRomtsh T hap/HJ•\n\nThe Stau qf\n\nMadras.\n\nFaz.I Ali,].\n\n1950 May 26.\n\nBrij Bhus\"\"' &I\n\nA'1t1lhtr\n\nT Ju S1au ef\n\nn.lhi.\n\nparticular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for crutiny.\" Held per KANIA\n\nC. J.,\n\nPATANJALI S1i.sTRI,\n\nMEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs\n\nJJ.-(FAZL ALI J. dissenting) that inasumch as s. 7 ( l) ( c) authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution for the pur- pose of preventing activities prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order, it was not a law relating to \"a matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the Stace'' within the meaning of the saving provisions contained in\n\ncl. (2) of art. 19 and was therefore µnconstitutional and void.\n\n[Romesh Thappm v. The State 1950 S.C.R. 594] followed.\n\nPer FAZL ALI J.-The expression \"public safety\"_ has, as a result of a long course of legislative practice acquired a wellrccognised meaning and may be taken to denote safety, or security of the State; and, though the expression \"public order\" is wide enough to cover small disturbances of the peace which do not jeopardise the security of the State yet, prominence given in the Act to public safety, the fact that the Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the aim and scope of the Act in general, show that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act~ and .. public order\" may well be paraphrased in the context as \"public tranquillity\".\n\nPublic J disorders which disturb the public ranquillity do undermine the security of the State and as s. 7 ( 1) ( c) of the impugned Act is aimed at preventing such disorders it is difficult to hold that it falls outside the ambit of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld by the Full Court.-The imposition of pre<ensorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential \"part of the right to freedom 0:£ speech and expression declared by art. 19 (1) (a). Blackstone's Commentaries referred .to.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1SDICTioN : PETITION No. XXIX of 1950.\n\nApplication under article 32 of the.\n\nConstitution of India for a writ of certiorari and prohibition. The facts are stated in the judgment.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee ( B. Banerji, with him) for the petitioner.\n\n M.\n\nSetaluad, Attorney-Geneal for India, (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. May 26. The judgment of Kania C. J ., Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das\n\nJJ. was delivered by Patanjali Sastri J.\n\nFAZL Au J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, with a view to examine the legality of and quash the order made by him in regard to an English weekly of Delhi called the Organizer of which the first applicant is the printer and publisher, and the second is the editor. On 2nd March, 1950, the respondent, in exercise of powers conferred on him by section 7 ( 1) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which has been extendtd to the Delhi Province and is hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, issued the following order : \"Whereas the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is satisfied that -Organizer, an English weekly of Delhi, has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action as is hereinafter mentioned is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order.\n\nNow therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, - i949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K. R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till fyrther orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz., Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintendent of Press\n\nBranch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on working days.\"\n\nThe only point argued before us relates to the constitutional validity of section 7 (1) ( c) of the impugned Act which, as appears from its preamble, was passed \"to provide special measures to ensure . public safety\n\n19j0\n\nBrij B/Uu1- Ill\n\nAltOllttr\n\nTlw Slau of\n\nD1/hi.\n\nPolaNjali &slri, J.\n\nllr{i Bhushan &\n\nAnollur.\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi.\n\nPalanjali S, utri, .7\n\n608 SUPREMl<: COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\nand maintenance of public order.\" Section 7 ( 1) ( c) under which the aforesaid order purports to have been made reads (so far as material here) as follows :-\n\n'The Provincial Government or any authority authorised by 1t 111 this behalf if satisfied tht such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny.\"\n\nThe petitioners claim that this provision infringes the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression conferred upon them by article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution inasmuch as it authorises the imposition of a restriction on the publication of the journal which is not justified under clause (2) of that article.\n\nThere can be little doubt that the imposition of precensorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of-the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by article 19(1) (a). As pointed out by Blackstone in his Commentaries \"the liberty of the press consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undonbted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public ; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press(').\n\nThe only question therefore is whether section 7 (l)(c) which anthorises the imposition of such a restriction falls within the reservation o[ caluse (2) of article 19.\n\nAs this question turns on comit!erations which are essentiallv the .<ame as those on which our decision in Petition No. XVI of 1950(') wJ' based, our judgment in that case concludes the present case also.\n\nAccordingly, for the reasons in\\licated in that judgment, we allow this petition and hereby quash the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, dated the 2nd March, 1950.\n\n(1) Blackstone's Comn:.cntaries, Vol. IV~ pp. 151, 152. (') Romtsh Thappar v. The State of Madras, supra p. 594.\n\n1950 FAUL Au J.-Tlie question raised in the , case relates to the validity of section 7(1) (c) of the East Punjab\n\nPublic Safety Act, 1949 (as extended to the Province of Delhi); which . runs as follows:-\n\nBrij Bliusltan &\n\n.dllllllrlr\n\n\"The Proyincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may, by order 'tn\n\nwriting addressed to a printer, publisher or editor- • •\n\n(c) require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny ;\"\n\nIt should be noted that the provisio11s of sub-clause ( c) are not in gen!=ral terms but are confined to a \"particular subject or . class of subjects,\" and that having regard to the context in which these words are used, they must be connected with \"public . safety or the maintenance of public order.\" ·\n\nThe petitioners, on whose behalf this provision is assailed, are respectively the printer (and publisher) , and ditor of ·. an English weekly . of Delhi called Orgamzer, and they pray for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition .. to the Chief Conimissioner, .\n\nDelhi, with . a view \"to examine . and review the\" lelity\" of and \"restrain the operation\" . of . and \"quash\" the' ·\n\norder made by him on the 2nd March, 1950, under ·. the .\n\nimpugned section, directing · them ~to . · submit . • for scrutiny, in duplicate, before . publication, till : further orders, all communal matter and news and · . views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or SUp-' . plied by the news agencJ.es .... \" The order in question\n\nrecites, among other things that the Chief Comn:iis-;\n\nsioner is satisfied that the Organizer has been publishing highly • objectionable . matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action to which refer(\\ .ce has been made is necssary for the purpose of ' preventing or combating activities\n\nTIM Stat. 'If\n\nIM!ri.\n\nFazl JfliJ.\n\nT h4 Sra/6 of\n\nD1lhi.\n\n/ia<I illi, ].\n\nprejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that notwithstanding these recitals the order complained against is liable to be quashed, because it amounts to an infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 ( l) (a) of the Constitution. Articles 19 ( l) (a) and (2), -which are to be read together, runs as follows :-\n\n\"19. (1) All citizens shall have the right- ( a) to freedom of speech and expression ;\n\n\" \" \"\n\n(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any Law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of\n\nCout or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.\"\n\nIt is contended that section 7 ( l) ( c) of the Act, under which the impugned order has been made, cannot be saved by clause (2) of article 19 of the Constitution, because it does not relate to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. Thus the main ground of attack is that the impugned law is an infringement of a fundamental right and is not saved by the so-called saving clause to which reference has been made.\n\nThere can be no doubt that to impose pre-censorship on a journal, such as has been ordered by the Chief Commissioner in this case, is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is included in the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and the only question which we have therefore to decide is whether clause (2) of article 19 stands in the way of the petitioners.\n\nThe East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, of which section 7 is a part, was passed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon 1t by section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is\n\nread with Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act, which includes among other matters \"public order.\" This . expression in the general sense may be construed to have reference to the maintenance of what is generally known as law and order in the Province, and this is confirmed by the words which follow it in Entry 1 of List II and which have been put within brackets, viz., \"but not including the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power.\" It is clear that anything which affects public . tranquillity within the State or the Province will also affect public order and the State Legislature is therefore competent . to frame laws on matters relating to public tranquillity and public order. It was not disputed that under the Government of India Act, 1935 (under which the impugned Act was passed) . it was the responsibility of each Province to deal with all . internal disorders whatever their magnitude may be and to preserve public tranquillity and order within the Province.\n\nAt this stage, it will be convenient to consider the meaning of another expression \"public safety\" which is used throughout the impugned Act and which is also chosen by its framers for its title.\n\nThis expression, though it has been variously used in different contexts (see the Indian Penal Code, .Ch. XIV), has not acquired a well-recognized meaning in relation to an Act like the impugned Act, as a result of a long course of legislative practice, and may be taken to denote safety or security of the State. In this sense, it was used in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, as well as the Defence of India Act, and this is how it was judicially interpreted in Rex v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison (1 ). T4e headnote of this case runs as follows :-\n\n\"By section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, power was given to His Majesty in Council 'during the continuance of the present war to issue regulations ...... for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm' :-\n\n(1)[1 !)l!o) 2 K. B. 305. 7-s s. c. India (N.D.)/58\n\nBrjj Bhushan &\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Delhi.\n\nFa-i:l Ali J.\n\nBrjj Bhushan (JI\n\nAnother\n\nThe Slate of\n\nDelhi\n\nfoci Ali].\n\nHeld, that the regulations thereby authorized were not limited to regulations for the protection of the country against foreign enemies, but included regulations designed for the prevention of internal disorder and rebellion.\"\n\nThus 'public order' and 'public safety' are allied matters, but, in order to appreciate how they stand in relation to each other, it seems best to direct our attention to the opposite concepts which we may, for convenience of reference, respectively label as 'public disorder' and 'public unsafety'. 1f 'public safety' is, as we have seen, equivalent to 'security of the State', what I have designated as public unsafety may be regarded as equivalent to 'insecurity of the State'.\n\nWhen we approach the matter in this way, we find that while 'public disorder' is wide enough to cover a small riot or an affray and other cases where peace is disturbed. by, or affects, a small group of persons, 'public unsafety' (or insecurity of the State), will usually be connected with serious internal disorders and such disturbances of public tranquillity as jeopardize the security of the State.\n\nIn order to understand the scope of the Act, it will be necessary to note that in the Act \"maintenance of public order\" always occurs in juxtaposition with \"public safety\", and the Act itself is called ''The East Punjab Public Safety Act.\" The prominence thus given to 'public safety' strongly suggests that the Act was intended to deal with serious cases of public disorder which affect public safety or the security of the State, or cases in which, owning to some kind of emergency or a grave situation having arisen, even public disorders of comp?ratively small dimensions may have far-reaching effects on the , security of the State. It is to be noted that the Act purports to provide \"special measures to ensure public safety and maintenance of public order.\" The words \"special measures\" are rather important, because they show that the Act was not intended for ordinary cases or ordinary situations. The ordinary cases are provided for by the Penal Code and other existing laws, and\n\nwith these the Act which purports to be of a temporary Act is not apparently concerned. It is concerned with special measures which would presumably be required for special cases or special situations.\n\nOnce this important fact is grasped and the Act is viewed in the proper perspective, much of the confusion which has been created in the course of the arguments will disappear. The line of argument advanced on behalf of the pc;_titioners is that since the Act has been passed in exercise ' of the power granted by the expression \"public order,\" used in the Government of India Act, which .is a general term of wide import, and since it purports to provide for the maintenance of public order, its provisions are intended or are liable to be used for all cases of breaches of public order, be they small or insignificant breaches or those of a grave or serious nature. This is, in my opinion, approaching the case from a wrong angle. The Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the central idea dominating it is public safety and maintenance of public order in a situation requiring special measures.\n\nIt was argued that \"public safety\" and \"maintenance of public order\" are used in the Act disjunctively and they are separated by the word \"or\" and not \"and,\" and therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of the Act providing for ordinary as well as serious cases of disturbance of public order and tranquillity. This, as I have already indicated, is a somewhat narrow and tf'chnical approach to the question. In construing the Act, we must try to get at its aim and purpose, and before the Act is declared to be invalid, we must see whether it is capable of being so construed as to bear a reasonable meaning consistent with its validity.\n\nWe therefore cannot ignore the fact that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act and that it is a special Act providing for special measures and therefore it should not be confused with an Act which is applicable to ordinary situations and to any and every trivial case of breach of public order.\n\nBrij B/iusfian Cl>\n\nAnolhn\n\nT fie State of\n\nDelhi.\n\nFiu:l Ali J.\n\nhrjj B/slulian 6f .....,,.,,\n\nTiu S1au of\n\nINlhi.\n\nFaz.I Ali].\n\nIn my opinion, the word \"or\" is us¢d here not so much to separate two wholly different c'Oncepts as to show that they are closely allied concepts and can be used almost interchangeably in the context. I think that \"public order\" may well be paraphrased in the context as public tranquillity and the words \"public safety\" and \"public order\" may be read as equivalent to \"security of the State\" and \"public tranquillity.\"\n\nI will now advert once more to clause (2) of article 19 and state what I consider to be the reason for inserting in it the words \"matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.\" It is well recognized in all systems of law that the right to freedom of speech and expression or freedom of the press means that any person may write or say what he pleases so long as he does not infringe the law relating to libel or slander or to blasphemous, obscene or seditious words or writings : (see Halsb\\lfy' s Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Vol. II, page 391).1 This is practically what has been said in clause (2) of article 19, with this difference only that instead of using the words \"law relating to sedition,\" the framers of the Constitution have used the words mentioned above.\n\nIt is interesting to note that sedition was mentioned in the original draft of the Constitution, but subsequently that word was dropped and the words which I have quoted were inserted. I think it is not difficult to discover the reason for this change and I shall briefly state in my own words what I consider it to be.\n\n, The latest pronouncement by the highest Indian tribunal as to the law of sedition is to be found in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v.\n\nThe King(') which has been quoted again and again and in which Gwyer C. J. laid down that public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or likehood of public disorder, is the gist of the offence of sedition and \"the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or\n\n(1) [194•] •. c. ll, 38.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'f REPORTS. 61~\n\nmust be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency.\" For this. view, the learned Chief Justice relied on certain observations of Fitzgerald J. in R. v. Sullivan(1)1, and he also added that he was content to adopt \"the words 6£ tliat learned Judge which are to be found in every book dealing with' this branch of the criminal\n\nlaw.\" There is no doubt that what Gwyer C. J. has stated in that case repre8ents the view of a number of Judges and authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating to the law of sedition [R. v.\n\n· Burns (1 ) said :-\n\n\"The law upon the question of what is seditious and what is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater kaowledge of criminal law than any other Judge who sits . upon the Bench, and what he has said upon the . $Ubject of sedition was submitted to the other Judges, who sometime back were engaged with him in drafting a criminal code, and upon their report the Commissioners say . that his statement of law appears to them to be stated accurately as it exi5\"s at present.\"\n\nThe decision. of Gwyer C. J. held the field for several years until the Privy Council, dealing with a case under the Defence of India Rules, expressed the view in King Emperor v.\n\nSadhashiv Narayan Bhalerao (8 ) that the test laid down by thG learned Chief Justice . was not applicable in India where the offence under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code should be construed with reference to the words used in that section. They also added :-\n\n''The word 'sedition' does not occur either in section 124A or in the Rule ; it is only found as a marginal note to section 124A, and Is not an operative part of the section, but merely provides the name by which the crime defined in the section will be known.\n\n(1) [1868]'11 Cox. C.C. 44. (') [1886] 16. Cox. 355. (•) 74 I.A. 89.\n\nUl50\n\nBrij Bhushan 6f\n\nAllDl/ur ·\n\nTlllS1ai. of\n\nDllhi.\n\nFa.ti Ali].\n\nBrij Bhushan &\n\nAnothlr\n\nTJr. Stau qf\n\nDelhi.\n\nFa:/ Ali]·\n\nThere can be no justification for restricting the contents of the section by the marginal note. In England there is no statutory definition of sedition ; its meaning and content have been laid down in many decisions, some of which are referred to by the Chief Justice, but these decisions are not relevant when you have a statutory definition of that which is termed sedition as we have in the present case.\n\nTheir Lordships are unable to find anything in the language of either section 124A or the Rule which could suggest that 'the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that this is their intention or tendency.' \"\n\nThe framers .of the Constitution must have therefore found themselves face to face with the dilemma as to whether the word \"sedition\" should be used in article 19 (2) and if it was to be used in what sense it was to be used. On the one hand, they must have had before their mind the very widely accepted view supported by numerous authorities that sedition was essentially an offence agai11.st public tranquillity and was connected in some way or other with public disorder ; and, on the other hand, there was the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee that sedition as defined in the Indian Penal Code did not necessarily imply any intention or tendency to incite disorder.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is not surprising that they decided not to use the word \"sedition\" in clause (2) but used the more general. words which cover sedition and everything else which makes sedition such a serious offence.\n\nThat sedition does undermine the security of the State is a matter which cannot admit of much doubt. That it undermines the security of the State usually through the medium of public disorder is also a matter on which eminent Judges and jurists are agreed.\n\nTherefore it is difficult to hold that public disorder or disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUJ?REME COURT REPORTS 617\n\nIt will not be out of place to quote here the following passage from Stephen's Criminal Law of England (Vol. If, pp. 242 and 243) :-\n\n\"It often happens, however, that the public peace is disturbed by offences which without tending to the subversion of the existing political constitution practically subvert the authority of the Government over a greater or less local area for a longer or shorter time.\n\nThe Bristol riots in 1832 and the Gordon riots in 1780 are instances of this kind.\n\nNo definite line. can be drawn between insurrections of this sort, ordinary riots, and unlawful assemblies. The difference between a meeting stormy enough to cause well-founded fear of a breach of the peace, and a civil war the result of which may determine the course of a nation's history for centuries, is a difference of degree. Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other, and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defirute boundaries.\n\nAll of them haye in common one feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least by the show and threat of it.\n\nAnother class of offences against public tranquillity are those in which no actual force is either employed or displayed, but in which steps are taken tending to cause it.\n\nThese are the formation of secret societies, seditious conspiracies, libels or words spoken.\n\nUnder these tcrnal public arranged.''\n\ntwo heads all offences against the intranquillity of the State may be\n\nThis passage brings out two matters with remarkable clarity. It shows firstly that sedition is essentially an offence against public tranquillity and secondly that broadly speaking there are two classes of offences agaihst public tranquillity : (a) those accompanied by violence including disorders which\n\nBrij BhushfJJI &\n\nAnoth.r\n\nThe State of Delhi.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n.Brij B.- l'I .,,..,,,,,\n\nTA1St.u of\n\nDI/Iii.\n\nFatJ .Ali J.\n\naffect tranquillity of a considerable number of persons or an extensive local area, and (b) those not accompaI).icd by violence but tending to cause it, such as seditious utterances, seditious conspiracies, etc.\n\nBoth these classes of offences are such as will undermine. the security of the State or tend to overthrow it if left unchecked, and, as I have tried to point out, there is a good deal of authoritative opinion in favour of the view that the gravity ascribed to sedition is due to the fact that it tends to seriously affect the tranquillity and security of .the tate. In principle, en, .it would not have been logical to Icfer to sedioon m clause (2) of article . 19 and omit matters .which are no less grave and which have equal potentiality for undermining the security of the State.\n\nIt appears that the framers of the Constitution preferred to adopt the logical course and have used the more general and basic words which are apt to cover sedition as well as other matters which are as detrimental to the security of the State as sedition.\n\nIf the Act is to be viewed as I have suggested, it is difficult to hold that section 7 ( 1) ( c) falls outside the ambit of article 19 ( 2). That clause clearlystates that nothing in clause ( 1) (a} shall affect the operation of any existing law relating to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. I have tried to show that public disorders and disturbance of public tranquillity do undermine the security of the State . and if the Act is a law aimed at preventing such disorders, it fulfils the requirement of the Constitution. It is needless to add that the word \"State\" has been defined in article 12 of the Constitution to include \"the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of Jndia.\"\n\nI find that section 20 of the impugned Act provides that the Provincial Government may by notification\n\ndeclare that the whole or any part of the Province as may be specified in the notifiGation is a dangerously disturbed area. This provision has some bearing on the aim and object of the Act, and we cannot overlook it when considering its scope. It may be incidentally mentioned that we have been informed that, under this section, Delhi Province has been notified to be a \"dangerously disturbed area.\"\n\nIt must be recognized that freedom of speech and expression is 'one of the most valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen bv the Constitution and should be jealously guarded by the Courts.\n\nIt must also be recognised that free political discussion is essential for the proper functioning of a democratic government, aad the tendency af modern jurists is to deprecate censorship though they all agree that \"liberty of the press\" is not to be confused with its \"licentiousness.\" But the Constitution itself has prescribed . certain limits for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression and this Court is only called upon to sec whether a particular case comes within those limits.\n\nIn my opinion, the law which is impugned is fully saved by article 19 (2) and if it cannot he successfully assailed it is not possible to grant the remedy which the petitioners arc seeking here.\n\nAs has been stated already, the order which is impugned in this case recites that the weekly Organizer has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat of public law and order\" and that the action which it is proposed to take against the petitioners \"is necessary for the. purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to public safety or . the maintenance of public order.\" These facts arc supported by an affidavit sworn by the Home .\n\nSecretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among other things that the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with the C-cntral Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the AU-India Newspaper Editors' Conference and is . composed of 8---5 S. C. India (N.D.J/58\n\nBrij BJ111shtJ11 f.! btit,,,.\n\nTllA Stnttef\n\nD1/hi.\n\nT t.. SlotL ef\n\nDll/O.\n\nTtll!l ,(Ji J.\n\nreprcsentati ves of some of the lc;.ding papen such as The Hind•stao Times, Stausmtm, etc.\n\nIn my tipinion, there can be no doubt that the Chief Commissioner has purported to act in this case within the sphere within which he is pemiitted to act under the Jaw, and it is beyond the power of this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners.\n\nIn these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners' application.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners : Ganpat RJli.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nQIPN-S1-5 S. C. Indi• (N. D.)/58.-27-2-59-500.", "total_entities": 118, "entities": [{"text": "-K. /. Kale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner :-K. /. Kale."}}, {"text": "-P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "-P. A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1040, "end_char": 1064, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1071, "end_char": 1089, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1092, "end_char": 1115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1134, "end_char": 1150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1152, "end_char": 1170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1192, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1195, "end_char": 1216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1656, "end_char": 1691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1724, "end_char": 1729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that \"the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a\n\nRomtsh T hap/HJ•\n\nThe Stau qf\n\nMadras."}}, {"text": "Brij Bhus", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2149, "end_char": 2158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brij Bhus\"\"' &I\n\nA'1t1lhtr\n\nT Ju S1au ef\n\nn.lhi.", "canonical_name": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "MEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2336, "end_char": 2355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA\n\nC. J.,\n\nPATANJALI S1i.sTRI,\n\nMEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs\n\nJJ.-(FAZL ALI J. dissenting) that inasumch as s. 7 ( l) ( c) authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by art.", "canonical_name": "MEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2357, "end_char": 2366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA\n\nC. J.,\n\nPATANJALI S1i.sTRI,\n\nMEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs\n\nJJ.-(FAZL ALI J. dissenting) that inasumch as s. 7 ( l) ( c) authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by art.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA\n\nC. J.,\n\nPATANJALI S1i.sTRI,\n\nMEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs\n\nJJ.-(FAZL ALI J. dissenting) that inasumch as s. 7 ( l) ( c) authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by art.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2422, "end_char": 2426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2554, "end_char": 2561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2986, "end_char": 2994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per FAZL ALI J.-The expression \"public safety\"_ has, as a result of a long course of legislative practice acquired a wellrccognised meaning and may be taken to denote safety, or security of the State; and, though the expression \"public order\" is wide enough to cover small disturbances of the peace which do not jeopardise the security of the State yet, prominence given in the Act to public safety, the fact that the Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the aim and scope of the Act in general, show that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act~ and .. public order\" may well be paraphrased in the context as \"public tranquillity\".", "canonical_name": "Fazl JfliJ."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3911, "end_char": 3921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4148, "end_char": 4155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Blackstone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blackstone's Commentaries referred .to."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4276, "end_char": 4286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4399, "end_char": 4415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee ( B. Banerji, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "B. Banerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4418, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee ( B. Banerji, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nSetaluad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.\n\nSetaluad, Attorney-Geneal for India, (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M.\n\nSikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.\n\nSetaluad, Attorney-Geneal for India, (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4579, "end_char": 4587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C. J .,"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Mehr Chand Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4611, "end_char": 4629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "MEHR\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4645, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das\n\nJJ.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4692, "end_char": 4699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Patanjali Sastri J.\n\nFAZL Au J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment.", "canonical_name": "Fazl JfliJ."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, with a view to examine the legality of and quash the order made by him in regard to an English weekly of Delhi called the Organizer of which the first applicant is the printer and publisher, and the second is the editor.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "2nd March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd March, 1950, the respondent, in exercise of powers conferred on him by section 7 ( 1) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which has been extendtd to the Delhi Province and is hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, issued the following order : \"Whereas the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is satisfied that -Organizer, an English weekly of Delhi, has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action as is hereinafter mentioned is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Shankar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5955, "end_char": 5969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, - i949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K. R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till fyrther orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Brij Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6032, "end_char": 6044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, - i949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K. R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till fyrther orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz.,", "canonical_name": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "K. R. Halkani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6077, "end_char": 6090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, - i949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K. R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till fyrther orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6246, "end_char": 6254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, - i949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K. R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till fyrther orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Press Trust of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6377, "end_char": 6397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintendent of Press\n\nBranch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on working days.\""}}, {"text": "United Press of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6399, "end_char": 6420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintendent of Press\n\nBranch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on working days.\""}}, {"text": "United Press of America", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6425, "end_char": 6448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintendent of Press\n\nBranch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on working days.\""}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6719, "end_char": 6728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PolaNjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PolaNjali &slri, J.\n\nllr{i Bhushan &\n\nAnollur."}}, {"text": "Bhushan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6944, "end_char": 6951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PolaNjali &slri, J.\n\nllr{i Bhushan &\n\nAnollur."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nDelhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6969, "end_char": 6984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nDelhi.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nDelhi"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7080, "end_char": 7089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7787, "end_char": 7800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8184, "end_char": 8197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8596, "end_char": 8605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8713, "end_char": 8723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9303, "end_char": 9315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9340, "end_char": 9363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Brij Bliusltan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9431, "end_char": 9445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "runs as follows:-\n\nBrij Bliusltan &\n\n.dllllllrlr\n\n\"The Proyincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may, by order 'tn\n\nwriting addressed to a printer, publisher or editor- • •\n\n(c) require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny ;\"\n\nIt should be noted that the provisio11s of sub-clause ( c) are not in gen!=ral terms but are confined to a \"particular subject or .", "canonical_name": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Proyincial Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9467, "end_char": 9488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "runs as follows:-\n\nBrij Bliusltan &\n\n.dllllllrlr\n\n\"The Proyincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may, by order 'tn\n\nwriting addressed to a printer, publisher or editor- • •\n\n(c) require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny ;\"\n\nIt should be noted that the provisio11s of sub-clause ( c) are not in gen!=ral terms but are confined to a \"particular subject or ."}}, {"text": "Fazl JfliJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11344, "end_char": 11355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl JfliJ.\n\nT h4 Sra/6 of\n\nD1lhi.", "canonical_name": "Fazl JfliJ."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11701, "end_char": 11711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11742, "end_char": 11753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12399, "end_char": 12409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12978, "end_char": 12988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13099, "end_char": 13109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13153, "end_char": 13188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13199, "end_char": 13208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13307, "end_char": 13318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13326, "end_char": 13355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13382, "end_char": 13425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "was not disputed that under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14716, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15198, "end_char": 15207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brjj Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15494, "end_char": 15506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-s s. c. India (N.D.)/58\n\nBrjj Bhushan &\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Delhi.", "canonical_name": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15523, "end_char": 15537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-s s. c. India (N.D.)/58\n\nBrjj Bhushan &\n\nAnother\n\nThe State of Delhi.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nDelhi"}}, {"text": "Brjj Bhushan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fa-i:l Ali J.\n\nBrjj Bhushan (JI\n\nAnother\n\nThe Slate of\n\nDelhi\n\nfoci Ali].", "canonical_name": "BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17680, "end_char": 17690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19924, "end_char": 19926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20420, "end_char": 20430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20910, "end_char": 20917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well recognized in all systems of law that the right to freedom of speech and expression or freedom of the press means that any person may write or say what he pleases so long as he does not infringe the law relating to libel or slander or to blasphemous, obscene or seditious words or writings : (see Halsb\\lfy' s Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21009, "end_char": 21019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21691, "end_char": 21696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", The latest pronouncement by the highest Indian tribunal as to the law of sedition is to be found in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v.\n\nThe King(') which has been quoted again and again and in which Gwyer C. J. laid down that public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or likehood of public disorder, is the gist of the offence of sedition and \"the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or\n\n(1) [194•] •. c. ll, 38."}}, {"text": "Fitzgerald", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22133, "end_char": 22143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "view, the learned Chief Justice relied on certain observations of Fitzgerald J. in R. v. Sullivan(1)1, and he also added that he was content to adopt \"the words 6£ tliat learned Judge which are to be found in every book dealing with' this branch of the criminal\n\nlaw.\""}}, {"text": "James Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22483, "end_char": 22496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that what Gwyer C. J. has stated in that case repre8ents the view of a number of Judges and authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating to the law of sedition [R. v.\n\n· Burns (1 ) said :-\n\n\"The law upon the question of what is seditious and what is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater kaowledge of criminal law than any other Judge who sits ."}}, {"text": "Cave", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22515, "end_char": 22519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that what Gwyer C. J. has stated in that case repre8ents the view of a number of Judges and authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating to the law of sedition [R. v.\n\n· Burns (1 ) said :-\n\n\"The law upon the question of what is seditious and what is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater kaowledge of criminal law than any other Judge who sits ."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22733, "end_char": 22740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that what Gwyer C. J. has stated in that case repre8ents the view of a number of Judges and authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating to the law of sedition [R. v.\n\n· Burns (1 ) said :-\n\n\"The law upon the question of what is seditious and what is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater kaowledge of criminal law than any other Judge who sits ."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23432, "end_char": 23437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was not applicable in India where the offence under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code should be construed with reference to the words used in that section."}}, {"text": "section 124A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23462, "end_char": 23474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23482, "end_char": 23499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 124A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23637, "end_char": 23649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 124A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23706, "end_char": 23718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 124A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24530, "end_char": 24542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24887, "end_char": 24897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25321, "end_char": 25338, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bristol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26496, "end_char": 26503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bristol riots in 1832 and the Gordon riots in 1780 are instances of this kind."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28036, "end_char": 28044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\n.Brij B.- l'I .,,..,,,,,", "canonical_name": "Fazl JfliJ."}}, {"text": "FatJ .Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28096, "end_char": 28105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FatJ .Ali J.\n\naffect tranquillity of a considerable number of persons or an extensive local area, and (b) those not accompaI).icd by violence but tending to cause it, such as seditious utterances, seditious conspiracies, etc."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29243, "end_char": 29252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29290, "end_char": 29300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29798, "end_char": 29808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29860, "end_char": 29879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is needless to add that the word \"State\" has been defined in article 12 of the Constitution to include \"the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of Jndia.\""}}, {"text": "Government of Jndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30030, "end_char": 30049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is needless to add that the word \"State\" has been defined in article 12 of the Constitution to include \"the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of Jndia.\""}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30065, "end_char": 30075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31306, "end_char": 31316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "C-cntral Press Advisory Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32075, "end_char": 32108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among other things that the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with the C-cntral Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the AU-India Newspaper Editors' Conference and is ."}}, {"text": "AU-India Newspaper Editors' Conference", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32154, "end_char": 32192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among other things that the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with the C-cntral Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the AU-India Newspaper Editors' Conference and is ."}}, {"text": "Ganpat RJli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32806, "end_char": 32817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners : Ganpat RJli."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32846, "end_char": 32857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "-P. A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32865, "end_char": 32867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_621_741_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nPROVINCE OF BOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nKUSALDAS S. ADV ANI AND OTI; IERS\n\n[SHRI fuRILAL KANIA c. J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMt:KHERJV.A and DAs JJ.]\n\nBombay I.And Requisition Ordinance ( V of 1947), ss. 3, 4, 10, 12-0rder requisitioning Land-Application for writ of certiorari -Order of requisition, whether judicial or quasi-judicial act, or administrative act-Construction of s. 3-Existence of public purpose, whethe1 condition precedent to exercise of power to requisition -Whether collateral fact or compo, site part of power to requisition- Distinction between jujicial or quasi-judicial acts, and administr• tive acts-Guiding principles and tests-Writ of certiorari-Nature and incidents of the writ- -Power of High Court to issu' writ ogainst Provincial Government-Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 176, 306-\"Sue,\" meaning of.\n\nHeld by the Full Court, (KANIA C. J., FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR . CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.).-A writ of ceitiorari lies whenever a body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in exess of their legal authority ; it docs not lie to remove or adjudicate upon an order which is of an administrative or ministerial nature.\n\nSection 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947) provided as follows:-\"If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so the Provincial Government may, by order in writing requisition any land for any public purpose: Provided that no land used for the purpose of public religious worship or for any purpose which the Provincial Government may specify by notification in the Official\n\nGazette shall be requisitioned under this section.\" The l st respondent wbo was a refugee from Sind got an assignment of the tenancy rights in a flat in Bombay and went into possession of the flat.\n\nA few days later the Government of Bombay issued an order requisitioning the Rat under s. 3 of the abovesaid Ordinance, allotte~ the samo:: to another refugee and issued orders to an Inspector to take possession of the same. On an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, a writ of certiorari was issued by the Bombay High Court against the Province of Bombay and others and this order was confirmed on appeal as against the Province of Bombay by a Division Bench of the said High Court.\n\nHeld, per KANIA C. J., FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTR1 and DAs\n\n]J. (MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ. dissenting)-that on a proper construction of s. 3 of the Ordinance the decision of the Bombay Government that the property was required for a public\n\nSept. 15.\n\nProvince. of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advtmi\n\nad OtherJ.\n\npurpose was no.~ a judicial or quasi-judicial decision but an ad- 1ninistrative act and the High Court of Bombay had therefore no jurisdiction to issue a writ of ceriiorari in respect of the order of requisition.\n\nPer MAHAJAN and MuKlffiRJEA Jj. (contra).-The Go\\ernn1ent of Bombay is a body of persons having legal authority co d<; terminc questions affecting the rights of subjects and in deciding whether a land was required for a public purpose under s. 3 of the Ordinance it had to :ict judicially. The conditions necessary for the granting of a \\\\'rit of certiorari were accordingly satisfied :ind the. J Jigh Court of. Bo1nhay had power .to issue the \\\\'rit. ~\n\nKANIA C. J.-Though a writ of certiorari 1nay be issued where a body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affectin,;; the rights of subjects anJ haYing a duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority, yet merely because an c::xe~ cutive authoritv has to detern1ine certain objective facts affe-.:ting the rights of subjects as a prelin1inary step to the discharge of an executive function it does not follow that it tnust determine those facts judicially. On the contrary, when the executive authority has to forn1 an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the deter~ mination of the ohjectivc iai.::t anJ the exercise of the power based thereon are alike nlatters of an administrative character and arc not amenable to the \\\\'rit of certiorari.\n\nIt cannot be laid do\\vn broadly that in order that a deter~ mination may be a judicial or quasi-judicial one there must be a proposition and an opposition, or that a /is is necessary, or that it is necessary that there should be right to exan1inc, cross-examine and re-examine witnc-sscs.\n\nThe true test is whether the law, under which the authQrity is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach.\n\nPrescribed forms are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision wellrccognised principles of approach are required to be followed.\n\nFAZL ALt J .-The mere fact that au executive authority has: to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference and the real test is: is there any duty to decide judicially. There is nothing in s. 3 or any other section of the Ordinance in question which imposes expressly or impliedly a dutv on the Provincial Government to decide the existence of a\n\npubli~ purpose judicially or quasi-judicially.\n\nIt is well settled that \\vhen an .'\\.ct or regulation cotnmits to an executive authority the decision o{ what is necessary or expedient and that authority make the decision, it is not comt to the courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the dcci>ion in the absence of an allegation of bad faith, and the opinion formed by the Provincial Government whether it is necessary or expedient to acquire land, give<: a public purpooe,\n\ncannot therefore be questioned. The same cannot be said with\n\nregard to the decision of the Provincial Government as to the existence of a public purpose which is the foundation of its power and is a condition precedent to its exercise. The determination of the public purpose and the opinion formed as to the necessin\" ot\" expediency of requisition do not form one psychological process but are two distinct and independent steps and if the executive authority requisitions land under s; 3 without . there being a public purpose in existence its action would be a nullity, and the person whose right is affected can go to the proper court ana claim a declaration that his rights cannot be affected. An application for certiorari would not, however, lie in such a case as the requisition of premises under s~ 3 of the Ordinance is a purely administrative act and docs not involve any duty to decide the. existence of a public purpose or any other marw judicially or quasi-judicially.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The question whether an act is a judidal or a quasi-judicial one or a purely executive act depends on the terms of the particular rule and the nature, scope and effect of the puticular power in cxcccisc of which the act may be done and would therefore depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nThe question whether a land is required for a public purpose or is being used for public worship involves difficult questions of law and fact seriously affecting the rights of parties.\n\nThe.o; e are not questions for the mere determination of the Government subjectively by its own opinion, but are matters for determination objectively and in a judicial manner, on materials which , the Governmrent have sufficient power to call for under ss; 10 and 12 of the Ordinance after hearing any opposition to its proposal, and the High Court of Bombay had therefore jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.\n\nMU!(HERJEA J.-Undcr s. 3 of the Ordinance, the act of requisitioning land is left to the_ executive discretion of the Provincial Government. But the section makes the existence of a public purpose an cssentiai pre-requisite to the taking of steps by the Provincial Government in the matter of requisitioning any property and under th, e section the essential fact on which the jurisdiction to proceed with the requisition is founded is the existence of a public purpose as an objective fact, and not the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government that such fact exists.\n\nWhether a public purpose exists or not has to be determined judicially as there is a lis or controversy between the interest of the public on the one hand and th:lt of the individual who owns the property on the other hand, and the determination. of the Government was therefore a judicial act; the detemiination was further a collateral matter on which the jurisdiction to requisition was ' founded, and not a part of the executive act of\n\n19.';0\n\nProoifl<I of\n\nBombay ...\n\nK. S. r'lilvani\n\ntJlllf Otherr,\"\n\n19.JO\n\nPn1vinu of\n\nBt1mboy\n\nK. S. Advani ft Ollurs.\n\nrequisitioning, and a writ of certiMIJl'i could therefore be issued in the \"'1SC,\n\nDAs J.-The words \"to do so\" in s. 3 of the Ordinance refer to the entire composite matter of \"requisitioning for a public purposc,11 not n1erely to the act of requisitioning sirnplicitcr and the existence of a public purpose was left as much to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government as the necessity or expediency for requisitioning a particular l_and.\n\nAs the formation of \"the opinion on the entire matter was purely subjective and the order of requisition was to be founded on this subjective opinion, it was not a judicial or quasi-judicial act buta purely administrative act ::1:nd consequently it was not a matter in respect of which a writ. of certiorari could be issued. Even on the assumption that the question of the existence of a public purpose had not been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Govern1nent and that the question had to be determined by it, there was nothing in s. 3 to suggest that such determination had to be made judicially and a 'vrit of certiorari would not in any case lie.\n\nEven if the existence of a public purpose \\Vas a collateral fact, then at best it was only a case of an administrative body assuming jurisdiction to pcrfonn its administratiYe powers, and if it assumes jurisdiction pn an erroneous assumption it might be corrected by an action, but certiorari cannot be an appropriate remedy; and assun1ing further that this collateral fact had to be decided quasi-judicially and its decision might be quadied, the administrative act, namely the for1nation of opinion and the order based _thCreon wotild still remain unaffected by certiorati. . ' In order that a body may be a quasi-judicial body it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine qhcstions .-affecting the rights of subjects; there must be supcradded to th:it\n\ncharacteristic the further characteristic that the body has the J4ty to act judicially.\n\nIf a statute empowers an al; lthority not being a court in the ordinary sense to . decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one patty under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who arc oppt>scd to each othr, there is a lis and prima J11cie, and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasijudicial act.\n\nJf a statutory body . has power to do any act which will pre1udicially affect the subject, then although there arc not two par.lies apart from the authority, and .the contest is between the\n\n11uoi:i~ -proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the\n\n6ul . clctumination of thc autlu>rity will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judiciaUJ.\n\nA mere provision for an enquiry s a preliminary tp to coming to a decision will not necessarily m?kc the dcc1S1on a quasi-judicial act; for, the purpose of the enquiry ay only be to enable the deciding authority to make up its mmd to do what may be a purely administrative act.\n\nHeld, per\n\nKANI4 C. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, and Dit.s JJ.-The powers given to the Provincial Government under ss. IO and 12. of the Ordinance are only enabling and in terms arc not compulsory, and there is , nothing in these sections which makes it incumbent on the Government to act judicially in the maner ot making an order tor requisition under s. 3.\n\nHeld aho, per MAHAJAN, and MuKHERJI:A JJ.-(i) that the immunity granted by s. 306 of the Government of India Act, 1935, related to the Governor and not to the Provincial Government and under the said Act the High Court of Bombay had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against the Provin, ial Government of Bombay; (ii) that the word \"sue\" in s. 176 of the said Act meant the enforcement of a claim or a civil right by means of legal proceedings and was wide enough to include :rn application for a writ of certiorari.\n\nRex v. Electricity Commissioners ([1924] 1 K. B. 171), Rex v . . London County Council ([1931) 2 K. B. 215), The Queen v. Corporntion of Dublin ([1878] 2 L.R. Ir. 371), Frome United Bmueries v.\n\nBath fustices ( [1926] A.C. 386), Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury ([1944] l K. B. 281), Rex v. Woodhouse (1906) 2 K. B. 501), King v.\n\nPostmaster General ([1928] 1 K.B. 291), Rex v. Boycott and Others\n\n(fl939] 2 K. B. 651), Franklin v. Minister of Town .and Country Planning ([1948] A. C. 87), In re Banwarilal Roy ( 48 C. W. N. 766), fugilal Kamlapat v'. Collector of Bombay (47 Born. L. R. 1070), Hamabai Framji Petit v. Secretary of State for India (L R. 42 I. A.\n\nH), King. v.\n\nBradford ([1908] 1 K. B. 365), and other cases referred to.\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION (C1v1L) : Case No. III . of 1949.\n\nAppeal under section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, from . the judgment of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J.) dated the 4th day of January, 1949, in Appeal No. 65 of 1948.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and\n\nC~ K. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay (G. N. /oslzi and M. M. Desai, with them) for the appellant.\n\nH.- M. Seert1_ai, R. /. Joshi and Ramesluvar Nath, for respondents Nos. 1 (a) and 1 (b).\n\nProvinu of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\n'Ind Others.\n\nP,.11ince of\n\nB..,.b'!J!\n\nK. S. AJuani\n\nand Others.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\n1950. September 15. The Court delivered judgment as follows :-\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of tbe High Court at Bombay and it relates to the power of the High Court to issue a writ of certiormi against the province of Bombay to quash an order to requisition certain premises.\n\nThe material facts, as stated in the judgment of the High Court, are these.\n\nOne Abdul Hamid Ismail was, prior to the 29th of January, 1948, the tenant of the first floor of a building known as \"Paradise\" at Warden Road, Bombay, the landlord of which was one Dr. M. D. Vakil.\n\nOn the 29th January, 1948, Ismail assigned his tenancy to the petitioner and two others, the son and hrother's daughter's son of the petitioner (the respondent). All the three assignees were refugees from Sind.\n\nOn the 4th February, 1948, the petitioner went into possession of the flat.\n\nOn the 26th February, 1948, the Government of Bombay issued an order requisitioning the flat under section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947) which came into force on the 4th December, 1947.\n\nOn the same day Dr. Vakil was informed that the Government had allotted the premises to Mrs. C. Dayaram who was also a refugee from Sind.\n\nFurther orders were issued authorising an Inspector to take possession of the premises.\n\nOn the 4th March, 1948, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and an order under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act.\n\nThe petition was heard by Mr. Justice Bhagwati who, inter alia, granted the writ against the province of Bombay and the Secretary etc. On appeal the appellate Court confirmed the order as regards the issue of the writ of certiorari against the appellant, bnt cancelled the order as regards the other parties.\n\nThe appellant has come on appeal to this Court.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, on behalf of the appellant, urged the following three points for the Court's consideration. ( 1) (a) t):aving regard to the provisions of Ordinance V of 1947, whether the order in question was quasi-judicial or only administrative ?\n\n( b) Assuming the order to be of a quasi-judicial nature, whether it was a case of want or excess of jurisdiction, or it was only a case of mistake of law ?\n\n(2) Whether a writ of certiorari can be issued against the appellant, which for its actions under the Ordinance, represents the Crown ?\n\n(3) Whether the order in question was made for a public purpose t ·\n\nSection 3, 4, 10 and 12 of the Ordinance which are material for the discussion m this appeal run as follows:\n\n\"3; Requisition of land.-!£ in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may by order in '\\.vriting requisition any land for any public purpose :\n\nProvided that no land used for the purpose of public religious worship or for any purpose which the\n\nProvincial Government may specify by notification in the Official Gazette shall be requisitioned under this section.\n\n4. Requisition of vacant premises.-(1) If any premises situate in an area specified by the Provincial Government by notification in the Official Gazette are vacant on the date of such notification and whenever any such premises become vacant after such date either by the landlord ceasing to occupy the premises, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by the eviction of a tenant, or by the release of the premises from requisition or otherwise, the landlord of such premises shall give intimation thereof in the prescribed form to an officer authorised in this behalf by the Provincial Gqyernment.\n\n(2) Such intimation shall be given by post within one month of the date of such notification in the case of premises which are vacant on such date, and in other cases within seYen days of the premises being vacant.\n\n(3) A landlord shall not, without the permission of the Provincial Government, let the premises before\n\nPl'<'vinrt oJ\n\nBombay\n\n\"· K. S. Muani\n\ntmd Otnns.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nProiilV4 qf\n\nBom61f1\n\nJr. S .. Advani\n\nmu/ 01/Jtrs.\n\nx..ia c. J.\n\ngiving such intimation an<l for a period of one month from the date on which such intimation is given.\n\n( 4) Whether or not an intimation under subsection (!), is given, and notwithstanding anything contained in sectio.n 3, the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition the premises and may use or deal with the premises in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient.\n\n(5) Any lan<llord who fails to give such intimation within the period specified in sub-section (2) shall on conviction, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and any landlord who lets the premises in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (3), shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three months or with fine or with both.\n\n10. Power to obtain information.-(l) The provincial Government may, with a view to carrying out the purposes of this . Ordinance, by order require any person to furnish to such authority as may be specified in the order such information in his possession relating to any land which is requisitioned or is continued under requisition or is intended to be requisitioned or continued under requisition.\n\n(2) Every person requirc<l to furnish such information as is referred to in sub-section ( l) shall be deeme<l to be legally bound to do so within the meaning of sections 176 and 177 of the Indian Penal Code\n\n(XLV of 1860).\n\n12. Pou1er to enter and inspect land.--Without prejutlice to any powers otherwise conferred by this Ordinance any officer or person empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government by general or special order may e-nter ancl inspect any land for the purpose of determining whether, and, if so, in what manner, an order under this Ordinance should be made in relation to such land, or with a view to securing compliance with any order made under this Ordinance.\"\n\nOn the first question, it was pointed out that under section 3 of the Ordinance the decision of the Provincial Government to requisition certain premises is clearly a matter of its opinion and therefore not liable to be tested by any objective standard.\n\nIt was urged that the decision as to whether the premises were required for a public purpose was also a matter for the opinion of the Provincial Government, and not a matter for judicial investigation, and therefore the making of the order was in no sense a quasi-judicial di::cision, but an administrative or ministerial order.\n\nIn this connection it was pointed olit that unlike the Land Acquisition Act there was no provision in the Ordinance for issuing a notice, or for inquiries to be made, or for rival contentions to be examined and evidence to be weighed before a decision is arrived at.\n\nIt was pointed out that if public purpose was outside the_ scope . of the opinion of the Provincial Government, the section would have run : \"If for any public prpose in the opinion of Government .......... \".\n\nA discussion about the distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial functions is not useful in this case as the point for determination is whether the order in question is a quasi-judicial order or an administrative or ministerial order. In Regina (lohn M'Evoy) v. Dublin Corporation ( 1 ), May C. J. in dealing with this point observed as follows :-\"It is established that the writ of certiorari does not lie to\n\nremove an order merely ministerial, such as a warrant, but it lies to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts judicial.\n\nIn this connection. the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a judge or legal\n\ntribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others.\" This definition was approved by Lord Atkinson in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath /ustices (\n\n) as the best (') [1878] 2 L. R. Irish 371, 376.\n\n(1) [1926] A. C. 586, 602. 81\n\nProvince of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S .. Aduan• and Othm.\n\nKa11iaC.J.\n\nProvinr~ tf\n\nBombay\n\nK. S, Mvtmi\n\nand Olllers.\n\nKtmia C.J.\n\ndefinition of a jwlicial act as distinguished from an :i.dministrative act.\n\nA distinction between the nature of the two acts has been noticed in a series of decisions. This Irish case is one of the very early decisions. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that as stated by Chief Justice May, whenever there is the determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, that determination is a quasi-judicial decision, and, if w;' a writ of certiorari will lie against the. body entrusted with the work of making sucli decision. .A5 against this, it was pointed out that in several English cases emphasis is laid on the fact that the decision should be a judicial ckcision and the obligation to act judicially is to be found in the Act establishing the body which makes the decision.\n\nThi.s point appears to have been brought out clearly in The King ,._ The Electricity Commissioners ( 1 ), where Lord Justice Atkin (as he then was) laid down the following test': \"Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Rench Division exercised in these writs.\" This passage has been cited with approval in numerous subsequent decisions and aGcepted as laying down the correct test. A slig]1tly more detailed examination of the distinction is found in The King v. London County Council ( '2 ), where Scrutton L. J. observed as fol1ows :~\"It is not necessary that it should be a court in the sense in which thi• court is a court ; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition ; :i.nd it is not necessary to be strictly a court ; if it is .a tribunal which h:i.s to decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of certiorari.\" Lord Justice Slesser in his judgment at page 243 separated the four conditions laid down by Atkin L. J. under which a rule for\n\n(') [1924] I K. B. 171.\n\n(') [1931] 2 K. B. 215, 2:'3.\n\ncertiorari may issue. They are : wherever any body of persons ( 1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act ju<licially ( 4) act in excess of their legal authority-a writ of certiorari may issue.\n\nHe examined each of these conditions separately and came to the conclusion that the existence of each was\n\nnecesary to determine the nature of the act in quest10n.\n\nIn The Ryots of Garabandho and other villages v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi ( 1 ) Viscount Simon L.C., in delivering the judgment of the Board, accepted the test of these four conditions to determine the nature of the act.\n\nHe stated : \"This writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior 'courts' in the strictest sense.\n\nBroadly speaking, it may be said that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will lie.\n\nThe reme<ly, in point of principle, is derived from the superintending authority which the Sovereign's superior courts and in particular the court of King's Bench, possess and exercise over inferior jurisdictions.\n\nThis principle has been transplanted to other parts of King's Dominions and operates, within certain limits, in British India.\" In Franklin v.\n\nThe Minister of Town and Country Planning ( 2 ) the points of distinction are again noticed. The question arose in respect of the town and country. planning undertaken under the relevant Statute on the order of the Minister following a public local inquiry under the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe question was whether the order of the Minister was a quasi-judicial act or a purely administrative one.\n\nLord Thankerton pointed out that the duty was purely administrative but the Act prescribed certain methods or steps in the discharge of that duty. Defore making the draft order, the Minister must have made elaborate inquiry into the matter and haYe consulted any local authorities who app:::ar to him to be concerned and other departments\n\n( 1) 70 I. A. 119.\n\n(') [19'18] A, C. 87,.102.\n\nPreoilta •!\n\nBtlllHy\n\nK. S. M\"IDli.\n\n\"\"\" OIJ#rs.\n\nKanill C.J.\n\np,,,;;,,,. of\n\nlkmbq\n\nK. S. Moam\n\nand Ut/rm.\n\nKtudaC.J.\n\nof the Government.\n\nThe Minister was required to satisfy himself that it was a s0und scheme before he took the serious step -0f issuing a draft order. For the purpose of inviting objections and where they were not withdrawn, of having a public inquiry to be held by someone other than the respondent to whom that person reports was for the further information of the respondent for the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme. He observed: \"I am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid on the respondent in discharge of these statutory duties and that the only question is whether he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint person to hold the public inquiry and to consider that person's report.\"\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent referred to several cases but in none of them the dicta of Atkin L.\n\nJ. or the four conditions analysed by Slesser L. J. have been suggested, much less stated, to be not the correct tests.\n\nThe respondent's argument that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, the decision is quasijudicial, does not appear to be sound. The observations of May C. J ., when properly read, included the judicial aspect of the determination in the words used by him. I am led to that conclusion because after the test of judicial duty of the body making the decision was expressly stated and • emphasized by Atkin and Slesser L. JJ. in no subsequent decision it is even suggested that the . dictum of May C.\n\nJ. was different from the statement of law of the two Lords Justices or that the latter, iii any way, required to be modified.\n\nThe word \"quasi-judicial\" itself necessarily implies the existence of the judicial element in the process leading to the decision. Indeed, in the judgment of the lower court, while it is stated at one place that if the act done by the inferior body is. a judicial act •. as distinguished from a ministerial act, certiorari will lie, a. little later the idea has got mixed up where it is broadly stated that when the fact has to be determined by an objective test and when that decision affects rights of someone, the decision or act\n\nts quasi-judicial.\n\nThis last statement overlooks the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights of someone or the other. Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective inatter I as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari . . Observations from different decisions .of the English Courts were relied upon to find out whether a particular determination was quasi-judicial or ministerial.\n\nIn some cases it was stated that . you require a proposition and an opposition, or that a tis was necessary, or that it was necessary to have a right to examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses.\n\nAs has often been stated, the observations in a case have to be read along with the facts thereof and the emphasis in the cases on these different aspects is not necessarily the complete or exhaustive statements of the requirements to make a decision quasi-judicial or otherwise.\n\nIt seems to me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial.\n\nPrescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in comi!lg to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed. In my opinion the conditions laid down by Slesser L. J. in his judgment correctly bring out the distinction between a judicial or quasi-judicial decision on the one hand and a ministerial decision on the other.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it was strortgly urged that even applying these tests 'the decision of the Provincial Government under section 3 is quasi-judicial. The decision whether the premises were required for a public 2-6 S. C. India (N.D.)/58\n\nProvince of\n\nJJomhdy\n\nv; /[. S. A.duan;\n\nand Others.\n\nKlllliaC.J.\n\nP1ovinct \"J\n\nBnmbay\n\nK . .). Advani\n\n1md Others.\n\nA.\"aniaC.].\n\npurpose was contended not to be a matter of opinion.\n\nThe power to make inquiries under sections 10 and 12 were strongly relied upon in this connection.\n\nTwo cases were strongly relied Ul'_on by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention that the order in the present case was quasi-judicial.\n\nThe first is The King v. The Postmaster General ( 1 ). In that case an employee claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.\n\nThe compensation was payable to him if the workman obtained a certificate of the certifying surgeon . that he was suffering from the telegraphists' cramp and was thereby disabled.\n\nA medical practitioner was appointed by the Secretary of State and was given powers and duties of a certifying surgeon under .section 4 of the relevant Act. By an order of the Secretary of State, made in pursuance of that section, it was provided that so far as regards the post office employees, the post office medical officer \"under whose charge the workman is placed shall, if authorized to act\" be substituted for the certifying surgeon in cases of telegraphists' cramp.\n\nIt was the practice of the post office to refer all cases of such cramp to the chief medical officer of the post office and this reference was relied on as constituting him the substitute for the certifying surgeon under the Act and Order. The applicant suffering from telegraphists' cramp was on the capitation list of the local post office medical officer. but in fact never consulted him.\n\nOn her claiming compensation for telegraphists' cramp the case was referred to the chief medical officer in accordance with the usual practice who certified that the applicant was not suffering from such cramp.\n\nIt was held that the giving of the certificate was therefore the appropriate subject of proceedings by way of certiorari.\n\nIn rejecting the argument that on the issue of such certificate no right to obtain a writ came into existence, because the certificate was a mere nothing as it had to be followed bv another enmination and inquiry, Lord Hewart C. ; observed as follows : \"I do not think that it was\n\n(') [1928] I K. B. i9!.\n\ncontemplated at all that the judgment of the medical referee should, in th'e-- smallest degree, be fettered or influenced by a certificate given by a wholly unauthorized person and I do not think :Mrs. Carmichael would be in the same position before the medical referee as that in which she would have been if there had been a refusal on the part of the proper officer to give her any certificate at all.\" -, A surgeon's certificate which gave or deprived a person .'of right to compensation was thus considered a judicial act and if the person had no jurisdiction to give such' a certificate a writ of certiorari was considered the ; proper remedy.\n\nIt should be noticed that in this case a procedure of inquiry was provided under the Act. The case was under entirely different provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which, inter alia, gave a right of appeal against the surgeon's decision. It may be further noticed that the subsequent right to obtain compensation started with the certificate in question and was not an independent act' of the deciding authority having no connection or concern and not influenced by this decision. A similar decision in respect of the mental capacity of a boy in a school is in Rex v. Boycott and Others (1 ). In that case also the opinion of the examining doctor, which had to be followed by subsequent examination and inquiry, was considered subject to a writ of certiorari because that decision directly related to the boy and was the starting point for proceeding under the Detention Act and the Mental Deficiency Act.\n\nBearing in mind the important factor which <iistinguishes a quasi-judicial decision from an adminis--\n\ntrative act, it is next necessary to find out whether the action of Provincial Government permitted under section 3 of the Ordinance, read along with the scheme of the Ordinance, is a quasi-judicial decision or an administrative act.\n\nSection 3 of the Ordinance permits the Provincial Government, if in its opinion it is necessary or expedient to do so, to make an order in writing to requisition any land for any public purpose. , Keeping aside for the moment the proviso_ to the\n\n'11) [1939] 2 K. B. 651.\n\n11>50\n\nProWice of\n\n&mibay\n\nK, S, Adonni\n\nand 01/ws\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nK. S . .A.dva•ti\n\nand 0Jhers.\n\nKania C. J\n\nsection, it 1s not seriously disputed that the subjective op1111on of the Provincial Government in respect of the ordn of the requisition is not open to challenge by a writ of certiorari. The Ordinance has left that decision to the discretion of the Provincial Government and that opm10n cannot be revised by another authority.\n\nIt appears therefore that except when ma/a fides is clearly proved, that opinion cannot be questioned.\n\nThe next question is whether the requirement \"for any public purpose\" stands on the same footing. On behalf of the appellant, it was argued that the opinion of the Government, that it is necessary or expedient to pass an order of requisition, stands on the same footing as its decision on the public purpose.\n\nIn the alternative it was urged that the two factors, viz., necessity to requisition and decision about public purpose, form one composite opinion and the composite decision is the subjective opinion of the Provincial Govcrm; nent. The third alternative contention was that the decision of the Government about a public purP.ose is a fact which it has to ascertain or decide, and thereafter the order of requisition has to follow. The decision of the Provincial Government as to the public purpose contains no judicial element in it. Just as the Government has to sec that its order of requisition is not made in respect of land which is used for public religious worship or is not in respect of land used for a purpose specified by tht Provincial Government in the Official Gazette, (as mentioned in the proviso to section 3) or that the premises are vacant on the date when the notification is issued (as mentioned in section 4 of the Ordinance), the Government has to decide whether a particular object, for which it is suggested that land should be requisitioned, was a public purpose.\n\nIn my opm10n, this third alternative contention is clearly correct and it is unnecessary therefore to deal with the first two arguments. There appears nothing in the Ordinance to show that in arriving at its decision on this point the Provincial Government has .. to act judicially.\n\nSections 10 and 12, which were relid upon to show that the decision was quasi-judicial, in my\n\nop1ruon, do not support the plea. The enquiries mentioned in those sections are only permissive and the Government is not obliged .to make them. Moreover, they do not relate to the purpose for which the land may be required. . They are in :respect of the condition of the land and such other matters affecting land.\n\nE-fery decision of the Government, followed by the exercise of certain power given to it by any law is not necessarily judicial or quasi-judicial.\n\nThe words of section .. 3 read with the proviso, and the words of section 4 taken along with the scheme of the whole Ordinance, in my opinion, do not import into the decision of the public purpose the judicial element required to make the decision judicial or quasi-judicial. The decision of the Provincial Government about public purpose is therefore an administrative act. If the Government erroneously decides that fact it is open td question in a court of law in a regular, suit, just as its action, on its decision on the facts mentioned in the proviso to section 3 and in. section 4, is open to question in a similar way. The argument that a suit may be infructuous because a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is essential and that remedy is therefore inadequate, is unhelpful.\n\nInconvenience or want of adequate remedy does not create a right to a writ of certiorari.\n\nIt is clear that such writ can be asked for if two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, the decision of the authority must be judicial or quasi-judicial, and secondly; the challenge must be in respect of the excess or want of . jurisdiction of the deciding authority. Unless both those conditions are fulfilled no application for a writ of certiorari can succeed. As, in my opinion, the decision of the Provincial Govern- . ment about public purpose is not a judicial or quasijudicial decision, there is no scope for an application for a writ ofcertiorari.\n\nHaving regard to my conclusion, it is not necessary to discuss the other points urged by the Attorney- Gcneral against the issue of a writ against the Province of Bombay and. I pronounce no opinion on the same.\n\nProvinu Of\n\nBom611J\n\nY, K. S. Jfd•1J11i\n\n\"n4 Othtr$.\n\nKmnaC.J.\n\nPro&ince qf\n\nBombay\n\nv. t;. S. Ad1•ani\n\nand Others.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nF•tl Ali].\n\n' [1950)\n\nThe result is that the appeal is allowed and the petition dismissed.\n\nThe order of costs made by the lower .:ourts in favour of the respondents is cancelled.\n\nThe respondents will pay the costs throughout.\n\nThe costs of the lower courts will be taxed in favour of the appellant on the terms allowed by those courts in favour of the respondents.\n\nThe respondent will pay the costs of the appeal here. The order of costs against the respondents will be limited to the assets of the deceased come to their hands, as the original applicant has died pending these proceeding<.\n\nFAzL Au J.-This is, in my opinion, quite a simple case, but it has been greatly complicated by the citation of a mass of decisions hy the parties and by an attempt on their part to extract from them some principle to support their respective contentions.\n\nThe principal question to he decided m this appeal is whether a writ of certiorari is available to the respondent to remove or quash an order made by the Government of Bombay requisitioning certain premises under section 3 of Bombay Ordinance No. V of 1947.\n\nIt is well settled that a w.rit of certiorari can be issued only against inferior courts or persons or authorities who are required by law to act judicially or quasi-judicially, in those cases where they act in excess of their legal authority.\n\nSuch a writ is not available to remove or correct executive or administrative acts.\n\nThe first question therefore to be decided in this case is whether the order passed by the Government of Bombay requisitioning the premises in question is a judicial or quasi-judicial order or an executive or administrative order.\n\nWithout going into the numerous cases cited before us, it may be safely laid down that an order will be a judicial or quasi-judicial order if it is made by a court or a judge, or by some person or authoity who is legally bound or authorized to act as if he was a court or a judge. To act as a court or a judge necessarily involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation,\n\nmaking some kind of inquiry, hearing and weighing evidence, if any, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of a controversy, before any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at.\n\nThe procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a court of law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure as indicated by me.\n\nIn some of the cases which were cited before us and which have been discussed in the elaborate -judgments under appeal, an attempt has been made to lay down certain fomulae for determining whether an order is a judicial or quasi-judicial order or not, but in my opinion it is safer to grasp the principle than to depend on the application of any formula or formulae. Again, a large number of cases were cited to show various instances in which a person or persons was or were held to act judicially or quasi-judicially, but those cases, as I have already indica, ted, often obscure what may otherwise be a simple question ; and apart from the fact that this Court is not bound to refer to cases unless it finds it necessary to do so, I fully share the view expressed by the Privy Council in Wijeyesekara v.\n\nFesting ( 1 ) as to why cases decided under different enactments are often not very helpful.\n\nIn that case, which related to a Ceylon Ordinance, one of the provisions of which appears to be similar in certain respects to section 3 of the Ordinance before us, the Privy Council observed :\n\n\"Reference has been made to cases dealing with similar questions arising under statutory enactments in India.\n\nTheir L( 1'hips do not refer to those cases because the wording ot ti•.: enactment is not the same, and their discussion might, to some extent, complicate what appears to their Lordships to be a very simple . \" issue.\n\nHaving made these observations, they proceeded to say:\n\n(1) [1919] A.C. 646.\n\nProvine• of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adt>(Jfli\n\nand Otlvrs.\n\nFaz/ Ali ].\n\nProvince ef\n\n.8m:h(!'\n\n.K'. S.~Adt•ani\n\nand Oth.trt.\n\n\"The whole case is decided, in I he opinion of their Lordships, in the last three lines of section 6 of the Ordinance.\"\n\nIn the present case also, the simplest way to decide it is to try to construe correctly section 3 of the Ordinance under which this case has arisen.\n\nThat section runs as follows :\n\n\"If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition any land for any public purpose :\n\nProvided that no land used for the purpose of public religious worship or for any purpose which the Provincial Government may specify by notification in the Official (', azette shall be requisitioned under this section.\"\n\nIn construing this section, it is our first duty to enter into the mind of the framers of the Ordinance and look at the whole matter as they must have looked at it. Proceeding in this way, two things seem to me\n\nto be clear : ( 1) The existence of a public purpose is the foundation of the power (or jurisdiction, if that term may appropriately be used with reference to an executive body) of the Provincial Government to requisition premises under sectio11 3, or, as is son1ctimes said,· it is a condition precedent to the exercise of that power. I think that this aspect of the matter has been very luciclly ; ummed up by Bhagwati J. in these words :\n\n\"Unless and until there was a public purpose in existence for the achievement of which they would exercise the power invested in them under section 3, there would be no jurisdiction at all in the Provincial Government to make any order for requisition of bnd.\n\nIt is only when that public purpose existed that the jurisdiaion of the Provincial Government would come to be exercised and then and then only would they be invested with the discretion of deciding whether it is necessary or expedient to requisition any land for the\n\nachievement of that purpose.\n\nIt therefore follows that\n\n...\n\nthe existence of a public purpose is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of requisitioning invested in the Provincial Government by section 3 of the Ordinance.\n\nThe Provincial Government are not constituted the sole judges of what that public purpose is. The public purpose has to exist before they can exercise any pow:er of requisition of land within the meaning of that section.\"\n\n(2) The framers of the Ordinance never intended to impose any duty on the Provincial Government to determine judicially whether a certain purpose is a public purpose or not.\n\nThere are no express words in section 3 or any other section, to impose such a duty ; nor is there anything to compel us to hold that such a duty is implied.\n\nA reference to section 6 of the Ordinance wherein an inquiry is specifically provided for with a view to assess the compensation and sections 10 and 12 under which the Provincial Government is empowered to obtain certain information and enable its officer to inspect land, show that where an inquiry or anything like an inquiry was intended to be made it was specifically provided for.\n\nThere is however no provision for any inquiry being made for determining the public purpose. Indeed it appears to me that in a large majority of cases no inquiry should be necessary as the existence of a public purpose would be self. evident or obvious, and a mere reference to the purpose will make anyone say : This is of course a public\n\npurpoe. It may be that just in a few exceptional cases, legalistic or some other considerations may make the position obscure, but in an Act or Ordinance which has to provide for prompt action and which in its day-to-day application must be confined to normal and not exceptional cases, the legislature may not attach too much importance to such cases and may credit the Provincial Government with sufficient intelligence to know before acting under the Ordinance whether a certain purpose is a public purpose or not.\n\nHowever that may be, the fact remains that there is nothing in the Ordinance to suggest that the public purpose is to be determined in, a judicial way.\n\nProDinee of\n\nBombay\n\nJC S. Advani\n\ntmd Others.\n\nFaz! Ali].\n\nPr0fline8 of\n\nB .... '!!'\n\nK. S. Adroni\n\nand Othtrs:\n\nFa</ AI; J.\n\nIn this appeal, two principal contentions, which in\n\nth~ view I am inclined to take are the only contentions which need be referred to, were raised in the course of the arguments, one on behalf of the respondent and the other on behalf of the appellant. The contention of the respondent was that the Provincial Government has to act judicially in determining the public purpose and its action is therefore subject to a writ of certiorari if it acts beyond its legal authority. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that section 3 empowers the Government to form an opinion on two matters :\n\n(1) whether there is a public purpose; and (2) whether it is necessary or expedient in the interests of that purpose to requisition certain premises.\n\nSuch being the case, the opinion of the Provincial Government on both these matters is final and cannot be questioned in any court of law.\n\nI have said enough with regard to the first contention, but I shall add just a few words more.\n\nFor prompt action the executive authorities have often to take quick decisions and it will be going too far to say that in doing so they are discharging any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The word \"decision\" in common parlance is more or less a neutral expression and it can be used with reference to purely executive acts as well as judicial orders. The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is : Is there any duty to de; cide judicially ? As I have already said, there is nothing in the Ordinance to show that the Provincial Government has to decide the existence of a public purpose judicially or quasi-judicially.\n\nIt is not obliged to call for or consider any objections, make any inquiry or hear evidence, but it may proceed in its own way-ex pa~ on prima facie grounds, just to see that it is acting within the limits of the powet granted to it. Besides, the\n\ndetermination of the public purpose per se does not affect the rights of any person. It is only when the further step is taken, namely, when the Provincial\n\nGovernment forms an opinion that it is necessary or e:i:pedient n the interests of public purpose to requisition certam premises that the rights of others can be said to be affected. In these circumstances, I am unable to hold that the Provincial Government has to act judicially or quasi-judicially under section 3 of the Ordinance.\n\nThe contention on behalf of the appellant, to which I have referred, raises the question as to whether, if certain premises are requisitioned by the Provincial Government for a non-public purpose, the matter is open to challenge in a court of law. It is well settled that. where an Act or regulation commits to an executive authority the decision of what is necessary or expedient and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the decision in the absence o~ an allegation of bad faith. Therefore, since the question as to whether it is necessary or expedient to .\"; quire land (given a public purpose) has been left entirely to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government, the opinion formed by it, provided it is formed in good faith, cannot be questioned. In other words, if. there is a public purpose, the mere fact that to the court or to any other person the requisition of the premises does not appear necessary or expedient in the public interest will not make the requisition bad.\n\nBut the same cannot be said with regard to the decision of the Provincial Government as to the existence of a public purpose, which is the foundation of its power and is a condition precedent to its exercise.\n\nIf the executive authority requisitions land under section 3 without there being any public purpose in existence, its action is a nullity and the position in law is as if the authority did not act under section 3 at all. Such being the legal position, a person whose right is said to have been affected can always go to a proper court and claim a declaration that in law his right cannot be affected.\n\nI am not prepared to subscribe to the view that the determination of a public purpose and the opinion formed as to the necessity or expediency of requisition\n\nv. /(. S. Advani\n\n-.t ou.r •.\n\nFo.r.l Ali]·;\n\nProuintt of\n\nBaml>..,\n\nIr. s. ,14,..;\n\nand Ot,,,, s.\n\nFiul Ali J.\n\nform one psychological process and not two distinct and independent . steps ; and therefore the rule which applies to one applies to the other. The correct position in my opinion is that the determination of the public purpose is the first step so that if the Provincial Government decided that .there is no public purpose the second step need not follow. Besides, whereas the subjective opinion of the Government as to necessity or expediency is not capable of being accurately tested objectively, the existence of a public purpose can be so tested, because there are well-known definitions of public purpose and those definitions can form the common basis for the ascertainment of a public purpose by different individuals. I think that the following dictum of Lord Halsbury in Mayor etc. of Westminster v. London & North Western Ry. Co. ( 1 ), sums\n\nup the legal position correctly :\n\n\"Where the legislature has confided the power to a particular body with a discretion how it is to be used, it is beyond the power of any Court to contest that discretion.\n\nOf course, this assumes that the thing done is the thing which the Legislature has authorised.\"\n\nA number of cases were cited before us by the appellant to show thab in construing certain provisions in other enactments which are drafted in similar language, the courts have held that the existence or otherwise of a public purpose is as completely left to the satisfaction of the executive authority as the question as to whethet it is necessary or expedient to acquire land.\n\nThe leading case in support of this proposition is\n\nWijeyesekara v. Festing (' ). The decision of that cue turned on the construction of sections 4 and 6 of Ceylon Ordinance No. 3 of 1876, which run as follows :\n\n\"4. Whenever it shall :.ppear to the Governor that land in any locality' is likely to be needed for any public purpose, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct the Surveyor-General or other officer generally or specially authorized by the Governor in this behalf, to examine such land and report whether the same is fitted for such purpose.\n\n(') [191;] A.C. 426. ('l [1919] A.C. 646.\n\n6. The Surveyor-General or other officer as authorized as aforesaid shall then make his report to the Governor, whether the possession of the land is needed for the purposes for which it appeared likely to be needed as aforesaid. And upon the receipt of such report it shall be lawful for the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council, to direct the Government Agent to take order for the acquisition of the land.\"\n\nIt appears that the procedure prescribed by the Ordinance in the above sections was followed and an order was made by the Governor of Ceylon directing the Government Agent to make an order for the acquisition of certain land for a public purpose, namely, the making of a road.\n\nThe appellant to the Privy Council, who was the person whose land had been acquired, contended that the land was not required for any public purpose and that the direction of the Governor was invalid.\n\nThe Privy Council repelled this contention and held that it was not open to the appellant to contend that the land was not needed for a public purpose.\n\nLord Finlay who delivered the judgment of the Board quoted with approval a previous decision of the Ceylon Court,\n\nGovernment Agent v. Perera ( 1 ), in which the first two paragraphs of the headnote run as follows :\n\n\"In the acquisition of a private land for a public purpose, the Governor is not bound to take the report of the Surveyor-General as to the fitness for such a purpose. His decision on the question whether a land is needed or not for a public purpose is final, and the District Court has no . power to entertain objections to His Excellency's decisions.\" ·\n\nIn my opinion, this case does not go so far as it is supposed to have gone and it is apt to be misunderstood and misapplied.\n\nThe land was acquired there for the purpose of making a road, and it could not have been argued that the making of a road was not a public purpose. The emphasis was on whether the land was\n\n(1) 7 Cey. N.L.R. 313.\n\nP11oince ef\n\nBomba_,\n\nv. r. S. Advani\n\narui Others.\n\nFa:r.l Ali].\n\nProvince Qj\n\nBarubay\n\nJC S. Ad\"\"\"i\n\nond Othtrs.\n\nFazl ,, fJ; ].\n\nactually needed or wanted for a public pu\"PQSC and not on the character of the purpose and their Lordships held that the question whether the land was or was #JOI needed for a pubilc purpose had been left to the satisfaction of the executive authority. It seems to me that if the land had been acquired not for the purpotc of making a road but for a purpose which was evidently not a public purpose at all, the courts could not have held that the Governor's action in acquiring the land for a non-public purpose was not open to challenge.\n\nI do not wish to refer to cases decided under the Land Acquisition Acts, such as Ezra v. Secretary of .State ( 1 ) and others because, aprt from other things,\n\nas was pointed out by the Privy Council in the course of the arguments in Wiieyesekara v. Festing ( ' ) the Indian Land Acquisition Acts expressly provide that the order of the local Government directing the acquisition of land is conclusive.\n\nA third class of cases are those arising under certain war and emergency laws, of which Carltona Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioners of Works and Others(\"\") may be taken to be a specimen. Tht case was decided under regulation 51 (1) of the Defence (General) Regulations which ran as follows :\n\n\"A competent authority, if it appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services eS>ential to the life of the community, may take possession of any land, and may give such directions as appear to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient in connection with the taking of possession of that land.\"\n\nIn that case and other similar cases, it was held that the Parliament had completely entrusted to the executive the discretion of deciding when it would be necessary or expedient to requisition land in the (') I.LR. 30 Cal. 36. (') [1943] 2 All E.R. 560.\n\n(') (1919] A.C. 646 ..\n\n.....\n\ninterests of public safety, the defence of the realm, etc., and therefore with that discretion if bona fide exercised no court coul9 interfere.\n\nIt is clear that .the relevant provisions under which those cases have been decided refer to matters such as interest of public safety, defence of the realm, efficient prosecution of the war, etc., of which the executive authorities alone could be the best judges. So far as these matters are concerned, it is difficult to lay down an objective test for determining when the conditions upon which the executive authorities are to act should be deemed to be fulfilled. Thus there is no true analogy between this case and the c:.1se before us.\n\nAn analogy to be complete must rest not 01ily on similarity of language but also on simibrity of objects. li1 certain complicated or border-line cases; the courts mav find it difficult to decide whether ::t certain matter ha.,· been committed to the judgment of the executive authority and made entirely dependent on its satisfaction or whet her it i5 a condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction or power. The line of demarcation between these two matters may appear to be a thin one but it has to he drawn for arriving at a correct coriclusion.\n\nAs I have already stated, a petition for a writ of certiorari can succeed onlv if two conditions are fulfilled : firstly, the order to be quashed is passed by an inferior court or a person or authority exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and secondly, such court or quasi-judicial body has acted in excess of its legal authority.\n\nThe second element 'Would seem to be present in this case on the concurrent findings of the three Judges of the Bombay High Court which are clear and well-reasoned.\n\nBut that does not seem to be enough for the purpose of granting a writ of certiorari to the respondent, since the requisitioning of the premises under section 3 of the Ordinance was a purely administrative act and did not involve any duty to decide the existence of a public purpose or any other matter judicially or quasi-judicially.\n\nThe remedy of the respondent is clearly by action and not by Jsking for a writ of certiorari. In the circumstances, the::\n\nProvince of\n\nB0111bay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\na11J Others.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nPr•uitUe 11/\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adoani\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanJali\n\nSastri].\n\nMahajan].\n\nfurther points raised in the case do not call for decision, and I agree that this appeal should be allowed. It would however be for the Provincial Government to consider whether in view of the findings of the Bombay High Court it is desirable to pursue the matter any further.\n\nPATANJALl SAsTRI J.-I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons indicated in the judgment. of my Lore! and have nothing useful to add.\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN J.-1 agree with the judgment which my brother Mukherjea proposes to deliver and wish to add some observations of my own out of respect for my Lord the Chief Justice from whose judgment we feel constrained to differ.\n\nThe principal questions raised by this appeal are : ( 1) Whether the order of requisition dated 26th February 1948' made under section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ord!nance (Ordinance No. V of 1947) is a quasi-judicial order ?\n\n(2) Whether a writ of certiorari lies against the Government of Bombay ?\n\n(3) Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against the Provincial Government ? ( 4) Whether the requisition of the said flat and its allotment to Mrs. C. Dayaram, a refugee from Sindh, was for a public purpose ?\n\nThe case of the appellant is that the said requisition order is an administrative order, hence no writ of certiorari can issue, that no writ of certiorari lies against the Provincial Government, that the High Court has no juriscliction to issue a writ of certiorari. against the I Provincial Government which in law means and in- \\_ eludes the Governor and that the requisition and the allotment of the said flat to Mrs. C. Dayaram was for a public purpose.\n\nIt is well settled that a writ of certiorari lies if the order complained of is either a judicial or a quasijudicial order but it is not competent if the order is\n\nan administrative or an executive order.\n\nThe circumstances under which a writ of certiorari can be issued are succinctly stated by Atkin L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1 ). in these terms :\n\n\"Whenever any body of prsons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.\"\n\nIt was said in Rex v. London County Council( 2 ) that four condition~ have to be fulfilled before a writ of certiorari can issue,\n\n(1) there must be a body of persons, (2) it must have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, ( 3) it has the duty laid upon it to act judicially, and ( 4) it acts in excess of Its legal authority.\n\nThe learned trial Judge as well as the Judges of the court of appeal have not in any way departed from these conditions. On the other hand, they have stood firmly by them. Mr. Justice Bhagwati, the learned trial Judge, observed that it is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the body of persons is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.\n\nIn the court of appeal the learned Chief Justice said that the very basis and foundation of the writ is that the act complained of must be a judicial or a quasi-judicial act.\n\nThe fundamental rules governing the writ were not disputed before us during the course of the arguments.\n\nThe real controversy centred round the de.finitfon of a judicial and a quasi-judicial act as distinguished from an administrative or a purely ministerial act.\n\nThe que-stion is where to draw a line which demarcates the executive or purely administrative act from a quasi-judicial . or a judicial act. The learned Chief Justice in the court below summed up the result of the authorities on the point in these terms :\n\n\"In the .first place, a duty must be cast by the legislature upon the person or persons who is or are\n\n( 1) [1924] 1 K.B. 171 .at 205 (\") [1931] 2 K.B. 215 at 243. 3-6 S.C. Tndia (N.D.) /58\n\nP, o,, ince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advanj and Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\n19'0\n\nProvince of _\n\nBomba, ..\n\nK. S . .Aduani and Others.\n\nMaA.efanJ.\n\nempowered to act to determine or decide some fact or facts.\n\nThere must also be some !is or dispute\n\nrsulting from there being two sides to the question he has to decide.\n\nThere must be a proposal and an opposition. It must ly: necessary that he should have - to weigh the pros and cont before he can come to a conclusion. He would also have to consider facts and circumstances bearing upon the subject.\n\nIn other words, the duty cast must not only be to determine and decide a question, but there must also be a duty to determine or decide that fact judicially.\"\n\nThe statement of the law seems unexceptionable. It is based on high authority. The classic ckfinition of the term \"judicial\" was given by May C. J. in The Q11een\n\nv. The Corporation of D11blin( 1 ), and this definition is in these terms :\n\n\"It is established that the writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order merely ministerial, such as a warrant. but it lies to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts judicial. In this connection the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge o~ legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others.\"\n\nThese observations of May C. J. were quoted by Lord Atkinson in Frame United Breweries v. Bath /t1stices( ' ) as 'one of the best definitions of a iudicial act as distinguished from an administrative act.\" They seem to have been approvl!d by Lord Greene M. R. in Rex\n\nv. Archbishop of Canterbt1ry( 8 ). In Rex v. Woodhouse(' ) Lord Fletcher Moulton L. J. observed as follows :\n\n\"The term 'judicial act' is used in contrast with purely ministerial acts. To these latter the process of certiorari does not apply, as for instance to the issue of a warrant to enforce a rate. even though the rate is one which could itself be' questioned by certiorari.\n\nIn short, there must be the exercise of some right or duty in (') (1878) 2 L.R. Tr. 371 (') [19HJ l K.ll. 282.\n\n(') [1926] A.C. 586.\n\n(') (1906] 2 K.B. 501.\n\norder to provide scope for a writ of certiorari at common law.\"\n\nIn /ugilal Kamlapat v. The Collector of Bombay( 1 ) Bhagwati J. after a consideration of a number of English authorities reached the conclusion that the phrase \"judicial act\" must be taken in a very wide sense ncluding many acts that would not ordinarily be termed judicial. The cases cited at the Bar fully bear out this conclusion.\n\nReference may be made to The King v. Postmaster General ( 1), where it was held that the . giving of a certificate by a medical man was of the nature. of a judicial act, and that the certificate was a proper object of proceedings by way of certiorari.\n\nBy the effect of section 1 sub-section (1) (i) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, and an order extending its provisions to include telegraphists' cramp, a post\n\noffice workman obtaining the certificate of the certifying . surgeon that he was suffering from that complaint\n\nnd was thereby disabled, :was entitled to compensation.\n\nBy section 44, sub-section (3), a medical practitioner 2ppointed by the Secretary of State was given the powers and duties of a certifying surgeon. An or<ler made by the Secretary of State in pursuance of that sub-section provided that so far as regards post office employees the post office medical officer under whose -charge the workmen was placed shall, if authorized to .act, be substituted for the certifying surgeon in cases -0£ telegraphists' cramp.\n\nIt was the practice of the post office to refer all cases of telegraphists' cramp to the Chief Medical Officer of the post office and this reference was relied on as constituting hini the substitute for the certifying surgeon under the above sub-section\n\nand order. The applicant in that case claimed compensation for telegraphists' cramp and the case was referred to the Chief Medical . Officer in accordance with the usual practice. He certified that she was not suffering from tclegrapsists' cramp. It was the giving -0f this certificate that was treated i11 the nature of a judicial act. Lord Hewart C. J. observed as follows :\n\n(1) (19!5) 47 Born. L.R., 1070.\n\n(1) [1928] 1 K.B.291.\n\nK. S. Advlllli\n\n.nJ Othas.\n\nProvince ef\n\nBombay\n\nK. ,\\'. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\n\"There was a moment in this case when it was argued that the document was of such a kind as not to be proper for the writ of certiorari. But I am satisfied, when I look at the part which a certificate of this nature must play in the making of any claim for compensation by a post office worker suffering from telegraphists' cramp, that the certificate of the certifying surgeon is of the nature of a judicial act, and is a fit subject fotcertiotari.\"\n\nIn Rex v. Boycott (1 ) certification as to mental deficiency of a boy was held to be a quasi-judicial act within the mischief of the remedy of certiorari.\n\nBy section 31 of the Mental Deficiency. Act, 1913, it is provided that in case of doubt whether a child is or is not capable of receiving benefit from instruction in a special school or class, or whether his retention in such school or class would be detrimental to the interests of the other children, the matter shall be determined by the Board' of Education.\n\nA certificate that the boy was incapable by reason of mental defect, of receiving further benefit from instruction in a special school or class and was an imbecile was issued by the medical office{.\n\nThe father of the boy moved for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the certificate. Lord Hewart C. J. in issuing the writ made the following observations :\n\n\"In my opinion, on the facts of this case, this certificate of October 5, 1938, created in the way in which we know that it was created, purported to be and to look like the decision of a quasi-judicial authority.\"\n\nReliance was placed on the observations of Atkin L. J. in Rex. v. Electricity Commissioners( 2 ).\n\nIn The King v. The London County Council( 3 ), a writ of certiorari was issued to the London County Council who had exercised the power to grant a licence under the Cinematograph Act, 1909, and had given permission to open the premises on a Sunday under the Sunday Observance Act, 1780.\n\nBy section 2, sub-section (1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1909, it was provided that\n\n(') [19'912K.B.651.\n\n(') (1931] 2 K.B. 615.\n\n(') [1924] I K.B. 171.\n\na coty council may grant licences to persons to use\n\npremises for the exhibition of pictures or other optical effects by means of a cinematograph on such conditions and under such restrictions as the council may determine. The council had also power to modify or\n\nw:nve any of the conditions or restrictions attached by the council to the licence.\n\nSection 1 of the Sunday Observance Act, 1780, provided that any house, room or other place which shall be opened or used for public entertainment or amusement upon any part of the Lord's Day called Sunday, and to which persons shall be admitted by the payment of money, shall be deemed a disorderly house. A company applied for a licence to open and use premises for . cinematograph entertainments and also for permission to open the premises for such purposes on Sundays; Christmas Day and Good Friday. In compliance with this application the county .\n\ncouncil made an order accordingly provided a sum of £35 was paid to charity in respect of each Sunday,\n\nChristmas Day or Good Friday.\n\nScrutton L. J. in issuing the writ made the following observations :\n\n\"It is quite clear that every proceeding of magistrates or confirming authorities in granting new or renewing old licences is in the nature of a Court, excess of jurisdiction in which can be dealt with by the writ of certiorari ; and the procedures in granting . licences under the Cinematograph Act, and proceedings consequential thereon appear to me to stand exactly on the same footing as the proceedings of magistrates or confirming authorities dealing with licences for public houses.\n\nWhen the question is, on what terms and conditions shall a licence be granted; and when the committee proceeds to require that notice of the proposal shall be given, and to hear the applicant and his opponents, and to take evidence, the proceeding seems to me to be exactly that of a tribunal which the King's Bench Division, by the writ of certiorari, restrains within its jurisdiction.\"\n\nSlesser L. J. in the same case discussed this matter at some length and in the 'concluding portion of the judgment made the following observations :\n\nProvitice oj\n\n&mbtJ)I\n\nJr. S. Advam and Othns.\n\nMahajan].\n\nProoitte# of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adriani and Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\n\"The legal authority is clearly given try the section to grant the licences, and I have pointed out how it affects the rights of the subjects.\n\nBut the third question is the one wch was most strenuouslv debated in the argument before us : Are the Council 'under a dutv to act judicially? It. is said that what has here been done is not a judicial act, or not an act of an administrative body having judicial duties to perform, but is in substance an administrative act for the review of which the writ of certiorari is not appropriate. I am unable to distinguish in principle between the application for a licence under the Cinematograph Act, 1909. and an applicatio; i made with regard to a licence for a public house, which for many years, as to the Confirming Authority, and iater. as to the whole proceedings, has been held to be a judicial act. It was suggested, so far as\n\nI understood the argument which attempts to differentiate this application from an application for a public house licence, that there is not provided in terms in s. 2 any provision for opposition ; and that is perfectly true. There is an obligation to notify the police, but there is not in terms there any provision for dealing with opposition, though the County Council have made an elaborate code under which opposition may he heard.\n\nI have examined other statutes which similarly contain powers to grant licences, but do not in terms mention opposition, and I find that in one, at any rate, the action of the magistrates was treated as a judicial act, although the statute contained no express provision for opposition. Reg. v. fustices of Walsall( 1 ) this is an authority that where, on the face of it, it appears that a licence is to be granted to certain persons and not to others, conferring upon them certain rights and obligations, the mere fact that the statute does not in terms provide for opposition to be heard, does not any the less make the duty of the magistrates a judicial duty and therefore it is clear that they were acting or purporting to act judicially in hearing this application, assuming that it was an application, to modify the licence. Of course, as was pointed out by Greer L. J. in the course of the\n\n(') [1854]\n\n3 W.R. 69.\n\nargument, unless the body was usurping a jurisdiction or acting contrary to their juridical powers, it would not be necessary to have a certiorari at all ; and• to argue that, because they have gone beyond their powers, therefore certiorari would not lie, would be to defeat the whole purpose of the writ. But the question is, have they purported under the statute, and have they a duty under the statute, to perform a judicial function in hearing applications for these licences ? In my opinion they certainly have.\"\n\nThe learned Attorney-General cited the case of Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1 ), for the proposition that the mere circumstance that an enquiry may have to be made publicly and objections may have to be heard of persons affected does not necessarily convert the act into a judicial or quasi-judicial act.\n\nThat case related to the functions of a Minister under the Town and Country Planning Act and the New Towns Act, 1946.\n\nLord Thankerton made the following obsrvations :\n\n\"In my opinion, no judicial, or quasi-judicial duty was imposed on the respondent, and any reference to judicial duty, or bias, is irrelevant in the present case.\n\nThe respondent's duties under section 1 of the Act and Sch. 1 thereto, are in my opinion purely administrative, but the Act prescribes certain methods of or steps in, discharge of that duty. It is obvious that, before making the draft order, which must contain a definite proposal to designate the area concerned as the site of a new town, the respondent must have made elaborate inquiry into the matter and have consulted any local authorities who appear to him to be concerned, and obviously other departments of the Government, such as the Ministry of Health, would naturally require to be consulted.\n\nIt would seem, accordingly, that the respondent was required to satisfy himself that it was a sound scheme before he took the serious step of issuing a draft order. It seems clear also, that the purpose of inviting objections, and, . where they are not withdrawn, of having a public inquiry, to be held\n\n(1) [194B] A.C. 87.\n\nl!r.iO\n\n:Pro1:inct o_f\n\nBombqv\n\nK. S. Ad1•ani •nd Others.\n\nMllhajan].\n\nProvince of Bomha.J v.\n\nK. S. Advani and Othn-s.\n\nJi.falwjan J.\n\nby someone other tlun the respondent, to whom that person reports, was for the further information of the respondent, in order to the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme of the designation ; and it is important to note that the development of the site, after the order is made, is primarily the duty of the development corporation established under section 2 of the Act. I am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid on the respondent in discharge of these statutory duties, and that the only question is whether he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint a person to hold the public inquiry, and to consider that porson's report.\"\n\nIn view of these authorities all that can he said is that there is an indefinable, yet an appreciable, difference between the doing of an executive or administrative act and a juJicial or a quasi-judicial act. The question, however, whether an act is a purely ministerial or a judicial one depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nAs observed by my brother Das in In re Banwarilal Roy ( '), the question whether an act is a judicial or a quasi-judicial one or a purely executive act depends on the terms of the particular rule, the nature, scope and effect of the particular power in exercise of which the act may be done.\n\nIn the actual application of the abstract pr<>- positions to the circumstances of different ca'c' the exercise of jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari varies according to the foot of the Chancellor.\n\nThe question therefore for decision in this case is whether the Government is a body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and secondly, to the extent to which it has and in performing that duty has it the duty to act judicially. In my opinion, the position and duties of the Government under the Bombay Lane! Acquisition Ordinance arc such that it satisfies hoth the tests.\n\nIt is a body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and I\n\n(') (1914) 4R C.W.N. 766.\n\nthink its duty is to act judicially. It cannot arrive at its determination on a mental process of its own.\n\nAn examination of the provisions of this Ordinance shows that before the Government forms the opinion that it is necessary and expedient to requisition any land it has to <letermine the following questions of fact and law- ( I) whether the land is required for a public purpose;\n\n(2) whether the land, the subject matter of the requisition is being used for public religious worship ;\n\n(3) whether the land which it is intended to requisition is being used for a purpose which the Provincial Government has specified by a notification; and ( 4) whether the premises are vacant premises.\n\nAll these questions are mixed questions of law and fact.\n\nNo precise definition of the . phrase \"public purpose\" can be attempted and none has been given in judicial decisions.\n\nIt was, however, observed in Hamabai Premiee Petit v. Secretary of State for India( 1 ) that in order to constitute a \"public purpose\" in taking land it is not necessary that the land when taken is to be made available to the public at large, but that it includes a purpose, that is an object in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individuals is directly and vitally concerned.\n\nIt was said in that case that prima facie the Government are good judges of the question whether the purpose is one in which the general interests of the community is concerned but that they are not absolute judges, that is, they cannot say \"I desire it, therefore I order it\". Under the proviso the question whether the land is being used for public religious worship is again a matter which involves difficult questions of fact and law and the determination of these - questions may seriously affect legal rights of worshippers, trustees and other people interested in a place of worship. Similarly the question\n\n(1) '.LR. 42 I.A 44.\n\n19.iO\n\nProvince of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adi•ani\n\nand Others.\n\nMahicm].\n\nProumce of\n\nBombay\n\nIC S. .Advani and Otllhs.\n\nMaha; anJ.\n\nwhether the premises are vacant is a matter that has\n\nto, be determined in view of the definition of \"vacant premises\" given in section 4.\n\nIt involves the determination of the question whether the vacancy was caused by. the termination of a tenancy, or by the eviction of a tenant, or by the release of the premises from requisition, etc.\n\nA duty has been cast on the landlord to give information of th~ vacancy of a premises to Government and any failure in the performance of that duty is punishable under the law.\n\nThe determination bv the Government that certain property is required . for a public purpose and therefore in its opinion it should be requisitioned entitles the person whose premises are requisitioned to a right to compensation which has to be determined admittedly in a judicial manner under the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe point therefore arises whether it was intended by the provisions of the order that all these questions of fact and law which have to be determined before Government forms an opinion as to the expediency or necessity of requisitioning certain . premises, were to be subjective! y determined and the rights of persons were to be affected merely on the opinion of the Government ; or whether the determination was intended to be of a judicial or qu; isi-judicial nature ; in other words, whether the determination of these important questions has to be in the infinite mind of the Government or is in the truth of the facts themselves. Are these questions to be determined by the mental operations or the idiosyncracy of the officers of Government or does their determination depend on existence of material facts ? If the decision of all the questions is to be arrived at by a subjective process, then there can be no doubt that the act of the Government in making the requisition will be a purely ministerial act and . will not fall within the mischief of the writ ; if, on the other hand, these questions of fact and law have to be determined objectively, then the inference is irresistible that the determination will be of a judicial nature. The method and manner of reaching it will be a judicial process. It will consider\n\na propos1t1on and an opposition ; both sides of the question will have to be considered, i.e., the Government's point of view as well as the point of view of the person affected and the determination would only be reached on a consideration of facts and circumstances.\n\nThe line of approach in' the matter is, does section 3 of the Ordinance contemplate a thinking on the part of the Government that the place is not being used for the purpose of public religious worship, or does it contemplate a finding on facts that the place is not a place of public worship. As stated by Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1 ), does the Ordinance contemplate a case of a thinking that a person has a broken ankle and not a case of his really having a broken ankle ? Similarly, can it be said that 5ection 4 contemplates merely a vacancy in .. the mind of the Government, not a vacancy in fact as a real thing.\n\nAfter a careful consideration of the matter I have no,. hesitation in holding that these questions are not questions for the mere determination of the Government subjectively by its own opinion but are matters of determination objectively.\n\nThat being so, the determination of these questions depends on n1aterials which the Government have sufficient power to call for under the Ordinance. It is not only the duty of the Government to determine these questions but its duty is to determine them in a judicial manner, that is, by hearing any opposition to the proposal and by placing its determination on some materials which it has called for under the provisions of section 10 or 12 of the Ordinance. The determination affects valuable rights of persons as to . property, it affects rights of worship and any such determination may entail serious consequences.\n\nThe case The King v. Bradford (2) furnishes an apposite illustration.\n\nIn that case authority was given to take materials for a period of five years from a certain enclosed land which in the opinion of the High Court was a park. It was held that the justict!s could. not by wrongly deciding that the land was not a park give themselves jurisdiction in the matter. In\n\n(1) [1942) A. C. 2~6.\n\n(1) [1908) I K. B. 365.\n\n19j0\n\nProdnce of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Aduan~ sni 0th.rs.\n\nl'roi; i11&e of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Moani 4nd 01/rm.\n\n.Mah4jan].\n\nmy opinion, the Government by wrongly deciding that the place is not a place of public worship cannot\n\naqi:ire jurisdiction for requmt1oning the land.\n\nS1milarly . they cannot by describing a private purpose as a public purpose acquire jurisdiction to make an order of requisition.\n\nThe Ordinance contemplates 0~ making of necessary enquiries and enabling pr<> v1s1ons have been made in it for facilitating them. It seems that a duty is cast on Government before reaching its decision on such important matters to make enquiries and hear persons concerned. Though no express provision exists that objections have to be heard, the power given under section 12 o make enquiries from the person occupying the premises or owning them show that no sooner enquirie! are made all that a person ha§ to say on the matter will be said and heard.\n\n For the reasons given above I cannot accede to the contention of the learned Attorney-General as to .lite . construction of section 3 of the Ordinance when he says that it means that the determination of \"public purpose\" is a matter which rests in the opinion of the Government alone and that the decision of the facts mentioned. in the proviso also depends on that opinion. I cannot also agree in the contention that even if these matters required determination objectivdy, they can be so determined by making administrative enquiries and without hearing persons concerned. In my judgment the learned trial Judge aS' well as the Judges of the Court of appeal reached a correct decision in this ca!C which is a case on the border line and I do not think that there are any substantial grounds for reversing their well considered decision.\n\nAs regarcls the second question, I have no hesitation in holding that a writ of certiorari lies against the Government of Bombay. Section 306, read with section 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935, expressly preserves the right to sue in all cases where such a right could be exercised as against the East India\n\nCompany.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General argued that the section was confined to suits and to actions and did not cover the case of a writ of certiorari. It was said that there is no power to issue a command to the Sovereign.\n\nMy simple answer is that the Provincial Government is not the sovereign and that the Government of India Act expressly says that there is a right to sue the Province. The expression \"sue\" means \"the enforcement of a claim or a civil right by means of legal proceedings.\" When a right is in jeopardy, then ariy proceedings that can be adopted to put it out of jeopardy fall within the expression \"sue\". Any remedy that can be taken to vindicate the right is included within the expression.\n\nA writ of certiorari therefore falls within the expression \"sue\" used in section 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the remedy therefore is within the express terms of the statute. The immunity granted by section 306 is to the Governor and not to the Province.\n\nIt was argued that the word \"Governor\" in the section is synonymous with \"Provincial Government\" by reasoµ of the definition of the phrase \"Provincial Government\" given in section 46 (3) of the General Clauses Act. In my opinion, this definition cannot affect the interpretation of the Government of India Act. In that Act the Provincial Government and the Governor have been used in two different senses and not in one sense.\n\nImmunity from suits is given to the Governor and not to the Provincial Government, though the Governor may be one of the important component parts of the Provincial Government. Reference in this connection was made to the East India Company Act, 1780 (21 Geo. 3, c. vii), and to various statutes which eventually culminated in sections 306 and 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nOn the basis of the Act of 1780 it was contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Governor. That statute, however, did not prohibit the issue of a writ against the East India Company. On the , other hand, there are cases which show that such writs were being issued against the East India Company. In my opinion, the\n\nProvince of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advani' and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\np, ovince of\n\nBomh~J\n\nK. S. Adrlf.1t1i\n\nand 01M, s.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nmatter has to be <lecided exclusively under the term~ of the Government of India Act, 1935, and not on the terms of any repealed statute. Clanses 4 and 13 of the Charter of the Supreme Court gave the power to issue a writ of certiorari to the High Court against the East Ipdia Company and the same. jurisdiction has been li.ept alive by the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nReference was made to a number of Madras cases but, in my opinion, those cases have not been correctlv decided inasmuch as they have placed the Governor on the same footing as the Provincial Government by a process of reasoning which to my mind is not correct.\n\nOn the merits of the case whether the land iii the present case was required for a public purpose, there is a concurrent finding of fact to the effect that the object of this requisition was to benefit an individual and no public purpose was involved in it. That being so, the writ was in my opinion properly issued in this case and the appeal is without force.\n\nI would accordingly dismiss it with costs.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the Province of Bombay and is directed against the judgment of an appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court (consisting of Chagb C. T. and Tendolkar J.) dated January' 4, 1949, by\" which the learned Judges affirmed an order of Bhagwati J. dated September 27, 1948, in so far as it granted a writ of certiorari, for bringing up and quashing a requisition order made by the Provincial Government un, ler section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947).\n\nThere is not much controversy about the facts of the case which lie within a short compass. The requisition order was made by the Province of Bombay on February 26, 1948, in respect of the first floor of a building known as \"Paradise\" situated at 22, Warden Road, Mahalakshmi, Bombay.\n\nThe entire building is owned by one Dr._ M. B. Vakil, and one Abdul Hamid was in occupation of the first floor as a tenant under Dr. Vakil prior to January 29, 1948. Abdul Hamid intended to go to Pakistan and was on the look out for\n\nr •\n\nsome premises a:t Karachi where he might reside and carry on business.\n\nThe petitioner Khusal Das, who was the main respondent in this appeal and is now dead and represented by his heirs, was a refugee from Karachi where he owried a Bungalow worth more than Rs. 50,000 and also a running business in which a considerable sum of money was invested. On 29th January, 1948, there was an agreement entered into by and between Abdul Hamid on the one hand, and the petitioner Khusal Das, his son Gobind Ram and his brother's daughter's son Hiranand on the . other, by which the former assigned to the latter his tenancy right in the first floor of the Paradise in exchange of his getting a leasehold interest in the petitioner's Bungalow at Karachi.\n\nThere were other terms 0£ this transaction which are not relevant for our present purpose.\n\nThe petitioner went into possession ot'the flat on February 4, 1948.\n\nOn February 26, 1948, the Government of Bombay issued an order requisitioning the flat, the order being made under -section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition OrdinaGce (Ordinance No. V of 1947) which came into force on and from the 4th of December, 1947.\n\nThe order was signed by Mr. P. L. Rao as Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Health and Local Government Department.\n\nOn the same day a letter was addressed by Mr. Rao to Dr. Vakil intimating to him that the said flat had been requisitioned as per copy of the Requisition Order enclosed therewith and that Government had allotted the flat to one Mrs. C. Dayaram at a rental of Rs. 85 per month. Mrs. Dayaram, it may be mentioned here, was also a refugee from Sind.\n\nOn February 27, 1948, a further order was passed under the signature of Mr. Rao authorising one Lalwani, an Inspector in the Health and Local Government Department of the Government of Bombay, to take possession of the requisitioned flat under the provision of section 9 of the Requisitioning Ordinance.\n\nOn March 4, 1948, the petitioner Khusal Das filed an application in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court against P. L. Rao, Secretary to the Government of Bombay\n\nProvince ~( Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Oth1rs.\n\nMukhtr)1a :J.\n\nPreof\n\nBombf!1\n\nv. ](. S. Ativ11n;\n\nand OtMrs.\n\n111ukherjea J.\n\nas party respondent alleging that the order of reqms1tion was illegal and ultra vires on various grounds and praying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and an order under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the respondent.\n\nOn this application, an interim injunction was granted by Coyajee J. restrainrng the Government from obtaining possession of the flat.\n\nBy a subsequent amendment of the petition the Province of Bombay, as well as Mr. G. D. Vartak, the Minister-in-charge of the Health and Local _Government Department were added as parties respondents.\n\nA large number of defences were taken by the respondents in answer to the prayers of the petitioner.\n\nIt was contended inter alia that the orders made under the Ordinance were not judicial or quasi-judicial orders, but executive orders made by the Province cif Bombay and no writs of certiorari or prohibition would lie against orders of this 'description.\n\nOn behalf of Mr. Rao, it was urged that he did not make any order himself and had merely authenticated and signed the orders in accordance with the provisions of section 59 (2) of the Government of India Act. As regards. the Province of Bombay a point was taken that no writ could be issued against the Provincial Government which meant and included the Governor of the Province, he being immune from all proceedings in, and processes from any court of India under section 306 of the Government of India Act. The Minister respondent, it was said, was not personally responsible for the orders or for the consequences thereof under the Constitution. It was contended further that the requisition 0£ the flat, and the allotment of it to Mrs. Dayaram were for public purpose.\n\nThe petition was heard by Bhagwati J., who overruled all the contentions of the respondents and granted the petitioner's prayer. Writs of certiorari and prohibition were dircted to be issued against all the\n\nresponden~, and there were also orders of mandamus granted against respondents other than the Province of Bombay.\n\nAgainst this decision an appeal was taken to the appeal Bench of the High Court (being\n\nAppeal No. 65 of 1948) and tht'. appeal was heard by Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J. By their judgment dated January 4, 1949, the learned Judges allowed the appeal in favour of the two respondents other than the Province of Bombay and set aside the orders made against them.\n\nThey affirmed however the judgment of. Bhagwati J., so far as it related to the Province of Bombay, and maintained the writ of certiorari issued against it.\n\nThe Province of Bombay has now come up on appeal to this Court.\n\n The learned Attorney-General who appeared in support of the appeal contended before us, that having regard to the provisions of the Ordinance under which the requisition order was made no writ of certiorari would be at all available in law.\n\nIt has been argued in the first place that the order complained of is a ministerial or administrative order which does not involve exercise of any judicial or quasi-judicial .function and to a purely administrative order of this character no writ of certiorari lies.\n\nIt is argued in the alternative that assuming that the Provincial Government has any semijudicial function to exercise while making an order under section 3 of the Ordinance, the question as to whether the requisition was for a public purpose or not, was a question of fact which the Provincial Government was competent to entertain and decide, under the terms of the Ordinance itself, and no writ of certiorari would lie to bring up an order of the Provincial Government on the ground that its decision on this point was erroneous or unsound.\n\nLastly, it is contended that the Provincial Government is immune from all court . processes and no writ of certiorari could be issued rn it.\n\nThe first and the second point5 are really inter-connected, and I may have to discuss theM together.\n\nThey raise questions of considerable nicety and general importance, and we had arguments of the most elaborate character advanced on them by the }earned COUnsel On both sidCR. 4--6 S.C. India(N D)/58\n\nl~'.O\n\nPr1vince of\n\nBrim ha;·\n\nK. S. Ad1.a11i\n\nand OtMrs.\n\nMukh<fJta ].\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nIt. S. Advani and Others.\n\nMukheriea J.\n\nThe first and the most important point for our consideration is whether the act of requisition against which the writ of certiorari has been issued by the High Court is a judicial or an administrative act. It is not disputed that the writ does not lie to remove an act which is purely ministerial. It can be availed of only to remove and adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts( ' ). To ascertain the exact connotation of the expression \"judicial act\" in connection with the issuing of a writ of certiorari and to determine whether the act complained of in the present case is a judicial act or not it would be necessary and convenient to set out briefly how the law on the point as developed by the Courts in England stands at present.\n\nA writ of certiorari like the writ of prohibition is a judicial writ of antiquity and it is the ordinary process by which the Court of King's Bench Division exercises control over the acts of bodies vested with inferior jurisdiction.\n\nThe writ is intended to bring up before the High Court the records of proceedings or determinations of inferior tribunals and to quash them if the tribunals are found tc, have acted in excess of their jurisdiction.\n\nIt is well settled that the writ is not limited to bringing up the acts of bodies that are ordinarily considered to be Courts. \"The procedure of certiorari\" as has been observed by Fletcher Moulton L. J. in Rex v. Woodhouse( 2 ) \"applies in many cases in which the body whose acts are criticised would not ordinarily be called a 'Court' nor would its acts be ordinarily termed judicial acts.\n\nThe true view of the limitation would seem to be that the term 'judicial act' is used in contrast with purely ministerial acts.\n\nTo these latter the process of certiorari does not apply, as for instance to the issue of a warrant to enforce a rate, even though the rate is one which could itself be questioned by certiorari. In short there must be the exercise of some right or duty to decide in order to proide scope for a writ of certiorari at common law.\"\n\n(')Per May C.J. in &g. v. Dublin Corporation (1878] L.R. 2 fr. 371 at\n\nP. 376.\n\n(') [1906] 2 K.B. 501 at P. 535.\n\nThere can be no doubt that originally the writ of certiorari was issued only to inferior Courts using the word \"Court\" in its ordinary sense. As bodies of various types and denominations _ exercising semijudicial functions came to be introduced, the writ was extended to these bodies also.\n\nThre is a long line of decided cases showing that the writ of certiorari has been issued to rating authorities, licensing Justices, Electricity Commissioners, the Board of Education, the General Medical Council, the Inns of Court, Assessment Committees, the Commissioner of Taxation and various other authorities who could be regarded as performing some sort of . judicial or semi-judicial function though they have no authority to try cases, or pass judgments in the proper sense of the word ( 1 ) It would be interesting to note that in King v. Postmaster General( 2 ), a writ of certiorari was issued to quash a disablement certificate granted by the Chief Medical Officer of the Post Office on the ground that he was not the certifying surgeon under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, and the granting of a certificate was held to be a . judicial act. In Rex v.\n\nBoycott (3 ), one Russel Keasely moved on behalf of }iis\n\ninfant son Stanley for an order of certiorari to remove and quash a medical certificate granted by the respondent to the effect that Stanley was incapable by reason of, mental defect of receiving benefit from instruction in a special school under section 56 of the Education Act, and two other connected documents.\n\nThe Court was. of opinion that as doubts did arise as to whefher the boy was ineducable, it was a proper case to be determined by the Board of Education under section 31.\n\nIt was held in these !:ircumstances that the three documents which were parts and parcel of one and the same transaction constituted the determination of a quasi-judicial authority, and \"exhibited all the mischief which a writ of certiorari was intended and well fitted to correct\". The result was that all the three documents were directed to be brought up and\n\n(1) Vide Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd Edition) Vol. 26, p. 284.\n\n(') [1928] I K. B. 291.\n\n(') [1939] 2 K.B. 651.\n\nProvinct qf\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Othtrs.\n\nMuk/wiea].\n\nProvinn ef\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Ac/1, ani\n\nand Others.\n\nMukhnjeeeJ.\n\nquashed.\n\nEven a report made by a Chief Gas Examiner has been removed and quashed by a writ of certiorari ( 1 ) .\n\nIn the words of Banks L. J. the course of development of law on the subject demonstrates what has been the boast of English Common Law that it will, whenever possible and where necessary, apply existing principles to new set of circumstances( ' ) ; and it was in very general terms that opinion was expressed in Rex v. Inhabitants of Glamorganshire( 3 ) that the Court would examine the proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Acts of Parliament and if under pretence of such an Act they proceeded to encroach jurisdiction to themselves greater than the Act warrants, the Court would send a certiomri to them to have their proceedings returned to the Court to the end that the Court might see that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction, and if they exceed it, to restrain them.\n\nThe whole law on the subject relating to issuing of writs of certiorari was thus summed up by Atkin L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners( • ) :\n\n\"Whenever any body or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.\"\n\nThis statement of law has been affirmed and reiterated in various cases since then ( 5 ) and its correctness has never been questioned.\n\nBut unexceptionable though the statement is, it does not by itself afford any assistance in solving the real difficulty that arises in cases of this description. It postulates existence of a duty in the authority to decide judicially but it does not enumerate or give any indication of the\n\n(1) R .... London County CoutJcil, 11 T.L.R. 337. (') Vide Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at p. 192.\n\n(') I Ld. Raym. 580. (') [1924) 1 K.B. 171 at p. 205. (Ji) Vide R. v. North Worcestershire Assessment Committee, [19291 2 K.n.\n\n397 at p. 405-6; R. v. London County Council, [1931] 2 K.B. 215.\n\ncircumstances un<ler which such duty shall be held to be imposed. It has been pointed out very nghtly by my learned brother Das J. in a recent Calcutta case ( 1 ) that of the four clements invoked in the proposition of law enunciated by Lord Atkin, three may be present m an administrative or executive act as well.\n\nA valid executive act undoubtedly presupposes the existence of a legal authority in the officer or department to do the act.\n\nSuch executive acts may and in fact do affect the rights of subjects. Cases are also not infrequent where an executive authority transgresses the limits of its jurisdiction, and acts in excess of its powers.\n\nYet, it is not disputed that no writ of certiorari can be issued to restrain or invalidate such executive acts.\n\nAs was observed by Lord Hewart C. J. in Rex v.\n\nLegislative Committee of the Church Assembly( 8 ), \"in order that a body may satisfy the required test, it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, there must be superadded to that characteristic the further characteristic that the body has the duty to act judicially.\" The material points for consideration therefore are what is the true criterion of a judicial act, and how it is to be ascertained whether an authority is bound to -act judicially in a particular matter or not.\n\nIt is said that one of the best definitions of a judicial act, as distinguished from an administrative act, is that gi.ven by May C. J. in the Irish case of Reg v. D.ublin Corporation( 3 ). The question raised in that case was whether a borough rate levied by a Corporation was illegal or not.\n\nIt was found that the borough fund of the Corporation was otherwise sufficient for all legitimate purposes but it was rendered insufficient by reason of certain illegal payments made . out of it.\n\nTc make up the deficiency, the Corporation levied a borough rate, the legality of which was challenged and writ of certiorari was prayed for to qu:ish a\\J the orders and.\n\n(') lnre Ba11warilal, 48 C.W.N. 766.\n\n(') [1928] I, K.B. 411 at 415.\n\n(1) [1878] L.R. 2 Ir. 371.\n\nProzinct o.f\n\nBomhv\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nJnd Others.\n\nMukherjta J.\n\nProllime of Bombay v.\n\nA. S. Advnni\n\nand Othtrs.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nresolutions of the Corporation in connection with the imposition of the rate.\n\nThe writ was granted and May C. J. while discussing in his judgment the meaning of the expression 'judicial act' observed as follows :\n\n\"In this connection the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others.\n\nAnd if there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, make estimates to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequence would be judicial acts.\"\n\nThis definition was approved by Palles C. B. in Re : Local Government Board, Ex parte Kensington Commissioners( 1 ) and was quoted in extenso by Lord Atkinson, in Frome United Bre1ueries Company v. Bath fustices(').\n\nIn the passage quoted above, the learned Chief Justice really describes what may be called the judicial process. There cannot indeed be a judicial act which does not create rights or impose obligations ; but an act, as has been already pointed out is not necessarily judicial because it affects the rights of subjects.\n\nEvery judicial act presupposes the application of judicial process. There is a well marked distinction between forming a personal or private opii1ion about a matter, and determining it judici1lly. In the performance of an executive act, the authority has certainly to apply his mind to the materials before him ; but the opinion he forms is a purely subjective matter which depends entirely upon his state of mind. It is of course necessary that he must act in good faith, and if it is established that he was not influenced by any extraneous consideration, there is nothing further to be said. about it.\n\nIn .a judicial proceeding, on the other hand, the process or method of application is different. \"The judicial process involves the application of a body of\n\n(') 16 L.R. h-. 150.\n\n(') [1926] A.C. ;86.\n\nrules or principles by the technique of a , particular psychological method\"( 1 ). It involves a proposal and an opposition, and arriving at a decision upon the same on consideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice( 2 ). It is not necessary that the strict rules of evidence should be followed : the procedure for investigation of facts or for reception of evidence may vary according to the requirements of a particular case. There need not be any hard and fast rule on such matters, but the decision which the authority arrives at, must not be his 'subjective', 'personal' or 'private' opinion. It must be something which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or otherwise of the determination must be capable of being tested by the same external standard.\n\nThis is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative function ; and whether an authority is required to exercise one kind of function or the other depends entirely upon the provlSlons of the particular enactment. Where the statute itself is clear on this point, no difficulty is likely to arise, but where the language of the . enactment does not indicate with precision what kind of function is to be exercised by an authority, considerable difficulties are bound to be experienced. There are numerous decided cases, which deal with questions of this character, and quite a number of them were cited to us by the learned counsel on both sides. As they relate to the powers and duties of various types of , authorities under various statutes and war regulations, dealing with different subject-matters and not uniformly worded, they are of no direct assistance to us in the present case.\n\nI think however that we can cull a few general principles from some of the pronouncements of the English Courts, which may throw light on the interpretation of the Ordinance before us.\n\nGenerally speaking, where the language of a statute indicates with sufficient clearness that the personal\n\n(') Robson's Justice and Administrative Law, p. 33. (') Vide R. v. London County Counril (1931] 2 K.B. 215 at p. 2'<3.\n\n19.iO\n\nProvincd of\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nPrtwinct .\"/\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Aduatti\n\nand Others.\n\nsatisfaction of the authority on certain matters about whioo he has to form an opinion founds his jurisdiction to do certain acts or make certain orders, the function should be regarded as an executive function.\n\nThe decision of the House of Lords in Li11ersidge v. Anderson( ) is the leading illustration of this type of cases.\n\nEven Lord Atkin observed, in course of his dissenting judgment -in this case, that when the discretion is left to the Minister or any other authority without qualification, by use of expressions like the following : \"A Secretary of State .. , . if it appears to him necessary may order ; if it appears .'to tbe Secretary of State that any person is concerned .... ; if the Secretary of State is •atisfied that it is necessary or expedient,\" the act cannot but b~ held to be an executive act.\n\nLord Atkin was however inclined to hold that the words \"if the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe,\" should be construed as meaning \"if there is in fact reasonable cause for believing,\" and according to his Lordship \"reasonable cause\" for an action or belief is as much a positive fact for determination by a third party as any other objective condition.\n\nThis view was not accepted by the majority of the House and it was held that the words meant no more than that the Secretary of State had honest! y to suppose that he had reasonable cause to believe the required .thing.\n\nProvided there was good faith the maker of t11e order was the only possible Judge of the conditions of his own jurisdiction(').\n\nAfter die law was settled in this way by the House of Lords, a large number ci cases came up before the Courts in England which involved consideration of the provisions contained in various other orders and regulations relating to taking control of business or requisition of property. The language of these orders was very similar to that, of Regulation 18 (B) under whicli the detention order was made in Liversidge's case. In Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v.\n\nLloyd George( 3 ) the\n\n(') [1942] A.C. 206.\n\n( 1) Vide observation of Lord Radcliffe in Nakudda . .f.li v. M. F. D1\n\nS. Jayaratne, 54 C.W.N. 883, 888.\n\nI') [1943] 2 A.E.R. 046.\n\n.!.. ...\n\ncontrol of the appellant's undertaking was taken by the Ministry of Fuel • and Power by an order made under the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, reg. 55 ( 4).\n\nThe relevant provision of the regulation stood as follows:\n\n\"If it appears to the competent authority that in the interest of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war or for maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to take control on behalf of His Majesty of the whole or any part of an existing undertaking .... the competent authority may by order authorise .... \"\n\nThe appellant's contention was that there were no adequate grounds upon which the Minister could find, as he stated, he had found, that it was necessary to take control in the .interests of the realm or the efficient prosecution of war. It was held that there was no jurisdiction in .the Court to interfere with what was an executive order passed bona fide.\n\nIn Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works and Others( 1 ) which was decided near about the same time, the appellant's factory was requisitioned by the Commissioner of Works under the provisions of the Defence ~General) Regulations, 1939, Reg. 51 (1).\n\nThe requisition order was challenged inter alia on the ground that the requisitioning authority neyer brought their minds to bear upon the question and had they done so, they could not possibly come to the conclusion to which in fact they came. In this case the regulation was almost in the same language as that in the earlier case. The words were \"If it appears to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient so to do ........ \"\n\nThe Court held that the Parliament had committed to the executive the discretion of deciding when an order for the requisition of the premises should be made under the regulation, and. with that discretion if bona fide exercised no Court could interfere.\n\n(') [1943] 2 A.E.R. 560.\n\n.1950\n\nProrrinu of Bomb'!Y v.\n\nIf.. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nProvinu of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Mvani\n\nand o.,,,,.,.\n\nMukh.,.jeaJ.\n\nEven when the language of the statute is such that it confers an unlimited discretion. on the executive, there are cases where a duty on the part of the authority to act judicially has heen sought to be • spelt out of the other provisions in the statute, particularly those which relate to the holding of public enquiries and consideration of objections by the authorities coacerned.\n\nThus in Pheonix Association Company v. Minister of Town and Country Planning( 1 ) an application was made to quash an order made under section l ( l) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which empowered the Minister of Town and Country Planning to make an order declaring land in any area to be subject to compulsory purchase, if he was satisfied that it was requisite for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily with extensive war damage in the area of a local Town Planning authority that such lands should be laid out afresh and re-developed as a whole.\n\nIt was held by Henn Collins J. that the matter was not so peculiarly within the administrative capacity of the Minister that it could be regarded as one of pure discretion.\n\nReliance was placed on the fact that the statute was not a piece of temporary legislation like Regulation l8 (B), and the provisions relating to holding of public enquiry, and hearing of objections, indicated according to the learned J11dge that the function was of a quasijudicial character.\n\nThere was no appeal against this judgment, but quite a contrary view was taken by the Court of Appeal in another case which involved consideration of the same provisions of the same Act. This was th~. case of Robinson and others v. Minister of Town and Country Planning( 2 ) and it was held there that the order under section 1 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Act is made by the Minister as an executive authority and he is at liberty to base his opinion on whatever he thinks proper. Stress waS' laid on the words \"requisite\" and \"satisfactory\" used in the\n\n(') [1947] 1 A.E.R. 45•.\n\n(') [1947] 1 A.B.R.. 851\n\nsection and these words indicated according to the' learned Judges that the question was one of opinion and policy, matters which were peculiarly for the Minister himself to decide, and as to which, assuming always that he acted bona fide, he was the sole Judge.\n\nIt was further . observed that no objective test was here indicated and that different considerations might apply where a Minister could be shown to have overstepped the limits of his power, e.g., where the conditions in which they may be exercised were laid down in the statute and he purported to act in a case where the conditions did not exist.\n\nIn Errington and others v. Minister of Health( • ) the question arose as to whether an order of the Minister of Health confirming a clearance order. made by a local authority under section 1 of the Housing Act of 1930 was an executive or judicial order. It was held that if there was no objection raised to clearance order by persons interested in the property and it was confirmed by the Minister, there was no exercise by the latter of any judicial or quasi-judicial function.\n\nBut the position becomes different if objections are raised.\n\nThen the Minister would have to hold a public local enquiry as provided for by the Act and consider the report of the person who held the enquiry. In such circumstances the decision to confirm the clearance order amounts to an exercise of quasi-judicial function.\n\nThis was a case under the Housing Act of 1930. In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning( 2 ) however, which was a case under the New Towns Act, 1946, and contained very similiar provisions, it was held by the House of Lords that in C()nsidering the report of the person who held a public enquiry after objections have been made to an order under section 1\n\n(1) of the New Towns Act, the Minister has no judicial or quasi-judicial duty imposed on him, so that considerations of bias in the execution of such duties were altogether irrelevant.\n\nIt would be seen from the cases referred to above that the distinction between judicial and executive\n\n( 1) [1935] 1 K.B. 249. (')\n\n[19481 A.C. 87.\n\n19:;0\n\nProvince of\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Aduani and Others.\n\nP; ovitied Of\n\nBombtg\n\nJr. S . .Advani\n\nand Oflwrs.\n\nfunction often turns out to be a very fine one, and difference of opinion amongst Judges is not uncommon on these matters even when they have got to construe provisions of Acts which employ language very similar to each other.\n\nLeaving aside the cases, where the existence of a duty to act judicially is sought to be inferred from the provisions of a statute relating to holding of enquiry or hearing of objections, the general rule that all the cases lay down is that if the foundation of the exercise of the powers by an authority is his personal satisfaction or subjective opinion about certain facts, the function is to be regarded as executive and not judicial.\n\nThe facts may undoubtedly be and often are objective facts about which the authority has got to form his opinion. When a statute says that a Minister can requisition property or order compulsory purchase if he deems it expedient to do so in the interest of public safety or the defence of the realm, the condition precedent to the exercise of his powers is not the actual existence of national interest, but his own opinion or belief that it exists.\n\nTo quote the words of Lord Radcliffe \"If the question whether the condition has been satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields the power the value of the intended restraint is in fact nothing( 1 ) \". On the other hand, if the statute imposes an objective condition precedent of fact to the exercise of powers by an authority, and not merely his subjective opinion about it, the function would be prima fade judicial.\n\nThe distinction is beantifully illustrated by Lord Atkin in his classic judgment in Liversidge's case( • ) . If it is a condition t<5 the exercise of powers by A that X has a right of way or Y has a broken ankle, the authority is charged with determining these facts and it must ascertain judicially whether the conditions are fulfilled or not. If, on the other hand, the condition is tliat the authority thinks or is of opinion that X has a right of way or Y has a broken ankle, the condition is a purely subjective condition\n\n(') Vidc Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jrratne 54 C.W.N. 883,888.\n\n(') (1942) A. C. 206, 227.\n\nand the act cannot be a judicial act as the existence of the condition is incapable of being determined by a third party by application of any rule of law or procedure.\n\nOne other question arises in this ccmnection and that relates to the second and alternative contention raised by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nWhen the legislature delegates powers to an authority, and lays down that the powers could be exercised only if a certain state of facts exists, obviously the authority cannot act if the condition is not fulfilled. If it wrongly holds or assumes that the condition exists although it actually does not exist, its assumption of jurisdiction would be unsupportable, and could be removed by a writ of certiorari.\n\nThe legislature however may entrust the authority with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists. In such cases even if the authority makes a wrong decision either of facts or law, it can be corrected by an appellate tribunal if there is any, but not by a writ of certiorari, as every authority if it acts within jurisdiction is competent to decide both rightly or wrongly( 1 ).\n\nKeeping in view the principles mentioned above, I' would now turn to the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisiti6'n Ordinance, 1947, _and try to ascertain from the nature and scope of the provisions, whether the act of requisition which section 3 of the Ordinance contemplates is a judicial or a purely administrative order.\n\nThe title of the Ordinance shows that it was passed to provide for the requisition of land, for continuance of requisition already made and for other purposes.\n\nThe first preamble sets out the fact that the Governor- General in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, has empowered all provincial .legislatures to enact laws with respect to requisition of land. The second preamble really gives the reason for passing of\n\n(1) Per Esher L.J. in Queen v. Commissioners for the. Special Purposes of\n\nIncome Tax, 21 Q.B.D. 313 at p. 319.\n\nPwuina of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Aduani and Ot/:ers.\n\nMuk/w:jea ].\n\nProvince o.f\n\nBombay v. /(. S. Advani and Others.\n\nMukherjea .7.\n\nthe Ordinance ; it recites that the Bombay Legislature is not in session and the Governor of Bombay is satisfied that circumstances exist which render 1t necessary for him to take immediate action to enable the Provincial Government to make provisions for requisitioning of land and for continuance of requisition of lands already subject to requisition.\n\nSection 3 of the Ordinance is the most material section for our present purpose and it stands as follows :-\n\n\"If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition any land for any public purpose.\"\n\nThere is a proviso added to the section which is worded thus:\n\n\"Provided that no land used for the purpose of public religious worship or for any purpose which the Provincial Government may specify by notification in the Official Gazette shall be requisitioned under this section.\"\n\nThe language of the section taken along with the proviso indicates in my opinion, that whereas the act of requisitioning land is left to the executive discretion of the Provincial Government and the latter can requ1S1t10n. land whenever it considers necessary or expedient to do so, certain conditions have been laid down which are conditions precedent to the exercise of the powers. The first condition is specified in the section itself and it postulates the existence of a public purpose as an essential pre-requisite to the taking of steps by the Provincial Government in the matter of requisitioning any property.\n\nEven whee this condition is satisfied, there is another condition imposed by the proviso which is in the nature of an exception engrafted upon the entire section and which prevents the Provincial Government from exercising its powers at all if the land sought to be requisitioned is used for public religious worship or for any other purpose which the Provincial Government has specified in the\n\nOfficial Gazette.\n\nIn my opinion the existence of a public purpose as an objective fact, and not the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government that such fact exists, has been made the essential preliminary which founds the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government to proceed with any act of requisition.\n\nThis would be apparent from the collocation of words as they. occur in section 3 and also from other provisions of the Ordinance which indicate the scheme which the framers of the Ordinance had in view.\n\nSection 3 does not say that if in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is. necessary or expedient to requisition land fqr any public purpose, it may do so by ;, in order in writing.\n\nIn that case it might be argued that it was left as a matter of subjective opinion to the Provincial Government to decide whether there was or not any public purpose justifying the requisition; al)d provided the authority acted in a bona fide manner, the Courts would have no say in the matter. The words \"public purpose\", it would be seen, have been placed at the end of the sentence, -and this indicates that it is a thing collateral to, and not included in, the act which has been described before, and which has been left to the. discretion of the executive. It is an independent fact, the existence of which enables the execuitve to move in the matter of requisitioning property, but it is itself not dependent on the personal opinion of the executive. I agree entirely with Chagla\n\nC. J. that the words \"to do so\" refer to the act of requisition, that is to~ say, to the nature of the act and not to the purpose for which it is done. There is no indication here, as there is in various statutes and regulations which I have referred to above that not merely the_ necessity or expediency of requisitioning property, but the existence of a public purpose which gives occasion for exercising the powers of requisition, is also a matter of personal opinion of the executive.\n\nReference was made in course of arguments to the language of section 4 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, and similar provisions in other Land Acquisition\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Adi, ani\n\nand Others.\n\nMukheiea J.\n\n1950 enactments, where the expression 'public purpose'\n\nPtov u of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Othars.\n\nM ukhlrjea J.\n\noccurs.\n\nIt will be seen at once that the language of these prov1s10ns is material! y different from that of section 3 of the Ordinance.\n\nIn Wijeyesekera v. Festing( 1 ) the Privy Council had to deal with a case under the Ceylon Acquisition of Land Ordinance. Section 4 of the Ordinance provides as follows:\n\n\"Whenever it shall appear to the Governor that Land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct the Surveyor General or other officer ........ to examine such land and report whether the same is fitted for such purpose.\"\n\nSection 6 then says : \"The Surveyor General or other officer ...... shall make his report to the Governor whether the possession of the land is needed for the purpose for which it appeared likely to be needed as aforesaid, and upon the receipt of such report it shall be lawful for the Governor with the advice of the Executive Council to direct the Government Agent to take order for the acquisition of the land.\"\n\nThe question raised was whether the decision of the Governor that the land is wanted for public purpose is final, and the question was answered in the affirmative. It seems clear that on the language of the two sections referred to above no other answer waspossible. It is not the existence of a public purpose which is a condition precedent to the exercise of powers by the Governor under the Ceylon Ordinance. The Governor has been made the sole Judge of the existence of public purpose as well as of the necessity of acquiring land for that purpose. There is no condition limiting or restricting his powers in any way.\n\nThe language of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act of India is very much the same.\n\nThe section begins with these words :\n\n(1) (1919] A. C. 646.\n\n' .\n\n\"Whenever it appears to the local Government that land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose .... \"\n\nMoreover, under section 6 (3) of the Act, a declaration made by the Government that any land is needed for public purpose is conclusive evidence of the existence of such purpose.\n\nWhat exactly is the extent of powers conferred by the Legislature upon a body or tribunal is to be gathered from the language . used by the Legislature.\n\nMere similarity or even identity of objects cannot justify us in coming to the conclusion that the Legislature must have meant the same thing in one piece of legislation as it meant in another when the language is not identical. In cases of this description utmost stress should be laid on the actual words used, for there .is no presumption that the Legislature intended to confet one kind of power on the authority rather than another in 'lases of particular type. If there is -any preswnption at all it is in favour of the liberty ef\n\nthe subject, and any law which encroaches upon such liberty must be construed strictly and should not be carried beyond what the actual words used mean in their plain grammatical sense. It may be pertinent to point out in this connection that a similar provision in section 3 ( 1) of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control Act, has been expressed in a different language and the actual existence of public purpose has not been made a condition precedent to the exercise of powers by the Provincial Government. The section is worded as follows :\n\n\"Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any premises in any locality are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose, it may by order in writing requisition such premises.\"\n\nThere has been a recent decision ( 1 ) of the Calcutta High Court on the above provision of the Bengal Act, but the particular point which has arisen . for our consideration in this case, was not and could not be raised there.\n\n(I) A.C. Mahoin4d v. SailendranaJh 54 C.W.N. 642. 5-6 S. C. India (N. D.)/58.\n\nPrDVinu .!\n\nBombay\n\n\"· IC S. Advanei\n\nanJ Othm.\n\nMukftij.a J.\n\nProvinu of\n\nBo-mlJay\n\n:A:. S. Advani\n\nand Others\n\nA conspectus of the whole of the Bombay Ordinance leaves a clear impression that it was not the intention of the framers of the Ordinance to give an unlimited and unfettered discretion to the Executive Government in the matter of requisitioning property.\n\nThe powers are to be exercised within defined limits.\n\nSection 3 as stated above imposes at two-fold restriction, one by postulating the objective existence of public purpose as a pre-requisite to the exercise of discretionary powers, the other by excluding the powers altogether when the land is used for a public religious purpose. Thus the proviso which excepts the cases specified therein from the sphere of operation of the general provision of the entire section has also set up an objective condition, the existence of which would exclude the exercise of powers by the Provincial Government. Section 4 again deals with requisition of v; icant premises and instead of leaving it to the executive to determine whether a premises is vacant or not .• sub-clause (i) gives an elaborate description of the circumstances under which vacancy would be deemed to arise in law. The power of requisitioning vacant premises can be made only if the conditions laid down in section 4 are fulfilled. Section 8 deals with powers of enquiry for purposes of payment of compensation as is provided for in section 6 and is not material for our purpose. Section 10 makes a general provision and the Provincial Government under this section may, with a view to carry out ; iny of the purposes of the Ordinance, by order, require any person to furnish any information in his possession relating to the land requisitioned or to be requisitioned. This is certainly an enabling provision and I am unable to say that this provision by itself indicates that the function exercisable by the Provincial Government is a judicial function. The duty to act judicially is, in my opinion, implicit in section 3 itself.\n\nIt must not be overlooked that the determination of the existence of 'public purpose' involves decision on questions of both facts and .Jaw. As was observed by\n\nLord Loreburn in Board of Education v. Rice ( 1 ), \"comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion involving no law. It will, I suppose, be usually of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the fact.\" This was held by his Lordship to be a clear index of a duty to act judicially.\n\nIt was suggested, in course of arguments that as admittedly the actual act of requisition is discretionary with the Provincial Government, no writ of certiorari can possibly be issued. There is not much substance in this argument, for the very jurisdiction or authority to exercise discretion is dependem on a condition precedent which if unfulfilled would make the exercise of discretion void altogether. It is a commonplace feature of this class of legislation that an authority is often required to exercise both ministerial and quasijudicial functions. Whether he acts administratively throughout or is put at one stage in a quasi-judicial position has to be gathered from the provisions of the Act. The case of Errington v. Minister of Health ( 2 ) is a leading authority which holds that the same proceeding may be administrative at one stage and quasijudicial at another.\n\nThe position in my opinion may be summed up as follows:\n\nThe Provincial Government has to satisfy itself that there is a public purpose before it proceeds to requisition any property.\n\nAs this is an objective condition which has not been made dependent on the personal opinion of the Executive it has got to be determined judicially and whether a public purpose exists or not is itself a mixed question o£ facts and law which could\n\n(I) [1911] A.c. 179at p. 182.\n\n(2) [1935] I K.B. 249.\n\nProvince of\n\n. Bombay\n\ny, K. S • .Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nMuk/rerjea J.\n\nPr£cinct o} nombay v. i:. S. Advatti\n\nand Otkrs.\n\nMukhujra ].\n\nbe determined by application of well established principles of law to the circumstances of a particular case. There is undoubtedly a lis or point in controversy-or what is called a proposal and an opposition.\n\nOn the one hand, there is the interest of the public, and on the other, the interest of the individual whose property is being requisitioned. No formal array of parties is necessary. It is enough that there is a point in issue which has got to be decided between parties having conflicting interests in respect to the same.\n\nThe fact that the Provincial Government represents the interest.> of the public also is to my mind immaterial. If there is a duty to decide judicially it would be a judicial act, and it is not necessary that there must be two opposing parties other than the deciding authority appearing in a regular or formal manner.\n\nMy conclusion, therefore, is that on the first point the decision of the High Court is right, and the contentions raised by t):ie learned Attorney-General must fail.\n\nThe question now arises whether the Ordinance has conferred upon the Provincial Government the jurisdiction or authority to decide finally as a part of the requisition proceeding itself whether .any public purpose exists or not.\n\nIf it has, the error, if any, committed by the Provincial Government, may be an error of fact or law, but would not be one of jurisdiction, and whatever other remedy might be open to the aggrieved party, a writ of certiorari would not lie. As has been said already, it is clear from the language of section 3 of the Ordinance that the act of requisition itself, provided the condition precedent is fulfilled, is a pure executive act, in regard to which an untrammelled discretion has been left to the Provincial Government. If the state of fact exists which entitles the Provincial Government to act, the function that the Provincial Government exercises is a purely administrative function, which does not involve performance of any judicial duty. In such circumstance the existence of public purpose is either a matter of personal opinion of the Provincial Government\n\nin which case no question of exerc1smg a judicial function at all arises, or it is wholly independent of and collateral to the executive act and is an objective condition which must be fulfilled before the Provincial Government can take any steps in the matter. As I have stated already, on a proper interpretation of section 3 of the Ordinance, the latter is the proper view to . take.\n\nThis being the position, whether or not a public purpose exists is a preliminary question which is collateral to the merits of the executive act which is to be performed by the Government under section 3 of the Ordinance.\n\nPublic purpose must exist as a fact, and the Provincial Government must satisfy itself as to its existence before it can take any steps in requisitioning property; but it is not for the Provincial Government to decide the matter finally or conclusively, and its decision on this preliminary point would be open to enquiry by superior courts.\n\nThese principles are laid down in Bunbury v. Fuller ( 1 ), Pease v. Chaytor ( 9 ) and Colonial Bank of Australasia v.\n\nWillan ( 8 ). By way of illustration of these principles reference may be made to two well-known English cases.\n\nIn Rex v. Woodhouse( •) there was an application to bring up an order made by Licensing Justices under the Licensing Act referring an application for renewal of a licence to quarter sessions. One of the points . raised in the case was whether or not the Justices were right in deciding that the. applicants were qualified to apply for licence under the provisions of the Beer House Act, 1840, which required that the applicant should be the real resident holder and occupier of the dwelling house in which he should apply to be licensed.\n\nIt was held by the majority of Judges in the Court of Appeal that the fact that the applicants were not the real resident holders of the_ Beer houses excluded them from the class to whom licences, whether absolute or conditional, could be granted and no erroneous decision on this\n\n(1) 9 Ex. Ch. lll.\n\n(3) [1874-] 5 P.C. 417 at p. 422\n\n(2) 3 B. & S. 620.\n\n(4) (1900)12 K.B. 505.\n\nProvinc1 of\n\n.llt>m6ay\n\nv. 1.·. S. Advani\n\nsnd Others.\n\n. Proriince of\n\nBombqy\n\nK. S. Adllani\n\nand OtMrs.\n\nMW.lrajea J.\n\nquestion of fact by the Magistrates could give them jurisdiction .\n\nReference was made by Fletcher Moulton L. J. to certain passages in Bunbury v. Fuller( 1 ) and Pease v.\n\nChaytor ( ) and it was held that if the licensing Magistrates did decide these points of fact, it is the duty of the Court to review their decisions, and if it is erroneous, to quash the licences and references.\n\nThe other case is that of Rex v. Bedford( 3 ), and it arose upon a rule for a certiorari to bring up an order of the Justices authorising the entry upon certain enclosed land for the purpose of taking materials for the repair of cenain roads under sections 53 and 54 of the Highways Act, 1835. Under sections 53 and 54 of the Highways Act, the Justices may license the Surveyor of Highways to take materials for repair of the Highways \"at such time or times as to such Justices may seem proper from the enclosed land of any person .... not being a park.\" On a licence being granted by the justices to the Newton Abbot Rural District Council, authorising them by their Surveyor, to take materials for the repairs of the Highway from a place known as Grange Quarry in the said Parish, a rule was obtained for a writ of certiorari to bring up the order to be quashed, inter alia on the ground that it was made in respect of a land which was a park. It was held that the land was in fact a park, and the Justices cannot give themselves jurisdiction by finding that. it was not a park.\n\nThe question whether the place is a park or not is a matter which is preliminary to exercise of the Justices' jurisdiction, and one which is not for the Justices to determine finally. \"The enquiry is not in the course of exercise of jurisdiction but as a prelimina.ry to it. The case therefore falls within the rule laid\"down in Bunbury v. Fuller (' ) and the Justices' decision in the matter is subject to . \" review.\n\nIt must be admitted that in both these was no dispute that the Justices had\n\n(1) 9 E><. Ch. 111.\n\n(3) [1908) 1 K.B. 3[>5.\n\n(2) 3 B. & S. 620.\n\n(4) 9 Ex. Ch. 111.\n\ncases there to exercise\n\nquasi-judicial powers, and the only question was whether the facts upon which the exercise of jurisdiction was made to depend were preliminar{ matters collateral to the enquiry or were matters to be adjudicated\n\n1 upon as part of the enquiry itself. fo the case before us the act of requisition, as said already, is an executive and not a judicial act, and to this extent therefore there is no similarity between. the present case_ and those referred to above.\n\nBut the principles underlying these authorities can certainly be invoked for our present purpose. The act of requisition being an executive act, the determination of the existence of a public purpose upon which the exercise of powers is dependent is either a part of the executive act itself or is something . collateral to it.\n\nI have attempted to show that it is a thing collateral and preliminary to the exercise of executive authority and not a part of it.\n\nThat being so, the determination of this conateral matter by the executive authority which is, in my op1mon, a judicial function cannot be regarded as final and if the determination is erroneous, it can be corrected and removed by a writ of certiorari.\n\n, It may be stated here that before the learned Judges of the appellate Bench in the High Court no attempt was made on behalf of the Government to establish that the premises in question were requisitioned for any public purpose.\n\nA public purpose involves some benefit to the community as a whole, as opposed to the perso.qal gain or interest of particular individuals.\n\nHousing of refugees may certainly be a public purpose, and under certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot be to the general interest of the community to requisition the property of on!! refugee for the benefit of another refugee.\n\nThe only other question that remains to be considered is whether a writ of certiorari lies against the Provincial Government ?\n\nOn this point the .contentions Attorney-General fall under raised by the learned two heads.\n\nThe first\n\nPrDllina of\n\nBombfJJJ\n\nK. S. Adtani\n\nand Ot/rzn.\n\n!9.'iO\n\nP1o; ina~ ef\n\nBomb~\n\nK. S. Aduuii\n\nand Ol!.1:11.\n\nMukhnj,. ].\n\nbranch of the argument is that the expression \"Provincial Government\" occurring in section 3 of the Ordinance means the same thing as the Governor of the Province.\n\nThis being the position there is complete immunity enjoyed by the Provincial Government in respect of all judicial processes under section 306 (I) of the Constitution Act, and the powers of the High Court itself are restricted and limited in this respect by certain enactments.\n\nThe other branch of the contention is that under section 176 of the Constitution Act, no action of this character could be brought against the Province of Bombay, and in any view the expressions \"sue or be sued\" as usccl in section 176, do not include an application for a writ of certiorari.\n\nAs regards the first branch of the argument. it may be pointed out at the outset that no definition of the term \"Provincial Government\" has been given in the Constitution Act, 1935, Part III of the Act deals with Governors' Provinces.\n\nSection 49 (1) which occurs in this Part provides that \"the executive authority of a Province shall be exercised on behalf of Hi.s Majesty by the Governor, either directly or through officers subordinate to him.\" Section 50 lays down that \"there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Act required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.\" Section 51 provides inter alia how the ministers are to be chosen and section 52 deals with the special responsibilities of the Governor: Section 59 (1) provides that \"all executive action of the Government of a Province shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.\"\n\nThe Governor is thus the executive head of a Province and all executive acts are done in his name.\n\nThis does not mean that Government of a Province 1s vested solely in the Governor, or that the expressions \"Governor\" and \"Provincial Government\" have t11e same meaning and connotation in the Constitution Act.\n\nIt is only a form adopted for purpose of convenience that in a Governor's Province, all acts of the Provincial Government would be done in the name of the Governor, no matter wherever under the Constitution,\n\nthe responsibility might actually lie.\n\nSection 3 ( 43)\n\n(a) of the General Clauses Act (as amended by the Adaptation Order of 1947) which is relied upon in this connection does not in any way affect this position.\n\nIt says that \"as respects anything done or to be done\n\nter the establishment of the Dominion of India,\n\n'Provincial Ckwcmment' shall mean in the Governor's Province the Governor.\" This is a mere description as will be apparent from the fact that under the same dause, the expression \"Provincial Government\" used with reference to a Chief Commissioner's Province means the Central Government.- Section 306 ( 1) of the Constitution Act however is based on an absolutely different principle and it is not concerned with the acts of any Provincial Government no matter in whose name the acts are expressed to be taken.\n\nThe section runs as follows :\n\n\"No proceedings whatsoever shall lie in, and no process whatsoever shall issue from, any court in India . .against the Governor-General, against the Governor\n\n.of a Province, or against the Secretary of State, whether in a personal capacity or otherwise, and, except with the sanction of His Majesty in Council, no proceedings whatsoever shall lie in any court in India against any person, who has been the Governor-General, the Governor of a Province, or the Secretary of State in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any .of them during his term of office in performance or purported performance of the duties thereof : '\n\nProvided that nothing in this section shall be construed as restricting the right of any person to bring against the Federation, a Province, or the Secretary .of State such proceedings as are mentioned in Chapter III of Part VII of this Act.\"\n\nThe lartguage of the section is perfectly clear and indicates that its whole object is to grant personal\n\nProviNCI oj\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Mvani\n\nlllld 01rs.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1950.\n\nProvinct of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Otlwrs.\n\nimmunity to the Governor-General, the Secretary of State or the Governor of a Province from all proceedings in or processes from any court in India, both during the term of their office and afterwards.\n\nThe protection is. given in the interests of the administration itself, 'for it would really be productive of disastrous consequences if the Governor-General or the Governor of a Province could be hauled up before any court in India in respect of acts committed by them in their personal capacity or otherwise.\n\nThat this protection is purely personal follows clearly from the latter part of the section which interdicts any proceeding against the Governor- General, the Governor of a Province or the Secretary of State, after they have ceased to be in office, for any act of omission or commission during the term of their office.\n\nThis part of the section would be wholly devoid of any meaning, if the Governor of a Province, is taken to be sonymous with the Provincial Government. The Govefrnor of a Province is certainly a part of the Government of the Province and formally he is the mouthpiece of all executive acts done in the Province, but section 306 (1) does not purport to protect any of the official acts. It grants a personal exemption to the Governor from any judicial processes in India, no matter whether they arise out of official or non-official acts committed by him, and this exemption continues even after he has ceased to be in office, except where His Majesty chooses to relax the rule.\n\nI agree with the learned Judges of the High Court in holding that even the possibility of a misconstruction of this section has been removed by the proviso engrafted on it, which lays down in clear terms tha( the provisions of the section shall not be construed as restricting in any way the right of any person to bring against the Federation, a Province, or the Secretary of State such proceedings as are mentioned in Chapter III of Part VII of the Act.\n\nThe material provision in Chapter III of Part VII of the Act is that contained in. section 176 and I will come to that presently; but before I d~ so, it would\n\nbe convenient to dispose of. the other point raised by the learned Attorney-General in connection with the first branch of his argument. The point raised is that apart from , the protection afforded by section 306 (1) of the Constitution Act there is a limitation on the powers of the High Court, to grant processes against the Provincial Government and we have been referred in this connection to section 1 of the East India Company Act (21 George III, Ch. 17) and certain pro-. visions in the Act of 1823 under which the Supreme Court was established in Bombay.\n\nThis contention again, in my opinion, would be of no avail, if as I have stated above, the Provincial Government is not identifiable with the Governor personally.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that the Supreme Court was established at Fort William in Bengal under the Statute (13 George III, Ch. 63) commonly known as the Regulating Act, and the Charter establishing the Court was issued by King George III on March 26,\n\n1774. It is a historical fact that there was conflict of an unseemly character between the Judges of the Supreme Court and the Executive Government headed by the Governor-General in Council. In view of this conflict an Act was pased in 1781 (21 George III, Ch.\n\n17) section 1 of which provided that the Governor- General in Council in Bengal \"should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for or by reason of any act or order or any other matter of thing whatsoever counselled or ordeed or done by them in their public capacity only.\" Bombay got its Supreme Court in 1823, under Statute, 3 George IV, Ch. 71, and clause VII laid down \"that it shall be lawful for His Majesty to establish a Supreme Court at Bombay, to be invested with such powers and authorities and privileges, limitations, restrictions and control. ....... as the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal by virtue of any law, now in force ...... is invested or subject to.\"\n\nThe Charter expressly provided that \"the Governor and Council at Bombay and the Governor-General and Council of Fort William shall enjoy the same\n\nProoina of\n\nBomb191\n\n11. S. Mvani\n\ntlllt! Others.\n\nMukherj1a J.\n\nv Ji.. S. Moani\n\ntltUl Others.\n\nexemptions and no other from the authority of the Supreme Court to be erected at Bombay as is enjoyed by the said Governor in Council at Fort William from the Judicature of the Supreme Court of Judicature there already established.\" Assuming that these powers and disabilities of the . Supreme Court continued even after the establishment of High Courts by reason of section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and that these. limitations were implicitly recognised in section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and section 223 of the Act of 1935, it is quite clear from the language of the provisions set out above that they granted only a personal exemption to the Governor and Members of the Council. As the Governor in his personal capacity is different from the Provincial Government, these provisions are of no '1-ssistance to the appellant in the present case.\n\nIt would be seen that these exemptive provisions were substantially embodied in section 110 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and were later on placed in a much more comprehensive form in section 306( 1) of the Constitution Act. As the jurisdiction of the old Supreme Court was inherited by the Original Side of the three . Presidency High Courts, section 110 of the Government of India Act, 1915, granted exemption to the Governor-General the Governor and members of the Council from the Original Jurisdiction of High Courts. both civil and criminal, the only exception being when there were charges of treason and felony against these officials.\n\nSection 306(1) of the Act of 1935 is more comprehensive and includes proceedings and pr<; icesses of any kind either civil o.r criminal, and started either in the Original Side of a High Court, or in any other Court in , the mofusil. As there were no members of the Council under the Constitution Act of J935, there is no mention of such members in section 306(1) of the Act.\n\n The first . branCh of the contention advanced by the learned Attorney-General cannot therefore be supported.\n\n' As regards the other branch of the appellant's contention the decision really hinges on the true\n\nconstruction of section 176 of the Constitution Act.\n\nSection 176(1) stands as follows:\n\n\"The Federation may sue or be sued by the name of the Federation of India and a Provincial Government may sue or be sued by the name of the Province, and, without prejudice , to the subsequent provisions of this chapter, may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of the Federal or a Provincial Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Secretary of State in Council might have sued or been sued if this Act had not been passed.\"\n\nThe first part of the sub-section relates to parties and procedure, and lays down in what form a suit is to be instituted against Government in respect to matters relating to the Federation or Provinces of India. The latter part enacts that subject to any statutory provision that might be made, suits WGuld lie against the Provincial Government in the name of the Province, and against the Federal Government in the name of the Federation of India, in relation to their respective affairs, where such suits would have laid against the Secretary of State in Council if the Act of 1935 had not been passed. The present proceeding which. has been started against the Province of Bombay, would therefore be competent if such proceeding could have been instituted against the Secretary of State in Council under the law as it stood prior to the passing of the Constitution Act.\n\nThe right and liability of the Secretary of State for India to sue or •to be sued were created for the first time by section 65 of Act 21 and 22 Victoria, Ch. 106, which was passed in 1858 on the transfer of the Government of India from the East' India Company to the Crown. The section runs as follows :\n\n\"The Secretary of State in Council shall and may sue and be sued as well in India as in England by the name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate, and all persons and bodies politic shall and\n\nProvi'itt1 of\n\nBwibf!!\n\nK. S .. .4dvanf\n\nand Othm.\n\nMukheijea J ..\n\nProvince cf Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advuni\n\nand Others.\n\nmay have and take the same proceedings legal and equitable of State in Council of India, as against the said company.\"\n\nsuits, remedies and against the Secretary they could have done\n\nThe object of the Act was to transfer to Her Majesty the possession and government of the British territories in India which were then vested in the East India Company in trust for the Crown ; but as the Queen could not be sued in her own court, it was provided that the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate would have the same rights of suit as the East IndQ, Company had and would be subject to the same liability of being sued as previously attached to the East India Company.\n\nThis provision of the Act of 1858 was reproduced in section 32 of the Government of India Act, 1915, m the foliowing terms :\n\n\"(l) The Secretary oL State in Council may sue and be sued by the name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate.\n\n(2) Every person shall have the same remedies against the Secretary of State in Council as he might have had against the East India Company, if the Government of India Act, 1858, and this Act had not been passed.\"\n\nThe question therefore narrows down to this as to whether an action of the character that has been brought against the Province of Bombay could have been brought against the East India Company prior to 1858.\n\nIn my opinion the answer to this question must be given in the affirmative.\n\nAll the relevant authorities on this point have been very carefully reviewed by the' learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, and I am in entire agreement with the reasons assigned by them in support of their conclusion.\n\nIt is true that the East India Company was invested with powers and functions of a two-fold characr. They had on the one hand powers to carry on trade as merchants; on . the other hand they had delegate<l to them powers to acquire, retain and govern territories\n\nto raise and maintain armies and to make peace and war with native powers in India. But the liability of the East India Company to be sued was not restricted altogether to claims arising out of undertakings which might be carried on by private persons; but other claims if not arising out of acts of State could be entertained by civil courts, if the acts were done under sanction of municipal law and in exercise of powers conferred by such law. The law on this point was discussed very ably by the Madras High Court in Secretary of State v. Hari Bhanji ( ). The learned Chief Justice in course of his judgment contrasted .the decision in Secretary of State\n\nv. Kamachee Boye Saheba( a ) with that in Forester v. Secretary of State( 8 ).\n\nIn the first of these cases, on the death of Raja Sivaji who enjoyed the status of a sovereign the East India Company seized the whole of his property as an escheat to the Paramount Power.\n\nA bill was filed by the widow of the deceased to recover. possession of the properties. It was held by the Privy Council that the suit was not maintainable.\n\nLord Kingsdown laid down that the real point for determination in such cases was whether \"it was seizure by arbitrary power on behalf of the Crown of the dominions and property of a neighbouring State, an act not affecting to justify itself on grounds of municipal law ; or whether it was in whole or in part .a possession taken by the Crown under colour of legal title of the property of the late Raja of Tanjore in trust for those who by law might be entitled to it on the death of the last possessor. On the facts of the case it was held that the seizure was an exercise of sovereign power effected at the arbitrary discretion of the company by the aid of military force and consequently the court had no jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nIn the other case the Government had recovered the lands held by one Begum Sumarco as a Jagirdar after her death and the plaintiff filed a suit to recover the property, on the basis of a deed of will executed by (!) [1882] 5 Mad. 273.\n\n(2) [1859] 7 M.I.A. 461.\n\n(3) [1871-72] I.A. Supplement Vol., p. 10.\n\n!'••vince of\n\nBomb'!JI\n\nK. S. Mviini\n\nand Olher•.\n\nPror; inu of\n\n1Jomb41\n\nK.S. Moani\n\nand Othns.\n\nMuklterjea J.\n\nher. It was held by the Privy Council that ::.s Begum Sumaroo was not a Sovereign Princess and the act of resumption was done under colour of legal title of lands . previously held from Government by a subject, it was not an act of State, and tl1e suit was consequently triable by a civil court. As was observed by Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria(' ), \"This phrase (act of State) is capable of being misunderstood. As applied to an act of the sovereign power directed against another sovereign power or the subjects of another sovereign. power not owing temporary allegiance, in pursuance of\n\nsovereign rights of waging war or maintaining peace on the high seas or abroad, it may give rise to no legal remedy. But as applied to acts of the executive directed to subjects within the territorial jurisdiction it has no special meaning, and can give no immunity from the jurisdiction of the court to enquire into tht legality of the Act.\"\n\nMuch importance, cannot in my opinion be attached to the observations of Sir B.\n\nPeacock in Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v.\n\nThe Secretary of State ( ' ). In that case the only point for consideration was whether in the case of a tort committed in the conduct of a business the Secretary of\n\nState for India could be sued.\n\nThe question was answered in the affirmative.\n\nWhether he could be sued in cases not connected with the conduct of a business or commercial undertaking was not really a question for the court to decide.\n\nIn the case before us the act of requisition which purports to have been done under the sanction of municipal law, and in exercise of powers conferred by such law cannot be an act of State. An action on the ground of the powers being illegally exercised could certainly have been brought against the Secretary of State, if the Constitution Act of 1935 had not been passed.·\n\nI am not much impressed by the argument of the learned Attorney-General that the expression \"sue or\n\n(1) [1931) A.C. 662, 671.\n\n(1) [186lf5 Boin. H.C.R. App. !.\n\nbe sued\" occurring in section 176 does not include an application for a writ of certiorari. The expression 'sue' in its plain grammatical sense connotes the \"enforcement of a claim or civil right by means of legal proceedings.\" The proceedings may be initiated by a plaint or by a petition of motion, and it cannot be said that what section 176 of the Constitution Act contemplates is a proceeding which must begin with a plaint and end in a decree as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nNo argument can also in.· my opinion be founded upon the fact that there was no express mention of prerogative writs in clause ( 13) of the Charter by which the Supreme Court was first established in Bengal.\n\nThe Supreme Court was invested under clause (5) of the Charter with all the powers and privileges of the Court of King's Bench in England and these undoubtedly included the power of issuing certiorari and other prerogative writs. There are reported cases to show that the writs of mandamus were issued to the Directors of East India Company by the Court of King's Bench ' in England ( 1 ). On the whole, it seems to me that the view taken by the learned Judges of the appeal Bench of the Bombay High Court is right, and this appeal should stand dismissed with costs.\n\nDAs J.-ln my opinion this appeal should be allowed. As I have taken a view different from those of three eminent Judges of the Bombay High Court and some of my learned brethren of this Court, for all of whom I always have the highest respect, I consider it right to give the reasons for my conclusions in some detail.\n\nThis appeal is directed against the judgment and order of an appellate Bench. of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J.) affirming an order of Bhagwati J. sitting on the Original Side of that Court.\n\nThe order appealed from is a mandate in the nature of\n\n' (1) Vide The King v. The Directors of East jndia Company, 4 B. and Ad. 530; The King v. Th4 Court of Dimtors of 1114 Eait India Company, 4 M & S. 279. 6 S. C. India (N. 0.)/)6 ·\n\nl'rovince of\n\nBom/Jay\n\nK. S. Aduani\n\nand Others.\n\nMliklierjea J\n\nDu].\n\nProuinet of\n\nBombqy\n\nS . .Advani and Others.\n\nDaJ ].\n\na writ of certiorari quashing an order of requisition of a certain premises in Bombay made by the appellant in exercise of powers vested in it by Bombay Ordinance No. • V of 1947.\n\nThere is no substantial dispute as to the facts leading up to the proceedings out of which the present appeal has arisen. They have been sufficiently stated in the Judgments just delivered and need not be recapitulated by me.\n\nLearned Attorney-General appearing in support the present appeal has confined himself to. two mam points, namely, (i) that, having regard to the provisions of Bombay Ordinance V of 1947 under which the impugned order was made, a writ of certiorari does not lie at all, and (ii) that a writ of certiorari does not lie against the Province of Bombay.\n\nMr.\n\nSeervai appearing for the respondents has, quite properly, not sought to raise any of the several subsidiary points which were unsuccessfully canvassed before the Courts below and his endeavour has been to support the judgment under appeal on the two points mentioned above and to reinforce them with fresh reasoning and rulings.\n\nThe writ of certiorari is a very well known ancient high prerogative writ that used to be issued by the Court of King's Bench to correct the errors of the inferior Courts strictly so called. It is with this writ that the Judges of the King's Bench used to exercise control over Courts of inferior jurisdiction where the latter acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Gradually the scope of these writs was enlarged so as to exercise control over various bodies which were not, strictly apeaking, Courts at all, but which were •by statute vested with powers / and duties that resembled those of rhe ordinary inferior Courts. These statutory bodies were called quasi-judicial bodies @d their decisions were called quasi-judicial .acts and the Comt of King's Bench freely began to bdng µp he rccdl'.ds\n\nof these quasi-judicial bodies, examine .them a11d, if thought fit, quash them.\n\nThe real reason for -this\n\nextension of 'the scope of the writ of certiorari was the distrust with which the Judges looked upon the numerous statutory bodies that were being brought into existence and vested with large powers of affecting the rights of the subject and this extension was founded on the plausible plea that these statutory bodies exercised quasi-judicial functions.\n\nThe law is now well settled that a writ of certiorari will lie to control a statutory body if it purports to act without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice, provided that, on a true construction of the statute creating the body, it can be said to be a quasi-judicial body entrusted with quasijudicial functions. It is equally well settleJ that a certiorari will not lie to correct the errors of a statutory body which is entrusted with purely administrative functions. It is, therefore, necessary, in order to determine the correctness of the order appealed from, to ascertain the true nature of the functions entrusted to, and exercised by, the Provincial Government under the Ordinance in question.\n\nThe title of the Ordinance was \"An Ordinance to provide for the requidtion of land, for the continuance of requisition of land and for certain other purposes.\" The second preamble recited that the Governor of Bombay was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action to enable the Provincial Government to make provision for requisition of .1and and for the continuance of the requisition of land already subject to requisition.\n\nThe Bombay Legislature not being in session at the date of this Ordinance and the instructions of the Governor-General under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 88 of the Act having been obtained, the Governor of Bombay had legislative power and authority and the Ordinance promulgated by him had, for the requisite period, the force of an Act of the legislature. The Ordinance has since been replaced by an Act but this appea1 must be decided on the terms of the Ordinance which was in force at . the material times.\n\nThe preambles to the Ordinance clearly indicated that\n\nProui11ce ef\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas :J.\n\n19~0\n\nl'rouince of\n\nBom1'6:, Y .. r. S. A.Cuani\n\nad Ot/,.rs.\n\nDas].\n\nthe Ordinance had been promulgated under circumstances of considerable urgency. This is a fact which should be borne in mind in interpreting the operative provisions of the Ordinance .\n\nSection 3 of the Ordinance under which the order of requisition was made was in the terms following :\n\n\"3. Requisition of land.-If in the qpinion of the Provincial_ Government it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may, by order in writing, \"requisition any land for any public purpose :\n\nProvided that no land used for the purpose of public religious worship or for any purpose which the Provincial Government may specify by notification in the Official Gazette shall be requisitioned under this section.\"\n\nIt is clear, and, indeed, there can be no dispute, that the words \"If in the opinion of the Provincial Government\" governed the words \"it is necessary or expedient to do so\" and that whatever those latter words might mean or imply had been left entirely to the op11110n of the Provincial Government.\n\nWhat then, were the meaning and implication of the words \"it is necessary or expedient to do so\"?\n\nThe main section read as a whole clearly implied a close and intimate correlation between the two parts, namely, the power conferred on the Provincial Government by the operative part and the formation of opinion as to the necessity or expediency for exercising that power under the earlier part of the section and this correlation was brought about by the use of the word \"so''. in conjunction with the words \"to do\". To my mind, the words \"to do so\" covered and included within their meaning whatever Provincial Government had been authorised to do.\n\nBy the operative part of the section the Provincial Government had been empowered, not to requisition simpliciter but to requisition for a public purpose. The words \"to do so\"\n\nin the opening part of the sentence necessarily, therefore, referred to the act of requisitioning for a public purpose and it must follow, therefore, that the\n\nnecessity or expediency for requisitioning for a public purpose was left to the opinion of the Provincial Government. Strictly, as a matter of construction of the section, both grammatically and according to the necessary intendment of the Ordinance, as it appears from its language, the conclusion is irresistible that the words \"to do so\" meant and stood for the words \"to requisition any land for a public purpose.\" It is to avoid the repetition of the words \"requisition any land for any public purpose\" that the words \"to do so\" were used in the earlier part. It would have served the purpose equally well if in the earlier part of the sentence the words \"to requisition any land for any public purpose\" had been used instead of the words \"to do so\" and the words \"do so\" had been used at the end of the section instead ofthe words \"requisition· any land for any public purpose.\". It appears to me to be entirely fallacious to say that because the words \"for a public purpose\" were to be found at the end of the section, therefore, the existence of a public purpose' must have been a collateral fact which could not come within the scope of the formation of the opinion. The truth is that the earlier part of the section by the use of the words \"to do so\" included the question of a public purpose and the entire composite matter, namely, the necessity or expediency for requisitioning land for. a public purpose had been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government. . · Learned counsel for the respondents contends-and in this he has the judgments of the High Court in his favour-that although it had been left to the Provincial Government to form its own opinion as to the necessity or expediency of requisitioning land and to make an order of requisition founded on that opinion, the existence of a public purpose was a . condition precedent to the exercise of the power and the question of the fulfilment of the condition precedent had not been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government but had to be determined as an objective fact by the Provincial Government before it proceeded to form its opinion and to make the order;\n\nProvines of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\n/ -\n\n19SQ\n\nPrffillU ef a.,..., ...\n\nX.S . .At/uani\n\n..- Ot,..,.s.\n\nSUPREME COORT REPORTS' [1950]\n\nThe words \"to do w\", acC(>rding to learned counsel for the respondents, referred to the act of requisition on! y but not to the purpose of uch requisition. I am unable to accept this line of argument which appears to me to be open to the following several objections :\n\n(i) It overlooks the word \"so\" and gives no meaning to it.\n\n(ii) If that interpretation were correct then the section would have read as follows :\n\n•If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to requisition any land, the Provincial Government may, by an order in writing, requisition any land for a public purpose.\"\n\nSo read, th~ section would mean that the Provincial Government vrold, iri order of sequence, first have to form its opinion as to the necessity or expediency for requisitioning any land without reference 'to any purpose.\n\nQn this interpretation it is clear that the Provincial Government could not act directly upon the opinion .so formed, because the exercise of the Power depended on the eXistence of a public purpose as an objective fact which had yet to be determined. If that were to be so then what was the necessity for the anterior formation of opinion by the Provincial Government?\n\nA formation of opinion as to the necessity or expediency of a purposeless requisitioning would be an entirely useless, incomplete and futile mental exercise, for such formation of opinion would not have in any way helped the Provincial Government in making an order of requisition at .all.\n\n(ii) According to the respondents' interpretation the existence of a public purpose as an objective fact\n\n. had to be determined first before the Provincial Government would form its opinion < as to the necessity or expediency of requisitioning a particular land. This argument amounts to reading the section upside dOllfn .and in fact to recasting the section altogether. If that\n\nwere the true intention of the Governor of Bomb:ly in promulgating this Ordinance, then the section would\n\nhave said-\"If any land is needed for a public purpose and if in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to requisition any particular land for that purpose, the Provincial Government may, by an order in writing reqJ.lls1tion\n\nsuch land.\" The section as enacted, however, did not say anything of the kind.\n\n(iv) It is said that this section postulated a public purpose to exist and required the Provincial Government to form its opinion as to the necessity or expediency of requisitioning land for that public purpose. One can only \"rrive at the last mentioned proposition by interpreting the words \"to do so\" in .the way suggested by me and once that interpretation is adopted, the existence of a public purpose as well as the necessity or expediency of requisitioning land must both become the subject-matter of the opinion of the Provincial Government.\n\n( v) If the existence of a public purpose had to be determined as an objective fact and if that determination were liable to the subjected to the scrutiny of the Court in legal proceedings, then such a .procedure would have quite effective! y frustrated the very object set forth in the second preamble by preventing the Provincial Government, by means of protracted legal proceedings, from taking immediate action for making provision for requisition of land and for the continuance of the requisition of land already subject to requisition. In this very case, the order of requisition which had heed made in February, 1948, is stiU in abeyance.\n\n(vi) The result of the interpretation suggested by the respondeIJts would be to hold that the Provincial Government had to determine judicially the existence of a public purpose as an objective fact before it proceeded to form its opinion as to the necessity or expediency of requisitioning any particular land. It is difficult to appreciate how the Provincial Government would have proceeded to decide this issue. To whom would the Provincial Government give notice that it proposed to decide this issue of the existence or otherwise of a\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Adt'ani\n\naru/ OtherS.\n\nDas].\n\n19.\\0\n\nProiince of\n\ns ... b'!J ..\n\nJCS. AtJ.-i\n\nimd Othtrs.\n\nDas].\n\npublic purpose?\n\nWho would be interested to deny the existence of such a purpose at that stage? None, for no particular person's land was actually sought to be requisitioned at that stage. Indeed this issue could not arise until a person was actually threatened with a requisition order. An interpretation that leads to such an absurd and anomalous position_ cannot but be rejected.\n\n(vii) If it is contended that the Provincial Government had to decide this issue as and when it sought to requisition any particular land belonging to a particular person, the result will be still more anomalous.\n\nIn that case the Provincial Government would be called upon to decide the self same issue as to the existence of a . public purpose as often and as many times as it, would need any land, for the decision in one case will ' not bind the owner of a different land.\n\nThere would have to be as many decisions as to the existence of a public purpose as there would be number of plots of land to be acquired. Can anything be more absura than this ?\n\n(viii) If the decision on the existence of a public purpose had to be made along with or simultaneously \"With the formation of opinion as to the necessity or\n\nexpediency for requisitioning any particular land then . it must be conceded that the two matters were correlated to each other and then it will be absurd to sug- gest that the intention of the Ordinance was to keep the two component parts in separate water-tight compartments, one being required to be decided as an objective fact and the other being left to tl)e subjective opinion of the Provincial Government. In the absence of specific provision in express language such an anomalous intention cannot be imputed to the legislative authority.\n\nThe objections stated above quite definitely lead me to the conclusion that the interpretation suggested by the respondents cannot be adopted and they also fortify my view that the section must be construed in the manner I have mentioned. So construed, it would reatl as follows:\n\n\"If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to requisition any land for a public purpose, the Provincial Government may, by an order in writing, requisition any land for a public purpose.\"\n\nAf> soon as this construction is reached, there remains, on the authorities . and on principle, no escape from the conclusion that what had been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government was a composite matter, namely, the necessity or expediency for requisitioning land for a public purpose.\n\nThe Provincial Government was authorised to form an opinion on the entire matter and every component part of i~. In short the existence of a public purpose was left as much to the opinion . of the Provincial\n\nGovernmnt as was the necessity or expediency foi: requisitioning any particular land. It seems clear to me that the legislative authority meant, not that there must be a public 'purpose as an objective fact to be determined judicially which determination was to be subject to the scrutiny of the Court but, that the Provincial Government should be of opinion that a public purpose existed for the advancement of which it was necessary or expedient to requisition land. In my opinion, the words \"if in the opinion of the Provincial\n\nGovernment\" . governed both the purpose and the necessity or expediency of making ari order of requisition. The formation of opinion on the entire matter was purely subjective, and the order of requisition was to be founded on this subjective opinion and as such was a purely administrative :ict.\n\nIt will be useful, at this stage, to refer to. some of the judicial decisions which, as I apprehend them, fully support my above conclusions.\n\nIt is well established that if the legislatiire simply confides the power of doing an act to a particular body if in the opinion .of that body it is necessary or expedient to do it, then the act is purely an administrative, i.e., an executive act as opposed to a judicial or quasi-judicial act, and, in the absence of proof of /\n\nPro1ince of\n\nBOTflbay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\na11d.Othm.\n\nDas].\n\nProlliN4 If\n\nB ..... l!ff\n\nDu].\n\nbad faith, the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with it and certainly not by the high prerogative writ of certiorari.\n\nUsually this discretion is confided by the use of expressions like \"If it appears to,\" \"If in the opinion of\" or \"If so and so is satisfied.\" In Mayor etc. of Westminster v. London and North-\n\nWestern Railway Company ( 1 ) Lord Halsbury L. C. observed:\n\n\"Assuming the thing done to be within the ruscretion of the local authority, no Court has power to interfere with the mode 'in which it has exercised it. Where the Legislature has confided the power to a particular body, with a discretion how it is to be used, it is beyond the power of any Court to contest that discretion. Of course, this assumes that the thing done is the thing which the Legislature has authorised.\"\n\nTo the like effect are the following observations of Batty J. in Balvant Ramchandra Natu v. The Secretary of State(' ) :\n\n\"No doubt when a power has been conferred in unambiguous language by Statute, the Courts cannot interfere with its exercise and substitute their own discretion for that of persons orbodies sekcted by the Legislature for the purpose.\"\n\nSometimes the Legislature may entrust a power to a specified authority to do an act for a certain purpose. Even in such a case, the Legislature may, nevertheless, by appropriate language, leave not only the determination of the necessity or expediency for doing the act but also the determination of the necessity or expediency for doing the . act for that purpoac as a composite matter to the opinion, satisfaction or discretion of that authority. In such a case what is a condition precedent for the doing of the act is not the actual existence of the particular purpose but the opinion of the specified authority that the purpose exists. In other words the authority is also made the sole judge of the existence of the purpose, for otherwise it cannot form its opinion as to the necessity or expediency of doing the act for that purpose.\n\n(') [1905) A.C. +26.\n\n(1) I.L.ll. [1905) Born. 4811, 511!1\n\nIn Wijeyesekera v. Festing( ) the Governor of Ceylon with the advice of his Executive Council made an order under the Acquisition of Land Ordinance, 1876, directing the Government agent to take order for the acquisition, under the provisions of the Ordinance, of part of the appellant's estate for a public purpose, namely, -the making of a road. The whole point in the case was whether the decision of the Governor in Council was conclusive on the point that the land was wanted for a public purpose. The question turned on sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance (No. 3 of 1876) relevant portions of which provided as follows :\n\n. \"4. Whenever it shall appear to the Governor that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct the SurveyofrGeneral or other officer generally or specially authorised by the Governor in this behalf, to examine such land and report whether the same is fitted for such purpose.\n\n6. The Surveyor-General, or other officer so authorised as aforesaid, shall then make his report to the Governor whether the possession of the land is needed for the purposes for which it appeared likely to be needed as aforesaid. And upon receipt of such report it shall be lawful for the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council, to direct the Government Agent to take order for the acquisition of the land.\"\n\nIn delivering the judgment of the Board Lord Finlay approved of a previous decision of the Supreme Court of Ceylon and observed as follows:\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships that the decision of the Governor that the land is •wanted for public purposes is final, and was intended to be final, and could not be questioned in any Court.\n\nThe nature of the objection is such that it would be obviously unsuitable for the District Court, which is concerned with questions of compensation which would arise if the land is to be taken. But the question might also be raised\n\n(1} (1919] A.C. 646.\n\nProuinct ef\n\nB•mhay\n\nK. S. Aduani\n\nand Other•.\n\nDas],\n\nPrz1int:e of\n\nBombay\n\n~. ;/(, S. Adva11i\n\nmd Othn<.\n\n.Das].\n\nin a preliminary way, as was suggested by Lord W renbury in the course of the argument.\n\nIt might be raised by an application to the Court to stay the further proceedings on the ground that although the Governor in the Executive Council had made the order, it was not a case where the condition precedent of the Ordinance was really fulfilled, namely, that the land was wanted for a public purpose .\n\nIn their Lordships' opinion no such proceeding would be competent in such a case, and the decision of the Governor in Council, making an order under the latter part of s. 6 of the Ordinance, is final and conclusive.\"\n\nHis Lordship concluded- \"When you have an enactment of that kind it shows that it was intended that the decision of the Governor in Executive Council on the point should be binding.\"\n\nThe decision in Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v.\n\nUoyd George ( 1 ) which was a case.of requisition of an undertaking turned on reg. 55 ( 4) of the Defence (General) Regulations-the relevant parts of which were as follows :\n\n\"If it appears to a competent authority that m the interests of the public safety, the defence of the realm, or the eflicii=nt prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to take control on behalf of His Majesty of the whole or any part of .an existing undertaking, and that, for the purpose of exercising such control, it is expedient that the undertaking or part should be carried on in pursuance of an order made under this paragraph, the competent authority may by order authorise any person (hereinafter referred to as an \"authorised controller\") to exercise, with respect to the undertaking or any part thereof specified in the order, such functions of control on behalf of His Majesty as may be provided by the order •••. \"\n\n(1) [1943] 2 All E.R. 546.\n\nAn order under the regulation having been made with respect to the appellant's undertaking, the appellant brought an action impugning it on the ground, inter alia, that there were no adequate grounds upon which the Minister could find, as he stated he had found, namely, that it was necessary to take control in the interests of the public safety, the defence of the realm, the efficient prosecution of the war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the community. Singleton J. having dismissed the action, the appellant went up to the appeal Court. If the reasonings and the conclusions of the judgments under appeal before us were sound and correct it could well have been held by the Court of Appeal in that case that the regulation postulated the existence of the interests of public safety, etc., which had to be judicially determined as an objective fact and that what had been left to the subjective opinion of the competent authority was only the necessity for taking control of the undertaking. This was, however, repelled and in dismissing the appeal Lord Greene M. R. with whom Goddard and du Parcq L. JJ. concurred observed as follows: ·\n\n\"If one thing js settled beyond the possibility of dispute, it is that, . in construing regulations of this character expressed in this particular form of language, it is for the competent authority, whatever Ministry that may be, to decide as to whether or not a case for the exercise . of the powers has arisen.\n\nIt is for the competent autherity to judge of the adequacy of the evidence before it. It is for the competent authority to judge of the credibility of that evidence.\n\nIt is for the competent authority to judge whether or not it is desirable or necessary to make further investigations before taking action.\n\nIt is for the competent authority to decide whether the situation requires an immediate step, or whether some delay may be allowed for further investigation and perhaps negotiation.\n\nAll these matters are . placed by Parliament in the hands of the Minister in the belief that the Minister will exercise his powers properly, and\n\nProvince ef\n\nRom bay\n\ny IL. S .• .fduoni\n\nand Others.\n\nDa,.].\n\nP1ovince of Bombay v. .K. S . .A.dvani\n\n.and Others.\n\nDas].\n\nin the knowledge that, if he does not do so, he is liable to the criticism of Parliament. One thing is certain, and that is that those matters are not within the competence of this Court.\n\nIt is the competent authority that is selected by Parliament to come to the decision, and if that decision is come to in good faith, this Court has no power to interfer, provided, of course, that the action is one which is within the four corners of the authority delegated to the Minister.\"\n\nThere is no substantial difference in the language of reg. 55(4) and that of the Bombay Ordinance now before us if it is properly construed and read in the way I have indicated above .. Even if it were possible, on an overmeticulous analysis, to detect any such difference, the position is put beyond doubt in the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works and Others( 1 ). The decision turned on reg. 51 (l) of the Defence (General) Regulations which was in the following terms:\n\n\"A competent authority, if it appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, may take possession of any land, and may give such directions as appear to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient in connection with the taking of possession of that land.\"\n\nThere is no substantial difference at all between the language of this regulation and section 3 of the Bombay Ordinance as construed above. If the reasonings of Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J. were correct, the words \"so to do\" in the above regulation would refer only to the act of taking of possession, for, according to them, the interests of the public safety etc. do not describe the nature or character of that act but constitute the purpose for which the competent authority was to do the act of taking possession.\n\nOn that line of reasoning the regulation could be equally said to postulate\n\n(') [1943] 2 A.E.R. 560.\n\nthe existence of the interests of the public safety etc. as conditions precedent to the exercise of the power and it could be said that the fulfilment of those conditions precedent had to , be determined quasi-judicially so as to be subject to the scrutiny and interference of the Coon. All this line of reasoning was rejected by Lord Greene M. R. with the concurrence of Goddard and du Parcq L.. JJ. in the following words:\n\n''The last point that was taken was to this effect, that the circumstances were such that, if the requisitioning authorities had brought their minds to bear on the matter, they could not possibly have come to the concliision to which they did come; That argument is one which, in the absence of an allegation of bad faith -and I may say that there is no such allegation here -is not open to this Court.\n\nIt has been decided that, where a regulation of this kind commits to an executive authority the decision of what is necessary or ex- ' pedient and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the Courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the decision in the absence of an allegation of bad faith. If it were not so, it would mean that the Courts would be made responsible for carrying on the executive Government of thiscountry on these important matters. Parliament, which authorises this regulation, commits to the executive the discretion to decide and with that discretion if bona fide exercised no Court can interlere. All that the Court can do is to see that the power which it is claimed to exercise is one . which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the Legislature and to see that those powers are exercised in good faith.\n\nApart from that, the Courts have no power at all to inquire into the reasonableness. the policy, the sense or any other aspect of the transaction.\"\n\nVedlapatla Suryanarayana v. Province of MadraJ(1) is a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court.\n\nIt discussed section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and held that the decision of the Provincial Government\n\n(1) ~-L-R. [1946] Mad. 153; A.I.R. [1945] Mad. 394.\n\nl'rovince o./\n\nBombay\n\n/(. S. Moani\n\nmid Others.\n\nDas].\n\nl9jQ\n\nProlJi, ftCe f\n\nBomia;·\n\nK. S. Ad11ani\n\nand Othe, s.\n\nDos}.\n\nthat the land was required for a public purpose was final.\n\nRobinson v. Minister ning( 1 ) is instructive. and Country Planning that case.\n\nThe relevant Act were as follows:\n\nof Town and Country Plan- The provisions of the Town Act, 1944, were considered in portions of section 1 of that\n\n\"Where the Minister of Town and Country Planning (in this Act referred to as the Minister) is satisfied that it is requisite, for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily with extensive war damage in the area of a local planning authority, that a part or parts of their area, consisting of land shown to his satisfaction to have sustained war damage or of such land together with other land contiguous or adjacent thereto, should be laid \\mt afresh an<l redeveloped as a whole, an order declaring all or any of the land in such a pan of their area to be land subject to compulsory purchase for dealing with war damage may be made by the Minister if an application in that behalf is made by the authority to him before the expiration of five years from such date as the Minister may by order appoint as being the date when the making of such applications has become practicable.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that the power to make the order was subject to the satisfaction of the Minister not only that it was requisite that lands should be laid out afresh but that it was requisite \"for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily etc.\" which Wlquestionably was a question of fact and could be said to be subject to objective determination yet, it was held by the appeal Court, overruling an earlier decision of Henn Collins J. in another case that the entire matter, namely, the necessity for laying out the lands afresh as well ; is the purpose of dealing was for the satisfaction of the Minister, that he was the sole judge, that no objective test was possible and that the decision of the Minister was an administrative act.\n\nFranklin v. Min1ster for Town and Country Planning( 1) was concerned with section 1 (1) of the New (') [1947] l A.E.R. 851.\n\n(1)[1947] 2 A.E.R. 289; [1948] A.C. 87.\n\nTowns Act, 1946, the relevant _portions of which ran as follows:\n\n\"If the minister is satisfied, after consulting with any local authorities who appear to him to be concerned, that it is expedient in the national interest that any area of land should be developed as a new town by a Corporation established under this Act, he may make an order designating that area as the site of the proposed new town.\"\n\nHere what was left to the satisfaction of the Minister was not only whether it was expedient that any area should be developed as a new town but whether it was expedient in the national interest that any area should be so developed. If the present arguments were sound it couid be held in that case that the section postulated the existence of national interest to be determined judicial! y as .an objective fact and that it was a condition precedent to the making of the order.\n\nIt was, however, held by the. House of Lords that. no judicial or quasi-judicial duty was imposed on the Minister in the discharge of his statutory duties, those duties being purely administrative.\n\nThe case of Httbli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay( 1 ) may also be referred to.\n\nRelevant portions of section 4, sub-section (1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, provided:\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, if in its opm1on the public interests require, revoke a license in the following cases, namely :\n\n(a) Where the licensee, in the opinion of the Provincial Government makes wilful and unreasonably pr<>- longed default in doing anything required of him by or under this Act.\"\n\nCouid anything be more objective than the requirements of public interest or the wilful and unreasonably prolonged default? And yet in construing the section their Lordships of the Privy Council observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships are unable to see that there is anything in the language of the sub-section or in the\n\n(1) (19-!8) L.R. 76 I.A. 57; A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 136. 7-6 S. C. India (N.D.)/58\n\nPro; ince of\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas].\n\n19.iO\n\nPrmilfCe •f\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. ~Jl'Mli\n\nand Others.\n\nDas].\n\nsubject-matter to which it relates on which to found the suggestion that the opinion of the Government is to be subject to objective tests.\n\nIn terms the relevant matter is the opinion of the Government-not the grounds on which the opinion is based.\n\nThe language leaves no room for the relevance of a judicial examination as to the sufficiency of the grounds on which the Government acted in forming an opinion.\n\nFurther, the question on which the opinion of the Government is relevant is not whether a default has been wilful and unreasonably prolonged but whether there has been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default. On that point the opinion is the determining matter, and-if it is not for good cause displaced as a relevant opinionit is conclusive.\"\n\nThe recent case of A. C. Mohamed v. Sailendra Natk Mitra(') may also be referred to. It was concerned with an order of requisition of certain premises exceptthe ground floor made under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947, which runs as follows:\n\n\"Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any premises in any locality are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose, it may, by order in writing, requisition such premises.\n\nProvided that no premises exclusively used for the purpose of religious worship shall be requisitioned under this section.-\"\n\nI find no difference between the language of thi• section and that of section 3 of the Bombay Ordinance as construed by me. It is quite clear that what was left to the opinion of the Provincial Government was not the need of the premises simpliciter but the need of any premises for a public purpose as a composite matter. If the present arguments were sound, it could be held that the section postulated the existence of a public purpose . and that what was left to the opinion of the Provincial Government was the need , of the premises for that public purpose. It was, howe\\er, held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court\n\n(') (1950) 54 C. W. N. 652.\n\n-and I think quite rightly-that it sufficed for the exercise of the power that the local Government was satisfied as to the existence of the condition precedent to the exercise of its powers.\n\nTo summarise: It is abundantly clear from the authorities cited above that questions of fact such as the existence of a public purpose or the interest of the public safety or the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or the maintenance of essential supplies and the like may well be and, indeed, are often left to th~ subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority.\n\nMerely because such a matter involves a question of fact it does not follow at all that it must always, and irrespective of the language of the particuiar enactment, be determined judicially as an objective fact.\n\nWhen the Legislature leaves it to an executive authority to form an opinicn on or to be satisfied about such a matter as a condition for the exercise of any power conferred on it, and to act upon such opinion, what is condition precedent is, not the actual existence of the matter but, the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority that it exists. The cases referred to above, clearly establish this much that when te Legislature leaves it to the opinion or, satisfaction of the executive authority as to whether it is necessary or expedient to requisition any land for a . public purpose the executive authority is constituted the sole judge of the composite matter, that is to say of the existence of the public purpose as well as the necessity or expediency for requisitioning the land for that public purpose, call it a condition precedent or an objective fact or what you will.\n\nOn a proper construction of section 3 of the Bombay Ordinance (No. V of 1947) there can be no doubt that that section left it to the Provincial Government to form its own opinion on the entire •matter, namely, whether it was necessary or expedient to requisition any land for a public purpose and to ct upon that opinion.\n\nSo construed, the formation of opinion on the whole matter and the act founded thereon was nothing but a purely administrative, (i.e., executive)\n\nProlfince of\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. ~· Advani\n\nand Othn-s.\n\nv .. 7.\n\nProDince of\n\nBombay\n\nIC S. Adfani\n\nad 01/rns.\n\nDas].\n\nact. H the acts were . done in good faith and within the four corners of the Ordinance, the Court cannot interfere with it in any proceeding and far less by the prerogative writs of certiorari or prohibition.\n\nIf there be any Ji.ardship the appeal of the subject must be to the Legislature and not to the Court. The first and the major head of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents must, therefore, fail.\n\nIt will be convenient to dispose of at once two 'anci11ary points. In the petition a bald suggestion was\n\nmade, verified only as true to information and belief and unsupported by any legal evidence, that the Provincial Government had made the order ma/a fide and for a collateral purpose. The petitioner gave evidence in Court.\n\nThere is nothing in the evidence which may support any pica of bad faith on the part of the P.rovincial Government or its officers.\n\nAll that was said was that Mrs. C.\n\nDayaram to whom the requisitioned premises had been allotted was the wife of an advocate from Karachi, and was a refugee and that the petitioner did not know whether her husband had also migrated from Karachi.\n\nAt an adjourned hearing tlie question was put as to whether Mrs. li>ayar:llll was concerned in any manner whatever with the administration of Government of Bombav or was a public servant. The purpose of the quetion was perhaps to establish that she was in a position to influence the Government officers. The petitioner in fairness replied that he was not aware if she were. In the evidence there is nothing from which it can be t; lken as proved that the Provincial Government and its officers had acted in bad faith. Sec.ondly, it was suggested that the Provincial Government had not acted within the four corners of the Ordinance in that, on its own sho\"l(l'ing, there was no public purpose at all for which the order was made. Bhagwati J. expressed the view that the requisitioning of a .Bat for a particular or individual refugee was not a public purpose, for there was no question of serving the general interests of the community. On appeal Chagla C. J. disagreed with the above view. .In his opinion the housing of a\n\nrefugee might certainly be a public purpose, for securing a house for . an individual refugee might itself confer a benefit on the community as a whole. In this opinion the learned Chief Justice was manifestly right.\n\nBut the learned Chief Justice went on to say that choosing one refugee as against another without any ostensible cause would not constitute a public purpose for which the flat in question could be requisitioned.\n\nThis conclusion, with great respect to the learned Chief Justice, appears to be founded on a slight confusion of ideas.\n\nIt has to be remembered that this was not a solitary order of requisition made by the Government for the public purpose of housing refugees.\n\nThe petitioner's Solicitors' letter dated February 27, 1948, clearly stated that there were \"similar orders\" issued by the Government.\n\nThe impugned order itself shows ex f acie that the order was made generally for \"public purpose housing.\" It was not in terms made for the benefit of any particular individual refugee.\n\nThe allotment of the flat to Mrs. C. Dayaram was the next step and as such the allotment of the flat already requisitioned to a particular refugee cannot possibly vitiate the preceding order of requisition.\n\nTo say that seeing that the allotment was made to her, the order of requisition must have been made in her interest is to act on suspicion which is not permissible.\n\nThe flat had to be allotted to a refugee for purposes of his or her housing. The fact that the petitioner himself was a refugee has been stressed before us and it has been said that it w:ts a novel way of solving . the refugee problem by ousting one refugee and putting in another.\n\nThere is no evidence as to the relative circumstances of the petitioner and Mrs. C. Dayaram. For all we know she may have been a more deserving person whose needs were more urgent than those of the petitioner. The point is that it lies heavily on the person who challenges the bona fides of a public authority or who contends that the authority had acted outside its powers to establish his case on cogent legal evidence. He cannot succeed by leaving the matter in\n\nPtovince ef\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani and OtMrs.\n\nDas].\n\n19-'lO\n\nPrnii11t:1 of\n\nBomba;·\n\nK. S . .A.dvani\n\nand Ot!urs.\n\nDas].\n\nthe air and to the ingenuity of his counsel in creating an atmosphere of mere suspicion, which falls far short of legal proof.\n\nI now pass on to the second head of argument which is based on the assumption that the existence of a public purpose had not been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government but was an objective fact which was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of requisition.\n\nWhat consequences follow from this assumption? The contention of the respondents is that the fulfilment of this condition as an objective fact had to be determined by the Provincial Government judicially and that being thus charged with a quasi-judicial function the Provincial Government became amenable to the high prerogative writ of certiorari in case it acted wid1out jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice.\n\nThe question, therefore, arises as to what are the tests for ascertaining whether the act of a statutory body is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act.\n\nAs to what is a quasi-judicial act there have heen many judicial pronouncements. May C. J. in Queen\n\nv. Dubline Corporation(•) described a quas;-judicial act as follows :\n\n\"In this connection the term judicial cloes not ' neceosarily mean acts of a Judge or legaltribun-;; l sitting for the determination of matters of low, hut for purpose of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority upon considera- : tion of facts and circumstances and imposing liabilit\"y l or affecting the rights.\n\nAnd if there be a body em-, powered by law to enquire into facts, make esilpates I to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me 1 that the acts of such a body involving such consequ- ' ence would be judicial acts.\" ----- ~------\n\n- -· Lord Atkinson in Frome Unitt:d Breweries v.\n\nBath f1Htice1( ') approved of this definition as one of the best definitions. The definition that now holds the (') (1878) 2 !r. R. 371. (') [1926] A.C. •, s6.\n\nfield is that of Atkin L. J. as he then was, in Rex\n\nv. Electricity Commissioners (1). lt runs as follows: \"Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.\"\n\nThis definition was accepted as correct in Rex v.\n\nLondon County Council(') and by many learned Judges in subsequent cases including the latest decision of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne (').\n\nIn Banwarilal's case(') I had occasion to analyse the essential characteristics of a quasi-judicial act as opposed to an administrative act. I stand by what I said on this point on that occasion. As I pointed out there, the two kinds of acts have many common features. Thus a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith.\n\nA good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which may,. nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority, as was done in the several Ordinances, regulations and enactments considered and construed in the several cases referred to above.\n\nThe first two items of the definition given by Atkin L. J. may be equally applicable to an\n\n(!) [19•4] 1 K.B. 171.\n\n(2) [193!J 2 K.B 215.\n\n\\~) \\\\%~\\ !>~ Cl.W .11. ~~~.\n\n14) (1943) 48 0 W.N. 766 at\n\npp. 799-801,\n\nProvince of\n\nBo1nbay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others\n\nDasJ.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. 8. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nadministrative act. The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the third item in Atkin L. J .'s definition, namely, the duty to act judicially. As was said by Lord Hewart C. J. in R. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly('):\n\n\"In order that a body may satisfy the required test it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects; there must be superadded to that characteristic the further characteristic that the body has the duty to act judicially.\"\n\nThe above passage was quoted with approval by Lord Radcliffe in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in N akkuda Ali's case ('). Therefore, in considering whether a particular statutory authority is a quasi-judicial body or a mere administrative body it has to be ascertained whether the statutory authority has the duty to act judicially. When and under what circumstances then can a statutory body be said to be under a duty to act judicially?\n\nAn examination of the decided cases shows that in many of them where the statutory bodies were held to be quasi-judicial bodies and their decisions were regarded as quasi-judicial acts there were some parties making a claim under the statute and some parties opposing such claim and the statutory authority was empowered to adjudicate upon the matters in issue between the parties and to grant or refuse the claim.\n\nThus in Th~ Queen v_. The Local Government Board (') the contestmg parties were the County Council of Wexford on one side and Webster & Leary on the other side and the Local Government Board was the statutory authority to decide whether the latter were entitled to higher salary. In Rex v. Woodhouse (') the contest was between the applicants for renewal of licence and certain brewers and the Justices of Leeds were to decide whether the licence should or should not be renewed.\n\nReference may also be made to the cases of Rex v. Post-\n\n(1) [1928) 1 K.B. 411 at p. 415. (B) (1902) L. R. 2 Ir. 349.\n\n(2) (1950) 54 C.W.N. 883.\n\n(4) [1906) 2 K.B. bOl.\n\nmaster General (1), Rex v. London County Council (2) and Rex v. Hendon District Council('). Even in Rex v.\n\nBoycott (') it may be said that the Statute there contemplated a contest between the Local Education Society and the boy who was alleged to be imbecile and whose father was entitled to notice under the regulations before a certificate was issued against the boy. It is not necessary to multiply instances. The point to note is that in each of these cases there was a lis-a proposition and an opposition-and the statutory authority was authorised to decide the question and in each of these cases the decision was regarded as a quasi-judicial decision.\n\nIndeed in some of the cases the necessity of a lis between two or more parties has been referred to or even insisted upon. Thus in Errington & others v. Minister of Health (5), Maugham L.J., as he then was, said:\n\n\" In determining whether the position of the Minister is that which I have described as being quasi-judicial, I think it is necessary to appreciate that under a clearance area scheme, to which objections are made by the owners of the property in the area, there is a true contest as between the owners of the property and the local authority ; in other words, there are two sides as between whom the Minister has to come to a determination after consideration\".\n\nThe following passage from the judgment of Greer L.J. in that case quoted with approval by Swift J. in Frost & others v. 1vlinister of Health(') takes the matter a little further in that line :\n\n\" In so far as the Minister deals with the matter of confirmation of a closing order in the absence of objection by the owners, it is clear to me, and I think to my brethren, that he would be acting in a ministerial or administrative capacity, and would be entitled to make such enquiries as he thinks necessary to enable him to make up his mind whether it was in the public interest that order should be made. But the position, in\n\n(!) [1928] I K.B. 291.\n\n(2) [1931] 2 K.B. 215.\n\n\\~\\ ll9~U1i1\\., B.696.\n\n(4) [1939] 2 K. B. 651.\n\n15) [l 939] 2 K.B. 249, 271.\n\n(6) l1935] l K.B. 286, pp. 292-S.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S Advani\n\naiid Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\na.nd Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nmy judgment, is different where objections are taken by those interested in the properties which will be affected by the order if confirmed and carried out. It seems to me that in deciding whether a closing order be made in spite of the objections which have been raised by the owners, it seems to me reasonable that the Minister should be regarded as exercising quasi judicial functions\".\n\nSwift J. in accepting the above statement added:\n\n\"I accept that from the moment an objection is made the Minister is exercising quasi-judicial functions, but it seems to me to be clearly recognised by the Court of Appeal that up to the time of objection being made the Minister acts in an administrative, and not a judicial, capacity.\"\n\nUnder the Housing Act, 1930, the local authority submits a clearing order to the Minister. If no objection is raised by the owners of the property the Minister considers the matter and either confirms or modifies the order of the local authority. In the absence of objection the Minister, according to those two decisions, acts in an administrative capacity.\n\nWhy? Because there is no lis in the sense of two opposing parties. There is only a proposal by the local authority. But if objection is raised by the owner, the Minister, according to these cases, in deciding the matter, acts judicially. Why? Because there is a lis between two contending parties, namely, the local authority and the owner which has to be decided by the Minister. It is true that in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning(') the House of Lords held that under the Statute the Minister at no stage acted judicially, and, therefore, the actual decisions in these two cases cannot be sustained. But, nevertheless, I have quoted the above passages only to illustrate the reasons and the principle on which the act of a statutory body empowered to decide disputes betweed two contesting parties was held to be quasijudicial.\n\nThe Report of the Ministers' Powers Committee in defining the words 'judicial' and\n\n(I) [1947) 2 A.E.R. 289; [1948) A.O. 87; 11947) 176 L.T. 312, 316, -..\n\n'quasi-judicial' which definition was accepted by Scott L. J. as correct in Cooper v. Wilson (')stated:\n\n\"A true judicial decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites ...... A quasi-judicial decision equally pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves ...... \"\n\nThis definition of a quasi.judicial decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more contesting parties and an outside authority to decide those disputes. The fo!lo\\ving observations of my Lord the\n\nChief Justice then sitting as a Single Judge in the Bombay High Court, in Kai Khushroo Sorabjee v. The Commissioner of Police(') in which an order made under the Defence of India Rules was under consideration, are relevant on this point :\n\n\"It appears to me that unless the authority in-1 vested with the power to pass an order had to act judicially, i.e., to weigh a question from two sides and decide on the matter, no question of quasi-judicial act can arise. The two sides cannot include himself as he is the deciding authority.\"\n\nIn Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning('), while it was before the Appeal Court, Lord Oaksey L.J. said :\n\n\" In all the authorities which have been referred to as showing that at an enquiry there must be an examination of the case of both sides, there was what has been called a lis : that is to say, there were two parties contesting and the Minister as an outside authority, was deciding the case.\"\n\nIn the very recent case of Patri Shaw v. R.N. Roy(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dissented from this very Bombay case (5) which is now before us and emphasised the necessity of a lis between two parties for making the decision of the authority a quasi-judicial act.\n\nil) [1937] 2 K.TI. 30J, 340.\n\n12) (1947) Born. L.R. 717; A.LR. 1947 Bom. Wl.\n\n(~I (J0i71 176 L.T. srn, 316. w (1950) 54 o.W.N. Bf5, (5\\ (1949) 51 Bom. L.R, 342.\n\nl950\n\nProvince of Bombay\n\nv K. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. 8. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nOn the other hand there are many cases where the act of a statutory authority has been accepted as a quasi-judicial act although there were not two opposing parties over whose disputes the authority was to sit in judgment. In those cases it was the authority who made a proposal and another person objected to it and the authority itself was entrusted to hear the objection and give a decision on it.\n\nIn short the authority which was the proposer was the judge in its own cause. The only ground on which the decision of such an authority, placed in such situation as I have just mentioned, was regarded as a quasi judicial act was that the authority was empowered to affect the rights of or impose a liability on others and was required by the very law which constituted it to act judicially.\n\nTo take a few illustrative cases: The Queen v. Corporation of Dublin(') was the case before May C. J. for quashing a borough rate by certiorari. Here the contest was between the\n\nCorporation on one side and the ratepayers on the other. It was the Corporation which, under the Act, was empowered, after consideration of facts and circumstances, to impose a borough rate, a liability of the ratepayers. The provisions of the relevant statutes are not set out in the report and it is difficult to say precisely what duties had been imposed on the Corporation before it could impose liability on ratepayers.\n\nI, therefore, pass on to the case of Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (') in which we find the celebrated definition of Atkin L. J. It will be noticed that in this case also there were not two parties apart from the Commissioners. Indeed the Commissioners themselves proposed the scheme and the companies took objection to it an.d the Commissioners after holding the local enquiry and hearing the objections had to make the final order. It will also be noticed that the local enquiry was to be held by the Commissioners themselves.\n\nThe only principle on which this decision rests is that the Commissioners had power to do something which affected the rights of others and that they were required\n\n(1) (1878) 2 L.R. Ir. 371.\n\n(21 [1924] I K.B. 171.\n\n,.,\n\n1950 by the statute itself to hold an enquiry, hear objections and evidence in support thereof and make their final decision after considering all facts and circum- Province of Bombay stances. Take the case of Estate and Trust Agencies v.\n\n(1927) Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust('). The K, s. Advani contest was between the appellant as owner and the and Othm. respondent Trust as the authority making an adverse declaration with respect to the appellant's building.\n\nBy the very provisions of the statute the respondent Trust was made the judge in its own cause. It was, however, directed to entertain objections, hear evidence and then decide the issue. It is this last mentioned circumstance on which this decision rests.\n\nIt is needless to multiply instances, for, I think, these cases sufficiently illustrate the position.\n\nWhat are the principles to be deduced from the two lines of cases I have referred to' The principles, as I apprehend them, are :\n\n(i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and\n\n(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi. judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.\n\nIn other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will Prima jacie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the\n\nill [1937] 3 A, El,~. ~'!1 \\l'.C.J.\n\nDasJ.\n\nProvine~ of Bombay v.\n\nK. 8. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nauthority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially.\n\nMr. Seervai relied on two cases, namely, Rex v.\n\nHendon Rural District Council(') and Rex v. London County Council(') as '.establishing that although the statute itself may not require an inquiry yet the decision of the authority may be a quasi-judicial act. In the second case although there were no express provisions for inquiry in the statute itself, the rules framed by the Theatre and Music Hall Committee had made elaborate provisions for notice, advertisement, opposition and hearing in public and liberty to examine and cross-examine witnesses.\n\nIn the first case notice was actually given, objections were invited and the parties had appeared. In any case, in both the cases, as I have already pointed out, there was a lis between two contending parties apart from the deciding authority and the decision of the authority affected the rights of the parties and can, therefore, be well supported as a quasi-judicial act on the principle first enunciated.\n\nThe question I have now to consider is whether the act of the Provincial Government under the Bombay Ordinance satisfied either of the two tests. In the case before us there were not two parties so as to make up a lis in the usual sense.\n\nHere the Provincial Government had been authorised to requisition land for a public purpose and the respondent's father whose interests were prejudicially affected opposed the requisition. The case, therefore, did not satisfy the test of a quasi-judicial act based on the presence of two parties apart from the Provincial Government. Chagla C.J. obviously felt the difficulty and tried to get over it by introducing the State as a party, as if, under the Government of India Act, 1935, the State was a legal entity apart from the Provincial Government. This introduction of a fiction is wholly unconvincing and cannot be supported. The Ordinance under review\n\n(1) [1933) 2 K.B. 696.\n\n(2) [1931] 2 K.B. 216.\n\ndid not contemplate or permit such a fiction.\n\nThe bald fact has to be faced that in this case there was an absence of two contending parties apart from the Provincial Government which was the deciding authority.\n\nThis, as I have said, is, however, not decisive, for it has yet to be enquired whether the case satisfied the second test, that is to say, whether the Ordinance re. quired the Provincial Government to act judicially.\n\nTurning now to the provisions of the Ordinance, it is contended that it is implicit in section 3 that the existence of a public purpose must be determined judicially. The argument may be summed up thus: The existence of a public purpose as an objective fact was, under the main body of section 3, a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of requisition, just as the non-user of land for any of the purposes mentioned in the proviso to section 3 or the vacancy of the premises under section 4 were conditions precedent. This condition precedent being an objective fact, it had of necessity to be determined by the Provincial Government in a quasi-judicial manner. The first part of the argument wholly overlooks the difference in the language used in the main body of section 3 and that used in the proviso to that section and that used in section 4 of the Ordinance. The proviso to section 3 placed certain lands outside the ambit of the power conferred on the Provincial Government by the main body of that section. If the Provincial Government purported to exercise its power of requisition with respect to land which fell within the proviso on an erroneous belief that it did not, then the Provincial Government overstepped the limits of its powers and the order of requisition would not bind anybody and could be challenged by suit as wholly without jurisdiction. Likewise, under section 4 the Provincial Government's power of requisition had been confined in its range to vacant premises and if the Provincial Government purported to requisition premises as vacant premises which in fact were not vacant premises then also the Provincial Government entered the forbidden field and went beyond its power and its\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. 8. Advani and Others.\n\nJ)as J.\n\nProvince of\n\nBonibay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\ndecision would not bind any body and could be challenged by a suit. This would be the position in the two cases I have mentioned, because there was nothing in the proviso to section 3 or in section 4 which could suggest that the question of the fulfilment of the condition precedent, namely, the non-user of the land for any of the purposes mentioned in the proviso to section 3 or the vacancy of the premises under section 4, had in any manner been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government. But, as I have already stated, the main body of section 3, on a correct construction of it, expressly left the question of the existence of the public purpose along with the question of the necessity or expediency of requisitioning land to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government, and, therefore, its decision, if made in good faith, could not be questioned at all. The circumstance that the fulfilment of the condition precedent laid down in the proviso to section 3 or in section 4 had not been left to the opinion of the Provincial Government could not affect the question of construction of the language used in the main body of section 3 or alter the nature or character of the act under that section. The first part of the argumcat overlooks this aspect of the matter. The second part of the argument proceeds on the assumption that an objective fact can never be left to the subjective opinion of a specified authority and must always be determined judicially. The cases already referred to in connection with the first head of arguments clearly show that the question of the existence of a public purpose or the interests of the State\n\nand the like may well be, and, indeed, often are, left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the specified authority and in such cases its decision, in the absence of bad faith, cannot be challenged in any proceeding.\n\nEven if the matter be not left to its subjective opinion, nevertheless, as already pointed out, an administrative authority has frequently to come to a decision in its own mind as to the objective facts such as the existence of a public purpose or the like as a step in the process of the exercise of its administrative\n\n,,..,··\n\n1950 powers. That decision, if erroneous, will not bind anybody and may be questioned in an action. See the B T' Q L l Province of o bservahons of Palles C. . in iie ueen v. oca Bombay Government Board('). The mere fact that the exisv. tence of a public purpose is a condition precedent to K. s. Advani the exercise of the power of requisition will not necesand Others. sarily make the decision as to its existence a quasijudicial act. There is no warrant for saying that the fulfilment of the condition precedent to the exercise of an administrative power must necessarily and always be determined judicially by the authority invested with the power.\n\nThe authority decides it for its own purpose and in case of dispute the final decision rests with the Court-a circumstance which also supports the view that the authority has no duty to decide it judicially. In my opinion, even on the assumption that the question of the existence of a public purpose had not been left to the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government, and that the question had to be determined by the Provincial Government, there was nothing in section 3 to suggest that such determination had to be made judicially at all. The observations of Lord Radcliffe in N akkuda Ali's case(') at p. 887 are also instructive and helpful on this point.\n\nMr. Seervai then draws our attention to sections 10 and 12 of the Ordinance on which he strongly relies in support of his contention. It should be borne in mind that Mr. Seervai has not contended that the order for requisition by itself was a quasi-judicial act.\n\nHis contention has been that this power to make the order was subject to a condition precedent, namely, the existence of a public purpose which alone had to be established judicially as an objective fact. It will, therefore, have to be seen whether the sections relied on have any bearing on the question of the determination of the existence in fact of a public purpose. The sections ran as follows :- , \"10. Power to obtain information-(!) The Provincial Government may, with a view to carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance, by order require any\n\n(1) [1902] L.R. 2 Ir, 349,\n\n(2) 119501 54 C.W.N. 883.\n\nDasJ,\n\nProvine~ of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Ad1; ani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nperson to furnish to such authority as may be specified in the order such information in his possession relating to any land which is requisitioned or is continued under requisition or is intended to be requisitioned or continued under requisition.\n\n(2) Every person required to furnish such information as is referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be legally bound to do so within the meaning of sections 176 and 177 of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860).\n\n12. Power to enter and inspect land.-Without prejudice to any powers otherwise conferred by this Ordinance any officer or person empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government by general or special order may enter and inspect any land for the purpose of determining whether, and, if so, in what manner, an order under this Ordinance should be made in relation to such land or with a view to securing compliance with any order made under this Ordinance.\"\n\nIn considering and construing the above sections it has to be borne in mind that a mere provision for an enquiry as a preliminary step to coming to a decision wi!J not necessarily make the decision a quasi-judicial act, for the purpose of the enquiry may only be to enable the deciding authority to make up its mind to do what may be a purely administrative act. Take the case of Robinson v. Afinister of Town and Country\n\nPlanning (') to which reference has already been made where the act of the Minister was held to be an administrative act. Lord Greene M.R. said at p. 859:\n\n\"As an example of the difference to be found in the subject-matter dealt with in different statutes I may point out that this case is different from a case where a Minister is given the duty of hearing an appeal from an order such as a closing order made by a local authority. This is not !he case of an appeal. It is the case of an original order to be made by the Minister as an executive authority who is at liberty to base his\n\n(1) [1947] 1 A. E .R. 851.\n\nopm10n on whatever material he thinks fit, whether obtained in the ordinary course of his executive functions or derived from what is brought out at a public enquiry if there is one. To say that, in coming to his decision, he is in any sense acting in a quasi-judicial capacity is to misunderstand the nature of the process altogether. I am not concerned to dispute that the enquiry itself must be conducted on what may be described as quasi-judicial principles, but this is quite a different thing from saying that any such principles are applicable to the doing of the executive act itself, i.e., the making of the order. The enquiry is only a step in the process which leads to the result, and there is, in my opinion, no justification for saying that the executive decision to make the order can be controlled by the Courts by reference to the evidence or lack of evidence at the inquiry which is here relied on. Such a theory treats the executive act as though it were a judicial decision (or, if the phrase is preferred, a quasi-judicial decision) which it most emphatically is not.'!\n\nIn Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ('), to which also reference has already been made, Lord Thankerton at p. 295-296 said :\n\n\"In my opinion, no judicial or quasi-judicial duty was imposed on the respondent, and any reference to judicial duty or bias is irrelevant, in the present case.\n\nThe respondent's duties under section 1 of the Act and Schedule I thereto are, in my opinion, purely administrative, but the Act prescribes certain methods of, or steps in, the discharge of that duty. It is obvious that, before making the draft order, which must contain a definite proposal to designate the area concerned as the site of a new town, the respondent must have made elaborate inquiry into the matter, and have consulted any local authorities who appear to him to be concerned, and, obviously, other departments of the Government, such as the Ministry of Health, would naturally require to be consulted. It would seem, accordingly, that the respondent was required to satisfy\n\n(II [1947] 2 A.E.R. 289; [1948] A.O. 87.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani and Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nProvinee of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nhimself that it was a sound scheme before he took the serious step of issuing a draft order. It seems clear also, that the purpose of inviting objections, and, where they are not withdrawn, of having a public inquiry, to be held by some one other than the respondent, to whom that person reports, was for the further information of the respondent, in order to the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme of the designation, and it is important to note that the development of the site, after the order is made, is primarily the duty of the development Corporation established under s. 2 of the Act.\n\nI am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid on the respondent in discharge of these statutory duties, and that the only question is whether he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint a person to hold the public inquiry, and to consider that person's report.\"\n\nKeeping these weighty observations in view I now proceed to analyse the provisions of the two sections.\n\nIt will be noticed that the powers given to the Provincial Government under both the sections are only enabling and in terms are not compulsory. The Court below has construed the word ' may ' as 'must' on the hypothesis that a right implies a corresponding duty and the Provincial Government is, therefore, under an obligation to exercise the power and consequently an enquiry is compulsory.\n\nI am unable to accept this line of reasoning. The authorities show that in construing a power the Court will read the word ' may ' as ' must ' when the exercise of the power will be in furtherance of the interest of a third person for securing which the power was given.\n\nEnabling words are always potential and never in themselves significant of any obligation. They are read as compulsory where they are words to effectuate a legal right. See Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford(').\n\nHere the power was given to enable the Provincial Government to obtain information to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance. It was not given for the\n\n(1) (1880) 5 App. C•s. 2U.\n\n,..\n\nbenefit of any other person including the owner of the land sought to be requisitioned.\n\nWhen a power is given to one person, here the Provincial Government, for his own benefit, couched in enabling words making its exercise optional, there is no principle or authority that I know of which enables the Court to make the exercise of the power compulsory by reading the word 'may' as 'must'. Assuming, however, that 'may' in these sections means 'must,' what follows? It is true that the information could be obtained antler section 10 with a view to carrying out the purposes of the Act but what was the nature of the information that might be gathered under the section? It was only information relating to the land requisitioned or to be requisitioned that could be obtained. Information relating to the land would certainly be useful in enabling the Provincial Government to consider the necessity or expediency of requisitioning that land. Such information would also be useful to the officer determining the question of compensation. But how could any information relating to any particular land have any bearing on the question of the existence of a public purpose which was the only matter under section 3, which, according to Mr. Seervai, had to be judicially determined by the Provincial Government?\n\nI fail to perceive any. As I have said, information relating to land certainly had a bearing on the question whether it was necessary or expedient to acquire that particular land which admittedly was a purely administrative act. Finally, section 10 enabled the Provincial Government to require 'any person' to furnish information relating to the land. The Ordinance did not think fit even to mention the owner or other persons interested in the land as a specific source of information. Assuming that the Provincial Govern. ment was obliged to make any enquiry, the owner of the land had no special right to be consulted apart from the general right of \"any person.\" No provision was made for giving notice of the intended requisiticn by special notice or by advertisement or for enabling ; my aggrieved person to lodge any objection and nobody\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. 8. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others,\n\nDas .J.\n\nwas designated as authority on whom was cast any duty to hear the objections. Further, it will be noticed that under the section the information was to be furnished to such authority as might be specified, which means that the information was not to be communicated to the Provincial Government direct.\n\nTherefore, the information was nothing more than the information obtained for the Minister by somebody appointed by him to hold a public enquiry under the statutes which were considered in Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1) and Franklin v.\n\nMinister of Town and Country Planning('). The circumstance that by sub-section (2) of that section a legal obligation, on pain of criminal penalty, was imposed on persons to furnish information, so strongly relied on by Mr. Seervai, appears to me to have no bearing on the character or scope of the inquiry envisaged by sub-section (1).\n\nThe provisions of section 12 also carried the matter no further. This section was also an enabling section.\n\nThe inspection was in terms for the purpose of determining whether, and, if so, in what manner an order should be made. It can have no possible bearing on the question of the existence of a public purpose which is an independent question having no necessary relation to any particular land.\n\nFurther, presumably, a number of premises might have to be requisitioned and, if the contention of the respondent were correct, there would have to be as many quasi-judicial determinations of the existence of the same public purpose as there might be the number of houses to be acquired-a proposition impracticable and absurd on the face of it. Finally, compare the provisions of sections 10 and 12 with those of section 6. The determination of the question of compensation and the apportionment thereof were certainly judicial or quasijudicial acts. There was a provision for appeal also.\n\nSection 16 provided for making rules for holding the inquiry under sub-sections (I) and (3) of section 6. The circumstance that the Ordinance provided for judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry for the purposes of section 6\n\n11) (1947) 1 A. E. R. 851.\n\n12) (1948) A. r.. 87.\n\n. . ;~\n\nbut was silent as regards section 3 cannot be overlooked.\n\nIn my judgment, the Ordinance did not require the Provfocial Government to act judicially at all in the matter of making a requisition order under section 3.\n\nThe provisions for obtaining information and for getting inspection under sections 10 and 12 respectively cannot be read as provisions for a judicial or quasijudicial inquiry, nor was such so called inquiry obligatory at all. Those sections served and were intended to serve the purpose of obtaining information which would enable the Provincial Government to exercise its administrative, i.e., executive function of making an order for requisition. The conclusions I have arrived at are (i) that on a true construction of section 3 of the Ordinance the determination of the existence of a public purpose and the necessity or expediency for requisitioning any particular land for that purpose was a purely administrative act, for the entire composite matter was left to the opinion of the Provincial Government, and its decision, if made in good faith, could not be questioned;\n\n(ii) that, apart from the question of construction and assuming that the matter had not been left to its opinion, the determination of the existence of a public purpose or the necessity or expediency for making the order could not be regarded as a quasi. judicial act, because (a) there was no lis in the sense of dispute between two contesting parties to be decided by the Provincial Government ; and (b) the Provincial Government was not required by the Ordinance to hold any judicial inquiry or to act judicially and that the determination of the existence of a public purpose was only a step in the process of the exercise of the administrative power and, if erroneous the decision could at best be challenged by an action, but a certiorari would be a wholly inappropriate remedy. The second head of argument must, therefore, be rejected.\n\nThere is the last head of argument which requires consideration before I conclude. The argument is that\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Other~.\n\nDas J.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. 8. Adva.ni\n\nand Others.\n\n.Das J.\n\nthe existence of a public purpose was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power and, therefore, the fulfilment of the condition precedent had to be determined judicially by the Provincial Government as an objective fact but the Provincial Government could not, by wrongly deciding the preliminary point, assume jurisdiction to exercise the power.\n\nIn Bunbury v. Fuller(') Coleridge J. laid down:\n\n\"Now it is a general rule, that no Court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends and however its decisions may be final on all particulars making up together that subject-matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet upon these preliminary questions, its decision must always be open .to enquiry in the superior Court.\"\n\nThis was cited by Blackburn J. in Pease v.\n\nChaytor (').\n\nThe same principle was also laid down by the Privy Council in Colonial Rank of Australia v.\n\nW illan ('). The principle is quite plain but as Lord Esher M. R. pointed out in Reg. v., Commissioner of Income-tax(') \"its application is often misleading.\" The learned Master of the Rolls classified the cases in two categories thus :\n\n\"When an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things but not otherwise.\n\nThere it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists,\n\n(1) 9 Ex, 111 at p. 140.\n\n(2) 3 B. & S, 620.\n\n(3) [1874] L. R. 5 P. C. 417.\n\n(4) (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nand, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction.\n\nBut there is another state of things which may exist.\n\nThe legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding . that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more.\n\nWhen the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.\"\n\nK. 8. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nMr. Seervai contends that the present case falls within the first class of cases and strongly relies on Rex v.\n\nWoodhouse (') and Rex v. Bradford (') as establishing that a certiorari lies to correct the error of the Provin. cial Government. There are two answers to this argument. In the first place, it is not disputed that the formation of opinion as to the necessity or expediency of requisitioning any land is a purely subjective matter and that the order of requisition founded on that opinion is an administrative act. What is contended is that the existence of a public purpose must be judicially determined by the Provincial Government be. fore it could proceed to exercise its administrative powers. In short qua that issue only the Provincial Government was to act judicially. The consequence of this argument is that the decision of the Provincial Government on this issue was not a decision\n\n(!) (1906] 2 K. B. !01.\n\n(2) [1908) 1 K. B. S65,\n\nDas J,\n\n19llO\n\nProvincB of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adva.n\\\n\nand Otht1rs.\n\nDasJ.\n\non a collateral matter but a decision on the issue itself which, according to the argument, had been left wit?in the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government to decide.\n\nIt must, therefore, follow that the case fell within the second class of cases mentioned by Lord Esher M.R.\n\nThe fact that there is no right of appeal from this decision, although the Ordinance provided for an appeal under section 6, is also significant. Before coming to the decision on this issue the Government had sent an Inspector to gather information under section 10 and the Respondent's father, the original applicant, furnished all necessary information and produced the original Deed of Assignment on which he founded his title and gave a written statement. The requirements of the Statute had been complied with and the petitioner had his say. The decision of the Provincial Government that a public purpose existed given in such circumstances became, in the absence of bad faith, binding and, in the absence of any right of appeal, was conclusive, however erroneous the decision might have been.\n\nThe second answer to Mr. Seervai's contention is that, assuming that the case fell within the first class of cases and the erroneous decision could be corrected, it might have been corrected by an action but certainly not by certiorari.\n\nThe two cases relied on by Mr. Seervai, when properly understood, can have no application to the facts of the case before us.\n\nIn Rex v. Woodhouse (1) the Court of Appeal accepted the position that the licensing Justices in granting or refusing to grant the licence had to perform a quasi-judicial act, for they had to decide the matter as between two contending parties, namely, the applicant for licence and the persons opposing the grant. There the Justices granted a provisional licence and referred the matter to Quarter Sessions. Three points were taken, namely, (i) that the Justices did not apply their mind to the issue and failed to decide the matter judicially but made the order in pursuance of a pre.existing agreement between them and the Corporation, (ii) that the] ustices were biased and (iii) that\n\n(ti ll906] 2 K.B 501,\n\nthe power of the Justices being limited to granting licences to persons who had some specified qualifications, they could not, by wrongly deciding that the applicants had the necessary qualifications, assume jurisdiction to do the quasi-judicial act of granting the licence.\n\nThis decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed by the House of Lords in Lord Mayor etc. of Leeds v. Ryder (1) on the ground that the Justices had to act according to their own discretion and that they were not guilty of any bad faith in doing what they did. The point to note, however, is that the decision of the Court of Appeal proceeded on the footing that the Justices were a quasi-judicial body and that by wrongly deciding a preliminary fact they assumed to discharge their quasi-judicial function of granting the licence and it was the quasi-judicial act of granting the licence that was brought up and quashed by certiorari.\n\nThe case of Rex v.\n\nBradford (') also proceeded on the footing that in granting the licence to the District Council to take away stones etc. the Justices were exercising a quasi-judicial function and they assumed jurisdiction to exercise that quasi-judicial function by wrongly deciding the collateral fact that the land in question was not a park. The same remarks apply to Rex (Greenaway) v. Justices of Armagh(').\n\nAll these cases in the appeal Court were cases where a quasijudicial body purported to assume jurisdiction to discharge its quasi-judicial function by an erroneous decision of a collateral fact and, therefore, certiorari was granted to correct the error of jurisdiction by quashing the order itself which was a quasi-judicial act.\n\nIn the case now . before us the Provincial Government was functioning as an administrative body doing an administrative act, namely, forming its opinion as to the necessity or expediency of requisitioning land and making an order of requisition based on that opinion. If the existence of a public purpose was a collateral fact, then at best it was a case of an\n\n(11 [1907] A.O. 420.\n\n(2) [1908] l K.B. 365.\n\n(3) (1924] 2 Ir. R. 55,\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDaa J,\n\nProvinca of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nadministrative body assuming jurisdiction to perform its administrative powers by erroneously deciding the collateral fact as to the existence of a public purpose.\n\nIn such circumstances the two cases relied on by Mr. Seervai can have no possible application. Assum. ing that this case fell within the first class mentioned by Lord Esher M. R. this erroneous assumption of jurisdiction to do an administrative act might have been corrected by an action but certiorari cannot possibly bo: the appropriate remedy.\n\nIt is said that in deciding the collateral fact the Provincial Government was acting judicially and, therefore, certiorari might go.\n\nThe argument will take the respondents nowhere, for, assuming that the decision on the question of existence of a public purpose was a quasi-judicial act, that decision, at the most, might be quashed but the administrative act, namely, the formation of opinion and the order based thereon would remain unaffected, for certiorari would not affect it.\n\nThe passage I have quoted from the judgment of Lord Greene M. R. in Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, clearly establishes that although the preliminary enquiry had to be done in a quasijudicial manner, that fact could not alter the nature or character of the ultimate administrative act. That administrative act would remain an administrative act and could not be touched by certiorari. The third head of arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents must, therefore, also fail.\n\nIn my judgment the first of the two points raised by the learned Attorney-General orr behalf of the appellant must prevail for reasons stated above. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal and the second point, namely, whether a writ of this nature can lie against the Provincial Government, does not arise. In view of the fact that the Government of India Act, 1935, has been repealed and the provisions of our Constitution on this point are different from those of the Government of India Act, the question has also become academic for future purposes and I express no opinion on it.\n\n-··\n\nI, therefore, agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this appeal should be allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below should be set aside and the petition should stand dismissed. I also agree to the order for costs made by my Lord the Chief Justice.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ranjit Singh Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1 (a) and 1 (b) : Rajinder Narain.\n\nlIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]\n\nCO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS\n\nNANDLAL\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and R. s. NAIK JJ.J\n\nCo-operative Cr<dit Societies Act, 1340 ]!'., (Hyderabwi), s. 42 --Award-Remission by Registrar to Civil Court for execution-\n\nPoicers of Registrar-Instal1nent decree-Defa'U, lt-Exer:tltion pro ceedinas for whole amount in Civil Oourt-P(, wer of Registrat to a.ccept instalment and direct Civil Oottrt to stop proceedings.\n\nSection 42 of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1340 F., {Hyderabad) provided as follows: \"If an award g:ven by the Registrar or by a person nominatecl by him, or by a comruittee of arbitrators is not acted upon, then tbe Registrar can Jave it enforced-(a) through a civil court on a certificate issud by him.\n\nThe civil court will treat the award in the satne way as itB own decree; l_b) through a Revenue Court or officer by issuing a certi- ':ficate to that court or officer.\"\n\nHeld, that under the section the Registrar was not in the same position as a court passing t.he decree unUer the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of execution of the decree and be does not possess all the powers of an executing court.\n\nWhere a dispute arose bet, veen a m<:mber of a society and the society and an arbitrator appointed under the Act passed a decree for payruent of a certain sum in six monthly instaln1ents with a condition that if default was made in the payment of any inRtaln1ent the who!e amount will become due, and under the provisions of s. 42 the decree was sent for execution to the Civil Court au a. certificate of Registrar :\n\nProvince of\n\nBonibay\n\nK. S. Advani and Others,\n\nDas J,\n\nOc~. 12.", "total_entities": 477, "entities": [{"text": "PROVINCE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PROVINCE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ti.\n\nKUSALDAS S. ADV ANI AND OTI;", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUSALDAS S. ADVANI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI fuRILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 198, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "And Requisition Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4, 10, 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250, "end_char": 266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "And Requisition Ordinance", "statute": "And Requisition Ordinance"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429, "end_char": 433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "And Requisition Ordinance", "statute": "And Requisition Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Provincial Government-Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 176, 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 853, "end_char": 865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Government-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Provincial Government-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 973, "end_char": 982, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Muklterjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1315, "end_char": 1324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Government-Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Provincial Government-Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1901, "end_char": 1907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The l st respondent wbo was a refugee from Sind got an assignment of the tenancy rights in a flat in Bombay and went into possession of the flat."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few days later the Government of Bombay issued an order requisitioning the Rat under s. 3 of the abovesaid Ordinance, allotte~ the samo:: to another refugee and issued orders to an Inspector to take possession of the same."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2034, "end_char": 2038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2196, "end_char": 2203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution, a writ of certiorari was issued by the Bombay High Court against the Province of Bombay and others and this order was confirmed on appeal as against the Province of Bombay by a Division Bench of the said High Court."}}, {"text": "Province of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution, a writ of certiorari was issued by the Bombay High Court against the Province of Bombay and others and this order was confirmed on appeal as against the Province of Bombay by a Division Bench of the said High Court.", "canonical_name": "PROVINCE OF BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTR1 and DAs\n\n]J. (MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALt"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2474, "end_char": 2490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTR1 and DAs\n\n]J. (MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2505, "end_char": 2512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA C. J., FAzL Au, PATANJALI SAsTR1 and DAs\n\n]J. (MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2576, "end_char": 2580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Advtmi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2714, "end_char": 2726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advtmi\n\nad OtherJ.\n\npurpose was no.~ a judicial or quasi-judicial decision but an ad- 1ninistrative act and the High Court of Bombay had therefore no jurisdiction to issue a writ of ceriiorari in respect of the order of requisition.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2832, "end_char": 2852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advtmi\n\nad OtherJ.\n\npurpose was no.~ a judicial or quasi-judicial decision but an ad- 1ninistrative act and the High Court of Bombay had therefore no jurisdiction to issue a writ of ceriiorari in respect of the order of requisition."}}, {"text": "MuKlffiRJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MAHAJAN and MuKlffiRJEA Jj. ("}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "FAZL ALt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL ALt J .-The mere fact that au executive authority has: to decide something does not make the decision judicial.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALt"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. r'lilvani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8732, "end_char": 8747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Government was therefore a judicial act; the detemiination was further a collateral matter on which the jurisdiction to requisition was ' founded, and not a part of the executive act of\n\n19.';0\n\nProoifl<I of\n\nBombay ...\n\nK. S. r'lilvani\n\ntJlllf Otherr,\"\n\n19.JO\n\nPn1vinu of\n\nBt1mboy\n\nK. S. Advani ft Ollurs."}}, {"text": "K. S. Advani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8794, "end_char": 8806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Government was therefore a judicial act; the detemiination was further a collateral matter on which the jurisdiction to requisition was ' founded, and not a part of the executive act of\n\n19.';0\n\nProoifl<I of\n\nBombay ...\n\nK. S. r'lilvani\n\ntJlllf Otherr,\"\n\n19.JO\n\nPn1vinu of\n\nBt1mboy\n\nK. S. Advani ft Ollurs.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8933, "end_char": 8937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12006, "end_char": 12014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per\n\nKANI4 C. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, and Dit.s JJ.-The powers given to the Provincial Government under ss.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALt"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12340, "end_char": 12344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MuKHERJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12374, "end_char": 12382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held aho, per MAHAJAN, and MuKHERJI:A JJ.-(i) that the immunity granted by s. 306 of the Government of India Act, 1935, related to the Governor and not to the Provincial Government and under the said Act the High Court of Bombay had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against the Provin, ial Government of Bombay; (ii) that the word \"sue\" in s. 176 of the said Act meant the enforcement of a claim or a civil right by means of legal proceedings and was wide enough to include :rn application for a writ of certiorari.", "canonical_name": "Muklterjea"}}, {"text": "s. 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12422, "end_char": 12428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12697, "end_char": 12703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 205", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13683, "end_char": 13694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13702, "end_char": 13731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chagla C. 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Advani\n\nmu/ 01/Jtrs."}}, {"text": "sections 176 and 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19591, "end_char": 19611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19619, "end_char": 19636, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20175, "end_char": 20184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22125, "end_char": 22133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition was approved by Lord Atkinson in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath /ustices (\n\n) as the best (') [1878] 2 L. R. Irish 371, 376.", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "May", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22682, "end_char": 22685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent it was contended that as stated by Chief Justice May, whenever there is the determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, that determination is a quasi-judicial decision, and, if w;' a writ of certiorari will lie against the.", "canonical_name": "May"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23310, "end_char": 23315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Electricity Commissioners ( 1 ), where Lord Justice Atkin (as he then was) laid down the following test': \"Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Rench Division exercised in these writs.\"", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "Scrutton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23895, "end_char": 23903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A slig]1tly more detailed examination of the distinction is found in The King v. 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Ad1•ani"}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31395, "end_char": 31413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32073, "end_char": 32082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hewart", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33371, "end_char": 33377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In rejecting the argument that on the issue of such certificate no right to obtain a writ came into existence, because the certificate was a mere nothing as it had to be followed bv another enmination and inquiry, Lord Hewart C. ; observed as follows : \"I do not think that it was\n\n(') [1928] I K. B. i9!."}}, {"text": "Carmichael", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33661, "end_char": 33671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contemplated at all that the judgment of the medical referee should, in th'e-- smallest degree, be fettered or influenced by a certificate given by a wholly unauthorized person and I do not think :Mrs. Carmichael would be in the same position before the medical referee as that in which she would have been if there had been a refusal on the part of the proper officer to give her any certificate at all.\" -,"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35236, "end_char": 35245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35365, "end_char": 35374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. 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S. Jfd•1J11i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40111, "end_char": 40126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provinu Of\n\nBom611J\n\nY, K. S. Jfd•1J11i\n\n\"n4 Othtr$.\n\nKmnaC.J.\n\nPro&ince qf\n\nBombay\n\nv. t;."}}, {"text": "S. Ad1•ani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40179, "end_char": 40189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ad1•ani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "S. Ad1•ani"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41280, "end_char": 41289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43768, "end_char": 43777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43939, "end_char": 43944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, which related to a Ceylon Ordinance, one of the provisions of which appears to be similar in certain respects to section 3 of the Ordinance before us, the Privy Council observed :\n\n\"Reference has been made to cases dealing with similar questions arising under statutory enactments in India."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44453, "end_char": 44462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44571, "end_char": 44580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45865, "end_char": 45874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46464, "end_char": 46473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46921, "end_char": 46930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47065, "end_char": 47074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47183, "end_char": 47201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. 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Perera ( 1 ), in which the first two paragraphs of the headnote run as follows :\n\n\"In the acquisition of a private land for a public purpose, the Governor is not bound to take the report of the Surveyor-General as to the fitness for such a purpose."}}, {"text": "JC S. Ad\"\"\"i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57251, "end_char": 57263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Province Qj\n\nBarubay\n\nJC S. Ad\"\"\"i\n\nond Othtrs."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59046, "end_char": 59056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case and other similar cases, it was held that the Parliament had completely entrusted to the executive the discretion of deciding when it would be necessary or expedient to requisition land in the (') I.LR."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61185, "end_char": 61194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Advani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61516, "end_char": 61528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances, the::\n\nProvince of\n\nB0111bay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\na11J Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "K. S. Adoani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61578, "end_char": 61590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pr•uitUe 11/\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adoani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "PatanJali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61605, "end_char": 61614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PatanJali\n\nSastri].", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "PATANJALl SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61915, "end_char": 61931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALl SAsTRI J.-I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons indicated in the judgment.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62130, "end_char": 62139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN J.-1 agree with the judgment which my brother Mukherjea proposes to deliver and wish to add some observations of my own out of respect for my Lord the Chief Justice from whose judgment we feel constrained to differ.", "canonical_name": "Muklterjea"}}, {"text": "26th February 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62397, "end_char": 62415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal questions raised by this appeal are : ( 1) Whether the order of requisition dated 26th February 1948' made under section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ord!nance (Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62428, "end_char": 62437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sindh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62817, "end_char": 62822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) Whether the requisition of the said flat and its allotment to Mrs. C. Dayaram, a refugee from Sindh, was for a public purpose ?"}}, {"text": "I Provincial Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63131, "end_char": 63154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "against the I Provincial Government which in law means and in- \\_ eludes the Governor and that the requisition and the allotment of the said flat to Mrs. C. Dayaram was for a public purpose."}}, {"text": "K. S . .Aduani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65725, "end_char": 65739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19'0\n\nProvince of _\n\nBomba, ..\n\nK. S .", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "MaA.efanJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65753, "end_char": 65763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MaA.efanJ.\n\nempowered to act to determine or decide some fact or facts."}}, {"text": "May", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66468, "end_char": 66471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The classic ckfinition of the term \"judicial\" was given by May C. J. in The Q11een\n\nv. The Corporation of D11blin( 1 ), and this definition is in these terms :\n\n\"It is established that the writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order merely ministerial, such as a warrant.", "canonical_name": "May"}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67363, "end_char": 67369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They seem to have been approvl!d by Lord Greene M. R. in Rex\n\nv. Archbishop of Canterbt1ry( 8 ).", "canonical_name": "Greene M.R."}}, {"text": "Fletcher Moulton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67448, "end_char": 67464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rex v. Woodhouse(' ) Lord Fletcher Moulton L. J. observed as follows :\n\n\"The term 'judicial act' is used in contrast with purely ministerial acts."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68594, "end_char": 68603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Compensation Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68641, "end_char": 68663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68916, "end_char": 68926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Compensation Act, 1925", "statute": "Compensation Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "K. S. Advlllli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 70061, "end_char": 70075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Advlllli\n\n.nJ Othas.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70761, "end_char": 70771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "London County Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 71820, "end_char": 71841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The King v. The London County Council( 3 ), a writ of certiorari was issued to the London County Council who had exercised the power to grant a licence under the Cinematograph Act, 1909, and had given permission to open the premises on a Sunday under the Sunday Observance Act, 1780."}}, {"text": "Cinematograph Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71966, "end_char": 71983, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sunday under the Sunday Observance Act, 1780", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72042, "end_char": 72086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72092, "end_char": 72101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sunday under the Sunday Observance Act, 1780", "statute": "Sunday under the Sunday Observance Act, 1780"}}, {"text": "Cinematograph Act, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72126, "end_char": 72149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72591, "end_char": 72600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cinematograph Act, 1909", "statute": "the Cinematograph Act, 1909"}}, {"text": "Sunday Observance Act, 1780", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72608, "end_char": 72635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cinematograph Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73632, "end_char": 73649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. S. Adriani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74462, "end_char": 74475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prooitteof\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adriani and Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Cinematograph Act, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75124, "end_char": 75147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75541, "end_char": 75545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cinematograph Act, 1909", "statute": "the Cinematograph Act, 1909"}}, {"text": "Greer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76681, "end_char": 76686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, as was pointed out by Greer L. J. in the course of the\n\n(') [1854]\n\n3 W.R. 69."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77949, "end_char": 77958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That case related to the functions of a Minister under the Town and Country Planning Act and the New Towns Act, 1946", "statute": "That case related to the functions of a Minister under the Town and Country Planning Act and the New Towns Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Health", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78462, "end_char": 78480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obvious that, before making the draft order, which must contain a definite proposal to designate the area concerned as the site of a new town, the respondent must have made elaborate inquiry into the matter and have consulted any local authorities who appear to him to be concerned, and obviously other departments of the Government, such as the Ministry of Health, would naturally require to be consulted."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ad1•ani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78881, "end_char": 78894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l!r.iO\n\n:Pro1:inct o_f\n\nBombqv\n\nK. S. Ad1•ani •nd Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Ji.falwjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78970, "end_char": 78980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J v.\n\nK. S. Advani and Othn-s.\n\nJi.falwjan J.\n\nby someone other tlun the respondent, to whom that person reports, was for the further information of the respondent, in order to the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme of the designation ; and it is important to note that the development of the site, after the order is made, is primarily the duty of the development corporation established under section 2 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79349, "end_char": 79358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80017, "end_char": 80020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by my brother Das in In re Banwarilal Roy ( '), the question whether an act is a judicial or a quasi-judicial one or a purely executive act depends on the terms of the particular rule, the nature, scope and effect of the particular power in exercise of which the act may be done.", "canonical_name": "DAs JJ."}}, {"text": "Banwarilal Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80030, "end_char": 80044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by my brother Das in In re Banwarilal Roy ( '), the question whether an act is a judicial or a quasi-judicial one or a purely executive act depends on the terms of the particular rule, the nature, scope and effect of the particular power in exercise of which the act may be done.", "canonical_name": "Banwarilal Roy"}}, {"text": "LR. 42 I.A 44", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 82984, "end_char": 82997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. S. Adi•ani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83028, "end_char": 83041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19.iO\n\nProvince of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adi•ani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83253, "end_char": 83262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85612, "end_char": 85621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85879, "end_char": 85884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated by Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1 ), does the Ordinance contemplate a case of a thinking that a person has a broken ankle and not a case of his really having a broken ankle ?", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86877, "end_char": 86887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prodnce of Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 87495, "end_char": 87512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19j0\n\nProdnce of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Aduan~ sni 0th.rs.", "canonical_name": "PROVINCE OF BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "K. S. Aduan~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87517, "end_char": 87529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19j0\n\nProdnce of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Aduan~ sni 0th.rs.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "K. S. Moani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87568, "end_char": 87579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'roi; i11&e of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Moani 4nd 01/rm.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87756, "end_char": 87758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88252, "end_char": 88262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88566, "end_char": 88575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89412, "end_char": 89423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89435, "end_char": 89446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89454, "end_char": 89483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90388, "end_char": 90399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "My simple answer is that the Provincial Government is not the sovereign and that the Government of India Act", "statute": "My simple answer is that the Provincial Government is not the sovereign and that the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90407, "end_char": 90436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90531, "end_char": 90542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90760, "end_char": 90770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90782, "end_char": 90801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Reference in this connection was made to the East India Company Act, 1780", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91193, "end_char": 91266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 306 and 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91343, "end_char": 91363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference in this connection was made to the East India Company Act, 1780", "statute": "Reference in this connection was made to the East India Company Act, 1780"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91371, "end_char": 91400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91602, "end_char": 91620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That statute, however, did not prohibit the issue of a writ against the East India Company."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91804, "end_char": 91811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\np, ovince of\n\nBomh~J\n\nK. S. Adrlf.1t1i\n\nand 01M, s.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nmatter has to be <lecided exclusively under the term~ of the Government of India Act, 1935, and not on the terms of any repealed statute.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91942, "end_char": 91971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 92058, "end_char": 92071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clanses 4 and 13 of the Charter of the Supreme Court gave the power to issue a writ of certiorari to the High Court against the East Ipdia Company and the same."}}, {"text": "East Ipdia Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 92147, "end_char": 92165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clanses 4 and 13 of the Charter of the Supreme Court gave the power to issue a writ of certiorari to the High Court against the East Ipdia Company and the same."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92222, "end_char": 92251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92288, "end_char": 92294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to a number of Madras cases but, in my opinion, those cases have not been correctlv decided inasmuch as they have placed the Governor on the same footing as the Provincial Government by a process of reasoning which to my mind is not correct."}}, {"text": "January' 4, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93122, "end_char": 93138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the Province of Bombay and is directed against the judgment of an appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court (consisting of Chagb C. T. and Tendolkar J.) dated January' 4, 1949, by\" which the learned Judges affirmed an order of Bhagwati J. dated September 27, 1948, in so far as it granted a writ of certiorari, for bringing up and quashing a requisition order made by the Provincial Government un, ler section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947)."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93208, "end_char": 93226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the Province of Bombay and is directed against the judgment of an appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court (consisting of Chagb C. T. and Tendolkar J.) dated January' 4, 1949, by\" which the learned Judges affirmed an order of Bhagwati J. dated September 27, 1948, in so far as it granted a writ of certiorari, for bringing up and quashing a requisition order made by the Provincial Government un, ler section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947)."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93365, "end_char": 93374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 26, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93582, "end_char": 93599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The requisition order was made by the Province of Bombay on February 26, 1948, in respect of the first floor of a building known as \"Paradise\" situated at 22, Warden Road, Mahalakshmi, Bombay."}}, {"text": "M. B. Vakil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93757, "end_char": 93768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire building is owned by one Dr._ M. B. Vakil, and one Abdul Hamid was in occupation of the first floor as a tenant under Dr. Vakil prior to January 29, 1948.", "canonical_name": "M. D. Vakil"}}, {"text": "Abdul Hamid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 93778, "end_char": 93789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire building is owned by one Dr._ M. B. Vakil, and one Abdul Hamid was in occupation of the first floor as a tenant under Dr. Vakil prior to January 29, 1948.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Hamid Ismail"}}, {"text": "January 29, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93864, "end_char": 93880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire building is owned by one Dr._ M. B. Vakil, and one Abdul Hamid was in occupation of the first floor as a tenant under Dr. Vakil prior to January 29, 1948."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93912, "end_char": 93920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid intended to go to Pakistan and was on the look out for\n\nr •\n\nsome premises a:t Karachi where he might reside and carry on business."}}, {"text": "Karachi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93973, "end_char": 93980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Hamid intended to go to Pakistan and was on the look out for\n\nr •\n\nsome premises a:t Karachi where he might reside and carry on business."}}, {"text": "Khusal Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 94042, "end_char": 94052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner Khusal Das, who was the main respondent in this appeal and is now dead and represented by his heirs, was a refugee from Karachi where he owried a Bungalow worth more than Rs."}}, {"text": "Gobind Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94445, "end_char": 94455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th January, 1948, there was an agreement entered into by and between Abdul Hamid on the one hand, and the petitioner Khusal Das, his son Gobind Ram and his brother's daughter's son Hiranand on the ."}}, {"text": "Hiranand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94489, "end_char": 94497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th January, 1948, there was an agreement entered into by and between Abdul Hamid on the one hand, and the petitioner Khusal Das, his son Gobind Ram and his brother's daughter's son Hiranand on the ."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94843, "end_char": 94859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner went into possession ot'the flat on February 4, 1948."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94978, "end_char": 94987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95093, "end_char": 95114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V of 1947) which came into force on and from the 4th of December, 1947."}}, {"text": "P. L. Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 95145, "end_char": 95154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was signed by Mr. P. L. Rao as Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Health and Local Government Department.", "canonical_name": "P. L. Rao"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95284, "end_char": 95287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day a letter was addressed by Mr. Rao to Dr. Vakil intimating to him that the said flat had been requisitioned as per copy of the Requisition Order enclosed therewith and that Government had allotted the flat to one Mrs. C. Dayaram at a rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dayaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95520, "end_char": 95527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Dayaram, it may be mentioned here, was also a refugee from Sind.", "canonical_name": "C.\n\nDayaram"}}, {"text": "February 27, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95589, "end_char": 95606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 27, 1948, a further order was passed under the signature of Mr. Rao authorising one Lalwani, an Inspector in the Health and Local Government Department of the Government of Bombay, to take possession of the requisitioned flat under the provision of section 9 of the Requisitioning Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Lalwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95682, "end_char": 95689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 27, 1948, a further order was passed under the signature of Mr. Rao authorising one Lalwani, an Inspector in the Health and Local Government Department of the Government of Bombay, to take possession of the requisitioned flat under the provision of section 9 of the Requisitioning Ordinance."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95847, "end_char": 95856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. L. Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96010, "end_char": 96019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 4, 1948, the petitioner Khusal Das filed an application in the Original Side of the Bombay High Court against P. L. Rao, Secretary to the Government of Bombay\n\nProvince ~( Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Oth1rs.", "canonical_name": "P. L. Rao"}}, {"text": "S. Ativ11n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96148, "end_char": 96158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ativ11n;\n\nand OtMrs."}}, {"text": "111ukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96173, "end_char": 96184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111ukherjea J.\n\nas party respondent alleging that the order of reqms1tion was illegal and ultra vires on various grounds and praying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and an order under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the respondent."}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96362, "end_char": 96372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96380, "end_char": 96399, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Coyajee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96483, "end_char": 96490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this application, an interim injunction was granted by Coyajee J. restrainrng the Government from obtaining possession of the flat."}}, {"text": "G. D. Vartak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 96642, "end_char": 96654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a subsequent amendment of the petition the Province of Bombay, as well as Mr. G. D. Vartak, the Minister-in-charge of the Health and Local _Government Department were added as parties respondents."}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97282, "end_char": 97292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97585, "end_char": 97596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98358, "end_char": 98364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeal was heard by Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J. By their judgment dated January 4, 1949, the learned Judges allowed the appeal in favour of the two respondents other than the Province of Bombay and set aside the orders made against them.", "canonical_name": "Chagla C. 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By their judgment dated January 4, 1949, the learned Judges allowed the appeal in favour of the two respondents other than the Province of Bombay and set aside the orders made against them."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99460, "end_char": 99469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukheriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100426, "end_char": 100435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheriea J.\n\nThe first and the most important point for our consideration is whether the act of requisition against which the writ of certiorari has been issued by the High Court is a judicial or an administrative act.", "canonical_name": "Muklterjea"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 101154, "end_char": 101161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To ascertain the exact connotation of the expression \"judicial act\" in connection with the issuing of a writ of certiorari and to determine whether the act complained of in the present case is a judicial act or not it would be necessary and convenient to set out briefly how the law on the point as developed by the Courts in England stands at present."}}, {"text": "Compensation Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103658, "end_char": 103680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Russel Keasely", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103778, "end_char": 103792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rex v.\n\nBoycott (3 ), one Russel Keasely moved on behalf of }iis\n\ninfant son Stanley for an order of certiorari to remove and quash a medical certificate granted by the respondent to the effect that Stanley was incapable by reason of, mental defect of receiving benefit from instruction in a special school under section 56 of the Education Act, and two other connected documents."}}, {"text": "Stanley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103829, "end_char": 103836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rex v.\n\nBoycott (3 ), one Russel Keasely moved on behalf of }iis\n\ninfant son Stanley for an order of certiorari to remove and quash a medical certificate granted by the respondent to the effect that Stanley was incapable by reason of, mental defect of receiving benefit from instruction in a special school under section 56 of the Education Act, and two other connected documents."}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104065, "end_char": 104075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Compensation Act, 1925", "statute": "Compensation Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104293, "end_char": 104303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Compensation Act, 1925", "statute": "Compensation Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 104799, "end_char": 104805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provinct qf\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Othtrs."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ac/1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 104872, "end_char": 104882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provinn ef\n\nBombay v.\n\nK. S. Ac/1, ani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107134, "end_char": 107137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been pointed out very nghtly by my learned brother Das J. in a recent Calcutta case ( 1 ) that of the four clements invoked in the proposition of law enunciated by Lord Atkin, three may be present m an administrative or executive act as well.", "canonical_name": "DAs JJ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 107153, "end_char": 107161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been pointed out very nghtly by my learned brother Das J. in a recent Calcutta case ( 1 ) that of the four clements invoked in the proposition of law enunciated by Lord Atkin, three may be present m an administrative or executive act as well."}}, {"text": "Mukherjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109180, "end_char": 109189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjta J.\n\nProllime of Bombay v.\n\nA. S. 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Aduatti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 113675, "end_char": 113688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nPrtwinct .\"/\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Aduatti\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Liversidge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115654, "end_char": 115664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The language of these orders was very similar to that, of Regulation 18 (B) under whicli the detention order was made in Liversidge's case."}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115784, "end_char": 115793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 1) Vide observation of Lord Radcliffe in Nakudda ."}}, {"text": "K. S. Mvani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117939, "end_char": 117950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provinu of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Mvani\n\nand o.,,,,.,.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Town and Country Planning Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118523, "end_char": 118558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Henn Collins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118944, "end_char": 118956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Henn Collins J. that the matter was not so peculiarly within the administrative capacity of the Minister that it could be regarded as one of pure discretion."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119715, "end_char": 119724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120808, "end_char": 120817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Then the Minister would have to hold a public local enquiry as provided for by the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121169, "end_char": 121255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "New Towns Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121575, "end_char": 121594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121792, "end_char": 121801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the New Towns Act, 1946", "statute": "the New Towns Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125831, "end_char": 125840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126194, "end_char": 126205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126213, "end_char": 126242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Per Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126402, "end_char": 126411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second preamble really gives the reason for passing of\n\n(1) Per Esher L.J. in Queen v. 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S. Adi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 130749, "end_char": 130758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made in course of arguments to the language of section 4 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, and similar provisions in other Land Acquisition\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Adi, ani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Mukheiea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130778, "end_char": 130786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheiea J.\n\n1950 enactments, where the expression 'public purpose'\n\nPtov u of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Othars.", "canonical_name": "Muklterjea"}}, {"text": "M ukhlrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130895, "end_char": 130905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ukhlrjea J.\n\noccurs."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131019, "end_char": 131028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131170, "end_char": 131179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131506, "end_char": 131515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132561, "end_char": 132570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132850, "end_char": 132859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133972, "end_char": 133981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 134510, "end_char": 134529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There has been a recent decision ( 1 ) of the Calcutta High Court on the above provision of the Bengal Act, but the particular point which has arisen ."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135195, "end_char": 135204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135739, "end_char": 135748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136106, "end_char": 136115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136131, "end_char": 136140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136232, "end_char": 136241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136279, "end_char": 136289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136812, "end_char": 136821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Loreburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136997, "end_char": 137005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was observed by\n\nLord Loreburn in Board of Education v. 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S. Adllani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143546, "end_char": 143559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Proriince of\n\nBombqy\n\nK. S. Adllani\n\nand OtMrs.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "MW.lrajea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143573, "end_char": 143582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MW.lrajea J.\n\nquestion of fact by the Magistrates could give them jurisdiction ."}}, {"text": "sections 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144221, "end_char": 144239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Highways Act, 1835", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144247, "end_char": 144265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144273, "end_char": 144291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Highways Act, 1835", "statute": "the Highways Act, 1835"}}, {"text": "Newton Abbot Rural District Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 144578, "end_char": 144613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a licence being granted by the justices to the Newton Abbot Rural District Council, authorising them by their Surveyor, to take materials for the repairs of the Highway from a place known as Grange Quarry in the said Parish, a rule was obtained for a writ of certiorari to bring up the order to be quashed, inter alia on the ground that it was made in respect of a land which was a park."}}, {"text": "S. 620", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145609, "end_char": 145615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. 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the Statute (13 George III, Ch."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 155021, "end_char": 155027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that the Supreme Court was established at Fort William in Bengal under the Statute (13 George III, Ch."}}, {"text": "March 26,\n\n1774", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 155180, "end_char": 155195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "63) commonly known as the Regulating Act, and the Charter establishing the Court was issued by King George III on March 26,\n\n1774."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155457, "end_char": 155466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 155898, "end_char": 155921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "71, and clause VII laid down \"that it shall be lawful for His Majesty to establish a Supreme Court at Bombay, to be invested with such powers and authorities 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Mvani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 156343, "end_char": 156351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mvani\n\ntlllt!", "canonical_name": "S. Mvani"}}, {"text": "S. Moani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 156390, "end_char": 156398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherj1a J.\n\nv Ji.. S. Moani\n\ntltUl Others.", "canonical_name": "S. Mvani"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156782, "end_char": 156791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156799, "end_char": 156820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156880, "end_char": 156891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Courts Act, 1861", "statute": "the High Courts Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156899, "end_char": 156928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156934, "end_char": 156945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157367, "end_char": 157378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 157386, "end_char": 157415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 306( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157479, "end_char": 157494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Presidency High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 157615, "end_char": 157637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Presidency High Courts, section 110 of the Government of India Act, 1915, granted exemption to the Governor-General the Governor and members of the Council from the Original Jurisdiction of High Courts."}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157639, "end_char": 157650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 157658, "end_char": 157687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 306(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157940, "end_char": 157954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 306(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158289, "end_char": 158303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158544, "end_char": 158555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Section 176(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158582, "end_char": 158596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Federation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 158671, "end_char": 158690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 176(1) stands as follows:\n\n\"The Federation may sue or be sued by the name of the Federation of India and a Provincial Government may sue or be sued by the name of the Province, and, without prejudice , to the subsequent provisions of this chapter, may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of the Federal or a Provincial Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Secretary of State in Council might have sued or been sued if this Act had not been passed.\""}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160174, "end_char": 160184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 160269, "end_char": 160288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "106, which was passed in 1858 on the transfer of the Government of India from the East' India Company to the Crown."}}, {"text": "East' India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 160298, "end_char": 160317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "106, which was passed in 1858 on the transfer of the Government of India from the East' India Company to the Crown."}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160599, "end_char": 160601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S .. .4dvanf\n\nand Othm."}}, {"text": "Mukheijea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160627, "end_char": 160636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheijea J ..\n\nProvince cf Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advuni\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Muklterjea"}}, {"text": "K. S. Advuni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 160666, "end_char": 160678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheijea J ..\n\nProvince cf Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Advuni\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. 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[", "canonical_name": "Begum Sumarco"}}, {"text": "K. S. Mviini", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164770, "end_char": 164782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "••vince of\n\nBomb'!JI\n\nK. S. Mviini\n\nand Olher•.\n\nPror; inu of\n\n1Jomb41\n\nK.S. Moani\n\nand Othns.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "K.S. Moani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164820, "end_char": 164830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "••vince of\n\nBomb'!JI\n\nK. S. Mviini\n\nand Olher•.\n\nPror; inu of\n\n1Jomb41\n\nK.S. Moani\n\nand Othns.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Muklterjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164844, "end_char": 164854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklterjea J.\n\nher.", "canonical_name": "Muklterjea"}}, {"text": "Begum Sumaroo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 164907, "end_char": 164920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Privy Council that ::.s Begum Sumaroo was not a Sovereign Princess and the act of resumption was done under colour of legal title of lands .", "canonical_name": "Begum Sumarco"}}, {"text": "B.\n\nPeacock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 165922, "end_char": 165933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Much importance, cannot in my opinion be attached to the observations of Sir B.\n\nPeacock in Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v.\n\nThe Secretary of State ( ' )."}}, {"text": "section 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166952, "end_char": 166963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 176", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167263, "end_char": 167274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168622, "end_char": 168631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J.) affirming an order of Bhagwati J. sitting on the Original Side of that Court.", "canonical_name": "Chagla C. J."}}, {"text": "S. 279", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168932, "end_char": 168938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mliklierjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 169018, "end_char": 169029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mliklierjea J\n\nDu]."}}, {"text": ".Advani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 169064, "end_char": 169071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Advani and Others.", "canonical_name": "S. Ad1•ani"}}, {"text": "Bombay made by the appellant in exercise of powers vested in it by Bombay Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 169172, "end_char": 169255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 169856, "end_char": 169863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nSeervai appearing for the respondents has, quite properly, not sought to raise any of the several subsidiary points which were unsuccessfully canvassed before the Courts below and his endeavour has been to support the judgment under appeal on the two points mentioned above and to reinforce them with fresh reasoning and rulings."}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172903, "end_char": 172913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173640, "end_char": 173649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Adt'ani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 181876, "end_char": 181889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To whom would the Provincial Government give notice that it proposed to decide this issue of the existence or otherwise of a\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Adt'ani\n\naru/ OtherS.\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Batty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 187000, "end_char": 187005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the like effect are the following observations of Batty J. in Balvant Ramchandra Natu v. The Secretary of State(' ) :\n\n\"No doubt when a power has been conferred in unambiguous language by Statute, the Courts cannot interfere with its exercise and substitute their own discretion for that of persons orbodies sekcted by the Legislature for the purpose.\""}}, {"text": "sections 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188731, "end_char": 188747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Governor of Ceylon with the advice of his Executive Council made an order under the Acquisition of Land Ordinance, 1876", "statute": "the Governor of Ceylon with the advice of his Executive Council made an order under the Acquisition of Land Ordinance, 1876"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Ceylon", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 189692, "end_char": 189715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In delivering the judgment of the Board Lord Finlay approved of a previous decision of the Supreme Court of Ceylon and observed as follows:\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships that the decision of the Governor that the land is •wanted for public purposes is final, and was intended to be final, and could not be questioned in any Court."}}, {"text": "W renbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190353, "end_char": 190362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in a preliminary way, as was suggested by Lord W renbury in the course of the argument."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190875, "end_char": 190879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singleton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192650, "end_char": 192659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singleton J. having dismissed the action, the appellant went up to the appeal Court."}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 193251, "end_char": 193257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was, however, repelled and in dismissing the appeal Lord Greene M. R. with whom Goddard and du Parcq L. JJ.", "canonical_name": "Greene M.R."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 193274, "end_char": 193281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was, however, repelled and in dismissing the appeal Lord Greene M. R. with whom Goddard and du Parcq L. JJ."}}, {"text": "du Parcq", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 193286, "end_char": 193294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was, however, repelled and in dismissing the appeal Lord Greene M. R. with whom Goddard and du Parcq L. JJ."}}, {"text": "P1ovince of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 194351, "end_char": 194369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P1ovince of Bombay v. .K. S .", "canonical_name": "PROVINCE OF BOMBAY"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195969, "end_char": 195978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198481, "end_char": 198490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Ad11ani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 198717, "end_char": 198730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l9jQ\n\nProlJi, ftCe f\n\nBomia;·\n\nK. S. Ad11ani\n\nand Othe, s.\n\nDos}.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Town and Country Plan- The provisions of the Town Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 198931, "end_char": 198990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199023, "end_char": 199032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town and Country Plan- The provisions of the Town Act, 1944", "statute": "Town and Country Plan- The provisions of the Town Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200729, "end_char": 200738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Towns Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 200821, "end_char": 200836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202020, "end_char": 202029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 202054, "end_char": 202082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 57", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 202725, "end_char": 202740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. S.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 202878, "end_char": 202883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19.iO\n\nPrmilfCe •f\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. ~Jl'Mli\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203861, "end_char": 203873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204374, "end_char": 204383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206712, "end_char": 206721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.rovincial Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 208110, "end_char": 208132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in the evidence which may support any pica of bad faith on the part of the P.rovincial Government or its officers."}}, {"text": "C.\n\nDayaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 208183, "end_char": 208194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that was said was that Mrs. C.\n\nDayaram to whom the requisitioned premises had been allotted was the wife of an advocate from Karachi, and was a refugee and that the petitioner did not know whether her husband had also migrated from Karachi.", "canonical_name": "C.\n\nDayaram"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombav", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 208540, "end_char": 208560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At an adjourned hearing tlie question was put as to whether Mrs. li>ayar:llll was concerned in any manner whatever with the administration of Government of Bombav or was a public servant."}}, {"text": "K. S . .A.dvani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 211651, "end_char": 211666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19-'lO\n\nPrnii11t:1 of\n\nBomba;·\n\nK. S .", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "s6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213696, "end_char": 213698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banwarilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 214324, "end_char": 214334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Banwarilal's case(') I had occasion to analyse the essential characteristics of a quasi-judicial act as opposed to an administrative act.", "canonical_name": "Banwarilal Roy"}}, {"text": "N akkuda Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216585, "end_char": 216597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The above passage was quoted with approval by Lord Radcliffe in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in N akkuda Ali's case (')."}}, {"text": "Leeds", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 217750, "end_char": 217755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rex v. Woodhouse (') the contest was between the applicants for renewal of licence and certain brewers and the Justices of Leeds were to decide whether the licence should or should not be renewed."}}, {"text": "Swift", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 219424, "end_char": 219429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following passage from the judgment of Greer L.J. in that case quoted with approval by Swift J. in Frost & others v. 1vlinister of Health(') takes the matter a little further in that line :\n\n\" In so far as the Minister deals with the matter of confirmation of a closing order in the absence of objection by the owners, it is clear to me, and I think to my brethren, that he would be acting in a ministerial or administrative capacity, and would be entitled to make such enquiries as he thinks necessary to enable him to make up his mind whether it was in the public interest that order should be made."}}, {"text": "K. S Advani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 220146, "end_char": 220157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "292-S.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\nK. S Advani\n\naiid Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Housing Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220977, "end_char": 220994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Scott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 222382, "end_char": 222387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report of the Ministers' Powers Committee in defining the words 'judicial' and\n\n(I) [1947) 2 A.E.R. 289; [1948) A.O. 87; 11947) 176 L.T. 312, 316, -..\n\n'quasi-judicial' which definition was accepted by Scott L. J. as correct in Cooper v. Wilson (')stated:\n\n\"A true judicial decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites ...... A quasi-judicial decision equally pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves ...... \"\n\nThis definition of a quasi.judicial decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more contesting parties and an outside authority to decide those disputes."}}, {"text": "Oaksey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 223525, "end_char": 223531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning('), while it was before the Appeal Court, Lord Oaksey L.J. said :\n\n\" In all the authorities which have been referred to as showing that at an enquiry there must be an examination of the case of both sides, there was what has been called a lis : that is to say, there were two parties contesting and the Minister as an outside authority, was deciding the case.\""}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 223895, "end_char": 223936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the very recent case of Patri Shaw v. R.N. Roy(') a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dissented from this very Bombay case (5) which is now before us and emphasised the necessity of a lis between two parties for making the decision of the authority a quasi-judicial act."}}, {"text": "Advani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 228666, "end_char": 228672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Advani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "S. Ad1•ani"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 230593, "end_char": 230622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231365, "end_char": 231374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231564, "end_char": 231573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231723, "end_char": 231732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231770, "end_char": 231779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232055, "end_char": 232064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232127, "end_char": 232136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232170, "end_char": 232179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232672, "end_char": 232681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233294, "end_char": 233303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233310, "end_char": 233319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233489, "end_char": 233498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233536, "end_char": 233545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233679, "end_char": 233688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234101, "end_char": 234110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234117, "end_char": 234126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234276, "end_char": 234285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. s. Advani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 235633, "end_char": 235645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tence of a public purpose is a condition precedent to K. s. Advani the exercise of the power of requisition will not necesand Others.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236465, "end_char": 236474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236704, "end_char": 236722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DasJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 237538, "end_char": 237542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ,\n\nProvine~ of Bombay v.\n\nK. S. Ad1; ani\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "DAs JJ."}}, {"text": "sections 176 and 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238013, "end_char": 238033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 238041, "end_char": 238058, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Greene M.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239087, "end_char": 239098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Greene M.R. said at p. 859:\n\n\"As an example of the difference to be found in the subject-matter dealt with in different statutes I may point out that this case is different from a case where a Minister is given the duty of hearing an appeal from an order such as a closing order made by a local authority.", "canonical_name": "Greene M.R."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 241003, "end_char": 241012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 241028, "end_char": 241038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242411, "end_char": 242415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243858, "end_char": 243863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here the power was given to enable the Provincial Government to obtain information to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance", "statute": "Here the power was given to enable the Provincial Government to obtain information to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244395, "end_char": 244405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here the power was given to enable the Provincial Government to obtain information to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance", "statute": "Here the power was given to enable the Provincial Government to obtain information to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245074, "end_char": 245083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245419, "end_char": 245429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247063, "end_char": 247073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247826, "end_char": 247844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247859, "end_char": 247868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248037, "end_char": 248047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248132, "end_char": 248141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248247, "end_char": 248256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248343, "end_char": 248352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248523, "end_char": 248532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248609, "end_char": 248627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 249058, "end_char": 249067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Adva.ni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 250450, "end_char": 250457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adva.ni\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "S. Ad1•ani"}}, {"text": ".Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 250472, "end_char": 250476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Das J.\n\nthe existence of a public purpose was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power and, therefore, the fulfilment of the condition precedent had to be determined judicially by the Provincial Government as an objective fact but the Provincial Government could not, by wrongly deciding the preliminary point, assume jurisdiction to exercise the power.", "canonical_name": "DAs JJ."}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 250862, "end_char": 250871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bunbury v. Fuller(') Coleridge J. laid down:\n\n\"Now it is a general rule, that no Court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends and however its decisions may be final on all particulars making up together that subject-matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet upon these preliminary questions, its decision must always be open .to enquiry in the superior Court.\""}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 251511, "end_char": 251520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was cited by Blackburn J. in Pease v.\n\nChaytor (')."}}, {"text": "Esher M. R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 251698, "end_char": 251709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle is quite plain but as Lord Esher M. R. pointed out in Reg.", "canonical_name": "Esher M. R."}}, {"text": "S65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254742, "end_char": 254745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Adva.n\\", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 254784, "end_char": 254797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) [1908) 1 K. B. S65,\n\nDas J,\n\n19llO\n\nProvincB of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Adva.n\\\n\nand Otht1rs.", "canonical_name": "K. S . .A.dvani"}}, {"text": "Esher M.R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 255088, "end_char": 255098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must, therefore, follow that the case fell within the second class of cases mentioned by Lord Esher M.R.\n\nThe fact that there is no right of appeal from this decision, although the Ordinance provided for an appeal under section 6, is also significant.", "canonical_name": "Esher M. R."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255214, "end_char": 255223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255355, "end_char": 255365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 259125, "end_char": 259128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daa J,\n\nProvinca of\n\nBombay\n\nK. S. Advani\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "view of the fact that the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 261002, "end_char": 261057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution on this point are different from those of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 261103, "end_char": 261185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 261593, "end_char": 261612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ranjit Singh Narula."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 261664, "end_char": 261679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 (a) and 1 (b) : Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 261690, "end_char": 261726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]"}}, {"text": "CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS\n\nNANDLAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 261728, "end_char": 261766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS\n\nNANDLAL\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and R. s. NAIK JJ.J\n\nCo-operative Cr<dit Societies Act, 1340 ]!'., ("}}, {"text": "R. s. NAIK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 261792, "end_char": 261802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS\n\nNANDLAL\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and R. s. NAIK JJ.J\n\nCo-operative Cr<dit Societies Act, 1340 ]!'., ("}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1340", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 261829, "end_char": 261848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 261868, "end_char": 261873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1340", "statute": "Societies Act, 1340"}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262133, "end_char": 262143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1340", "statute": "Societies Act, 1340"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1340", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 262151, "end_char": 262190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uer the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 262724, "end_char": 262752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 263182, "end_char": 263187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uer the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Uer the Civil Procedure Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_64_74_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "March 14.\n\nSUPREME COURT REpORTS (1950]\n\nMESSRS. KHIMJI POONJA AND COMPANY\n\nSHRI BALDEV DAS C. PARIKH\n\n(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID F AZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and S. R. DAS JJ.] Bombay Cotton Contracts Act (IV of 1982). s. 8(1)-East India Cotlt!n Association Bye-laws, Nos. 61-A, 66-A, BO, 82-Cottcn Oontract-Oontract note stating minimum amount of depo!ii DI Rs. 26 and not in prescribed form-Validit11-Arbitration and award undr arbitration clause, whether void.\n\nSection 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, provided that contracts entered into after the date of the commencement of the Act which are not in accordance with the bye-laws of any recognised cotton association shall be void. Bye-law 80 of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., which was a recognised cotton association within the meaning of the Act provided that contracts between members acting a.s commission agents on the one band and their constituents on the other shall be subject to the byelaws and that a contract note in the form given in the Appendix to the bye-laws shall be rendered in respect of every . contract. Bye-law 51-A originally required a deposit at a rate not less than Rs. 25 per bale and the contract note accordingly contained a clause to that effect.\n\nDuring the war this bye-law was a.mended by reducing the minimum amount of deposit to Rs. 12·8 per bale and introducing a new byelaw (byelaw 65-A) which, ini'3r alia., gave certain options to the last buyer, and by a Notification of the Government the form of tbe contract note was also amended by altering the minimum deposit to Rs. 19-8 and adding two new clauses to comply with the bye-law 65-A.\n\nA contract note rendered after these amendments to the byelaws and the form of contract note,' contained a rubber stamp impression in which the minimum amount of deposit was stated as Rs. 25, and did not contain the two new clauses that were introduced by the Government Notification : Held, that the contract note rendered was not in accor<la, nce with the bye-laws and in the prescribed form as the clause relating to the minimum amount of deposit was inconsistent with the provisions of bye-law 51-A as amended, and the two new clauses had been omitted, even though the con-. tra.ct note recited that it was made in accordance with the byelaws, and it was accordingly void and a valid award could not be made under the arbitration clause contained in the note. [PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI J. preferred to rest his deciion solely on the ground of the omission to include in the contract in question the two clauses newly added in the prescribed form in order to give effect to byelaw 65A.]\n\nJudgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed.\n\nAPPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bom- 1900 bay. Civil Appeal No. XXVI of 1949. Messrs. Khimji This was an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Poonja &- Co • . Bombay High Court (Stone C.J. and Coyajee J.) dated v. 20th March, 1947, in Appeal No. 42 of 1946, reversing a Shri Balde.., Das\n\n• d t f Ch l J d' . . l' t' d C. Parikh.\n\nJU gmen o ag a . 1sm1ssmg an app 1ca 10n ma e by the respondent under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, praying inter alia that the arbitration agreement containe<j in certain contract notes sent by the appellants to the respondent be declared invalid and void and for setting aside an award made by arbitrators appointed under the said contract note.\n\nM. G. Setalvad, (Rameshwar Nath with him), for the appellants.\n\nG. K. Daphtary, ( B. Sen and K. T. Desai with him), for the respondent.\n\n1950. March 14.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS J.-This appeal arises out of an application Das J. made by the Respondent under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, praying inter alia that the arbitration agreement contained in certain contract notes including contract note No. 17996 sent by the Appellants to the Respondent be declared to be invalid, void and unenforceable and be set aside and that a purported award made by the arbitrators appointed in terms of the said contract notes be set aside. That application came to be made in the following circumstances : The Appellants were and are members of the East India Cotton Association Ltd. The Respondent, however, was not and is not a member of that Association.\n\nIn April, 1945, the Respondent employed the Appellants as his agents to effect forward contracts for the sale and/or purchase of cotton according to the rules, regulations and bye-laws of that Association. Between the 9th April, 1945, and the 10th August, 1945, the Appellants as such agents put through various contracts for sale and/or purchase of cotton for July, 1945, and September, 1945, deliveries and sent to the Respondent\n\n• 19llO contract notes in respect of each of such contracts.\n\nAll the said contract notes were in printed forms, a M;\"'\"s: K:i; J• specimen copy whereof is set out at pages 12 to 15 of\n\n\"\"\"':. o. the Paper Book. On the 10th August, 194?, the pursh,; &ldev Das chase of 900 bales of cotton at Rs. 432 per candy for\n\nc. Parikh.\n\nSeptember 1945 delivery remained outstanding. According to the Respondent, on the 11th August, 1945, Das J. the Respondent instructed the Appellants to close the said outstanding purchase by selling 900 bales for September 1945 delivery at a rate not less than Rs. 426 per candy, which is said to be the prevailing market rate on that date. As the Respondent did not receive any contract note from the Appellants in respect of the closing transaction of900 bales, the Respondent on the 18th August, 1945, put on record his aforesaid instructions and asked the Appellants to send the contract note.\n\nThe Appellants, however, deny that any instruction was given by the Respondent on the 11th August, 1945, for closing the outstanding contract.\n\nThey deny the receipt of the Respondent's letter of that date. According to the Appellants the 21st August, 1945, was a clearing date and on that clearing a sum of Rs. 18,900 became due and payable by the Respondent to the Appellants and that instead of paying up his dues the Respondent concocted the false story of having given instructions to the Appellants to close the outstanding purchase. The Appellants by their letter of the 22nd August, 1945, repudiated the allegations in the Respondent's last mentioned letter and called upon the Respondent to pay up Rs. 18,900 and gave notice to him that if he failed to pay up the amount by noon of the 23rd August, 1945, the Appellants would be compelled to square up the outstanding contract at their discretion on account and at the risk of the Respondent. The Respondent on the 24th August, 1945, denied having fabricated any false story and repudiated liability for Rs.18,900 and returned the Appellants' bill. On the 27th August, 1945, the Appellants closed the outstanding contract for purchase of 900 bales by selling the same at Rs. 356 per candy for September, 1945, delivery and along with their letter dated the 27th August, 1945, sent contract note No. 17996. The\n\nRespondent by his letter dated the 28th August, 1945, reiterated the story of previous instruction for closing\n\nlllllO\n\nMessrs. KMmji the contract, denied having given any instruction to Poonja 6ca. the Appellants to close the contract on the 27th August, v. 1945 and returned the contract note No. 17996. On Shri Balde\" Das ' . the 28th August, 1945, the Appellants wrote to the\n\nc. Par.ltlt.\n\nRespondent claiming Rs. 34,313 and expressing the desire to refer the disputes to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in the contract notes. Both parties appointed their respective arbitrators. The arbitrators entered upon the reference and eventually fixed the 24th October, 1945, for a meeting of the arbitrators. The Respondent alleges that he received the notice of meeting only on 22nd October, 1945, and could not attend the meeting on the 24th October, 1945, as he had to appear before the Income Tax Officer on the same day. Accordingly, the Respondent sent his agent to attend the arbitration meeting and to obtain an adjournment. The arbitrators, however, rejected the application for adjournment and made an ex parte award on the same day for Rs. 34,313 and interest and cc;:; ts.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the award the Respondent on the 10th November, 1945, filed 1'n appeal to the Board of the Association. The Respondent's allegation is that pending the said appeal he discovered that the contract notes rendered by the Appellants from time to time including the contract note No. 17996 were not in accordance with the prescribed official form of contract notes of the Association and he was advised that in the premises the contracts were void under the pro-: visions of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act (IV of\n\n1932) and that, that being so, there was no arbitration agreement between the parties under which there could be any reference to arbitration on which any award could be made.\n\nThe Respondent thereupon amended his memorandum of appeal to the Board pointiug out the invalidity of the contracts and at the same time made a substantive application to the High Court under the Indian Arbitration Act for the reliefs already summarised above.\n\nIn order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to refer to the relevant\n\nDas},\n\n19~\n\nMeurs. Khimji\n\nPoonja &- Co.\n\nShi Baldev Das C. Parikh.\n\nDas J.\n\n, '\n\nprovisions of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, and the bye-laws of the said Association.\n\nSection (8) (i) of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, runs as follows :-\n\n\"Save as hereinafter provided in this Act any contract (whether either party thereto is a member of a recognised cotton association or not) which is entered into after the date on which this Act comes into operation and which is not in accordance with the byelaws of any recognised cotton association shall be\n\nvoid.\"\n\nThere is no dispute that the East India Cotton Association is one of the recognised cotton associations for the purposes of the said Act. Bye-laws 80 and 82 of that Association are in the terms following :-\n\n\"80. Delivery Contracts between members shall be made on the Official from giv, en in the Appendix.\n\nHedge Contracts between members may be verbal or in writing and when in. writing shall be in one or other of the forms given in the Appendix. Whether verbal or written all contracts shall be subject to the bye-laws, provided that in the case of Delivery Contracts Bye- Jaws 149 to 163 inclusive shall not apply.\n\n82. Contracts between members acting as commission agents on the one hand and their constituents on the other shall be made subject to the bye-laws and a contract note in the form given in the Appendix (pages 92; 93, 94 and 95) shall be rendered in respect of every such contract. Bye-laws 130 to 166 (inclusive) shall not apply to these con tracts.\"\n\nBye-law 51-A originally required a deposit at a rate not less than Rs. 25 per bale and accordingly the contract note submitted by the agent to the constituent used to contain the following clause at the end of the clause relating to payment of margin:-\n\n\"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at arate not less than Rs. 25 per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you tome/us in Bombay.\"\n\nDuring the war bye-law 51-A was amended by reducing the minimum amount of deposit from Rs. 25 per\n\nl9IKI bale to Rs. 12-8-0 per bale and accordingly the Government of Bombay by a Notification made on the i9th Sepb 1945 ' f h r db h Messrs. Khimji tem er, , m exermse o t e powers con1erre y t e P . Ii- Co Bombay Options in Cotton Prohibition Act, 1939 (Act\n\n00 \"':. • XXV of 1939) provided that the contract note should Shri Baldcv Das also be amended so that the clause last quoted above\n\nc. Parikh. should read as follows:-:-\n\n\" In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying in.terest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you to me/us in Bombay.\"\n\nIn order to enforce war-time controls another amend ment of the bye-laws was made whereby a new bye-law was added as bye-law 65-A. In view of this last mentioned amendment and in order to bring the contract note between the agent and the constituent into line with this new bye-law the Government of Bombay by the same Notification dated the 19th September 1944 directed the i11clusion of the two following clauses in the contract note, namely :\n\n\"If this contract is a co, ntract for sale, then if between us and other members of the East India Cotton Association we become, under the bye-laws, the first seller of the cotton so sold and if the last buyer exercises the right given by bye-law 65-A, you will then be bound by the provisions of that bye-law as between you and us.\n\nIf this contract is a contract of purchase, and if between us and other members of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., we become the last buyers unless we shall have received express instructions from you in writing to the contrary, before the commencement of the delivery period if the contract is entered into before the commencement of the delivery period, or with the order if the contract is entered into during the permitted days of trading in the delivery period, we shall be at liberty at our option and without any further reference to you to exercise the right given to the last buyer under bye law 65-A, and if we so exercise the right you will be bound by the provisions of that bye-law as between you and us.\"\n\nDas).\n\n70 SUPREME GOUR r REPORTS [1950]\n\nAfter all these amendments the contract note to be rendered by art agent to the constituent had to be in Musrs. Khimji the form, a specimen copy whereof is set out at pages Poonja 6- Co, •. 17 and 18 of the Paper Book. The contracts between\n\nShri Baldev Das the Appellants and the Respondent were made after the\n\nc. Parikh. aforesaid contract note form came into vogue.\n\nThe\n\nDas J. official Contract Note form to be used after the aforesaid amendments opens with the following clause:-\n\n\" I/we have this day sold/bought for you in Bombay subject to the following conditions and to the Bye-laws of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., in force from time to time and subject also to my /our usual charges and terms of business as Commission Agents.\"\n\nThen are inserted particulars of the description, quantity, price etc., of the cotton which is the subjec_tmatter of the contract.. Then follows the clause for payment of margin, the last sentence of which provides for payment of deposit payable under bye-law 51-A as amended, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale. At the end of the form are to be found the two new clauses required to qe incorporated in every Contract Note by the Government Notification already referred-to.\n\nThe Contract Notes actually rendered by the Appellants to the Respondent, however, were in forms, a specimen copy whereof is set out at pages 12-15 of the Paper Book. A comparison of the two forms of the contract notes will reveal the following differences:-\n\n(1) In the contract note rendered by the Appellants to the Respondent the last sentence providing for deposit at the end of the margin clause is missing. There is, however, a rubber stamp impression on the top of the back of the contract to the following effect:-\n\n\"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 25 pe: bale shall, when demanded, he made by you to me/us m Bombay.\"\n\nEvidently, this rubber stamp provision is a reproduction of the sentence that used to be found at the end of the margin clause before bye-law 51-A was\n\namended and the clause itself was amended by the Government Notification of 1944.\n\n(2) The two new clauses required to be ineerted in the contract referred to above have also been omitted.\n\nMessrs. Khimji The contention of.the respondent was that the con- P()()nja & co. tract notes actually issued were not in accordance with v. the bye-laws of the Association and were accordingly Shri Balde_v Das void under Section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts\n\nc. Parikh.\n\nAct, 1932, and that, that being so, the arbit.ration agree- Das J. ment incorporated in the contract note was also void and there could be no reference to arbitration and there could be no award as purported to have been made by the arbitrators on a reference under the void contracts.\n\nThe matter was dealt with by Mr. Justice Chagla who overruled the contentions of the Respondent and dismissed the application on 2nd July 1946.\n\nThe learned Judge pointed out that whereas bye-law 80 required that delivery contracts must be made on the official from and that the hedge contracts, when made in writing, must be made in the form given in the Appendix, clause 82 did not require that the eon.tracts between members acting as commission agents on the one hand and their constituents on the other must be in writing or in particular form.\n\nAccording to the learned Judge bye-law 82 required two things, namely:-\n\n(i) that the contracts referred to therein should be made subject to the bye-laws, and\n\n(ii) that a contract note in the prescribed torm should be re'ndered in respect of every such contract.\n\nThe learned Judge was of the opinion that section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, only avoided the contracts in case of contravention of the first requirement, namely, if the contracts were not made subject to the bye-laws, but had no concern with the contravention of the second requirement, namely, if the contract notes were not in the prescribed form. The learned Judge appears to have made a distinction between a contract and a contract note.which wail a mere evidence of the contract. According to him, even if the contract note was not in the prescried form, that fact did not affect the pre-existing contract which had only to be made subject to the bye-laws but need not have\n\nAlcssrs. J{hiniji\n\nPoonja {:; Co. v.\n\nShri Baldev Das C. Parikli.\n\n/)as}.\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\nbeen made in writing at all. Accordingly, the learned Judge dismissed the a pplica ti on.\n\nBeing aggrieved by that deeision, the Re&pondent went up on appeal which was heard by Stone C.J. and Coyajee J. who accepted the appeal, set aside the dismissal of the Respondent's petition and gave the declaration prayed for and set aside the award. The Appellants have no~ come up on appeal before us after having obtained the necessary certificate from the Bombay High Court.\n\nWe find ourselves in agreement with the decision of the appellate Court. Ordinarily, when a contract between the parties i8 reduced to writing, the writing becomes the repository of the contract and that writing only can be looked at to ascertain what the contract between the parties is, and if that writing is not in accordance with the bye-laws, the contract itself must be void. We do not, however, feel pressed to emphasize this aspect of the matter, for, assuming tha.t there was a pre-existing oral contract between the parties dehors the written contract note, .as held by Chagla J. we have yet to see whether the so-called pre-existing oral contract was iri accordance with the bye-laws, for if it were not, then it would be hit by section 8of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932.\n\nThere is no suggestion that the terms of the so-called pre-existing oral contract were in any way different from the terms subsequently recorded in the contract notes actually issued.\n\nIn the first place we find that the last sentence in the margin clause, in order to be in accordance with the bye-laws, should have been as follows:-\n\n\"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you to me/us in Bombay.\"\n\nInstead of that sentence, we have the rubber stamp impression reading as follows:-\n\n\"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, na.mely, at a\n\nrate not less than Rs. 25 per bale shall, when demand- 1950 ed, be made by you to us in Bombay.\" Messrs. Khitnji The respondent contends that this term is not in Poonja & eo. accordance with the bye-laws of the Association. The v.\n\nAppellants on the other hand contend that there is no Shri Bald•.\" Das discrepancy, because a provision for a rate not less\n\nc. Parikh. than Rs. 25 per bale does not contravene or is not in- Das 1. consistent with the provision for a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale. In other words, any rate above the rate of Rs. 12! may be stipulated in accordance with the terms of business to which the contract was subject, for it did not contravene the requirement that the rate should not be less than Rs. 12!. It is true that the opening clause of the contract note makes the contract subject to the Appellants' usual charges and terms of business, but the contract is at the same time subject to the bye-laws of the Association. In order to reconcile the two, such terms of business as are not inconsistent with the bye-laws can only be permitted to prevail. The rubber stamp provision clearly imposes on the respondent as the constituent the liability to deposit a higher amount as the minimum amount to be deposited and is to that extent not in accordance with bye-law 51-A. Apart from this consideration there is another serious objection to the rubber stamp provision. The language of that rubber stamp provision clearly indicates that it purports to summarise and set out what is payable under bye-law 51-A.\n\nIn fact, as already stated above, bye-law51-A had been amended and what is payable under the amended bye-law is not at a rate not less than Rs. 25 but at a rate not less than Rs. 12!. Therefore, the rubber stamp provision wrongly summarises and sets out the provisions of bye-law 51-A and consequently is not in accord.ance with that bye-law.\n\nThe contention of the Respondent has been and is that by reason of the omission of the two clauses at the end of the contract note actually issued by the Appellants it was not in accordance with the bye-laws. The learned Attorney-General appearing for the Appellants contends that the contract was expressly made subject\n\n19!50 to the bye-laws and, therefore, the provisions of he new bye-law 65-A were by reference incorporated in Messrs. Khimji Poo .. ja & co. the contract. This contention, we are satisfied, is v. unsound. Bye-law 65-A in terms regulates the rela- Sh•i Balde• Das tionsbip between members and incorporation thereof in\n\nc. Pa•ikh. a contract between a member agent and an outsider\n\nDas J. constituent will make no sense and on a plain reding will be meaningless. Further, under bye-law 65-A the last buyer has certain options. The outstanding contract being one for purchase of 900 bales, the Appellants, if they became the last buyers, could, under that bye-law, exercise any of those options at their own discretion. In the second of the two clauses which have been omitted from the contract note this option has been made subject to express instructions of the constituent to the contrary, for it provides that the Appellants as agents would be free to exercise their option-\n\n\" unless I/We shall have received express instructions from you in writing to the contrary before the commencement of the delivery period if the contract is entered into before the commencement of the delivery period or with the order if the contract is entered into during the permitted days of trading in the delivery period.\"\n\nBy reason of the omission of the two clauses, this right of the respondent as constituent is not made a term of the contract between the parties. It follows, therefore, that the so-called pre-existing oral contract is not in accordance with the bye-laws on this ground also.\n\nFor reasons stated above, this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-I agree that this appeal should be dismissed with costs, but I would prefer to rest my decision solely on the ground of the omission to include in the contract in question the two clauses newly added in the prescribed form in order to give effect to bye-law 65-A.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri.", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "SUPREME COURT REpORTS (1950]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 39, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REpORTS (1950]\n\nMESSRS."}}, {"text": "KHIMJI POONJA AND COMPANY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHIMJI POONJA AND COMPANY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BALDEV DAS C. PARIKH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Baldev Das C. Parikli", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID F AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257, "end_char": 264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act", "statute": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act", "statute": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 520, "end_char": 553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East India Cotton Association, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 754, "end_char": 789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bye-law 80 of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., which was a recognised cotton association within the meaning of the Act provided that contracts between members acting a.s commission agents on the one band and their constituents on the other shall be subject to the byelaws and that a contract note in the form given in the Appendix to the bye-laws shall be rendered in respect of every ."}}, {"text": "PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2459, "end_char": 2476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI J. preferred to rest his deciion solely on the ground of the omission to include in the contract in question the two clauses newly added in the prescribed form in order to give effect to byelaw 65A.]\n\nJudgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed.", "canonical_name": "PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2694, "end_char": 2711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI J. preferred to rest his deciion solely on the ground of the omission to include in the contract in question the two clauses newly added in the prescribed form in order to give effect to byelaw 65A.]\n\nJudgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bom- 1900", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2739, "end_char": 2776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bom- 1900 bay."}}, {"text": "Khimji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2821, "end_char": 2827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Khimji This was an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Poonja &- Co • .", "canonical_name": "Khimji Poo"}}, {"text": "Poonja &- Co • . Bombay High Court", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Khimji This was an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Poonja &- Co • ."}}, {"text": "Coyajee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2932, "end_char": 2939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay High Court (Stone C.J. and Coyajee J.) dated v. 20th March, 1947, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Balde", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 of 1946, reversing a Shri Balde.., Das\n\n• d t f Ch l J d' . .", "canonical_name": "Baldev Das C. Parikli"}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3144, "end_char": 3172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. G. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, (Rameshwar Nath with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, (Rameshwar Nath with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3487, "end_char": 3501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. K. Daphtary, ( B. Sen and K. T. Desai with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3505, "end_char": 3511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. K. Daphtary, ( B. Sen and K. T. Desai with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. K. Daphtary, ( B. Sen and K. T. Desai with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3621, "end_char": 3624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS J.-This appeal arises out of an application Das J. made by the Respondent under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, praying inter alia that the arbitration agreement contained in certain contract notes including contract note No.", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "Respondent under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East India Cotton Association Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4187, "end_char": 4221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application came to be made in the following circumstances : The Appellants were and are members of the East India Cotton Association Ltd. The Respondent, however, was not and is not a member of that Association."}}, {"text": "9th April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4515, "end_char": 4530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the 9th April, 1945, and the 10th August, 1945, the Appellants as such agents put through various contracts for sale and/or purchase of cotton for July, 1945, and September, 1945, deliveries and sent to the Respondent\n\n• 19llO contract notes in respect of each of such contracts."}}, {"text": "10th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4540, "end_char": 4557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the 9th April, 1945, and the 10th August, 1945, the Appellants as such agents put through various contracts for sale and/or purchase of cotton for July, 1945, and September, 1945, deliveries and sent to the Respondent\n\n• 19llO contract notes in respect of each of such contracts."}}, {"text": "10th August, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th August, 194?,"}}, {"text": "11th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the Respondent, on the 11th August, 1945, Das J. the Respondent instructed the Appellants to close the said outstanding purchase by selling 900 bales for September 1945 delivery at a rate not less than Rs."}}, {"text": "18th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5543, "end_char": 5560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Respondent did not receive any contract note from the Appellants in respect of the closing transaction of900 bales, the Respondent on the 18th August, 1945, put on record his aforesaid instructions and asked the Appellants to send the contract note."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5895, "end_char": 5912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the Appellants the 21st August, 1945, was a clearing date and on that clearing a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6234, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellants by their letter of the 22nd August, 1945, repudiated the allegations in the Respondent's last mentioned letter and called upon the Respondent to pay up Rs."}}, {"text": "23rd August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6451, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18,900 and gave notice to him that if he failed to pay up the amount by noon of the 23rd August, 1945, the Appellants would be compelled to square up the outstanding contract at their discretion on account and at the risk of the Respondent."}}, {"text": "24th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Respondent on the 24th August, 1945, denied having fabricated any false story and repudiated liability for Rs.18,900 and returned the Appellants' bill."}}, {"text": "27th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6771, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th August, 1945, the Appellants closed the outstanding contract for purchase of 900 bales by selling the same at Rs."}}, {"text": "Balde\" Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7340, "end_char": 7350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Shri Balde\" Das ' .", "canonical_name": "Baldev Das C. Parikli"}}, {"text": "24th October, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arbitrators entered upon the reference and eventually fixed the 24th October, 1945, for a meeting of the arbitrators."}}, {"text": "22nd October, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7831, "end_char": 7849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Respondent alleges that he received the notice of meeting only on 22nd October, 1945, and could not attend the meeting on the 24th October, 1945, as he had to appear before the Income Tax Officer on the same day."}}, {"text": "10th November, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8289, "end_char": 8308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by the award the Respondent on the 10th November, 1945, filed 1'n appeal to the Board of the Association."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9376, "end_char": 9379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\n, '\n\nprovisions of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, and the bye-laws of the said Association.", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9407, "end_char": 9440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11296, "end_char": 11302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you tome/us in Bombay.\""}}, {"text": "Ii- Co Bombay Options in Cotton Prohibition Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11605, "end_char": 11658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12323, "end_char": 12343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to enforce war-time controls another amend ment of the bye-laws was made whereby a new bye-law was added as bye-law 65-A. In view of this last mentioned amendment and in order to bring the contract note between the agent and the constituent into line with this new bye-law the Government of Bombay by the same Notification dated the 19th September 1944 directed the i11clusion of the two following clauses in the contract note, namely :\n\n\"If this contract is a co, ntract for sale, then if between us and other members of the East India Cotton Association we become, under the bye-laws, the first seller of the cotton so sold and if the last buyer exercises the right given by bye-law 65-A, you will then be bound by the provisions of that bye-law as between you and us."}}, {"text": "19th September 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12379, "end_char": 12398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to enforce war-time controls another amend ment of the bye-laws was made whereby a new bye-law was added as bye-law 65-A. In view of this last mentioned amendment and in order to bring the contract note between the agent and the constituent into line with this new bye-law the Government of Bombay by the same Notification dated the 19th September 1944 directed the i11clusion of the two following clauses in the contract note, namely :\n\n\"If this contract is a co, ntract for sale, then if between us and other members of the East India Cotton Association we become, under the bye-laws, the first seller of the cotton so sold and if the last buyer exercises the right given by bye-law 65-A, you will then be bound by the provisions of that bye-law as between you and us."}}, {"text": "Baldev Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13834, "end_char": 13844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contracts between\n\nShri Baldev Das the Appellants and the Respondent were made after the\n\nc. Parikh.", "canonical_name": "Baldev Das C. Parikli"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16115, "end_char": 16124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16497, "end_char": 16503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was dealt with by Mr. Justice Chagla who overruled the contentions of the Respondent and dismissed the application on 2nd July 1946."}}, {"text": "2nd July 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16585, "end_char": 16598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was dealt with by Mr. Justice Chagla who overruled the contentions of the Respondent and dismissed the application on 2nd July 1946."}}, {"text": "clause 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16822, "end_char": 16831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17315, "end_char": 17324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17332, "end_char": 17365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Baldev Das C. Parikli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18015, "end_char": 18036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J{hiniji\n\nPoonja {:; Co. v.\n\nShri Baldev Das C. Parikli.", "canonical_name": "Baldev Das C. Parikli"}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18255, "end_char": 18260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by that deeision, the Re&pondent went up on appeal which was heard by Stone C.J. and Coyajee J. who accepted the appeal, set aside the dismissal of the Respondent's petition and gave the declaration prayed for and set aside the award."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19290, "end_char": 19299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19306, "end_char": 19339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Khitnji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20172, "end_char": 20179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Khitnji The respondent contends that this term is not in Poonja & eo."}}, {"text": "Khimji Poo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22393, "end_char": 22403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General appearing for the Appellants contends that the contract was expressly made subject\n\n19!50 to the bye-laws and, therefore, the provisions of he new bye-law 65-A were by reference incorporated in Messrs. Khimji Poo .. ja & co. the contract.", "canonical_name": "Khimji Poo"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24268, "end_char": 24283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24312, "end_char": 24327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_741_747_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "-··\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 741\n\nI, therefore, agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this appeal should be allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below should be set aside and the petition should stand dismissed. I also agree to the order for costs made by my Lord the Chief Justice.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ranjit Singh Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1 (a) and 1 (b) : Rajinder Narain.\n\nlIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]\n\nCO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS\n\nNANDLAL\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and R. s. NAIK JJ.J\n\nCo-operative Cr<dit Societies Act, 1340 ]!'., (Hyderabwi), s. 42 --Award-Remission by Registrar to Civil Court for execution-\n\nPoicers of Registrar-Instal1nent decree-Defa'U, lt-Exer:tltion pro ceedinas for whole amount in Civil Oourt-P(, wer of Registrat to a.ccept instalment and direct Civil Oottrt to stop proceedings.\n\nSection 42 of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1340 F., {Hyderabad) provided as follows: \"If an award g:ven by the Registrar or by a person nominatecl by him, or by a comruittee of arbitrators is not acted upon, then tbe Registrar can Jave it enforced-(a) through a civil court on a certificate issud by him.\n\nThe civil court will treat the award in the satne way as itB own decree; l_b) through a Revenue Court or officer by issuing a certi- ':ficate to that court or officer.\"\n\nHeld, that under the section the Registrar was not in the same position as a court passing t.he decree unUer the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of execution of the decree and be does not possess all the powers of an executing court.\n\nWhere a dispute arose bet, veen a m<:mber of a society and the society and an arbitrator appointed under the Act passed a decree for payruent of a certain sum in six monthly instaln1ents with a condition that if default was made in the payment of any inRtaln1ent the who!e amount will become due, and under the provisions of s. 42 the decree was sent for execution to the Civil Court au a. certificate of Registrar :\n\nProvince of\n\nBonibay\n\nK. S. Advani and Others,\n\nDas J,\n\nOc~. 12.\n\n1950 Held, that after a default bad been made in the payment of the first instalment and the whole decree de.bt had become duo Oo-ope1 alive and execution had been taken out for recovery of tht:l \\vhole Soc1et11 of Debts amount, the Rei;(istrar had no pJwer to accept the amount of first\n\nv. instalment and direct the executing co1.1rt to stop further pro- Nandlo, f, ceed.inga, and the executing court wa.s entitled to ignoro the Registrar's order and ta proceed with the execution.\n\nAPPEAL under article 37 4( 4) of the Cons ti tu tion from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Hyderabad dated 24th Aban 1356 F., in Civil Appeal No. 374/4 of 1356 F.\n\nDevi Pershad, for the appellant.\n\nAppa Rao and Sada Shiva Rao, for the respondent.\n\n1950. October 12.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\"ahajan J.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-This appeal arises out of execution proceedings of a decree passed by an arbitrator under the Co.operative Credit Societies Act.\n\nThe appeal was presented to the Judicial Committee of the State and is now before us under article 374 (4) of the Constitution.\n\nRaja Nandlal was a member of the decree-holder society and was also its debtor. A dispute arose between him and the society and under the rules governing such societies the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator on the 19th Meher 1352 F., passed a decree against him in the sum of Rs. 8,100 payable' in equal six monthly instalments with six per cent. interest, the first instalment being payable at the end of Azur 1353 F. On the 2nd Dai 1353 F., under the provisions of section 42, clause ( d), of the Co-operative Societies Act the decree was sent for execution to the civil court on a certificate issued under the signature of one Moulvi Mohammed Hasan, Madadgar Nazim.\n\nThe amount recoverable was stated as Rs. 8, 100 principal and Rs. 666·9-0 interest.\n\nOn the same day the decree-holder presented an application for execution of the decree to the Civil Court, Balda, claiming recovery of Rs. 10,339 14-9. It was alleged that as default had been committed in the payment of\n\n. '\n\nthe first instalment due in the month of Azur 1353 F., 1950 the wh<J!e decretal amount had become recoverable.\n\nIt was prayed that the property detailed in the appli- 8 °t7v:. cation be attached.\n\nOn 3rd Dai 1353 F., i.e., a day oc\" Y; 'L after the presentation of the application for execution, Nandlal. the judgment debtor deposited a sum of Rs .. 1,000 towards the first instalment in the Office of the Regis- Mahajan J. trar of Co-operative Societies and expressed his willingness to deposit any further amount that may be due towards that instalment. The Nazim's office stated in reply that as he had committed default in the payment of the first instalment the whole decree had become due and the amount of Rs. 1.000 could not be accepted. Subsequently, however, on the 5th Dai 1353 F., a letter was issued by one Mohammed Aihsan, Assistant Madadgar Nazim, to the Civil Court, Balda, saying that Rs. 1,034 had been deposited in the Office of the Nizamat Co operative Credit Societies and therefore the proceedings in execution should be stayed or adjourned. On receipt of the Jetter in the civil court, the decree-holder raised an objection that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to stay execution of the decree as he was not an executing court. This objection was overruled by the court and it was held that under the provisions of section 42 of the Co-operative Credit\n\nSocieties Act the Registrar retained the power of staying execution of the award decree even after the issue of a certificate by him. In the result the execution proceedings were stayed. Against this order an appeal was taken to the Sadar Adalat. The Sadar\n\nAdalat allowed the appeal partially and held that to the extent of the payment made the decree could not be executed but it could be executed with respect to future instalments as and when they would fall due.\n\nIt further found that the default clause in the decree must be taken to have been condoned by the deposit •of the first instalment in the office of the Registrar.\n\nThe decree-holder preferred a second appeal to the High Court but without any material success.\n\nThe High Court held that there had been a default in the payment of the first instalment\n\n1950 and the decree-holder had thus a right to . execute the whole decree and that neither the Registrar 00operatw•b nor the executing court could deprive the decree-holder Sooioly of De ts f h h J f th\" fi d · t k th v. o t at ng t. n spite o 1s n mg 1t oo e Nandt•t. view that the Registrar still retained jurisdiction to adjourn execution proceedings.\n\nThe contention of the Mahajan J. judgment-debtor that the certificate was bad as having been issued by a l\\Iadadgar Nazim was negatived. It was held that the Madadgar N azim had delegated powers in this respect and that the defect, if any, stood cured by a fresh certificate signed by the N azim himself. The result was that with these findings the decision of the executing court adjourning the execution proceedings was maintained.\n\nThe first point for consideration in this appeal is as regards the jurisdiction of the Registrar functioning under the Co-operative Credit Societies Act in respect to execution of decrees.\n\nThe decision of this question depends on the interpretation to be placed on the language employed in section 42, clause (d), of the Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1340 F., as amended.\n\nThis section is in these terms :-\n\n\"If an award given bithe Registrar or by a person nominated by him, or by a committee ofarbitrators is not acted upon, then the Registrar can have it enforced- ( a) through a civil court on a certificate issued by him.\n\nThe civil court will treat the award in the same way as its own decree;\n\n(b) through a Revenue Court or officer by issuing a certificate to that court or officer.\"\n\nThe language employed in this section does not place the Registrar on the same pedestal as a court passing the decree under the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nUnder the Code a civil court passing a deceee is also the court executing the decree. It has a dual capa. city, (1) of the court passing the decree, and (2) of the executing court. The Registrar, it appears, has the first capacity of a civil court but he has not been placed in the matter of execution in the same capacity as a civil court passing a decree.\n\nThe only '\n\n.jurisdiction conferred on the Registrar is that he can t95o issue a certificate and on that certificate he can sencl 1 a decree either to the civil court or to a revenue officer.\n\nCo-operative . . .fi h Society of Debts It may be that after 1ssumg a certi cate e may be v. entitled to cancel the certificate or issue another, or he Nandlat. may by withdrawing the certificate withdraw execution from a civil court and send it to a revenue court :llahaian J. and vice versa.\n\nOn the plain words of the section it cannot be held that the Registrar has been constituted an executing court or that any powers in the matter of the execution of the a ward decree have been conferred1 upon him. The question that arises for consideration is whether in view of this construction of the section it was open to the H.egistrar to intervene during execution proceedings that were pending in a civil court on the basis of the certificate granted by him. In order to determine this point it is necessary to see precisely what the Registrar actually did in this case. After a default had been made in the payment of the first instalment and the whole decree debt had become due and execution had been taken out for recovery of the amount, the Registrar accepted the amount of the first instalment and asked the executing court to stop further proceedings.\n\nThe act of the Registrar in accepting the first instalment was a clear trespass on the duties of the executing court. It is only in the executing court where payment towards satisfaction of the decree, the execution of which had been taken out, could be made, unless the court passing the decree has also the jurisdiction to execute it. As already indicated, this jurisdiction is not possessed by the Registrar. That being so, in our opinion, the requisition of the Registrar to the executing court to stop execution proceedings and his act in accepting the first instalment were in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on him and the executing court was entitled to ignore it. Moreover, the' Registrar could not alter or amend the decree passed by the Arbitrator at this stage.\n\nAll .the courts below have interpreted the section to mean that the Registrar as thl! couripassing tlie\n\nI%o decree has the same power as the court executing it.\n\n0 t.\n\nWe are unable to agree in this view in view of the o-opera ive ] . .\n\nSooieiy of Debts clear anguage employed m the section.\n\nThe analogy\n\nv. of decisions given in respect of civil courts is not avail- N•nilal. able in interpreting this Act.\n\nUnder the Civil Procedure Code the parent court, i.e., the court passil!akaja.'i J. I d · d\" mg tie ecree, always retams 1uns 1ct10n to execute the decree even if it has been transferred to one or more courts for the purpose of execution. Primarily it is the function of the court passing the decree to execute it but when it is found that it is not possible for it to effectively execute it provision has been made in the Code authorising it to send it to other courts for the purpose of execution; but none of these provisions in any way affect the jurisdiction of the court passing the decree to execute it whenever it thinks fit to do so and the order transferring execution to other courts does not take away its jurisdiction in the matter. The position however in the case of the Registrar is entirely different.\n\nHe himself has been given no jurisdiction to execute his own decree.\n\nThe only power conferred on him is to get it realized through a civil court or a revenue court and the only authority conferred on him is to issue a certificate for that purpose.\n\nThe High Court in this case has, in our opinion, given a decision contradictory to its own findings.\n\nIt has been held that the first appellate court was in error in the view that the default clause in the decree stood condoned by the payment of the first instalment . by the judgment-debtor in the office of the Registrar and it has been positively found that once a default has been made the Registrar had no jurisdiction to condone it and that the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree for the full decretal amount with interest.\n\nHaving reached this conclusion the High Court still maintained the decision of the two courts below adjourning the execution proceedings.\n\nThe logical result of the High Court's decision is that the certificate stands and the execution application has been properly made and the decree-holder is entitled to the relief claimed but in spite of it it has been held\n\n. ,\n\nthat the Registrar can stay the proceedings. It seems 1950 to us that the act of the Registrar in asking the civil . t t t . d' d' b f .\n\nCo-opB'atwe cour to s ay execu 10n procee ings pen mg e ore it Soci•tY of n, bts is a clear encroachment on the powers of the executing v. court and is in excess of his statutory powers and Nandlal • should have been ignored by the courts.\n\nAs a fresh certificate was issued by the Nazim in Mahajan J. order to cure a defect that might be said to exist in the original certificate because of its having been sent by the Madadgar N azim, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of the learned counsel that there was no proper certificate in this case and the proceedings in execution therefore were without jurisdiction.\n\nThe result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the decisions of all the three courts below are set aside and the executing court is directed to proceed with the execution of the decree from the stage at which it was interfered with by the letter received from the office of the Registrar. In the circumstances of this case we will make no order as to costs of the proceedings throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n[IN THE SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]\n\nKAPOJ\\E CHAND\n\nKADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J\n\nMuhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-\n\nNature of widow's lien for dower.\n\nA Muhammadan widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the other bairn or otherwise is not entitled to priority as against his other un~\n\nJ9b0\n\nOct l'l.\n\n, ,. , secured creditors. There is nothing inherent in the very nature \\)\\ (\\.\\)~~~ Vl'n\\c\\1 en\\it\\es it to priority.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "Ranjit Singh Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ranjit Singh Narula."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 421, "end_char": 436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 (a) and 1 (b) : Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]"}}, {"text": "CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 514, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NANDLAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 516, "end_char": 523, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NANDLAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 526, "end_char": 544, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. NAIK JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 562, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. s. NAIK JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Societies Act, 1340", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 625, "end_char": 630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1340", "statute": "Societies Act, 1340"}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 890, "end_char": 900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Act, 1340", "statute": "Societies Act, 1340"}}, {"text": "Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1340", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 908, "end_char": 947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uer the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1481, "end_char": 1509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1939, "end_char": 1944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Uer the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Uer the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "K. S. Advani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a dispute arose bet, veen a m<:mber of a society and the society and an arbitrator appointed under the Act passed a decree for payruent of a certain sum in six monthly instaln1ents with a condition that if default was made in the payment of any inRtaln1ent the who!e amount will become due, and under the provisions of s. 42 the decree was sent for execution to the Civil Court au a. certificate of Registrar :\n\nProvince of\n\nBonibay\n\nK. S. Advani and Others,\n\nDas J,\n\nOc~. 12."}}, {"text": "article 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2596, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL under article 37 4( 4) of the Cons ti tu tion from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Hyderabad dated 24th Aban 1356 F., in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Devi Pershad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "374/4 of 1356 F.\n\nDevi Pershad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Appa Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appa Rao and Sada Shiva Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sada Shiva Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2804, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appa Rao and Sada Shiva Rao, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "ahajan J.\n\nMAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\"ahajan J.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-This appeal arises out of execution proceedings of a decree passed by an arbitrator under the Co.operative Credit Societies Act."}}, {"text": "Credit Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3148, "end_char": 3159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Credit Societies Act", "statute": "Credit Societies Act"}}, {"text": "Raja Nandlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Nandlal was a member of the decree-holder society and was also its debtor."}}, {"text": "19th Meher 1352 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arbitrator on the 19th Meher 1352 F., passed a decree against him in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd Dai 1353 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3629, "end_char": 3644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interest, the first instalment being payable at the end of Azur 1353 F. On the 2nd Dai 1353 F., under the provisions of section 42, clause ( d), of the Co-operative Societies Act the decree was sent for execution to the civil court on a certificate issued under the signature of one Moulvi Mohammed Hasan, Madadgar Nazim."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Credit Societies Act", "statute": "Credit Societies Act"}}, {"text": "Moulvi Mohammed Hasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interest, the first instalment being payable at the end of Azur 1353 F. On the 2nd Dai 1353 F., under the provisions of section 42, clause ( d), of the Co-operative Societies Act the decree was sent for execution to the civil court on a certificate issued under the signature of one Moulvi Mohammed Hasan, Madadgar Nazim."}}, {"text": "Madadgar Nazim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3856, "end_char": 3870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interest, the first instalment being payable at the end of Azur 1353 F. On the 2nd Dai 1353 F., under the provisions of section 42, clause ( d), of the Co-operative Societies Act the decree was sent for execution to the civil court on a certificate issued under the signature of one Moulvi Mohammed Hasan, Madadgar Nazim.", "canonical_name": "Madadgar N azim"}}, {"text": "Civil Court, Balda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4052, "end_char": 4070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day the decree-holder presented an application for execution of the decree to the Civil Court, Balda, claiming recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "3rd Dai 1353 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4384, "end_char": 4399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd Dai 1353 F., i.e., a day oc\" Y; 'L after the presentation of the application for execution, Nandlal."}}, {"text": "5th Dai 1353 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4960, "end_char": 4975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, however, on the 5th Dai 1353 F., a letter was issued by one Mohammed Aihsan, Assistant Madadgar Nazim, to the Civil Court, Balda, saying that Rs."}}, {"text": "Mohammed Aihsan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5004, "end_char": 5019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, however, on the 5th Dai 1353 F., a letter was issued by one Mohammed Aihsan, Assistant Madadgar Nazim, to the Civil Court, Balda, saying that Rs."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5523, "end_char": 5533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sadar Adalat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order an appeal was taken to the Sadar Adalat."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6760, "end_char": 6767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the Mahajan J. judgment-debtor that the certificate was bad as having been issued by a l\\Iadadgar Nazim was negatived."}}, {"text": "Madadgar N azim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6896, "end_char": 6911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that the Madadgar N azim had delegated powers in this respect and that the defect, if any, stood cured by a fresh certificate signed by the N azim himself.", "canonical_name": "Madadgar N azim"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7464, "end_char": 7474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1340", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7495, "end_char": 7533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "llahaian", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8940, "end_char": 8948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "may by withdrawing the certificate withdraw execution from a civil court and send it to a revenue court :llahaian J. and vice versa."}}, {"text": "SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14196, "end_char": 14217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[IN THE SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]"}}, {"text": "R. S. NAIK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14300, "end_char": 14310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAPOJ\\E CHAND\n\nKADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J\n\nMuhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-\n\nNature of widow's lien for dower.", "canonical_name": "R. s. NAIK JJ"}}, {"text": "KHALIL UZZAMAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAPOJ\\E CHAND\n\nKADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J\n\nMuhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-\n\nNature of widow's lien for dower."}}, {"text": "Muhammadan Law", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14338, "end_char": 14352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAPOJ\\E CHAND\n\nKADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J\n\nMuhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-\n\nNature of widow's lien for dower."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_747_754_EN", "year": 1950, "text": ". ,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 747\n\nthat the Registrar can stay the proceedings. It seems 1950 to us that the act of the Registrar in asking the civil . t t t . d' d' b f .\n\nCo-opB'atwe cour to s ay execu 10n procee ings pen mg e ore it Soci•tY of n, bts is a clear encroachment on the powers of the executing v. court and is in excess of his statutory powers and Nandlal • should have been ignored by the courts.\n\nAs a fresh certificate was issued by the Nazim in Mahajan J. order to cure a defect that might be said to exist in the original certificate because of its having been sent by the Madadgar N azim, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of the learned counsel that there was no proper certificate in this case and the proceedings in execution therefore were without jurisdiction.\n\nThe result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the decisions of all the three courts below are set aside and the executing court is directed to proceed with the execution of the decree from the stage at which it was interfered with by the letter received from the office of the Registrar. In the circumstances of this case we will make no order as to costs of the proceedings throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n[IN THE SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]\n\nKAPOJ\\E CHAND\n\nKADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J\n\nMuhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-\n\nNature of widow's lien for dower.\n\nA Muhammadan widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the other bairn or otherwise is not entitled to priority as against his other un~\n\nJ9b0\n\nOct l'l.\n\n, ,. , secured creditors. There is nothing inherent in the very nature \\)\\ (\\.\\)~~~ Vl'n\\c\\1 en\\it\\es it to priority.\n\n1950 Ameer Ammal v.\n\nSankaranarayan~ Chetty (LL.R. 25 Mad. 658), Meer Melter Ally v . . mt. Amanee (11 W. R. 212), Mania Kapore Chand Bili v. Was-i Ahrnod (LI .... R 41 A_ll. fJ58), Hami1a Btbi v. Zubaid(;, v.\n\nBibi (A.LR 1916 P.O. 46), Im:iaz Be9\"m v. Abdul Karim Khw Kadar Unnisa (A.LR. 1930 All. 881) referred to.\n\nBegum di Others.\n\nKulwm Bibi v. Sliiam S.inder La.l (A.LR. 1936 Ail. 600), Mst. Ghafooran v. Ram Chandra Dos ( .\\.I.R. 1934 All. 168), Mohamed 'l'wabuddin v. Yasin Begum :_17 D.L.R. 224) diRapproved.\n\nMaina Bibi v. Chaudh>i Vakil Ahmad (52 I.A. 145) explained.\n\nAPPEAL from a judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad under article 374 (4) of the Constitution of India: Civil Appeal No. 189 of 1950.\n\nAbdul Wahid Owasi, for the appellant.\n\nAhmed Saeed Khan, for respondent No. 1.\n\n1950. October 12.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKhat; lunaman J.\n\nKHALILUZZAMAN ].-This appeal arises out of execution proceedings. The appellant, Kapurchand, had a money decree, amongst others, against one Mir Hamid Ali Khan, husband of the respondent Mst. Kaderunnissa.\n\nIn execution of the decree the house in dispute belonging to the deceased judgment-debtor was attached.\n\nTo the attachment the widow of the deceased raised an objection on the ground that she was in possession of it in lieu of her outstanding <lower and could not Le dispossessed till her claim was satisfied. The objection was allowed by the executing court and it was ordered that the house be sold subject to the respondent's. claim, the decree-holder being entitled to the surplus, if any, out of the sale proceeds.\n\nThere was not much possibility of the house fetching more in the execution sale than the amount due on account of dower. The court took the view that the widow's claim for dower had priority over the debts due to other unsecured creditors and her position was analogous to that of a secured creditor. The decreeholder made an application in revision to the High Court but without any success.\n\nHe then preferred an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the State and it is now before us under article 374 (4) of the Constitution. ••\n\nThe sole point for determination in the appeal is 1950 whether a widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the Kapore Cha\"d v. other heirs or otherwise is entitled to priority as against Kadar unnisa his other unsecured creditors. It is conceded that the Bequm\" Others. husband died leaving the house in dispute and leaving . - outstanding a number of debts including the one due Khatilu., aman J. to the decree-holder. The house was not charged or mortgaged by him either in favour of his wife or in favour of any of the creditors. If the husband had created any charge in favour of his wife in lieu of her claim for dower, then it cannot be doubted that she would have priority over the unsecured creditors. No specific Quranic text or any other original authority on Muslim law has been cited in support of the contention that a widow's claim for dower stands on a higher footing than the claim of any creditor in respect of an unsecured debt. Reference was made to a text in Sur-ai.Nissa which enjoins a husband to pay the claim of his wife and it also says that widows and minors should be given favourable treatment. This text does not give an absolute protection to the claim of the widow as against other claims. On the other hand, a Muslim is enjoined to observe his engagements and to • keep his contracts faithfully and to discharge his liabilities in an honest manner. No distinction is made between an injunction relating to the payment of dower on the one hand and the payment of the other debts on the other. The learned advocate for the appellant contends that a widow's claim for outstanding dower even when she is in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim with the consent of other heirs of the deceased stands on no better footing than that of unsecured creditors, though in their absence she is entitled to be paid in full before te • estate is distributed among the heirs. He drew our attention to certain passages from the ho! y Quran and from . writings of other jurists on this subject. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that a widow has a lien on her husband's estate for her outstanding dower and when she has entered \"into\n\n1900 possession of his house after his death she cannot be dispossessed till her claim is satisfied either by the Kapo•'. .. Cha\"d heirs or by the unsecured creditors.\n\nHe placed Kad\"' un\"\"\" reliance on a decision of the Hyderabad High Court Begum Ji Others. and also of some other High Courts in India.\n\nA careful examination of the various authorities on Kha!iluuama\" J. the subject shows that the proposition of law on this subject has been correctly enunciated in Tyabji's Muhammadan Law (1940 Edn.) in these terms: (1) A widow by• her lien does not.have any priority over other creditors ; (2) Mehr as a debt has priority over other heirs' claim to have the estate distributed among themselves.\n\nThese two considerations are not affected by the fact of her being in or out of possession of the estate. It seems clear that unless the husband by his own act has placed the widow in a better position than his other creditors, her claim for dower is in the nature of an unsecured debt and she has no priority of any kind against the other unsecured creditors of her husband. The Quranic text in Surai-Nissa, Ruku 4, enjoins the payment of dower in preference to bequests and. inheritance but it is silent on the question of priority of dower debt in relation to other creditors.\n\nIn Mubsoot Sarkhasi, Vol. 29, Kitabulfaiaiz, page 137, it is pointed out that payment of debts, has priority over bequests and wills.\n\nIn the administration of the estate of a deceased Muslim the rule laid down by early text writers and Fatwas, such as Fatwa-e- Alamgiri, is that in the first instance the funeral expenses of the deceased should be paid out of the estate and that having been done, the estate should be divided between the legatees and the heirs after payment of the debts due from him.\n\nNo priority has been indicated in respect of a dower debt of a widow over other • unsecured creditors even if she has taken possession of her husband's estate after his death.\n\nIt was said that the nature of the widow's claim for dower is such that it amounts to a lien on the husband's estate.\n\nThe claim for lien is based on the assumption that the dower debt is consideration for the marriage ; i.nd is not merely a voluntary debt incurred due to the\n\n' ,\\ , '\n\nrespect to the wife. According to Hamilton's Hedaya rn50 (1870 Edn., page 44), the leading text book on Hanafi d d.\n\nKapore Chand law, if a person specifies a ower of ten or more 1ams v. and should afterwards consummate his marriage, or be Kadar Unni•• removed by death, his wife in either case can claim Begum .t othe ... the whole of the dower specified, because by consum- -- mation her claim for dower becomes absolute. The Khaliluszaman J. dower debt becomes her property and it devolves on her heirs and has to be paid out of the estate of the husband. It has been described as a debt upon the husband to be paid out of his estate. The dower of a Muslim woman is a settlement in her favour made prior to the marriage contract and is similar to the donatio propter nuptias of the Romans but is of such an obligatory nature that if it is not mentioned before or at the time of the marriage, it is presumed to exist to the extent of a proper dower amount. Among the Hebrews the dower settled on a wife was for her use after the termination of marriage and among the Jews marriages without similar consideration were invalid.\n\nAs pointed out by Mr. Ameer Ali in his book on Muhammadan Law, the custom originated in ancient times with the payments made by husbands to their wives as a means for their support and as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of the power of divorce.\n\nThe Muslim concept of dower has no reference to the price that under some systems of law was paid to the father of the bride when she was given in marriage.\n\nOn the other hand, it is considered a debt with consideration (for the submission of her person by the wife).\n\nThe result of the above discussion is that dower is purely in the nature of a marriage settlement and is for consideration. It is a claim arising out of contract by the husband and as such has preference to be- . q nests and inheritance, but on no principle of .Muhammadan Law it can have priority over other contractual debts. In our view, therefore, a dower debt cannot be given any priority over other debts on any equitable consideration or on the ground that there is something inherent in its very nature which entitles it to priority.\n\n1950 It is now convenient to examine the decided cases on this subject. In Ameer Ammal v. Sankara- Ka.pore Chand\n\nv. narayanan Chetty (1) a Bench of the Madras High\n\nKadar Unni•a Court held that a claim for unpaid dower constitutes a Begum & Others. debt payable pari passu with the demands of other -- creditors and is not a preferential charge on the KhaliluuamanJ.estate.\n\nInMaina Bibi v. Chaudh1i Vakil Ahmad(') it was held that where the widow is not in the position of a secured creditor and is otherwise in possession of the husband's estate with the consent of the heirs, she is entitled to retain possession of it until her dower debt is satisfied. Their Lordships observed that it was not necessary to say whether the right of the widow in possession is a lien in the strict sense of the term. Whatever the right may be called, it appears to be founded on the power of a widow as a creditor for her dower to hold the property of her husband of which she has lawfully, and without force or fraud, obtained possession until her debt is satisfied. This decision does not place the widow on a higher footing than any other creditor.\n\nAs against the heirs all creditors are to be paid in priority before the estate can be distributed.\n\nIn Meer Meher Ally v. Mst.\n\nA.manee (') it was held that the lien of the widow over the property in her possession is not a lien in the ordinary legal sense of the term and that a claim for dower is in the same position as that of any other ordinary creditor and ranks pari passu with them and like other debts ha5 to be paid before the heirs are entitled to take anything.\n\nIn M aina Bibi v. W asi Ahmad(') it was held that she has no right of possession against the creditors, not being a secured creditor herself.\n\nAt page 547 the following observations occur:-\n\n\"she cannot set up any such right of possession against creditors claiming to have the debts owing to them from the husband satisfied out of the estate.\n\nShe is not a secured creditor ; her claim for her dower\n\n(!1 I.L.B. 25 M•d. 658.\n\n121 52 LA. 145.\n\n13) 11 w .R. 212.\n\n141 I.L.R. 41 All. 5~.8.\n\n. '\n\ndebt ranks equally with the claims of other creditors t95o of her husband.\"\n\nKapore Chand In Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (') it was observed \"' that dower ranks as a debt and the wife is entitled Kada• unni•• along with the other creditors to have it satisfied on B'gum .t Oth•ro . the death of the husband out of his estate.\n\nHer right, . -- however, is no greater than that of any other un- Khal.ZuzMman J. secured creditor.\n\nQua the heirs she has a creditor's lien.\n\nIn Imtiaz Begum v. Abdul Karim Khan(') the same view was expressed. In para. 295 Mr. Mulla in his book on Muhammadan Law has adopted the view that dower ranks as a debt and that the widow is entitled along with other creditors to have it satisfied out of the estate and that her right is not greater than that of any other creditor. The learned counsel 'for the respondent relied on the decision in Kulsum Bibi\n\nv. Shiam Sunder Lal ('), in which it was held that a widow in possession of her husband's estate is entitled as against the other heirs of her husband ;:and as against the -creditors to retain possession until her dower is satisfied.\n\nThe same view had been taken earlier in Mst. Ghafooran v. Ram Chandra Das(') by a single Judge.\n\nIt was said that her possession could not be disturbed till her dower debt was satisfied.\n\nIn MohamedTurabuddin v. Yasin Begum(') a Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held that the claim of a widow for dower was in1the nature of a secured debt. There was no other creditor in that case which arose between the heirs and the widow.\n\nHowever, in W ahidunnissa Begum v. Yasin Begum (') it was pointed out that the claim of the widow for dower does not create any interest or charge on the property and that the position of a widow is not only that of a creditor where her dower remains unpaid but also of an heir.\n\nThe result of the authorities is that excepting the two Allahabad decisions mentioned above and a decision of the Hyderabad High Court. the consensus\n\n/Jl A.LR. 1916 P.O. 46.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1930 All. 881. \\3/ A.I, R, 1936 All. 600.\n\n14) A.I.R. 1934 All. 168.\n\n(5) 17 D.L, R. 224.\n\n(6/ 32 D.L.R. 421.\n\n\\950 of authority is against the proposition that a widow as an unsecured creditor has any priority over the\n\nK•P 0 \" Chand other unsecured creditors of her husband. In our v.\n\nK\".d\"' u\"\"'\"' opinion, the above mentioned two Allahabad decisions\n\nB•um .t Oth\"' do not lay down the law correctly on this point and the rule has been correctly laid down in Ameer\n\nKha.l•lus.oman \"· Ammal v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty ( 1).\n\nThere is nothing repugnant or inequitable according to the principles of Muhammadan Law in the estate of a deceased Muslim being rateably distributed between the unsecured creditors.\n\nFor the reasons given above we hold that the objection raised by the widow had no substance in it and the executing court should have directed the property to be sold and the sale proceeds distributed rateably amongst the decreeholders and the widow.\n\nIn the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the two courts below and direct the executing court to proceed with the execution in accordance with the observations made herein.\n\nIn the circumstances we will make no order as to costs of these proceedings.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n1 9~0 f!N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]\n\nOct. JR.\n\nNARHARI AND OTHERS\n\nSHANKAR AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALILUZZAMAN JJ.J\n\nRes iudicata-Severai a.ppeals arising out of sam' suit-Appeal disposed of by same judgment-Separate decrees drawn \"p-Appeal from, orie decree only-Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Extension of time-Sufficient cause-Conflict of decisions .\n\n..4. instituted a. suit for possession of two-thirrls share in an estate against B and 0 who cloimed a one-third share each in it.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the trial court. B ant! 0 preferred (I) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 658.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "As a fresh certificate was issued by the Nazim in Mahajan J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 419, "end_char": 479, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madadgar N azim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 598, "end_char": 613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a fresh certificate was issued by the Nazim in Mahajan J. order to cure a defect that might be said to exist in the original certificate because of its having been sent by the Madadgar N azim, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of the learned counsel that there was no proper certificate in this case and the proceedings in execution therefore were without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "KADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1276, "end_char": 1305, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. NAIK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1328, "end_char": 1338, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDER NAIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kapore Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1984, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kapore Chand", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2461, "end_char": 2484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad under article 374 (4) of the Constitution of India: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Abdul Wahid Owasi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2568, "end_char": 2585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Wahid Owasi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ahmed Saeed Khan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2607, "end_char": 2623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ahmed Saeed Khan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Kapurchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2810, "end_char": 2820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Kapurchand, had a money decree, amongst others, against one Mir Hamid Ali Khan, husband of the respondent Mst.", "canonical_name": "Kapore Chand"}}, {"text": "Mir Hamid Ali Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2870, "end_char": 2888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Kapurchand, had a money decree, amongst others, against one Mir Hamid Ali Khan, husband of the respondent Mst."}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3948, "end_char": 3959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sole point for determination in the appeal is 1950 whether a widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the Kapore Cha\"d v. other heirs or otherwise is entitled to priority as against Kadar unnisa his other unsecured creditors."}}, {"text": "Bequm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is conceded that the Bequm\" Others."}}, {"text": "Khatilu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "outstanding a number of debts including the one due Khatilu.,"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6453, "end_char": 6473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He placed Kad\"' un\"\"\" reliance on a decision of the Hyderabad High Court Begum Ji Others."}}, {"text": "Begum Ji Others", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6474, "end_char": 6489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He placed Kad\"' un\"\"\" reliance on a decision of the Hyderabad High Court Begum Ji Others."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6529, "end_char": 6534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and also of some other High Courts in India."}}, {"text": "Kha!iluuama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A careful examination of the various authorities on Kha!iluuama\" J. the subject shows that the proposition of law on this subject has been correctly enunciated in Tyabji's Muhammadan Law (1940 Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Tyabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A careful examination of the various authorities on Kha!iluuama\" J. the subject shows that the proposition of law on this subject has been correctly enunciated in Tyabji's Muhammadan Law (1940 Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Fatwa-e- Alamgiri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7767, "end_char": 7784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the administration of the estate of a deceased Muslim the rule laid down by early text writers and Fatwas, such as Fatwa-e- Alamgiri, is that in the first instance the funeral expenses of the deceased should be paid out of the estate and that having been done, the estate should be divided between the legatees and the heirs after payment of the debts due from him."}}, {"text": "Hamilton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8518, "end_char": 8526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Hamilton's Hedaya rn50 (1870 Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Ameer Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9635, "end_char": 9644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Mr. Ameer Ali in his book on Muhammadan Law, the custom originated in ancient times with the payments made by husbands to their wives as a means for their support and as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of the power of divorce."}}, {"text": "Madras High\n\nKadar Unni•a", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10836, "end_char": 10861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ameer Ammal v. Sankara- Ka.pore Chand\n\nv. narayanan Chetty (1) a Bench of the Madras High\n\nKadar Unni•a Court held that a claim for unpaid dower constitutes a Begum & Others."}}, {"text": "Kapore Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12870, "end_char": 12882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapore Chand In Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (') it was observed \"' that dower ranks as a debt and the wife is entitled Kada• unni•• along with the other creditors to have it satisfied on B'gum .t Oth•ro .", "canonical_name": "Kapore Chand"}}, {"text": "ZuzMman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13191, "end_char": 13198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ZuzMman J. secured creditor."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13348, "end_char": 13353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295 Mr. Mulla in his book on Muhammadan Law has adopted the view that dower ranks as a debt and that the widow is entitled along with other creditors to have it satisfied out of the estate and that her right is not greater than that of any other creditor."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16073, "end_char": 16107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 9~0 f!N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]"}}, {"text": "NARHARI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16121, "end_char": 16128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARHARI AND OTHERS\n\nSHANKAR AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "SHANKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARHARI AND OTHERS\n\nSHANKAR AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "KHALILUZZAMAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16199, "end_char": 16212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALILUZZAMAN JJ.J\n\nRes iudicata-Severai a.ppeals arising out of sam' suit-Appeal disposed of by same judgment-Separate decrees drawn \"p-Appeal from, orie decree only-Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Extension of time-Sufficient cause-Conflict of decisions ."}}, {"text": "Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16366, "end_char": 16415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16417, "end_char": 16421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_754_758_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1950]\n\n\\950 of authority is against the proposition that a widow as an unsecured creditor has any priority over the\n\nK•P 0 \" Chand other unsecured creditors of her husband. In our v.\n\nK\".d\"' u\"\"'\"' opinion, the above mentioned two Allahabad decisions\n\nB•um .t Oth\"' do not lay down the law correctly on this point and the rule has been correctly laid down in Ameer\n\nKha.l•lus.oman \"· Ammal v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty ( 1).\n\nThere is nothing repugnant or inequitable according to the principles of Muhammadan Law in the estate of a deceased Muslim being rateably distributed between the unsecured creditors.\n\nFor the reasons given above we hold that the objection raised by the widow had no substance in it and the executing court should have directed the property to be sold and the sale proceeds distributed rateably amongst the decreeholders and the widow.\n\nIn the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the two courts below and direct the executing court to proceed with the execution in accordance with the observations made herein.\n\nIn the circumstances we will make no order as to costs of these proceedings.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n1 9~0 f!N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]\n\nOct. JR.\n\nNARHARI AND OTHERS\n\nSHANKAR AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and\n\nKHALILUZZAMAN JJ.J\n\nRes iudicata-Severai a.ppeals arising out of sam' suit-Appeal disposed of by same judgment-Separate decrees drawn \"p-Appeal from, orie decree only-Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Extension of time-Sufficient cause-Conflict of decisions .\n\n..4. instituted a. suit for possession of two-thirrls share in an estate against B and 0 who cloimed a one-third share each in it.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the trial court. B ant! 0 preferred (I) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 658.\n\n• \"\n\nseparate appeals.\n\nThese appeals were heard togethe.r and 1900 disposed of by the same judgment but sepa.rate decrees were prepared; A preferred an appeal from one of these decrees in Narhari a.nd time paying the full court fee anl later on, after the period of Othm limitation had expired, preferred an appeal from the other decree v. also. paying a court fee of Re. 1 only.\n\nThe High Conrt held that Shankar and A shoula have filed Repante appeals within the period of limita- Others. 1.i on and that, inasn_1uch as one of the appeals was time-barred,\n\nche first appeal was barred by res judicata.\n\nHeld, that, as there was only one suit and the appeals hon been disposed of by the same judgment, it was not necessary to file two separate appeals and the fact that one of the appeals waH time-barred did not affect the maintainability of the other appeal and the question of res judica.ta did not a.t all arise in the case.\n\nHeld further, that in the circumstances the High Court,, .. , wrong in not giving to the appellant the benefit of s. 5 of the Limitation Act as there was a conflict of rulings on the subject.\n\nMst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli (A.I.R. 1927 Lob. 289) applied- Appa v. Kach\"i B<ryyan Kutty (A.J.R. 1932 lliad. 689) referred to.\n\nAPPEAL from a judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad under article 374 (4) of Constitution: Appeals Nos. 22 and 23 of 1950.\n\nGhulam Ahmad Khan, for the appellants.\n\nThe respondents were not represented.\n\n1950. October 13.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nNAIK J.-The suit out of which these appeals arise Na.; k J. was one for possession of two-thirds of the land covered by survey No. 214 and formesne profits. The plaintiffs claim possession on the ground that survey No. 214 was an inam land and according to the family custom, belonged to them exclusively as members of the senior line as against the defendants who were of the junior lines. There are two sets of defendants: Nos. I to 4 belong to one branch of the family and Nos. 5 to 8 to another.\n\nEach set claim that they are in possession of orie-third of the land and maintain that they are entitled to it as their share of the family property. They deny the custom of exclusive possession by the senior branch, alleged by the plaintiffs. The trial court decreed the suit. From this decree, two separate appeals were taken by the two sets of the defendants to the Sadar -\n\n&.\\\\a\\at, G\\l\\barga, each daimin~ one-third portion of\n\nNarhari tuid\n\nOthers\n\nS h€lnkar a11d\n\nOthtffS\n\nNaik J.\n\nthe land and each paid the court fee to the extent of their share. The first appellate court, i.e., the Sadar Adalat, allowed both the appeals and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit by one judgment dated 30th Bahman 1338 F. and ordered a copy of the judgment to be placed on the file of the other connected appeal. On the basis of this judgment, two decrees were prepared by the first appellate court. The plaintiffs preferred two appeals to the High Court. The first was filed on 23rd Aban 1345 F. and with it was attached the decree passed in the appeal of defendants Nos. 1 to 4. Later, on 17th Azur 1346 F. another appeal was filed and with it the decree passed in the appeal of defendants Nos. 5 to 8 was attached.\n\nThis latter appeal was twenty-nine days beyond the period of limitation for appeals. It was filed on one-rupee stamp paper and a note was made therein that the full court fee had been paid in the appeal filed earlier, which has been registered as Appeal No. 331 of 1346 F. At the hearing of the appeals, a preliminary objection was raised by the defendants that as the other appeal. i.e., No. 332 of 1346 F. was filed beyond the period of limitation, it cannot be maintained and that when the other appeal is thus dismis, sed, the principle of res judicata would apply to the first appeal, i.e., No. 331 of 1346 and it should also fail. The High Court held that the plaintiffs should have filed two separate appeals within the period of limitation and as the other appeal was admittedly time-barred, the first appeal also failed by the application of the principle of res judicata. The High Court dismissed both the appeals. Against this judgment of the High Court two appeals were preferred to the Judicial Committee of the State and they are now before us under article 374(4) of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court in its judgment relied on the decision given in jethmal v. Ranglal(1). That was a case of a money suit where the plaintiff's claim was partially decreed and from this judgment both the parties had appealed, the plaintiff to the extent of the suit dismissed and the defendant to the extent of the\n\nll} ~~. D. L. R. 322.\n\nsuit decreed.\n\nThe first appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's suit in toto, thus allowing the defendant's appeal and dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, and two separate decrees were made. The plaintiff appealed from one decree only, which was passed against him and it was held that the principle of res judicata applied.\n\nNotwithstanding, this ruling of the Judicial Committee of the State, the High Court, in several cases, i.e., Nandlal v. Mohiuddin Ali Khan('), Nizamuddin\n\nv. Chatur Bhuj('), Gayajee Pant v. Habibuddin('), and Jagannath v. Sonajee(') has held that when the suit is one and two appeals arise out of the same suit, it is not necessary to file two separate appeals.\n\nIn the judgment of the High Court, though reference is given to some of these decisions, it is merely mentioned that the appellant relies on these decisions.\n\nThe learned Judges perhaps thought that in the presence of the Hyderabad Judicial Committee decision in ]ethmal v. Ranglal(') they need not comment on these decisions at all.\n\nThere is also a later decision of the Judicial Committee of the State in Bansilal v.\n\nMohanlal('), where the well known and exhaustive authority of the Lahore High Court in Mst. Lachmi v.\n\nM st. Bhuli (') was followed. In the Lahore case, there were two cross suits about the same subject-matter, filed simultaneously between the same parties, whereas in the present case, there was only one suit and one judgment was given by the trial court and even in the first appeal to the Sadar Adalat, there was only one judgment, in spite of there being two appeals by the two sets of defendants.\n\nThe plaintiffs in their appeal to the High Court have impleaded all the defendants as respondents and their prayer covers both the appeals and they have paid consolidated court-fee for the whole suit. It is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up.\n\n(1) 22 D.L.R, 400.\n\n(31 28 D.L.R. 1094.\n\n15) 17 D.L.R. S22.\n\n(2) 23 D.L.R. 457.\n\n14) 29 D.L R 108.\n\n(61 33 D.L.R. 601.\n\n(7) A.I.R, 1927 L•h. '89, 97\n\nNarhari and\n\nOthers\n\nShankar and\n\nOthrs.\n\nNaikJ.\n\nNarhari and\n\nOf hers v.\n\nShankar and\n\nOth!ra.\n\nNafk J.\n\nAs has been observed by Tek Chand J. in his learned judgment in Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli(') mentioned above, the determining factor is not the decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment. The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit.\n\nAs such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata.\n\nThe same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one. Besides, the High Court was wrong in not giving to the appellants the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act because there was conflict of decisions regarding this question not only in the High Court of the State but also among the different High Courts in India.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants cited in support of his arguments the decision given in Appa v.\n\nKachai Bayyan Kutti(2), which is on all fours with the present case.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that these appeals should be allowed and the case remanded to the High Court for decision on the merits of the case.\n\nCosts of these appeals will abide the result of the case.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(ll A.I.I\\. 19'7 Loh. 289. (21 A.l.R. l 932 (\\fad. 689.", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 9~0 f!N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]"}}, {"text": "NARHARI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1236, "end_char": 1254, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARHARI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHANKAR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1256, "end_char": 1274, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHANKAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1278, "end_char": 1296, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. NAIK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1298, "end_char": 1308, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDER NAIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1481, "end_char": 1530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1532, "end_char": 1536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Narhari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2003, "end_char": 2010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals were heard togethe.r and 1900 disposed of by the same judgment but sepa.rate decrees were prepared; A preferred an appeal from one of these decrees in Narhari a.nd time paying the full court fee anl later on, after the period of Othm limitation had expired, preferred an appeal from the other decree v. also."}}, {"text": "Shankar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Conrt held that Shankar and A shoula have filed Repante appeals within the period of limita- Others.", "canonical_name": "Shankar"}}, {"text": "A shoula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2233, "end_char": 2241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Conrt held that Shankar and A shoula have filed Repante appeals within the period of limita- Others."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad under article 374 (4) of Constitution: Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ahmad Khan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3191, "end_char": 3208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ahmad Khan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "NAIK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nNAIK J.-The suit out of which these appeals arise Na.;", "canonical_name": "NAIK"}}, {"text": "Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From this decree, two separate appeals were taken by the two sets of the defendants to the Sadar -\n\n&.\\\\a\\at, G\\l\\barga, each daimin~ one-third portion of\n\nNarhari tuid\n\nOthers\n\nS h€lnkar a11d\n\nOthtffS\n\nNaik J.\n\nthe land and each paid the court fee to the extent of their share.", "canonical_name": "NAIK"}}, {"text": "23rd Aban 1345 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was filed on 23rd Aban 1345 F. and with it was attached the decree passed in the appeal of defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "17th Azur 1346 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on 17th Azur 1346 F. another appeal was filed and with it the decree passed in the appeal of defendants Nos."}}, {"text": "article 374(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6105, "end_char": 6119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7655, "end_char": 7672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also a later decision of the Judicial Committee of the State in Bansilal v.\n\nMohanlal('), where the well known and exhaustive authority of the Lahore High Court in Mst."}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7729, "end_char": 7735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Lahore case, there were two cross suits about the same subject-matter, filed simultaneously between the same parties, whereas in the present case, there was only one suit and one judgment was given by the trial court and even in the first appeal to the Sadar Adalat, there was only one judgment, in spite of there being two appeals by the two sets of defendants."}}, {"text": "Sadar Adalat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7982, "end_char": 7994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Lahore case, there were two cross suits about the same subject-matter, filed simultaneously between the same parties, whereas in the present case, there was only one suit and one judgment was given by the trial court and even in the first appeal to the Sadar Adalat, there was only one judgment, in spite of there being two appeals by the two sets of defendants."}}, {"text": "S22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8519, "end_char": 8522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narhari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8614, "end_char": 8621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "89, 97\n\nNarhari and\n\nOthers\n\nShankar and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Shankar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8635, "end_char": 8642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "89, 97\n\nNarhari and\n\nOthers\n\nShankar and\n\nOthrs.", "canonical_name": "Shankar"}}, {"text": "Shankar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8689, "end_char": 8696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NaikJ.\n\nNarhari and\n\nOf hers v.\n\nShankar and\n\nOth!ra.", "canonical_name": "Shankar"}}, {"text": "Tek Chand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8744, "end_char": 8753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nafk J.\n\nAs has been observed by Tek Chand J. in his learned judgment in Mst."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9801, "end_char": 9810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9981, "end_char": 9986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, the High Court was wrong in not giving to the appellants the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act because there was conflict of decisions regarding this question not only in the High Court of the State but also among the different High Courts in India."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_759_766_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 759\n\nCHI NT AMAN RAO\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nRAM KRISHNA\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nCentral Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act (LXIV of 1948), ss. 8, 4-Law prohibiting bidi manufacture during agriwltural season-Validity -Restriction of fundamental right to carry on trade or business- Reasonableness of restrictions-Test of reasonableness-Jurisdiction of court to consider whether restrictions are reasonable-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g), 19(6).\n\nThe Central ProvinceB and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of BidiB (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, a law which was in force at the commencement of the Constitution of India, provided that\n\n11 the Deputy Commissioner may by notifica.tiou fix a. period to be an agricultural season v.rith respect to such villages\n\nas may be specified therein\" and lhat \"the Deputy CommiBsioner may by general order which Bhall extend to such villageB as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidiB during the agricultural season.'' The Act provided further that\n\n11 no person reBiding in a village Bpecified in Buch order Bhall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any perBon for the manufacture of bidis.\" An order waB issued by the Deputy CommiBBioner under the proviBions of the Act forbidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis during a particular season. A manufacturer of bidiB and an employee in a bidi factory residing in one of the Baid villageB applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus alleging that since the Act prohibited the petitionerB from exercising their fundamental right to carry on their trade or businesB which was guaranteed to them by cl. (1) (g) of Art. 19 of the ConBtitution, the Act waa void : Held, (i) that the object of the Btatute, namely, to provide meaBures for the Bupply of adequate labour for agricultural purpoBeB in bidi manufacturing areaB of the Province could well have been achieved by legislation reBtraining the employment of agricultural labour in the manufacture of bidiB dnring the agricul tural seaBon without prohibiting altogether the manufacture of bidis.\n\nAs the provisions of the Act had no reaBonable relation\n\nNov.S.\n\n1!1:50 to the object in view, the Act was not a law imposing \"reasonable restrictions\" within the meaning of cl. (6) of Art. 19 and was Ohintamat1. Rao therefore void.\n\n(ii) The law even to the extent that it could be said t~ The State of authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural Madhya labour cannot be held to be valid because the language employed Pradesh. was wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affect ing the right, and so long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly void.\n\nThe phrase \"reasonable restriction\" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public.\n\nThe word \"reasonable\" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates.\n\nLegislntion which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a. proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Art. 19 (!) (g.! and the social control permitted by cl. (6) of Art. 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.\n\nHeld also, that the determination by the Legislature of what constitutes a. reasonable restriction is not final and conclusive.\n\nThe Supreme Court has power to consider v.i'bether the restrictions imposed by the Legislature are reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19, cl. \\6) '1nd to declare the law void if in its opinion the restrictions are not reasonable.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 78 and 79 of 1950.\n\nApplication under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus.\n\nG. N. Joshi, for the petitioners.\n\nS. M. Sikri, for the respondent.\n\n1950. November 8. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-These two applications for enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India have been made by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi manufacturing concern of District Sagar (State of Madhya Pradesh). It is contended that the law in force in the State authorizing it to prohibit the manufacture of bid is in certain villages including the one\n\nwherein the applicants reside is inconsistent with the 1950 provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is conse- -- entl o d Ohintaman Rao qu y V I . v, The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Th• St•t• of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, Madhya LXIV of 1948, was passed on 19th October 1948 and PradBSh. was the law in force in the State at the commencement Mahaja.n.J. of the Constitution. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are in these terms:-\n\n\" 3. The Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural sason with respect to such villages as may be specified therein.\n\n4. (1) The Deputy Commissioner may, by general order which shall extend to such villages as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season.\n\n(2) No person residing in a village specified in such order shall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any person for the manufacture of bidis.\"\n\nOn the 13th June 1950 au order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis.\n\nOn the 19th June 1950 these two petitions were presented to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order as it prejudicially affected the petitioners' right of freedom of occupation and business. During the pendency of the petitions the season mentioned in the order of the 13th June ran out.\n\nA fresh order for the ensuing agricultural season·· 8th October to 18th November 1950-was issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms.\n\nThis order was also challenged in a supplementary petition.\n\nArticle 19 (1) (g) runs as follows:- \"All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.\"\n\n1950 The article guarantees freedom of occupation and - business. The freedom guaranteed herein is, however, Ohintaman Rao subject to the limitations imposed by clause (6) of\n\nTh• ;·;.1, of article 19. That clause is in these terms:-\n\nMadhya \" Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall Pradesh. affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law .1:lakajan J. imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.\"\n\nThe point for consideration in these applications is whether the Central Provinces and Berar Act LXIV of 1948 comes within the ambit of this saving clause or is in excess of its provisions. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned Act does not impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right in the interests of the general public but totally negatives it. In order to judge the validity of this contention it is necessary to examine the impugned Act and some of its provisions. In the preamble to the Act, it is stated that it has been enacted to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas. Sections 3 and 4 cited above empower the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season. The contravention of any of these provisions is made punishable by section 7 of the Act, the penalty being imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. It was enacted to help in the grow more food campaign and for the purpose of bringing under the plough considerable areas of fallow land.\n\nThe question for decision is whether the statute under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily\n\ninterferes with private business and imposes unreason- I95o able and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon 0 . - f 1 · h d h h hintamanRao law u occupation ; m ot er wor s, whet er t e total v. prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture The Stat• of of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a Madhya reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights men- Pradesh. tioned in article 19 (1) lg) of the Constitution. Unless it is shown that there is a reasonable relation of the Mahajan J. provisions of the Act to the purpose in view, the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot be curtailed by it.\n\nThe phrase \"reasonable restriction \" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word \" reasonable\" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.\n\nClause (6) in the concluding paragraph particularizes certain instances of the nature of the restrictions that were in the mind of the constitution-makers and which have the quality of reasonableness.\n\nThey afford a guide to the interpretation of the clause and illustrate the extent and nature of the restrictions which according to the statute could be imposed on the freedom guaranteed in clause (g).\n\nThe statute in substance and effect suspends altogether the right mentioned in article 19 (I) (g) during the agricultural seasons and such suspension may lead to such dislocation of the industry as to prove its ultimate ruin.\n\nThe object of the statute is to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural pur. poses in bidi manufacturing areas of the Province and it could well be achieved by legislation restraining the employment of agricultural labour in the manufacture\n\n1950 of bidis during the agricultural season.\n\nEven in point - of time a restriction may well have been reasonable if Chintomon Rao t d 1 f th h f k th v. 1t amoun e to a regu at10n o e ours o wor m e Th• stat• of business. Such legislation though it would limit the\n\nMadh11a field for recruiting persons for the manufacture of bidis\n\nP•adosh and regulate the hours of the working of the industry, would not have amounted to a complete stoppage of the Mohainn J. business of manufacture and might well have been within the ambit of clause (6).\n\nThe effect of the provisions of the Act, however, has no reasonable relation to the object in view but is so drastic in scope that it goes much in excess of that object.\n\nNot only are the provisions of the statute in excess of the requirements of the case but the language employed prohibits a manufacturer of bidis from employing any person in his business, no matter wherever that person may be residing.\n\nIn other words, a manufacturer of bidis residing in this area cannot import labour from neighbouring places in the d1strict or province or from outside the province.\n\nSuch a prohibition on the face of it is of an arbitrary nature inasmuch as it has no relation whatsoever to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and as such cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right.\n\nFurther the statute seeks to prohibit all persons residing in the notified villages during the agricultural season from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis. It cannot be denied that there would be a number of infirm and disabled persons, a number of children, old women and petty shop keepers residing in these villages who are incapable of being used for agricultural labour.\n\nAll such persons are prohibited by law from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis; and are thus being deprived of earning their livelihood.\n\nIt is a matter of common knowledge that there are certain classes of persons residing in every village who do not engage in agricultural operations. They and their womenfolk and children in their leisure hours supplement their income by engaging themselves in bidi business.\n\nThere seems no reason for prohibiting them from carrying on this occupation.\n\nThe statute as\n\nit stands, not only compels those who can be engaged 1950 in agricultural work from not taking to other avoca- 0 -- t. b t 1 h'b't h h hintaman Rao ions, u it a so pro 1 1 s persons w o ave no connecv. tion or relation to agricultural operations from engaging The State of in the business of bidi making and thus earning their Madhya livelihood. These provisions of the statute, in our Prad .. h. opinion, cannot be said to amount to reasonable restrictions on the right of the applicants and that being so, Mahajan J. the statute is not in conformity with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The law even to the extent that it could be said to authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural Jabour cannot be held valid because the language employed is wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly void.\n\nMr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not.\n\nThis argument runs counter to the clear provisions of the Constitution. The determination by the legislature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive ; it is subject to the supervision by this Court.\n\nIn the matter of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court watches and guards the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and in exercising its functions it has the power to set aside an Act of the Legislature if it is in violation of the freedoms guaran. teed by the Constitution, We are therefore of opinion\n\n9ij\n\nSUI'REM:E COURT RE.PORTS (1950]\n\nthat the impugned statute does not stand the test of reasonableness and is therefore void.\n\nChi.'IJ-tama:n Rao\n\nThe result therefore is that the orders issued by the Tiu State of Depl, lty Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th\n\nMndhya September 1950 are void, inoperative and ineffective.\n\nPrad•.••· We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the\n\nM, ah.ajan J.\n\nNov. li.\n\nprovisions contained in section 4 of the Act agan.st the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. The pet1ttone>s\n\nwill have their costs of these proceedings in the two petitions.\n\nAgent for the petitioners Rajinder Narain.\n\nPetitions allowed.\n\nm Nos. 78 and 79:\n\nAgent for the respondent m\n\nP.A. lv/hta.\n\nRAM GOPAL\n\nII.\n\nNos. 78 and 79:\n\nNAND LAL AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Gift to female owner-Construction-Gift for maintenance-Estate conveyed, whether absolute or limited-Use of\n\nthe word 'Malik', effect of. ·\n\nIn construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered but tbat is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed.\n\nTo convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of a.lienaticn need be given ; it is enough if words of such amplit11de are used as would convey full rights of ownership.\n\nThe term 'Malik' when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a. devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of lull proprietary rights, including a. full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such f11ll 11roprietory rights were not intended to\n\nbe conferred,", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 759\n\nCHI NT AMAN RAO\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nRAM KRISHNA\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nCentral Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act (LXIV of 1948), ss."}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 185, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 213, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217, "end_char": 255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 8, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 324, "end_char": 332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Provinces and Berar Regulation", "statute": "Central Provinces and Berar Regulation"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 590, "end_char": 611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g), 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 619, "end_char": 639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 804, "end_char": 825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Buch", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1252, "end_char": 1256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act provided further that\n\n11 no person reBiding in a village Bpecified in Buch order Bhall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any perBon for the manufacture of bidis.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 1988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.\n\n1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2477, "end_char": 2482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court has power to consider v.i'bether the restrictions imposed by the Legislature are reasonable within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4263, "end_char": 4273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4281, "end_char": 4302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4328, "end_char": 4339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Joshi, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4459, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-These two applications for enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India have been made by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi manufacturing concern of District Sagar (State of Madhya Pradesh)."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4588, "end_char": 4609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4730, "end_char": 4744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-These two applications for enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India have been made by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi manufacturing concern of District Sagar (State of Madhya Pradesh)."}}, {"text": "19th October 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v, The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Th• St•t• of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, Madhya LXIV of 1948, was passed on 19th October 1948 and PradBSh."}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5309, "end_char": 5325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Deputy Commissioner", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural sason with respect to such villages as may be specified therein."}}, {"text": "13th June 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th June 1950 au order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis."}}, {"text": "Sagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5996, "end_char": 6001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th June 1950 au order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8th October to 18th November 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6518, "end_char": 6551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fresh order for the ensuing agricultural season·· 8th October to 18th November 1950-was issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms."}}, {"text": "29th September 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6566, "end_char": 6585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fresh order for the ensuing agricultural season·· 8th October to 18th November 1950-was issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ohintaman Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The freedom guaranteed herein is, however, Ohintaman Rao subject to the limitations imposed by clause (6) of\n\nTh• ;·;.1, of article 19."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "lakajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7233, "end_char": 7240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law .1:lakajan J. imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.\""}}, {"text": "Berar Act LXIV of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8482, "end_char": 8498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act LXIV of 1948", "statute": "Berar Act LXIV of 1948"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8679, "end_char": 8688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Act LXIV of 1948", "statute": "Berar Act LXIV of 1948"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9449, "end_char": 9459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9551, "end_char": 9558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unless it is shown that there is a reasonable relation of the Mahajan J. provisions of the Act to the purpose in view, the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot be curtailed by it."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10216, "end_char": 10226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10285, "end_char": 10295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10829, "end_char": 10839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chintomon Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11365, "end_char": 11378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in point - of time a restriction may well have been reasonable if Chintomon Rao t d 1 f th h f k th v. 1t amoun e to a regu at10n o e ours o wor m e Th• stat• of business."}}, {"text": "Mohainn J. business", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11699, "end_char": 11718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such legislation though it would limit the\n\nMadh11a field for recruiting persons for the manufacture of bidis\n\nP•adosh and regulate the hours of the working of the industry, would not have amounted to a complete stoppage of the Mohainn J. business of manufacture and might well have been within the ambit of clause (6)."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14608, "end_char": 14613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14622, "end_char": 14650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not."}}, {"text": "legislature of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14669, "end_char": 14698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16225, "end_char": 16234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16405, "end_char": 16420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "RAM GOPAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16504, "end_char": 16513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAM GOPAL\n\nII."}}, {"text": "NAND LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16537, "end_char": 16545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 and 79:\n\nNAND LAL AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16559, "end_char": 16573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 and 79:\n\nNAND LAL AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16589, "end_char": 16612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 and 79:\n\nNAND LAL AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_75_87_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 75\n\nSHETH MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI\n\nMESSRS. HORMUSJI JAMSHEDJI GINWALLA\n\nAND SONS.\n\n[SAIYID F AZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\nMUKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nTransfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 58-A-Agreement to lease evidenced by co1respondence-Lessee put in possession-Acceptance of rent for several years-No regiatered lease deed-Suit for ejectment of lessee as trespasser-Maintainability-Doctrine of partperformance.\n\nThe predecessor in interest of the defendant, behig desirous of putti~ up a factory in certain plots of land situated within a Taluqdari estate which was under the management of the Government under the Gujarat, Taluq<lars Act, 1888, applied in writing to the Taluqdari Settlement Officer for a perm1.uent lease of the plots. The Taluqdari Officer agreed to grant a lease on certain tar.ms subject to the sanction of the Government and forwarded a letter to the Government stating the offer to take the plots on lease, his provisional acceptance of the slime sub- . ject to the sanction of the Government and the terms of the lease and by a Resolution dated 5th September, 1917, the Government granted the sanction.\n\nThe defendant's predecessor was put in possession and though a formal lease deed was not executed and registered, the Taluqdari Officer and after the release of the estate by the Government, the agent of the taluqdar, and the plaintiffs who came in as ijaradars. continued to receive the agreed rent up to 1932.\n\nIn 1933 the plaintiffs instituted a suit to eject the defendant alleging that be was a mere trespasser as there was no registered lease deed :\n\nlield, that the correspondence which passed between the defendant's predecessor-in-title and the Taluqdari Officer, the Jetter sent by the latter to the Government, and the Resolution of tbe Government dated 5th September, 1917, proved that there was a contract in writing to grant a lease on the terms stated in the Taluqdari Officer's letter, and as the defenda-nt's predecessor wa~ put in possession in furtherance of this contract and the rents agreed upon were accepted for several years, s. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable to the case and the plaintiffa were not entitled to eject the defendant.\n\nJudgment of tbe Bombay High Court reversed.\n\nMarch l.\n\n19.'50 APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bom-\n\nSheu. M\"\"'lrlal bay: Appeal No. XXXVII of 1949.\n\nMan:sukhbhai This was an appeal from a judgment and decree of •· n the Bombay High Court dated 9th March, 1943, in\n\nM~sJrs. hord .. Second Appeal No. 717 of 1940, varying the decree of musi• ams e 'J• h A J d Ah d b d GillwaUa and t e ss1stant u ge, me a a , m Appeal No. 173 sons. of 1936 reversing the decree of the joint Sub-Judge, Ahmedabad, in Suit No. 830 of 1933.\n\nR.J. Thakur, for the appellant.\n\nNanak Ohand Pandit, (Diwan Oharanjit Lal, with him), for the respondents.\n\n1950. March 21. The judgment of the Court was de- Iiver.ed by\n\nMahajan}.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay dated 9th March 1943, and made in Second Appeal No. 717of1940 varying the decree of the Assjstant Judge, Ahmedabad, in Appeal No. 173 of 1936 reversing the decree of the Joint Sub-Judge, Ahmedabad, in Suit No. 830 of 1933.\n\nThe suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the respondent firm in ejectment to recover possession of survey Nos. 222, 223, 225 and 226 situate in Rampura in Ahmadabad district and for mesne profits, as early as July, 1933, and during its 17 years' span of life it had a somewhat chequered career. Those responsible for drawing up the pleadings did not take pains to comprehend correctly as to what they were about and the whole litigation was conducted in a slovenly and slipshod manner. Evidence which should have been produced at the beginning was allowed to be produced at a much later stage after the case went back on remand and the suit was determined by the Assistant Judge on fresh issues and fresh materials.\n\nIt was in this confused state of the record that it vrns eventually decided by the High Court and its judgment is by no means satisfactory. The long time take in deciding the suit which involved determination of a few simple issues is such as is calculated to bring into ridicule the administration of justice.\n\n. There is a talukdari estate called the Bnankoda 1960 estate in Viramam taluka in Ahmedabad district. It d b 1 1 kd ff Sheth Mandlal is jointly owne y severa ta u ars in di erent ManSt•khbhai shares and comprises twelve villages one of which is v.\n\nRampura in which the suit lands are situate. By Messrs. Hor- Government Resolution No. 8179, dated 30th August mus;; Jamshedii 1912, the estate was taken under Government manage- Ginwalla and ment under section 28 of the Gujarat Talukdars Act Sons. (Bombay Act VI of 1888). The firm of Shah Manila} Mahajan J.\n\nMaganlal and Bros. (predecessors in interest of the appellant) desired to erect a ginning factory on survey Nos. 223, 225, and 226 and with thatobject approached the Talukdari Settlement Officer for a permanent lease of these survey numbers., The said officer agreed to grant a lease subject to sanction of Government. By Resolution No. 10795of1917 dated 5th September, 1917, the Government of Bombay granted the requisite sanction.\n\nExhibit 181 is a certified copy of the letter from the Chief Secrtary to Government to the Commissioner and to the Talukdari Settlement Officer and in detail it mentions the varfous steps taken to effect the transaction.\n\nOn 9th December 1916 an application was made by Shah Manilal Maganlal in writing signed by him to the Talukda.ri Settlement Officer offering to take a permanent lease of the abov1i mentioned survey numbers on an annual rental of Rs. 290 for the purpose of erecting a ginning factory. On rnth July, 1917, the said officer accepted provisionally this offer after taking in to consideration the objections raised by some of the talukdars in respect of the grant of a lease. He submitted the papers to government with the following recommendations :-\n\n\"As the petitioner was in urgent need to start operations during the current ginning season I have in anticipation of Government sanction permitted him to enter upon the land and have the honour to approach you for sanction under seQtion 27 (A) of the Court of Wards Act, the provisions of which have been made applicable to Talukdari Estates by section 29 (G) of the Gujarat Talukdars Act.\"\n\n19!50\n\nSheth Maneklal\n\nMansrlkhbai\n\n•• Messrs. Hor musji Jamshedji\n\nGinwalla and\n\nSons.\n\nMaliajan J,\n\nThe conditions of the lease agreed upon by the parties were annexed with this letter and a copy of the offer was also sent to Government. Ex. 181 recites the contents of the offer and states the undertaking given by the lessee. There is intrinsic evidence within its con ten ts to show that these writings were signed by the proposer.\n\nThe Talukdari Settlement Officer in a signed writing accepted the offer and sent it for Government sanction.\n\nIt further appears that he communicated his acceptance to the lessee and agreed to give a lease if Government gave sanction.\n\nThe survey numbers in question were in possession of tenants and it was agreed that the lessee would take possession after making private settlements with them. It was also agreed that if no such private arrangement could be made, then the settlement officer would take steps to issue ejectment notice against the tenants. On 20th July, 1917, the Commissioner forwarded the papers to Government with his recommendations and the Government on 5th September, 1917, sanctioned the arrangement agreed to by the Talukdari Settlement Officer with Shah Manila! Maganlal.\n\nThe sanction order is signed by the Chief Secretary to the Government and it contains an endorsement of its having been sent to the officers concerned. It is thus clear that a binding agreement to lease the survey numbers in question was effected between the Talukdari Settlement Officer and Shah Manila! Maganlal with the sanction of the Government.\n\nThough a draft of a formal deed of lease was prepared, no such document was formally executed or registered for reasons which it is not necessary to state herein.\n\nSoon after the agreement the lessee took possession of the survey numbers in suit and put up thereupon a ginnin'g and a pressing factory, a bungalow, engine rooms and other structures. He tendered the agreed rent to the Talukdari Settlement Officer who re.l)ejved it from him.\n\nHe continued receiving it for about two years when the estate was released from the management of the Government and came under the management of the talukdars. The manager appointed by the talukdars continued to receive rent from the lessee as had been settled by the Talukdari Settlement Officer.\n\n\\ I\n\nOn 4th May, 1924, a pe>ssessory mortgage of the ginn 1960 ing factory along with all its buildings 'Yas effected by Sltdh Maneklal Shah Manila! Maganlal in the sum of Rs. 1,40,000 in Mansukhbltai favour of the defendant. The mortgage included in v. the schedule of the mortgaged property some other pro- Mesrs. Hor- . perty as well.\n\nThe two contestants in the suit, the '\"\"\"'' Jamslzed1• d f d d h I . t'ff . d h . . ht .\n\nGmwa/la and e en ant an t e p arn 1 s, acqmre t eir ng s m sons. this property during the years 1924-25.\n\nThe defendant came in as a mortgagee as above stated, while the Mahajan J. plaintiffs came in as ijaradar and assignee of certain mortgage rights.\n\nThe pla.intiffs since then have been receiving the rent according to the grant made by the Talukdari Officer. In the year 1933 the appellant purchased the equity of redemption of the suit property at a court auction and became vested with all the rights of Manila! Maganlal in this property, the value of which has now been estimated in the neighbourhood of Rs. 38,000.\n\nIn the year 1933 the plaintiffs discovered that the defendant had no registered lease in his favour and therefore in law he was not entitled to the rights of a permanent tenant in respect of the survey numbers in dispute.\n\nThey therefore instituted the present suit for ejectment of the defendant. In the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the plaint it was admitted that in the course of the correspondence with the Government of Born bay a lease was negotiated between the firm of Shah .Manila!\n\nMagan Jal and the Talukdari Settlement Officer in respect of the survey numbers in dispute for a period of fifty years at an annual rental of Rs. 290, but it was Rtated that because Mani I al Maganlal did not execute a formal registered lease they were in possession rs trespaRsers.\n\nTu the 4th paragraph the authority of t.he Ta I nkdari Settlement Officer to grant the let1se wa<; also rha llenged.\n\nIn the 8th paragraph it was se id that the pin intiffs received the amount of the lease up t£) :Hst , July 1932 and that no notice was necessary to be given, the position of the defendant being that of a tre;; passer It was however alleged that a notice was given on 25th December 1930.\n\n19ll0\n\nShth Maneklilal\n\nlifansukhbliai\n\nv. 1\\fcs.srs, Hor- 1n11sji Jatnslredji\n\nGinwalla anrl\n\nSons.\n\nThe suit was defended on a number of grounds, inter alia, it was pleaded that the plaintiffs had no right to sue in ejectment, not being the landlord inasmuch as they had not obtained any right in the land itself and had not acquired complete title by an assignment of the whole of the interest of the talukdars in the survey numbers in dispute. It was pleaded that the defendant was a permanent tenant of the survey numbers and that the plaintiffs' own conduct debarred them from claiming ejectment.\n\nThe trial Judge decreed the suit on the finding that as no written lease was forthcoming it'should be deemed to be non-existent. It was said that no efforts had been made to show that the Settlement Officer had sanctioned with the approval of the Government a permanent lease in respect of survey Nos. 223 and 225 to Shah Manila! Maganlal. In the concluding part of the judgment it was remarked that the doctrine of equitable part performance could not apply to the present case. Though no specific issue was raised on this point, the matter seems to have been argued at some stage before the trial Judge on facts found or admitted. There was an unsuccessful effort to obtain a review of this decision on the ground of discovery of fresh materials. Thereafter the matter was taken to the court of appeal and it was alleged in ground No. 3 that the Subordinate Judge had erred in not considering the position created in the case by the equitable rule of law embodied in section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. On 30th July, 1938, the appellate court made an order of remand under Order XLI, Rule 25, and called for a report on the following two issues :-\n\n(l) Whether the plaintiff was a mortgagee in occupation of S. Nos. 222, 223, 225 and 226?\n\n(2) Whether the suit was bad for non-joinder of parties?\n\nThe trial Judge reported on the remand issues against the plaintiffs. He also admitted in evidence a number of documents produced after remand and one of these is Ex. 181. A point was raised that documents produced after remand were not relevant to the issues remanded\n\nI ' !\n\n' (\n\nand should not be admit1; ed.\n\nThis contention was overruled. The Assistant , Judge aJlowed the appeal on .27th April, 1940. He held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their right to maintain the suit either as ijaradars or as assignees of mortgage rights. In\n\n19ll0\n\nSheth Maneklalij\n\nMansuklrbluzi\n\n,\\fes.rs. 1/o;- para. 21 of his judgment he observed as follows:- \"'\"sji Jamsliedji \" Ex. 181 shows that the terms of the lease have Gi1rwalla and been reduced to writing though no regular lease &ms. appears to have been executed. On the question whether the lease is binding on the plaintiff, I think section 53-A of the Transfer of the Property Act is a complete answer. Ex. 181 shows that the Talukdari Settlement Officer, with the sanction of the Government, contracted to lease out thfe lands. The writing is . signed by the Government. The terms of the lease can be ascertained clearly from Ex. 181. It is not denied that the defendant's prede:cessor-in-title was put in possession of this property in performance of that contract. Also the acceptance by the Talukdari Settlement Officer as well as by 1he plaintiff of the rent of the property as fixed by that contract shows that the possession of the defendant and his predecessor-in-title was in part performance of the contract of lease.\n\nAdmittedly, there is no registered lease.\n\nThe conditions of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act arefully satisfied and the plaintiff cannot, therefore, eject the defendant on the ground that there is no registered lease.\"\n\nFurther on the learned Judge said that section53-A of the Transfer of Property Act embodied the doctrine of estoppel and a plea to that effect had been taken inasmuch as the defendant had pleaded that the plaintiffs were es topped by their conduct from asking for possession and that therefore no s:eparate issue was raised on this point.\n\nThe unsuccessful plaintiffs went up in second appeal against this decision to the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThe High Court allowed the appeal and modified the decree of the Assistant Judge. It decreed the plaintiffs' suit in respect of survEiy Nos. 223 and 225 and dismissed the suit in respect of survey Nos. 222 and 226.\n\nMahaja1' J.\n\n195'> On the question of the plain tiffs' title to maintain the suit the High Court reached the following decision:- Sheth Maneklul\n\nMan&ukhbal \"If it were necessary we would hold that the v. plaintiff has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to Messrs. Ho,- maintain this suit in its capacity as ijaradar as well as ,,,...;; Jamshedfi assignee from the moi\\tgagees. But we think even apart G.n'::a and from that, plaintiff is entitled to bring this suit because s. on the defendant's own admission he has paid rent to Mahajan J, the plaintiff for three of the suit fields, viz., survey Nos. 223, 225 and 226, and that too not the interest of 84 Dakdas in them but for all the 100 Dakdas. In fact, ever since the plaintiff came on the scene the defendant has treated the plaintiff as the landlord as regards these three survey numbers, and in the present suit, therefore, the defendant cannot dispute the plaintiff's right to sue.\"\n\nIn a later part of the judgment it was observed that in any case Ginwallaas the manager of the plaintiff firm would be entitled to continue the 'Present suit as receiver. On the second question the learned judges of the High Court observed as follows:-\n\n\" We do not think it necessary to decide whether if there had been a signed contract by the transferor in the present case, it would have fallen under section 53-A, because, in our opinion, the correspondence which is summarized in the Government Resolution cannot be regarded as evidence of the contract, and secondly, the terms of the contract also cannot be deduced from the correspondence with any reasonable Mrtainty. We, therefore, hold that the Government Resolution on which the defendant relies is no evidence of the writing\n\nof a contract referred to in section 53-A of the Transfer 1 of Property Act, and apart from that thedefendant has : no legal basis on which he can claim to hold the land either as a permanent lessee or for a particular period.\" I\n\nThe principal questions canvassed in this appeal are, , whether the plaintiff firm has proved its title to main- I tain the present suit in ejectment against the defendant and whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of see. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The question as to the maintainability of the suit\n\nagainst the defendant without & proper notice was raised before the High Court but permission to argue it was refused because the matter had not been raised in either of the lower Courts.\n\n19ll0\n\n.Shells Manelllal\n\nJlonsukhbhai\n\nThe appeal was elaborately argued before us by the Messrs. Hor. learned counsel for the parties, but in our view, it is musji Jamshedji not necessary to consider and decide all the points urged Ginwauu a11d because we consider that the Assistant Judge was right Sons. in entertaining and giving effect to the plea under sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and we are satisfied that no substantial grounds existed for reversing that decision in second appeal. This section introduced in the Transfer of Property Act in 1929 is in these terms :-\n\n\"Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,\n\na~1d the transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof ....... and has done some act in furtherance of the contract; ed the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered ....... . the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contraet ........ \".\n\nThe section is a partial importation in the statute law of India of the English doctrine of part performance. It furnishes a statutory defence to a person who has no registered title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favour and some action on his part in part-performance of that contract. In order to find whether the defendant in the present case has satisfied the conditions of the\n\nMahcja11 J.\n\n1950 section, it has to be held proved that the Talukdari Settlement Officer contracted to give a lease of the Theth Mandia!\n\nMansukhbai survey numbers in suit to Manilal Maganlal by a .,, writing signed by him and that from this writing the Mmn. Hor terms of the tenancy can be ascertained with reasonable mus;• Jamshedii certainty. It has further to be held established that\n\nGintoalla and the transferee took possession of the property or did\n\ns..... any acts in furtherance of the contract. It may be\n\nMaha; an J. mentioned that in cases of lease the legislature has recognized that the equity of part performance is an active equity as in English Jaw 'and is sufficient to support an independent action by the plaintiff. (Vide S. 27 -A of the Specific Relief Act). This section however applies to contracts executed after 1st Rpril, 1930, and has no application in the present case; but there can be no manner of doubt that the defence under Section 53-A is available to a person who has an agreement of lease in his favour though no lease has been executed and registered.\n\nWe are satisfied that the defendant has fulfilled both the conditions necessary to attract the application of the section in the present case. The High Court was in error when it held that the correspondence summarised in Ex. 181 eould not be treated as evidence of the contract and that its terms could not be reasonably deduced from this document. It is no doubt true that Ex. 181 is merely secondary evidence of the agreement of lease but it is equally true that it is a very reliable piece of secondary evidence coming as it does from government records. It furnishes proof of the fact that there was an acceptance in writing under which the con tract to transfer the survey num hers in suit by way of lease was effected by the Talukdari Settlement Officer in favour of Manila!· Maganlal.\n\nThe offer was also in writing signed by the offerer.\n\nThe Government Resolution which made the agreement binding was also in writing and was signed by competent authority. No objection as to admission of secondary evidence could be taken in this case as tho primary evidence was in the possession either of the plaintiff or of the talukdars, the predecessors in interest and in spite of notice it was not produced. Reference in this connection may be made to the statement of the\n\nplaintiff in the witness box which ie to the foUowing 19llO effect :-· Sheu. Mon11\"\"1I \"l must have read thecorrespondence with T.S.O.\n\nManaullbhoi since it is so recited in the para. 2 of the plaint. I cannot v. say wheth~ that correspondence is in my office or with M~•· Hor .. the talukdare. I cannoteay without that correspond- \"'';/;..f::a•1::.:.f'. ence as to whether T.S.O. has called survey No . . 226 · Som as Lalliti and hence the 1balukdars are not entitled to any income for it. I aleCI cannot say without that Maha/qn J. correspondence that the irents of survey Nos. 225 and 223 were fixed at Rs. 135 :11.nd R1t. 115 respectively and that Re. 45 were to be taken by way of sugar .... \"\n\nIn another part of the 'same statement he said that the talukdars had got the records of the time preceding his D1anagement. It appears that the original documents were returned to tho talukdars after the discharge of the Talukdari SettlemEint Officer and were in the possession and power of the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest and they were not produced by him in spite of notice. Para. 2 of the plaint clearly recites that there was correspondence between the Talukdari Settlement Officer and the defendant's predecessor in interest under which a lease was negotiated. The plaintiff's knowledge of this correspondenoe and its contents is thus prima facie established and leads to the conclusion that it was in his possession or power and he has intentionally withheld it. Without.a perusal of this correspondence the facts recited in para. 2 of the plaint could not ha.Ye been mentioned in the plaint. Once it is held that Ex. 181 is good secondary evidence of the agreement of lease, there can then be no hesitation in holding that by an offer and an acceptance mad1~ in writing and signed by the respective parties an agreement was completed between the Talukdari Settlement Officer and the predecessor in interest of the defendant and that necessary sanction of t.he Government was also in writing signed by the officer concerned. It bas further to be held that the terms of the contract can be fairly deduced from the recitals of this document. The only in1portant clause with which we are concerned in the present case is as to the nature of the tenam}y. It is clearly recited therein\n\n19llO\n\nSINlh Maneklal Manaukhbhai\n\nMess. Hoy-. tlWsji }amshedji\n\nGinwaUa and\n\nSons.\n\nMahajan}.\n\nthat the lease was to be of a permanent character and the terms as regards rental could be revisE'd after a period of fifty years.\n\nThe rent payable is recited in unambiguous terms in the document as Rs. 290 per annum.\n\nIt was not denied that the lessee took possession after this agreement was arrived at. It was argued that possession was taken before sanction of the Government was obtained in September, 1917. There is however no proof of this except a bare recital in the Talukdari Settlement Officer's letter to Government that he had permitted 'the defendant to enter on the land in anticipation of Government's sanction. As already pointed out, the possession was with the tenants and had to be taken after entering into an arrangement with them or by issuing notice to them. It is not possible to think that this could have happened in such a short space of time as elapsed between the middle of July and the beginning of September. In any case the factory could not have been built before the sanction of the Government was received. Not only did the lessee take possession in part-performance of the agreement but he offered the rent agreed upon and paid it not only to the Talukdari Settlement Officer but to all those who subsequently managed the interest of the talukdars in the survey numbers in dispute. The original lessee after having entered into possession of the property effected a mortgage of it in favour of the defendant. The defendant advanced a substantial sum on security of the pr.)perty to the lessee.\n\nThe equity of redemption was sold at an auction sale. The defendant and his predecessor in interest were willing to perform their part of the contract.\n\nAs a matter of fact, they have performed the whole of it. All t.lw.t r_emains to be done is the execution of a lease deed by the lessor in favour of the lessee and of getting it registered. The plaintiff in para. 6 of the plaint in unambiguous terms admitted that he received the amount of the lease up to 31st July, 1932, in respect of the survey numbers in dispute.\n\nIt is difficult to imagine what lease he was referring to in the absence of a registered deed of lease. It oould only mean the agreement of lease given in writing\n\nand signed by the Talukdari Settlement Officer.\n\nIt is in pursuance of this agreement of lease that all the subsequent acts above mentioned were done.\n\nIt may also be observed that an agreement of lease creating a present demise but not registered is admissible under S. 49 of the Indian Registration Act as evidence of part performance and Ex .. 181 is secondary evidence of that agreement. A formed lease is not necessary to attract the application of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nAll that is required is that an agreement in writing signed by the transferor can be gathered from the evidence. The correspondence mentioned in Ex. 181 fully establishes that fact.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the learned Assistant Judge rightly dismissed the plaintiff's suit and the High Court was in error in interfering with that decision in second appeal. The result therefore is that the appeal is allowed, the decision of the Assistant Judge restored and that of the High Court reversed.\n\nThe circumstances of the case are such that we would make no order as to costs. The defendant was at fault in not producing all the documentary evidence at the proper stage of the case and he has been enabled to - avail himself of the defence furnished to him under S. 53-A by reason of the admission in evidence after remand of Ex. 181, which though not properly admitted at that stage was not rejected by the High Court and could not be re1ected at the stage when .we dealt with the case.\n\nTh~ parties are therefore left to bear their own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Ganpat Rai.\n\n1-~ S C India/~8\n\nSheth Manek/a/\n\nMansukhbhai\n\nMessrs. Hormusii Jamshtdji\n\nGinwalla and\n\nSons.\n\nMahajan].", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "75\n\nSHETH MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "75\n\nSHETH MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HORMUSJI JAMSHEDJI GINWALLA\n\nAND SONS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HORMUSJI JAMSHEDJI GINWALLA AND SONS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID F AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "5th September, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1097, "end_char": 1116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ject to the sanction of the Government and the terms of the lease and by a Resolution dated 5th September, 1917, the Government granted the sanction."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2122, "end_char": 2146, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bom-\n\nSheu. M\"\"'lrlal bay: Appeal No. XXXVII of 1949.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2314, "end_char": 2395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March l.\n\n19.'50 APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bom-\n\nSheu."}}, {"text": "ss1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2632, "end_char": 2635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.J. Thakur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2769, "end_char": 2780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.J. Thakur, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nanak Ohand Pandit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2802, "end_char": 2820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Ohand Pandit, (Diwan Oharanjit Lal, with him), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Diwan Oharanjit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2823, "end_char": 2842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Ohand Pandit, (Diwan Oharanjit Lal, with him), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay dated 9th March 1943, and made in Second Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Rampura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222, 223, 225 and 226 situate in Rampura in Ahmadabad district and for mesne profits, as early as July, 1933, and during its 17 years' span of life it had a somewhat chequered career."}}, {"text": "Ahmadabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "222, 223, 225 and 226 situate in Rampura in Ahmadabad district and for mesne profits, as early as July, 1933, and during its 17 years' span of life it had a somewhat chequered career."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a talukdari estate called the Bnankoda 1960 estate in Viramam taluka in Ahmedabad district."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VI of 1888", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4852, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm of Shah Manila} Mahajan J.\n\nMaganlal and Bros. (predecessors in interest of the appellant) desired to erect a ginning factory on survey Nos.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5244, "end_char": 5264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10795of1917 dated 5th September, 1917, the Government of Bombay granted the requisite sanction."}}, {"text": "9th December 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5523, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th December 1916 an application was made by Shah Manilal Maganlal in writing signed by him to the Talukda.ri Settlement Officer offering to take a permanent lease of the abov1i mentioned survey numbers on an annual rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shah Manilal Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5568, "end_char": 5589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th December 1916 an application was made by Shah Manilal Maganlal in writing signed by him to the Talukda.ri Settlement Officer offering to take a permanent lease of the abov1i mentioned survey numbers on an annual rental of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Shah .Manila!\n\nMagan Jal"}}, {"text": "rnth July, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On rnth July, 1917, the said officer accepted provisionally this offer after taking in to consideration the objections raised by some of the talukdars in respect of the grant of a lease."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sheth Maneklal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6468, "end_char": 6482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19!50\n\nSheth Maneklal\n\nMansrlkhbai\n\n•• Messrs. Hor musji Jamshedji\n\nGinwalla and\n\nSons.", "canonical_name": "75\n\nSHETH MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI"}}, {"text": "Maliajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6550, "end_char": 6558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maliajan J,\n\nThe conditions of the lease agreed upon by the parties were annexed with this letter and a copy of the offer was also sent to Government."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7461, "end_char": 7476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20th July, 1917, the Commissioner forwarded the papers to Government with his recommendations and the Government on 5th September, 1917, sanctioned the arrangement agreed to by the Talukdari Settlement Officer with Shah Manila!"}}, {"text": "Shah Manila! Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7676, "end_char": 7697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20th July, 1917, the Commissioner forwarded the papers to Government with his recommendations and the Government on 5th September, 1917, sanctioned the arrangement agreed to by the Talukdari Settlement Officer with Shah Manila!", "canonical_name": "Shah .Manila!\n\nMagan Jal"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7992, "end_char": 7996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus clear that a binding agreement to lease the survey numbers in question was effected between the Talukdari Settlement Officer and Shah Manila!"}}, {"text": "Manila! Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7997, "end_char": 8013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus clear that a binding agreement to lease the survey numbers in question was effected between the Talukdari Settlement Officer and Shah Manila!", "canonical_name": "Mani I al Maganlal"}}, {"text": "4th May, 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ I\n\nOn 4th May, 1924, a pe>ssessory mortgage of the ginn 1960 ing factory along with all its buildings 'Yas effected by Sltdh Maneklal Shah Manila!"}}, {"text": "Sltdh Maneklal Shah Manila! Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ I\n\nOn 4th May, 1924, a pe>ssessory mortgage of the ginn 1960 ing factory along with all its buildings 'Yas effected by Sltdh Maneklal Shah Manila!"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9393, "end_char": 9400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant came in as a mortgagee as above stated, while the Mahajan J. plaintiffs came in as ijaradar and assignee of certain mortgage rights.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Manila! Maganlal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9734, "end_char": 9750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1933 the appellant purchased the equity of redemption of the suit property at a court auction and became vested with all the rights of Manila!"}}, {"text": "Government of Born bay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10256, "end_char": 10278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the plaint it was admitted that in the course of the correspondence with the Government of Born bay a lease was negotiated between the firm of Shah .Manila!"}}, {"text": "Shah .Manila!\n\nMagan Jal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10322, "end_char": 10346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the plaint it was admitted that in the course of the correspondence with the Government of Born bay a lease was negotiated between the firm of Shah .Manila!", "canonical_name": "Shah .Manila!\n\nMagan Jal"}}, {"text": "Mani I al Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10519, "end_char": 10537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "290, but it was Rtated that because Mani I al Maganlal did not execute a formal registered lease they were in possession rs trespaRsers.", "canonical_name": "Mani I al Maganlal"}}, {"text": "Shah Manila! Maganlal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11948, "end_char": 11969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "223 and 225 to Shah Manila!"}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12600, "end_char": 12610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12620, "end_char": 12644, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "30th July, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12649, "end_char": 12664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th July, 1938, the appellate court made an order of remand under Order XLI, Rule 25, and called for a report on the following two issues :-\n\n(l) Whether the plaintiff was a mortgagee in occupation of S. Nos."}}, {"text": "Sheth Maneklalij\n\nMansuklrbluzi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\n\n19ll0\n\nSheth Maneklalij\n\nMansuklrbluzi\n\n,\\fes.rs."}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13835, "end_char": 13845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14593, "end_char": 14603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14613, "end_char": 14637, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14823, "end_char": 14847, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15187, "end_char": 15207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unsuccessful plaintiffs went up in second appeal against this decision to the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Mahaja1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15426, "end_char": 15433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaja1' J.\n\n195'> On the question of the plain tiffs' title to maintain the suit the High Court reached the following decision:- Sheth Maneklul\n\nMan&ukhbal \"If it were necessary we would hold that the v. plaintiff has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to Messrs. Ho,- maintain this suit in its capacity as ijaradar as well as ,,,...;; Jamshedfi assignee from the moi\\tgagees.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Sheth Maneklul", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15556, "end_char": 15570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaja1' J.\n\n195'> On the question of the plain tiffs' title to maintain the suit the High Court reached the following decision:- Sheth Maneklul\n\nMan&ukhbal \"If it were necessary we would hold that the v. plaintiff has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to Messrs. Ho,- maintain this suit in its capacity as ijaradar as well as ,,,...;; Jamshedfi assignee from the moi\\tgagees.", "canonical_name": "75\n\nSHETH MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI"}}, {"text": "Ginwallaas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16440, "end_char": 16450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a later part of the judgment it was observed that in any case Ginwallaas the manager of the plaintiff firm would be entitled to continue the 'Present suit as receiver."}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16780, "end_char": 16790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17193, "end_char": 17203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17658, "end_char": 17682, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jlonsukhbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17951, "end_char": 17963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19ll0\n\n.Shells Manelllal\n\nJlonsukhbhai\n\nThe appeal was elaborately argued before us by the Messrs. Hor."}}, {"text": "Ginwauu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "learned counsel for the parties, but in our view, it is musji Jamshedji not necessary to consider and decide all the points urged Ginwauu a11d because we consider that the Assistant Judge was right Sons."}}, {"text": "sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18285, "end_char": 18292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18302, "end_char": 18326, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18461, "end_char": 18485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19486, "end_char": 19491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The section is a partial importation in the statute law of India of the English doctrine of part performance."}}, {"text": "Mahcja11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19878, "end_char": 19886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to find whether the defendant in the present case has satisfied the conditions of the\n\nMahcja11 J.\n\n1950 section, it has to be held proved that the Talukdari Settlement Officer contracted to give a lease of the Theth Mandia!"}}, {"text": "Manilal Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20054, "end_char": 20070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mansukhbai survey numbers in suit to Manilal Maganlal by a .,,", "canonical_name": "Mani I al Maganlal"}}, {"text": "Gintoalla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20269, "end_char": 20278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has further to be held established that\n\nGintoalla and the transferee took possession of the property or did\n\ns..... any acts in furtherance of the contract."}}, {"text": "S. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20623, "end_char": 20628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20639, "end_char": 20658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1st Rpril, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20718, "end_char": 20733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section however applies to contracts executed after 1st Rpril, 1930, and has no application in the present case; but there can be no manner of doubt that the defence under Section 53-A is available to a person who has an agreement of lease in his favour though no lease has been executed and registered."}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20838, "end_char": 20848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manila", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21745, "end_char": 21751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It furnishes proof of the fact that there was an acceptance in writing under which the con tract to transfer the survey num hers in suit by way of lease was effected by the Talukdari Settlement Officer in favour of Manila!·"}}, {"text": "Maneklal Manaukhbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24562, "end_char": 24582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clearly recited therein\n\n19llO\n\nSINlh Maneklal Manaukhbhai\n\nMess."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26637, "end_char": 26652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of the plaint in unambiguous terms admitted that he received the amount of the lease up to 31st July, 1932, in respect of the survey numbers in dispute."}}, {"text": "S. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27132, "end_char": 27137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27152, "end_char": 27168, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27318, "end_char": 27323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27333, "end_char": 27357, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28132, "end_char": 28137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28469, "end_char": 28480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28510, "end_char": 28520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Sheth Manek", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28541, "end_char": 28552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-~ S C India/~8\n\nSheth Manek/a/\n\nMansukhbhai\n\nMessrs. Hormusii Jamshtdji\n\nGinwalla and\n\nSons.", "canonical_name": "75\n\nSHETH MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI"}}, {"text": "Hormusii Jamshtdji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28578, "end_char": 28596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-~ S C India/~8\n\nSheth Manek/a/\n\nMansukhbhai\n\nMessrs. Hormusii Jamshtdji\n\nGinwalla and\n\nSons."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_766_780_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "SUI'REM:E COURT RE.PORTS (1950]\n\nthat the impugned statute does not stand the test of reasonableness and is therefore void.\n\nChi.'IJ-tama:n Rao\n\nThe result therefore is that the orders issued by the Tiu State of Depl, lty Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th\n\nMndhya September 1950 are void, inoperative and ineffective.\n\nPrad•.••· We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the\n\nM, ah.ajan J.\n\nNov. li.\n\nprovisions contained in section 4 of the Act agan.st the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. The pet1ttone>s\n\nwill have their costs of these proceedings in the two petitions.\n\nAgent for the petitioners Rajinder Narain.\n\nPetitions allowed.\n\nm Nos. 78 and 79:\n\nAgent for the respondent m\n\nP.A. lv/hta.\n\nRAM GOPAL\n\nII.\n\nNos. 78 and 79:\n\nNAND LAL AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Gift to female owner-Construction-Gift for maintenance-Estate conveyed, whether absolute or limited-Use of\n\nthe word 'Malik', effect of. ·\n\nIn construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered but tbat is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed.\n\nTo convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of a.lienaticn need be given ; it is enough if words of such amplit11de are used as would convey full rights of ownership.\n\nThe term 'Malik' when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a. devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of lull proprietary rights, including a. full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such f11ll 11roprietory rights were not intended to\n\nbe conferred,\n\nThe mere fact that • gift of property is made fot the Bupport and maintenance of a female relation could nob be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the <loner, th.t the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life-time. The extent of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon tha intention o( the donor as expressed by the language used, and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership1 the purpose of ihe grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interest. The desire to provide maintenance or residence of the donee would only show the motive which prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a measure of the extent of the gift.\n\nWhere a Hindu died leaving two widows, a widowed daughter in-law and a daughter's son, and a relative of the family sating as guardian of the daughter's son's son who was then the nearest reversioner got a. relinquishment deed fiom the daughter-in-law r'3nouncing all her claims to the estate and in return executed a deed of ' tamliknama' to her with respect to certain properties which ran as follows:\n\n11 I have therefore, of my own accord and free will, without any compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of a double-storied pucca built shop ......... and & house and a kothri in Etawah ......... worth Rs. 8,000 for purposee of rasidence of the Musammat (the daughter-in-law) owned by the minor aforesaid ......... which at preaent stands let out on rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst. Meri a aforesaid ........ .in favour of Mst, Meria aforesaid, widow of Ohhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik) \":\n\nHeld, that there was nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumetances which would displace the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the words Malik' is apt ordinarily to convey and the daughter-in-law obtained under the gift deed a full heritable and transferable title to the properties conveyed thereby.\n\nRajendra Prasad v. Gopal Pra•ad (57 I.A. 296), Koliani Koer\n\nv. Luchmee Parsad (24 W.R. 395), Tagore v. Tagore (I.A. Supp. 4 7) Sasiman Chaudhur<>in v. Shib Narayan (49 I.A. 25), Biswanath Prasad v. Chandrika (60 I.A. 56) relied on.\n\nRaja Ram Baksh v. Arjun (60 I.A. 56), Woodayaditta Deb v.\n\nMukoond (22 W.R. 229) distinguished.\n\nAPPELLATE juRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. LIX of 1949.\n\nAppeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.) dated 6th September,\n\n1943 in First Appeal No. 3 of 1940.\n\nP. L. Banerjee (B. Banerjee, with him), for the appellant.\n\nJ!lliO\n\nRam Gopa.l v.\n\nNa.nd Lat and\n\nOthe1~.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNana. Lal and\n\nOthers.\n\nJluleherjtJ'.l J.\n\nS. P. Sinha (N. C. Sen, with him), for the respondents.\n\n1950. November 14. The court delivered judgment as follows :- M uKHERJEA ].-This appeal is directed against an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated September 6, 1943, by which the learned Judges reversed a decision of the Civil Judge, Etawah. made in Original Suit No. 28 of 1936.\n\nThe suit was one commenced by the plaintiff, who is respondent No. 1 in this appeal, for recovery of possession of two items of immovable property-one, a residential house and other, a shop-both of which are situated in the town of Etawah.\n\nThe properties admittedly formed part of the estate of one Mangat Sen who died sometime towards the end of the last century, leaving behind him, as his heirs, his two widows, Mst. Mithani and Mst. Rani.\n\nMangat Sen had a son named Chhedi Lal and a daughter named Janki Kuar born of his wife Mst. Rani, but both of them died during his lifetime.\n\nChhedi Lal had no issue and he was survived by his widow Mst. Meria, while J anki left a son named Thakur Prasad. J anki's husband married another wife and by her got a son named Babu Ram. On Mangat Sen's death, his properties devolved upon his two widows, and Mst. Rani having died subsequently, Mst. Mithani came to hold the entire estate of her husband in the restricted rights of a Hindu widow.\n\nOn 27th November 1919, Mst.\n\nMithani surrendered the whole estate of her husband by a deed of gift in favour of Thakur Prasad who was the nearest reversioner at that time. Thakur Prasad died in 1921, leaving a minor son named Nand Lal who succeeded to his properties and this Nand Lal is the plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises.\n\nOn 27th October 1921, there was a transaction entered into between Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as guardian of infant Nand Lal on tlie one hand and Mst. Meria, the widow of Chhedi Lal, on\n\nthe other, by which two items of property which are the subject-matter of the present litigation were conveyed to Meria by a deed of transfer which has been described as a Tamliknama; and she on her part executed a deed of relinquishment renouncing her claims to every portion of the estate left by Mangal Sen. It is not disputed that Meria took possession of the properties on the basis of the Tamliknama and on 10th April 1923 she executed a will, by which these properties were bequeathed to her three nephews, who are the sons of her brother Sunder Lal. Meria died on 19th June 1924.\n\nOne Ram Dayal had obtained a money decree against. Sunder Lal and his three sons, and in execution of that decree the properties in suit were attached and put up to sale and they were purchased by Ram Dayal himself on 30th January\n\n1934. On 1st June 1936, the present suit was instituted by Nand Lal and he prayed for recovery of possession of these two items of property on the allegation that as they were given to Mst. Meria for her maintenance and residence, she could enjoy the same only so long as she lived and after her death, they reverted to the plaintiff. Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, was made the first defendant in the suit, and his three sons figured as defendants Nos. 2 to 4.\n\nDefendant No. 5 is a lady named Chimman Kunwar in whose favour Sunder Lal was alleged to have executed a deed of transfer in respect of a portion of the disputed property.\n\nRam Dayal, the decree-holder auction purchaser, died in May 1935 and his properties vested in his daughter's son Ram Gopal under a deed of gift executed by him in favour of the latter.\n\nOn 1st September 1938, Ram Gopal was added as a party defendant to the suit on the plaintiff's application and he is defendant No. 6. The two other defendants, namely, defendants 7 and 8, who were also made parties at the same time, are respectively the widow and an alleged adopted son of Ram Dayal.\n\nThe suit was contested primarily by defendant No. 6, and the substantial contentions raised by him in his written statement were of a two-fold character.\n\nRam GopaZ\n\nNana. Lal and\n\nOthera.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNa.nd Ltil and\n\nOt1uw&.\n\nMukh11rjea J.\n\nThe first and the main contention was that Mst. Meria got an absolute title to the disputed properties on the strength of the 'Tamliknama' executed in her favour by the guardian of the plaintiff and after her death, the properties passed on to the three sons of Sunder Lal who were the legatees under her will.\n\nRam Dayal, it was said, having purchased these properties in execution of a money decree against Sunder Lal and his three sons acquired a valid title to them. The other contention raised was that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Judge decided both these points m favour of the contesting defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal to the High Court, the judgment of the Civil Judge was set aside and the plaintiff's suit was decreed.\n\nThe defendant No. 6 has now come up on appeal to this court and Mr. Peary Lal Banerjee, who appeared in support of the appeal, pressed before us both the points upon which the decision of the High Court has been adverse to his client.\n\nThe first point raised by Mr. Banerjee turns upon the construction to be placed upon the document executed by Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as on behalf of Nand Lal then an infant, by which the properties in dispute were transferred to Mst. Meria by way of a 'Tamliknama'. The question is whether the transferee got, under it, an absolute interest in the properties, which was heritable and alienable or was it the interest of a life tenant merely.\n\nThe document is by no means a complicated one.\n\nIt begins by a recital of the events under which Nand Lal became the sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen and refers in this connection to the obligation on the part of both Babu Ram and Nand Lal to \"support, maintain and console\" Mst. Meria, the widow of the pre-deceased son of Mangal Sen.\n\nThe document then proceeds to state as follows :\n\n\"I have therefore, of my own accord and free will, without any compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of a double-storied pucca built shop ...... and a house\n\nand a kothri in Etawah ......... worth Rs. 8,000 for 19•0 purposes of residence of the Musammat, owned by the minor aforesaid ...... which at present stands let out on Bam Gopa.1\n\nv. rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst. Meria aforesaid ......... in favour of Mst. Meria aforesaid, widow of Chhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik). If any portion or the whole of the property made a Tamlik of for the purpose mentioned above passes out of the possession of the Musammat aforesaid on account of the claim of Nand Lal minor aforesaid, I and my property of every sort shall be responsible and liable for the same.\"\n\nNand Ji.al and\n\nThis document has got to be read along with the deed of relinquishment, which is a contemporaneous document executed by Meria renouncing all her claims to the property left by Mangal Sen. The deed of relinquishment like th<i Tamliknama recites elaborately, with reference to previous events, particularly to the deed of gift executed by Mst. Mithani in favour of Thakur Prasad, the gradual devolution of the entire estate of Mangal Sen upon Nand Lal. It states thereafter that Babu Ram, as the guardian of the minor and also in his own right, \"has under a Tamliknama dated this day made a 'Tamlik' in my favour of a shop along with a Balakhana and a kota for my maintenance and a house ....... for purpose of my residence which are quite sufficient for my maintenance.\" \"I have therefore, of my own accord\", the document goes on to say, \"made a relinquishment of the entire property aforesaid mentioned in the deed of gift ...... worth ls. 25,000.\n\nI do covenant and do give in writing that I have and shall have no claim to or concern with the property ......... belonging to the minor aforesaid, nor has the property aforesaid remained subject to my maintenance allowance nor shall I bring any claim at any time.\" The schedule to the instrument, it may be noted, gives a list of all the properties of Mangal Sen in respect to which Mst. Mithani executed a deed of gift in favour of Thakur Prasad, including the two items of property covered by the 'Tamliknama' mentioned. aforesaid.\n\n. . .r\n\nOth6TS.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nI 050\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukktrjea J.\n\nIn construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used ; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered, but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed(')· In the present case the instrument of grant has been described as a 'Tamliknama ' which means a document by which 'Maliki ' or ownership rights are transferred and the document expressly says that the grantee has been made a ' Malik' or owner. There are no express words making the gift heritable and transferable; nor on the other hand, is there any statement that the transferee would enjoy the properties only during her life-time and that they would revert to the grantor after her death.\n\nIt may be taken to be quite settled that there is no warrant for the proposition of law that when a grant of an immovable property is made to a Hindu female, she docs not get an absolute or alienable interest in such property, unless such power is expressly conferred upon her.\n\nThe reasoning adopted by Mr. Justice Mitter of the Calcutta High Court in Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Parsad(') which was approved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable. It was held by the Privy Council as early as in the case of Tagore v. Tagore(') that if an estate were given to a man without express words of inheritance, it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry, by Hindu Law, an estate of inheritance. This is the general principle of law which is recognised and embodied in section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act and unless it is shown that under Hindu Law a gift to a female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those that exist in a •widow's estate', there is no justification for departing from this principle.\n\nThere is certainly no such provision in Hindu Law and no text could be supplied in support of the same.\n\nfl) Vide Brijendra Prasad v, Gopal Prasad, 57 I.A. 296,\n\n12) H W, R, 395. (31 L.R.!, A. Supp. 47 at 65,\n\n' -\n\nThe position, therefore, is that to convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given; it is enough if words are used of such amplitude as would convey full rights of ownership.\n\nMr. Banerjee naturally lays stress upon the description of the document as •Tamliknama' and the use of the word ' Malik ' or owner in reference to the interest which it purports to convey to the transferee. The word ' Malik ' is of very common use in many parts of India and it cannot certainly be regarded as a techni. cal term of conveyancing.\n\nIn the language of the Privy Council, the term •Malik' when used in a will or other document \" as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of full proprietory rights, including a full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietory rights were not intended to be conferred(').\" This I think to be a perfectly correct statement of law and I only desire to add that it should be taken with the caution which the Judicial Committee uttered in course of the same observation that \"the meaning of every word in an Indian document must always depend upon the setting in which it is placed, the subject to which it is related and the locality of the grantor from which it receives its true shade of meaning.\"\n\nThe question before us, therefore, narrows down to this as to whether in the present case there is anything in the context of these two connected instruments or in the surrounding circumstances to cut down the full proprietory rights that the word 'Malik' ordinarily imports.\n\nThe High Court in reaching its decision adyerse to the appellant laid great stress on the fact that the grant was expressed to be for maintenance and residence of Mst. Meria. This, it is said, would prima facie indicate that the grant was to enure for the lifetime of the grantee. It is pointed out by the learned\n\n(l) Vide Sasiman Ohowdhuraif1. v 8hib Nar.'.iyaii, 49 I.A, '25, 85,\n\n.. -\n\n19!0\n\nRam Gopcil\n\nNatid Lal and\n\nOth1rs.\n\nJfukhtr jea_ J.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthe-rs.\n\n.. \\1ukherjea J,\n\nJudges that the language of the document does not show that anybody else besides the lady herself was to be benefited by the grant and the indemnity given by Babu Ram was also given to the lady personally. It is further said that if Meria was given an absolute estate in the properties comprised in the 'Tamliknama' . there was no necessity for including these two properties again in the deed of relinquishment which she executed at the same time.\n\nI do not think that the mere fact that the gift of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation could be taken to be a Prima facie indication of the intention of the donor, that the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life. time.\n\nThe extent of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the intention of the donor as expressed by the language used, and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership, the purpooe of the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interest. The desire to provide maintenance or residence of the donee would only show the motive which prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a measure of the extent of the gift.\n\nThis was laid down in clear terms by the Judicial Committee in a comparatively recent case which is to be found reported in BishunathPrasad v. Chandrika(').\n\nThere a Hindu executed a registered deed of gift of certain properties in favour of his daughter-in-law for the\" support and maintenance\" of his daughter-in-law and declared that the donee should remain absolute owner of the property (malik mustaqil) and pay Government revenue. There were no words in the document expressly making the interest heritable or conferring on the donee the power of making alienation.\n\nIt was held by the Judicial Committee that the donee took under the document, an absolute estate with powers to make alienation giving title valid after her death. In course of the judgment, Lord Blanesburgh quoted, with approval, an earlier decision of the\n\n(1) 60 I.A. 56.\n\nJudicial Committee, where the words \"for your maintenance\" occurring in a deed of gift were held insufficient to cut down to life interest the estate taken by the donees. These words, it was said, \"are quite capable of signifying that the gift was made for the purpose of enabling them to live in comfort and do not necessarily mean that it was to be limited to a bare right of maintenance.\"\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Ram Buksh v. Arjun(') in support of the contention that in a maintenance grant it is the prima Jacie in ten. tion of the gift that it should be for life. In my opinion, the decision cited is no authority for the general proposition as is contended for by the learned Counsel for the respondent, and it is to be read in the context of the actual facts of the case which relate to grants of a particular type with special features of its own. It was a case where a Talukdar made a grant of certain villages to a junior member of the joint family for maintenance of the latter. The family was governed by the Jaw of primogeniture and the estate descended to a single heir.\n\nIn such cases the usual custom is that the junior members of the family, who can get no share in the property, are entitled to provisions by way of maintenance for which assignments of lands are generally made in their favour. The extent of interest taken by the grantee in the assigned lands depends entirely upon the circumstances of the particular case, or rather upon the usage that prevails in the particular family.\n\nIn the case before the Privy Council there was actually no deed of transfer. It was an oral assignment made by the Talukdar, and the nature of the grant had to be determined upon the recitals of a petition for mutation of names made to the Revenue Department by the granter after the verbal assignment was made and from other facts and circumstances of the case. The case of Woodoya. ditta Deb v. Mukoond('), which was referred to and relied upon in the judgment of the Privy Council, was\n\n(!) 28 I.A, I.\n\n(2) 22 W, R. 229.\n\nRani Gopal\n\nv, Nand Lal an4\n\nOther~.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRam Gop:Jl\n\nNana. Lal and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukhtrjea J.\n\nalso a case of maintenance or khor phos grant made in favour of a junior member of the family, where the estate was impartible and descended under the rules of primogeniture. It was held in that case that such grants, the object of which was to make suitable provisions for the immediate members of the family, were by their very nature and also under the custom of the land resumable by the zemindar on the death of the grantee, as otherwise the whole zemindary would be swallowed up by continual demands. This principle bas obviously no application to cases of the type which we have before us and it was never so applied by the Privy Council, as would appear from the decision referred to above.\n\nThe learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent drew our attention in this connection, to the fact that the properties given by the Tamliknama' were valued at Rs. 8,000, whereas the entire estate left by Mangal Sen was worth Rs. 25,000 only. It is argued that the transfer of nearly one-third of the entire estate in absolute right to one who was entitled to maintenance merely, is, on the face of it, against probability and common sense.\n\nI do not think that, on the facts of this case, any weight could be attached to thfs argument. In the first place, it is to be noted that whatever might have been the actual market value of the properties, what the widow got under the Tamliknama was a residential house and a shop, and the shop was the only property which fetched any income. This shop, it appears, was all along in possession of Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, and the rent, which he paid or promised to pay in respect of the same, was only Rs. 12 a month.\n\nSo from the income of this property it was hardly possible for Meria to have even a bare maintenance, and this would rather support the inference that the properties were given to her absolutely and not for enjoyment merely, so long as she lived.\n\nBut what is more important is, that the object of creating these two documents, as the surrounding circumstances show, was not merely to make provision\n\nfur the maintenance of Mst. Meria ; the other and the more important object was to perfect the title of Nand Lal to the estate left by Mangal Sen and to quiet all disputes that might arise in respect of the same. It may be that Mst. Meria could not, in law, claim any. thing more than a right to be maintained out of the estate of her deceased father-in-law. But it is clear that whatever her legal rights might have been, Nand Lal's own position as the sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen was not altogether undisputed or free from any hostile attack. As has been said already, Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, was in occupation of the double-storied shop from long before the Tamliknama was executed and Meria got any legal title to it. It appears from the record that in 1920 a suit was instituted on behalf of the infant N and Lal for evicting Sunder Lal from the shop and the allegation in the plaint was that Sunder Lal was occupying the property as a tenant since the time of Mst. Mithani by taking a settlement from her. Sunder Lal in his written statement filed in that suit expressly repudiated the allegation of tenancy and also the title of Nand Lal and openly asserted that it was Mst. Meria who was the actual owner of Mangal Sen's estate. The suit ended in a compromise arrived at through the medium of arbitrators and the result was that although Sunder\n\nLal admitted the title of the plaintiff, the latter had to abandon the claims which were made in the plaint for rents, costs and damages. Sunder Lal continued to be in occupation of the shop and executed a rent agreement in respect of the same in favour of Nand Lal promising to pay a rent of Rs. 12 per month. A few months later, the Tamliknama was executed and this shop along with the residential house were given to Meria in maliki right. The recitals in both the Tamliknama and the deed of relinquishment clearly indicate that the supreme anxiety on the part of . Babu Ram, who was trying his best to safeguard the interests of the minor, was to put an end to all further disputes that might be raised by or on behalf of Mst. Meria with regard to the rights of N and Lal to the properties\n\nRtt.m Gopal\n\nNana Laland\n\nOthsra.\n\n.l!ukherj•a J.\n\n19~0\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthers.\n\nof Mangal Sen and to make his title to the same absolutely impeccable. That seems to be the reason why Meria was given a comparatively large portion of the properties left by Mangal Sen which would enable her to live in comfort and her interest was not limited to a bare right of maintenance. It is significant to note that the shop room, which was all along in possession of Sunder Lal, was included in this Tamliknama and soon after the grant was made, Sunder Lal executed a rent agreement in respect of the shop in favour of Mst. Meria acknowledging her to be the owner of the property.\n\nIt is true that the document does not make any reference to the heirs of Meria, but that is not at all necessary, nor is it essential that any express power of alienation should be given. The word \" Malik \" is too common an expression in this part of the country and its meaning and implications were fairly well settled by judicial pronouncements long before the document was executed. If really the grantee was intended to have only a life interest in the properties, there was no lack of appropriate words; perfectly well known in the locality, to express such intention.\n\nThe High Court seems to have been influenced to some extent by the fact that in the Tamliknama there was a guarantee given by Babu Ram to Meria herself and to no one else agreeing to compensate her in case she was dispossessed from the properties at the instance of Nand Lal. This covenant in the document was in the nature of a personal guarantee given by Babu Ram to Mst. Meria for the simple reason that the property belonged to an infant and it was as guardian of the minor that Babu Ram was purporting to act. It was too much to expect that Babu Ram would bind himself for all time to come and give a guarantee to the future heirs of Meria as weH. Probably no such thing was contemplated by the parties and no such undertaking was insisted upon by the other side.\n\nBut whatever the reason might be which led to the covenant being expressed in this particular form, I do not think that it has even a remote bearing on the\n\nquestion that arises for our consideration in the present case. It is of no assistance to the plaintiff in support of the construction that is sought to be put upon the document on his behalf.\n\nI am also not at all impressed by the other fact referred to in the judgment of the High Court that if the properties were given to Meria in absolute right, there was no necessity for including them again in the schedule to the deed of relinquishment which Meria executed. I fail to see how the inclusion of the properties in the deed of relinquishment would go to indicate that Meria's rights to these properties were of a restricted and not an absolute character. It is after all a pure matter of conveyancing and the two documents have to be read together as parts of one and the same transaction. Under the 'Tamliknama ', Meria got two properties in absolute right out of the estate of Mangal Sen. By the deed of relinquishment, she renoupced her claim for maintenance in respect of all the properties left by Mangal Sen including the two items which she got under the 'Tamliknama'. After the ' Tamliknama' was executed in her favour, there was no further question of her claiming any right of maintenance in respect of these two items of property. She became the absolute owner thereof in exchange of her rights of maintenance over the entire estate and this right of maintenance she gave up by the deed of relinquishment.\n\nOn a construction of the entire document, my conclusion is that there is nothing in the context of the document, or in the surrounding circumstances which would displace the presumption of full proprietary rights which the use of the word \" Malik\" is apt ordinarily to convey. The first contention of the appellant, therefore, succeeds and in view of my decision on this point, the second question does not arise for determination at all.\n\nThe result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and those of the trial Judge restored. The defendant No. 6 will have his costs from the plaintiff in all the courts. There will be no order for costs as regards the other parties.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthers.\n\nllfukherjea J\n\n1950 FAZL ALI J.-I agree with the judgment delivered\n\nRam Gopal by my learned brother, Mukherjea J.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-During the hearing of Nand Lal and the appeal I entertained doubts whether the view taken\n\nOth\"' by the High Court was not correct. But on further consideration, I find that it cannot be maintained, having regard to the terms of the ' Tamliknama ' (deed of transfer) in favour of Musammat Meria and the context in which it came into existence. The name of the document or deed does not verv much matter.\n\nThough the word 'malik ' is not a term of art, it has been held in quite a large number of cases, decided mostly by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, that the word, as employed in Indian documents, means absolute owner and that unless the context indicated a different meaning, its use would be sufficient to convey a full title even without the addition of the words, •heirs', or ' son ', 'grandson' and 'great ' grandson'. Of course, if there are other clauses in the document which control the import of the word and restrict the estate to a limited one, we must give the narrower meaning; otherwise the word must receive' its full significance. Especially is this so, when the rule of interpretation laid down in A1ohammed Shamsul\n\nv. Sewak Ram(') has come to be regarded as unsound.\n\nThe language employed in the 'Tamliknama ' (Ex. II) is almost similar to the language of the deeds construed in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab & Another(') and Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumari and Others(') where it was held that an absolute estate was conveyed.\n\nI agree that the judgment and decree of the High Court should be set aside and that the decree of the trial Judge should be restored with costs to the appellant in all the Courts. .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R.K.Kuba.\n\nAgent for the respondents: S. P. Varma.\n\nl~I '9 I.A. L\n\n(8) 60 I.A. 66.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440, "end_char": 449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 620, "end_char": 635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "RAM GOPAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 719, "end_char": 728, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAND LAL AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 752, "end_char": 771, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAND LAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 790, "end_char": 799, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mukh11rjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 814, "end_char": 831, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Etawah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a Hindu died leaving two widows, a widowed daughter in-law and a daughter's son, and a relative of the family sating as guardian of the daughter's son's son who was then the nearest reversioner got a. relinquishment deed fiom the daughter-in-law r'3nouncing all her claims to the estate and in return executed a deed of ' tamliknama' to her with respect to certain properties which ran as follows:\n\n11 I have therefore, of my own accord and free will, without any compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of a double-storied pucca built shop ......... and & house and a kothri in Etawah ......... worth Rs."}}, {"text": "Sunder Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3466, "end_char": 3476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,000 for purposee of rasidence of the Musammat (the daughter-in-law) owned by the minor aforesaid ......... which at preaent stands let out on rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst.", "canonical_name": "Sunder\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Meri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meri a aforesaid ........ .in favour of Mst, Meria aforesaid, widow of Ohhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik) \":\n\nHeld, that there was nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumetances which would displace the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the words Malik' is apt ordinarily to convey and the daughter-in-law obtained under the gift deed a full heritable and transferable title to the properties conveyed thereby.", "canonical_name": "Meria"}}, {"text": "Meria", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3539, "end_char": 3544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meri a aforesaid ........ .in favour of Mst, Meria aforesaid, widow of Ohhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik) \":\n\nHeld, that there was nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumetances which would displace the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the words Malik' is apt ordinarily to convey and the daughter-in-law obtained under the gift deed a full heritable and transferable title to the properties conveyed thereby.", "canonical_name": "Meria"}}, {"text": "Ohhedi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3565, "end_char": 3575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meri a aforesaid ........ .in favour of Mst, Meria aforesaid, widow of Ohhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik) \":\n\nHeld, that there was nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumetances which would displace the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the words Malik' is apt ordinarily to convey and the daughter-in-law obtained under the gift deed a full heritable and transferable title to the properties conveyed thereby.", "canonical_name": "Ohhedi Lal"}}, {"text": "Malik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meri a aforesaid ........ .in favour of Mst, Meria aforesaid, widow of Ohhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik) \":\n\nHeld, that there was nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumetances which would displace the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the words Malik' is apt ordinarily to convey and the daughter-in-law obtained under the gift deed a full heritable and transferable title to the properties conveyed thereby."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Yorke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. L. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. Banerjee (B. Banerjee, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4499, "end_char": 4510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. Banerjee (B. Banerjee, with him), for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "B. Banerjee"}}, {"text": "Ram Gopa.l", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4551, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J!lliO\n\nRam Gopa.l v.\n\nNa.nd Lat and\n\nOthe1~.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNana.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Ram Gopal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J!lliO\n\nRam Gopa.l v.\n\nNa.nd Lat and\n\nOthe1~.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNana.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Nana. Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4601, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J!lliO\n\nRam Gopa.l v.\n\nNa.nd Lat and\n\nOthe1~.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNana."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JluleherjtJ'.l J.\n\nS. P. Sinha (N. C. Sen, with him), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "N. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JluleherjtJ'.l J.\n\nS. P. Sinha (N. C. Sen, with him), for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Mangat Sen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The properties admittedly formed part of the estate of one Mangat Sen who died sometime towards the end of the last century, leaving behind him, as his heirs, his two widows, Mst.", "canonical_name": "Mangal Sen."}}, {"text": "Mithani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mithani and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Mithani"}}, {"text": "Rani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5457, "end_char": 5461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani."}}, {"text": "Chhedi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5491, "end_char": 5501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangat Sen had a son named Chhedi Lal and a daughter named Janki Kuar born of his wife Mst.", "canonical_name": "Ohhedi Lal"}}, {"text": "Janki Kuar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5523, "end_char": 5533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangat Sen had a son named Chhedi Lal and a daughter named Janki Kuar born of his wife Mst."}}, {"text": "J anki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meria, while J anki left a son named Thakur Prasad."}}, {"text": "Thakur Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5705, "end_char": 5718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meria, while J anki left a son named Thakur Prasad."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5785, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J anki's husband married another wife and by her got a son named Babu Ram."}}, {"text": "27th November 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27th November 1919, Mst."}}, {"text": "Mithani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mithani surrendered the whole estate of her husband by a deed of gift in favour of Thakur Prasad who was the nearest reversioner at that time.", "canonical_name": "Mithani"}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Prasad died in 1921, leaving a minor son named Nand Lal who succeeded to his properties and this Nand Lal is the plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises.", "canonical_name": "Natid Lal"}}, {"text": "27th October 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6357, "end_char": 6374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27th October 1921, there was a transaction entered into between Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as guardian of infant Nand Lal on tlie one hand and Mst."}}, {"text": "Mangal Sen.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meria, the widow of Chhedi Lal, on\n\nthe other, by which two items of property which are the subject-matter of the present litigation were conveyed to Meria by a deed of transfer which has been described as a Tamliknama; and she on her part executed a deed of relinquishment renouncing her claims to every portion of the estate left by Mangal Sen. It is not disputed that Meria took possession of the properties on the basis of the Tamliknama and on 10th April 1923 she executed a will, by which these properties were bequeathed to her three nephews, who are the sons of her brother Sunder Lal.", "canonical_name": "Mangal Sen."}}, {"text": "10th April 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6962, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meria, the widow of Chhedi Lal, on\n\nthe other, by which two items of property which are the subject-matter of the present litigation were conveyed to Meria by a deed of transfer which has been described as a Tamliknama; and she on her part executed a deed of relinquishment renouncing her claims to every portion of the estate left by Mangal Sen. It is not disputed that Meria took possession of the properties on the basis of the Tamliknama and on 10th April 1923 she executed a will, by which these properties were bequeathed to her three nephews, who are the sons of her brother Sunder Lal."}}, {"text": "19th June 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7121, "end_char": 7135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meria died on 19th June 1924."}}, {"text": "Ram Dayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ram Dayal had obtained a money decree against.", "canonical_name": "Ram Dayal"}}, {"text": "30th January\n\n1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sunder Lal and his three sons, and in execution of that decree the properties in suit were attached and put up to sale and they were purchased by Ram Dayal himself on 30th January\n\n1934."}}, {"text": "1st June 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st June 1936, the present suit was instituted by Nand Lal and he prayed for recovery of possession of these two items of property on the allegation that as they were given to Mst."}}, {"text": "Chimman Kunwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7868, "end_char": 7882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 is a lady named Chimman Kunwar in whose favour Sunder Lal was alleged to have executed a deed of transfer in respect of a portion of the disputed property."}}, {"text": "Ram Dayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8009, "end_char": 8018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Dayal, the decree-holder auction purchaser, died in May 1935 and his properties vested in his daughter's son Ram Gopal under a deed of gift executed by him in favour of the latter.", "canonical_name": "Ram Dayal"}}, {"text": "Ram Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8122, "end_char": 8131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Dayal, the decree-holder auction purchaser, died in May 1935 and his properties vested in his daughter's son Ram Gopal under a deed of gift executed by him in favour of the latter.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "1st September 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8198, "end_char": 8216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st September 1938, Ram Gopal was added as a party defendant to the suit on the plaintiff's application and he is defendant No."}}, {"text": "Ram GopaZ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8652, "end_char": 8661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram GopaZ\n\nNana.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8687, "end_char": 8696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNa.nd Ltil and\n\nOt1uw&.", "canonical_name": "Mukh11rjea"}}, {"text": "Mukh11rjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukh11rjea J.\n\nThe first and the main contention was that Mst.", "canonical_name": "Mukh11rjea"}}, {"text": "Meria", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8800, "end_char": 8805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meria got an absolute title to the disputed properties on the strength of the 'Tamliknama' executed in her favour by the guardian of the plaintiff and after her death, the properties passed on to the three sons of Sunder Lal who were the legatees under her will.", "canonical_name": "Meria"}}, {"text": "Peary Lal Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9592, "end_char": 9610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 has now come up on appeal to this court and Mr. Peary Lal Banerjee, who appeared in support of the appeal, pressed before us both the points upon which the decision of the High Court has been adverse to his client."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9790, "end_char": 9798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first point raised by Mr. Banerjee turns upon the construction to be placed upon the document executed by Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as on behalf of Nand Lal then an infant, by which the properties in dispute were transferred to Mst.", "canonical_name": "B. Banerjee"}}, {"text": "Mangal Sen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10369, "end_char": 10379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It begins by a recital of the events under which Nand Lal became the sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen and refers in this connection to the obligation on the part of both Babu Ram and Nand Lal to \"support, maintain and console\" Mst.", "canonical_name": "Mangal Sen."}}, {"text": "Nand Ji.al", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11441, "end_char": 11451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nand Ji.al and\n\nThis document has got to be read along with the deed of relinquishment, which is a contemporaneous document executed by Meria renouncing all her claims to the property left by Mangal Sen. The deed of relinquishment like th<i Tamliknama recites elaborately, with reference to previous events, particularly to the deed of gift executed by Mst."}}, {"text": "Mukktrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13015, "end_char": 13024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukktrjea J.\n\nIn construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used ; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered, but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed(')· In the present case the instrument of grant has been described as a 'Tamliknama ' which means a document by which 'Maliki ' or ownership rights are transferred and the document expressly says that the grantee has been made a ' Malik' or owner.", "canonical_name": "Mukh11rjea"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14145, "end_char": 14151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasoning adopted by Mr. Justice Mitter of the Calcutta High Court in Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Parsad(') which was approved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14159, "end_char": 14178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasoning adopted by Mr. Justice Mitter of the Calcutta High Court in Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Parsad(') which was approved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14662, "end_char": 14671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14679, "end_char": 14703, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15652, "end_char": 15657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word ' Malik ' is of very common use in many parts of India and it cannot certainly be regarded as a techni."}}, {"text": "Ram Gopcil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17281, "end_char": 17291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'.iyaii, 49 I.A, '25, 85,\n\n.. -\n\n19!0\n\nRam Gopcil\n\nNatid Lal and\n\nOth1rs.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Natid Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17293, "end_char": 17302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'.iyaii, 49 I.A, '25, 85,\n\n.. -\n\n19!0\n\nRam Gopcil\n\nNatid Lal and\n\nOth1rs.", "canonical_name": "Natid Lal"}}, {"text": "Ram Gopal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17334, "end_char": 17343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jfukhtr jea_ J.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthe-rs.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17345, "end_char": 17353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jfukhtr jea_ J.\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthe-rs.", "canonical_name": "Natid Lal"}}, {"text": "\\1ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17372, "end_char": 17382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. \\1ukherjea J,\n\nJudges that the language of the document does not show that anybody else besides the lady herself was to be benefited by the grant and the indemnity given by Babu Ram was also given to the lady personally."}}, {"text": "Blanesburgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19390, "end_char": 19401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In course of the judgment, Lord Blanesburgh quoted, with approval, an earlier decision of the\n\n(1) 60 I.A. 56."}}, {"text": "Rani Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21583, "end_char": 21593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani Gopal\n\nv, Nand Lal an4\n\nOther~.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRam Gop:Jl\n\nNana.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21621, "end_char": 21630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani Gopal\n\nv, Nand Lal an4\n\nOther~.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRam Gop:Jl\n\nNana.", "canonical_name": "Mukh11rjea"}}, {"text": "Mukhtrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21671, "end_char": 21680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhtrjea J.\n\nalso a case of maintenance or khor phos grant made in favour of a junior member of the family, where the estate was impartible and descended under the rules of primogeniture.", "canonical_name": "Mukh11rjea"}}, {"text": "Tamliknama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22518, "end_char": 22528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent drew our attention in this connection, to the fact that the properties given by the Tamliknama' were valued at Rs."}}, {"text": "Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24600, "end_char": 24603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the record that in 1920 a suit was instituted on behalf of the infant N and Lal for evicting Sunder Lal from the shop and the allegation in the plaint was that Sunder Lal was occupying the property as a tenant since the time of Mst."}}, {"text": "Sunder\n\nLal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25132, "end_char": 25143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit ended in a compromise arrived at through the medium of arbitrators and the result was that although Sunder\n\nLal admitted the title of the plaintiff, the latter had to abandon the claims which were made in the plaint for rents, costs and damages.", "canonical_name": "Sunder\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Ram Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25992, "end_char": 26001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".l!ukherj•a J.\n\n19~0\n\nRam Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ram Gopa.l"}}, {"text": "Mangal Sen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26029, "end_char": 26039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Mangal Sen and to make his title to the same absolutely impeccable.", "canonical_name": "Mangal Sen."}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30273, "end_char": 30281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Gopal\n\nNand Lal and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Natid Lal"}}, {"text": "llfukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30296, "end_char": 30307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llfukherjea J\n\n1950 FAZL ALI J.-I agree with the judgment delivered\n\nRam Gopal by my learned brother, Mukherjea J.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-During the hearing of Nand Lal and the appeal I entertained doubts whether the view taken\n\nOth\"' by the High Court was not correct."}}, {"text": "1950 FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30311, "end_char": 30324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llfukherjea J\n\n1950 FAZL ALI J.-I agree with the judgment delivered\n\nRam Gopal by my learned brother, Mukherjea J.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-During the hearing of Nand Lal and the appeal I entertained doubts whether the view taken\n\nOth\"' by the High Court was not correct."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30412, "end_char": 30432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llfukherjea J\n\n1950 FAZL ALI J.-I agree with the judgment delivered\n\nRam Gopal by my learned brother, Mukherjea J.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-During the hearing of Nand Lal and the appeal I entertained doubts whether the view taken\n\nOth\"' by the High Court was not correct."}}, {"text": "Musammat Meria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30716, "end_char": 30730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on further consideration, I find that it cannot be maintained, having regard to the terms of the ' Tamliknama ' (deed of transfer) in favour of Musammat Meria and the context in which it came into existence."}}, {"text": "R.K.Kuba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32144, "end_char": 32152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R.K.Kuba."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32182, "end_char": 32193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: S. P. Varma."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_781_792_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSARJU PERSHAD\n\nRAJA JWALESH\\VARI PRATAP NARAIN\n\nSINGH AND OTHERS [SAIYID F AZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and\n\nMUKHERJEA JJ.J\n\nPractice-Appellate court-Finding of fact depending on credibility of witnesses-Interference-Correct principle.\n\nWhen there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon tbe credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature a.bout the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with tho finding of the trial judge on a question of fact.\n\nIt would not detract from tbe value to be attached to a trial judge's finding or fact if the judge does not expressly base his conclusion upon the impressions he gathers from the demeanour of witnesses.\n\nThe rule is, however, only a. rule of practice and docs not mean that the court of first instance can be treated as illfallible in deterrnining which, side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. [Where the High Court reversed a finding of fact arrived &t by the trial court depending on oral evidence on the ground that the rule that the appellate court should be slow to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the trial judge who had seen and heard the witnesses did not apply to the case as the trial judge did not ba.se bis conclusions on the impressions created in hie mind by the witnesses who deposed before him, but upon the inherent impl'Obabi!ity of the circumstances deposed to, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach to the case was not proper and, alter weighing the whole evidence in the case, reversed the finding of the High Court.]\n\nW. O. Macdonald v. Fred Latimer (A.LR. 1929 P.O. 15 at p.18), Watts v. Thomas ([1947] A.O. 484 at p. 486), Saraveeraswami\n\nv. Talluri\n\n(A.I.R.\n\n1949 P. C. 32), Netherlandsche Handel Maatschappij v. R. M. P. Ohettiar Firm and Others (A.I.R. 1929 P.O. 202, 205), referred to.\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. LXX of 1949.\n\nAppeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.) dated the 22nd April, 1943.\n\nJOO\n\nNov. 1!.\n\nt95o M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Sri .- Narain Andley, with him), for the appellant.\n\nSarJU Pershad L . (H j U 'th h' ) f th •.\n\nP. . Banerjee . . mrigar, w1 1m , or e\n\nRaia respondents.\n\nJwaleshwari Pratap Narain\n\n1950. November 14.\n\nThe judgment of the Court\n\nS.ngh .t Others was delivered by\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an appeal against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated April 22, 1943, which reversed on appeal those of the Civil Judge of Basti dated 6th of November 1939.\n\nThe suit, out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by the plaintiff, whose successor the present appellant is, to recover a sum of Rs. 11,935 by enforcement of a simple mortgage bond. The mortgage deed is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder of Basti Raj which is an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu, the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a loan of Rs. 5,500 advanced by the mortgagee on hypothecation of certain immovable properties appertaining to the estate of the mortgagor. The loan carried interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum and there was a stipulation to pay the mortgage money within one year from the date of the bond. The mortgagor and the mortgagee were both dead at the time when the suit was instituted, and the plaintiff in the action was Ramdeo Sahu, the son and heir of the mortgagee, while the principal defendant was the eldest son of the mortgagor who succeeded to the Basti estate under the rule of primogeniture. It was stated in the plaint that absolutely nothing was paid by the mortgagor or his successor towards the mortgage dues and the plaintiff claimed the principal amount of Rs. 5,500 together with interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum up to the date of the suit.\n\nA number of pleas were taken by the contesting defendant in answer to the plaintiff's claim, most of which are not relevant for our present purpose. The\n\nIii\n\nsubstantial contentions raised by the defendant were 1950 of a three-fold character. In the first place, it was urged that the document sued upon was not a properly Sariu Ptrshad attested or validly registered document and could not 1; ia operate as a mortgage instrument in law.\n\nThe second Jwal••hwar; contention raised was that there was no consideration Pratap Narain in support of the transaction, at least to the extent of Singh .t Othm.\n\nRs. 2,000, which was represented by items 3 and 4 of the consideration clause in the document. The third Mukhorjea J. and the last material defence related to a claim for relief under the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act.\n\nThe trial Judge held in favour of the defendant on the last point mentioned above and negatived his other pleas. The result was that he made a preliminary decree for sale in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of the principal sum of Rs. 5 ,500 with interest at certain rates as are sanctioned by the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act; and agreeably to the provisions of that Act the decretal dues were directed to be paid in a number of instalments.\n\nAgainst this decision, the defendant took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad which was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Verma and York J J.\n\nThe learned Judges reversed the judgment of the trial Judge and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on one ground only, viz., that the bond was not attested in the manner required by law and consequently could not rank as a mortgage bond ; and as the suit was instituted beyond 6 years from the date of the bond, no money decree could be claimed by the plaintiff.\n\nIt is against this judgment that the plaintiff has come up on appeal to this court, and the main contention raised by the learned Attorney.General, who appeared in support of the appeal, is that in arriving at its decision on the question of attestation, the High Court approached the matter from a wrong standpoint altogether and on the materials in the record it had no justification for reversing the findings of the trial court on that point.\n\nThe question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the\n\n1950 appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case.\n\nIn such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in S(l, rju Prshad d d h\" h h v. min that it has not the a vantage w ic t e trial\n\nRaja Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of\n\nJwal., hwari observing the manner in which they deposed in court.\n\nPratap Narai\" This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies\n\nSi•gh & Othera, on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse\n\n~ 1 k-;:--.\n\nJ a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule u \" 1'a is -and it is nothing more than a rule of practice --that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some\n\nspecial feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact('). The gist of the numerous decisions on this subject was clearly summed up by Viscount Simon in Watt v. Thomas('), and his observations were adopted and reproduced in extenso by the Judicial Committee in a very recent appeal from the Madras High Court('). The observations are as follows: -·\n\n\"But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on confliciting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight.\n\nThis is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration.\n\nLike other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when\n\n(11 Vid9 Lord A•kin's obsetva.tions in lV. 0. Macdonald v. Prd Latimer,\n\nA.LR. 1929 P.O. 15, 18.\n\n(2) [1947] A.O. 484, alp. 48r..\n\n(3) Vide Saravedrcuwami v. Talluri, A.LR. 19i9 P.O. p. 32,\n\nestimating the value of verbal testimony, has the 1950 advantage (which is denied to Courts of appeal) of 8\n\n. -Pd h . th \"t b f h. d b . th ar; u 6'sha avmg e w1 nesses e ore 1m an o servmg e v manner in which their evidence is given.\" Raia It is in the light of these observations that we pro- Jwal,.hwali pose to examine the propriety of the decision of the Pratap Nar•m\n\nJ h . .\n\nSingh ~Others. learned udges of t e High Court m the present case. _ It will appear that the mortgage deed besides contain Mukherjea J. ing the signature of the executant, purports to bear the signatures of three other persons, two of whom are described as attesting witnesses <tnd the third one as the scribe. Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari purport to have signed the document as attesting witnesses and Jawala Prasad Patwari is the person who has signed it as the scribe. Jawala Prasad Tewari was admittedly dead when the suit was brought and Harbhajan Lal, the only surviving attesting witness was called on behalf of the plaintiff to prove the execution of the deed as is required under section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Harbhajan Lal stated in the witness box that he did sign the document as a witness and so did Jawala Prasad Tewari, but neither of them signed it in the presence of the mortgagor; nor did the mortgagor sign in their presence.\n\nOn this statement being made, the witness was declared hostile and he was allowed to be crossexamined by the plaintiff's Counsel.\n\nHe was crossexamined by the defendant also and in answer to the questions put to him by the defendant's lawyer, he stated that he signed the deed at the Co!lectorate Kutchery, meaning thereby the Bar Library, where he used to sit as a petition writer and the document was taken to him at that place by Bhikhi Ram Sahu, the mortgagee, Ghur Lal, a Karinda ot the mortgagor, and Jawala Prasad Patwari, the scribe.\n\nJawala Prasad Tewari signed the deed after him.\n\nThe mortgagor certainly did not come to that place and his signature was already on the deed when the witness signed it.\n\nThe details of the defendant's version relating to execution of this document were given by Jawala Prasad Patwari, who was the principal witness on the\n\n1950 side of the defendant. He says that he prepared the -- draft at the sherista or the office of the Raja Sahib SMju Porshad h\" h . \"d h\" K t 1 Th d ft v w lc lS outs1 e ls o or pa ace. e ra was Raja prepared under instructions from Bhikhi Ram, the Jwaleshwari mortgagee. and Ghur Lal, the Karinda of the mort- Pmtap Narain gagor, both of whom were present when the draft was Singh & Othm prepared. After the draft was fair copied and stamp-\n\nMukhe, Jea J. ed, the witness signed it as the scribe and then it was taken by Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal to the Kot or palace of the Raja for his signature.\n\nAfter obtaining the Raja's signature, Bhikhi Ram went away to his house and some time later he as well as Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal went to the Collectorate Kutchery, where they took the signatures of Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari.\n\nThey then went to the registration office, where the document was presented for registration by Jainarayan Sukul who held a general power of attorney for the Raja.\n\nAs against this, there is a completely different version given by the plaintiff himself and his witness Buddhu Lal.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff, the document was executed and attested at one and the same sitting in the Kot or palace of the Raja; the terms had been settled beforehand between Bhikhi Ram and the mortgagor and on the 8th of November 1926 the plaintiff himself, and not his father, went to the Raja's palace at about 10 or 11 A. M. in the morning to get the document executed. He was accompanied by three persons to wit Harbhajan Lal, the deed writer of his father, Buddhu Lal, an old servant of the family, and Jawala Prasad Tewari who was also well known to the plaintiff and was taken to bear witness to the deed.\n\nThey found Jawala Prasad Patwari already with the Raja when they reached the Kot.\n\nThe draft was prepared by Buddhu Lal at the suggestion of the Raja. It was the plaintiff's desire that the final document should be scribed by Harbhajan Lal but as the Raja wanted to oblige Jawala Prasad Patwari, who was the Patwari of Basti proper, the deed was faired out and scribed by Jawala Prasad Patwari.\n\nAfter the Raja had put his signature on the\n\ndocument in the presence of Harbhajan Lal and mo Tewari, both the latter signed the document in the f l R Th b d Sarju Pershad presence o tie aia. e su sequent events narrate by the plaintiff relate to the registration of the docun:ja ment and we do not consider them to be material for Jwaleshwari our present purpose.\n\nPratap Narnin This story of the plaintiff is supported materially Singhllim. and on all points by Buddhu Lal, who was an old .•lukhecjea J. servant of the family, though he was no longer in service when he deposed in court.\n\nThere were thus two conflicting versions placed before the court and each side attempted to substantiate its case by verbal testimony of witnesses.\n\nThe trial Judge was to decide which of the two versions was correct and he accepted the story of the plaintiff and rejected that of the defendant.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court in dealing with the appeal do observe, at the beginning of their discussions, that on a question of fact the appellate court should be slow to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the trial Judge who had seen and heard the witnesses; but in their opinion, this rule did not apply to the present case as the trial Judge here did not base his conclusions on the impressions created in his mind by the witnesses who deposed before him.\n\nWhat the trial Judge relied upon, it is said, was not the demeanour of the witnesses as index of their credibility but upon the inherent improbability of the circumstances deposed to by the defendant's witnesses.\n\nIt is observed by the High Court that the trial Judge, when he found the defendant's story to be improbable, should have considered whether or not there were improbable features in the plaintiff's case also, and _whether the evidence of the plaintiff and his servant Buddhu Lal merited credence at all. The learned Judges of the High Court then proceed to examine and discuss at great length the different reasons put forward by the trial Judge in support of his finding that the defendant's case was unreliable.\n\nThese reasons are held to be inconclusive and unsound and tne High Court further found that the plaintiff's story\n\n.. ,\n\n19;0 as narrated by him and his servant is improbable and not worthy of belief.\n\nSwju Pershad\n\nIn our opinion, the High C0urt's approach to the\n\nRaia case has not been proper and its findings are un-\n\nJwaleskwari supportable on the materials in the record.\n\n:ratp, t;;:'\" Here was a case where the controversy related to a mg\"__ \"\"pure question of fact which had to be determined by\n\n,\\fakheriea J. weighing and appraising of conflicting oral testimony adduced by the parties. It cannot be denied that in estimating the value of oral testimony, the trial Judge, who sees and hears the witnesses, has an advantage which the appellate court does not possess.\n\nThe High Court was wrong in thinking that it would detract from the value to be attached to a trial Judge's finding of fact if the Judge does not expressly base his conclusion upon the impressions he gathers from the demeanour of witnesses (I). The duty of the appellate court in such cases is to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, outweighs such finding.\n\nApplying this principle to the present case, we do not think that the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Judge on the question of attestiation of the document. In the opinion of the High Court the story narrated by the plaintiff and his servant is untrue, and the main reason given is that it is not at all probable that the plaintiff and not his father Bhikhi Ram was present at the palace of the Raja when the document was executed. The mortgagor, it is said, was an influential person in the locality occupying a very high social position and it would be indecorous and against Indian customs for a man like Bhikhi Ram not to be personally present when the Raja was going to execute a document in his favour. The learned Judges seem to think that the plaintiff was not really at the spot when the mortgage deed was executed and as Bhikhi Ram was dead, this story was manufactured by the plain tiff in order to\n\nfll Vida ihe observa.tions of Lord Carson in Netherlatt.dsche Handel .\\faatscha:ppij v, R.M, P. Ghettir Firm ad Others, A.LR. 1929 P.C. 20J, '..105,\n\nenable him to prove attestation. Mr. Banerjee appear- 1s5o ing for the defendant respondent went to the length . - of suggesting that it was only after Harbhajan Lal sar, u Persha<i\n\nturned hostile in the witness box and denied that he R; j. attested the document that the new story was invent- Jwaleshwari ed by the plaintiff.\n\nPratop Narain We think that this argument rests on an extremely Smgh .t OthM. flimsy basis which does not bear examination. It Muk;;;;.a J. may be that the Raja was a man of high social position, but it should be remembered that he was in the position of a borrower and moreover it was not the first time that he was borrowing money from Bhikhi Ram.\n\nAs, however, he was the Raja of Basti, the document was executed at his palace and not in the house of the mortgagee and if as the plaintiff says, the terms were already settled between Bhikhi Ram and the Raja and the only thing left was to embody the agreed terms in writing, we fail to see why it was absolutely necessary for Bhikhi Ram to wait upon the mortgagor personally; and why his adult son, who was sufficiently old and experienced in business affairs, could not represent him in the transaction.\n\nThe suggestion of Mr. Banerjee that the new story was invented after the plaintiff had seen Harbhajan Lal giving evidence against him in the witness box 1s not worthy of serious consideration having regard to the fact that the plaintiff himself stepped into the witness box immediately after Harbhajan Lal had finished his deposition.\n\nIt seems to us also that the presence of Harbhajan Lal and Buddhu Lal at the sitting when the mortgage transaction took place was quite a probable and natural thing which cannot give rise to any suspicion.\n\nIt appears from the evidence on the record that Harbhajan Lal, who was a professional deed writer, was usually employed for writing deeds of the plaintiff's father and he figured either as a scribe or as an attesting witness in various documents to which the plaintiff's father was a party. It was quite natural for the plaintiff in such circumstances to take Harbhajan Lal _ along with him to the Raja's palace on the day that th(!\n\n1950 mortgage bond was executed and we see no reason to . -- disbelieve the plaintiff's statement that his original 8\"'1u p.,, had intention was to have the deed scribed by Harbhajan v.\n\nRaja Lal. It is said by the High Court that in the mofussil Jwaleshwari districts in the United Provinces the Patwari is the Pratap Narain person generally .employed for drafting and scribing Singh & Others. deeds.\n\nThis cannot mean that all the people in the district of Basti used to have their deeds drafted and Jfukherjea J. scribed by the Patwari. We have exhibited documents in the records of this case where the name of Harbhajan Lal appears as the scribe; and so far as the plaintiff's father was concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever that Harbhajan Lal was the scribe ordinarily employed to do his work. In this case also if Jawala Prasad Patwari had not been present on the spot, the plaintiff would certainly have the document scribed by Harbhajan Lal, as so many documents in favour of the plaintiff's father had been scfibed by this man on previous occasions.\n\nWe see nothing improbable in the story that it was out of deference to the wishes of the Raja that the plaintiff consented to the document being scribed by Jawala Prasad Patwari.\n\nAs regards Buddhu Lal, it is not disputed that he was an old and a trusted servant of the plaintiff's family. That he was trusted in business matters is clear from the fact that his name appears as a witness in the registered receipt (Ex. 10) given by Sheo Balak Ram, to whom a sum of Rs. 500 was paid by Bhikhi Ram under the terms of the disputed mortgage deed.\n\nWe fail to see why it was improbable that Buddhu Lal would accompany the plaintiff to the Raja's palace on the day of the execution of the document.\n\nThe trial Judge relied to some extent upon the fact that the signatures of the executant and Harbhajan Lal were in the same ink in support of his conclusion that Harbhajan Lal signed the document at the place of its execution and not at the Collectorate Kutchery as alleged by him. Speaking for ourselves, we do not attach much importance to the similarity in the ink which is after all not a very reliable test ; but we do agree with the trial Judge in holding that Harbhajan ....\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT H.EPORTS 791\n\n1950 Lal must have signed the document at the time when it was executed and not afterwards; and it is really Sarju Pe,.shad inconceivable that an old and experienced deed writer v. like him did not know the requirements of proper Raja attestation. On his own evidence he had attested Jwaleshwari numerous documents and he could not recall a single Pratap Narai\" instance where he signed the document in such manner Singh &o Others. as he did in the present case. The way in which the Mukherjea J. learned Judges of the High Court have attempted to explain away this part of Harbhajan Lal's evidence does not appear to be satisfactory. The other observation made by the High Court in this connection that in this particular province there are many persons who are acquainted with law but do nnt care to comply with its requirements on accouut of carelessness, indifference, sloth or over-confidence is not relevant and need not be taken seriously.\n\nWhatever that may be, we have no hesitation in holding that Harbhajan Lal knew perfectly well what attestation means in law and he did sign the document as an attesting witness at the Raja's Kot after the document was executed.\n\nJawala Prasad Patwari is apparently a man under the control of the defendant and cannot be trusted.\n\nWhy Harbhajan Lal did go over to the defendant's side is a question which may not admit of an easy answer. The trial Judge seems to be of opinion that it was probably due to the influence exercised by Jaw ala Prasad Patwari, who is a co-villager of Harbhajan.\n\nWe think it unnecessary to speculate upon these matters, for ill our opinion Harbhajan Lal stands condemned by his own statement in court.\n\nOur conclusion is that the finding of the trial Judge on the question of attestation is perfectly consistent with the circumstances and probabilities of the case and the learned Judge did not omit anything which ought to have been present to his mind in coming to a conclusion.\n\nThe evidence on the record taken as a whole fully supports the finding, and in our opinion the High Court has reversed it on totally inadequate grounds. The result is that the appeal must be\n\nil\\1Jwd ind the judgment of tlle Higl1 Court should be\n\n1950 set aside. As the High Court, however, has dismissed -- the suit only on the ground of non-attestation of the Sarju Pmhad mortgage bond and did not consider the other points\n\n;; ja which were raised before it, the case must go. back to Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the\n\nSingh & Others. learned Judges and the case disposed of in accordance with law. The plaintiff appellant is entitled to costs of\n\nfakherjea J. this hearing as well as the costs of the High Court\n\nNov. 30.\n\nagainst defendant No. 1.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Rajindar Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents: 5. P. Varma.\n\nA. M. MAIR & CO.\n\nGORDHANDASS SAGARMULL. [SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.] Arbitration-Contract by broer for sale of goods by \"sold\" and \"bought\" notes-Arbitration clause-Seller denying right of b•roker to enforce arbitral ,; nn clause-~J urisdiction of arbitrators- Valid, ity of award-Construction of contract.\n\nThe appellants, a firm of brokers, entered into a' contract for the sale and purchase of a quantity of jute under a ''sold note\"\n\naddressed to the respondents which they signed as \" A & Co.,\n\nbrokers\" and a \"bought note\" of the same date and for the same quantity of jute addressed to a third person in which also they signed as ' 1 A & Co., brokers\".\n\nThe\" sold note\" contained the usual arbitration clause under which '' all matters, questions, disputes, differences and/.or. cla.ims, arising out of and/or concerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating to, the contract ......... shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.\" A dispute having arisen with regard to a matter wbich admittedly arose out of the contract evidenced by the sold note, the appellants referred the dispute for arbitration.\n\nThe respondents raised before the arbitrators the further contention that as the appellants were only brokers they were not entitled to refer the matter to arbitration.\n\nThe arbitrators made an award in favour of the appellants.\n\nThe respondents wade an application to the High Court under the Indian Arbitration Act for setting aside the award: Held that,. assuming that it was open to the respondents to raise this objection at that stage, inasmuch as this further dispute -", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "SARJU PERSHAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Sarju Pe,.shad", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJA JWALESH\\VARI PRATAP NARAIN\n\nSINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA JWALESH\\VARI PRATAP NARAIN\n\nSINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID F AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID F AZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the High Court reversed a finding of fact arrived &t by the trial court depending on oral evidence on the ground that the rule that the appellate court should be slow to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the trial judge who had seen and heard the witnesses did not apply to the case as the trial judge did not ba.se bis conclusions on the impressions created in hie mind by the witnesses who deposed before him, but upon the inherent impl'Obabi!ity of the circumstances deposed to, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach to the case was not proper and, alter weighing the whole evidence in the case, reversed the finding of the High Court.]"}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Yorke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2229, "end_char": 2234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Yorke"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2289, "end_char": 2303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t95o M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Sri .- Narain Andley, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2340, "end_char": 2353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t95o M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Sri .- Narain Andley, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "SarJU Pershad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2386, "end_char": 2399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SarJU Pershad L . (", "canonical_name": "Sarju Pe,.shad"}}, {"text": "P. . Banerjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2429, "end_char": 2442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H j U 'th h' ) f th •.\n\nP. ."}}, {"text": "Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2596, "end_char": 2605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court\n\nS.ngh .t Others was delivered by\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an appeal against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated April 22, 1943, which reversed on appeal those of the Civil Judge of Basti dated 6th of November 1939.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA JJ"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court\n\nS.ngh .t Others was delivered by\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an appeal against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated April 22, 1943, which reversed on appeal those of the Civil Judge of Basti dated 6th of November 1939.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA JJ"}}, {"text": "8th of March 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgage deed is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder of Basti Raj which is an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu, the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3087, "end_char": 3122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgage deed is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder of Basti Raj which is an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu, the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a loan of Rs.", "canonical_name": "RAJA JWALESH\\VARI PRATAP NARAIN\n\nSINGH"}}, {"text": "Basti Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgage deed is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder of Basti Raj which is an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu, the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bhikhiram Sahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3235, "end_char": 3249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgage deed is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder of Basti Raj which is an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu, the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a loan of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Bhikhi Ram Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ramdeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3288, "end_char": 3294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgage deed is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder of Basti Raj which is an impartible estate governed by the rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu, the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a loan of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ramdeo Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ramdeo Sahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgagor and the mortgagee were both dead at the time when the suit was instituted, and the plaintiff in the action was Ramdeo Sahu, the son and heir of the mortgagee, while the principal defendant was the eldest son of the mortgagor who succeeded to the Basti estate under the rule of primogeniture.", "canonical_name": "Ramdeo Sahu"}}, {"text": "Pratap Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second Jwal••hwar; contention raised was that there was no consideration Pratap Narain in support of the transaction, at least to the extent of Singh .t Othm.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Narain"}}, {"text": "Mukhorjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third Mukhorjea J. and the last material defence related to a claim for relief under the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief Act.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA JJ"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision, the defendant took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad which was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Verma and York J J.\n\nThe learned Judges reversed the judgment of the trial Judge and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on one ground only, viz.,"}}, {"text": "York", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision, the defendant took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad which was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Verma and York J J.\n\nThe learned Judges reversed the judgment of the trial Judge and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on one ground only, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Yorke"}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6732, "end_char": 6736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in S(l, rju Prshad d d h\" h h v. min that it has not the a vantage w ic t e trial\n\nRaja Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of\n\nJwal.,", "canonical_name": "Raja"}}, {"text": "Pratap Narai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratap Narai\" This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies\n\nSi•gh & Othera, on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse\n\n~ 1 k-;:--.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Narain"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7853, "end_char": 7870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gist of the numerous decisions on this subject was clearly summed up by Viscount Simon in Watt v. Thomas('), and his observations were adopted and reproduced in extenso by the Judicial Committee in a very recent appeal from the Madras High Court(')."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9200, "end_char": 9205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh ~Others."}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9511, "end_char": 9524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari purport to have signed the document as attesting witnesses and Jawala Prasad Patwari is the person who has signed it as the scribe."}}, {"text": "Jawala Prasad Tewari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari purport to have signed the document as attesting witnesses and Jawala Prasad Patwari is the person who has signed it as the scribe."}}, {"text": "Jawala Prasad Patwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9613, "end_char": 9634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari purport to have signed the document as attesting witnesses and Jawala Prasad Patwari is the person who has signed it as the scribe."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9899, "end_char": 9909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9917, "end_char": 9936, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhikhi Ram Sahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10598, "end_char": 10613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was crossexamined by the defendant also and in answer to the questions put to him by the defendant's lawyer, he stated that he signed the deed at the Co!lectorate Kutchery, meaning thereby the Bar Library, where he used to sit as a petition writer and the document was taken to him at that place by Bhikhi Ram Sahu, the mortgagee, Ghur Lal, a Karinda ot the mortgagor, and Jawala Prasad Patwari, the scribe.", "canonical_name": "Bhikhi Ram Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ghur Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10630, "end_char": 10638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was crossexamined by the defendant also and in answer to the questions put to him by the defendant's lawyer, he stated that he signed the deed at the Co!lectorate Kutchery, meaning thereby the Bar Library, where he used to sit as a petition writer and the document was taken to him at that place by Bhikhi Ram Sahu, the mortgagee, Ghur Lal, a Karinda ot the mortgagor, and Jawala Prasad Patwari, the scribe.", "canonical_name": "Ghur Lal"}}, {"text": "Jawala Prasad Patwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10672, "end_char": 10693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was crossexamined by the defendant also and in answer to the questions put to him by the defendant's lawyer, he stated that he signed the deed at the Co!lectorate Kutchery, meaning thereby the Bar Library, where he used to sit as a petition writer and the document was taken to him at that place by Bhikhi Ram Sahu, the mortgagee, Ghur Lal, a Karinda ot the mortgagor, and Jawala Prasad Patwari, the scribe.", "canonical_name": "Jaw ala Prasad Patwari"}}, {"text": "Jawala Prasad Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawala Prasad Tewari signed the deed after him.", "canonical_name": "Jaw ala Prasad Patwari"}}, {"text": "Bhikhi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11267, "end_char": 11277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e ra was Raja prepared under instructions from Bhikhi Ram, the Jwaleshwari mortgagee.", "canonical_name": "Bhikhi Ram Sahu"}}, {"text": "Pmtap Narain gagor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ghur Lal, the Karinda of the mort- Pmtap Narain gagor, both of whom were present when the draft was Singh & Othm prepared."}}, {"text": "Mukhe", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11477, "end_char": 11482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the draft was fair copied and stamp-\n\nMukhe, Jea J. ed, the witness signed it as the scribe and then it was taken by Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal to the Kot or palace of the Raja for his signature."}}, {"text": "Gbur Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the draft was fair copied and stamp-\n\nMukhe, Jea J. ed, the witness signed it as the scribe and then it was taken by Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal to the Kot or palace of the Raja for his signature.", "canonical_name": "Ghur Lal"}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11608, "end_char": 11612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the draft was fair copied and stamp-\n\nMukhe, Jea J. ed, the witness signed it as the scribe and then it was taken by Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal to the Kot or palace of the Raja for his signature.", "canonical_name": "Raja"}}, {"text": "Harbhajan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11832, "end_char": 11845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After obtaining the Raja's signature, Bhikhi Ram went away to his house and some time later he as well as Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal went to the Collectorate Kutchery, where they took the signatures of Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari.", "canonical_name": "Harbhajan Lal"}}, {"text": "Jainarayan Sukul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They then went to the registration office, where the document was presented for registration by Jainarayan Sukul who held a general power of attorney for the Raja."}}, {"text": "Buddhu Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12142, "end_char": 12152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against this, there is a completely different version given by the plaintiff himself and his witness Buddhu Lal."}}, {"text": "8th of November 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12370, "end_char": 12390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the plaintiff, the document was executed and attested at one and the same sitting in the Kot or palace of the Raja; the terms had been settled beforehand between Bhikhi Ram and the mortgagor and on the 8th of November 1926 the plaintiff himself, and not his father, went to the Raja's palace at about 10 or 11 A. M. in the morning to get the document executed."}}, {"text": "Buddhu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12618, "end_char": 12628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was accompanied by three persons to wit Harbhajan Lal, the deed writer of his father, Buddhu Lal, an old servant of the family, and Jawala Prasad Tewari who was also well known to the plaintiff and was taken to bear witness to the deed."}}, {"text": "Basti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13089, "end_char": 13094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the plaintiff's desire that the final document should be scribed by Harbhajan Lal but as the Raja wanted to oblige Jawala Prasad Patwari, who was the Patwari of Basti proper, the deed was faired out and scribed by Jawala Prasad Patwari."}}, {"text": "mo Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13257, "end_char": 13266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Raja had put his signature on the\n\ndocument in the presence of Harbhajan Lal and mo Tewari, both the latter signed the document in the f l R Th b d Sarju Pershad presence o tie aia."}}, {"text": "Sarju Pershad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13324, "end_char": 13337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Raja had put his signature on the\n\ndocument in the presence of Harbhajan Lal and mo Tewari, both the latter signed the document in the f l R Th b d Sarju Pershad presence o tie aia.", "canonical_name": "Sarju Pe,.shad"}}, {"text": "Jwaleshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13498, "end_char": 13509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e su sequent events narrate by the plaintiff relate to the registration of the docun:ja ment and we do not consider them to be material for Jwaleshwari our present purpose."}}, {"text": "Pratap Narnin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13532, "end_char": 13545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratap Narnin This story of the plaintiff is supported materially Singhllim.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Narain"}}, {"text": "Singhllim", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13598, "end_char": 13607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratap Narnin This story of the plaintiff is supported materially Singhllim.", "canonical_name": "Singhllim"}}, {"text": ".•lukhecjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13657, "end_char": 13668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and on all points by Buddhu Lal, who was an old .•lukhecjea J. servant of the family, though he was no longer in service when he deposed in court."}}, {"text": "Swju Pershad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15460, "end_char": 15472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Swju Pershad\n\nIn our opinion, the High C0urt's approach to the\n\nRaia case has not been proper and its findings are un-\n\nJwaleskwari supportable on the materials in the record."}}, {"text": "\\fakheriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15764, "end_char": 15774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":ratp, t;;:'\" Here was a case where the controversy related to a mg\" \"\"pure question of fact which had to be determined by\n\n,\\fakheriea J. weighing and appraising of conflicting oral testimony adduced by the parties."}}, {"text": "fll Vida", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17532, "end_char": 17540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges seem to think that the plaintiff was not really at the spot when the mortgage deed was executed and as Bhikhi Ram was dead, this story was manufactured by the plain tiff in order to\n\nfll Vida ihe observa.tions of Lord Carson in Netherlatt.dsche Handel .\\faatscha:ppij v, R.M, P. Ghettir Firm ad Others, A.LR."}}, {"text": "Carson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17567, "end_char": 17573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges seem to think that the plaintiff was not really at the spot when the mortgage deed was executed and as Bhikhi Ram was dead, this story was manufactured by the plain tiff in order to\n\nfll Vida ihe observa.tions of Lord Carson in Netherlatt.dsche Handel .\\faatscha:ppij v, R.M, P. Ghettir Firm ad Others, A.LR."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17719, "end_char": 17727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Banerjee appear- 1s5o ing for the defendant respondent went to the length . -", "canonical_name": "Banerjee"}}, {"text": "Pratop Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18011, "end_char": 18024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratop Narain We think that this argument rests on an extremely Smgh .t OthM. flimsy basis which does not bear examination.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Narain"}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18892, "end_char": 18900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suggestion of Mr. Banerjee that the new story was invented after the plaintiff had seen Harbhajan Lal giving evidence against him in the witness box 1s not worthy of serious consideration having regard to the fact that the plaintiff himself stepped into the witness box immediately after Harbhajan Lal had finished his deposition.", "canonical_name": "Banerjee"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20226, "end_char": 20231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said by the High Court that in the mofussil Jwaleshwari districts in the United Provinces the Patwari is the Pratap Narain person generally .employed for drafting and scribing Singh & Others.", "canonical_name": "Singhllim"}}, {"text": "Jfukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20349, "end_char": 20359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This cannot mean that all the people in the district of Basti used to have their deeds drafted and Jfukherjea J. scribed by the Patwari."}}, {"text": "Patwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20378, "end_char": 20385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This cannot mean that all the people in the district of Basti used to have their deeds drafted and Jfukherjea J. scribed by the Patwari."}}, {"text": "Sheo Balak Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21342, "end_char": 21356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10) given by Sheo Balak Ram, to whom a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Harbhajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22071, "end_char": 22080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for ourselves, we do not attach much importance to the similarity in the ink which is after all not a very reliable test ; but we do agree with the trial Judge in holding that Harbhajan ....\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT H.EPORTS 791\n\n1950 Lal must have signed the document at the time when it was executed and not afterwards; and it is really Sarju Pe,.shad inconceivable that an old and experienced deed writer v. like him did not know the requirements of proper Raja attestation.", "canonical_name": "Harbhajan Lal"}}, {"text": "Sarju Pe,.shad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22232, "end_char": 22246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for ourselves, we do not attach much importance to the similarity in the ink which is after all not a very reliable test ; but we do agree with the trial Judge in holding that Harbhajan ....\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT H.EPORTS 791\n\n1950 Lal must have signed the document at the time when it was executed and not afterwards; and it is really Sarju Pe,.shad inconceivable that an old and experienced deed writer v. like him did not know the requirements of proper Raja attestation.", "canonical_name": "Sarju Pe,.shad"}}, {"text": "Jaw ala Prasad Patwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23602, "end_char": 23624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Judge seems to be of opinion that it was probably due to the influence exercised by Jaw ala Prasad Patwari, who is a co-villager of Harbhajan.", "canonical_name": "Jaw ala Prasad Patwari"}}, {"text": "Prntap Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24636, "end_char": 24649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "back to Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the\n\nSingh & Others.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Narain"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24704, "end_char": 24709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "back to Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the\n\nSingh & Others.", "canonical_name": "Singhllim"}}, {"text": "fakherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24833, "end_char": 24842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff appellant is entitled to costs of\n\nfakherjea J. this hearing as well as the costs of the High Court\n\nNov. 30."}}, {"text": "Rajindar Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 24992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Rajindar Narain."}}, {"text": "P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25025, "end_char": 25033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Varma."}}, {"text": "GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25054, "end_char": 25075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL. ["}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25078, "end_char": 25092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID F AZL ALI"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25094, "end_char": 25110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Bengal Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26030, "end_char": 26056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cla.ims, arising out of and/or concerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating to, the contract ......... shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.\""}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_792_798_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\n1950 set aside. As the High Court, however, has dismissed -- the suit only on the ground of non-attestation of the Sarju Pmhad mortgage bond and did not consider the other points\n\n;; ja which were raised before it, the case must go. back to Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the\n\nSingh & Others. learned Judges and the case disposed of in accordance with law. The plaintiff appellant is entitled to costs of\n\nfakherjea J. this hearing as well as the costs of the High Court\n\nNov. 30.\n\nagainst defendant No. 1.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Rajindar Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents: 5. P. Varma.\n\nA. M. MAIR & CO.\n\nGORDHANDASS SAGARMULL. [SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.] Arbitration-Contract by broer for sale of goods by \"sold\" and \"bought\" notes-Arbitration clause-Seller denying right of b•roker to enforce arbitral ,; nn clause-~J urisdiction of arbitrators- Valid, ity of award-Construction of contract.\n\nThe appellants, a firm of brokers, entered into a' contract for the sale and purchase of a quantity of jute under a ''sold note\"\n\naddressed to the respondents which they signed as \" A & Co.,\n\nbrokers\" and a \"bought note\" of the same date and for the same quantity of jute addressed to a third person in which also they signed as ' 1 A & Co., brokers\".\n\nThe\" sold note\" contained the usual arbitration clause under which '' all matters, questions, disputes, differences and/.or. cla.ims, arising out of and/or concerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating to, the contract ......... shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.\" A dispute having arisen with regard to a matter wbich admittedly arose out of the contract evidenced by the sold note, the appellants referred the dispute for arbitration.\n\nThe respondents raised before the arbitrators the further contention that as the appellants were only brokers they were not entitled to refer the matter to arbitration.\n\nThe arbitrators made an award in favour of the appellants.\n\nThe respondents wade an application to the High Court under the Indian Arbitration Act for setting aside the award: Held that,. assuming that it was open to the respondents to raise this objection at that stage, inasmuch as this further dispute -\n\nwas also one which turned on the true interpretation of the 1950 contraet a.nd the reSpondents must have recourse to the contract to estJ.blish their claim, this was also a dispute arising out of or .4, M. Mair & Co. concerning the contract and as such fell within the arbitration v. clause, and the award could not be set a.side under the Indian Gordhandass\n\nArbitration Act, 1.940, on the ground that it was beyond iuris- Sagarmull. diction and void.\n\nHeyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1942] A.O. 356)referred to.\n\nAPPELL.ATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. XLII of 1950.\n\nAppeal from the judgment of the Calcutta H!gh Court (Harries C.J. and Chakravarthi J.) in Appeal from Original Order No. 78 of 1948. , N. C. Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him), for the appellants.\n\nA. N. Grover, for the respondents.\n\n1950. November 30. The judgment of Faz! Ali and Patanjali Sastri JJ. was delivered by\n\nF .AZ'L ALI J .-This is an appeal from a judgment of a E'azl Ali J.\n\nBench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in West Bengal, reversing the decision of a single Judge of that Court, who had refused to set aside an award given by the arbitration tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on a submission made by the respondents.\n\nThe facts of the case are as follows.\n\nOn the 25th January, 1946, the appellants entered into a contract with the respondents for the sale of 5,000 maunds of jute, which was evidenced by a \"sold\n\nnote\" (Exhibit A), which is in the form of a letter addressed to the respondents, commencing with these words: \"We have this day sold by your order and for your account to the undersigned, etc.\" The word\n\n\"undersigned \" admittedly refers to the appellants, and, at the end of the contract, below their signature, the word \"brokers\" is written. On the same day, a\n\n\"bought note\" (Exhibit B) was addressed by the appellants to the Bengal Jute Mill Company, with the following statement: \"We have this day bought by your ortler and for your account from the undersigned,\n\ni9.10 etc.\" In this note also, the word \"undersigned\" refers --:- & 0 to the appellants, and, underneath their signature, the A. M. ~r\n\n0 • word \"brokers\" appears, as in the \"sold note.\" There\n\nGordhandass are various provisions in the sold note, relating to\n\nSagarn1ull. delivery of jute, non-delivery of documents, non- . acceptance of documents, claims, etc., but the most Fa•' Ali J. material provisions are to be found in paragraphs 10 and 11. Paragraph 10 provides that the sellers may in certain cases be granted an .extension of time for\n\ndivering the jute for a period not exceeding thirty days from the due date free of all penalties, and if the contract is not implemented within the extended period, the buyers would be entitled to several options, one of them being to cancel the contract and charge the sellers the difference between the contract rate and the market rate on the day on which the option is declared. In the same paragraph, there is another provision to the -following effect : ·-\n\n\" Sellers shall notify Buyers that goods will or will not be shipped within such extended period rferred to in (a) and in the case of sellers intimating that they will be unable to ship within the extended time Buyers shall exercise their option within 5 working days of receiving notice and notify Sellers. In the absence of any such notice from Sellers it shall be deemed that the goods have not been shipped 'and Buyers shall exercise their option within 5 working days after expiration of extended date and notify Sellers.\"\n\nThe 11th paragraph provides among other things that •all matters, questions, disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of and/or concerning and/or in connection and/or in consequence of or relatiµg to this Contract whether or not obligations of either or both parties under this contract be subsisting at the time of such disputes and whether or not this contract has been terminated or purported to be terminated or completed shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce under the rules of its Tribunal of Arbitration for the time being in force and according to such rules the arbitration shall be conducted.\" •\n\nIt is common ground that the respondents delivered 1950 2,256 maunds of jute under . the contract, but the --:- h l f 2 744 d Id t b d 1. d \"th\" A. M. Ma>r&Co. a ance o , maun s cou no e e ivere w1 m the stipulated period, and, by mutual agreement, time Gord; ndass\n\nwas extended up to the 30th June, 1946. On the 2nd Sa.garmul!.\n\nJuly, 1946, the respondents addressed a letter to the appellants stating that the balance of jute could not be Fazl Ali J. despatched owing to lack of wagons, and \"extension\" was requested for a period of one month. •Jn reply to this letter, which was received by the appellants on or about the 3rd July, 1946, time was extended till the 31st July, 1946. On the same day on which the reply was received by the respondents, i.e., on the 9th July, 1946, they addressed a letter to the appellants pointing out that the extension of time had not been intimated within the 5th working day as provided in the contract and therefore the contract was automatically cancelled.\n\nAfter this letter, some further correspondence followed between the two parties, and finally a bill of difference amounting to Rs. 4, 116 .was submitted by the appellants to the respondents, who, in their turn, denied their liability to pay the sum. The appellants thereupon claimed arbitration under Clause 11 of the sold note and submitted the dispute between them and the respondents to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. On the 6th February, 1947, the Tribunal of Arbitration made an award to the effect that the due date of contract had been extended by mutual agreement up to the 31st July, 1946, and accordingly the respondents .should pay to the appellants a sum of Rs. 4,116 together with interest at the rate of 4% per annum from the 10th August, 1946, until the date of the award.\n\nA sum of Rs. 210 was also held to be payable by the respondents on account of costs. Nearly a year later, on the 19th February, 1949, a petition was presented by the respondents under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, to the High Court at Calcutta, in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, praying inter alia that the award may be adjudged to be without jurisdiction and void and not binding on the respondents, and that it may be set aside. The main point raised by the\n\n1950 respondents in the petition was that it was not open to -- the appellants to invoke the arbitration clause, as the A.kI.l.!air&Oo.B lJ t \"1·11c d th 11 t v. enga u e n L ompany an no t e appe an s were\n\nGordha•dass the real party to the contract and the appellants had sagarmult. acted as mere brokers. The appellants asserted in reply that the allegation made by the respondents in regard Fazl Ali J. to there being no privity between them and the appellants was wrong. and in paragraph 16 of their affidavit they statedas follows :-\n\n\"With regard to paragraph 7 of the petition I crave reference to the said contract for its true construction and effect. I say as I have already stated that according to the custom or usage or practice of the trade the respondent is entitled to charge brokerage and also to enforce the terms of the said contract.\"\n\nThe case was heard by Sinha]., who dismissed the petition on the ground that the contract was directly between the respondents and the appellants. The learned Judge also observed that if the right of the appellants to enforce the contract depended upon the existence of custom it would have been necessary to take evidence and the arbitrators would have had jurisdiction to decide the question of the existence of custom.\n\nThe respondents being dissatisfied with the judgment of Sinha ]., preferred an appeal, which was heard and disposed of by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Chakravarthi].\n\nThe learned Judges held that having regard to the fact that the appellants' own contention was that they had entered into the contract as brokers and were entitled to enforce its terms by reason of the usage or custom of the trade, it was not open to Sinha J. to treat them as principals, and the award was liable to be set aside on the ground that the arbitration tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an award at the instance of a per. son who was not a principal party to the contract. The appellants thereafter having obtained a certificate from the High Court under section 109 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, preferred this appeal.\n\nIt seems to us that this appeal can be disposed of on 1950 a short ground. vVe have carefully read the affidavit -- filed on behalf of the appellants in the trial cuurt, and A. M. Mair & Co. we are unable to hold that their case was that they Gord; ndass were not parties to the contract or that they had asked Sagarmull. the court to proceed on the sole ground that they were entitled to enforce the contract by virtue of the custom Fa•Z Ali J. or usage of the trade. In our opinion, the position which was taken up by them may be summed up as follows:-\n\n(1) They did not accept the allegations made by the respondents that they were not parties to any arbitration agreement with the respondents.\n\n(2) They asked the Court to construe the contract and its effect and asserted that they were entitled to enforce it.\n\n(3) They also stated that they were entitled to enforce the contract according to the custom or usage of the trade, The principal dispute raised in this case was whether the extension of time for delivery was granted within the time limited in the contract. That dispute is cer. tainly covered by the arbitration clause. The further dispute that, he brokers (appellants) were not parties to the contract in their own right as principals but entered into the contract only on behalf of the Bengal Jute Mill Company does not appear to have been raised until the matter wenL to the arbitrators. Assuming that at that stage it was open to the respondents to raise such an objection, after the other dispute which clearly fell within the arbitration clause was referred to the arbitrators, this further dispute is also one which turns upon the true interpretation of the contract, so that the respondents must have recourse to the contract to establish their claim that the appellants were not bound as principals while the latter say that they were.\n\nIf that is the position, such a dispute, the determina. tion of which turns on the true construction of the contract, would also seem to be a dispute, under pr arising out of or concerning the contract. In a,\n\nlOi\n\n~ 50 passage quoted in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd.('), Lord\n\nA. M. Mair &Co. Dunedin propounds the test thus: - \"If a party v. has to have recourse to the contract, that dispute is\n\nGordhondass a dispute under the contract\". Here, the respondents\n\nSagarmul!. must have recourse to the contract to establish their\n\nFa.Z Ali J. case and therefore it is a dispute falling within the arbitration clause. The error into which the learned Judges of the appellate Bench of the High Court appear to have fallen was their regarding the dispute raised by the respondent in respect of the position of the appellants under the contract as having the same consequence as a dispute as to the contract ever having been entered into.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nIf, therefore, we come to the conclusion that both the disputes raised by the respondents fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, then there is an end of the matter, for the arbitrators would have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the disputes, and we are not conc<\"rned with any error of law or f_act committed by them or any omission on their part to consider any of the matters. In this view, it would not be for us to determine the true construction of the contract and find out whether the respondents' contention is correct or not.\n\nOnce the dispute is found to be within the.scope of the arbitration clause, it is no part of the province of the court to enter into the merits of the dispute.\n\nIn the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the appellate Bench of the High Court and restore the order of Sinha J. The appellants will be entitled to their costs throughout.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-I agree with my brother Fazl Ali that this appeal be allowed with costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondents : J1.f. G. Poddar.\n\n(I I\n\n[1942] A.C. 356,", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\n1950", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\n1950 set aside."}}, {"text": "Prntap Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 337, "end_char": 350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "back to Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the\n\nSingh & Others."}}, {"text": "Rajindar Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Rajindar Narain."}}, {"text": "P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 726, "end_char": 734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Varma."}}, {"text": "A. M. MAIR & CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 737, "end_char": 752, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. M. MAIR & CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 776, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 795, "end_char": 811, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 817, "end_char": 839, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bengal Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1731, "end_char": 1757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cla.ims, arising out of and/or concerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating to, the contract ......... shall be referred to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.\""}}, {"text": "Harries C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3029, "end_char": 3041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Calcutta H!gh Court (Harries C.J. and Chakravarthi J.) in Appeal from Original Order No."}}, {"text": "Chakravarthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment of the Calcutta H!gh Court (Harries C.J. and Chakravarthi J.) in Appeal from Original Order No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him), for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. N. Grover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Grover, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3240, "end_char": 3248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Faz!", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3253, "end_char": 3269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali and Patanjali Sastri JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "F .AZ'L ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3292, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nF .AZ'L ALI J .-This is an appeal from a judgment of a E'azl Ali J.\n\nBench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in West Bengal, reversing the decision of a single Judge of that Court, who had refused to set aside an award given by the arbitration tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on a submission made by the respondents."}}, {"text": "E'azl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3347, "end_char": 3356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nF .AZ'L ALI J .-This is an appeal from a judgment of a E'azl Ali J.\n\nBench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in West Bengal, reversing the decision of a single Judge of that Court, who had refused to set aside an award given by the arbitration tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on a submission made by the respondents."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nF .AZ'L ALI J .-This is an appeal from a judgment of a E'azl Ali J.\n\nBench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in West Bengal, reversing the decision of a single Judge of that Court, who had refused to set aside an award given by the arbitration tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on a submission made by the respondents."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3414, "end_char": 3425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nF .AZ'L ALI J .-This is an appeal from a judgment of a E'azl Ali J.\n\nBench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in West Bengal, reversing the decision of a single Judge of that Court, who had refused to set aside an award given by the arbitration tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on a submission made by the respondents."}}, {"text": "25th January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3677, "end_char": 3695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th January, 1946, the appellants entered into a contract with the respondents for the sale of 5,000 maunds of jute, which was evidenced by a \"sold\n\nnote\" (Exhibit A), which is in the form of a letter addressed to the respondents, commencing with these words: \"We have this day sold by your order and for your account to the undersigned, etc.\""}}, {"text": "Bengal Jute Mill Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4256, "end_char": 4280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day, a\n\n\"bought note\" (Exhibit B) was addressed by the appellants to the Bengal Jute Mill Company, with the following statement: \"We have this day bought by your ortler and for your account from the undersigned,\n\ni9.10 etc.\""}}, {"text": "3rd July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•Jn reply to this letter, which was received by the appellants on or about the 3rd July, 1946, time was extended till the 31st July, 1946."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•Jn reply to this letter, which was received by the appellants on or about the 3rd July, 1946, time was extended till the 31st July, 1946."}}, {"text": "9th July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7350, "end_char": 7364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day on which the reply was received by the respondents, i.e., on the 9th July, 1946, they addressed a letter to the appellants pointing out that the extension of time had not been intimated within the 5th working day as provided in the contract and therefore the contract was automatically cancelled."}}, {"text": "Clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th February, 1947, the Tribunal of Arbitration made an award to the effect that the due date of contract had been extended by mutual agreement up to the 31st July, 1946, and accordingly the respondents .should pay to the appellants a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "10th August, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,116 together with interest at the rate of 4% per annum from the 10th August, 1946, until the date of the award."}}, {"text": "19th February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8486, "end_char": 8505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nearly a year later, on the 19th February, 1949, a petition was presented by the respondents under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, to the High Court at Calcutta, in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, praying inter alia that the award may be adjudged to be without jurisdiction and void and not binding on the respondents, and that it may be set aside."}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8561, "end_char": 8589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nearly a year later, on the 19th February, 1949, a petition was presented by the respondents under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, to the High Court at Calcutta, in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, praying inter alia that the award may be adjudged to be without jurisdiction and void and not binding on the respondents, and that it may be set aside."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9244, "end_char": 9252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants asserted in reply that the allegation made by the respondents in regard Fazl Ali J. to there being no privity between them and the appellants was wrong.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9728, "end_char": 9733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was heard by Sinha].,", "canonical_name": "Sinha"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10185, "end_char": 10190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents being dissatisfied with the judgment of Sinha ].,", "canonical_name": "Sinha"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10916, "end_char": 10927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10935, "end_char": 10962, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. M. Mair & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vVe have carefully read the affidavit -- filed on behalf of the appellants in the trial cuurt, and A. M. Mair & Co. we are unable to hold that their case was that they Gord; ndass were not parties to the contract or that they had asked Sagarmull."}}, {"text": "Sagarmull", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11299, "end_char": 11308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vVe have carefully read the affidavit -- filed on behalf of the appellants in the trial cuurt, and A. M. Mair & Co. we are unable to hold that their case was that they Gord; ndass were not parties to the contract or that they had asked Sagarmull.", "canonical_name": "Sagarmull"}}, {"text": "Fa•Z Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11422, "end_char": 11430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the court to proceed on the sole ground that they were entitled to enforce the contract by virtue of the custom Fa•Z Ali J. or usage of the trade.", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali"}}, {"text": "Sagarmul", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13310, "end_char": 13318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here, the respondents\n\nSagarmul!.", "canonical_name": "Sagarmull"}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13381, "end_char": 13384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Z Ali J. case and therefore it is a dispute falling within the arbitration clause."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13781, "end_char": 13788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nIf, therefore, we come to the conclusion that both the disputes raised by the respondents fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, then there is an end of the matter, for the arbitrators would have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the disputes, and we are not conc<\"rned with any error of law or f_act committed by them or any omission on their part to consider any of the matters.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14693, "end_char": 14700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-I agree with my brother Fazl Ali that this appeal be allowed with costs.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14728, "end_char": 14736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-I agree with my brother Fazl Ali that this appeal be allowed with costs.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14821, "end_char": 14837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "G. Poddar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14874, "end_char": 14883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Poddar."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_799_805_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSETH PREMCHAND SATRAMDAS\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR. [SAIYID FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Sales Tax Act (VI of 1944), s. 21 (3)-0rder of High 0011.rt Tefttsirig to require Board of Reven,~J, g to state case-Appeal to Federal Coivt-Maintainability-Letters Patent ', Patna, High Court 1, cl. 31-\" Final Order \"-Order in exercise of advisory jurisdiction of High Cmwt.\n\nNo appe!tl lay to the Federal Cou!'t from an order of the\n\nPt.:na High Court dismissing an application under s. 21 (3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1941, to di!'ect the Bi-ard of Revenue, Bihar, to state a case and refer it to the High Court.\n\nSuch an order i!; l not a\" final order\" within the meaning of cl. 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Oourt 1 inasmuch as 11.n order of the High Court under s. 21 (3) is advisory and standing by itself docs not bind or affect the rights of the parties though the\n\nultiwate order passed by the Board of Revenue may be based on the opinion expressed by tbe High Court. Nor is such an order passed by the High Court in the exercise either of its appellate or original jurisdiction. within the meaning of the said clause.\n\nSri Jriahanl Ha,.ihar Gir v. Commissioner of IncOme-tax, Bihar and Orissa (A.LR. 1941 Pat. 225) and Tata Iron and Steel Company v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay (50 I.A. 21:J 1 applied.\n\nFeroze Shah Kaka Khel v. Incametax 001nmissioner, Punjab (A.LR. 1931 Lah. 138) disapproved.\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from an order of the High Court of Patna dated 9th September, 1948, (Agarwala C.J. and Meredith J.) in M.J.C. N9. 5 of 1948.\n\nThe appeal was originally filed as Federal Court Appeal No. 71 of 1948 on a certificate granted by the Patna High Co.urt under cl. 31 of the Letters Patent of that High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Federal Court.\n\nH. P. Sinha (S. C. Sinha, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Mitra (S. L. Chibber, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. November 30.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was, d.llvrd by F AZL Au J.\n\nNov. 30.\n\n19'0 FAZL Au J .--This is an appeal from an order of the -- High Court of Judicature at Patna dated the 9th Seth Premchand September, 1948, declining to call upon the Board of\n\nSatramdas d 3 f h v.\n\nRevenue to state a case un er section 21 ( ) o t e Th• Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 (Act VI of 1944), with Bihar. reference to an assessment made under that Act.\n\nFast Ali J.\n\nThe Bihar Sales Tax Act was passed in 1944, and section 4 of the Act provides that \"every dealer whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding\n\nthe commencement of the Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on sales effected after the date so notified.\" It is not disputed that, having regard to the definitions of dealer, goods and sale under the Act, the appellant, who has been doing C0)1tract\n\nwork on a fairly extensive scale for the Central Public vVorks Department and the East Indian Railway,. comes within the category of a dealer mentioned in section 4.\n\nSection 7 of the Act provides that \"no dealer shall, while being liable under section 4 to pay tax under the Act, carry on business as a dealer unless he has been registered under the Act and possesses a registration certificate\". In pursuance of this provision, the appellant filed an application for registration on the 19th December, 1944, and a certificate of registration was issued to him on the 21st December,\n\n1944. On the 8th October, 1945, the Sales Tax Officer issued a notice to the appellant asking him to produce his accounts on 10th November, 1945, and to show cause why in addition to the tax to be finally assessed on him a penalty not exceeding one and a half times the amount should not be imposed on him under section JO (5) of the Act.\n\nSection JO (5), under which the. notice purported to have been issued, runs thus:--,\"·.\n\n\"If upon information which has come into his possession, the Commissioner is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay tax under this Act in P2spect of any period and has nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registration, the Commissioner sh; i.11, alt~ giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity o1 l:ieing '~ heard, assess, to the best of his judgment, the amount \\.,. of tax, if any, due from the dealer in respect of such \\\n\nperiod and all subsequent periods and the Commis- 19so sioner may direct that the dealer shall pay, by way of 8 -- . . . eth Premchaud penalty, m add1t10n to the amount so assessed, , a sum Satramdas not exceeding one and a half times that amount. ' v.\n\nThe appellant appeared before the Sales Tax Officer The State of in response to this notice, but obtained several adjourn- B1har. ments till 16th March, 1946, and ultimately failed to\n\nB'a11Z Ali J. appear. Thereupon, he was assessed by the Sales Tax\n\nOfficer, according to the best of his judgment, and was ordered to pay Rs. 4,526-13-0 as tax and a penalty amounting to one and a half times the amount assessed, under section 10 (5) of the Act.\n\nThe appellant appealed to the Commissioner against the assessment and the penalty levied upon him, but his appeal was dismissed on the 6th June, 1946.\n\nHe then filed a petition for revision to the Board of Revenue, against the order of the Commissioner, but it was dismissed on the 28th May, 1947.\n\nHe thereupon moved the Board of Revenue to refer to the High Court certain questions of law arising out of its order of the 28th May, but Mr. N. Baksi, a Member of the Board, by his order of the 4th December, 1947, rejected the petition with the following observations :-\n\n\"No case for review of my predecessor's order made out. No reference necessary.\"\n\nSection 21 of the Act provides that if the Board of Revenue refuses to make a reference to the High Court, the applicant may apply to the High Court against such refusal, and the High Court, if it is not ' satisfied that such refusal was justified, may require the Board of Revenue to state a case and refer it to the High .Court.\n\nThe section also provides that \"the High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall decide the question of law raised thereby, and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded, and shall send to the Board of Revenue a copy of such judgment under .the seal of the Court ......... and the Board shall .dispoe of he case accordingly.\" In accordance with tins sect10n, the appellant made an i.}}Nic:c\\ticm tQ the. High Court praying that the Board of Revenue may be called upon to state a case and refer\n\n1950 it to the High Court.\n\nDealing with this application,\n\n8 th Ph d the High Court pointed out that the Member of ' sat;::;:;.:~ the Board had not been asked to review his prev. decessor's order but only to state a case, and gave the The State of following directions :-\n\nBihor. \"The case must, therefore, go back to the Board of\n\nFa•t .!ti J, Revenue for a case to be stated or for a proper order rejecting the application to be passed.\"\n\nThe Board then reheard the matter and rejected the application of the appellant and refused to state a case and refer it to the High Court.\n\nThe appellant thereafter made an application to the High Court for requiring the Board of levenue to state a case, but this application was summarily rejected. He then applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, which the High Court granted, following the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Feroze Shah Kaka Khel v. lncome-tax Commissioner, Punjab and N.W.F.P., Lahore1• The High Court pointed out in the order granting leave that in the appeal that was taken to the Privy Council in the Lahore case, an objection had been raised as to the competency of the appeal, but the Privy Council, while dismissing the appeal on the merits, had made the following observations:-\n\n\"The objection is a serious one.\n\nAdmittedly such an appeal as the present is not authorized by the Income.tax Act itself. If open at all, it must be justified under clause 29, Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, as being an appeal from a final judgment, decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by a Division Bench of the High Court. And this present appeal was held by the Full Court to be so justified.\n\nBefore the Board the question was not fully argued, and their Lordships accordingly refrain from expressing any opinion whatever upon it\"(').\n\nThe High Court in granting leave to the appellant seems to have been influenced mainly by the fact that the view of the Lahore High Court had not been held by the Privy Council to be wrong.\n\n(ll A.LR. 1931Lah.138.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1933 P.O. 198, ...\n\nAt the commencement of the hearing of the appeal ~~ in this Court, a preliminary objection was raised by Seth Premchand the learned counsel for the respondent that this appeal Satramdas was not competent, and, on hearing both the parties, v. we are of the opinion that the objection is well- TheStateof founded.\n\nBihar.\n\nIn Sri Mahanth Harihar Gir v. Commissioner of In- Fa•t Ati J. come-tax, Bihar and Orissa (1) it was held by a special Bench of the Patna High Court that no appeal lay to His Majesty in Council under clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, from an order of the High Court dismissing an application under section 66 (3) of the Income-tax Act, (a provision similar to section 21 of the Act before us) to direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to state a case.\n\nIn that case, the whole Jaw on the subject has been clearly and exhaustively dealt with, and it has been pointed out that the view taken by the Full Bench of the.Lahore High\n\nCourt in the case cited by the appellant was not supported by several other High Courts and that the Privy Council also, when the matter came before it, refrained from expressing any opinion as to its correctness. In our opinion, the view expressed in the Patna case is correct.\n\nClause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, on the strength of which the appellant resists the preliminary objection raised by the respondent, runs thus:-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that any person or persons may appeal to Us, Our heirs and successors, in\n\nOtr or Their Privy Council, in any matter not be mg of criminal jurisdiction,\" from any final judgment, decree, or order of the said High Court of Judicature at Patna, made on appeal and from any final judgment, decree on order made in .the i; xercise of original juis?i_ction by Judges of the said High Court or of any D1v1s10n Court, from which an appeal does not lie to the said High Court under the provisions contained in the 10th clause of these\n\n11) A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 225.\n\n1950 presents : provided, in either case, that the sum or\n\nS -- nrn.tter at issue is of the amount or value of not less eth Premchand h h d h I Satramdas t an ten t onsan rupees, or that snc ]UC gment,\n\nv, decree or order involves, directly or indirectly, some The State of claim, demand or question to or respecting property\n\nB•har. amounting to or of the value of not less than ten\n\nFazl Ali J. thousand rupees; or from any other final judgment, dectee or order made either on appeal or otherwise as aforesaid, when the said High Court declares that the case is a flt one for appeal to Us ...... \"\n\nIn order to attract the provisions of this clause, it is necessary to show, firstly, that the order under appeal is a final order ; and secondly, that it was passed in the exercise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.\n\nThe second requirement clearly follows from the concluding part of the clause. It seems to us that the order appealed against in this case, !cannot be reg<\\rded as a final order, . because it does , not of its own force bind or affect the rights of the ; parties.\n\nAll that the High Court is required to do I under section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act is to decide the question of law raised and send a copy of its judgment to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue then has to dispose of the case in the light of the judgment of the High Court. It is true that the Board's order is based on what is stated by the High Court to be the correct legal position, but the fact remains that the order of the High Court standing by itself does not affect the rights of the parties, and the final order in the matter is the order which is passed ultimately by the Board of Revenue. This question has been fully dealt with in.Tata Iron and Steel Company\n\nv. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay('), where Lnrd Atkinson pointed out that the order made by the High Court was merely advisory and quoted the following observations of Lord Esher in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society('):-\n\n\"In the case of Ex parte County Council of Kent, where a statute provided that a case might be stated\n\n. ~1) 50 I.A. 'J12. 12> (1892] 2 Q. B. 613, at 617,\n\nfor the decision of the Court it was held that though !950 the language might prima facie import that there has -- b h 1 f d t d t h Seth P\"m<hand to et e equ1va ent o a JU gmen or or. er, ye w en 8 t d the context was looked at it appared that the juris- • '~~ •• diction of the Court appealed to was only consultative, Th• State of and that there was nothing which amounted to a mhar. judgment or order.\"\n\nIt cannot also be held that the order was passed .by the High Court in this case in the exercise of either original or appellate jurisdiction. It is not contended that the matter arose in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, because there was no appeal before it. Nor can the matter, properly speak•\n\ning, be said to have arisen in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court, as was held by the Judges of the Lahore High Court in the case to which reference was made, because the proceeding did not commence in the High Court as all original suits and proceedings should commence. But the High Court acquired jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue of an express provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act.\n\nThe crux of the matter therefore is that the jurisdiction of the High Court was only consultative and was neither original nor appellate.\n\nIn this view, the appeal must be dismissed, though on hearing the parties, it appeared to us that the sales. tax authorities including the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were in error in imposing a penalty upon the appellant under section IO (5) of the Act which had no application to his case, inasmuch as he had beeri registered as required by section 7 of the Act. .\n\nIn the circumstances, while dismissing the appeal, we make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nFazl Ali J.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "SETH PREMCHAND SATRAMDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SETH PREMCHAND SATRAMDAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Bihar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Bihar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 529, "end_char": 534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Bihar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 546, "end_char": 571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 725, "end_char": 731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1941", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 827, "end_char": 832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1941", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "Agarwala C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1601, "end_char": 1614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from an order of the High Court of Patna dated 9th September, 1948, (Agarwala C.J. and Meredith J.) in M.J.C. N9."}}, {"text": "Meredith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1619, "end_char": 1627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from an order of the High Court of Patna dated 9th September, 1948, (Agarwala C.J. and Meredith J.) in M.J.C. N9."}}, {"text": "cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1785, "end_char": 1791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1895, "end_char": 1906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. P. Sinha (S. C. Sinha, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. P. Sinha (S. C. Sinha, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1951, "end_char": 1962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra (S. L. Chibber, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. L. Chibber", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1964, "end_char": 1977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra (S. L. Chibber, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19'0 FAZL Au J .--This is an appeal from an order of the -- High Court of Judicature at Patna dated the 9th Seth Premchand September, 1948, declining to call upon the Board of\n\nSatramdas d 3 f h v.\n\nRevenue to state a case un er section 21 ( ) o t e Th• Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 (Act VI of 1944), with Bihar."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2324, "end_char": 2334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fast Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2463, "end_char": 2471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fast Ali J.\n\nThe Bihar Sales Tax Act was passed in 1944, and section 4 of the Act provides that \"every dealer whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding\n\nthe commencement of the Act exceeded Rs."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2524, "end_char": 2533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "statute": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Central Public vVorks Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that, having regard to the definitions of dealer, goods and sale under the Act, the appellant, who has been doing C0)1tract\n\nwork on a fairly extensive scale for the Central Public vVorks Department and the East Indian Railway,."}}, {"text": "East Indian Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2994, "end_char": 3013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that, having regard to the definitions of dealer, goods and sale under the Act, the appellant, who has been doing C0)1tract\n\nwork on a fairly extensive scale for the Central Public vVorks Department and the East Indian Railway,."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3067, "end_char": 3076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "statute": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "statute": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3157, "end_char": 3166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "statute": "Stars of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "19th December, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3401, "end_char": 3420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this provision, the appellant filed an application for registration on the 19th December, 1944, and a certificate of registration was issued to him on the 21st December,\n\n1944."}}, {"text": "21st December,\n\n1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3481, "end_char": 3501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this provision, the appellant filed an application for registration on the 19th December, 1944, and a certificate of registration was issued to him on the 21st December,\n\n1944."}}, {"text": "8th October, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3510, "end_char": 3527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th October, 1945, the Sales Tax Officer issued a notice to the appellant asking him to produce his accounts on 10th November, 1945, and to show cause why in addition to the tax to be finally assessed on him a penalty not exceeding one and a half times the amount should not be imposed on him under section JO (5) of the Act."}}, {"text": "10th November, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th October, 1945, the Sales Tax Officer issued a notice to the appellant asking him to produce his accounts on 10th November, 1945, and to show cause why in addition to the tax to be finally assessed on him a penalty not exceeding one and a half times the amount should not be imposed on him under section JO (5) of the Act."}}, {"text": "B'a11Z Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ments till 16th March, 1946, and ultimately failed to\n\nB'a11Z Ali J. appear."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th June, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5204, "end_char": 5218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant appealed to the Commissioner against the assessment and the penalty levied upon him, but his appeal was dismissed on the 6th June, 1946."}}, {"text": "28th May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5351, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then filed a petition for revision to the Board of Revenue, against the order of the Commissioner, but it was dismissed on the 28th May, 1947."}}, {"text": "N. Baksi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5510, "end_char": 5518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thereupon moved the Board of Revenue to refer to the High Court certain questions of law arising out of its order of the 28th May, but Mr. N. Baksi, a Member of the Board, by his order of the 4th December, 1947, rejected the petition with the following observations :-\n\n\"No case for review of my predecessor's order made out."}}, {"text": "4th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thereupon moved the Board of Revenue to refer to the High Court certain questions of law arising out of its order of the 28th May, but Mr. N. Baksi, a Member of the Board, by his order of the 4th December, 1947, rejected the petition with the following observations :-\n\n\"No case for review of my predecessor's order made out."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5723, "end_char": 5733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7501, "end_char": 7518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, which the High Court granted, following the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Feroze Shah Kaka Khel v. lncome-tax Commissioner, Punjab and N.W.F.P., Lahore1• The High Court pointed out in the order granting leave that in the appeal that was taken to the Privy Council in the Lahore case, an objection had been raised as to the competency of the appeal, but the Privy Council, while dismissing the appeal on the merits, had made the following observations:-\n\n\"The objection is a serious one."}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7719, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, which the High Court granted, following the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Feroze Shah Kaka Khel v. lncome-tax Commissioner, Punjab and N.W.F.P., Lahore1• The High Court pointed out in the order granting leave that in the appeal that was taken to the Privy Council in the Lahore case, an objection had been raised as to the competency of the appeal, but the Privy Council, while dismissing the appeal on the merits, had made the following observations:-\n\n\"The objection is a serious one."}}, {"text": "clause 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8068, "end_char": 8077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seth Premchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1933 P.O. 198, ...\n\nAt the commencement of the hearing of the appeal ~~ in this Court, a preliminary objection was raised by Seth Premchand the learned counsel for the respondent that this appeal Satramdas was not competent, and, on hearing both the parties, v. we are of the opinion that the objection is well- TheStateof founded.", "canonical_name": "SETH PREMCHAND SATRAMDAS"}}, {"text": "Satramdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1933 P.O. 198, ...\n\nAt the commencement of the hearing of the appeal ~~ in this Court, a preliminary objection was raised by Seth Premchand the learned counsel for the respondent that this appeal Satramdas was not competent, and, on hearing both the parties, v. we are of the opinion that the objection is well- TheStateof founded."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9175, "end_char": 9191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sri Mahanth Harihar Gir v. Commissioner of In- Fa•t Ati J. come-tax, Bihar and Orissa (1) it was held by a special Bench of the Patna High Court that no appeal lay to His Majesty in Council under clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, from an order of the High Court dismissing an application under section 66 (3) of the Income-tax Act, (a provision similar to section 21 of the Act before us) to direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to state a case."}}, {"text": "clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9243, "end_char": 9252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9364, "end_char": 9374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9386, "end_char": 9400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9426, "end_char": 9436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9680, "end_char": 9698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lahore High\n\nCourt in the case cited by the appellant was not supported by several other High Courts and that the Privy Council also, when the matter came before it, refrained from expressing any opinion as to its correctness."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the view expressed in the Patna case is correct."}}, {"text": "Clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9973, "end_char": 9982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11882, "end_char": 11892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lnrd Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12563, "end_char": 12576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Iron and Steel Company\n\nv. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay('), where Lnrd Atkinson pointed out that the order made by the High Court was merely advisory and quoted the following observations of Lord Esher in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society('):-\n\n\"In the case of Ex parte County Council of Kent, where a statute provided that a case might be stated\n\n."}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12693, "end_char": 12698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Iron and Steel Company\n\nv. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay('), where Lnrd Atkinson pointed out that the order made by the High Court was merely advisory and quoted the following observations of Lord Esher in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society('):-\n\n\"In the case of Ex parte County Council of Kent, where a statute provided that a case might be stated\n\n."}}, {"text": "Kent", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12810, "end_char": 12814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Iron and Steel Company\n\nv. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay('), where Lnrd Atkinson pointed out that the order made by the High Court was merely advisory and quoted the following observations of Lord Esher in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society('):-\n\n\"In the case of Ex parte County Council of Kent, where a statute provided that a case might be stated\n\n."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14572, "end_char": 14581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the High Court acquired jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue of an express provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act", "statute": "But the High Court acquired jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue of an express provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14723, "end_char": 14735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14764, "end_char": 14780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14783, "end_char": 14791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_806_821_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "Oot. l't,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\nSRI RANGA NILAYAM RAMA KRISHNA RAO\n\nKANDOKOlU CHELLA Y AMMA alias MANGAMMA\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nMadras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1935), ss. 3 (D), 8, 10, 19-Sale of estate in execution of decree-Whether cwner ceases to be \" Agriculturist \" pending application to set aside sale- Applications to set aside sale and for relief under Act-Maintainability-Order confirming sale and granting relief-Legality-0.P.G. (1908), O.XXI, r. 90-Execution .ale-Appeal against order refusing to set aside sale-When 8\"le becomes absolute and title passes-\n\nReceiver-Appointment of receiver, effect of.\n\nIn execution of a, decree .obtained on a mortgage a village owned by the mortgagor which was included in the niortgage was sold by the court on the 6th July 1935 and it was purchased by the mortgagee. An application by the mortgagor under Q.XXI1 r. 90, C.P.O., for setting aside the sale for irregularities as dismissed, the sale was confirmed and full sittisfaction of the decree was recorded, on the 6tb March 1943.\n\nA few days afterwards the mort gager and his adopted son ma.de an application under s. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, praying for relief unrler the\n\n~A..ct, and, as this application also was dismissed they preferred t\\vo appeals, one from the order dismissing this application and the other against the order of 6th March 1943 refusing to set aside the sale. The High Court of Madras held that, as the mortgagor's village had been sold be did not come within the purview of\n\ncl. (D) of the proviso to s- 3 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act and so be was entitled to claim relief under t.be Act and the debt stcod discharged under the provision of the Act, but the sale was not liable to be set aside ; and in accordrtnce with this judgment the decree-bolder wa• directed to pay the amount !o1 wbicb the property had been sold with interest thereon: Held per F.AZL ALI and MUKHERJEA JJ.-(i) that tbe conclusions arl'ived at by the High Court were selfcontra:lictory beca.uso if the ea.le was effective on the date it was held or confirmed, the decree was also satisfied on that dais and the judgment- . debtors were no longer entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act ; (ii) that the High Court was not justified in law in deciding the appeal on the footing that the judgment-debtors ceased to be owners of the village from the date of sale and on that account were not hit by cl. \\D) of the proviso to s. 3 of the Act inasmuch as when an appeal is preferred from an order rejecting an appli cation under O.XXI, r. 90, C.P.C., to set aside an execution sale, the sale does not bscome absolute until the matter is finally decided by the appellate court.\n\nPer CHANDRASEKHAI<A AIYAR J.-After the execution sale in !950 1935 the only interest which the ji; dgment-debtors had in the village was to have the sale set aside under the relevant pro- Sri Ratiga. visions of the Civil Procedure Code and this interest, not being Ntlayani &ma an interest contemplated by s. 3 (iii (a) & (b) and s. 19 (1) of the Krishna Ra.o Act, they were not \"agriculturists\" and were not entitled to any v. relief under the Act.\n\nKandokori Held also, per FAZL ALI and MUKHERJEA JJ.~A person does Oh, llayamma not cease to be a land-holder of an estate within the meaning of and Another.\n\ncl. (D) to the proviso to s. 3 of the Act merely because the estate is placed in the hands of a receiver.\n\nBhawani K<mwar v. Mathurn Pra•ad Singh (I.L.R. 40 Cal. 89) and Chandramani Shaha v. A.narja\" Bibi \\l.L.R. 61 Cal. 945)\n\nrferred to.\n\nJudgment of the Madras High Court reversed.\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1949. Appeals from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (\\N'adsworth and Patanjali • Sastri JJ.) dated 24th October, 1945, in A.A.O. , Nos. 372 of 1943 and 634 of 1944 which were appeals from the orders of the Subordinate Judge of Ellore in E.A. No. 440 of 1937 and C.M.P. No. 152 of 1943 in 0.5. No. 87 of 1923.\n\nP. Somasundaram (V. V. Chaudhry, with him) for the appellant.\n\nV. Rangachari (K. Mangachari, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1950. October 17.\n\nThe Court delivered judgment as follows.\n\nF AZL Au J. -These appeals arise out of an execution proceeding, and the main point to be decided in them is what is the effect of certain provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Madras Act IV of 1938, which will hereinafter be referred to as \"the Madras Act\"), on the rights of the parties. How this point arises will be clear from a brief statement of the facts of the case.\n\nIt appears that in 1908, one Veeresalingam, the husband of the first respondent, borrowed a sum of Rs. 9,000 from one Sitharamayya, and executed a mortgage bond in his favour. Subsequently a suit was\n\nFa11l Ali J.\n\n1950 instituted by the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage and a final decree in that suit was passed on the 19th , Sri Ranga . August, 1926. Thereafter, on the 28th October, 1931,\n\nN.tayam Ra.ma the decree-holder applied for the execution of the decree Krishna Rao\n\nv. by.the sale of the mortgaged property. In 1933, the Kandakari decree-holder transferred the decree to one Sobhanadri, Oh•llayamm• after whose death his son, the appellant before us, was\n\nand Anather. brought on the record as his legal representative in the\n\nFaz! Ali J. execution proceedings. Several years before the assignment of the decree, Veeresalingam, the defendant, had died and his widow, the firstrespondent, was therefore brought on the record as his legal representative. On the 6th July, 1935, two items of property were sold in execution of the decree and purchased by the decreeholder, these being:-(!) a village called Tedlam in West Godavari District ; and (2) 4 acres and 64 cents oJ land in Madepalli village. The first property was • sold for Rs. 21,000 and the second for Rs. 1,025. As, however, the amount due under the decree was only _about Rs. 17,860 and odd, the sale of the second property was subsequently set aside and the decree-holder . deposited into Court the excess amount of about\n\nRs. 3,000 and odd after setting off the decretal amount against the price of the first item of property. On the 5th August, 1935, the first respondent filed an application under Order XXI, rule 90, and section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the sale held in July, 1935, alleging certain. irregularities in the conduct of the sale. That application was after several years heard by the Subordinate Judge of Ellore, who by his order dated the 6th March, 1943, dismissed it and directed the sale of the first property to be confirmed and full satisfaction of the decree to be entered. After about 12 day~. i.e., on the 18th March, 1943, the first respondent and the second respondent, who had been adopted by the former on the 12th March, 1936, under the will of her husband and was subsequently brought on record, filed an application under section 19 of the Madras Act praying for certain reliefs under that Act.\n\nThis application was dismissed on the 22nd March, 1943.\n\nSubsequently, two appeals were filed on behalf\n\nof the respondents (who will hereinafter be sometimes 19~0 referred to as judgment-debtors), one against the order . . refusing to set aside the sale under Order XXI, rule N.~\" Ra';:\" . 90 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the other against ~;;,~:. ;';; the order dismissing the application under the Madras •- Act.\n\nThese appeals were heard together by two learned Kandol.m Judges of the Madras High Court and they took the Chellayamma\n\nview that the judgment-debtors' application under the and .l.nother.\n\nMadras Act was maintainable notwithstanding the FazlAliJ. fact that the sale had been confirmed and full satisfaction of the decree recorded, and remitted the case to the trial Court for a finding on the following questions, namely- (!) whether the applicants were agriculturists; and\n\n(2) if so, what would be the result of applying the provisions of Madras Act IV of 1938 to the decretal debt against them?\n\nSo far as regards the judgment-debtors' appeal against the order dismissing their application under Order XXI, rule 90, the learned Judges were inclined to agree with the trial Court that the sale should stand but declined to pass final orders in the appeal on the ground that \"it would seriously prejudice the judg. ment-debtors in the connected application for relief under section 19 of the Madras Act IV of 1938.\"\n\nThe Subordinate .T udge answered the questions referred to him by the High Court on remand as follows:-\n\n(1) The judgment-debtors were not agriculturists and were not therefore entitled to the benefits of the Madras Act ; and\n\n(2) If thy were agriculturists, they were not liable to P~Y. anythmg under the decree, as, in view of the prov1s10ns of the Act, the debt stood discharged on the date of sale. · When however the matter came up before the learned Judges of the High Court, they reversed the first finding of the trial. Cour! and held that the judgmentdebtors were agncultunsts within the meaning of th1.;\n\n....\n\nSri Ranga Nilnyam Rama\n\nKri1htta Rao v.\n\nKtJndokori Ohe1layatnmtl\n\nand A'iother\n\nFaal Ali J.\n\nAct, and that the debt stood discharged in view of section 8 (2) of the Act.\n\nAt the same time, they held that the sale was not liable to be set aside, and in this view dismissed one of the appeals and allowed the other. Then followed certain proceedings to which it would have been unnecessary to refer but for the fact that the judgment-debtors have attempted to rely on them in support of one of their preliminary objections to the maintainability of these appeals.\n\nIt appears that on the next day after the judgment of the High Court was delivered in the two appeals, counsel for the respondents wrote a letter to the Registrar of the High Court to direct the posting of the two cases 'for being mentioned' before the Court in order to obtain necessary directions consequent on the orders passed by it in the appeals. This letter was not placed before the learned Judges until the judgment had been signed by them and accordingly the judgment-debtors filed two petitions, one being a review petition to the. High Court and the other being a petition to the trial Court praying \"that the decreeholder may be ordered to pay to the petitioners the purchase money of Rs. 21,000 with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from the date of sale till the date of payment.\" The trial Court dismissed the latter petition on the ground that it was not maintainable, and the judgment-debtors tiled an appeal against the order.\n\nThe appeal as well as the review petition of the judgment debtors were heard together by the learned Judges who directed the decree-holder's counsel to elect whether his client would deposit the purchase money into Court or have the sale set aside.\n\nThe decree-holder applied for a short adjournment and ultimately on the 15th November, 1946, his counsel stated that his client wished to retain the property which he had purchased and to pay the purchase money into Court. Thereupon, he was directed to pay the sum of Rs. 21,000 together with interest within 3 months from that date.\n\nSubsequently, the appellant (decree.holder) having obtained leave to appeal from the High Court preferred\n\nthese appeals before us. It may be stated here that 1950 along with the application for leave to appeal, the appellant had filed an application for excusing the ., 1 8'' RonRg• d 1 . fil' h f l' , h' h .,, ayam •ma e ay m mg t e ormer app 1cat10n w IC he account- Kri.h,.a Rao ed for mainly by referring to the proceeditlgs for the v. review of the judgments in the previous appeals to the Kandokori High Court. This application was granted and the CheJln11•mm• delay was condoned. \"\"d A>wlher, As has been already stated, the main point arising Fazl dZ. J, in these appeals relates to the effect of the Madras Act upon this litigation. That Act was passed and came into effect in 1938, while the execution proceedings were still continuing. It will be recalled that the sale took place on the 6th July, 1935; and the application for setting it aside was not disposed of until the 6th March, 1943.\n\nBut, strangely enough, the judgmentdebtors did not apply fur any relief under the Madras Act during this period, and they made their applica. tion only after the sale had been confirmed and satisfaction of the decree had been entered. How far this belated application affects the right claimed by the judgment-debtors under the Act is one of the questions raised in these appeals, and I shall deal with it after referring to the material provisions of the Act and the findings of the High Court which have given rise to several debatable points.\n\nThe sections of the Act which are material for the purpose of these appeals are sections 3, 8 and 19. Section 3 defines an agriculturist and has a proviso stating that in certain cases a person shall not be deemed to be an agriculturist. The relevant clause of this pro~ visa, to which I shall also have to advert later, is clause (D) which runs thus:-\n\n\"Provided that a person shall not be deemed to be an 'agriculturist' if he -\n\n(D) is a landholder of an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, or of a share or portion thereof in respect of which estate, share or portion any sum exceed!ng Rs. 50~ is paid as. peshkash or any sum exceedmg Rs. 100 1s paid as quit-rent, jodi, kattubadi,\n\n1950 poruppu or the like or is a janmi under the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, who pays any sum exceeding Sri Ra•ga Rs. 500 as land revenue to the Provincial Govern- Nilayrim R11ma . ent \" Kri11hna Rio tn v.\n\nThe precise question which is said to arise with Kandokori reference to this provision is whether by reason of being Ohe!layamma the owners of village Tedlam, the judgment-debtors\n\n••• Another. should be held to be not entitled to relief under the\n\nFa•l Ali J.\n\nAct. The other material sections 8 and 19 run as follows:-\n\n\"8. Debts incurred before the 1st October, 1932, shall be scaled down in the manner mentioned hereunder, namely:-\n\n(1) All interest outstanding on the 1st October, 1937, in favour of any creditor of an agriculturist whether the same be payable under law, custom or contract or under a decree of Court and whether the debt or other obligation has ripened into a decree or not, shall be deemed to be discharged, and only the principal or such portion thereof as may be outstanding shall be deemed to be the amount repayable by the agriculturist on that date.\n\n(2) Where an agriculturist has paid to any creditor twice the amount of the principal whether by way of principal or interest or both, such debt including the principal, shall be deemed to be wholly discharged.\n\n(3) Where the sums repaid by way of principal or interest or both fall short of t\\vice the amount of the principal, such amount only as would make up this shortage, or the principal amount or such portion of the principal amount as is outstanding, whichever is smaller, shall be repayable.\n\n(4) Subject to the provisions of -sections 22 to 25, nothing contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be deemed to require the creditor to refund any sum which has been paid to him, or to increase the liability of a debtor to pay any sum in excess of the arp.ount which would have been payable by him if this Act had not been passed. -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 813 - Explanation.-Where a debt has been renewed or\n\n19M included in a fresh document in favour of the same cred!tor, the principal originally advanced by the N•l~~~a~~:a creditor together with such sums, if any, as have been Krishna Rao subsequently advanced as principal shall alone be v. treate<; t as the principal sum repayable by the agri- Kandokori cu]tunst under this section.\n\nCh•1layamma\n\nand Another.\n\n19. Where before the commencement of this Act, . a Court has passed a decree fo.r the repayment of a Fa•I ..11; J. debt, it shall, on the application of any judgmrntdebtor who is an agriculturist or in respect of a Hindu joint family debt, on the application of any member of the family whether or not he is the judgment.debtor or on the application of the decree-holder, apply the provisions of this Act to such decree and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amend the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction, as the case may be: Provided that all payments made or amounts recovered, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, in respect of any such decree shall first be applied in payment of all costs as originally decreed to the creditor.\"\n\nThese sections are material, because in the present case the judgment debtors asked the decree to be amended under section 19 of the Act and they were held to be entitled to relief under section 8.\n\nHaving referred to the relevant provisions of the Act, it becomes necessary now to state the main findings of the High Court upon which the decision of this appeal will turn. These findings are-\n\n(1) that tfie sale of Tedlam village, which was held on the 6th July, 1935, and confirmed on the 6th March, 19-13, was a good sale;\n\n(2) that by this sale, the title to the Tedi am village passed to the de'cree-holder, and in hearing the appeal the High Court was justified in proceeding on the footing that the judgment-debtors having ceased to be the owners of Tedlam village after its sale, were not\n\nio~\n\nSri Ranga Nilaylun Rama\n\nK•1shna Rao v.\n\nKandokori CJu1llay11nuna\n\nand Anothtr.\n\nFaal Ali J.\n\nhit by clause (D) of the proviso to section 3 of the Act ; and\n\n(3) that the decree had been satisfied at the date of the sale and the decree-holder was liable to repay to the judgment-debtors the full price of the property which was sold.\n\nThe main contentions directed against the conclusions arrived at by the High Court are: firstly, that they are self-contradictory, because if the sale was an effective sale on the date it was held or confirmed, the decree was also atisfied on that date and the juflgmentdebtors were no longer entitled to invoke the provisions of the Madras Act; and secondly, that the view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court that notwithstanding the appeal against the order ref using to set aside the sale they could proceed on the footing that the judgment-debtors had ceased to be the owners of Tedlam village on the date of the sale was unsound in law. .\n\nI will first deal with the second point which appears to me to require serious consideration. The High Court has in my opinion rightly proceeded on the footing that the ownership of Tedlam village would bring the judgment-flebtors within the mischief of clause (D} of the proviso to section 3 of the Act, and would disentitle them to any relief thereunder. This view was contested before us on behalf of the judgmentdebtors on two grounds :-(1) that the grant in favour of the ancestor of the judgment-debtors did not comprise a whole inam village and what they owned was therefore .not an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act (Madras Act I of 1908) ; 12) that on the date of the application, the judgment-debtors were not landholders of village Tedlam because the village was in the possession of a receiver since 1st February, 1937, and the latter was in law the landholder on the crucial date.\n\nNone of these contentions however appears to me to have any force. The first contention was sought to be supported by Exhibit P-1 which is a register of inams and which shows that poramboke or waste lands to the\n\nxtent of 599 acres had to be deducted from the area\n\n...\n\nof the inam. The point however has been dealt with 1950 very fully and clearly by the learned Subordinate s . R Judge, who has rightly pointed out that it has no force N<l;; • .:'i.\"...\n\nin view of the Madras Estates Land (Amendment). Act, Krihna &c 1945 [Madras Act No. II of 1945). The second point v. \"is equally unsubstantial, because it is well settled that K•ndokori • the owner of a property does not cease to be its owner Oh•llayamm•\n\nand A.nothr. merely because it i::; placed in the hands of a receiver.\n\nThe true position is that the receiver represents the F<Ul Ali J. real owner whoever he may be, and the true owner does not by themere appointment of a receiver cease to be a landholder under the Madras Estates Lan!i Act.\n\nI will now revert to the crucial question in the case, viz., whether the learned Judges of the High Court were justified in Jaw in deciding the appeal on the footing that the judgment-(lebtors had ceased to be the owners of Tedlam village and on that account they were not hit by clause (D) . of the proviso to section 3 of the Madras Act. At this stage, it will be useful to refer to certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which directly bear on the question as to when title to immovable property which is sold in execution of a decree is deemed to pass to the purchaser. One of the provisions is Order XXI, rule 92, which provides that \"where no application is made under rule 89, rule 90 or rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.'' The second relevant provision is section 65 which runs thus:-\n\n\"Where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute.\"\n\nIn !Jhawani Kunwar v. Mathura Prasad Singh(1) the quest10n as to when a mortgagee who has purchased certain villages in execution of the decree acquired title to the properties purchased by him directly arose for consideration, and the Privy Council rightly pointed\n\n(11 T.L.B. 40 C•J. S9.\n\nSri Ranga Nilayam Rama\n\nKrishna Rao v. Kandokori Chellayamma\n\nand Another.\n\nFasl Ali J.\n\nout that \"the sale in execution of the mortgage decree took effect from the actual date of the sale aod not from its confirmation.\" In a simple case, the provision$ cited above should settle the controversy, but, in the present case, the matter has been complicated on account of the appeal against the order refusing to set aside the sale under Order XXI, rule 90. In such a case, generally speaking, the true position seems to be that there is no finality until the litigation is finally determined by the appellate Court. This principle has been recognized in a number of cases, but it will be enough to cite Chandramani Shaha v. Anarjan Bibi('). The headnote of that case runs as follows:-\n\n\"Where a Subordinate Judge has disallowed an application under Order XXI, rule 90, to set aside a sale in execution, and has made an order under rule 92 (!)confirming the sale, and an appeal from disallowance has been dismissed by the :fligh Court, the three years' period provided by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Schedule I, article 180, for an application under Order XXI, rule 95. by the purchaser for delivery of possession runs from tbe date of the order on appeal; the High Court having under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the same powers as the Subordinate Judge, the 'time when the sale becomes absolute', for the purpose of article 180 is when the High Court disposes of the appeal.\"\n\nUnder article 180 of the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation runs \"from the date when the sale becomes absolute.\" If we give a narrow and literal meaning to these words, the period of limita. tion should be held to run from the date when the original Court of execution confirms the sale. But, as was pointed out by the Privy Council, the High Court as an appellate Court had the same powers as the trial Court and it is only when the appeal was dismissed by the High Court that the order of the trial Court confirming the sale became absolute. Till the decision of the appellate Court, no finality was attached to the order confirming the sale.\n\nill l.L.R. 61 Cal, 945,\n\n,.. .\n\nIt is clear that in 'this case the same rule would 1960 apply to the order recording satisfaction of the decree . and to the order confirming the sale. If the order \" 8\n\n1 \" RanRga d. . f . f h fi 1 d \"'ayam ama recor mg satis action o t e decree was not na an Krishna Rao remained an inchoate order until the appeal was v. decided, the order confirming the sale would have the Kandokori same inchoate character. This position seems to have Chellayamma\n\nf . and .4.nothr. been ully conceded m the statement of thelf case filed on behalf of the respondents in this Court.\n\nFazldli J.\n\nIt is quite clear that in this case the learned Judges of the Hii:;-h Court have taken up an inconsistent position. As I have already stated, they have held, for the purpose of allowing one of the appeals, that the judgment.debtors were not hit by clause (D) of the proviso to section 3 of the Act because they ceased to • be the owners of Tedlam village at the date of the sale in 1935. If this conclusion is correct, it must follow as a matter of logic that the decree was completely satisfied on the date of the sale, because the sale fetched a larger amount than what was payable under the decree an<l the excess amount was deposited by the decree-holder in Court. The sale and satisfaction must go together and if finality is to be attached to the sale it should have been held to attach also to the order recording satisfaction of the decree. It seems clear to me that if the decree had ceased to exist, no relief could be claimed by the judgment-debtors under the Madras Act. On the other hand, if the appeal had to be decided on the footing that the order recording satisfaction of the decree was not final, the same approach should have been made in regard to the effect of the sale. It is also clear that if the decree was satisfied on the date of sale by the application of the provisions of the Act, the sale could not stand, because how co'uld the property be sold in execution of a decree which had been already satisfied. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that notliing was due under the decree, the High Court has held that the sale was a good sale and was to stand. The correct approach to the case would have been to assume for the purpose of\n\nh~ iiVVev.i~ tha.t neither of the orders passed by the\n\n1000 Subordinate Judge was final.\n\nOn that view, the ,. Ron . appeals to the High Court could not have bt; en decided\n\n.,. 8\n\n• Rga on the footing that the judgment-debtors had ceased ,,, ayam iima I d h f Krishna Rao to be the owners of Ted am property an were t ere ore v. not hit by clause (D) of the proviso to section 3 of the Ka•doko,; Madras Act. In my opinion, the judgment of the Oh•ll•yamma High Court cannot be sustained, and the appeals will and Another have to be allowed.\n\nli'••I Ali J.\n\nI will now deal very briefly with two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents. The first objection is that the application for leave to appeal to his Majesty in Council against the order of the High Court was barred by limitation, inasmuch as the reasons stated in the affidavit filed by the appel- ,. ]ant in the High Court in support of his application for excusing delay do not constitute sufficient reason within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThe answer to this objection will be found in the facts which have been already narrated. The delay was caused mainly by reason of the review of the order of the High Court and the High Court considered that there was sufficient reason for condoning the delay.\n\nThis Court cannot override the discretion exercised by the High Court and the matter cannot be reopened in these appeals. 1he second objection is based on the fact that the decree-holder was given a choice by the High Court to elect whether he would deposit the purchase money . or have the sale set aside, and his counsel told the learned Judges on the 15th November, 1946, that his client wished to retainthe property which he had purchased and pay the purchase money in cash. It is contended that in view of this statement it was not open to the appellant to contend that he need not pay any amount to the judgmentdebtors.\n\nThis objection also is entirely devoid of any substance, because there is nothing on record to show that the appellant has consented to be bound by the order of the High Court and waived his right to appeal against it by reason of the election.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the sale should have been set aside by the\n\nHigh Court because the permissi0n given to the decree. 19;0 holder on the 16th February, 1934, to bid and set off 8 . Ii the decretal am?unt against th~ purchase price was con- N.z:;.,:n;:,.. fined to an earher sale and did not extend to the sale Krishna Rao which took place on the 16th March, 1935, after the v. upset price which had been originally fixed was Kandokori reduced. Personally, I am inclined to hold that the Chellayamma · b and Another. perm1ss10n covered the sale m question, ut in any case it is difficult to hold on the facts stated that Fa•l Ali J. there was any such material. irreg11Jarity as would vitiate the sale. The precise argument which is put forward here was advanced in the Courts below but it did not find favour either with the Subordinate Judge or with the High Court.\n\nBesides, the respondents cannot raise the point in these appeals because they have filed no appeal against the order of the High Court upholding the sale, In these circumstances, I would al!o\\v the appeals, set aside the orders of the High Court and restore the order of the learned Subordinate Judge. There will however be no order as to costs in these appeals.\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-I concur in the judgment just now Mukherj•a .1 delivered by my learned brother, Fazl Ali J., and there is nothing further which I can usefully add.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR ].-The facts which havechandrosekhara given rise to these appeafs and the questions for Aiyar J. decision have been stated in the judgment just now pronounced by my learned brother Faz! Ali ]. I wish to add only a few words on the main contention advanced for the respondents by their learned Advocate, Mr. V. Rangachari.\n\nIf by reason of the confirmation of sale and satisfaction of the decree having been entered up, the title to the village had passed indefeasibly to the decreeholder, there was no longer any decree or decree debt to be scaled down. If, however, the title did not pass, because it was still open to the respondents to attack the Court sale under Order XXI, rule 90, they were landholders of the villae and, as such, they would\n\nt9so come within the scope of proviso (D) to section 3 of the .-- Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, which enacts 8\" Ra•Rga that a landholder who holds a village paying more than Ndayam una OO • d · lt Kri•h•• Rao Rs. 1 as qmt rent or JO I 1s not an agncu unst v. within the meaning of the Act.\n\nKandokori The apparent inconsistency in the view taken by Oh•llayamma the Hieh Court was recognised, if not conceded, by the and Another. •, learned counsel. In one view, there was no longer any Ohandrasekh.ra decree in respect of which the Agriculturists' Relief Act\n\nAiyar J. could operate; and in £he other view, the respondents could not take advantage of the Act, as their ownership of the village precluded them. Faced with this dilemma, Mr. Rangachari urged a somewhat ingenious argument.\n\nHe contended that though the title passed to the decree.holder on the confirmation of sale and became vested in him from the date of the sale, the respodents could still be regarded as having an interest in the village, as the sale was open or liable to challenge and the title of the decree-holder was inchoate or incomplete.\n\nThere is, however, really no support for this position.\n\nOn confirmation, the title of the decree-holder became absolute or complete. If the sale was set aside, the title would re vest in the judgment-debtor. There is nothing like an equitable title in the decree-holder which could be recognised for certain purposes and not recognised for others.\n\nUnder the Madras Act; \"agriculturist\" means \"a person who has a saleable interest in any agricultural or horticultural land or one who holds interest in such land under a landholder as a tenant, ryot or undertenure.holder.\" Section 10, sub-clause (i) of the Act provides that the right conferrerl. on an agriculturist to have a debt scaled down will not apply to any person who, though an \" agriculturist\" as defined in the Act, dirl not on 1-10-1937 hoU an interest in or a lease or sub-lease of any land. After the sale in 1935, the only interest which the judgment-debtors had in the village was to have the sale set aside, under the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. This interest is not the interest contemplated by section 3, s11b-clause (ii) (a) & (b) of the 1\\ct which speaks of a\n\nsaleable interest or interest as a tenant, ryot or under- 1950 tenure holder.\n\nS.ri Rt'lnga I agree in the conclusion reached by my learned N.tayam Rama brother.\n\nKdshna Rao Appeals allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: M .S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondents: M.S.K. Aiyangar.\n\nMOHINDEI<. SINGH\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nCriminal trial-Jfiirder--I11juries ca.'l, tSed by lethal 1l'eapo1zs- Du.ty of p1oserution-Ini1Jortance of c.rpert evidence-Duty to prove whufe case-Evidence 1v.1.ntin'/ o, i mrttPrial point-Inipropriety of contJirtion-Proof of :ilibi-St, inilnrd of proof-S'llpreme Cotrt Criminal appea, l-Interfcrcn::e-Practicp_.\n\nIn :t case where death is due to injuries or woun1ls caused by a leth:tl weapon, it has always been considered to be the duty of the prosecution to pr JVC by Expert cvii!ence th at it 'vas like]y or at least possible for the injuries to have been caused with the weapon V•tith \\:vhich, and in the manner in which, they are allegerl to have been caused.\n\nWhere in a case of n1urder, the prosecut!on case was that the accuser] shot the deceased with a gun, but it appeared likely that the injuries on the deceased were inflicted by a rifle and there was no evidence of a duly qualified expert to prove that tho injuries were caused by a gun, :tnd the nature of the irijuries, vas also such that the shots must have been fired by more than one person and not by one person only, and. the prosecLio:i hafl no evidence to sho\\V that another person a!Ho shot, and the High Court, though realising that thel'e was thuq :t gap in the prosecution evidence, convicted the accusec.l placing reliance on the oral evidence of 3 wiGnesses which was not disinterested: Held, that the present case fell w'thin the rule laid down in Pritam Sin1h v. Th• State ([1950] 8.0.R. 45:3) iuasmuch as the appellant had been convicted notwithstaniing the fa, t that evidence '\\Vas wo.nting on a most materi'.11 parG of the prosecution case, and the conviction could not therefore be upheld,\n\n10~\n\nKandrikori Ghtllayanima\n\nand Anothe,..\n\nOct, 17,", "total_entities": 111, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nKANDOKOlU CHELLA Y AMMA alias MANGAMMA\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANDOKOlU CHELLA Y AMMA alias MANGAMMA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237, "end_char": 242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6tb March 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application by the mortgagor under Q.XXI1 r. 90, C.P.O., for setting aside the sale for irregularities as dismissed, the sale was confirmed and full sittisfaction of the decree was recorded, on the 6tb March 1943."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1189, "end_char": 1194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1488, "end_char": 1508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras held that, as the mortgagor's village had been sold be did not come within the purview of\n\ncl. ("}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2004, "end_char": 2013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o1 wbicb the property had been sold with interest thereon: Held per F.AZL ALI and MUKHERJEA JJ.-(i) that tbe conclusions arl'ived at by the High Court were selfcontra:lictory beca.uso if the ea.le was effective on the date it was held or confirmed, the decree was also satisfied on that dais and the judgment- .", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2537, "end_char": 2541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2653, "end_char": 2658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2792, "end_char": 2805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per CHANDRASEKHAI<A AIYAR J.-After the execution sale in !", "canonical_name": "HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "A AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2806, "end_char": 2813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per CHANDRASEKHAI<A AIYAR J.-After the execution sale in !"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3094, "end_char": 3098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3118, "end_char": 3123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3264, "end_char": 3272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kandokori Held also, per FAZL ALI and MUKHERJEA JJ.~A person does Oh, llayamma not cease to be a land-holder of an estate within the meaning of and Another.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3653, "end_char": 3670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Madras High Court reversed."}}, {"text": "Patanjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (\\N'adsworth and Patanjali • Sastri JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. Somasundaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Somasundaram (V. V. Chaudhry, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. V. Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Somasundaram (V. V. Chaudhry, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. Rangachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rangachari (K. Mangachari, with him) for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "V. Rangachari"}}, {"text": "K. Mangachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rangachari (K. Mangachari, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "F AZL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F AZL Au J. -These appeals arise out of an execution proceeding, and the main point to be decided in them is what is the effect of certain provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Madras Act IV of 1938, which will hereinafter be referred to as \"the Madras Act\"), on the rights of the parties."}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4445, "end_char": 4466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Veeresalingam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4673, "end_char": 4686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in 1908, one Veeresalingam, the husband of the first respondent, borrowed a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Veeresalingam"}}, {"text": "Sitharamayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4762, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9,000 from one Sitharamayya, and executed a mortgage bond in his favour."}}, {"text": "19th , Sri", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently a suit was\n\nFa11l Ali J.\n\n1950 instituted by the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage and a final decree in that suit was passed on the 19th , Sri Ranga ."}}, {"text": "Ranga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4977, "end_char": 4982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently a suit was\n\nFa11l Ali J.\n\n1950 instituted by the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage and a final decree in that suit was passed on the 19th , Sri Ranga .", "canonical_name": "V. Rangachari"}}, {"text": "28th October, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on the 28th October, 1931,\n\nN.tayam Ra.ma the decree-holder applied for the execution of the decree Krishna Rao\n\nv. by.the sale of the mortgaged property."}}, {"text": "N.tayam Ra.ma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on the 28th October, 1931,\n\nN.tayam Ra.ma the decree-holder applied for the execution of the decree Krishna Rao\n\nv. by.the sale of the mortgaged property.", "canonical_name": "N.tayam Ra.ma"}}, {"text": "Krishna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on the 28th October, 1931,\n\nN.tayam Ra.ma the decree-holder applied for the execution of the decree Krishna Rao\n\nv. by.the sale of the mortgaged property.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Rao"}}, {"text": "Sobhanadri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1933, the Kandakari decree-holder transferred the decree to one Sobhanadri, Oh•llayamm• after whose death his son, the appellant before us, was\n\nand Anather."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5385, "end_char": 5393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brought on the record as his legal representative in the\n\nFaz!"}}, {"text": "Veeresalingam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5471, "end_char": 5484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several years before the assignment of the decree, Veeresalingam, the defendant, had died and his widow, the firstrespondent, was therefore brought on the record as his legal representative.", "canonical_name": "Veeresalingam"}}, {"text": "6th July, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th July, 1935, two items of property were sold in execution of the decree and purchased by the decreeholder, these being:-(!)"}}, {"text": "Tedlam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a village called Tedlam in West Godavari District ; and (2) 4 acres and 64 cents oJ land in Madepalli village."}}, {"text": "Godavari District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a village called Tedlam in West Godavari District ; and (2) 4 acres and 64 cents oJ land in Madepalli village."}}, {"text": "Madepalli village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a village called Tedlam in West Godavari District ; and (2) 4 acres and 64 cents oJ land in Madepalli village."}}, {"text": "5th August, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th August, 1935, the first respondent filed an application under Order XXI, rule 90, and section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the sale held in July, 1935, alleging certain."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6387, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Ellore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was after several years heard by the Subordinate Judge of Ellore, who by his order dated the 6th March, 1943, dismissed it and directed the sale of the first property to be confirmed and full satisfaction of the decree to be entered."}}, {"text": "6th March, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6602, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was after several years heard by the Subordinate Judge of Ellore, who by his order dated the 6th March, 1943, dismissed it and directed the sale of the first property to be confirmed and full satisfaction of the decree to be entered."}}, {"text": "18th March, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6777, "end_char": 6793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After about 12 day~. i.e., on the 18th March, 1943, the first respondent and the second respondent, who had been adopted by the former on the 12th March, 1936, under the will of her husband and was subsequently brought on record, filed an application under section 19 of the Madras Act praying for certain reliefs under that Act."}}, {"text": "12th March, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After about 12 day~. i.e., on the 18th March, 1943, the first respondent and the second respondent, who had been adopted by the former on the 12th March, 1936, under the will of her husband and was subsequently brought on record, filed an application under section 19 of the Madras Act praying for certain reliefs under that Act."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7000, "end_char": 7010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd March, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7112, "end_char": 7128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was dismissed on the 22nd March, 1943."}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8038, "end_char": 8059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Madras Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8490, "end_char": 8511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Faal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nSri Ranga Nilnyam Rama\n\nKri1htta Rao v.\n\nKtJndokori Ohe1layatnmtl\n\nand A'iother\n\nFaal Ali J.\n\nAct, and that the debt stood discharged in view of section 8 (2) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9281, "end_char": 9290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Madras Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "15th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10978, "end_char": 10997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holder applied for a short adjournment and ultimately on the 15th November, 1946, his counsel stated that his client wished to retain the property which he had purchased and to pay the purchase money into Court."}}, {"text": "Kandokori High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11738, "end_char": 11758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ayam •ma e ay m mg t e ormer app 1cat10n w IC he account- Kri.h,.a Rao ed for mainly by referring to the proceeditlgs for the v. review of the judgments in the previous appeals to the Kandokori High Court."}}, {"text": "sections 3, 8 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12874, "end_char": 12894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12896, "end_char": 12905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13269, "end_char": 13298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13985, "end_char": 14002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "1st October, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14051, "end_char": 14068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debts incurred before the 1st October, 1932, shall be scaled down in the manner mentioned hereunder, namely:-\n\n(1) All interest outstanding on the 1st October, 1937, in favour of any creditor of an agriculturist whether the same be payable under law, custom or contract or under a decree of Court and whether the debt or other obligation has ripened into a decree or not, shall be deemed to be discharged, and only the principal or such portion thereof as may be outstanding shall be deemed to be the amount repayable by the agriculturist on that date."}}, {"text": "1st October, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14172, "end_char": 14189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debts incurred before the 1st October, 1932, shall be scaled down in the manner mentioned hereunder, namely:-\n\n(1) All interest outstanding on the 1st October, 1937, in favour of any creditor of an agriculturist whether the same be payable under law, custom or contract or under a decree of Court and whether the debt or other obligation has ripened into a decree or not, shall be deemed to be discharged, and only the principal or such portion thereof as may be outstanding shall be deemed to be the amount repayable by the agriculturist on that date."}}, {"text": "sections 22 to 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15116, "end_char": 15133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16343, "end_char": 16372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16787, "end_char": 16797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16859, "end_char": 16868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Tedlam village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17089, "end_char": 17103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These findings are-\n\n(1) that tfie sale of Tedlam village, which was held on the 6th July, 1935, and confirmed on the 6th March, 19-13, was a good sale;\n\n(2) that by this sale, the title to the Tedi am village passed to the de'cree-holder, and in hearing the appeal the High Court was justified in proceeding on the footing that the judgment-debtors having ceased to be the owners of Tedlam village after its sale, were not\n\nio~\n\nSri Ranga Nilaylun Rama\n\nK•1shna Rao v.\n\nKandokori CJu1llay11nuna\n\nand Anothtr."}}, {"text": "6th March, 19-13", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17164, "end_char": 17180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These findings are-\n\n(1) that tfie sale of Tedlam village, which was held on the 6th July, 1935, and confirmed on the 6th March, 19-13, was a good sale;\n\n(2) that by this sale, the title to the Tedi am village passed to the de'cree-holder, and in hearing the appeal the High Court was justified in proceeding on the footing that the judgment-debtors having ceased to be the owners of Tedlam village after its sale, were not\n\nio~\n\nSri Ranga Nilaylun Rama\n\nK•1shna Rao v.\n\nKandokori CJu1llay11nuna\n\nand Anothtr."}}, {"text": "Ranga Nilaylun Rama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17480, "end_char": 17499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These findings are-\n\n(1) that tfie sale of Tedlam village, which was held on the 6th July, 1935, and confirmed on the 6th March, 19-13, was a good sale;\n\n(2) that by this sale, the title to the Tedi am village passed to the de'cree-holder, and in hearing the appeal the High Court was justified in proceeding on the footing that the judgment-debtors having ceased to be the owners of Tedlam village after its sale, were not\n\nio~\n\nSri Ranga Nilaylun Rama\n\nK•1shna Rao v.\n\nKandokori CJu1llay11nuna\n\nand Anothtr.", "canonical_name": "RANGA NILAYAM RAMA KRISHNA RAO"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17606, "end_char": 17615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18749, "end_char": 18758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act I of 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19098, "end_char": 19118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st February, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19285, "end_char": 19303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was contested before us on behalf of the judgmentdebtors on two grounds :-(1) that the grant in favour of the ancestor of the judgment-debtors did not comprise a whole inam village and what they owned was therefore .not an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act (Madras Act I of 1908) ; 12) that on the date of the application, the judgment-debtors were not landholders of village Tedlam because the village was in the possession of a receiver since 1st February, 1937, and the latter was in law the landholder on the crucial date."}}, {"text": "K•ndokori", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20002, "end_char": 20011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second point v. \"is equally unsubstantial, because it is well settled that K•ndokori • the owner of a property does not cease to be its owner Oh•llayamm•\n\nand A.nothr."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20688, "end_char": 20697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21271, "end_char": 21281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21838, "end_char": 21840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ranga Nilayam Rama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21847, "end_char": 21865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Ranga Nilayam Rama\n\nKrishna Rao v. Kandokori Chellayamma\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "RANGA NILAYAM RAMA KRISHNA RAO"}}, {"text": "Fasl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21919, "end_char": 21927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fasl Ali J.\n\nout that \"the sale in execution of the mortgage decree took effect from the actual date of the sale aod not from its confirmation.\"", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22916, "end_char": 22943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22945, "end_char": 22955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "article 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22957, "end_char": 22968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23134, "end_char": 23163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23269, "end_char": 23280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "article 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23336, "end_char": 23347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23362, "end_char": 23376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fazldli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24593, "end_char": 24600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazldli J.\n\nIt is quite clear that in this case the learned Judges of the Hii:;-h Court have taken up an inconsistent position.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26634, "end_char": 26643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26813, "end_char": 26816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "li'••I Ali J.\n\nI will now deal very briefly with two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27272, "end_char": 27281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27289, "end_char": 27303, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "16th March, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28828, "end_char": 28844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ii the decretal am?unt against th~ purchase price was con- N.z:;.,:n;:,.. fined to an earher sale and did not extend to the sale Krishna Rao which took place on the 16th March, 1935, after the v. upset price which had been originally fixed was Kandokori reduced."}}, {"text": "Fa•l Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29102, "end_char": 29110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "perm1ss10n covered the sale m question, ut in any case it is difficult to hold on the facts stated that Fa•l Ali J. there was any such material.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29807, "end_char": 29815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUKHERJEA J.-I concur in the judgment just now Mukherj•a .1 delivered by my learned brother, Fazl Ali J., and there is nothing further which I can usefully add.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29876, "end_char": 29896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR ].-The facts which havechandrosekhara given rise to these appeafs and the questions for Aiyar J. decision have been stated in the judgment just now pronounced by my learned brother Faz!", "canonical_name": "HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29985, "end_char": 29990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR ].-The facts which havechandrosekhara given rise to these appeafs and the questions for Aiyar J. decision have been stated in the judgment just now pronounced by my learned brother Faz!"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30691, "end_char": 30700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30735, "end_char": 30751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Oh•llayamma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31006, "end_char": 31017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kandokori The apparent inconsistency in the view taken by Oh•llayamma the Hieh Court was recognised, if not conceded, by the and Another. •,"}}, {"text": "Rangachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31396, "end_char": 31406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faced with this dilemma, Mr. Rangachari urged a somewhat ingenious argument.", "canonical_name": "V. Rangachari"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32347, "end_char": 32357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-10-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32564, "end_char": 32573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on an agriculturist to have a debt scaled down will not apply to any person who, though an \" agriculturist\" as defined in the Act, dirl not on 1-10-1937 hoU an interest in or a lease or sub-lease of any land."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32859, "end_char": 32868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32870, "end_char": 32873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.tayam Rama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33068, "end_char": 33080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.ri Rt'lnga I agree in the conclusion reached by my learned N.tayam Rama brother.", "canonical_name": "N.tayam Ra.ma"}}, {"text": "Kdshna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33091, "end_char": 33101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kdshna Rao Appeals allowed.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Rao"}}, {"text": "M .S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33145, "end_char": 33172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: M .S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri."}}, {"text": "M.S.K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33202, "end_char": 33217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: M.S.K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "MOHINDEI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33220, "end_char": 33228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHINDEI<."}}, {"text": "Kandrikori Ghtllayanima", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34993, "end_char": 35016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prosecLio:i hafl no evidence to sho\\V that another person a!Ho shot, and the High Court, though realising that thel'e was thuq :t gap in the prosecution evidence, convicted the accusec.l placing reliance on the oral evidence of 3 wiGnesses which was not disinterested: Held, that the present case fell w'thin the rule laid down in Pritam Sin1h v. Th• State ([1950] 8.0.R. 45:3) iuasmuch as the appellant had been convicted notwithstaniing the fa, t that evidence '\\Vas wo.nting on a most materi'.11 parG of the prosecution case, and the conviction could not therefore be upheld,\n\n10~\n\nKandrikori Ghtllayanima\n\nand Anothe,..\n\nOct, 17,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_821_833_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 821\n\nsaleable interest or interest as a tenant, ryot or under- 1950 tenure holder.\n\nS.ri Rt'lnga I agree in the conclusion reached by my learned N.tayam Rama brother.\n\nKdshna Rao Appeals allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: M .S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondents: M.S.K. Aiyangar.\n\nMOHINDEI<. SINGH\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nCriminal trial-Jfiirder--I11juries ca.'l, tSed by lethal 1l'eapo1zs- Du.ty of p1oserution-Ini1Jortance of c.rpert evidence-Duty to prove whufe case-Evidence 1v.1.ntin'/ o, i mrttPrial point-Inipropriety of contJirtion-Proof of :ilibi-St, inilnrd of proof-S'llpreme Cotrt Criminal appea, l-Interfcrcn::e-Practicp_.\n\nIn :t case where death is due to injuries or woun1ls caused by a leth:tl weapon, it has always been considered to be the duty of the prosecution to pr JVC by Expert cvii!ence th at it 'vas like]y or at least possible for the injuries to have been caused with the weapon V•tith \\:vhich, and in the manner in which, they are allegerl to have been caused.\n\nWhere in a case of n1urder, the prosecut!on case was that the accuser] shot the deceased with a gun, but it appeared likely that the injuries on the deceased were inflicted by a rifle and there was no evidence of a duly qualified expert to prove that tho injuries were caused by a gun, :tnd the nature of the irijuries, vas also such that the shots must have been fired by more than one person and not by one person only, and. the prosecLio:i hafl no evidence to sho\\V that another person a!Ho shot, and the High Court, though realising that thel'e was thuq :t gap in the prosecution evidence, convicted the accusec.l placing reliance on the oral evidence of 3 wiGnesses which was not disinterested: Held, that the present case fell w'thin the rule laid down in Pritam Sin1h v. Th• State ([1950] 8.0.R. 45:3) iuasmuch as the appellant had been convicted notwithstaniing the fa, t that evidence '\\Vas wo.nting on a most materi'.11 parG of the prosecution case, and the conviction could not therefore be upheld,\n\n10~\n\nKandrikori Ghtllayanima\n\nand Anothe,..\n\nOct, 17,\n\n19~0 Held also, that the stndard of proof which is required in regard to the plea of alibi must be tbs same as the stundard Mohinder S1ngh which is applied to the prosecution evidence and in both cases it v. should be a reasonable standard.\n\nTh• 8\"''' APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1950.\n\nAppeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab (Falshaw and Soni JJ.) dated 30th December, 1949, upholding the conviction of the appellant under ss. 302 and 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and confirming the sentence of death passed against him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore on the 20th July, 1949, in Criminal Appeal Case No. 325 of 1949. ]ai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appellant.\n\nB. K. Khanna, Advocate-General of the Punjab, (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. October 17. The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nFall Ah J.\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab upholding the conviction of the appellant, Mohinder Singh, under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and confirming the sentence of death passed against him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore.\n\nThe case for the prosecution which has been substantially accepted by the trial Judge and the High Court is briefly as follows.\n\nSometime in January, 1949, one Bachittar Singh; brother of Dalip Singh who is said to have been murdered, lodged a complaint before the Naib Tehsildar at Zira to the effect that a tree belonging to him had been cut by 7 persons including Mohinder Singh, the appellant. On the 28th February, 1949, which was the date fixed for the hearing of the case before the Naib Tehsildar, Jita Singh and Dalip Singh, the two brothers of Bachittar Singh, were attacked by the appellant and one Gumam Singh,\n\n'I. lad of 17, near a Gurdwara at about mid-day, when\n\n... -\n\nthey were returning from their field.\n\nJita Singh was llllilf then carrying a load of fodder on his head while Dahp , - , S' h h d' ' kl ' h' I d J't s h h Mohtnder 81 .. flh wg a sic es m 1s rnn . 1 a wg was t e first to be attacked near a tailor's shop by Mohinder The tat\" Singh who fired at him from behind hitting him on the neck whereupon he fell down together with the Fail J.li J. bundle of fodder.\n\nDalip Singh, who was following Jita Singh, then ran backwards and he was chased' by Gurnam Singh round the outer boundary of a tank which was close by, Mohinder Singh ran on the other side of the tank in the opposite direction and confronted him and shot him with a gun on the chest whereupon he fell down. Meanwhile, Gurnam Singh had also reached the spot and he fired with his rifle from a distance of about 4 or 5 feet near about Dalip Singh's ear while he was lying sideways. The injuries proved fatal and Dalip Singh died on the spot.\n\nThe same day at 3 p, m .. J ita Singh went to the police station at Dharamkot, which is at a distance of 3 miles from village Augar, where the occurrence had taken place, and lodged a first information report, charging Mohinder Singh, with having caused injury to him, and Mohinder Singh and Gurnam Singh with the murder of Dalip Singh; and the police after investigating the case sent up a charge-sheet against the two accused persons, Thereafter they were tried by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appellant was sentenced to death under section 302 and Gurnam Singh was sentenced to transportation for life under that section in view of his youth. They were also sentenced to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment each under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIt appears that Dalip Singh had 6 injuries altogether which are described by the doctor who performed the post-mortem on his body in these words; -\n\n\" I. An irregularly round gun shot wound on the left tern poral region, I'' diameter. The wound is 2!\" behind outer canthus of left eye, its upper portion is at a level with the top of the pinna of the left ear,\n\n' ' .,,\n\n1950 behind it commences at the cartilages of the ear which arc broken.\n\nBrain is visible in the gap of the wound.\n\nMohind~ Srngh An area 4\" x 4\" is blackened, the wound being situ-\n\nTh• Stat•. ated in the middle of this area.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n2. A gun shot wound f' x f' on the back of right mastoid region, upper end of the wound is I\" behind the root of the right ear.\n\nDirection is vertically obli\"que. On dissection the left temporal bone under in jury No. 1 is, hole and its petrous portion shattered.\n\nA linear fracture extends upwards and backwards, from the hole into the left parietal and occipital bones.\n\nAfter piercing through the left temporal lobe of the brain the projectile has pierced through the brainstem, and emerged out as injury No. 2, holding the mastoid region of the skull on the right side.\n\n3. A gun shot wound i\" X ~\" on the left side of chest 2!'' above and behind the left nipple and !\" behind the anterior axillary fold as area l\" below the wound is bruised.\n\n4. A gun shot wound !\"Xi\" on the right side of chest in the mid axillary line. The top of the wound being Ii\" from the apex of right axilla and 4£'' above and behind the right nipple. 5.\n\nA gun shot wound!\" x ; I:\" on the inner aspect of the right arm, upper end of the wound is 1 ; I:'' from the top of the anterior axillary fold. 6.\n\nA gun shot wound i\" x !\" on the front of the right arm.\n\nIts upper end being 2!'' from the top of the anterior axillary fold. Its distance from injury No. 5 being l\" and it is inter-connected with injury No. 5 under the skin.\"\n\nThe doctor has stated in his evidence that in all two projectiles appeared to have hit Dalip Singh, and injuries Nos. 1 and 2 were caused by one of them, injury No. 1 being the wound of entrance and injury No. 2 being the wound of exit. \\Vith regard to the other 4 injuries, his evidence is as follows:-\n\n\"Injury No. 3 is the wound of entrance of another projectile and No. 4 is the wound of its exit. Wound\n\n• -\n\n• -\n\nNo. 5 is the wound of its re-entrance and wound io5o No. 6 the wound of its final exit from the body.\" ., 1 . a 8 . .!.':i:O iin er ingh Jita Singh had 4 slight injuries on the back of the v: neck which are said to have been caused by pellets Tize State. and two abrasions below the right elbow and right knee said to have been caused by blunt weapons.\n\nFazt Ali J.\n\nIt may be stated here that when the investigating police officer arrived at the scene of occurrence, he found an empty cartridge case at the place where Jita Singh is said to have been fired at, and 2 empty cartridge cases and a blood-stained cap of a cartridge case near the place where the dead body of Dalip Sin, gh was lying.\n\nLater, when Mohinder Singh appeared before the police, he was asked whether he possessed a gun and he produced a 12 bore gun (exhibit P-16) for which he held a licence.\n\nThe gun and the empty cartridges were thereupon sent to Dr. Gayle, Director of the C.I.D. Laboratory, Phil!aur, and the opinion that he submitted may be summed up as follows :-The gun had signs of having been fired but he could not sav when it was fired last.\n\nThe cartridge cases P-10 and\" P-15 could have been fired through the gun P-16, but he could not say whether they were actually fired from that particular gun or a similar gun or guns.\n\nHe did not make any experiment by firing any cartridge from the gun\n\nP-16, nor did he compare the markings on the empty cartridges P-10 and P.15.\n\nA notable feature of the case is that the occurrence is said to have taken place in the vicinity of a Gurdwara and some houses, but in spite of this fact, not a single person of the locality has been cited or examined as a witness by the prosecution. The whole case rests on the evidence of 3 witnesses, viz., Jita Singh, Harnam Singh and Buta Singh. Jita Singh,\n\nwho had been shot at from behind, claims to have seen the two accused firing at his brother. Harnam Singh admittedly lives at a considerable distance from the place of occurrence but has stated that he was coming from another village where he had gone to fetch some medicine for his maternal cousin, when he\n\nrnso saw the occurrence. Buta Singh, who is a tonga -- . driver, belongs to a distant village and is somewhat Mohind\"' 8••gh remotely related to Harnam Singh, and accounts for\n\nTh• ;; at•. his presence near the scene of occurrence by saying that he had come to see Harnam Singh the evening\n\nFa11 Ali J. before. Harnam Singh admitted in his evidence that there was a dispute between him and .Mohinder Singh nearly a month before the occurrence about a wall, but he also says that the dispute \"had been amicably settled by the panchayat\". There is nothing before us to show what the award of the panchayat was and whether or not it left any ill-feeling behind.\n\nBut, on the arguments of the counsel and the apparently trivial motive for which Dalip Singh is said to have been murdered, it would appear that among the class of persons with which we are concerned petty quarrels give rise to enmity which does not die soon or easily.\n\nAfter the close of prosecution evidence in the Sessions Court, the appellant was examined under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and he denied that he had fired at Jita Singh and Dalip Singh with the gun P-16 and that Gurnam Singh had fired at Dalip Singh with a rifle. He added that he was not present in village Augur at the time of the alleged occurrence but had gone to Zira to attend the Naib Tehsildar's court. To establish his plea of alibi, he examined 3 witnesses in the court of the Sessions Judge, The first witness was the Naib Tehsildar before whom Bachittar Singh had lodged the complaint, and he stated that when the case was called on the 28th February, 1949, 6 or 7persons appeared in court. He also proved an application for a taccavi loan which purports to have been filed by the appellant on the 28th February, 1949, and bears his thumb impression.\n\nHe further stated in his evidence that he had passed orders on that application on the 28th February but he did not know Mohinder Singh and therefore could not say who had produced that application before him on that date. The second witness for the appellant was his brother-in-law, Jogindar Singh, who had written the application, exhibit D-C.\n\nHe has stated that\n\n• -\n\nMohinder Singh himself was present in the court of the 1950 Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February, 1949, that he Moh.-;;-;:- sngh had signed the application (exhibit D-C) and that he ' ;. ' was also one of the persons who had appeared before The Bt•t•. the Tehsildar when Bachittar Singh's case was ca!ied\n\nout. The third defence witness is a hand-writing and Fa•! Ali J. fingerprint expert. He has proved that the application\n\n(exhibit D-C) alleged to have been presented to the Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February bore the thumb impression of the appellant, and he has also given evidence to show that certain handwritings which he was asked to compare did not tally. The evidence given by him with regard to these handwritings has a bearing on the assertion made by the appellant in a petition filed before the committing Magistrate to the effect that the original service report of the process peon showing that the appellant also was one of the persons served for appearance before the Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February, 1949, had been suppressed and another report with forged handwriting had been substituted in its place.\n\nBoth the courts below have held that the alibi has not been proved by satisfactory evidence and that the charges against the appellant have been made out.\n\nIt seems that the learned Judges of the High Court were not at all impressed by the evidence of Dr. Goy le which they characterized as unsatisfactory and they were not also confident that the gun, exhibit P-16, had been used in causing the injuries to Dalip Singh.\n\nThis appears from the following observations made by them in their judgment : -\n\n\"The gun P-16 was identified by Jita Singh as the gun with which Mohinder Singh fired at him and Dalip Singh but he identified the gun because of a brass plate at its butt end. We have seen the gun. Its brass plate could be of no use for the identification of the gun.\"\n\nAgain, commenting on the nature of the injuries, the learned Judges observed as follows:--\n\n1950 \"Another difficulty which is created in this case is Mahi•;:- Si\"a\" the nature of injuri<.>s found on the body of Dalip v.\n\nSingh ...... vVhat kind of bullet it was which, though it Th• State. had blackened the area where it entered the brain showing tliat it had been fired from not far away, did not Fa•l Ali J. shatter the brain we do not know. \\Vhat kind of projectile it was which entered the body (which if the evidence is to be believed was fired at from a few feet at Dalip Singh) and passed through the body without shattering the inside of the chest or causing extensive damage therein is also not kn0wn. Mr.Sethi (counsel for the accused) quoted Taylor's book on medical jurisprudence and Hatcher's book on ballistics and argued that the firing must have bern from a place between 600 and 1,200 yards away in order that the projectile may pass through and through the body and not shatter it. That of cuurse pre-supposes that the barrel of the gun. using the word ' gun' in a generic sense, is grooved which causes a projectile to go forward with a rotatory motion of something under a quart<.>r of a million revolutions a minute and travel. ling at the rate of about 2,000 rniks an hour when it leaves the gun ......... \\Ve do not know whether the barrel of this gun (exhibit P.16) is grooved or not. It is a single birrelled gun and is country made.\n\nThe likelihood is that the barrel is not grooved.\"\n\nOn a careful re\" ding of the judgment under appeal. it appears that 1 he learned ] uclges of the High Court strongly felt that they had no adequate explanation in the oral evidence before them for certain puzzling features of the injuries on Dalip Singh.\n\nThis is exactly what we also feel in this case, and it seems to us that the evidence which has been adduced falls short of proof in regard to a very material part of the prosecution case.\n\nIn a case where death is due to injuries or wounds caused by a lethal weapon, it has always been considered to be the duty of the prosecu. tion to prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible for the injuries to have been caused with the weapon with which and in the manner in which they are alleged to have been caused. It is\n\nelementary that where the prosecution.has a definite 1950 or positive case, it must prove the whole of that case.\n\nIn the present case, it is doubtful whether the injuries Mohindor Singh which are attributed to the appellant were caused by Th ;; 1 a gun or by a rifle.\n\nIndeed, it seems more likely that ' a' they were caused by a rifle than by a gun-, and yet the Fa•l Ali J. case for the prosecution is that the appellant was armed with a gun and, in his examination, it was definitely put to him that he was armed with the gun P-16. It is only by the evidence of a duly qualified expert that it could have been ascertained whether the injuries attributed to the appellant were caused by a gun or by a rifle and such evidence alone could settle the controversy as to whether they could possi. bly have been caused by a fire-arm being used at such a close range as is suggested in the evidence. It is clear, and it is also the prosecution case, that only 2 shots were fired at Dalip Singh and one of the crucial points which the prosecution had to prove was that these shots were fired by two persons and not by one man, and both the shots were fired in such manner and from such distance as is alleged by the eye witnesses. There is, in our opinion, a gap in the prosecution evidence on a most fundamental point and the error which has been committed by the courts below is to ignore the gap and decide the case merely upon the oral evidence of 3 witnesses, two of whom are mere chance witnesses and not altogether independent persons, and the evidence of the third witness is open to criticism on the ground of his partisanship as well as the improbability of his having been able to see the firing at his brother after he had himself been shot at the back of the neck. The learned Judges of the High Court, after commenting upon the entire evidence, say in their judgment:-\n\n\" We are thus left with the evidence of the three witnesses of the prosecution together with the state of wounds as shown by the medical evidence and an, unsatisfactory statement of Dr. Goy le,\"\n\n1900 They reject the evidence of Dr. Goy le and they consider the nature of the wounds to have created a Mohindtr Smghserious difficulty in the case. Having arrived at these\n\n1'he ~1,. 1 ,. conclusions, it was a serious thing to rest the appellant's conviction wholly upon the oral testimony in Far! Ali J. the case which has remained unchecked and uncon. firmed by expert evidence. The real position appears to be that the prosecution case cannot be said to be wholly proved but only partly proved if it is permissible to use such an expression. This Court, as was pointed out in Pritam Singh v. The State (1), will not entertain a criminal appeal except in special and exceptional cases where it is manifest that by a disregard of the forms of legal process or by a violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been done. It seems to us that the present case comes within the rule laid down, because the appellant has been convicted notwithstanding the fact that the evidence is wanting on a most-material part of the prosecution case.\n\nThis is enough to dispose of this appeal, but we are constrained to say that we are not altogether happy about the manner in which the plea of alibi put forward by the appellant has been disposed of by the courts below.\n\nOrdinarily this court will not look beyond the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below, but we find that in the present case the deci. sion on the plea of alibi has been arrived at in disre. gard of the principle that the standard of proof which is required in regard to that plea must be the same as the standard which is applied to the prosecution evidence and in both cases it should be a reasonable standard. It is common ground in this appeal that the appellant was summoned to appear before the Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February, 1949, which was the date fixed for dealing with Bachittar Singh's complaint. Ordinarily and without looking at anything else, there should have been nothing improbable about his appearance before the Naib Tehsildar on that date, but in the present case there is positive\n\n(11 [1950] s.c, R. 453,\n\nevidence that an application for a tacca vi loan bearing !95o that date and also bearing the thumb impression of. -- the appellant wa.s put up before the Naib Tehsildar J!ohinder Singh and that was dealt with by him on that very da.y.\n\nThe ?tate.\n\nThere is also affirmative evidence of a witness to prove that the appellant was present in the Naib Tehsildar's Fail Ali J. court. This witness is undoubtedly closely related to the appellant but his evidence is supported by probability and a written document. One of the points raised by the prosecution was that the summons for appearance on the 28th February was not served upon Mohinder Singh, but such evidence as there is on the record bearing on this point has certain peculiar features. The prosecution having cited the N aib Tehsildar and the Ahlrnad (Bench Clerk) as witnesses in the case gave them up and stated that the former had been won over by the appellant. This allegation could have been substantiated in the cross.examination of the Naib Tehsildar who was examined as a defence witness, but nothing was elicited from him to support such a charge. From the evidence of the Naib Tehsildar, it appears that on the 5th July, 1949, the Public Prosecutor showed him exhibit P.S. (which is an order directing the appearance of the seven persons including the appellant mentioned by Bachittar Singh in his complaint, before the Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February, 1949), and that he told the Public Prosecutor that 6 or 7 persons appeared in his court on that date. After this incident, on the 6th July, 1949, the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that he would \"give up the Naib Tehsildar as he has been won over ''. The evidence of the process peon is of a somewhat suspicious character, because he has conveniently forgotten every material detail. The appellant asserteci at the trial that the original report of the process peon had been suppressed and another report had been fabricated and substituted in its place.\n\nAn application to this effect was ma de by h irn before the corn rnitting Magistrate, and he also examined a handwriting expert to prove some of his allegations.\n\nNeither of the courts below has dealt with the evidence\n\n19~0 of this expert. The evidence of the Investigating . -- 8 . hOfficer as recorded by the Sessions Judge is to the Moh\"'\"\" ••g f JI ff t •. o owmg e ec :-\n\nThe stat•. \"P.B. and P.C. were obtained by me from the headquarters. Along with P.B. and P.C. the Parvana h'a•I Ali J.\n\nP.S. was also received by me. After going through the zimnis, the witness states that the aforesaid documents P.B., P.C. and P.S. were summoned by the committing Magistrate and were not sent for by the witness.\n\nOn 16th March, 1949, a Foot Constable was certainly sent to Zira to bring the said file.\n\nBut since the file had been sent to the headquarters, therefore, the said constable returned quite blank. I never inspected this file at the headquarters.\"\n\nThe most material document with which we are concerned is P.S. which should have contained an endorsement of service of summons on the persons against whom Bachittar Singh had complained. It is clear from the first part of the evidence of the Investigating Officer that he had received the report of the process peon which was endorsed on the back of P .S., from the headquarters, but he says later that the papers were sent for but they did not arrive. It is surprising that when a document was the subject of so much controversy he should have said by mistake that he had received it. One of the comments made by the learned Sessions Judge in dealing with the application alleged to have been made by the appellant on the 28th February, 1949, for a taccavi loan is that after producing the application before the N aib Tehsildar on that date, Mohinder Singh could have reached his village by noon time, but on this point the learned Sessions Judge seems to have wholly ignored the evidence of the Naib Tehsildar that he usually dealt with such applications between 12 and 4 P.M. on working days, and also the affirmative evidence of Joginder Singh.\n\nIn our opinion, there has been in substance no fair and proper trial in this case, and we are constrained to allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34\n\n...\n\n. .\n\nof the Indian Penal Code, and direct that he be set at 195\" liberty forthwith. In crdinary circumstances, we -d- . . b Afohin er Singh might have remanded the case for a fresh tnal, ut we v. consider that such a course would, in the present The State. case, be unfair and contrary to settled practice, seeing that the appellant has been in a state of suspense over Fail Ali J. his sentence of death for more than a year .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R.S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.\n\nMANGAN LAL DEOSHI\n\nMOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE & OTHERS.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRT\n\nand DAS JJ.]\n\nIndian R<gistration Act. 1908. s. 17 (1) (bl awl (d), !. 17 (21- \" Lease \"-Conivromise decree c1eatina !tnder.lea.se l.Jetw::e11 A and E on condition that A vavs a. s1t11i. of money to 0-TV!utlrnr comr'llfrorify regist1ab 1e-Aareem£nt to lease not creatin'] i'lnmdiate interest in\n\nlad-Whether ''lease \".\n\nAn agreement for a lense, which a lease is by the Indian Registration Act declared to include, must be a document which effects an nctu•I demise and operates as a lease. It must creato a present and irn1nediate interest in land.\n\nWhere a litigation between two perrnns A and B who claimed to he tenants under C was settled by a compromise decree tho effect of which \\\\'RS to create a perpetual underlease between A and B which was to tako effect only on condition that A paid ll.s. 8,000 to C within a fixed period :\n\nHe,7d, that such a contingent agreement was not\n\n11 a. lease\" within cl. (d) of s. I 7 (1) of the Indian Registrotion Act, ond even though it was covered by cl. (b' of the said section it was exempt from registration under cl. (vi) of subs. (2) of s. 17.\n\nHemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zaminiari Co. (I L.R. 47 Cal. 485 P.O.) relied on.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE j!JRISmGTION: Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1949. ·\n\nDec. l,", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "N.tayam Rama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.ri Rt'lnga I agree in the conclusion reached by my learned N.tayam Rama brother."}}, {"text": "Kdshna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kdshna Rao Appeals allowed."}}, {"text": "M .S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 252, "end_char": 279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: M .S. Krishnamoorthi Sastri."}}, {"text": "M.S.K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 309, "end_char": 324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: M.S.K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 343, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 354, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 373, "end_char": 382, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 389, "end_char": 411, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kandrikori Ghtllayanima", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2100, "end_char": 2123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prosecLio:i hafl no evidence to sho\\V that another person a!Ho shot, and the High Court, though realising that thel'e was thuq :t gap in the prosecution evidence, convicted the accusec.l placing reliance on the oral evidence of 3 wiGnesses which was not disinterested: Held, that the present case fell w'thin the rule laid down in Pritam Sin1h v. Th• State ([1950] 8.0.R. 45:3) iuasmuch as the appellant had been convicted notwithstaniing the fa, t that evidence '\\Vas wo.nting on a most materi'.11 parG of the prosecution case, and the conviction could not therefore be upheld,\n\n10~\n\nKandrikori Ghtllayanima\n\nand Anothe,..\n\nOct, 17,\n\n19~0 Held also, that the stndard of proof which is required in regard to the plea of alibi must be tbs same as the stundard Mohinder S1ngh which is applied to the prosecution evidence and in both cases it v. should be a reasonable standard."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2283, "end_char": 2285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2506, "end_char": 2526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab (Falshaw and Soni JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Falshaw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2528, "end_char": 2535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab (Falshaw and Soni JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Soni", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2540, "end_char": 2544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab (Falshaw and Soni JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2664, "end_char": 2681, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "20th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 and 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and confirming the sentence of death passed against him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore on the 20th July, 1949, in Criminal Appeal Case No."}}, {"text": "ai Gopal Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2840, "end_char": 2854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2856, "end_char": 2867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2902, "end_char": 2911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Khanna, Advocate-General of the Punjab, (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2946, "end_char": 2957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Khanna, Advocate-General of the Punjab, (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Fall Ah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3052, "end_char": 3059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nFall Ah J.\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab upholding the conviction of the appellant, Mohinder Singh, under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and confirming the sentence of death passed against him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore."}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3199, "end_char": 3213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nFall Ah J.\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab upholding the conviction of the appellant, Mohinder Singh, under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and confirming the sentence of death passed against him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore.", "canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH"}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3252, "end_char": 3262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3270, "end_char": 3287, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bachittar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime in January, 1949, one Bachittar Singh; brother of Dalip Singh who is said to have been murdered, lodged a complaint before the Naib Tehsildar at Zira to the effect that a tree belonging to him had been cut by 7 persons including Mohinder Singh, the appellant."}}, {"text": "Dalip Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3571, "end_char": 3582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime in January, 1949, one Bachittar Singh; brother of Dalip Singh who is said to have been murdered, lodged a complaint before the Naib Tehsildar at Zira to the effect that a tree belonging to him had been cut by 7 persons including Mohinder Singh, the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Dalip Singh"}}, {"text": "Zira", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime in January, 1949, one Bachittar Singh; brother of Dalip Singh who is said to have been murdered, lodged a complaint before the Naib Tehsildar at Zira to the effect that a tree belonging to him had been cut by 7 persons including Mohinder Singh, the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime in January, 1949, one Bachittar Singh; brother of Dalip Singh who is said to have been murdered, lodged a complaint before the Naib Tehsildar at Zira to the effect that a tree belonging to him had been cut by 7 persons including Mohinder Singh, the appellant.", "canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH"}}, {"text": "28th February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th February, 1949, which was the date fixed for the hearing of the case before the Naib Tehsildar, Jita Singh and Dalip Singh, the two brothers of Bachittar Singh, were attacked by the appellant and one Gumam Singh,\n\n'I. lad of 17, near a Gurdwara at about mid-day, when\n\n... -\n\nthey were returning from their field."}}, {"text": "Jita Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3889, "end_char": 3899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th February, 1949, which was the date fixed for the hearing of the case before the Naib Tehsildar, Jita Singh and Dalip Singh, the two brothers of Bachittar Singh, were attacked by the appellant and one Gumam Singh,\n\n'I. lad of 17, near a Gurdwara at about mid-day, when\n\n... -\n\nthey were returning from their field.", "canonical_name": "J ita Singh"}}, {"text": "Gumam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th February, 1949, which was the date fixed for the hearing of the case before the Naib Tehsildar, Jita Singh and Dalip Singh, the two brothers of Bachittar Singh, were attacked by the appellant and one Gumam Singh,\n\n'I. lad of 17, near a Gurdwara at about mid-day, when\n\n... -\n\nthey were returning from their field."}}, {"text": "Mohinder The tat\" Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 a wg was t e first to be attacked near a tailor's shop by Mohinder The tat\" Singh who fired at him from behind hitting him on the neck whereupon he fell down together with the Fail J.li J. bundle of fodder."}}, {"text": "Gurnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalip Singh, who was following Jita Singh, then ran backwards and he was chased' by Gurnam Singh round the outer boundary of a tank which was close by, Mohinder Singh ran on the other side of the tank in the opposite direction and confronted him and shot him with a gun on the chest whereupon he fell down."}}, {"text": "J ita Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5044, "end_char": 5055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same day at 3 p, m .. J ita Singh went to the police station at Dharamkot, which is at a distance of 3 miles from village Augar, where the occurrence had taken place, and lodged a first information report, charging Mohinder Singh, with having caused injury to him, and Mohinder Singh and Gurnam Singh with the murder of Dalip Singh; and the police after investigating the case sent up a charge-sheet against the two accused persons, Thereafter they were tried by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "J ita Singh"}}, {"text": "Dharamkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5086, "end_char": 5095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same day at 3 p, m .. J ita Singh went to the police station at Dharamkot, which is at a distance of 3 miles from village Augar, where the occurrence had taken place, and lodged a first information report, charging Mohinder Singh, with having caused injury to him, and Mohinder Singh and Gurnam Singh with the murder of Dalip Singh; and the police after investigating the case sent up a charge-sheet against the two accused persons, Thereafter they were tried by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Augar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5144, "end_char": 5149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same day at 3 p, m .. J ita Singh went to the police station at Dharamkot, which is at a distance of 3 miles from village Augar, where the occurrence had taken place, and lodged a first information report, charging Mohinder Singh, with having caused injury to him, and Mohinder Singh and Gurnam Singh with the murder of Dalip Singh; and the police after investigating the case sent up a charge-sheet against the two accused persons, Thereafter they were tried by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Ferozepore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same day at 3 p, m .. J ita Singh went to the police station at Dharamkot, which is at a distance of 3 miles from village Augar, where the occurrence had taken place, and lodged a first information report, charging Mohinder Singh, with having caused injury to him, and Mohinder Singh and Gurnam Singh with the murder of Dalip Singh; and the police after investigating the case sent up a charge-sheet against the two accused persons, Thereafter they were tried by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5524, "end_char": 5544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5555, "end_char": 5565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5590, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5839, "end_char": 5849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5874, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fazt Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8574, "end_char": 8582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazt Ali J.\n\nIt may be stated here that when the investigating police officer arrived at the scene of occurrence, he found an empty cartridge case at the place where Jita Singh is said to have been fired at, and 2 empty cartridge cases and a blood-stained cap of a cartridge case near the place where the dead body of Dalip Sin, gh was lying."}}, {"text": "Dalip Sin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8892, "end_char": 8901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazt Ali J.\n\nIt may be stated here that when the investigating police officer arrived at the scene of occurrence, he found an empty cartridge case at the place where Jita Singh is said to have been fired at, and 2 empty cartridge cases and a blood-stained cap of a cartridge case near the place where the dead body of Dalip Sin, gh was lying.", "canonical_name": "Dalip Singh"}}, {"text": "Gayle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9148, "end_char": 9153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gun and the empty cartridges were thereupon sent to Dr. Gayle, Director of the C.I.D. Laboratory, Phil!aur, and the opinion that he submitted may be summed up as follows :-The gun had signs of having been fired but he could not sav when it was fired last."}}, {"text": "C.I.D. Laboratory, Phil!aur,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9171, "end_char": 9199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gun and the empty cartridges were thereupon sent to Dr. Gayle, Director of the C.I.D. Laboratory, Phil!aur, and the opinion that he submitted may be summed up as follows :-The gun had signs of having been fired but he could not sav when it was fired last."}}, {"text": "Jita Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9991, "end_char": 10001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jita Singh, Harnam Singh and Buta Singh."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10003, "end_char": 10015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jita Singh, Harnam Singh and Buta Singh."}}, {"text": "Buta Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10020, "end_char": 10030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jita Singh, Harnam Singh and Buta Singh."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10138, "end_char": 10150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh admittedly lives at a considerable distance from the place of occurrence but has stated that he was coming from another village where he had gone to fetch some medicine for his maternal cousin, when he\n\nrnso saw the occurrence."}}, {"text": "Buta Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10379, "end_char": 10389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Buta Singh, who is a tonga -- ."}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10650, "end_char": 10653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "driver, belongs to a distant village and is somewhat Mohind\"' 8••gh remotely related to Harnam Singh, and accounts for\n\nTh• ;; at•. his presence near the scene of occurrence by saying that he had come to see Harnam Singh the evening\n\nFa11 Ali J. before."}}, {"text": ".Mohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10744, "end_char": 10759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh admitted in his evidence that there was a dispute between him and .Mohinder Singh nearly a month before the occurrence about a wall, but he also says that the dispute \"had been amicably settled by the panchayat\".", "canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11381, "end_char": 11392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Augur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11610, "end_char": 11615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He added that he was not present in village Augur at the time of the alleged occurrence but had gone to Zira to attend the Naib Tehsildar's court."}}, {"text": "Jogindar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12450, "end_char": 12464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second witness for the appellant was his brother-in-law, Jogindar Singh, who had written the application, exhibit D-C.\n\nHe has stated that\n\n• -\n\nMohinder Singh himself was present in the court of the 1950 Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February, 1949, that he Moh.-;;-;:- sngh had signed the application (exhibit D-C) and that he ' ;. '"}}, {"text": "Goy le", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13925, "end_char": 13931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems that the learned Judges of the High Court were not at all impressed by the evidence of Dr. Goy le which they characterized as unsatisfactory and they were not also confident that the gun, exhibit P-16, had been used in causing the injuries to Dalip Singh."}}, {"text": "Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15158, "end_char": 15163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.Sethi (counsel for the accused) quoted Taylor's book on medical jurisprudence and Hatcher's book on ballistics and argued that the firing must have bern from a place between 600 and 1,200 yards away in order that the projectile may pass through and through the body and not shatter it."}}, {"text": "Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15197, "end_char": 15203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.Sethi (counsel for the accused) quoted Taylor's book on medical jurisprudence and Hatcher's book on ballistics and argued that the firing must have bern from a place between 600 and 1,200 yards away in order that the projectile may pass through and through the body and not shatter it."}}, {"text": "Hatcher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15240, "end_char": 15247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.Sethi (counsel for the accused) quoted Taylor's book on medical jurisprudence and Hatcher's book on ballistics and argued that the firing must have bern from a place between 600 and 1,200 yards away in order that the projectile may pass through and through the body and not shatter it."}}, {"text": "Mohindor Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16921, "end_char": 16935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, it is doubtful whether the injuries Mohindor Singh which are attributed to the appellant were caused by Th ;; 1 a gun or by a rifle.", "canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH"}}, {"text": "Fa•l Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17114, "end_char": 17122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, it seems more likely that ' a' they were caused by a rifle than by a gun-, and yet the Fa•l Ali J. case for the prosecution is that the appellant was armed with a gun and, in his examination, it was definitely put to him that he was armed with the gun P-16.", "canonical_name": "Fa•l Ali"}}, {"text": "Far! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19119, "end_char": 19127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "conclusions, it was a serious thing to rest the appellant's conviction wholly upon the oral testimony in Far!"}}, {"text": "J!ohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21147, "end_char": 21162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant wa.s put up before the Naib Tehsildar J!ohinder Singh and that was dealt with by him on that very da.y.", "canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH"}}, {"text": "Fail Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21338, "end_char": 21346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also affirmative evidence of a witness to prove that the appellant was present in the Naib Tehsildar's Fail Ali J. court.", "canonical_name": "Fa•l Ali"}}, {"text": "Naib Tehsildar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21979, "end_char": 21993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This allegation could have been substantiated in the cross.examination of the Naib Tehsildar who was examined as a defence witness, but nothing was elicited from him to support such a charge."}}, {"text": "5th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22157, "end_char": 22171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the evidence of the Naib Tehsildar, it appears that on the 5th July, 1949, the Public Prosecutor showed him exhibit P.S. (which is an order directing the appearance of the seven persons including the appellant mentioned by Bachittar Singh in his complaint, before the Naib Tehsildar on the 28th February, 1949), and that he told the Public Prosecutor that 6 or 7 persons appeared in his court on that date."}}, {"text": "6th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22533, "end_char": 22547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this incident, on the 6th July, 1949, the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that he would \"give up the Naib Tehsildar as he has been won over ''."}}, {"text": "P.B.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23423, "end_char": 23427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Along with P.B. and P.C. the Parvana h'a•I Ali J.\n\nP.S. was also received by me."}}, {"text": "P.C. the Parvana h'a•I Ali J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23432, "end_char": 23461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Along with P.B. and P.C. the Parvana h'a•I Ali J.\n\nP.S. was also received by me."}}, {"text": "16th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23678, "end_char": 23694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th March, 1949, a Foot Constable was certainly sent to Zira to bring the said file."}}, {"text": "Joginder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25057, "end_char": 25071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the comments made by the learned Sessions Judge in dealing with the application alleged to have been made by the appellant on the 28th February, 1949, for a taccavi loan is that after producing the application before the N aib Tehsildar on that date, Mohinder Singh could have reached his village by noon time, but on this point the learned Sessions Judge seems to have wholly ignored the evidence of the Naib Tehsildar that he usually dealt with such applications between 12 and 4 P.M. on working days, and also the affirmative evidence of Joginder Singh.", "canonical_name": "MOHINDEI<. SINGH"}}, {"text": "sections 302 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25250, "end_char": 25270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25281, "end_char": 25291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25310, "end_char": 25327, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Afohin er Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25422, "end_char": 25437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b Afohin er Singh might have remanded the case for a fresh tnal, ut we v. consider that such a course would, in the present The State."}}, {"text": "R.S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25768, "end_char": 25779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R.S. Narula."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25808, "end_char": 25818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25821, "end_char": 25838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI\n\nMOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE & OTHERS."}}, {"text": "MOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25840, "end_char": 25861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI\n\nMOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE & OTHERS."}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25879, "end_char": 25892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRT\n\nand DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25899, "end_char": 25915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRT\n\nand DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25921, "end_char": 25924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRT\n\nand DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25962, "end_char": 25967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26096, "end_char": 26098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26294, "end_char": 26310, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26716, "end_char": 26720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27003, "end_char": 27008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_833_840_EN", "year": 1950, "text": ". .\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 833\n\nof the Indian Penal Code, and direct that he be set at 195\" liberty forthwith. In crdinary circumstances, we -d- . . b Afohin er Singh might have remanded the case for a fresh tnal, ut we v. consider that such a course would, in the present The State. case, be unfair and contrary to settled practice, seeing that the appellant has been in a state of suspense over Fail Ali J. his sentence of death for more than a year .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R.S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.\n\nMANGAN LAL DEOSHI\n\nMOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE & OTHERS.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRT\n\nand DAS JJ.]\n\nIndian R<gistration Act. 1908. s. 17 (1) (bl awl (d), !. 17 (21- \" Lease \"-Conivromise decree c1eatina !tnder.lea.se l.Jetw::e11 A and E on condition that A vavs a. s1t11i. of money to 0-TV!utlrnr comr'llfrorify regist1ab 1e-Aareem£nt to lease not creatin'] i'lnmdiate interest in\n\nlad-Whether ''lease \".\n\nAn agreement for a lense, which a lease is by the Indian Registration Act declared to include, must be a document which effects an nctu•I demise and operates as a lease. It must creato a present and irn1nediate interest in land.\n\nWhere a litigation between two perrnns A and B who claimed to he tenants under C was settled by a compromise decree tho effect of which \\\\'RS to create a perpetual underlease between A and B which was to tako effect only on condition that A paid ll.s. 8,000 to C within a fixed period :\n\nHe,7d, that such a contingent agreement was not\n\n11 a. lease\" within cl. (d) of s. I 7 (1) of the Indian Registrotion Act, ond even though it was covered by cl. (b' of the said section it was exempt from registration under cl. (vi) of subs. (2) of s. 17.\n\nHemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zaminiari Co. (I L.R. 47 Cal. 485 P.O.) relied on.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE j!JRISmGTION: Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1949. ·\n\nDec. l,\n\n1950 Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Appeal from Appel- M\";;!:,:ti1 late Decree No. 97 of 1946 (Manohar Lall and v.\n\nMukherji JJ.) dated 23rd December, 1947, confirming\n\nMohammad the judgment of the District Judge of Purulia in Jfo;•u! Hague Appeal No. 159 of 1944 .\n\n.tOthera S. P. Sinha (P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and Panchanan Ghosh (Chandra Narayan Naik, with them) for the respondent.\n\n1950. December 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPatanjali PATANJALI SASTRI ].-This appeal arises out of a 8••tri J. suit brought by the respondent in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, for recovery oi arrears of royalty and cess from the appellant and another alleged to be due under a compromise decree passed on the 6th March, 1923, in a previous suit between the predecessors in interest of the parties. The only plea which is material for the purpose of this appeal is that the compromise decree not having been registered was inadmissible in evidence. The courts below held that the document did not require registration and gave effect to its terms in decreeing the suit. The second defendant has preferred this appeal.\n\nThe facts are not now in dispute and may be briefly statJ!d. On 11th March, 1921, one Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kumar) granted a permanent lease of the right to the underground coal in 5,800 bighas of land belonging to him to Shibsaran Singh and Sitaram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Singhs) by a registered patta stipulating for a salami of Rs. 8,000 and royalty at the rate of 2a. per ton of coal raised subject to a minimum of Rs. 8,000 and for certain other cesses and interest. On 7th June, 1921, Kumar executed another permanent patta leasing the right to the coal in 500 bighas out of the 5,800 bighas referred to above to one Prayagji Bo1llavji Deoshi and his son Harakchand Deoshi (hereinafter referred to as the Deoshis). By this document\n\nthe Deoshis agreed inter alia to pay royalty at the rate of 2a. per ton on all classes of coal raised subject to a minimum of Rs. 750 a year. The Singhs feeling themselves aggrieved by the latter transaction brought a title suit (No. 1291of1921) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dhan bad for a declaration of their title and for possession of the 500 bighas leased to the Deoshis under the aforesaid patta of 7th June, 1921.\n\nTo that suit Kumar was made a party as defendant No. 3, the Deoshis being defendants 1 and 2. The suit was however compromised on 6th March, 1923, by all the parties and a decree based on the compromise was also passed on the same day. The interest of the Singhs was brought to sale in 1938 in execution of a decree obtained against them and was purchased by the plaintiff who instituted the present suit, on 3rd October, 1942, claiming the royalty and cesses payable under the compromise decree for the period from Pous 1345 to Asadh 1349 B. S. from defendants 1 and 2 as the representatives of the Deoshis who entered into the compromise of March, 1923.\n\nIn order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant terms of the compromise decree which are as follows :-\n\n\" The plaintiffs (the Singhs) within two months from this date shall pay Rs. 8,000 as salami to defendant No. 3 (Kumar). Otherwise all the terms of the compromise will stand cancelled and the plaintiffs shall not be competent to claim any right to or possession over theland covered.by the patta dated 11th March, 1921. ..\n\nThe patta which defendant No. 3 executed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of 5 ,800 bighas of coal land in village Rahraband shall remain in force, and the plaintiffs will get a decree of declaration of their right and title to the 500 bighas of coal land in dispute but defendants 1 and 2 (the Deoshis) shall hold possession as tenants. Besides the terms mentioned below, defendants 1 and 2 shall remain bound by all the remaining terms under which they took settlement of the 500 bighas of coal land from defendant No. 3 under\n\nMangan Lal\n\nDeoshi\n\nMohammad\n\n.. 'lloinul Ha2ue\n\ncf Oth!rs.\n\nPatanjali\n\n8a1tri J.\n\nMangan. Lal\n\nDtosh$\n\nMohamma.t Moi01ul Haqus\n\n¢ Otker1.,\n\nPatanjali\n\nSadr\\ J,\n\npatta and Kabuliyat, and both the defendants 1 and 2 shall possess the same under the plaintiffs from generation to generation and all the terms of the said patta and Kabuliyat shall remain effective and in force between them.\n\nBoth the defendants 1 and 2 shall remain bound to pay to the plaintiffs commission at the rate of 2a. 6p. per ton on all sorts of coal instead of 2a. a ton as stated before in the pat ta of 5,800 big has of land settled with the plaintiffs ... The plaintiffs shall pay to defendant No. 3 in future the minimum royalty of R.s. 6,000 instead of Rs. 8,000 as stipulated in the original patta of 11th March 1921 and commission at the rate of la. 9p. a ton in place of 2a. a ton as stipulated in the patta of March 21 ...... Unless the plaintiffs pay to the defendant No. 3 Rs. 8,000 within 2 months from this day they shall not be competent to take out execution of this decree, nor shall they be competent to take possession of the land in dispute. The defendants 1 and 2 within one month frcm the date of payment of ls. 8,000 as aforesaid to defendant No. 3 shall execute a new Kabuliyat in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the modified terms stated above, i.e., on the condition to pay commission at the rate of 2a. 6p. per ton ... In the new patta which defendant No. 3 will execute in favour of the plaintiffs he shall embody the condition that the annual minimum royalty will be 11'.s. 6,000 instead of Rs. 8,000 and commission will be at the rate of la. 9p. per ton in place of 2a. per ton as mentioned in the aforesaid patta. If the defendant No. 3 does not execute the patta on the aforesaid modified terms in favour of the plaintiffs within the time aforesaid and both the defendants 1 and 2 also do not execute a kabuliyat on the aforesaid modified terms, then this very rafanama shall be treated as the patta and kabuliyat, and the plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the rafanama shall pay to defendant No. 3, Rs. 6,000 only as minimum royalty and commission at the rate of la. 9p. per ton with respect to 5,800 bighas and shall continue to realise commission at the rate of 2a. 6p. per ton from defendants 1 and 2 who shall remain bound to pay the same.\" ,......\n\nThe answer to the question whether this compromise decree requires registration depends on the legal effect of the changes in the status quo ante of the parties brought about by the document. A careful analysis reveals the following alterations :-\n\n(1) In the lease to the Singhs, the rate of royalty or commission was reduced from 2a. per ton of coal raised to la. 9p. per ton and the minimum royalty was reduced from I'{s. 8,000 to l'{s. 6,000 while the area of coal land in their khas possession was reduced by 500 bighas.\n\n(2) In the lease to the Deoshis the rate of royalty or commission was enhanced from 2a. per ton to 2a. 6p. per ton and this was made payable to the Singhs.\n\n(3) The Singhs and the Deoshis were brought into a new legal relationship, the former accepting the latter as tenants holding the disputed 500 bighas under them in consideration of the latter agreeing to pay the enhanced royalty to the former.\n\n(4) The whole arrangement was made conditional on the Singhs paying l'{s. 8 ,000 to Kumar within 2 months from the date of the compromise, it being expressly provided that the Singhs were not to be entitled to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed area of SO::> bighas which evidently had not till then passed into their possession.\n\nNow, sub-section (I) of section 17 of the Registration Act, enumerates five categories of documents of which registration is made compulsory which include\" (d) leases of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;\". Sub.section (2) however provided that \"nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (I) applies to ...... (vi) any decree or order of court.\" It may be mentioned in passing that this clause was amended with affect from the 1st April, 1930, by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, so as to exclude from the scope of the exception com pro mise decrees comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit. But\n\nMangan La, l\n\nDeoshi\n\nMoliammaci .Uoinul Haqu,4\n\nct Oth6ra, -,- PatanjaU\n\nSastr~ J.\n\n19~0\n\nMangan L:il\n\nDJoshi\n\nMohrimmad Moin.ul Haque\n\ntl Othors.\n\nPatanjali\n\nS'astri J.\n\nthe amendment cannot affect the document here in question which came into existence in 1923. Before tlie amendment, the clause was held to cover even compromise decrees comprising immovable property which was not the subject matter of the suit : lVide Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Ji.1idnapur Zamindari Co. (1)].\n\nThat decision app)ies to the present case and obviates the objection that because the compromise in question covered also the remaining 5,300 bighas which were not the subject-matter of the title suit of 1921, it was outside the scope of the exception in sub-section (2), clause (vi).\n\nThe only question, therefore, is whether the compromise decree is a \"lease\" [which expression includes \"an agreement to lease\" by the definition in section 2 (7)] within the meaning of cl. (d) of sub-section (1).\n\nIt is obvious that if th~ compromise decree falls within clause (d) of sub.section (1) it would not be protected under clause (vi) of sub-sect.ion (2) which excepts only documents falling under the categories (b) and (c) of sub-section (1).\n\nThe High Court was of opinion that, on a proper construction of the terms of the compromise, it did not fall under clause (d).\n\nManohar Lall J ., who delivered the leading judgment, observed : \"It was a tripartite agreement embodied in the decree of the court and was, therefore, exempt from registration. It will be observed also that so far as the defendants were concerned, their possession of the 500 bighas was not interfered with and they still remained in possession as the lessees, but instead of paying the royalty to the plaintiffs it was agreed between all the parties that the defendants would pay the royalty in future to Shibsaran and Sitaram. If the matter had stood there, the learned Advocate for the appellant could not have seriously contested the position, but he vehemently argued that when the agreement was not to pay the same amount of royalty or commission as previously agreed to but an altered amount of royalty and commission, the document should be held to fall within the mischief of section 17 ( 1) ( d) of the\n\n(1) 47 C•I. 485; P.O.\n\nRegistration Act. The answer to this contention is, as I have stated just now, to be found in the Full Bench decision of this court:\" [see Charu Chandra Mitra's case (')]. It was there held that a mere alteration of the rent reserved does not make the transaction a new lease so as to bring it within clause (d) of subsection (1).\n\nWe are unable to share this view. It oversimplifies the compromise transaction which, in our opinion, involves much more than a mere alteration of the royalties stipulated for in the previous pattas executed by Kumar. Nor can we accept the suggestion of Mr. Chatterjee for the respondents that the compromise operated as an assignment to the Singhs by Kumar of the latter's reversion under the \"lease granted to the Deoshis and all that the latter did was to acknowledge the Singhs as their landlords and attorn\n\nto them.\n\nOn this view it was said that the transaction would not fall under clause (d), although it would fall under clause (b) but then would be saved by the exception in clause (vi) of sub-section (2).\n\nThe argument, however, overlooks that Kumar had leased the area of 5,800\n\nbighas to the Singhs by his patta dated I Ith !\\!arch, 1921, and the compromise by providing that the Singhs should pay the reduced royalty of la. 9p. per ton in respect of the whole area preserved Kumar's reversion intact.\n\nHe could not therefore be deemed to have assigned any part of his interest in 5,800 bighas as landlord to the Singhs who continue to hold the entire extent as tenants under him. 'vVhat the compromise really did was, as stated already, to bring the Singhs and the Deoshis into a new legal relationship as underlessor and under-lessee in respect of 500 bighas which were the subject-matter of the title suit; in other words, its legal effect was to create a perpetual underlease between the Singhs and the Deoshis which would clearly fall under clause (d) but for the circumstance that it was to take effect only on condition that the\n\nSingh~ paid Rs. 8,000 to Kumar within 2 month::;\n\nIP P, L. J. 2>,5.\n\nMangan Lal\n\nDeoshi\n\nMohammad Moinul Haqu1\n\ntt Others.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nManann Lal\n\nDeas hi\n\n' Mohammad Moi.nul Haque\n\n& Others.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSaatri J,\n\nDec, 1.\n\nthereafter. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in H emanta K uinar' s case (1) \"An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease ...... The phrase which in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document which creates a present and immediate interest in the land.\" The compromise decree expressly provides that unless the sum of Rs. 8,000 was paid within the stipulated time the Singhs were not to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed property. Until the payment was made it was impossible to determine whether there would be any underlease or not. Such a contingent agreement is not within clause (d) and although it is covered by clause (b), is excepted by clause\n\n(vi) of sub-section (2). \\Ve therefore agree with the conclusion of the High Court though on different grounds and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Sukumar Glzose.\n\nRAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY\n\nBAIJNATH BAJORIA.\n\n(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)\n\nConlract~Specific perforn\"nce-0.ff:r to purchase leasehold right-Stipulation that lesse'J sho-uld obtain consent of lessor-Lessor ttnreasonably refflsing consent-Lessee, 1vhethe' relieved of liribility f0 assign-Suit for sp-1cifi~ verformince by purchasftr-Maintain.• abilitr1-Lea.s9 deed-Covenant prohibitin1 assignm; nt of lease without l . \" l _f!sor s co:isent, Sit' i co 1isent, lunv, vr, not to b3 11,11reasonably ui hhJld in case of respectable p!rso'i \"-llieaniru; and effect of co1,>!':1tant.\n\n(1) 47 Ca.I. 48-'i, at p. 494.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 64, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fail Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case, be unfair and contrary to settled practice, seeing that the appellant has been in a state of suspense over Fail Ali J. his sentence of death for more than a year ."}}, {"text": "R.S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R.S. Narula."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 545, "end_char": 555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 558, "end_char": 575, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 607, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD MOINUL HAQUE & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 634, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 658, "end_char": 665, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 833, "end_char": 835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1047, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1453, "end_char": 1457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1740, "end_char": 1745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dec. l,\n\n1950 Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Appeal from Appel- M\";;!:,:ti1 late Decree No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2227, "end_char": 2238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".tOthera S. P. Sinha (P. K. Bose, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2282, "end_char": 2298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Panchanan Ghosh (Chandra Narayan Naik, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Panchanan Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2303, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Panchanan Ghosh (Chandra Narayan Naik, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Chandra Narayan Naik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2320, "end_char": 2340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Panchanan Ghosh (Chandra Narayan Naik, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Patanjali PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPatanjali PATANJALI SASTRI ].-This appeal arises out of a 8••tri J. suit brought by the respondent in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, for recovery oi arrears of royalty and cess from the appellant and another alleged to be due under a compromise decree passed on the 6th March, 1923, in a previous suit between the predecessors in interest of the parties."}}, {"text": "11th March, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th March, 1921, one Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kumar) granted a permanent lease of the right to the underground coal in 5,800 bighas of land belonging to him to Shibsaran Singh and Sitaram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Singhs) by a registered patta stipulating for a salami of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3211, "end_char": 3237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th March, 1921, one Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kumar) granted a permanent lease of the right to the underground coal in 5,800 bighas of land belonging to him to Shibsaran Singh and Sitaram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Singhs) by a registered patta stipulating for a salami of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shibsaran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3380, "end_char": 3395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th March, 1921, one Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kumar) granted a permanent lease of the right to the underground coal in 5,800 bighas of land belonging to him to Shibsaran Singh and Sitaram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Singhs) by a registered patta stipulating for a salami of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Shibsaran Singh"}}, {"text": "Sitaram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th March, 1921, one Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kumar) granted a permanent lease of the right to the underground coal in 5,800 bighas of land belonging to him to Shibsaran Singh and Sitaram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Singhs) by a registered patta stipulating for a salami of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sitaram Singh"}}, {"text": "7th June, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th June, 1921, Kumar executed another permanent patta leasing the right to the coal in 500 bighas out of the 5,800 bighas referred to above to one Prayagji Bo1llavji Deoshi and his son Harakchand Deoshi (hereinafter referred to as the Deoshis)."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th June, 1921, Kumar executed another permanent patta leasing the right to the coal in 500 bighas out of the 5,800 bighas referred to above to one Prayagji Bo1llavji Deoshi and his son Harakchand Deoshi (hereinafter referred to as the Deoshis).", "canonical_name": "Kumar"}}, {"text": "Prayagji Bo1llavji Deoshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th June, 1921, Kumar executed another permanent patta leasing the right to the coal in 500 bighas out of the 5,800 bighas referred to above to one Prayagji Bo1llavji Deoshi and his son Harakchand Deoshi (hereinafter referred to as the Deoshis)."}}, {"text": "Harakchand Deoshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3834, "end_char": 3851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th June, 1921, Kumar executed another permanent patta leasing the right to the coal in 500 bighas out of the 5,800 bighas referred to above to one Prayagji Bo1llavji Deoshi and his son Harakchand Deoshi (hereinafter referred to as the Deoshis)."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Dhan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4178, "end_char": 4203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1291of1921) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dhan bad for a declaration of their title and for possession of the 500 bighas leased to the Deoshis under the aforesaid patta of 7th June, 1921."}}, {"text": "Deoshis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1291of1921) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dhan bad for a declaration of their title and for possession of the 500 bighas leased to the Deoshis under the aforesaid patta of 7th June, 1921."}}, {"text": "6th March, 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was however compromised on 6th March, 1923, by all the parties and a decree based on the compromise was also passed on the same day."}}, {"text": "3rd October, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The interest of the Singhs was brought to sale in 1938 in execution of a decree obtained against them and was purchased by the plaintiff who instituted the present suit, on 3rd October, 1942, claiming the royalty and cesses payable under the compromise decree for the period from Pous 1345 to Asadh 1349 B. S. from defendants 1 and 2 as the representatives of the Deoshis who entered into the compromise of March, 1923."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 (Kumar).", "canonical_name": "Kumar"}}, {"text": "Rahraband", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 executed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of 5 ,800 bighas of coal land in village Rahraband shall remain in force, and the plaintiffs will get a decree of declaration of their right and title to the 500 bighas of coal land in dispute but defendants 1 and 2 (the Deoshis) shall hold possession as tenants."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6727, "end_char": 6731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7594, "end_char": 7598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8812, "end_char": 8816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8827, "end_char": 8831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9390, "end_char": 9394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9696, "end_char": 9706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9714, "end_char": 9730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1st April, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10171, "end_char": 10186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned in passing that this clause was amended with affect from the 1st April, 1930, by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, so as to exclude from the scope of the exception com pro mise decrees comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit."}}, {"text": "Supplementary Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11329, "end_char": 11338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manohar Lall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11765, "end_char": 11777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lall J .,"}}, {"text": "Shibsaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be observed also that so far as the defendants were concerned, their possession of the 500 bighas was not interfered with and they still remained in possession as the lessees, but instead of paying the royalty to the plaintiffs it was agreed between all the parties that the defendants would pay the royalty in future to Shibsaran and Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Shibsaran Singh"}}, {"text": "Sitaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12286, "end_char": 12293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be observed also that so far as the defendants were concerned, their possession of the 500 bighas was not interfered with and they still remained in possession as the lessees, but instead of paying the royalty to the plaintiffs it was agreed between all the parties that the defendants would pay the royalty in future to Shibsaran and Sitaram.", "canonical_name": "Sitaram Singh"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12651, "end_char": 12661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12703, "end_char": 12719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Charu Chandra Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12842, "end_char": 12861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The answer to this contention is, as I have stated just now, to be found in the Full Bench decision of this court:\" [see Charu Chandra Mitra's case (')]."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13293, "end_char": 13303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor can we accept the suggestion of Mr. Chatterjee for the respondents that the compromise operated as an assignment to the Singhs by Kumar of the latter's reversion under the \"lease granted to the Deoshis and all that the latter did was to acknowledge the Singhs as their landlords and attorn\n\nto them."}}, {"text": "Mangan Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14756, "end_char": 14766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangan Lal\n\nDeoshi\n\nMohammad Moinul Haqu1\n\ntt Others.", "canonical_name": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI"}}, {"text": "Manann Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14833, "end_char": 14843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nManann Lal\n\nDeas hi\n\n' Mohammad Moi.nul Haque\n\n& Others.", "canonical_name": "MANGAN LAL DEOSHI"}}, {"text": "Saatri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14902, "end_char": 14908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSaatri J,\n\nDec, 1."}}, {"text": "H emanta K uinar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14978, "end_char": 14994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in H emanta K uinar' s case (1) \"An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease ...... The phrase which in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document which creates a present and immediate interest in the land.\""}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16007, "end_char": 16023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Glzose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16053, "end_char": 16067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Glzose."}}, {"text": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16070, "end_char": 16092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY\n\nBAIJNATH BAJORIA."}}, {"text": "BAIJNATH BAJORIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16094, "end_char": 16110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY\n\nBAIJNATH BAJORIA."}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16114, "end_char": 16132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)", "canonical_name": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16139, "end_char": 16155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16161, "end_char": 16164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16452, "end_char": 16454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_840_851_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "Manann Lal\n\nDeas hi\n\n' Mohammad Moi.nul Haque\n\n& Others.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSaatri J,\n\nDec, 1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]\n\nthereafter. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in H emanta K uinar' s case (1) \"An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease ...... The phrase which in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document which creates a present and immediate interest in the land.\" The compromise decree expressly provides that unless the sum of Rs. 8,000 was paid within the stipulated time the Singhs were not to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed property. Until the payment was made it was impossible to determine whether there would be any underlease or not. Such a contingent agreement is not within clause (d) and although it is covered by clause (b), is excepted by clause\n\n(vi) of sub-section (2). \\Ve therefore agree with the conclusion of the High Court though on different grounds and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Sukumar Glzose.\n\nRAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY\n\nBAIJNATH BAJORIA.\n\n(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)\n\nConlract~Specific perforn\"nce-0.ff:r to purchase leasehold right-Stipulation that lesse'J sho-uld obtain consent of lessor-Lessor ttnreasonably refflsing consent-Lessee, 1vhethe' relieved of liribility f0 assign-Suit for sp-1cifi~ verformince by purchasftr-Maintain.• abilitr1-Lea.s9 deed-Covenant prohibitin1 assignm; nt of lease without l . \" l _f!sor s co:isent, Sit' i co 1isent, lunv, vr, not to b3 11,11reasonably ui hhJld in case of respectable p!rso'i \"-llieaniru; and effect of co1,>!':1tant.\n\n(1) 47 Ca.I. 48-'i, at p. 494.\n\nThe defendant had obtained certain premises on lease under a deed which contained a covenant by the lessee \"not to assign the demised premises or any port thereof without first obtaining the written consent of the lessor, such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of respectable or responsi hie person\", After some offers and counter offers the plaintiff finally made an offer to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest on certain terms one of which was that \" the consent of the landlord will be obtained by yon before the completion of the sale\"; and the offer was nnconditionally accepted by the defendant. The defendant subsequently refused to assign on the ground that the lessor had withheld bis consent, and the plaintiff sued for specific performance of the agreement :\n\nHeld, (i) that the agreement was not, for its coming into being, conditional or contingent on the obtaining of the lessor's consent, the obligation ta obtain the lessor's consent being only a term of the agreement which the defendant had to fulfil; (ii) tho words\n\n11 such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of a respectable or responsible person \" in the lease deed did not amount to a. separate or indepGndent covenant by the lessor that he would not refuse consent except on reasonable groundR in the case of a reBpectable or responsible person, but only limited or qualified the lessee's covenant not to assign with. out the lessor's consent, by relieving him from the burden of the covenant if the lessor withheld hie consent unreasonably in the case of proposed assignment to a respectable or responsible person ; (iii) that, as the plaintiff was admittedly a respectable and responsible person and on the facts of the case the lessor's refusal to give consent was unreasonable, the defendant could validly assign the lease without such consent ; (iv) that the court could come to a decision on this matter even though the lessor was not a party to the suit and the decision might not bind him ; (v) that the defendant could not under these circumstances plead the absence of the lessor's consent as relieving him from the obligation to perform his part of the agreement if the plaintiff insisted on bis carrying out the agreement even though the lessor had not given his consent; and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from the High Court of Judicature of Cal. cutta (Sir Trevor Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) from a judgment and decree dated .May 30, 1948, in Appeal No. 21 of 1947 confirming with modifications the decree of a single Judge of the same High Court (Ormond J.) dated January 24, 1947, in suit No. 1031 of 1945.\n\n!OS\n\nEaja Kamala Ranjan Roy\n\nBaiinatlt\n\nBajoria,\n\nRr1ja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy v.\n\nBaijnath\n\nBajoria.\n\nDas J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (Samarendra Nath f.fukherjee, with him) for the appellant.\n\nP. L. Banerjee (Upendra Chandra f.fullick, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. December 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs J.-This is an appeal by the defendant in a suit for specific performance against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal (Sir Trevor Harries C. J. and Mukherjea J.) dated May 30, 1948, dismissing his appeal and confirming, with certain modifications, the judgment and decree for specific performance passed by Ormond J. on January 24, 1947.\n\nThere is no substantial dispJite as to the facts leading up to the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen and they may shortly be stated : Maharaja Sris Chandra Nandy of Cossimbazar is the owner of premises No. 374 Upper Chitpur Road in the town of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the \"said premises\"). By an Indenture of lease made on April 27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly rent of Rs. 1,083-5-3 and upon terms and conditions contained therein.\n\nBy sub-clause (6) of clause 2 of the said Indenture the lessee covenanted, amongst other things, ''not to assign the demised premises or any part thereof without first obtaining the written consent of the lessor, such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of respectable or responsible person ......... \" There was the usual proviso for re-entry for non-payment of rent for three months or for breach of any of the lessee's covenants, without prejudice to the lessor's right of action for such breach. On March 25, 1943, Madan Gopal Daga, with the written consent of the lessor, assigned the unexpired residue of the lease to the defendant who\n\nwas accepted as the lessee by the lessor.\n\nBy an agreement said to have been arrived at by correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective solicitors between January 27, 1945, and February 2, 1945, the defendant is alleged to have agreed to assign the said lease to the plaintiff for the unexpired residue of the term with effect from February 1, 1945, at and for the price of Rs. 1,80,000 and upon terms and conditions contained in the correspondence to which reference will be made in greater detail hereafter. On February 21, 1945, the defendant wro!e a letter to the lessor intimating that he had agreed to assign his interest in the lease to the plaintiff and requesting the lessor to give his consent in writing to such assignment. On March 5, 1945, the lessor replied that the question of his giving consent to the transfer of the lease could not be entertained as he had already determined the lease and that in the circumstances the whole initiative was in the hands of the defendant.\n\nThis letter clearly indicated that the lease had been determined for non-payment of rents and it obviously implied that it was for the defendant to get the lease revived by paying up the arrears of rent so that the question of giving consent to an assignment of the lease might be considered by the lessor.\n\nOn March 8, 1945, the defendant by his solicitors' letter informed the plaintiff's solicitors that the defendant had ap proached the lessor but had failed to secure his consent and that, as no valid transfer could be made without such consent and the agreement for sale was subject to such consent being obtained, the defendant was reluctantly compelled to cancel the agreement. The plaintiff by his solicitors' letter of March 10, 1945, maintained that the agreement was not subject to the alleged condition and that the defendant was. not entitled to cancel the agreement. It was pointed out that under the terms of the lease the lessor could not refuse his consent to the transfer of the lease to a respectable or responsible person which the plaintiff undoubtedly was. It is not necessary to refer to the further correspondence that followed in which each\n\nRaja Kan1ala\n\nRtlnjati Boy\n\nv, Baijnath\n\nBajoria.\n\nDas J.\n\nRaja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy v.\n\nBa; jnath\n\nBajoria.\n\nDas J.\n\nparty maintained his own contention.\n\nOn March 17, 1945, the lessor filed a suit (being suit No. 425 of 1945) in the High Court against the defendant for the recovery of the demised premises on the ground that the lease had been determined. It was during the pendency of that suit that on July 4, 1945, the suit for specific performance of the agreement to assign the lease out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant.\n\nOn July 13, 1945, the lessor's suit for ejectment was settled by the defendant consenting to a decree for Rs. 59,213-11-0 for arrears of rent which was paid up.\n\nThere is no dispute that the forfeiture of the lease for non-payment of rent was waived and the lease was accordingly revived. Shortly after the settlement of the ejectment suit the defendant on August 6, 1945, applied to the lessor for his consent to the assignment of the lease and on the same day the lessor in reply declined to give his consent without assigning any reason whatever. The suit for specific performance came up for disposal before Ormond J. in November 1946 when it was heard in part and was adjourned. It was eventually further heard in January 1947 and finally disposed of on January 23, 1947, when Ormcnd J. passed a decree against the defendant for specific performance of the agreement.\n\nThe decree provided that in the event of the defendant being unable within a fortnight from the date of the decree to obtain the written consent of the lessor the assignment should be made without such consent.\n\nThe defendant appealed.\n\nAfter two days' hearing, \"in order to clear up the matter\" the appeal Court \"gave the plaintiff an opportunity to examine the Maharaja as a witness in this case so that all relevant facts might be brought out and placed before the Court for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper decision on this point.\" The appeal was accordingly adjourned and the lessor was examined on commission and his evidence was filed in the proceedings.\n\nAfter further hearing the appeal Court dismissed the defendant's appeal and confirmed the decree for specific performance of the agreement\n\nwithout the need for obtaining the consent of the lessor prior to the execution of the deed of assignment in favour of the plaintiff. This decree was subsequently amended by inserting therein a provision enabling the plaintiff to set off from the purchase price the amount of rent payable as and from February 1, 1945, until the date of conveyance Jess all outgoings and interest on the purchase price at four per cent. per annum from that date to the date of the conveyance. The defendant has now come up before us in appeal from this judgment and decree of the appeal Court.\n\nThe first point urged by learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal is that, being subject to the consent of the lessor, the agreement was contingent on the defendant obtaining such consent and as the defendant could not secure the lessor's consent no effective agreement came into being which could be ordered to be specifically performed. The determination of this question must depend on a correct analysis and ascertainment of the meaning and import of the correspondence by which the agreement is said to have been arrived at. It was on January 27, 1945, that the plaintiff offered to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest in the said premises upon terms and conditions set forth in the plaintiff's letter of that date. Clauses 3 and 4 of those terms were as follows :\n\n\"(3). The lease will be .transferred in my favour as from the 1st February, 1945, and I shall be entitled to recover rents from the tenants as from that date and shall pay the rent to the superior landlord and municipal taxes from that date. (4).\n\nYou shall have to obtain the necessary consent for the transfer of the lease in favour of myself or my nominees from the said l\\faharaja of Cossimbazar before the execution of the transfer of lease in my favour.\"\n\nThe defendant replied to the plaintiff's above letter on January 28, 1945.\n\nBy this reply the defendant expressed his willingness to transfer the lease to the plaintiff on terms contained therein. Clauses 3 and 4 of this letter were as follows:\n\n19~0\n\nRaja Kamara\n\nRanJan Roy\n\nBaijnath\n\n- Bojoria.\n\nDas J.\n\nRaja Karnala\n\nRanjan Ro11 v.\n\nBaijnath\n\nBajoria\n\nDru J.\n\n\" (3) If your final acceptance as stated above is received within 30th January current and if I am able to obtain the consent of Maharaja Cossimbazar for transfer of the leasehold interest within the first week of February, 1945, I agree to your para 3.\n\n(4) Your para 4 is agreed to but the name or names of the persons to be mentioned in the sale deed for whom permission is to be taken from Maharaja Cossimbazar should be clearly stated with their respective addresses.\"\n\nIt is quite clear that no agreement was concluded by these two letters for the defendant's letter was not an unconditional acceptance of the plaintiff's offer but amounted in law to only a counter-offer. By clause 3 the defendant offered to transfer the lease to the plaintiff as from February 1, 1945, so as to entitle the plaintiff to realize the rents from that date and to be liable to pay the rent to the lessor also from that date on two conditions, namely, that the plaintiff's acceptance was received within January 30, 1945, and the defendant was able to obtain the lessor's consent within the first week of February, 1945. This clause did not make the offer itself contingent on the obtaining of the lessor's consent but made one of the terms of the offer, namely, that the lease would be transferred as from February 1, 1945, conditional on the obtaining of the lessor's consent within the first week of February, 1945.\n\nLikewise, subject to the name of the assignee being clearly stated the defendant by clause 4 offered to obtain the lessor's consent to the assignment of the lease.\n\nClause 4 of the defendant's letter was not so expressed as to make the defendant's offer contingent on his obtaining the lessor's consent. On the contrary, clause 4 constituted one of the terms of the offer which, on the offer being accepted, would become binding on the defendant as one of the terms of the agreement. The plaintiff, however, does not appear to have accepted the defendant's counter offer but on January 29, 1945, through his solicitors made a fresh offer to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest at\n\nRs. 1,80,000 on the following terms:\n\n\" (a) That the earnest money will be Rs. 5.000 (Rupees five thousand) instead of Rs. 30,000.\n\n(b) Our client will have the conveyance in his own favour.\n\nThe consent of the landlord will be obtained by you before the completion of sale.\n\n(c) That your client will complete the conveyance within a month after the receipt by us of all the original title deeds with you.\n\n(d) That the transfer of the property in favour of our client will take effect on and from the I st February, 1945, irrespective of the date of the conveyance, he being entitled to all the rents, issues and profits and being liable for all the liabilities in respect thereof since the said date.\n\n(e) That our client will not be liable to pay your Solicitor's Bill of cost in respect of the sale.\"\n\nAgain, it will be noticed that by clause (b) the offer was not made contingent on the obtaining of the lessor's consent but the plaintiff insisted on the defendant's obtaining such consent as a substantive term of his offer so that if the offer by being accepted ripened into an agreement the defendant would be bound to obtain the lessor's consent as a term of such agreement. The defendant by his solicitors' letter dated February 1, 1945, purported to accept the plaintiff's last offer with a slight reservation, namely,-\n\n\" As regards clause ( d) of your said letter, it is distinctly understood that the same should be given effect to only in case the conveyance is completed in terms of clause (c) of your said letter.\"\n\nOn February 2, 1945, the plaintiff by his solicitors' letter of that date unconditionally accepted this reservation and so a concluded agreement was arrived at between the parties. This agreement was not, for its coming into being, contingent or conditional on the obtaining of the lessor's consent. The obligation to obtain the lessor's consent was cast upon the defendant as a term of the agreement.\n\nIn our judgment the Court below was right in holding that the agreement '\n\nRaja Kamala Ranjan Roy v, Bai.inn th Bajoria,\n\nDa.~ J.\n\nRaja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy\n\nBaifnnth Baforia\n\nDas J.\n\nitself was not contingent as contended for by the appellant.\n\nThe contentions next advanced by learned counsel for the appellant relate to the lessee's covenant contained in sub-clause (6) of clause 2 of the lease to which reference has already been made. The legal incidents of such a covenant are now well established by judicial decisions referred to in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary to refer to them in detail. Suffice it to say, that the words\" such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of respectable or responsible person\" contained in the covenant do not amount to a separate or independent covenant by the lessor that he would not refuse consent except upon reasonable grounds in the case of respectable or responsible person, but that those words limit or qualify the lessee's covenant not to assign the demised premises without the consent in writing of the lessor.\n\nIn other words, those words have the effect of relieving the lessee from the burden of this covenant if the lessor withholds his consent unreasonably in case of proposed assignment to a respectable or responsible person.\n\nIn this view of the matter, the plaintiff contended that he being a respectable and responsible person the lessor had unreasonably withheld his consent to the proposed assignment to him and had consequently relieved the defendant from the burden of his covenant so that the defendant could legally and validly assign the lease to him without such consent of the lessor.\n\nThe first objection taken by the appellant to this contention of the plaintiff is that in his plaint the plaintiff insisted on the defendant obtaining the lessor's consent and that he should not have been permitted to make this new case at the hearing. Both the trial Court and the appeal Court held that there was, strictly speaking, no element of surprise, particularly because the plaintiff relied upon facts admitted and proved by the defendant himself and that it was open to him to take this point. We may also add that lthis point was in a manner indicated in the plaint\n\nitself for in paragraph 11 thereof it was pleaded that the plaintiff was a responsible and respectable person and that if consent to assign in his favour was withdrawn such withdrawal would be unreasonable and would not be valid and binding. In view of such pleading we are unable to say that the point raised by the plaintiff at the trial was an entirely new point or that the defendant was ta.ken by surprise.\n\nThe next objection of the appellant was that this point should not have been allowed to be raised and no evidence should have been permitted to be adduced on this point in the absence of the lessor as a party to the suit. We do not think that there is any force in this objection. The Court had to decide whether it was a case where relief by way of specific performance should be given. The Court could not force the defendant to apply to the lessor for his consent nor could the Court force the lessor to give his consent and, if: the matter only depended on the consent, the Court would not have ordinarily, in those circumstances, directed the agreement for assignment to be specifical1y enforced. The Court, therefore, had also to consider, for the purposes of this case, as to whether the circumstances were such as would indicate that the defendant had been relieved of the burden of his covenant by reason of the lessor having unreasonably withheld his consent. It is true that a decision on that question in this suit would not be binding on the lessor, but nevertheless the Court had to come to a decision on that question for the purposes of this suit as between the parties thereto in order to award the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.\n\nThe third objection of the appellant is that the appeal Court should not have allowed the plaintiff to adduce further evidence. It will be recalled that the appeal Court directed the evidence of the Maharaja of\n\nCossimbazar to be taken during the hearing of the appeal. The judgment of. the appeal Court clearly indicates that it was the appeal Court that \"required\" the evidence \" in order to clear up the matter \" and\n\nIQ~\n\nRaja Kamala\n\n&njan Roy v.\n\nBaijnatk\n\nBajoria.\n\nDas J.\n\nRaja Kamala\n\nRan}a'lt Roy v.\n\nBaijnath\n\nBa.ioria.\n\nDas J.\n\n\" for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper decision on this point\". The matter, therefore, is fully covered by Order XLI, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and no objection can be taken to the course adopted by the appeal Court on that ground. We do not think there is any reason to interfere in the exercise of the Court's discretion.\n\nThe fourth objection is that the High Court was wrong in holding that the term in the agreement that the defendant must obtain the consent of the lessor before executing the assignment to the plaintiff was a term for the benefit of the plaintiff only. It will be recalled that that was a term which was introduced by the plaintiff in his offer that eventually ripened into an agreement. The term was not expressed in a manner indicating that it was inserted in the agreement for the protection of the defendant. In other words, the objection that the consent of the lessor had not been obtained was one which could be availed of by the plaintiff who could rescind the contract and claim damages for the breach thereof. We cannot see how, in view of the language used in the correspondence, the defendant could plead the absence of the lessor's consent as relieving him from the obligation of performing his part of the agreement if the plaintiff waived the objection and insisted on his carrying out the agreement.\n\nThe absence of consent may amount to a defect in the title of the defendant, but which the plaintiff was willing to accept.\n\nFinally it is said that by directing the specific performance of the agreement the Court has exposed the defendant to the risk of an action for damages for breach of covenant. If the assignment of the lease by the defendant to the plaintiff without the lessor's consent amounted to a breach of covenant, the lessor could forfeit the lease and sue for possession. Such a course would affect only the plaintiff but not the defendant, for he had already parted with the lease for valuable consideration. It is said that the lessor could $1.le the defendant for damages for breach of that\n\ncovenant and the Court should not, by decreeing specific performance, have put the defendant in that perilous position. There appear to us to be two answers to this argument, namely, (I) that the defendant should have, by proper language, made his obligation to transfer dependent or conditional upoq his being able to obtain the lessor's consent which he did not do and (2) that the plaintiff being a respectable and responsible person of means, the measure of damages could only be a problematic conjecture.\n\nIndeed, it may have been precisely for this very consideration that the defendant had unconditionally agreed to obtain the consent of the lessor and to assign his interest in the lease.\n\nThat the plaintiff was a respectable and responsible person cannot, on the evidence before the Court, be denied or disputed and, indeed, learned counsel for the appellant did not so contend. We find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that in the circumstances and on the evidence on record the lessor had unreasonably withheld his consent so as to enable the defendant to assign the lease without such consent. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that both the trial Court and the appeal Court exercised their discretion properly and no ground has been made out for our interfering with the judgment of the High Court.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appellant to pay the costs of this appeal.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant ; P.K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondent: S.K. Ghosh.\n\nRaja Kamala Ranjan Roy\n\nBaijnath Bajoria.\n\nDas I.", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "Manann Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manann Lal\n\nDeas hi\n\n' Mohammad Moi.nul Haque\n\n& Others."}}, {"text": "H emanta K uinar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in H emanta K uinar' s case (1) \"An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease ...... The phrase which in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document which creates a present and immediate interest in the land.\""}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. K. Chatterjee.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Glzose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1250, "end_char": 1264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Glzose."}}, {"text": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1267, "end_char": 1289, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1311, "end_char": 1334, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1336, "end_char": 1352, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1358, "end_char": 1365, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAS JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of Cal. cutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 4435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the High Court of Judicature of Cal."}}, {"text": "Trevor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cutta (Sir Trevor Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) from a judgment and decree dated .May 30, 1948, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4465, "end_char": 4474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cutta (Sir Trevor Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) from a judgment and decree dated .May 30, 1948, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Eaja Kamala Ranjan Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4702, "end_char": 4724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OS\n\nEaja Kamala Ranjan Roy\n\nBaiinatlt\n\nBajoria,\n\nRr1ja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy v.\n\nBaijnath\n\nBajoria.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "Das J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (Samarendra Nath f.fukherjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Samarendra Nath f.fukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4822, "end_char": 4849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (Samarendra Nath f.fukherjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. L. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. Banerjee (Upendra Chandra f.fullick, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Upendra Chandra f.fullick", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. L. Banerjee (Upendra Chandra f.fullick, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ormond", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5373, "end_char": 5379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs J.-This is an appeal by the defendant in a suit for specific performance against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal (Sir Trevor Harries C. J. and Mukherjea J.) dated May 30, 1948, dismissing his appeal and confirming, with certain modifications, the judgment and decree for specific performance passed by Ormond J. on January 24, 1947.", "canonical_name": "Ormond"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Sris Chandra Nandy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no substantial dispJite as to the facts leading up to the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen and they may shortly be stated : Maharaja Sris Chandra Nandy of Cossimbazar is the owner of premises No."}}, {"text": "Cossimbazar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5584, "end_char": 5595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no substantial dispJite as to the facts leading up to the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen and they may shortly be stated : Maharaja Sris Chandra Nandy of Cossimbazar is the owner of premises No."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "374 Upper Chitpur Road in the town of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the \"said premises\")."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Indenture of lease made on April 27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Maharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5775, "end_char": 5783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Indenture of lease made on April 27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5802, "end_char": 5831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Indenture of lease made on April 27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Madan Gopal Daga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Indenture of lease made on April 27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5979, "end_char": 5990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Indenture of lease made on April 27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar\n\nRaj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6108, "end_char": 6116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 25, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 25, 1943, Madan Gopal Daga, with the written consent of the lessor, assigned the unexpired residue of the lease to the defendant who\n\nwas accepted as the lessee by the lessor."}}, {"text": "January 27, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement said to have been arrived at by correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective solicitors between January 27, 1945, and February 2, 1945, the defendant is alleged to have agreed to assign the said lease to the plaintiff for the unexpired residue of the term with effect from February 1, 1945, at and for the price of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 6990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement said to have been arrived at by correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective solicitors between January 27, 1945, and February 2, 1945, the defendant is alleged to have agreed to assign the said lease to the plaintiff for the unexpired residue of the term with effect from February 1, 1945, at and for the price of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 1, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7129, "end_char": 7145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement said to have been arrived at by correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective solicitors between January 27, 1945, and February 2, 1945, the defendant is alleged to have agreed to assign the said lease to the plaintiff for the unexpired residue of the term with effect from February 1, 1945, at and for the price of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 21, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7310, "end_char": 7327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 21, 1945, the defendant wro!e a letter to the lessor intimating that he had agreed to assign his interest in the lease to the plaintiff and requesting the lessor to give his consent in writing to such assignment."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 5, 1945, the lessor replied that the question of his giving consent to the transfer of the lease could not be entertained as he had already determined the lease and that in the circumstances the whole initiative was in the hands of the defendant."}}, {"text": "March 8, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 8, 1945, the defendant by his solicitors' letter informed the plaintiff's solicitors that the defendant had ap proached the lessor but had failed to secure his consent and that, as no valid transfer could be made without such consent and the agreement for sale was subject to such consent being obtained, the defendant was reluctantly compelled to cancel the agreement."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8519, "end_char": 8533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff by his solicitors' letter of March 10, 1945, maintained that the agreement was not subject to the alleged condition and that the defendant was."}}, {"text": "Raja Kan1ala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8958, "end_char": 8970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to refer to the further correspondence that followed in which each\n\nRaja Kan1ala\n\nRtlnjati Boy\n\nv, Baijnath\n\nBajoria.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "Das J.\n\nRaja Kamala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9009, "end_char": 9028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nRaja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy v.\n\nBa; jnath\n\nBajoria."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9066, "end_char": 9069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nparty maintained his own contention."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9363, "end_char": 9375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was during the pendency of that suit that on July 4, 1945, the suit for specific performance of the agreement to assign the lease out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9545, "end_char": 9558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, 1945, the lessor's suit for ejectment was settled by the defendant consenting to a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9899, "end_char": 9913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly after the settlement of the ejectment suit the defendant on August 6, 1945, applied to the lessor for his consent to the assignment of the lease and on the same day the lessor in reply declined to give his consent without assigning any reason whatever."}}, {"text": "January 23, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10301, "end_char": 10317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was eventually further heard in January 1947 and finally disposed of on January 23, 1947, when Ormcnd J. passed a decree against the defendant for specific performance of the agreement."}}, {"text": "Ormcnd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10324, "end_char": 10330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was eventually further heard in January 1947 and finally disposed of on January 23, 1947, when Ormcnd J. passed a decree against the defendant for specific performance of the agreement.", "canonical_name": "Ormond"}}, {"text": "1st February, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12663, "end_char": 12681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease will be .transferred in my favour as from the 1st February, 1945, and I shall be entitled to recover rents from the tenants as from that date and shall pay the rent to the superior landlord and municipal taxes from that date. ("}}, {"text": "Raja Kamara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13315, "end_char": 13326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauses 3 and 4 of this letter were as follows:\n\n19~0\n\nRaja Kamara\n\nRanJan Roy\n\nBaijnath\nBojoria.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "RanJan Roy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13328, "end_char": 13338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauses 3 and 4 of this letter were as follows:\n\n19~0\n\nRaja Kamara\n\nRanJan Roy\n\nBaijnath\nBojoria.", "canonical_name": "RanJan Roy"}}, {"text": "Raja Karnala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13370, "end_char": 13382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nRaja Karnala\n\nRanjan Ro11 v.\n\nBaijnath\n\nBajoria\n\nDru J.\n\n\" (3) If your final acceptance as stated above is received within 30th January current and if I am able to obtain the consent of Maharaja Cossimbazar for transfer of the leasehold interest within the first week of February, 1945, I agree to your para 3.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Cossimbazar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13556, "end_char": 13576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nRaja Karnala\n\nRanjan Ro11 v.\n\nBaijnath\n\nBajoria\n\nDru J.\n\n\" (3) If your final acceptance as stated above is received within 30th January current and if I am able to obtain the consent of Maharaja Cossimbazar for transfer of the leasehold interest within the first week of February, 1945, I agree to your para 3."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14109, "end_char": 14117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 30, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14418, "end_char": 14434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By clause 3 the defendant offered to transfer the lease to the plaintiff as from February 1, 1945, so as to entitle the plaintiff to realize the rents from that date and to be liable to pay the rent to the lessor also from that date on two conditions, namely, that the plaintiff's acceptance was received within January 30, 1945, and the defendant was able to obtain the lessor's consent within the first week of February, 1945."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14918, "end_char": 14926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14999, "end_char": 15007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15155, "end_char": 15163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 29, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15412, "end_char": 15428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, however, does not appear to have accepted the defendant's counter offer but on January 29, 1945, through his solicitors made a fresh offer to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest at\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17535, "end_char": 17557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment the Court below was right in holding that the agreement '\n\nRaja Kamala Ranjan Roy v, Bai.inn th Bajoria,\n\nDa.~ J.\n\nRaja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy\n\nBaifnnth Baforia\n\nDas J.\n\nitself was not contingent as contended for by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "Baifnnth Baforia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17616, "end_char": 17632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment the Court below was right in holding that the agreement '\n\nRaja Kamala Ranjan Roy v, Bai.inn th Bajoria,\n\nDa.~ J.\n\nRaja Kamala\n\nRanjan Roy\n\nBaifnnth Baforia\n\nDas J.\n\nitself was not contingent as contended for by the appellant."}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17834, "end_char": 17842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Kamala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21847, "end_char": 21858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appeal Court clearly indicates that it was the appeal Court that \"required\" the evidence \" in order to clear up the matter \" and\n\nIQ~\n\nRaja Kamala\n\n&njan Roy v.\n\nBaijnatk\n\nBajoria.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22104, "end_char": 22131, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P.K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25499, "end_char": 25514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant ; P.K. Chatterjee.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "S.K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25543, "end_char": 25553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: S.K. Ghosh."}}, {"text": "Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25556, "end_char": 25578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy\n\nBaijnath Bajoria.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY"}}, {"text": "Baijnath Bajoria", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25580, "end_char": 25596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kamala Ranjan Roy\n\nBaijnath Bajoria.", "canonical_name": "ROY\n\nBAIJNATH BAJORIA"}}, {"text": "Das I.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25599, "end_char": 25605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das I.", "canonical_name": "DAS JJ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_852_868_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "Deo. l.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nYESWANT DEORAO DESHMUKH\n\nWALCHAND RAMCHAND KOTHARI.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\n[1950]\n\nLimitation Act (II of 1908), ss. 14 (21, 18, Art. 182-Giuil Pro C1ldure God• (V of 1908), s. 48-Execution of decree-Application after 12 years from decree and 3 years from order on last application-Fraudulent concealment of property to prevent execution- Maintainability of application-Limitation-Fraud preventing execution against particular property-\"Whether saves limitation under Art. 182-Applicability of s. 18-Decree direoting payment of deficit court fe. b•fore execution-Whether conditional decree-Starting point of limita.tian-Time spent in proceedings to adjudge judgmentdebtw insolvent, whether should be excluded.\n\nAn application for execution of a decree wos made after the expiry of 12years from the doto of tbe decree and 3 years from the date of the final order on tbe last previous application jor execution.\n\nThe decree-holder contended that the judgment-debtor had fraudulently purchased a business in the name of a stranger and bad conducted the same in the name of the latter with a view to prevent the assets of the business from being proceeded against in execution by the decree-holder and that therefore under s. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code be was entitled to make an application even after the expiry of 12 years. The High Court found that, as the decree-holder was prevented by the fraud of the judgment-debtor from executing the decree, the application was not barred under s. 48 of the Code, but as it was made more than 3 years from the date of the order on t.he last application it was barred under Art. 182 of the Limitation Act. The decree-holder appealed contending for the first time before the Supreme Court that as fraud for the purpose of s. 48 of Civil Procedure Code was proved, e. 18 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the case and - his application was not barred under Art. 182 as it was made within three years of the date when he became aware of the fraud and the proper article applicable was Art. 181 :\n\nHeld, (i) that the question whother on the proved facts s. 18 was applicable ta the case was a pure question of law and the deoree-hol<ler was entitled ta rsise the question before the Supreme Court, even though he had not raised it before the lower courts;\n\n(ii) though s. 48, Civil Procedure Code, and Arts. 181 and 182 of the Limitation Act dealt with the time limit for making applica tions for execution of decrees and should be read together, they were different in their scope and object, and the fact that the •Pplication was not barred under s. 48, Civil Procedure Code, did not obviate the necessity of considering whether it was barred\n\nunder Art. 182; (iii) that, as the fraud committed by the judg. 1950 ment-debtor did not in any way conceal from the decree-holder the knowledge of his right to make an application for execution of Y•awanl .Deorao the decree but only prevented him from exercising that rigbt in .Deshmukh respect of a particular property, s. 18 bad no application to the v. case, and the application was therefore barred under Art. 182 of Walchand the Limitation Act; (iv) the fact that there was no provision in Ramchand Art. 182 for cases where the judgment-debtor had committed a Kothari. fraud as in the present case did not render that article inapplicable and bring the case within the purview of Art. 181 as Art. 182 has to be read with the general provisions contained in s. 18 relating to cases where there is fraud.\n\nHeld also, (i) A decree which provides that the plaintiff should pay the deficient court fees before executing the decree is not a\n\nconditional decree and time for making an application for execu~ tion of such a decree runs from the date of the decree, and not from the date on which the plaintiff pays the deficit court fees.\n\n(ii) The period of time during which the decree-holder was prosecuting proceedings for adjudging the judgment-debtor an insolvent cannot be excluded under s. 14 (2) of Limitation Act, in computing the period of limitation for making an application for executing the decree.\n\nJudgment of the Bombay High Ooud affirmed.\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from a judgment of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Appeal No. 281 of 1947 ..\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K.\n\nNarasimha Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (B. Sen, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. December I. The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIY AR J.-This appeal, preferred Ohandra,.khara from the decree of the Bombay High Court in Appeal Aiyar J.\n\nNo. 281 of 1947, raises the question whether an execution application seeking to execute a final decree, passed by the 1st Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Poona, on 6th December, 1932, for a sum of Rs. 1,24,215 and odd, is barred by limitation. The decree was made in a suit for dissolution of a partnership and the taking of accounts.\n\n; i,,\n\n1950 The execution application was filed on 4th October, Y - 1946, and the amount stated to be due under the decree\n\n\"~:; m~~~; ao on that date was Rs. 2,30,986 and odd. The previous\n\nv. execution application No. 946 of 1940 filed in the Court Walchand of the 1st Class Sub-Judge, Sholapur, to which the Ramchand decree had been transferred for execution, was made Kothari on 24th June, 1940. It was dismissed on 9th September,\n\nChan;:;;, khara 1940, for non-prosecution.\n\nAiyar J.\n\nIt would thus be seen that the present application was filed after the lapse of 12 years from the date of the final decree and 3 years from the date of the final order on the previous application. To surmount the bar of limitation, the decree-holder, who is the appellant before us, raised four contentions: firstly, that the final decree, which provided tha:t the plaintiff should pay the deficit court fees on the decretal amount before the execution uf the decree, was a conditional decree, and that time began to run from the date when the condition was fulfilled on 5th December, 1935, by payment; secondly, that the period occupied by the insolvency proceedings from 10th August, 1937, to 14th December, 1942, initiated by the decree-holder to get the first judgment-debtor Walchand Ramchand Kothari (with whom alone we are now concerned) adjudged an insolvent, should be excluded under section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act ; thirdly, that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was the creditor of the present decree-holder, in seeking to execute this decree, should be deducted ; and lastly, that as the judgment-debtor prevented execution of the decree against the 'Prabhat' newspaper by suppressing his ownership of the same, a fresh starting point of limitation springs up in the decree-holder's favour from the date of the discovery of the fraud.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge held that the execution application was not barred, agreeing with every one of these contentions. On appeal to the High Court Chagla C.J. and Dixit J. reversed this decision, holding that it was not a conditional decree, that the steps taken by Tendulkar to execute this decree were of no avail, and that the insolvency proceedings were for a\n\ndifferent relief altogether, so that section 14 (2) of the 19~0 Limitation Act could not be invoked. Thev concurred with the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the Yeswant Deorao . b dh f d Deshmukh judgment-de tor prevente t e execut10n o the ecree v. within 12 years by fraudulent concealment of his watchand ownership of the 'Prabhat' newspaper and that the Ramchand twelve years' bar of limitation did not apply ; but they Kothari. held that the application was barred under article 182 -- of the Limitation Act, as more than three years had Cha-; r•sekara run from 9th September, 1940, the date of the dismissal\n\n•Y•• of the previous execution application, before the present application was filed on 4th October, 1946.\n\nPoints 1 to 3 above mentioned are of no avail to the appellant. The decree was not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen on the fulfilment of which alone it could be executed. The payment of court fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed. There could be no exclusion of the time occupied by the insolvency proceedings which clearly was not for the purpose of obtaining the same relief. The relief sought in insolvency is obviously different from the relief sought in the execution application. In the former, an adjudication of the debtor as insolvent is sought as preliminary to the vesting of all his estate and the administration of it by the Official Receiver or the Official Assignee, as the case may be, for the benefit of all the creditors ; but in the latter, the money due is sought to be realized for the benefit of the decree-holder alone, by processes like attachment of property and arrest of person. It may be that ultimately in the insolvency proceedings the decreeholder may be able to realize his debt wholly or in part, but this is a mere consequence or result. Not only is the relief of a different nature in the two proceedings but the procedure is also widely divergent.\n\nThe steps taken by the appellant's creditor Tendulkar to attach this decree and put it in execution do not save limitation. His darkhast for attachment of the\n\nl950 present decree was on 3rd April, 1940, and for execution\n\nY -t-D of the present decree was on 1st February, 1944, es wan eorao . .\n\nDeshmukh more than 3 years from 9th September, 1940, which 1s v. the date of the dismissal of the appellant's prior\n\nWalehana execution petition.\n\n~:t~'::~ The learned Advocate for the appellant therefore __ devoted most of his argument to the fourth contention\n\nChandrasekhara set forth above. That the judgment-debtor respondent Aiyar J. suppressed his ownership of the 'Prabhat' newspaper and fraudulently prevented the execution of the decree against this property has been found by both the Courts below, as stated already. It was strenuously urged that the fraud so found is not merely fraud as broadly interpreted under section 48 (2), Civil Procedure Code, but also strict or concealed fraud within the meaning of section 18 of the Limitation Act.\n\nIn this connection, it is as well to set out very briefly the nature of the concealment and the steps taken by the judgment-debtor to achieve the same. He purchased the 'Prabhat' newspaper with all its assets and goodwill from its previous owner one Purushottam Mahadev in 1938 under the letter marked Exhibit 129.\n\nHe opened current accounts in several banks, and gave the name of one Abhyankar as the owner of the paper, but he was himself operating on those accounts. One Rajwade, a friend of the judgment-debtor, was shown as the printer and publisher of the paper. Even in his supplementary written statement filed in Court in answer to the present execution, marked Exhibit 88 (page 53 of the printed book), the defendant asserted in paragraph 2 that he became the owner of the newspaper only in April, 1944, and that previously he had no ownership or right in the same. He did not go into the witness box to refute the allegation that he was the owner ever since the purchase of the paper in 1938 and that he opened accounts in the names of other people on which he was operating for his own benefit. On these facts, the Subordinate Judge found as follows:- \"l think on the whole that the evidence establishes beyond doubt that the judgment-debtor had concealed bis proprietary interest in bis newspaper called\n\n'Prabhat' from June, 1938, to April, 1944.\n\nThe only rn5o purpose for which the property could have been con- - cealed in this w; iy was probably the fear that the decree-Yes;•:t n;:\"\"' holder would pounce upon it if he came to know about \" u it. The decree-holder came to know of this fraud after Walchand April, 1944 ; for thereafter the judgment-debtor made Ramchand an open declaration that the newspaper belonged to him.\n\nKothari.\n\nI think therefore that this fraud has prevented the 0h d-kh . . an rase ara decree-holder from executmg the decree agamst some Aiyar J. property of the judgment-debtor.\" In this finding, the High Court concurred. After referring to the stratagem adopted by the judgment-debtor in Bhagu jetha v. Malick Bawasaheb('), the learned Judges observed:-\n\n\" In this case, in our opinion, the stratagem is much more dishonest. The attempt on the part of the judgment-debtor was to conceal his property, to deny its ownership and to put forward a mere benainidar as the real owner of that property. In our opinion, therefore, ' the execution of the decree is not barred under section 48.\n\nThe judgment-debtor has, by fraud, prevented the execution of the decree within 12 years before the date of the application for execution by the decree-holder and therefore the decree under consideration is capable of being executed.\"\n\nOn the strength of this concurrent finding, Mr.\n\nKrishnaswami Iyengar for the appellant argued that the fraud fell within the scope of section 18 of the Limitation Act and that if it were so, he was out of .,- the woods, inasmuch as the proper article to apply would be article 181 of the Limitation Act. The right to apply accrued to him when the fraud became known to him in or about June, 1946. Till then he was kept by the fraud from the knowledge of his right to make an application against the property. Law does not require him to make futile successive applications in execution, in the face of this fraud. He was not in a position to seek even the arrest of the judgment-debtor as he had got himself declared in the insolvency proceedings as an \" agriculturist \" within the meaning of the Deccan\n\nIll 1.i:..R, 9 Rom. sis.\n\n!10\n\n1950 Agriculturists' Relief Act, alleging falsely that he was -t-D not in receipt of any income by way of salary or Yeswan eorao .\n\nD\"hmukh remuneration from the newspaper concerned and that v. he was mainly dependent on the income of his family Walcha•a lands for his maintenance.\n\nRomchand There can be no question that the conduct of the Kothtir\\. __ respondent was fraudulent within the meaning of Chandrasekhara section 48 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThough Aiyar J. benami transact.ions are common in this country and there is nothing per se wrong in a judgment-debtor purchasing property in another man's name, we have to take into account all the circumstances attending the purchase and his subsequent conduct for finding out whether it was part of a fraudulent scheme on his part to prevent the judgment-creditor from realizing the fruits of his decree. Fraudulent motive or design is not capable of direct proof in most cases ; it can only be inferred. The facts before us here leave no room for doubt that the true object of the judgmentdebtor was to prevent the execution of the decree against the ' Prabhat ' newspaper which he had purchased. Other persons were shown as the printer and the publisher of the newspaper, while Abhyankar was mentioned as the proprietor. The judgment-debtor, was, however, operating on those accounts for his own benefit. In the Insolvency Court, he set up the plea that he was an agriculturist, by suppressing the truth about his ownership of the paper, and pretending that his income was mainly, if not solely, from the family lands. He kept up this show till April 1944, when probably he felt that he was safe from the reach of the judgment.creditor. Even in his answer to the execution application, out of which this appeal has arisen, he had the hardihood to assert that he was not the owner of the paper till April 1944. It should also be remembered that he did not get into the witness box to explain what other necessity there was for all this camouflage, except it be to cheat the appellant of his dues under the decree.\n\nMr. Setalvad, the learned Attorney-General, who appeared for the respondent, pointed out tha_t there\n\nwas no benami purchase and that the holding out of 1950 Abhyankar as the proprietor of the' Prabhat' did not -.- amount to any false representation or misrepresenta- Yes;•~ n::rao\n\ntion to the judgment-creditor, as the accounts on \":, u wl1ich reliance was placed were accounts opened in the Walchana banks and were not ordinarily available for inspection Ramchana by third parties. This line of reasoning is hardly con- Kothari. vincing, when we have to consider whether what is 01 d-kh . . an raae ara attnbuted to the ]Udgment-debtor does not amount to Aiuar J. a fraudulent scheme or device for preventing execution of the decree that had been passed against him for a very large sum of money. In the very nature of things, fraud is secret in its origin or inception and in the means adopted for its success. Each circumstance by itself may not mean much, but taking all of them together, they may reveal a fraudulent or dishonest plan.\n\nIt would be convenient to set out here in extenso section 48, Civil Procedure Code, and section 18 of the Limitation Act before we proceed to consider the soundness of the arguments advanced by both sides in support of the positions they have taken up.\n\nSection 48, Civil Procedure Code (which corresponds to section 230 of the Code of 1882), is in these terms:-\n\n\" 48. (1) Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of 12 years from\n\n(a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or,\n\n(b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree.\n\n(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed-\n\n(a) to preclude the Court from ordering the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the\n\nt95o judgment-debtor has by fraud or force prevented the\n\nY. -- execution of the decree at some time within twelve 8'Want Deorao . d f h l\" D\"hmukh years immediately before the ate o t e app 1. v. cation; or\n\nWalokand\n\n(b) to limit or otherwise affect the operation of Ramchanci article 183 of the first Schedule to the Indian Limita.\n\nKothari. tion Act, 1908.\"\n\nOhandrasekhara Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, runs thus:-\n\nAiyar J. \" 18. \\Vhere any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded, or where any document necessary to establish such right has been fraudulently concealed from him, the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application -\n\n(a) against the person guilty of the fraud or acces. sory thereto, or {b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production.\" Whether the fraud of the judgment-debtor should actually prevent the execution of the decree or whether it is enough if the fraud has been committed without resulting in actual prevention is a question on which there has been some divergence of opinion in the decided cases. The former view was taken in an early Madras case Kannu Pillay v. Chellathammal and Others(') and receives support from the decision reported in Sri Raja Venkata Lingama Nayanim Bahadur Varu and Another v. Raja Inuganti Rajagopala Venkata Narasimha Rayanim Bahadir Varu and five Others(') to which our learned brother Mr.\n\nJustice Patanjali Sastri was a party. The latter view\n\n11) [1898) M.L.J, 208.\n\n12) I. L.R. 1947 M•d. 6~5.\n\nis indicated in M. R. M.A. S. P. Ramanathan Chettiar 1950\n\nv. J.lahalingam Che/ti(') by a Bench of which Sir\n\n--D. . 1\n\n. J b Yeswant eorav Madhavan Nair . was a mem er. It is not necessary D hmukh to determine which view is correct, as we have here \" •. definite findings of both the Courts below that there Walchand was fraud preventing the execution of the decree Ramchand within the meaning of Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Kothari.\n\nCode.\n\nChandrastkhilra The appellant thus escapes the bar of the 12 years' tl.iyar J. period and he has a fresh starting point of limitation from the date of the fraud for section 48 of the Civil\n\nProcedure Code. In other words, the decree-holder has another 12 years within which he can execute his decree.\n\nHaving thus got over the difficulty in his way under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he has next to meet the objection under the Limitation Act. On behalf of the appellant, it was urged that section 18 of the Limitation Act applied to the facts and that the right to apply accrued to the appellant when the fraud by the judgment-debtor became known to him in 1946.\n\nNo reliance was placed on section 18 of the Limitation Act in the courts below and no reference to it is found in the grounds of appeal to this court. It is however mentioned for the first time in the appellant's statement of the case.\n\nIf the facts proved and found as established are sufficient to make out a case of fraud within the meaning of sec. tion 18, this objection may not be serious, as the question of the applicability of the section will be only a question of law and such a question could be raised at any stage of the case and also in the final court of appeal. The following observations of Lord Watson in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v.\n\nKavanagh (')are relevant. He said: \"When a ques. tion of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort upon the construction of a document or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient in the interests of justice to entertain the plea.\n\nThe expediency of\n\n(I) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 31 l.\n\n121 [18S2] A.O. 4VS.\n\n1950 adopting that course may be doubted when the plea -- cannot be disposed of without deciding nice questions Y6'wa•t Deo,.ao f f . .d . h. h th t f It• t\n\nD 1 kh o act m cons1 enng w 1c e cour o u 1ma e \"~w review is placed in a much less advantageous position\n\nWalohand than the courts below.\"\n\nRamchand Mr. Seta\\vad, however, urged that the appellant\n\nKothan. should not be allowed to rely on section 18 now for the\n\nGhan;;;.;;, khara first time and that even if fraud within the meaning\n\nAiyar J. of that section had been pleaded the respondent might have adduced counter-evidence by himself going into the witness box or otherwise. Accorc!ing to him, the approach to the question of fraud under section 18 of the Limitation Act is quite different from the approach under section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. There may be cases where the fraud alleged and found is fraud in the wider sense of the term within the meaning of section 48 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, but the same facts do not amount to fraud as strictly construed under section 18 of the Limitation Act. The fact that the decree-holder in the lower courts relied on section 48, Civil Procedure Code, only does not prevent him from relying on section 18 of the Limitation Act if the facts necessary to be established for bringing in the assistance of section 18 of the Limitation Act are admitted, or proved. It is not disputed that the fraud contemplated by section 18 of the Limitation Act is of a different type from the fraud contemplated by section 48 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe wording of section 18 which requires the fraud \"to prevent knowledge of the right to make the application\" is necessarilv of a different nature from the fraud which prevents the decree-holder from making an application for execution.\n\nConcedi!'g to the appellant the right to rely on section 18 of the Limitation Act even at this late stage, let us see if it is really of any help to him on the facts found. The section has been quoted already. It speaks of the right to institute a suit or make an application which by means of fraud has been kept from the knowledge of the person having the right or the title on which it is founded. The right to apply for\n\nexecution of a decree like the one before us is a single\n\nJ950 and indivisible right, and not a composite right, Y\n\n--D · f d\"ff 11 h db d h eswrnt eorao cons1stmg o , 1 erent. sma er ng ts an ase on t e Deshm .. kh decree-holder s remedies to proceed against the person v. of the judgment; debtor or his properties, moveable W•lchand and immoveable. To give such a meaning would be RamchMd to split up the single right into parcels and to enable Kothari. the decree-holder to contend that while his rib\" ht to 01 d--kh . d . . l . f ianras~ ara procee agamst a part1cu ar item o property is Aiyar J. barred, it is not barred in respect of other items. \\Ve would then be face to face with different periorls of limitation as regards one and the same decree.\n\nAn interpretation which lead> to this result is prima facie unsound. Both sides agTeed that this is the true position, but they reached it from slightly varying standpoints.\n\nAccording to the appellant, fraud even with reference to one property gives him a further extension of 12 years under section 48 (2) as regards the whole decree and it is not necessary for him to show that he had proceeded against the other properties of the judgment-debtor. According to the respondent, the fraud must consist in the concealment of the knowledge of the decree-holder's right to apply for execution of the decree and it is not enough to prove or establish that the fraud prevented him from proceeding against a specific item. The two contentions, lead to the same conclusion about the indivisibility of the decree, but along different lines.\n\nIn our opinion, the facts necessary to establish fraud under section 18 of the Limitation Act are neither admitted nor proved in the present case. Concealing from a person the knowledge of his right to apply for execution of a decree is undoubtedly different from preventing him from exercising his right, of which he has knowledge. Section 18 of the Limitation Act postulates the former alternative.\n\nTo read it as referring to an application for execution to proceed against a particular property would be destructive of the oneness of the decree and would lead to multiplicity of periods of limitation. It is true that articles 181 and 182 of the Limitation Act and section 48,\n\n1950 Civil Procedure Code, should be read together. The - articles expressly refer to the section. But they are Y\"want Deorao d d t ll 1 ' d'ff t h D h kh m epen en or para e prov1s1ons, 1 eren m t eir es ;.u scope and object.\n\nAs held in Kalyanasundaram Walchana Pillai v. Vaithilinga Vanniar (1) section 48 (2) extends Ramohand the 12 years' period of closure by a further period of Kothad. similar duration but the necessity of resort to artich d-, 1• cle 182 is not thereby obviated. The decree-holder an rase < i ,.ra . . 4; yar J. must have been takmg steps to keep the decree alive and the onlv circumstance that could relieve him of this obligatfon is the existence of fraud under section 18 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThe learned Advocate of the appellant asked how it could be possible for him to apply in execution when there was the fraud and whether the law contemplated that, even though the fraud prevented execution of the decree, he was to go on filing useless or futile applications every three years merely for keeping the decree alive. The answer is simple.\n\nThe fraud pleaded. namely suppression of ownership of the 'Prabhat' newspaper, did not conceal from him his right to make an application for execution of the decree.\n\nIndeed, the suppression, which began in 1938, did not prevent the decree-holder from applying for execution in 1940; and in his answers in cro\"s-examination, he has admitted that there were other properties to his knowledge against which he could have sought execution, viz., deposits in several banks of the judgment-debtor's monies but standing in his wife's or daughter's names, life insurance policies for which premia were being paid by him, law books written and published by him, movable properties in the house at Poona etc.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the appellant's present application seeks execution against several of these properties.\n\nNothing prevented him therefore , from seeking such execution within 3 years of the dismissal of his prior application in 1940. Even with reference to the 'Prabhat', all that the decree-holder states is that as he had no evidence to prove that the concern belonged to the defendant he did not take any steps, and not that he had no\n\n(lJ I.LJ~. 19.i9 i\\lad. 611.\n\nknowledge of the ownership. To quote two sentences 1950 from his deposition : \"I had suspected that defendant -- N I h 1 f h b . ll h h.\n\nY., want D•orao o. was t e rea owner o t e usmess a t e w Ile.\n\nD h kh But I had no positive knowledge or information till \".~\" 1946\" ....... \" I could not take any step for attaching Walchand the defendant's business till 1946 as I had no evidence Ramchand to prove the defendants fraud till then.\" There is Kotha•i. no obligation on the judgment-debtor to post the Oh d --;.h decree-holder with all details of his properties; it is the ai;:~ J. ara decree-holder's business to gather knowledge about the properties so that he can realise the fruits of his decree.\n\nIn dealing with this evidence, Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar relied on the Privy Council decision, Rahiinbhoy\n\nv. Turner in 20 I. A. I and referred to the following observation of Lord Hobhouse at page 5 : -\n\n\"But their Lordships consider, and in this they agree with both the Courts below, that all that the appellant Rahimbhoy has done is to show that some clues and hints reached the assignee in the year 1881, which perhaps, if vigorously and acutely followed up, might have led to a complete knowledge of the fraud, but that there was no disclosure made which informed the mind of the assignee that the insolvent's estate had been defrauded by Rahimbhoy of these assets in the year 1867.\"\n\nThe passage cited does not apply here because the appellant admits knowledge, which is more than a mere suspicion, but states that he had no evidence to prove the defendant's ownership. In any event, it has not been established within the meaning of section\n\n18 of the Limitation Act that the fraud alleged and proved kept back from him the knowledge of his right to execute the decree.\n\nIt is thus clear that the appellant cannot get the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act. It was next argued on behalf of the appellant that under section 48(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, because of the fraud of the respondent the appellant got a fresh starting point of limitation for the Limitation Act also\n\n1950 and therefore the starting point contemplated in the third column of the schedule to the Limitation Act\n\nYmDoanht D•kohraorelating to a1, plications for execution should be the\n\ne~ mu . v. date when the fraud was discovered by the appellant.\n\nWalchand In other words, it was argued that the effect of section Ramchand 48 was not merely to make the 12 years' period start Kothari. from the discovery of fraud for the purpose of section\n\nG d--kl 48(2) of the Civil Procedure Code but also to give a han rast iara h . . f h h d 1 h L' . .\n\nAiyar J.\n\nIres startrng pornt or t e sc e u e to t e 1m1tat10n Act.\n\nThis argument cannot be accepted. If a man is prevented from making an application, because of the fraud of the debtor, he 1s not necessarily prevented from knowing his right to make the application. By the enactment of section 18, the Legislature has distinctly contemplated that for the Limitation Act the starting point is changed on the ground of fraud, only when the knowledge of the right to make the application is prevented by the fraud of the judgmentdehtor.\n\nHaving the knowledge that he had the right to make the application, if the judgment-debtor prevents the decree-holder from knowing the existence of certain properties against which the decree could be enforced, the case is clearly not covered by the words of section 18 of the Limitation Act. Therefore the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is unsound.\n\nIt was urged that the various starting points mentioned in the third column to article 182 of the Limitation Act cannot apply because none of them specify a fresh starting point for execution acquired on the ground of the fraud of the judgment.debtor. This argument, in our opinion, instead of helping the appellant, goes against him.\n\nSuch a provision in the third column in the article relating to execution of decrees is not necessary because provision for such a contingency is made in section 18. Affirmatively, by the inclusion of section 18 in the Limitation Act, and, negatively, by not providing for a separate period of limitation in the case of the fraud of the judgment-debtor in the third column in the articles, the Legislature has clearly indicated that unless advantage could be taken by the\n\ndecree-holder under section 18 on the ground of the 1960 fraud of the judgment-debtor, fraud does not give any -- th\n\n1. f d h L\" \"t A t Th\" h f Yeswant Deorao o er re. 1e un rt e 1m1 a_t10n c : IS _sc eme o Deshmukh the Legislature 1s not inconsistent with sect10n 48 of v. the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe two provisions in the Walchand two Acts have to be read as related to the same subject Ramcha><d but dealing with two differents aspects.\n\nWithout Kothari. section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code a decree-holder, -- .f h d l\" · d b 1 181 011andrasekhara 1 e ma e app 1cat10ns as requJre y artic e or A.\n\nJ 182 of the Limitation Act, could keep his decree alive •var for an indefinite period. The Legislature, as a matter of policy, ruled that a decree of a civil court (but excluding the High Court) shall not be kept alive for more than 12 years, although all necessary steps are taken under the Limitation Act to keep the decree alive and operative. That is one limit to the right of the decree-holder to enforce the decree of the court.\n\nThe second limitation to his right, which is independent of the first, is that he must keep the decree alive under article 182 or 181, as the case may be.\n\nIn the case of the fraud of the judgment-debtor provision is made in section 48(2) for enlarging the 12 years period prescribed under section 48.\n\nFor defeating the plea of the bar of limitatio:1 under the Limitation Act, in the case of fraud of the judgment-debtor, provision is found in section 18 of the Limitation Act. If the particular case of fraud set up and proved is not covered by those words, there is no protection against the same in the Limitation Act.\n\nRead in that way, the two legislative provisions are neither conflicting nor overlapping; and they are capable of operating harmoniously, as they deal 11ith different situations and circumstances. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that because of the fraud he got not merely a fresh starting point for computing the 12 years period prescribed in section 48 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code but is also entitled to an extension of the time under the Limitation Act, must therefore fail.\n\nThe second contention urged on behalf.of the appellant that because in the third column of article 182\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT 5[1950)\n\n1950 fraud is not mentioned, the case is covered by article -- J 81 does not also appear to be sound. The third column\n\ny..,~··~ D~~·· in article 182 prescribes the starting point of limita-\n\n\" \"'\" tion under different specified circumstances. It does v.\n\nWalchand not, and indeed need not. mention the ground of fraud Ramchand because if fraud of the kind against which the Limita-\n\nKothari. tion Act contemplates relief, as prescribed in section 18\n\nCh d-,., of the Limitation Act, is established, the time is an rase~1tara . . .\n\nAiyar J. automatically altered by operation of that sect10n. If the case does not fall under that section, no relief is permitted under the Limitation Act and the starting point for computing the period must be as mentioned in the third column, irrespective of the question of fraud. In our opinion, therefore, the contention that because of the fraud established in the present case under section 48(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, the appellant gets a fresh starting point of limitation under article 182 of the Limitation Act is unacceptable.\n\nThe appellant relied on the general principle of jurisprudence that fraud stops or suspends the running of time and that it should be applied in his favour, apart from section 18 of the Limitation Act.\n\nRules of equity have no application where there are definite statutory provisions specifying the grounds on the basis of which alone the stoppage or suspension of running of time can arise. While the courts necessarily are astute in checkmating or fighting fraud, it should be equally borne in mind that statutes of limitation are statutes of repose.\n\nFor the reasons given above we concur in the conclusion reached by the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : K. ]. Kale.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Gan pat Rai.", "total_entities": 185, "entities": [{"text": "YESWANT DEORAO DESHMUKH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "YESWANT DEORAO DESHMUKH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WALCHAND RAMCHAND KOTHARI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WALCHAND RAMCHAND KOTHARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 169, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 565, "end_char": 570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1290, "end_char": 1295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1560, "end_char": 1565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1688, "end_char": 1696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1704, "end_char": 1718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1788, "end_char": 1801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holder appealed contending for the first time before the Supreme Court that as fraud for the purpose of s. 48 of Civil Procedure Code was proved, e. 18 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the case and - his application was not barred under Art."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1835, "end_char": 1840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1890, "end_char": 1904, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1975, "end_char": 1983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2170, "end_char": 2175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2392, "end_char": 2412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 181 and 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2418, "end_char": 2435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2443, "end_char": 2457, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2665, "end_char": 2670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2672, "end_char": 2692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2768, "end_char": 2776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3084, "end_char": 3089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Walchand the Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3267, "end_char": 3275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Walchand the Limitation Act", "statute": "Walchand the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3448, "end_char": 3456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Walchand the Limitation Act", "statute": "Walchand the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Walchand the Limitation Act", "statute": "Walchand the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Walchand the Limitation Act", "statute": "Walchand the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Walchand the Limitation Act", "statute": "Walchand the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4082, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4303, "end_char": 4320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4322, "end_char": 4333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4338, "end_char": 4343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "281 of 1947 ..\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K.\n\nNarasimha Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nNarasimha Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4407, "end_char": 4429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "281 of 1947 ..\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K.\n\nNarasimha Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (B. Sen, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (B. Sen, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December I. The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIY AR J.-This appeal, preferred Ohandra,.khara from the decree of the Bombay High Court in Appeal Aiyar J.\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4721, "end_char": 4726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December I. The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIY AR J.-This appeal, preferred Ohandra,.khara from the decree of the Bombay High Court in Appeal Aiyar J.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To surmount the bar of limitation, the decree-holder, who is the appellant before us, raised four contentions: firstly, that the final decree, which provided tha:t the plaintiff should pay the deficit court fees on the decretal amount before the execution uf the decree, was a conditional decree, and that time began to run from the date when the condition was fulfilled on 5th December, 1935, by payment; secondly, that the period occupied by the insolvency proceedings from 10th August, 1937, to 14th December, 1942, initiated by the decree-holder to get the first judgment-debtor Walchand Ramchand Kothari (with whom alone we are now concerned) adjudged an insolvent, should be excluded under section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act ; thirdly, that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was the creditor of the present decree-holder, in seeking to execute this decree, should be deducted ; and lastly, that as the judgment-debtor prevented execution of the decree against the 'Prabhat' newspaper by suppressing his ownership of the same, a fresh starting point of limitation springs up in the decree-holder's favour from the date of the discovery of the fraud."}}, {"text": "10th August, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6234, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To surmount the bar of limitation, the decree-holder, who is the appellant before us, raised four contentions: firstly, that the final decree, which provided tha:t the plaintiff should pay the deficit court fees on the decretal amount before the execution uf the decree, was a conditional decree, and that time began to run from the date when the condition was fulfilled on 5th December, 1935, by payment; secondly, that the period occupied by the insolvency proceedings from 10th August, 1937, to 14th December, 1942, initiated by the decree-holder to get the first judgment-debtor Walchand Ramchand Kothari (with whom alone we are now concerned) adjudged an insolvent, should be excluded under section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act ; thirdly, that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was the creditor of the present decree-holder, in seeking to execute this decree, should be deducted ; and lastly, that as the judgment-debtor prevented execution of the decree against the 'Prabhat' newspaper by suppressing his ownership of the same, a fresh starting point of limitation springs up in the decree-holder's favour from the date of the discovery of the fraud."}}, {"text": "14th December, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To surmount the bar of limitation, the decree-holder, who is the appellant before us, raised four contentions: firstly, that the final decree, which provided tha:t the plaintiff should pay the deficit court fees on the decretal amount before the execution uf the decree, was a conditional decree, and that time began to run from the date when the condition was fulfilled on 5th December, 1935, by payment; secondly, that the period occupied by the insolvency proceedings from 10th August, 1937, to 14th December, 1942, initiated by the decree-holder to get the first judgment-debtor Walchand Ramchand Kothari (with whom alone we are now concerned) adjudged an insolvent, should be excluded under section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act ; thirdly, that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was the creditor of the present decree-holder, in seeking to execute this decree, should be deducted ; and lastly, that as the judgment-debtor prevented execution of the decree against the 'Prabhat' newspaper by suppressing his ownership of the same, a fresh starting point of limitation springs up in the decree-holder's favour from the date of the discovery of the fraud."}}, {"text": "Walchand Ramchand Kothari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6341, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To surmount the bar of limitation, the decree-holder, who is the appellant before us, raised four contentions: firstly, that the final decree, which provided tha:t the plaintiff should pay the deficit court fees on the decretal amount before the execution uf the decree, was a conditional decree, and that time began to run from the date when the condition was fulfilled on 5th December, 1935, by payment; secondly, that the period occupied by the insolvency proceedings from 10th August, 1937, to 14th December, 1942, initiated by the decree-holder to get the first judgment-debtor Walchand Ramchand Kothari (with whom alone we are now concerned) adjudged an insolvent, should be excluded under section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act ; thirdly, that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was the creditor of the present decree-holder, in seeking to execute this decree, should be deducted ; and lastly, that as the judgment-debtor prevented execution of the decree against the 'Prabhat' newspaper by suppressing his ownership of the same, a fresh starting point of limitation springs up in the decree-holder's favour from the date of the discovery of the fraud.", "canonical_name": "WALCHAND RAMCHAND KOTHARI"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6490, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tendulkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6534, "end_char": 6543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To surmount the bar of limitation, the decree-holder, who is the appellant before us, raised four contentions: firstly, that the final decree, which provided tha:t the plaintiff should pay the deficit court fees on the decretal amount before the execution uf the decree, was a conditional decree, and that time began to run from the date when the condition was fulfilled on 5th December, 1935, by payment; secondly, that the period occupied by the insolvency proceedings from 10th August, 1937, to 14th December, 1942, initiated by the decree-holder to get the first judgment-debtor Walchand Ramchand Kothari (with whom alone we are now concerned) adjudged an insolvent, should be excluded under section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act ; thirdly, that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was the creditor of the present decree-holder, in seeking to execute this decree, should be deducted ; and lastly, that as the judgment-debtor prevented execution of the decree against the 'Prabhat' newspaper by suppressing his ownership of the same, a fresh starting point of limitation springs up in the decree-holder's favour from the date of the discovery of the fraud."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7327, "end_char": 7337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Yeswant Deorao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7457, "end_char": 7471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thev concurred with the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the Yeswant Deorao .", "canonical_name": "YESWANT DEORAO DESHMUKH"}}, {"text": "article 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7772, "end_char": 7783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7794, "end_char": 7808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "9th September, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7863, "end_char": 7882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held that the application was barred under article 182 -- of the Limitation Act, as more than three years had Cha-; r•sekara run from 9th September, 1940, the date of the dismissal\n\n•Y•• of the previous execution application, before the present application was filed on 4th October, 1946."}}, {"text": "4th October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7999, "end_char": 8016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held that the application was barred under article 182 -- of the Limitation Act, as more than three years had Cha-; r•sekara run from 9th September, 1940, the date of the dismissal\n\n•Y•• of the previous execution application, before the present application was filed on 4th October, 1946."}}, {"text": "3rd April, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9606, "end_char": 9621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His darkhast for attachment of the\n\nl950 present decree was on 3rd April, 1940, and for execution\n\nY -t-D of the present decree was on 1st February, 1944, es wan eorao . ."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9979, "end_char": 9993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~:t~'::~ The learned Advocate for the appellant therefore  devoted most of his argument to the fourth contention\n\nChandrasekhara set forth above.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10359, "end_char": 10379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10438, "end_char": 10448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10456, "end_char": 10470, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Purushottam Mahadev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10723, "end_char": 10742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He purchased the 'Prabhat' newspaper with all its assets and goodwill from its previous owner one Purushottam Mahadev in 1938 under the letter marked Exhibit 129."}}, {"text": "Abhyankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10859, "end_char": 10868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He opened current accounts in several banks, and gave the name of one Abhyankar as the owner of the paper, but he was himself operating on those accounts."}}, {"text": "Rajwade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10948, "end_char": 10955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Rajwade, a friend of the judgment-debtor, was shown as the printer and publisher of the paper."}}, {"text": "Kothari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12219, 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Kale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37537, "end_char": 37547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : K. ]."}}, {"text": "Gan pat Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37576, "end_char": 37587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Gan pat Rai."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_869_940_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCHIRANJIT LAL CHOWDHURI\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA and DAS JJ.]\n\nSholapllr Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Pro <isions) Act (XXVIII of 1950)-Act dismissing managing agents of a company, removing its directors, aahorising Government to appoint new dir<ctors, and \"irtuiling !\"lghts of shareholders in the matter of voting, etc.-Validity-Wliether infringes fundamental rights-Right not to be derived of property save by attthority of law-Right to acqiiire, hold and dispose of property-Right to equal protection of law-Constit,.tion of India, Arts. 14, 19 (1) (!), 19(5), 31, 32-\" Deprivation of properly\",\n\n11 Property\",\" acqiiisitio1z\", ''taking possession\",\n\n11 eqital protection'', meanings of-Right to apply under Art. 32-Corporntwn's right to apply-Shareholders' ·ight.\n\nThe Governor-General of India, finding that on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation had arirsen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., which had prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and bad caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community, and that au emergency had thereby a.risen which rendered it necessary to make special provision for the proper\n\nmanagement and adminietration of the said company, promulgated an Ordinance, which was subsequently re-enacted in the form of an Act of the Legislature called the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950, the net result of which was that the Managing .gents of the said company were dismissed, the directors holding office at the time automatically vacated their office, the Government was authorised to appoint new directors, the'.rights of the shareholders of the com\n\npany were curtailed in the matters of voting, appointment of directors, passing of resolutions and applying for winding up, anJ power was also given to the Government to further modify the Indian Companies Act in its application to the company; and in\n\naccordance with the provisions of the Ordinance new directors\n\nwere appointed by the Government. A shareholder of the company made an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a declaratior. that the Act was void and for enforcement of his fundamental rights by a writ of mandamus against the Central Government, the Government of Bombay and the directors res training them from exercising any powers under the Act and from interfering with the management of the company, on the ground that the Act was not within the Legislative competence\n\nDeo. 4.\n\nChiranjitlaZ\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\nof the Parliament and infringed his fundamental rights goaran teed by Arts. 19 (1) \\f), 31 and 14 of the Constitution and was consequently void under Art. 13.\n\nThe company was mado a respondent and opposed the petition.\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-\n\n(i) that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 31 (1), as it did nGt deprive the com. pany or the petitioner of any property save under authority of law;\n\n(ii) that the impuned Act did not infringe any fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31 (2) inasmuch as it did not authorise the ''acquisition\" of any property of the company or of the shareholders or '' the taking possession \" of the property of the petitioner, namely, the shares which he held in the company, though he wag disabled from exercising some of the rights which &n ordinary shareholder in a. company could exercise in respect of his shares, such as the right to vote, to appoint directors, and to\n\napply for winding up; and, if the Act had anthorised the \"taking possession\" of the propery of the company, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief on that score under Art. 32;\n\n(iii) that, as the Act did not impose any restrictions on the petitioner's right \"to acquire, hold and dispose of'' his shares, there was no infringement of Art. 19 (1) (f); and assuming that the restrictions imposed on the right of voting etc. were restrictions on the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property within Art. 19 (1) (f), such restrictions were reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the public, namely, to secure the supply of a. commodity essential to the community and to prevent serious unemployment amongst a section of the people, a.nd were therefore completely protected by cl. (5) of Art. 19.\n\nHeld .also per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, and MUKI!ERJEA JJ. (PATANJALI SASTRI AND DAS JJ. dissenting).-that though the Legislature ha.a proceeded against one ccmpany only and its shareholders, inasmuch as even one corporation or a. group of persons can be taken to be a class by itself for the purposes of legislation, provided there is sufficient basis or reason for it and there is a. strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, the burden was on the petitioner to prove that there were also other companies similarly situated a.nd this company alone had been discriminated against, and as he had failed to discharge this burden the impugned Act cannot be held to have donied to the petitioner the right to equal protection of the laws referred to in Art. 14 and the petitioner was not therefore entitled to any relief under Art. 32.\n\nPer PATANJALI SASTRIJ.-As the impugned Act plainly denied to the shareholders of this particular company the protections of the law relating to incorporated Joint Stock Companies as embodied in the Indian Comp•nies Act, it wu.s prima facie within\n\nthe inhibition of Art. 14 ; and, even though when law is made applicable to a class of persons or things and the classification ie based on differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be attained, it can be no objection to its constitutio1Jal validity that its aJiplication is found to affect only one person 01\n\nthing, since the impugned Act selected a particular company and imposed upon it and its shareholders burdens and disabilities on the ground of mis1nanagement and neglect of duty on the part of\n\nthose charged with the conduct of its undertaking no question of reasonable classification arose and the Act was plainly discriminatory in character and within the constitutional inhibition of Art. 14. Whilst all reasonable presumptions must undoubtedly be made in favour of the constitutional validity of a law ruade by\n\na competent legislature, no such presumption could be raised in this case as on the face of it the Act was discriminatory and the petitioner could not be called upon to prove that similar mismanagement existed in other companies. The issue was not whether the impugned Act was ill-ad vised or not justified by the facts on which it was based but whether it tramgressed the explicit constitutional restriction on legislative power imposed by Art. 14.\n\nPer DAS J.-The impugned Act, ex facie, is nothing but an arbitrary selection of a particular company and its shareholders for discriminating and hostile treatment, and, read by iteelf, is palpably an infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nAssuming that mismanagement and neglect in conducting the affairs of a company can be a basis of classification and that such a\n\nclassification would bear a reasonable relation to the conduct of\n\na.11 delinquent companies and shareholders and may therefore crea.te no inequality, a distinction cannot be made between the delinquent companies inter se or between shareholders of equally delinquent companies, and one set cannot be punished for its delinquency while another set is permitted to continue, or become, in like manner, delinquent without any punishment unless there be some other apparent difference in their respective obligations and unless there be some cogent reason why prevention of mis management is more irnperative in one instance than in the other.\n\nThe argument that the presumption being in favour of the Legislature, the onus is on the petitioner to show that there are other individuals or companies equally guilty of mismanagement pre judicially affecting the production of an essential commodity and causing serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community does not, in such circumstances, arise, for the simple reason that here there has been no classification at all and, in any case, the basis of classification by its very nature is muob wider and cannot, in its application, be limited only to this company and its shareholders; and that being so, there is no reason to throw on the petitioner the almost impossible burden of proving that there are other compa.nies which are in fact precisely and in ~JI particulars similarly situated. In any event, the petitioner,\n\nChiranjitfal\n\nChawdhurt\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd<ia and\n\nOther a,\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhiu~\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd-ia and\n\nOthers.\n\nmay well claim to have. discharged the onus of showing that this company and its shareholders bn.ve been singled out for discriminating treatment by showing that the Act, on the face of it, ha• adopted a basis of clai::sification which. by its very nature, cannot be exclusively applicable to this company and its shareholders but which may be equally applicable to other companies and their shareholders ttncl has r>enalised this particular con1pany and its shareholders, leaving out other companies and their shareholders who may be equally guilty of the alleged vice of mismanagement and neglect of the type referred to in the preamble in the Ordinance.\n\nPer PATANJALI SASTRI, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ. (KANIA, C.J., d1tbitante).-In so far as the petitioner's rights as a shareholder were curtailed be was entitled to apply for relief under Art. 32 in bis own right on the ground that the Act denied to him the equal protection of the laws and therefore contravened Art. 14 even tboush the other shareholders did not join him in the application.\n\nPer MUKRERJEA J .-The fundamental rights guamnteed by the Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens but to corpol'ate bo:lies as well except where tho language of the provision or the nature of the right compels the inference that they are applicable only to natural persons.\n\nAn incorporated company, therefore, can come up to the Supreme Court for enforcement ol its fundamental rights and so may the individual shareholders to enforce their own; but as the company and its shareholilers are in law separate entities, it \\Yould not b9 open to an individual shareholder to complain of a law which affects the fundamental right of the company except to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his own rights as well. Io order to redress a wrong to the company the action should prima facie be brought by the company itself.\n\nArticle 32 of the Constitution is not directly concerned with the determination of the constitutional validity of particular enactments, what it aims at is the enforcement of fundaenal rights guaranteed by the Constitution and to make out a case under the Article it is incumbent on the petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competence of the Legislature but that it affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, o( which he could seek enforcement by a.n appropriate writ or order.\n\nUnder Art. 32 the Su1Jreme Court has a. very wlde discretion in the matter of framing \\Vrits to suit the exigencies of particular cases and an application under the article cannot be thrown out simply on the grnund that the proper writ or direction has not been prayed for.\n\nIn the context in which th9 word\n\n11 a.cquisitio:i '' is used in Art. 31 .2) it means and implies the acquiring o( the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature or extent of that right might be.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 873\n\nThe guarantee against the denial of equal protection or the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions. It means only that there should be no rliscrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same.\n\nQuaere: Whether the word\" property\" in Art. 31 means the totality of the rights which the ownership of the property connotes, and whether clause (1) of Art. 31 contemplates only codiscation or destruction of property in exercise of what are known as police powers in American law for which no compensation is necessary.\n\nDAS J.-Tbe question whether an Act has deprived a person of his \"property\" must depend on whether it has taken away the substantial bulk of the rights constituting his property. Where the most important rights possessed by the shareholders of a company are still preserved hy a:i Act even though corhin pridleges incidental to the ownership of the shares have been put in abeyance, the sba, reholders cannot be said to have been deprived of their \"property'' in the sense in which tl..ia.t word is used in Art. 19(1) (f) and Art. 31.\n\nIf on the face of the Jaw there is no classification at all, or at any rate, none on the basis of any nppnrent difference specially peculiar to the individual or class affected by the law, it is only an instance of an arbitrary selection of an individual or class for rliscrirninating and hostile legislation and, therefore, no presumption can, in such circumstances, arise at all.\n\nAssuming, however, that even in such a case the onus is thrown on the complainant, there can be nothing to prevent him from proving, if he can, from the text of the law itself, that it is actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary and thereby discharging the initial onus.\n\nThe right to vote, to elect directors, to pass resolutions and to present an application for winding up, are privileges incidental to the ownership of a share, but they are not by themselves, apart from the share, \" property\" within the meaning of Art. 19 \\1) (f) and Art. 31; and even assuming that they are \"property\" such rights cannot be said to have been acquired or taken posBession of by the Government in this case within Art. 31 (2).\n\nThe language of clause (1) of Art. 31 is wider than that of clause (2), for d<privation of proporty may well be brought about otherwise than by acquiring or taking possession of it and in such a case no question of payment of compensation arises.\n\nFAZL ALI, MOKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-Except in the matter of writs in the nature of h'beas corpils no one but those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of the constitutionality of • law and claim relief under Art. 32.\n\nA car poration being • different entity from tbe shareholders,. I.\n\nll~\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nOhowdhuTi\n\nv. '1.'he Union Of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.\n\n1%0\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1950]\n\nshare-bolder cannot complain on the ground that the rights of the company under Arts. 19 (1) (f) or 31 are infringed.\n\nFAZL ALI J.-A classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no clas::; i:fication and a proper classi~ £.cation must al\\vays rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in re8pect of which it is proposed. But the presumption is always in favour of the consti•\n\ntutionality of an enactn1ent and the burden is upon bim who attacks it to show that there has been a clear tra.nsgressfon of constitutional principles. Though Art. 14 lays down an important fundamental 'right, which should be closely and vigilantly guarded, a doctrinaire approach which might choke all beneficial legislation should not be ail.opted, in construing it. i A. K. Gopalan, v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 87), Minist'T of State for the Army v. Dalziel (68 C.L.R. 26 l), Yick Wo v. Hopkins ( 118 U.S. 356), Southern Railway Co. v. Greene I 216 U.S. 400), Gulf C. it S. F. Co. v. Ellis (165 U.S. 150), Middleton v. Texa• Power and Light it Co. (249 U.S. 152), Ranice v. N'w York (%4 U.S. 294), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (260 U.S. 393), McCnb' v. Atchi son (235 U.S. 151), Jeffrey Maniifict<tring Co. v. Blcing (235 U.S.\n\n571), Newark Natural Gas and p,,, z Co. V Oity of Nework (242 U.S. 403), Trnax V Baich 1239 U.S. 33), B1tchanan V Wnrley (245 U.S. 60), Darnell v. The State of Iwliana (226 u.s. 388), Lindely v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (220 u.s. 618', and Barbier\n\nv. Connolly (113 U .s. 27) referre'1 to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 72 of 1950.\n\nPetition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, ]. S. Dawdo, Alladi Kuppuswami, and C. R. Pattabhi Raman, for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney.General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi with him) for opposite party Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nG.N. Joshi, for opposite party Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 to 10.\n\n1950. December 4.\n\nThe Court delivered Judgment as follows.\n\nKania a. J.\n\nKANIA C.J .-This is an application by the holder of one ordinary share of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under article 32 of the Constitution of India. The authorized capital of the company is Rs. 48 lakhs and the paid-up capital is Rs. 32 lakhs half of which is made up of fully paid ordinary share~ of Rs. 1,000 each.\n\nI have read the judgment prepared by Mr. Justice Mukherjea. In respect of the arguments advanced to challenge the validity of the impugned Act under articles 31 and 19 of the Constitution of India, I agree with his line of reasoning and conclusion and have nothing more to add.\n\nOn the question whether the impugned Act infringes article 14, two points have to be considered. The first is whether one individual shareholder can, under the circumstances of the case and particularly when one of the respondents is the company which opposes the petition, challenge the validity of the Act on the ground that it is a piece of discriminatory legislation, creates inequality before the law and violates the principie of equal protection of the laws under article 14 of the Constitution of India. The second is whether in fact the petitioner has shown that the Act runs contrary to article 14 of the Constitution. In this case having regard to my conclu.sion on the second point, I do not think it is necessary to pronounce a definite opinion on the first point. I agree with the line of reasoning and the conclusion of Mr. Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act on the ground that it infringes article 14 of the Constitution and have nothing more to add.\n\nIn my opinion therefore this petition fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nFAZL Au J.-I am strongly of the opinion that this petition should be dismissed with costs.\n\nThe facts urged in the petition and the points raised on behalf of the petitioner before us are fully set forth in the judgments of my brethren, Sastri, Mukherjea and Das JJ., and I do not wish to repeat them here.\n\nIt is sufficient to say that the main grounds on which the Sholapur Spinning and 'Neaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950 (Act No. XX VIII of 1950), which will hereinafter be referred to as \"the Act\", has been assailed, is that it infringes three fundamental rights, these being:-\n\nOhiranjttlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.\n\nKania 0. J.\n\nFael Ali J,\n\n!IMO\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhur$ ..\n\n'J?he: Union of\n\nIndia a11d\n\nQthef'JJ.\n\nFa~I Ali J.\n\n(1) the right to property secured by article 31 of the Constitution ;\n\n(2) the right to acquire, hold and dispose of pro. perty, guaranteed to every citizen by article 19 (l} (f); and\n\n(3) the right to equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by article 14.\n\nIt has been held in a number of cases in the United States of America that no one except those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of the constitutionality of that law. This principle has been very clearly stated by Hughes J. in McCabe v. Atchison('), in these words :-\"It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant -not to others-which justifies judicial interference.\" On this statement of the law, with which I entirely agree, the scope of the discussion on this petition is greatly restricted at least in regard to the first two fundamental rights. The company and the shareholders are in law separate entities, and if the allegation is made that any property belonging to the company has been taken possession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the company under article 19 (1) (f) has been infringed, it would be for the company to come forward to assert or vindicate its own rights and not for any individual shareholder to do so. In this view, the only question which has to be answered is whether the petitioner has succeeded in showing that there has been an infringement of his rights as a share holder under articles 31 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. This question has been so elaborately dealt with by Mukherjea J., that I do not wish to add anything to what he has said in his judgment, and all that is necessary for me to say is that I adopt his conclusions,\n\n11) 235 U.S. 151.\n\nwithout committing myself to the acceptance of all his reasonings.\n\nThe only serious point, which in my opinion, arises in the case is whether article 14 of the Constitution is in any way infringed by the impugned Act. This article corresponds to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which declares that \"no\n\nState shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws\". Professor Willis dealing with this clause sums up the law as prevailing in the United States in regard to it in these words:-\n\n\"Meaning and effect of the guaranty-The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. 'It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.' 'The inhibition of the amendment . . . . was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation'. It does not take from the states the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws, or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and nullifies what they do only when it is without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of treatment, is enough. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis.\"(')\n\nHaving summed up the law in this way, the same learned author adds :-\"Many different classifications\n\n(I) Conslilutlon•I Law bJ Pm!. Willis, (lat Edition), p. 679,\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhurt\n\n•• The UnWn of\n\nIndia and\n\nOtheri.\n\nFail AH J.\n\nChirarijitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nv. \"The Union of\n\nIndia ancl\n\nOthers.\n\nFa1Z AH J.\n\nof persons have been upheld as constitutional. A law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it.\" There can be no doubt that article 14 provides one of the most valuable and important guarantees in the Constitution which should not be allowed to be whittled down, and, while accepting the statement of Professor \\Villis as a correct exposition of the principles underlying this guarantee, I wish to lay particular emphasis on the principle enunciated by him that any classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed.\n\nThe petitioner's case is that the shareholders of the Sholapur company have been subjected to discrimination vis a vis the shareholders of other companies, inasmuch as section 13 of the Act subjects them to the following disabilities which the shareholders of other companies governed by the Indian Companies Act are not subject to : -\n\n\" (a) It shall not be lawful for the shareholders of the company or any other person to nominate or appoint any person to be a director of the company.\n\n(b) No resolution passed at any meeting of the shareholders of the company shall be given effect to unless approved by the Central Government.\n\n(c) No proceeding for the winding up of the company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie in any court unless by or with the sanction of the Central Government.\"\n\nPrima f acie, the argument appears to be a plausible one, but it requires a careful examination, and, while examining it, two principles have to be borne in mind :--(1) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual, in those cases where on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others,\n\n~---~\n\nthat single individual may be treated as a class by himself ; (2) that it is the accepted doctrine of the American courts, which I consider to be well-founded on principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. A clear enunciation of this latter doctrine is to be found in Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company('), in which the relevant passage runs as follows:-\n\n\"It must be presumed that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.\"\n\nThe onus is therefore on the petitioner to show that the legislation which is impugned is arbitrary and unreasonable and there are other companies in the country which should have been subjected to the same disabilities, because the reasons which led the Legislature to impose State control upon the Sholapur\n\ncompany are equally applicable to them. So far as article 14 is concerned, the case of the shareholders is dependent upon the case of the company and if if could be held that the company has been legitimately subjected to such control as the Act provides without violation of the article, that would be a complete answer to the petitioner's complaint.\n\nNow, the petitioner has made no attempt to discharge the burden of proof to which I have referred, and we are merely asked to presume that there must necessarily be other companies also which would be open to the charge of mismanagement and negligence.\n\nThe question cannot in my opinion be treated so lightly. On the other hand, how important the doctrine of burden of proof is and how much harm can be caused by ignoring it or tinkering with it, will be fully illustrated, by referring to the proceedings in the\n\nParliament in connection with the enactment of the\n\n111 2iB u.a. ia2, 1s7.\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\nIJ'ai! Ali J.\n\nChiranjitlai Chawdhuri v.\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia an.cl\n\nOther a.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nAct, where the circumstances which necessitated it are clearly set out. I am aware that legislative proceedings cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing an Act or any of its provisions, but I believe that they are relevant for the proper understanding of the circumstances under which it was passed and the reasons which necessitated it.\n\nA reference to the Parliamentary proceedings shows that some time ago, a representation was made on behalf of a section of the shareholders of the Sholapur company to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies in Bombay, against the conduct of the managing agents, and the Government of Bombay was moved to order a special inquiry into the affairs of the company. For the purpose of this inquiry, two special inspectors were appointed by the Bombay Government and their report revealed \"certain astounding facts\" and showed that the mill had been grossly mismanaged by the Board of Directors and the managing agents.\n\nIt also revealed that the persons who were responsible for the mismanagement were guilty of certain acts and omissions which brought them under the purview of the law.\n\nThe Bombay Government accepted the report of the inspectors and instructed the Advocate- 'General of Bombay to take legal proceedings against certain persons connected with the management of the company. Thereafter, the Government of India was approached by the Provincial Government and requested to take special action in order to secure the early opening of the mill.\n\nThe Government of India found that they had no power to take over the management of a particular mill, unless its working could be ensured through the existing management acting under the direction of a Controller appointed under the Essential Supplies Act, but they also found that a peculiar situation had been created in this case by the managing agents themselves being unable or unwilling to conduct the affairs of the company in a satisfactory and efficient manner. The Government of India, as a matter of precaution and lest it should be said that they were going to interfere unnecessarily in the affairs\n\nof the company and were not allowing the existing provisions of the law to take their own course, consulted other interests and placed the matter before the Standing Committee of the Industrial Advisory Council\n\nwhere a large number of leading industrialists of the country were present, and ultimately it was realized that this was a case where the Government could rightly and properly intervene and there would be no occasion for any criticism coming from any quarter.\n\nIt appears fro!ll the discussion on the floor of the House that the total number of weaving and spinning mills which were closed down for one reason or other was about 35 in number. Some of them are said to have closed for want of cotton, some due to overstocks, some for want of capital and some on account of mismanagement. The Minister for Industry, who sponsored the Bill, in explaining what distingnished the case of the Sholapur mill from the other mills against whom there might be charges of mismanagement, made it clear iu the course of the debate that \"certain conditions had to be fulfilled before the Government can and should intervene\", and he set out these conditions as follows :-\n\n\" (1) The undertaking must relate to an industry which is of national importance. Not each and every undertaking which may have to close down can be taken charge of temporarily by Government.\n\n(2) The undertaking must be an economic unit. If it appears that it is completely uneconomic and cannot be managed at all, there i> no sense in Government taking charge of it. If anything, it will mean the Government will have to waste money which belongs to the taxpayer on an uneconomic unit.\n\n(3) There must be a technical report as regards the condition of the plants, machinery, etc. which either as they stand, or after necessary repairs and reconditioning can be properly utilised.\n\n(4) Lastly ,-and this is of considerable importancethere must be a proper enquiry held before Government take any action. The enquiry should show that\n\n\\lS\n\nChiranjitlal Chowdhi•ri\n\nThe Unio11 of India and\n\nOthrs.\n\nFa1:l Ali J.\n\nChiranjitlal Chowdhuri\n\nTh~ Un.ion of\n\nIndia and\n\nOt/er!.\n\nmanaging agents have so misbehaved that they are no longer fit and proper persons to remain in charge of such an important undertaking.\"(') It appears from the same proceedings that the Sholapur mill is one of the largest mills in Asia and employs 13,000 workers.\n\nPer shift, it is capable of producing 25 to 30 thousand pounds of yarn, and also one lakh yards of cloth. It was working two shifts when it was closed down on the 29th August, 1949.\n\nThe closure of the mill meant a loss of 25 lakhs yards of cloth and one and a half lakhs pounds of yarn per month. Prior to 1947, the highest dividend paid by the company was ls. 525 per share and the lowest Rs. 100, and, in 1948, when the management was taken over by the managing agents who have been removed by the impugned Act, the accounts showed a loss of Rs. 30 lakhs, while other textile companies had been able to show very _substantial profits during the same period.\n\nAnother fact which is brought out in the proceedings is that the managing agents had acquired control over the majority of the shares of the company and a large number of shareholders who were dissatisfied with the management had been rendered powerless and they could not make their voice heard. By reason of the preponderance of their strength, the managing agents made it impossible for a controller under the Essential Supplies Act to function and they also made it difficult for the company to run smoothly under the normal law.\n\nIt was against. this background that the Act was passed, and it is evident that the facts which were placed before the Legislature with regard to. the Sholapur mill were of an extraordinary character, and fully justified the company being treated as a class by itself.\n\nThere were undoubtedly other mills which were open to the charge of mismanagement, but the criteria adopted by the Government which, in my opinion, cann; it be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable, is not applicable\n\n(l) Parlia.ments.ry DebateA, Volume III, Nn. 14~ 31st March lO:SO, pp, 2894.5.\n\nto any of them. As we have seen, one of the criteria was that a mere allegation of mismanagement should not be enough and no drastic step such as is envisaged in the Act should be taken without there being a complete enquiry.\n\nIn the case of the Sholapur mill, a complete enquiry had been made and the revelations which were made as a result of such enquiry were startling.\n\n\\Ve are familiar with the expression \"police power\" which is in vogue in the United States of America.\n\nThis expression simply denotes that in special cases the State can step in where its intervention seems necessary and impose special burdens for general benefit. As one of the judges has pointed out, \" the regulations may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good.\"(') It need not be emphasized that the princi pies underlying what is known as police power in the United States of America arc not peculiar to that country, but are recognized in every modern civilized State.\n\nProfessor Willis dealing with the question of classification in exercise of police power makes the following observations:\n\n\"There is no rule for determining when classification for the police power is reasonable. It is a matter for judicial determination, but in determining the question of reasonableness the Courts must find some economic, political or other social interest to be secured, and some relation of the classification to the objects sought to be accomplished. In doing this the Courts may consider matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times, and to sustain it they will assume every state of facts which can be conceived of as existing at the time of legislation. The fact that only one person or one object or one business or one locality is affected is not proof of denial of the equal protection of the laws. For such\n\n(I) Per Field J, in Barbier v. Connolly. 118 US. 27,\n\n19CO\n\nChiranjit1al Chowdhurt\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOther a.\n\nFa•l .Iii J.\n\nChirn.njitlai Chowdhurt\n\nv, Ths Uoiion. of India and\n\nOthsra,\n\nFIUl Ali J.\n\nproof it must be shown that there is no reasonable basis for the classification.\"(') In this particular case, the Government initially took control of the Sholapur Company by means of an Ordinance (Ordinance No. II of 1950), of which the preamble runs as follows:-\n\n\".Whereas on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential commocjity and has caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community; And whereas an emergency has arisen which renders it necessary to make special provision for the proper management and administration of the aforesaid Company; Now, therefore, ........................ \" In the course of the Parliamentary debate, reference was made to the fact that the country was facing an acute cloth shortage, and one of the reasons which apparently influenced the promulgation of the Ordinance and the passing of the Act was that the mismanagement of the company had gravely affected the production of an essential commodity. The facts relating to the mismanagement of this mill were carefully collected and the mischief caused by the sudden closing of the mill to the shareholders as well as to the general public were fully taken into consideration.\n\nTherefore, it seems to me that to say that one particular mill has been arbitrarily and unreasonably selected and subjected to discriminatory treatment, would be an entirely wrong proposition.\n\nArticle 14 of the Constitution, as already stated, lays down an important fundamental right, which should be closely and vigilantly guarded, but, in construing it, we should not adopt a doctrinaire approach which might choke all beneficial legislation.\n\nThe facts to which I have referred are to be found in a public document, and, though some of them may\n\n(1) Constitutional La.w by Prof. Willis (1st Edition) p. 580.\n\nrequire further investigation forming as they do part of a OJ:ie-sided version, yet they furnish good prima facie grounds for the exercise of the utmost caution in deciding this case and for not departing from the ordinary rule as to the burden of proof. In the last resort, this petition can be disposed of on the simple ground that the petitioner has not discharged the onus which lies upon him, and I am quite prepared to rest my judgment on this ground alone.\n\nI think that the petitioner has faiied to make out any case for granting the writs or directions asked for, and the petition should therefore be dismissed with costs.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution seeking relief against alleged infringement of certain fundamental rights of the petitioner.\n\nThe petitioner is a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, Sholapur, in the State of Bombay, (hereinafter referred to as\n\n\"the Company\"). The authorised share capital of the Company consisted of 1590 fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 1,000 each, 20 fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 500 each and 32,000 partly paid up redeemable cumulative preference shares of Rs. 100 each, of which Rs. 50 only was paid up.\n\nOf these, the petitioner held one ordinary share in his own name and 80 preference shares which, however, having been pledged with the Bank of Baroda Ltd., now stand registered in the Bank's name.\n\nThe company was doing flourishing business till disputes arose recently between the management and the employees, and in or about August, 1949, the mills were temporarily closed and the company, which was one of the largest producers of cotton textiles, ceased production. Thereupon, the Governor-General intervened by p110mulgating on the 9th January, 1950, an Ordinance called the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance (No. II of 1950), which empowered the Government of India to\n\nChiranfitlaE Chowdhuri\n\nThe Uiiio'I of\n\nI11d1a al'ld\n\nOthers.\n\nFad Ali J,\n\nPatanfa.ti\n\nBastri J,\n\nOhira>i;'itlal Chow, lhu.ri\n\nThe U•ii'ln of\n\nIndia a-id\n\nOthers.\n\nPatri.njali\n\nSastrt J.\n\ntake over the control and management of the company and its properties and effects by appointing their own Directors and to delegate all or any of their powers to the Provincial Government. In exercise of the powers thus delegated, the Government of Bombay appointed respondents 3 to 9 as Directors to take charge of the management and administration of the properties and affairs of the company. Subsequently, on 10th April,\n\n1950, the Ordinance was repealed and was replaced by an Act of Parliament containing similar provisions, namely the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company\n\n(Emergency Provisions) Act (No. XXVllI of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as the \"impugned Act\").\n\nThe petitioner complains that the impugned Act and the action of the Government of Bombay pursuant thereto have infringed the fundamental rights conferred on him by articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution with the result that the enactment is unconstitutional and void, and the interference by the Government in the affairs of the company is unauthorised and illegal.\n\nHe accordingly seeks relief by way of injunction and mandamus against the Union of India and the State of Bombay impleaded as respondents 1 and 2 respective. l y in these proceedings and against respondents 3 to 9 who are now in management as already stated.\n\nThe company is impleaded pro forma as the 10th respondent.\n\nBefore discussing the issues involved, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the impugned Act in order to see in what manner and to what extent the petitioner's rights have been affected thereby.\n\nThe preamble to the repealed Ordinance stated that \"on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limit. ed, which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and has caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community and that an emergency has arisen which renders it necessary to make special provision for the proper management and administration of the aforesaid\n\n• '\n\nCompany.\" This preamble was not reproduced in the impugned Act.\n\nSection 3 empowers the Central Government to appoint as many persons as it thinks fit to be directors of the company \"for the purpose of taking over its management and administration.\" Section 4 states the effect of the order appointing directors to be that (1) the old directors shall be deemed to have vacated their office, (2) the contract with the managing agents shall be deemed to have been terminated, (3) that the properties and effects of the company shall be deemed to be in the custody of the new directors who are to be \" for all purposes \" the directors of the company and \"shall alone be entitled to exercise all the powers of the directors of the company whether such powers are derived from the Companies Act or from the memorandum or articles of association or otherwise.\" Section 5 defines the powers of the new directors. They are to manage the business of the company \"subject to the control of the Central Government\" and shall have the power to raise funds offering such security as they think fit, to carry out necessary repairs to the machinery or other. property in their custody and to employ the necessary persons and define the necessary conditions of their service. Section 12 provides for the restoration of the management to directors nominated by the shareholrlers when the purpose of the Government's intervention has been fulfilled.\n\nSection 13 is important and reads thus: \" 13. Application of the Companies\n\nAct.-(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act or in the memorand11m or articles of association of the company (a) it shall not be lawful for the sharehrilders of the company or any other person to nominate or appoint any person to be a director of the company; (b) no resolution passed at any meeting of the shareholders of the company shall be given effect to unless approved by the Central Government; (c) no proceeding for the winding up of the company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie in any Court unless by or \\\\ith the sanction of the Central Government.\n\n(2) Subject\n\nChirt't•njitlal Chowdhurt\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd a and\n\nOthers,\n\nPa.lan; ali\n\nSastri J.\n\nChiranjit7al\n\nChowdhurS\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthera.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nto the provisions contained in sub-section (1) and to the other provisions of this Act, and subject to such exceptions, restrictions and limitations as the Central Government may, by notified order, specify, the Companies Act shall continue to apply to the company in the same manner as it applied thereto before the issue of the notified order under section 3.\" By section 14 the provisions of the Act are to have effect \"notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.\" Section 16 provides for delegation of powers to the Government of Bombay to be exercised subject to the directions of the Central Government, and section 17 bars suits or other proceedings against the Central Government or the Government of Bum bay or any director \"for any damage caused or likely to be caused by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act.\"\n\nAs a result of these provisions all the properties and . effects of the company passed into the absolute power and control of the Central Government or its delegate the Government of Bombay, and the normal functioning of the company as a corporate body came to an end. The shareholders have been reduced to the position of interested, if helpless, onlookers while the business is carried on against their will and, may be, to their disadvantage by the Government's nominees.\n\nThe declared purpose of this arrangement was, accord. ing to the Preamble of the repealed Ordinance to keep up the production of an essential commodity and to avert serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community.\n\nThe question accordingly arises whether the impugned Act, which thus affects the petitioner and his co-shareholders, while leaving untouched the shareholders of all other companies, including those engaged in the production of essential commodities, denies to the petitioner the equal protection of the laws under article 14 of the Constitution. The correct approach to\n\nthis question is first to see what rights have been confer. red or protection extended to persons similarly situated.\n\nThe relevant protection is to be found in the provisions of the Indian Companies Act which regulates the rights and obligations of the shareholders of incorporated companies in India. Section 21 of the Act assures to the shareholders the protection of the stipulations contained in the memorandum and articles of associaticn by constituting them a binding contract, so that neither the company nor the shareholders have the power of doing anything inconsistent therewith. The\\ basic right of the shareholders to have their undertaking managed and conducted by the directors of their own choice is ensured by section 83B. Their . right to exercise control and supervision over the\\ management by the directors by passing resolutions J at their general meeting is regulated by various provisions of the Act. The important safeguard of winding up the company in certain unfavourable circumstances either through court or by the shareholders themselves voluntarily is provided for in sections 162 and 203. All these rights and safeguards, on the faith of which the shareholders embark their money in their undertaking, are abrogated by the impugned Act in the case of the shareholrlers of this company alone. In fact, the Central Government is empowered to exclude, restrict or limit the operation of any of the provisions of the Companies Act in relation to this company. It is thus plain that the impugned Act denies to the shareholders of this particular company the protection of the law relating to incorporated joint stock companies in this country as embodied in the Companies Act and is primafacie within the inhibition of article 14.\n\nIt is argued, however, that article 14 does not make it incumbent on 1he Legislature always to make laws applicable to all persons generally, and that it is open to the Legislature to classify persons and things and subject them to the operation of a particular law according to the aims and objects which that law is designed to secure. In the present case, Parliament,\n\nOhiranJ1tlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J,\n\nOhiranfit1al\n\nChowdhuri\n\n- The Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a,\n\nPala~.iali Sastri J,\n\nit was said, came to the conclusion, on the materials placed before theni, that the affairs of the company were being grossly mismanaged so as to result in the cessation of production of an essential commodity and serious unemployment amongst a section of the community. In view of the detriment thus caused to public economy, it was competent for Parliament to enact a measure applicable to this company and its shareholders alone, and Parliament must be the judge as to whether the evil which the impugned Act was designed to remedy prevailed to such an extent in this companv as to call for special legislation. Reliance was pl::tced in support of this argument on certain American decisions dealing with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal\n\nConstitution. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss those decisions here, for it is undeniable that equal protection of the laws cannot mean that all laws must be quite general in their character and application.\n\nA legislature empowered to make laws on a wide range of subjects must of necessity have the power qf making special laws to attain particular objects and must. for that purpose, possess large powers of distinguishing and classifying the persons or things to be brought under the operation of such laws, provided the basis of such classification has a just and reasonable relation to the object which the legislature has in view. While, for instance, a classification in a law regulating labour in mines or factories may be based on age or sex, it may not be based on the colour of one's skin. It is also true that the class of persons to whom a law is made applicable may be large or small, and the degree of harm which has prompted the enactment of a particular law is a matter within the discretion of the law-makers. It is not the province of the court to canvass the legislative judgment in such matters. But the issue here is not whether the impugned Act was ill-advised or not justified by the facts on which it was based, but whether -it transgresses the explicit constitutional re:; triction on legislative power imposed by arti<; le 14.\n\nIt is obvious that the legislation is directed solely against a particular company and shareholders and not against any class or category of companies and no question, therefore, of reasonable legislative classification arises. If a law is made applicable to a class of persons or things and the classification is based upon differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be attained, it can be no objection to its constitutional validity that its application is found to affect only one person or thing. For instance, a law may be passed imposing certain restrictions and burdens on joint stock companies with a share capital of, say, Rs. IO crores and upwards, and it may be found that there is only one such company for the time being to which the Jaw could be applied. If other such companies are brought into existence in future the law would apply to them also, and no discrimina. tion would thus be involved. But the impugned Act, which selects this particular company and imposes upon it and its shareholders burdens and disabilities on the graund of mismanagement and neglect of duty on the part of those charged with the conduct of its undertaking. is plain! y discriminatory in character and is, in my judgment, within the constitutional inhibition of article 14.\n\nLegislation based upon mismar.agement or other misconduct as the differentia and made applicable to a specified individual or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think, receive judicial encouragement.\n\nIt was next urged that the burden of proving that\n\nte impugned Act is unconstitutional lay on the petitioner, and that, inasmuch as he has failed to adduce any evidence to show that the selection of this company and its shareholders for special treatment under the impugned Act was arbitrary, tlie application must fail. Whilst all reasonable presumption must undoubtedly be made in support of the constitutional v.alidity of a law made by a competent legislature, the circumstances of the present case would seem, .to my\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri'\n\nThs Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nCki1'anjitla!\n\nChowdhuri\n\nv, The Uriion of\n\nI11d1a and\n\nOthers.\n\nPatarija!i\n\nSastri J,\n\nmind to exclude such presumption. Hostile discdmina. tion is writ large over the fate of the impugned Act and it discloses no grounds for such legislative intervention. For all that appears no compelling public interests were involved. Even the preamble to the original Ordinance was omitted. Nor did respondents 1 and 2 file any counter-statement in this proceeding explaining the circumstances which led to the enactment of such an extraordinary measure. There is thus nothing in the record even by way of allegation which the petitioner need take steps to rebut. Supp\"sing, however, that the impugned Act was passed on the same grounds as were mentioned in the preamble to the repealed Ordinance, namely, mismanagement and neglect prejudicially affecting the production of an essential commodity and causing serious unemployment amongst a section of the community, the petitioner could hardly be expected to assume the burden of showing, not that the company's affairs were properly managed, for that is not his case, but that there were also other companies similarly mismanaged, for that is what, according to the respondents, he should prove in order to rebut the presump. tion of constitutionality. In other words, he should be called upon to establish that this company and its shareholders were arbitrarily singled out for the imposition of the statutory disabilities. How could the . petitioner discharge such a burden? Was he to ask for an investigation by the Court of the affairs of other industrial concerns in India where also there were strikes and lock outs resulting in unemployment and cessation of production of essential commodities? \\Vould those companies be willing to submit to such an investigation ? And even so, how is it possible to prove that the mismanagement and neglect which is said to have prompted the legislation in regard to this company was prevalent in the same degree in other companies ? In such circumstances, to cast upon the petitioner a burden of proof which it is as needless for him to assume as it is impracticable to discharge is to lose sight of the realities of the case.\n\nLastly, it was argued that the constitutionality of a statute could not be impugned under article 32 except by a person whose rights were infringed by the enact. ment, and that, inasmuch as there was no infringement of the individual right of a shareholder, even assuming that there was an injury to the company as a corporate body, the petitioner was not entitled to apply for relief under that article. Whatever validity the argument may have in relation to the petitioner's claim based on the alleged invasion of his right of property under article 31, there can be little doubt that, so far as his claim based on the contravention of article 14 is concerned, the petitioner is entitled to relief in his own right. As has been pointed out already, the impugned Act deprives the shareholders of the company of important rights and safeguards which are enjoyed by the shareholders of other joint stock companies in India unJer the Indian Companies Act. The petitioner is thus denied the equJ1l protection of the laws in his capacity as a shareholder, and none the less so because the other shareholders of the company are also similarly affected. The petitioner is therefore entitled to seek relief under article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nIn this view it becomes unnecessary to consider the questions raised under articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the result, I would allow the application.\n\n'Chiranjitlai\n\nChowdhuri\n\n•• The Unio11 of Ind1a and\n\nOther I.\n\nPalattjali\n\nSastr' J.\n\nMuKHERJEA ].-This is an application presented by Mukhorj,. J. one Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri, a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and \\Veaving Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the company), praying for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under article 32 of the Constitution. The company, which has its registered office within the State of Bombay and is governed by the-provisions of the Indian Companies Act, was incorporated with an authorised capital of Rs. 48 lakhs divided into 1590, fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each, 20 fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 500 each and 32,000 partly paid up\n\nt\\\\m\\\\\\'d\\\\'J~ }.)!krnce shares of Rs. 100 each. The\n\nChiranjitlal•\n\nChawdhuri\n\nThe U>iion of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\npresent paid up capital of the company is Rs. 32 lakhs half of which is represented by the fully paid up ordinary shares and the other half by the partly paid up cumulative preference shares. The petitioner states in his petition that he holds in his own right three ordinary shares and eighty preference shares in the company, though according to his own admission the preference shares do not stand in his name but have been registered in the name of the Baroda Bank Limited with which the shares are pledged. According to the respondents, the petitioner is the registered holder of one single ordinary share in the company.\n\nIt appears that on July 27, 1949, the directors of the company gave a notice to the workers that the mills would be closed, and pursuant to that notice, the mills were in fact closed on the 27th of August following.\n\nOn January 9, 1950, the Governor-General of lnd1a promulgated an Ordinance which purported to make special provisions for the proper management and administration of the company. It was stated in the preamble to the Ordinance that \"on account of mismanagement and neglect, a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and has caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community \", and it was on account of the emergency arising from this situation that the promulgation of the Ordinance was necessary.\n\nThe provisions of the Ordinance, so far as they are material for our present purpose, may be summarised as follows : Under section 3 of the Ordinance, the Central Government may, at any time, by notified order, appoint as many persons as it thinks fit, to be directors of the company for the purpose of taking over its management and administration and may appoint one of such directors to be the Chairman. Section 4 provides that on the issue of a notified order under section 3 all the directors of the company holding office as such immediately before the issue of the order shall be deemed to have vacated their offices, and any existing\n\ncontract of management between the company and any managing agent thereof shall be deemed to have\n\nterminated. The directors thus appointed shall be for all purposes the directors of the company duly constituted under the Companies Act and shall alone be entitled to exercise all the powers of the directors of the company. The powers and the duties of the directors are specified in section 5 and thiS section inter alia empowers the directors to vary or cancel, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, any contract or agreement entered into between the company and any other person if they are satisfied that such contract or agreement is rletrimental to the interests of the company. Section 10 lays down that no compensation for premature termination of any contract could be claimed by the managing agent or any other contracting party. It is provided by section 12 that so long as the management by the. statutory directors continues, the shareholders would be precluded from nominating or appointing any person to be a director of the company and any resolution passed by them will not be effective unless it is approved by the Central Government. This section Jays down further that during this period no proceeding for winding up of the company, or for appointment of a recei, er in respect thereof could be instituted in any court, unless it is sanctioned by the Central Government, ancl the\n\nCentral Government would be competent to impose any restrictions or limitations as regards application of the provisions of the Indian Companie3 Act to the affairs of the comµany.\n\nThe only other material provision is that contained in section 15, under which the Central\n\nGovernment may, by no.lilied order, direct that all or any of the powers exercisable by it under this Ordin\n\nance may be exercised by the Government of Bombay.\n\nIn accordance with the provisions of section 15\n\nmeniond above, the Central Government, by notificat10n issued on the same day that the Ordinance was promulgated, delegated ail its powers exercisable Q.nder the Ordinance to the Government of Bombay.\n\nChiraJJjitlaZ Chowdhurt\n\nThe Unioti of\n\nIndin and\n\nOthra.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\n•• The U11ion of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nOn th.e next day, the Government of Bombay appofnted respondents 3 to 7 as directors of the company in terms of section 3 of the Ordinance.\n\nOn the 2nd of March, 1950, the respondent No. 9 was appointed a director and respondent No. 5 having resigned his office in the meantime, the respondent No. 8 was appointed in his place. On the 7th of April, 1950, the Ordinance was repealed and an Act was passed by the Parliament of India, known as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act which re-enacted almost in identical terms all the provisions of the Ordinance and provided further that all actions taken and orders made under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been taken or made under the corresponding provisions of the Act. The preamble to the Ordinance was not however reproduced in the Act.\n\nThe petitioner in his petition has challenged the constitutional validity of both the Ordinance and the Act.\n\nAs the Ordinance is no longer in force and all its provisions have been incorporated in the Act, it will not be nece8sary to deal with or refer to the enactments separately.\n\nBoth the Ordinance and the Act have been attacked on identical grounds and it is only necessary to enumerate briefly what these grounds are.\n\nThe main ground put forward by the petitioner is that the pith and substance of the enactments is to take possession of and control over the mills of the company which are its valuable assets and such taking of possession of property is entirely beyond the powers of the Legislature. The provisions of the Act, it is said, amount to deprivation of property of the shareholders as well as of the company within the meaning of article 31 of the Constitution and the restrictions imposed on the rights of the shareholders in respect to the shares held by them constitute an unjustifiable interference with their rights to hold property and as such are void under article 19 (1) (f). It is urged that there was no public purpose for which the Legislature <; ould authorise the taking pcissession or acqubition of\n\nr . ,,,)\n\nproperty and such acquisition or taking of possession without payment of compensation is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by article 31 (2) of the Constitution. It is said further that the enactment denies to the company and its shareholders equality before the law, and equal protection of laws and thus offends against the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution. The only other material point raised is that the legislation is beyond the legislative competency of the Parliament and is not covered by any of the items in the legislative lists.\n\nOn these allegations, the petitioner prays, in the first instance, that it may be declared that both the Act and the Ordinance are ultra vires and void and an injunction may be issued restraining the respondents from exercising any of the powers conferred upon them by the enactments. The third and the material prayer is for issuing a writ of mandamus, \"restraining the respondents 1 to 9 from exercising or purporting to exercise any powers under the said Ordinance or Act and from in any manner interfering with the management or affairs of the company under colour of or any purported exercise of any powers under the Ordinance or the Act.\" The other prayers are not material for our purpose.\n\nBefore I address myself to the merits of this application it will be necessary to clear up two preliminary matters in respect to which arguments were advancd at some length from the Bar. The first point relates to the scope of our enquiry in the prese11t case and raises the question as to what precisely are the matters that h_ave to be investigated and determined on this application of the petitioner. The second point relates to the form of relief that can be prayed for and granted in a case of this description.\n\nArticle. 32 (1) of the Constitution guarantees to everybody the right to move this court, by appropriate proceeding, for enforcement of the fundamental rights which are enumerated in Part III of the Constitution. Clause (2) of the article lays down that the\n\n11~\n\n195\"\n\nChirari.jitlal Chowdhuri\n\nTho Union of\n\nIndill and\n\nOther a.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1900 Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or _writs including writs in the nature of CMranjitlal h 'b Chowdhuri habeas corpus, mandamus, pro i ition, quo warranto\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthtJrs.\n\nand certi:orari whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.\n\nThus anybody who complains of infraction of any of\n\nMukherjeo J. the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution is at liberty to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of such rights and this court has been given the power to make orders and issue directions or writs similar in nature to the prerogative writs of English law as might be considered appropriate in particular cases. The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely to\n\n~ individual citizens but to corporate bodies as well except where the language of the provision or the nature of the right compels the inference that they are applicable only to natural persons.\n\nAn incorporated company, therefore, can come up to this court for enforcement of its fundamental rights and so may the individual shareholders to enforce their own; but it would not be open to an individual shareholder to complain of an Act which affects the fundamental rights of the company except to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his own rights as well.\n\nThis follows logically from the rule of law that a corporation has a distinct legal personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations separate from those of its individual members.\n\nAs the\n\n~ rights are different and inhere in different legal entities, it is not competent to one person to seek to enforce the rights of another except where the Jaw permits him to do so. A well known illustration of such exception is furnished by the procedure that is sanctioned in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Not only the man who is imprisoned or detained in confinement but any person, provided he is not an absolute • jstranger, can institute proceedings to obtain a writ. of 'habeas corpus for the purpose of liberating another from an illegal imprisonment,\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nOhowdhu,.t\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOther\".\n\nThe application before us under article 32 of the Constitution is on behalf of an individual shareholder of the company.\n\nArticle 32, as its provisions show, is not directlv concerned with the determination of constitutional validity of particular legislative enact. ments. What it aims at is the enforcing of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, no matter whether the necessity for such enforcement arises out of an action of the executive or of the legislature.· To make out a case under this article, it is\"\n\nincumbent upon the petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competence of the particular legislature as not being covered by any of the items in the legislative lists, but that it• affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed. by the Constitution, of which he could seek enforcement by an appropriate writ or order. The rights that could be enforced under article 32 must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such rights and approaches the court for relief.\n\nThis being the position, the proper subject~ of our investigation would be what rights, if any, of the petitioner as a shareholder of the company have been violated by the impugned legislation. A discussion of the fundamental rights of the company as such would be outside the purview of our enquiry. It is settled law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, the action should prima jacie be brought by the company itself. It cannot be said that this course is not possible in the circumstances of th present case.\n\nAs the law is alleged to be unconstitutional, it is open to the old directors of the com pany who have been ousted from their position b reason o~ te enactment to maintain that they are dir ect?rs. still m the eye of law, and on that footing the maionty of shareholders can also assert the rights of the company as such.\n\nNone of them, however, have come forward to institute any proceeding on behalf of the company.\n\nNeither in form nor in substance does the present application purport to be one made by the company itself. Indeed, the company\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nChiranjitlai Chowdhuri\n\nThe Uriion of [,1dia and\n\nOthers,\n\nA1ukheriea J,\n\nis -one of the respondents, and opposes the petition.\n\nAs regards the other point, it would appear from the language of article 32 of the Constitution that. the sole object of the article is the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A proceeding under this article cannot really have any affinity to what is known as a declaratory suit.\n\nThe first prayer made in the petition seeks relief in the shape of a declaration that the Act is invalid and is apparently inappropriate to an application under article 32; while the second purports to be framed for a relief by way of injunction consequent upon the first.\n\nAs regards the third prayer, it has been contended by Mr. Joshi, who appears for one of the respondents, that having regard to the nature of the case and the allegations made by the petitioner himself, the prayer for a writ of mandamus, in the form in which it has been made, is not tenable. What is argued is that a writ of mandamus can be prayed for, for enforcement of statutory duties or to compel a person holding a public office to do or forbear from doing something which is incumbent upon him to do or forbear from doing under the provisions of any law.\n\nAssuming that the respondents in the present case are public servants, it is said that the statutory duties which it is incumbent upon them to discharge are precisely the duties which are laid down in the impugned Act itself.\n\nThere is no legal obligation on their part to abstain from exercising the powers conferred upon them by the impeached mactment which the court can be called upon to enforce.\n\nThere is really not much substance in this argument, for according to the petitioner the impugned Act is not valid at all and consequently the respondents cannot take their stand on this very Act to defeat the application for a writ in the nature of a mandamus. Any way, article 32 of the Constitution gives us very wide discretion in the matter of framing our writs to suit the exigencies of particular cases, and the application of the petitioner cannot be thrown out simply on the\n\nground that the proper writ or direction has not been prayed for.\n\nProceeding now to the merits of the case, the first contention that has been pressed before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the effect of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited (Emergency Provisions) Act, has been to take away from the company and its shareholders, possession of property and other interests in commercial undertaking and vest the same in certain persons who are appointed _ by the State, and the exercise of whose powers cannot be -.-~irected or co.ntrolled in any way by the shareholders.\n\n\"'\\As the taking of possession is not for any public pur-\n\n\\ ose and no provision for compensation has been made\n\nl'1y the law which authorises it, such law, it is said, +iolates the fundamental rights guaranteed under :lrticle 31 of the Constitution. _ / To appreciate the contention, it would be convenient / first of all to advert to the provisions of the first two / clauses of article 31 of the Constitution. The first / clause of article 31 lays down that \"no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law\".\n\nThe second clause provides : \"No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possesion of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.\"\n\nIt is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate private property belonging to individual citizens for public use. This right, which is described as eminent domain in American law, is like the power ?I taxation, an offspring of political necessity, and it 1s supposed to be based upon an implied reservation by Government that private property acquired by its\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n...\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nChowdhu.ri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukheriea J.\n\nc:itizens under its protection may be taken or its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner. Article 31 (2) of the Constitution prescribes a two-fold limit within which such superior right of the State should be exercised.· One limitation imposed upon acquisition or taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking must be for public purpose. The other condition is that no property can be taken, unless the law which authorises such appropriation contains a provision for payment of compensation in the manner laid down in the clause. So far as article 31 (2) is concerned, the substantial question for our consideration is whether the impugned legislation authorises any act amounting to acquisition or taking possession of private property within the meaning of the clause.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that. acquisition means and implies the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner, whatever the nature or extent of that title might be. The entire bundle of rights which were vested in the original holder would pass on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing in the former.\n\nIn taking possession on the other hand, the title to the property admittedly remains in the original holder, though he is excluded from possession or enjoyment of the property. Article 31 (2) of the Constitution itself makes a clear distinction between acquisition of property and taking possession of it for a public purpose, though it places both of them on the same footing in the sense that a legislation authorising either of these acts must make provision for payment of compensation to the displaced or expropriated holder of the property. In the context in which the word \"acquisition\" appears in article 31 (2), it can only mean and refer to acquisition of the entire interest of the previous holder by transfer of title and I have no hesitation in holding that there is no such acquisition either as regards the property of the company or of the shareholders in the present case. The question, therefore, narrows down to this as to whether the legislation in\n\nquestion has authorised the taking of possession of any property or interest belonging to the petitioner.\n\nCkiranjitlal It is argued by the learned Attorney-General that the Chowdhuri\n\nv taking of possession as contemplated by article 31 (2) means the taking of possession of the entire bundle of The Union of rights which the previous holder had, by excluding India and him from every part or item thereof. If the original Other•. holder is still left to exercise his possession with regard Mukheriea 1 . to some of the rights which were within the folds of his title, it would not amount to taking possession of the property for purposes of article 31 (2) of the Con. stitution.\n\nHaving laid down this proposition of law, the learned Attorney-General has taken us through the various provisions of the impugned Act and the contention advanced by him substantially is that~ neither the company nor the shareholders have been dispossessed from their property by reason of the enactment. As regards the properties of the company! I\n\nthe directors, who have been given the custody of the property, effects and actionable claims of the company,· are, it is said, to exercise their powers not in their own ; right but as agents of the companv. whose beneficial intertst in al.Lita-a£sets-ffils-not-bee1i_toui;, hed_gr_JaJ,:en away at all.\n\nNo doubt the affairs of the company are tObe managed by a body of directors appointed by the State and not by the company, but this, it is argued, would not amount to taking possession of any property or interest within the meaning of article 31 (2).\n\nMr. Chari, on the other hand, has contended on behalf of the petitioner that after the management is taken over by the statutory directors, it cannot be said \\ that the company still retains possession or control over its property and assets. Assuming that this State\n\nmanagement was imposed in the interests of the share. holders themselves and that the statutory directors are acting as the agents of the company, the possession of the statutory directors could not, it is argued, be regarded in law as possession of the company so long as they are bound to act in obedience to the dictates of the Central Government and not of the company itself in tile aclministration of its affairs. Possession of an\n\n1950\"\n\nOhiranjit!al Ohowdhuri\n\nThe Union of Ind1a and\n\nOthera.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nagent, it is said, cannot juridically be the possession of the principal, if the agent is to act not according to the commands or dictates of the principal, but under the direction of an exterior authority.\n\nThere can be no doubt that there is force in this contention, but as I have indicated at the outset, we are not concerned in this case with the larger question as to how far the inter. position of this statutory management and control amounts to taking possession of the property and assets belonging to the company.\n\nThe point for our consideration is a short one and that is whether by virtue of the impugned legislation any l\n\n'property or interest of the petitioner himself, as a shareholder of the company, has been taken possession . of by the State or an authority appointed under it, as contemplated by article 31 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioner as a shareholder has undoubtedly Ian interest in the company. His interest is represented by the share he holds and the share is movable property according to the Indian Companies Act with iall the incidence of such property attached to it.\n\nOrdinarily, he is entitled to enjoy the income arising from the shares in the shape of dividends; the share like any other marketable commodity can be sold or transferred by way of mortgage or pledge. The holding of the share in his name gives him the right to vote at the election of directors and thereby take a part, though indirectly, in the management of the company's affairs. If the majority of shareholders sides with him, he can have a resolution passed which would be binding on the company, and lastly, he can institute proceedings for winding up of the company which may result in a distribution of the net assets among the shareholders.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that the petitioner has not been dispossessed in any sense of the term of the shares he holds.\n\nNobody has taken the shares away from him. His legal and beneficial interest in respect to the shares he holds is left intact. If the company declares dividend, he would be entitled to the same.\n\nHe can sell or otherwise dispose of the shares at any\n\n. -·-\n\ntime at his option. The impugned Act has affected him in this way that his right of voting at the election of directors has been kept in abeyance so long as the management by the statutory director continues; and as a result of that, his right to participate in the management of the company has been abridged to that extent. His rights to pass resolutions or to institute winding up proceedings have also been restricted though they are not wholly gone; these rights can be exercised only with the consent or sanction of the Central Government. In my opinion, from the facts\\ stated above, it cannot be held that the petitioner has been dispossessed from the property owned by him.\n\nI may apply the test which Mr. Chari himself formulated. If somebody had taken possession of the petitioner's shares and was clothed with the authority to exercise all the powers which could be exercised by the holder of the shares under law, then even if he purported to act as the petitioner's agent and exercise these powers for his benefit, the possession of such person would not have been the petitioner's possession if he was bound to act not under the directions of the petitioner or in obedience to his commands but under the directions of some other person or authority. There is no doubt whatsoever that that is not the position in the present case. The State has not usurped the shareholders' right to vote or vested it in any other authority. The State appoints directors of its own choice but that it does, not in exercise of the shareholders' right to vote but in exercise of the powers vested in it by the impugned Act. Thus there has been no dispossession of the shareholders from their right of voting at all. The same reasoning applies to the other rights of the shareholders spoken of above, namely, their right of passing resolutions and of presenting winding up petition. These rights have been restricted undoubtedly and may not be capable of being exercised to the fullest extent as long as the management by the State continues. \\¥hether the restrictions are such as would bring the case within\n\n11~\n\nChiranjitlal Ohowdhurt\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.\n\nMukherjea .J.\n\n19~0\n\nChiranjitla!\n\nGhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nthe mischief of article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution,\n\nI will examine presently ; but I have no hesitation in holding that they do not amount to dispossession of the shareholders from these rights in the sense that the rights have been usurped by other people who are exercising them in place of the displaced shareholders.\n\nIn the view that I have taken it is not necessary to discuss whether we can accept as sound the contention put forward by the learned Attorney-General that the word \" property \" as used in article 31 of the Con. stitution connotes the entire property, that is to say the totality of the rights which the ownership of the object connotes.\n\nAccording to Mr. Setalvad, if a shareholder is not deprived of the entirety of his rights which he is entitled to exercise by reason of his being the owner or holder of the share and some rights, however insignificant they might be, still remain in him, there cannot be any dispossession as contemplated by article 31(2). It is difficult, in my opinion, to accept the contention formulated in such broad terms. The test would certainly be as to whether the owner has been dispossessed substantially from the rights held by him or the loss is only with regard to some minor ingredients of the proprietory right. It is relevant to refer in this connection to an observation made by Rich J. in a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Australia,(') where the question arose as to whether the taking of exclusive possession of a property for an indefinite period of time by the Commonwealth of Australia under Reg. 54 of the National Security Regulation amounted to acquisition of property within the meaning of placitum 31, section 51, of the Com. monwealth Constitution. The majority of the Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative and the main reason upon which the majority decision was based is thus expressed in the language of Rich J.-\n\n\" Property, in relation to land, is a bundle of rights exercisable with respect to the land. The tenant of an unencumbered estate in fee simple in possession has the largest possible bundle. But there is nothing in\n\n(1) See Miniater of State for the Army v. Dalziel, 68 C L.R. {>. 261.\n\nthe placitum to suggest that the legislature was intended to be at liberty to free itself from the restrictive provisions of the placitum by taking care to seize something short of the whole bundle owned by the person whom it was expropriating.\" . It is not, however, necessary for my purpose to pursue the matter any further, as in my opinion there has been no dispossession of the rights of a shareholder in the present case.\n\nMr. Chari in course of his opening relied exclusively on clause (2) of article 31 of the Constitution. During his reply, however, he laid some stress on clause (1) of the article as well, and his contention seems to be that there was deprivation of property in the present case in contravention of the terms of this clause. It is difficult to see what exactly is the contention of the learned Counsel and in which way it assists him for purposes of the present case. It has been argued by the learned Attorney-General that clause (1) of article 31 relates to a power different from that dealt with under clause (2).\n\nAccording to him, what clause (1) contemplates is confiscation er destruction of property in exercise of what are known as ' police powers ' in American law, for which no payment of compensation is necessary. I do not think it proper for purposes of the present case to enter into a discussion on this somewhat debatable point which has been raised by the learned Attorney-General. In interpreting the provisions of our Constitution, we should go by the plain words used by the Constitution.makers and the importing of expressions like ' police power', which is a term of variable and indefinite connotation in American law can only make the task of interpretation more difficult.\n\nIt is also not necessary to express any opinion as to whether clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 relate to exercise of different kinds of powers or they are to be taken as cumulative provisions in relation to the same subjectmatter, namely, compulsory acquisition of property.\n\nIf the word \"deprived\" as used in clause (1) connotes the idea of 'destruction or confiscation of property, obviously no such thing has happened in the present\n\nChiranjtllai ChowdhurS\n\nv, The Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthera.\n\n.Mukherjea J.\n\nOhiraajitlal Chowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\ncase.\n\nAgain if clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 have to be read together and \" deprivation\" in clause (1) is given the same meaning as compulsory acquisition in clause (2), clause (1), which speaks neither of compensation nor of public purpose, wonld not by itself, and apart from clause (2), assist the petitioner in any way.\n\nIf the two clauses are read disjunctively, the only question that may arise in connection with clause (1) is whether or not the deprivation of property is authorised by law. Mr. Chari has raised a question relating to the validity of the legislation on the ground of its not being covered by any of the items in the legislative list and to this question I would advert later on; but apart from this, clause (1) of article 31 of the Constitution seems to me to be altogether irrelevant for purposes of the petitioner's case.\n\nThis leads me to the consideration of the next point raised by Mr. Chari, namely, whether these restrictions offend against the provision of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 19(1) of the Constitution enumerates the different forms of individual liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed by the Constitution. The remaining clauses of the article prescribe the limits that may be placed upon these liberties by law, so that they may not conflict with public welfare or general morality. Article 19( 1) (f) guarantees to all citizens 'the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property.' Any infringement of this provision would amount to a violation of the fundamental rights, unless it comes within the exceptions provided for in clause (5) of the article. That clause permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of such righ teither in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Two questions, therefore, arise in this connection: first, whether the restrictions that have been imposed upon the rights of the petitioner as a shareholder in the company under the Sholapur Act amount to infringement of his right to acquire, hold or dispose of property within the meaning of article 19(l)(f) of the Constitution and\n\n--.\n\nsecondly, if they do interefere with such rights, whether they are covered by the exceptions laid down in clause (5) of the article.\n\nSo far as the first point is concerned, it is quite clear that there is no restriction whatsoever upon the petitioner's right to acquire and dispose of any property.\n\nThe shares which he holds do remain his property and his right to dispose of them is not fettered in any way.\n\nIf to 'hold' a property means to possess it, there is no\n\ninfrinement of this right either, for, as I have stated already, the acts complained of by the petitioner do not amount to dispossession of him from any property in the eye of law. It is argued that 'holding' includes enjoyment of all benefits that are ordinarily attached to the ownership of a property. The enjoyment of the fruits of a property is undoubtedly an incident of ownership. The pecuniary benefit, which a share_ holder derives from the shares he holds, is the divi. dend and there is no !imitation on the petitioner's right in this respect. The petitioner undoubtedly has been precluded from exercising his right of voting at the election of directors so long as the statutory directors continue to manage the affairs of the company.\n\nHe cannot pass an effective resolution in concurrence with the majority of shareholders without the consent or sanction of the Central Government and without such sanction, there is also a disability on him to institute any winding up proceedings in a court of law.\n\nIn my opinion, these are rights or privileges which are appurtenant to or flow from the ownership of pro\n\nperty, but by themselves and taken independently, they cannot be reckoned as property capable of being acquired, held or disposed of as is contemplated by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. r do not think that there has been any restriction on the rights of a shareholder to hold, acquire or dispose of his share by reason of the impugned enactment and consequently article 19 (!) (f) of the Constitution is of no assistance to the petitioner. In this view, the other point does not arise for consideration, but I may state here that even if it is conceded for argument's sake that the\n\nChiranjitlal Ohowdhuri\n\nThe Uniori of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers,\n\nA1.ukherja. J.\n\nChiran.jitlal Chawdhur'\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther ii\n\nMukherj('a J,\n\ndisabilities imposed by the impugned legislation amount to restrictions on proprietory right, they may very well be supported as reasonable restraints imposed in the interests of the general public, viz., to secure the supply of a commodity essential to the community and to prevent a serious unemployment amongst a section of the people.\n\nThey are, therefore, protected completely by clause (5) of article 19.\n\nThis disposes of the second point raised by Mr. Chari.\n\nThe next point urged on behalf of the petitioner raises an important question of constitutional law which turns upon the construction of article 14 of the Constitution. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Sholapur Act is a piece of discriminatory legislation which offends against the provision of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 14 guarantees to all persons in the territory of India equality before the law and equal protection of the laws and its entire object, it is said, is to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject of discriminatory legislation.\n\nIt is pointed out that the law in this case has selected one particular company and its shareholders and has taken away from them the right to manage their own affairs, but the same treatment has not been meted out to all other companies or shareholders situated in an identical manner.\n\nArticle 14 of the Constitution, it may be noted, corresponds to the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution which declares that \"no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\" We have been referred in course of the arguments on this point by the learned Counsel on both sides to quite a number of cases decided by the American Supreme\n\nCourt, where questions turning upon the construction of the 'equal protection' clause in the American Consti. tution came up for consideration. A detailed examination of these reports is neither necessary nor profitable for our present purpose but we think we can cull a few general principles from some of the pronouncements of\n\nthe American Judges which might appear to us to be consonant with reason and help us in determining the true meaning and scope of article 14 of our Constitution.\n\nI may state here that so far as the violation of the equality clause in the Constitution is concerned, the petitioner, as a shareholder of the company, has as much right to complain as the company itself, for his complaint is that apart from the discrimination made against the company, the impugned legislation has discriminated against him and the other shareholders of the company as a group vis a-vis the shareholders of all other companies governed by the Indian Companies Act who have not been treated in a similar way. As the discriminatory treatment has been in respect to the sharholders of this company alone, any one of the shareholders, whose interests are thus vitally affected, has a right to complain and it is immaterial that there has been nodiscrimination inter se amongst the shareholders them. selves.\n\nIt must be admitted that the guarantee againstthe denial of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions.\n\nAs has been said by the Supreme Court of America, \"equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws('),\" and this means \"subjection to equal laws applying alike to all in the same situation(').\" In other words, there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same. I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Chari\n\nthat a legislation relating to one individual or one family or one body corporate would per se violate the guarantee of the equal protection rule.\n\nThere can certainly be a law applying to one person or to one group of persons and it cannot be held to be\n\nn) Yt('k Wo v. Hopkins, llA US .1t 269.\n\n(2) Southern Railway Company v. Gr .. ne, 216 U.S. 4QO. 41'.\n\nOhir11.njitlal Chowdhuri\n\n•• Th~ Union of India and\n\nOthers,\n\nMukherja J.\n\nChiran}itlal Chowdhuri\n\nTh6 Un.ion of\n\nIndia anci\n\nOther a.\n\nMukhrjea J,\n\nunconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character('). It would be bad law \"if it arbitrarily selects one individual or a class of individuals, one corporation or a class of corporations and visits a penalty upon them, which is not imposed upon others guilty of like delinquency(').\" The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice in determining and classifying the subject of its laws, and if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, it is normally not obnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection; but the classification should never be arbitrary. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a. reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any substantial basis should be regarded as invalid(').\n\nThe question is whether judged by this test the the impugned Act can be said to have contravened the provision embodied in article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nObviously the Act purports to make provisions which are of a drastic character and against the general law of the land as laid down in the Indian Companies Act, in regard to the administration and management of the affairs of one company in Indian territory. The Act itself gives no reason for the legislation but the Ordinance, which was a precursor of the Act, expressly stated why the legislation was necessary.\n\nIt said that owing to mismanagement and neglect, a situation had arisen in the affairs of the company which prejudicially affected the production of_ an essential commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community. Mr. Chari's contention in substance is that there are various textile companies in India situated in a similar manner as the Sholapurcompany, against which the same charges could be brought and for the control and regulation of which all the reasons that are mentioned in the preamble to the Ordinance\n\nO} Willis ronstitutional Law, p. 5flO. 121Gulf0. &! S. Ti'. R. Co. v. Ellis, 163 U.S. Ito, al 1r9, \\3) Southern Rallway Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 40J. nt 41'2.\n\ncould be applied. Yet, it is said, the legislation has been passed with regard to this one company alone.\n\nThe argument seems plausible at first sight, but on a closer examination I do not think that I can accept it as sound. It must be conceded that the Legislature has a wide discretion in determining the subject matter of its laws. It is an accepted doctrine of the American Courts and which seems to me to be well founded on principle, that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a transgression of constitutional principles. As was said by the Supreme Court of America in Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company('),\n\n\"It must be presumed that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its Ia ws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.\" This being the position, it is for the petitioner to establish facts whicb would prove that the selection of this particular subject by the Legislature is unreasonable and based upon arbitrary grounds. No allegations were made in the petition and no materials were placed before us to show as to whether there are other companies in India which come precisely under the same category as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company and the reasons for imposing control upon the latter as mentioned in the preamble to the Ordinance are applicable to them as well. Mr. Chari argues that these are matters of common knowledge of which we should take judicial notice. I do not think that this is the correct line of approach. It is quite true that the Legislature has, in this instance, proceeded against one company only and its shareholders; but even one corporation or a group of persons can be taken as a class by itself for the purpose of legislation, provided it exhibits some exceptional features which are not possessed by others. The courts should prima f acie\n\n(II 219 U.S. 1.;2, alp. 157,\n\nI !7\n\nOhiranjttlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nChiranjttlal\n\nCkowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nItidia and\n\nOthera.\n\nMukhdrfea J.\n\nlean in favour of constitutionality and should support the legislation if it is possible to do so on any reasonable ground, and it is for the party who attacks the val.idity of the legislation to place all materials before the court which would go to show that the selection is arbitrary and unsupportable.\n\nThrowing out of vague hints that there may be other instances of similar nature is not enough for this purpose. We have not even before us any statement on oath by the petitioner that what has been alleged against this particular company may be said against other companies as well.\n\nIf there was any such statement, the respondents could have placed before us the whole string of events that led up to the passing of this legislation. If we are to take judicial notice of the existence of similar other badly managed companies, we must take notice also of the facts which appear in the parliamentary proceedings in connection with this legislation which have been referred to by my learned brother, Fazl Ali J. in his judgment and which would go to establish that the facts connected with this corporation are indeed exceptional and the discrimination that has been made can be supported on just and reasonable grounds.\n\nI purposely refrain from alluding to these facts or basing my decision thereon as we had no opportunity of investigating them properly during the course of the hearing.\n\nAs matters stand, no proper materials have been placed before us by either side and as I am unable to say that the legislature cannot be supported on any reasonable ground, I think it to be extremely risky to overthrow it on mere suspicion or vague conjectures. If it is possible to imagine or think of cases of other companies where similar or identical conditions might prevail, it is also not impossible to conceive of something\" peculiar\" or \" unusual\" to this corporation which led the legislature to intervene in its affairs. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court of America, '' The Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest\"('). We should\n\n(1) Radice v. Now York, 261 U.S. 291.\n\nbear in mind that a corporation, which is engaged in production of a commodity vitally essential to the community, has a social character of its own, and it must no.t be regarded as the concern primarily or only of those who invest their money in it. If its possibilities are large and it had a prosperous and useful career for a long period of time and is about to collapse not for any economic reason but through sheer perversity of the controlling authority, one cannot say that the legislature has no authority to treat it as a class by itself and make special legislation applicable to it alone in the interests of the community at large. The combina tion of circumstances which are present here may be of such unique character as could not be existing in any other institution. But all these, I must say, are matters which require investigation on proper materials which we have not got before us in the present case.\n\nIn these circumstances I am constrained to hold that the present application must fail on the simple ground that the petitioner made no attempt to discharge the prima facie burden that lay upon him and did not place before us the materials upon which a proper decision on the point could be arrived at. In my opinion, therefore, the attack on the legislation on the gound of the denial of equal protection of law cannot succeed.\n\nThe only other thing that requires to be considered is the argument of Mr. Chari that the law in question is invalid as it is not covered by any of the items . in the legislative list.\n\nIn my opinion, this argument has no substance. What the law has attempted to do is to regulate the affairs of this company by laying down certain special rules for its management and administration. It is fully covered by item No. 43 of the Union List which speaks inter alia of \"incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations.\" The result is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nDAS J.-As I have arrived at a conclusion different from that reached by the majority of this Court, I\n\nChiran.jitlal Chowdhuri ..\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\n,.Wukherjea. J.\n\nDaaJ.\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOth•r1.\n\nDasJ.\n\nconsider it proper, out of my respect for the opinion of my learned colleagues, to state the reasons for my conclusions in some detail.\n\nOn January 9, 1950, the Governor-General of India, acting under section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, promulgated an Ordinance, being Ordinance No. II of 1950, concerning the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, (hereafter referred to as the said company). The preambles and the provisions of the Ordinance have been referred to in the judgment just delivered by Mukherjea J. and need not be recapitulated by me in detail.\n\nSuffice it to say that the net result of the Ordinance was that the managing agents of the said company were dismissed, the directors holding office at the time automatically vacated their office, the Government was authorised to nominate directors, the rights of the shareholders of this company were curtailed in that it was made unlawful for them to nominate or appoint any director, no resolution passed by them could be given effect to without the sanction of the Government and no proceeding for winding up could be taken by them without such sanction, and power was given to the Government to further modify the provisions of the Indian Companies Act in its application to the said company.\n\nOn the very day that the Ordinance was promulgated the Central Government acting under section 15 delegated all its powers to the Government of Bombay.\n\nOn January IO, 1950, the Government of Bombay appointed Respondents Nos. 3 to 7 as the new directors. On March 2, 1950, Respondent No. 5 having resigned, Respondent No. 8 was appointed a director in his place and on the same day Respondent No. 9 was also appointed as a director. In the meantime the new Constitution had come into force on January 26, 1950.\n\nOn February 7, 1950, the new directors passed a resolution sanctioning a call for H.s. SO on the preference shares. Thereupon a suit being Suit No. 438 of 1950 was filed in the High Court of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOH.TS 917\n\nBombay by one Dwarkadas Shrinivas against the new directors challenging the validity of the Ordinance and the right of the new directors to make the call.\n\nBhagwati J. who tried the suit held that the Ordinance was valid and dismissed the suit. An appeal (Appeal No. 48 of 1950) was taken from that decision which was dismissed by a Division Bench (Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar J.) on August 29, 1950. In the meantime, on April 7, 1950, the Ordinance was replaced by Act No. XXVIII of 1950. The Act substantially reproduced the provisions of the Ordinance except that the preambles to the Ordinance were omitted. On May 29, 1950, the present petition was filed by one Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri.\n\nThe petitioner claims to be a shareholder of the said company holding 80 preference shares and 3 ordinary shares. The preference shares, according to him, stand in the name of the Bank of Baroda to whom they are said to have been pledged. As those preference shares are not registered in the name of the petitioner he cannot assert any right as holder of those shares.\n\nAccording to. the respondents, the petitioner appears oil the register as holder of only one fully paid up ordinary share. For the purposes of this application, then, the petitioner's interest in the said company must be taken as limited to only one fully paid up ordinary share. The respondents are the Union of India, the State of Bombay and the new directors besides the company itself. The respondent No. 5 having resigned, he is no longer a director and has been wrongly impleaded as respondent. The reliefs prayed for are that the Ordinance and the Act are itltra vires and void, that the Central Government and the State Government and the directors be restrained from exercising any powers under the Ordinance or the Act, that a writ of mandamus be issued restraining the new directors from exercising any powers under the Ordinance or the Act or from in any manner interfering with the management of the affairs of the company under colour of or in purported exercise of any powers under the said Ordinance or Act.\n\n19~0\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nTha Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.\n\nDaaJ.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOther a.\n\nDas J,\n\nThe validity of the Ordinance and the Act has been challenged before us on the following grounds :-(i) that it was not within the legislative competence-(a) of the Governor-General to promulgate the Ordinance, or (b) of the Parliament to enact the Act, and (ii) that the Ordinance and the Act infringe the fundamental rights of the shareholders as well as those of the said company and are, therefore, void and inoperative under article 13.\n\nRe (i) -The present application has been made by the petitioner under article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nSub-section (1) of that article guarantees the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Sub-section (2) empowers this Court to issue directions or orders or writs, including certain specified writs, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by that Part. It is clear, therefore, that article 32 can only be invoked for the purpose of the enforcement of the fundamental rights. Article 32 does not permit an application merely for the purpose of agitating the competence of the appropriate legislature in passing any particular enactment unless the enactment also infringes any of the fundamental rights. In this case the claim is that the fundamental rights have been infringed and, therefore, the question of legislative competence may also be incidentally raised on this application. It does not appear to me, however, that there is any substance in this point for, in my opinion, entry 33 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and the corresponding entry 43 of the Union List set out in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution clearly support these pieces of legislation as far as the question of legislative competency is concerned. Sections 83A and 83-B of the Indian Companies Act can only be supported as valid on the ground that they regulate the management of companies and are, therefore, within the said entry. Likewise, the provisions of the Ordinance and the Act relating to the appointment of directors by the\n\nGovernment and the curtailment of the shareholders' rights as rega.rds the election of directors, passing of resolutions giving directions with respect to the management of the company and to present a winding up petition are matters touching the management of the company and, as such, within the legislative competence uf the appropriate legislative authority. In my judgment, the Ordinance and the Act cannot be held to be invalid on the ground of legislative incompetency of the authority promulgating or passing the same.\n\nRe (ii)-The fundamental rights said to have been infringed are the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed to every citizen by Article 19(1)(f) and the right to property secured by article 31. In Gapalan' s case (I) I pointed out that the rights conferred by article 19 (1) (a) to (e) and (g) would be available to the citizen until he was, under article 21, .deprived of his life or personal liberty accordin~ to procedure established by law and that the right to property guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) would like. wise continue until the owner was, under article 31, deprived of such property by authority of law. Therefore, it will be necessary to consider first whether the shareholder or the company has been deprived of his or its property by authority of law under Article 31 for, if he or it has been so deprived, then the question of his or its fundamental right under article 19 (1) (f) will not arise .\n\nThe relevant clauses of article 31 run as follows :-\n\n\" 31.\n\n(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.\n\n(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired\n\nIll {19SOJ 8.0, R. 86.\n\nChirartjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthera.\n\nDasJ.\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhu.ri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&,\n\nDas J.\n\nand either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which. and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and . \" given.\n\nArticle 31 protects every person, whether such person is a citizen or not, and it is wide enough to cover a natural person as well as an artificial person. Whether or not, having regard to the language used in article 5, a corporation can be called a citizen and as such entitled to the rights guaranteed under article 19, it is quite clear that the corporation is protected by article 31, for that article protects every \"person\" which expression certainly includes an artificial person.\n\nThe contention of the petitioner is that the Ordinance and the Act have infringed his fundamental right to property as a shareholder in the said company. Article 31, like article 19( I) (f), is concerned with \" property \".\n\nBoth the articles are in the same chapter and deal with fundamental rights.\n\nTherefore, it is reasonable to say that the word\" property\" must be given the same meaning in construing those two articles. What, then, is the meaning of the word \" property\"? It may mean either the bundle of rights which the owner has over or in respect of a thing, tangible or intangible, or it may mean the thing itself over or in respect of which the owner may exercise those rights. It is quite clear that the Ordinance or the Act has not deprived the shareholder of his share itself.\n\nThe share still belongs to the shareholder.\n\nHe is still entitled to the dividend that may be declared. He can deal with or dispose of the share as he pleases.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contends that even if the other meaning of the word \"property\" is adopted, the shareholder has not been deprived of his \" property\" understood in that sense, that is to say he has not been deprived of the entire bundle of rights which put together constitute his \"property\". According to him the\" property\" of the shareholder, besides and apart from his right to elect directors, to pass resolutions giving directions to the directors and to present a winding up petition, consists in his right to participate\n\n- ...... , ..•\n\nin the dividends declared on the profits made by the working of the company and, in case of winding up, to participate in the surplus that may be left after meeting the winding up expenses and paying the creditors.\n\nThose last mentioned rights, he points out, have not been touched at all and the shareholder can yet deal with or dispose of his shares as he pleases and is still entitled to dividends if and when declared. Therefore, concludes the learned Attorney-General, the shareholder cannot complain that he has been deprived of his \"property\", for the totality of his rights have not been taken away. The argument thus formulated appears to me to be somewhat too wide, for it will then permit the legislature to authorise the State to acquire or take possession, without any compensation, of almost the entire rights of the owner leaving to him only a few subsidiary rights.\n\nThis result could not, in my opinion, have been intended by our Constitution.\n\nAs said by Rich J. in the Minister for State for the Army\n\nv. Datziel (1) while dealing with section 31 (XXXI) of the Australian Constitution-\n\n\" Property, in relation to land, is a bundle of rights exercisable with respect to the land. The tenant of an unencumbered estate in fee simple in possession has the largest possible bundle. But there is nothing in the placitum to suggest that the legislature was intended to be at liberty to free itself from the restrictive provisions of the placitum by taking care to seize something short of the whole bundle owned by the person whom it is expropriating.\"\n\nThe learned Judge then concluded as follows at p. 286:-\n\n\"lt would, in my opinion, be wholly inconsistent with the language of the placitum to hold that whilst preventing the legislature from authorising the acquisition of a citizen's full title except upon just terms, it leaves it open to the legislature to seize possession and enjoy the full fruits of possession indefinitely, on any terms it chooses or upon no terms at all.\"·\n\n11). (1943-194,41 68 c.r •. R. 261.\n\nOhiraajitlal Ohowdkuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOtherJJ,\n\nDas J.\n\nChiranjiUal Cf!owdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers.\n\nDasJ.\n\nIn my judgment the question whether the Ordinance or the Act has deprived the shareholder of his \"property\" must depend, for its answer, on whether it has taken away the substantial bulk of the rights constituting his \"property\". In other words, if the rights taken away by the Ordinance or the Act are such as would render the rights left untouched illusory and practically valueless, then there can be no question that in effect and substance the \"property\" of the shareholder has been taken away by the Ordinance or the Act.\n\nJudged by this test can it be said that the right to dispose of the share and the right to receive dividend, if any, or to participate in the surplus in the case of winding up that have been left to the shareholder are illusory or practically valueless, because the right to control the management by directors elected by him, the right to pass resolutions giving directions to the directors and the right to present a winding up petition have, for the time being, been suspended? I think not.\n\nThe right still possessed by the shareholder are the most impor. tant of the rights constituting his \"property\", although certain privileges incidental to the ownership have been put in abeyance for the time being. It is, in my opinion, impossible to say that the Ordinance or the Act has deprived the shareholder of his '' property \" in the sense in which that word is used in article 19 (1) (f) and article 31. The curtailment of the incidental privileges, namely, the right to elect directQrs, to pass resolutions and to apply for winding up may well be supported as a reasonable restraint on the exercise and enjoyment of the shareholder's right of property imposed in the interests of the general public under article 19 (5), namely, to secure the supply of an essential commodity and to prevent unemployment.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner, however, urges that the Ordinance and the Act have infringed the shareholder's right to property in that he has been deprived of his valuable right to elect directors, to give directions by passing resolutions and, in case of apprehension of loss, to present a petition for the winding -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RE!'ORTS 923\n\nup of the company. These rights, it is urged, are by themselves \" pwperty\" and it is of this \" property \" that the shareholder is said to have been deprived by the State under a law which does not provide for payment of compensation and which is, as such, an infraction of the shareholder's fundamental right to property under article 31 (2).\n\nTwo questions arise on this argument. Are these rights \" property\" within the meaning of the two articles I have mentioned?\n\nThese rights, as already stated, are, no doubt, privileges incidental to the ownership of the share which itself is property, but it cannot, in my opinion, be said that these rights, by themselves, and apart from the share are\" property\" within the meaning of those articles, for those articles only regard that as \"property\" which can by itself be acquired, disposed of or taken possession of. The right to vote for the election of directors, the right to pass resolutions and the right to present a petition for winding up are personal rights flowing from the ownership of the share and cannot by themselves and apart from the share be acquired. or disposed of or taken possession of as contemplated by those articles.\n\nThe second question is, assuming that these rights are by themselves \"property\", what is the effect of the Ordinance and the Act on such \"property\". It is nobody's case that the Ordinance or the Act has authorised any acquisition by the State of this \"property\" of the shareholder or that there has in fact been any such acquisition. l The only question then is whether this \"property\" of the shareholder, meaning thereby only the ngh ts mentioned above, has been taken possession of by the State. It will be noticed that by the Ordinance or the Act these particular rights of the shareholder have not been entirely taken away, for he can still exercise these rights subject of course, to the sanction of the Government. Assuming, however, that the fetters placed on tuese rights are tantamount to the taking away of the rights altogetl1er, there is nothing to indicate that the Ordinance or the Act has, after taking away the rights from the shareholder,\n\n!950\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri v.\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers.\n\nDasJ,\n\nOhiranjitlai Ghowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthera.\n\nDas J.\n\nvested them in the State or in any other person named by it so as to enable the State or any other person to exercise those rights of the shareholder. The Government undoubtedly appoints directors under the Act, but such appointment is made in exercise of the the powers vested in the Government by the Ordinance or the Act and not in exercise of the shareholder's right. As already indicated, entry 43 in the Union List authorises Parliament to make laws with respect, amongst other things, to the regulation of trading corporations.\n\nThere was, therefore, nothing to prevent Parliament from amending the Companies Act or from passing a new law regulating the management of the company by providing that the directors, instead of being elected by the shareholders, should be appointed by the Government. The new Jaw has undoubtedly cut down the existing rights of the shareholder and thereby deprived the shareholder of his unfettered right to appoint directors or to pass resolutions giving directions or to present a winding up petition. Such deprivation, however, has not vested the rights in the Government or its nominee. What has happened to the rights of the shareholder is that such rights have been temporarily destroyed or kept in abeyance. The result, therefore, has been that although the share holder has been for the time being deprived of his \"property\", assuming these rights to be \"property\", such \"property\" has not been acquired or taken possession of by the Government. If this be the result brought about by the Ordinance and the Act, do they offend against the fundamental rights guaranteed by article 31 ? Article 31 (1) formulates the fundamental right in a negative form prohibiting the deprivation of property except by authority of law. It implies that a person may be deprived of his property by authority of law. Article 31 (2) prohibits the acquisition or taking possession of property for a public purpose under any Jaw, unless such law provides for payment of compensation. It is suggested that clauses\n\n(1) and (2) of article 31 deal with the same topic, namely, compulsory acquisition or taking possession\n\nof property, clause (2) being only an elaboration of clause (1). There appear to me to be two objections to this suggestion. If that were the correct view, then clause (1) ; must be held to be wholly reduudant and clause (2), by itself, would have been sufficient. In the next place, such a view would exclude deprivation of property otherwise than by acquisition or taking of possession. One can conceive of circumstances where the State may have to deprive a person of his property without acquiring or taking possession of the same.\n\nFor example, in any emergency, in order to prevent a fire spreading, the authorities may have to demolish an intervening building. This deprivation of property is supported in the United States of America as an exercise of \" police power\". This deprivation of property is different from acq llisition or taking of possession of property which goes by the name of \" eminent domain \" in the American Law. The construction suggested implies that our Constitution has dealt with only the law of \"eminent domain \", but has not provided for deprivation of property in exercise of' 'police powers\". I am not prepared to adopt such construction, for I do not feel pressed to do so by the language used in article 31. On the contrary, the language of clause ( 1) of article 31 is wider than that of clause (2), for deprivation of property may well be brought about otherwise than by acquiring or taking possession of it.\n\nI think clause (_ 1) enunciates the general principle that no person shall be deprived of his property except by authority of law, which, put in a positive form, implies that a person may be deprived of his property, provided he is so deprived by authority of law.\n\nNo question of compensation arises under clause (1).\n\nThe effect of clause (2) is that only certain kinds of deprivation of property, namely those brought about by acquisition or taking possession of it, will not be permissible under any law, unless such law provides for payment of compensation. If the deprivation of property is brought about by means other than acquisition or taking possession of it, no compensation is required, provided that such deprivation is by\n\nChiranjitlal GhowdhurS\n\nThe Uniott of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthera,\n\nDa.oJ.\n\nChiran.iitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nTh~ Union of\n\nIndiaand\n\nOthers.\n\nDas J.\n\nauthority of law.\n\nIn this case, as already stated, although the shareholder has been deprived of certain rights, such deprivation has been by authority of law passed by a competent legislative authority. This deprivation having been brought about otherwise than by acquisition or taking possession of such rights, no question of compensation can arise and, therefore, there can be no question of the infraction of fundamental rights under article 31 (2). It is clear, therefore, that so far as the shareholder is concerned there has been no infringement of his fundamental rights under article 19 (lJ (f) or article 31, and the shareholder cannot question the constitutionality of the Ordinance or the Act on this ground.\n\nAs regards the company it is contended that the Ordinance and the Act by empowering the State to dismiss the managing agent, to discharge the directors elected by the shareholders and to appoint new directors have in effect authorised the State to take possession of the undertaking and assets of the company through the new directors appointed by it without paying any compensation and, therefore, such law is repugnant to article 31 (2) of our Constitution. It is, however, urged by the learned Attorney-General that the mills and all other assets now in the possession and custody of the new directors who are only servants or agents of the said company are, in the eye of the law, in the possession and custody of the company and have not really been taken possession of by the State. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that in order that the possession of the servant or agent may be juridically regarded as the possession of the master or principal, the servant or agent must be obedient to, and amenable to the directions of, the master or principal. If the master or principal has no hand in the appointment of the servant or agent or has no control over him or has no power to dismiss or discharge him, as in this case, the possession of such servant or agent can hardly, in law, be regarded as the possession of the company(l).\n\nIn this view of the\n\n\\11 81:Jt:1 E.lemeutil ofL<1.w by Markby, 6th Editioo, Pa.ra. 071, p, 192.\n\nmatter there is great force in the argument that the property of the company has been taken possession of by the State through directors who have been appointed by the State in exercise oi the powers conferred by the Ordinance and the Act and who are under the direction and control of the State and this has been done without payment of any compensation. The appropriate legislative authority was no doubt induced to enact this law, because, as the preamble to the Ordinance stated, on account of mismanagement and neglect, a situation had arisen in the affairs of the company which had prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and had caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the com. ruunity, but, as stated by Holmes]. in Pennsylvania\n\nCoal Company v. Mahon('), \"A strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.\" Here, therefore, it may well be argued that the property of the company having been taken possession of by the\n\nState in exercise of powers conferred by a law which does not provide for payment of any compensation, the fundamental right of the company has, in the eye of the law, been infringed.\n\nIf the fundamental right of the company has been infringed, at all, who can complain about such infringement ? Prima f acie the company would be the proper person to come forward in vindication of its own rights.\n\nIt is said that the directors having been dismissed, the company cannot act.\n\nThis, however, is a misapprehension, for if the Act be void on account of its being unconstitutional, the directors appointed by the shareholders have never in law been discharged and are still in the eye of the law the directors of the company, and there was nothing to prevent them from taking proceedings in the name of the company at their own risk as to costs. Seeing that the directors have not come forward to make the application on behalf of the company and in its name the question arises whether\n\n(!) l60 u, s. 393 •\n\nOhiranjitlal Chowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nTtid1a and\n\nOthers.\n\nDas J.\n\nan individual shareholder can complain. It is well settled in the United States that no one but those Ohiranjit!al whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise Chowdhuri\n\nv. the question of the constitutionality of that law.\n\nTho Union of Thus in McCabe v.\n\nAtchison(') which arose out India and of a suit filed by five Negros against five Railway Others, Companies to restrain them from making any distinction\n\nDas J, in service on account of race pursuant to an Oklahoma Act known as \"The Separate Coach Law,\" in upholding the dismissal of the suit Hughes ]. observed :-\n\n\" It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainants' need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear.\n\nThe complaint cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt.\n\nNor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the same race or (occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of \\ injury to the complainant - not to others -which\n\nUustifies judicial interference.\"\n\nIn that case there was no allegation that anyone of the plaintiffs had ever travelled on anyone of the rail roads or had requested any accommodation in any of the sleeping cars or that such request was refused.\n\nThe same principle was laid down in ] effrey M anuf acturing Company v. Blagg('), Hendrick v. Maryland(') and Newark Natural Gas and Fuel Company\n\nv. The City of Newark('). In each of these cases the\n\nCourt declined to permit the person raising the ques- ) tion of constitutionality to do so on the ground that his ')rights were not directly affected by the law or Ordinance \\.in question. On the other hand, in Truax v. Raich(') and in Buchanan v. W arley(6) the Court allowed the plea because in both the cases the person raising it was directly affected.\n\nIn the first of the two last mentioned cases an Arizona Act of 1914 requiring employers employing more than five workers to employ not less than eighty per cent. native born citizens was\n\n(1) 235 U.S. In!.\n\n(2) 235 U.S. 571. 13! 23.5 us. 610.\n\n(4) 241 U.S. 403.\n\n15) ng U.S. ~3. \\6) 245 u.s. 60.\n\nv--\n\n1950 challenged by an alien who had been employed as a cook in a restaurant. That statute made a violation f h A b 1 h bl Th f Ohi,.anjitlaZ o t e ct y an emp ayer pums a e. e act that Chowdhuri the employment was at will or that the employer and v. not the employee was subject to prosecution did not The Union of prevent the employee from raising the question of Ind;• and constitutionality because the statute, if enforced, would Others. compel the employer to discharge the employee and, therefore, the employee was directly affected by the statute. In the second of the two last mentioned cases a city Ordinance prevented the occupation of a plot by a coloured person in a block where a majority of the residences were occupied by white persons. A white man sold his property in such a block to a Negro under a contract which provided that the purchaser should not be required to accept a deed unless he would have a right, under the laws of the city, to occupy the same as a residence. The vendor sued for specific performance and contended that the Ordinance was unconstitutional. Although the alleged denial of constitutional rights involved only the rights of coloured persons and the vendor was a white person yet it was held that the vendor was directly affected, because the\n\nCourts below, in view of the Ordinance, declined to enforce his contract and thereby directly affected his right to sell his property. It is, therefore, clear that ...... the constitutional validity of a law can be challenged only by a person whose interest is directly affected by the law.\n\nThe question then arises whether the infringement of the company's rights so directly affects its sha; holders as to entitle any of its shareholders to question the constitutional validity of the law infringing the company's rights. The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of the United States in Darnell v. The State of Indiana(').\n\nIn that case the owner of a share in a Tennessee corporation was not allowed to complain that an Indiana law discriminated against Tennessee corporations in that it did not make any allowance, as it did in the case of Indiana corporations, where the corporation\n\nIll 226 U.S. 388. 119\n\nDas J.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs.\n\nDas J.\n\nhad property taxed within the State. This is in accord with the well established legal principle that a corporation is a legal entity capa.ble of holding property and of suing or being sued and the corporators are not, in contemplation of law, the owners of the assets of the corporation. In all the cases referred to above the question of constitutionality was raised in connection with the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Federal Constitution. If such be the requirements of law in connection with the equal protection clause which corresponds to our article 14, it appears to me to follow that only a person who is the owner of the property can raise the question of constitutionality under article 31 of a law by which he is so deprived of his property. If direct interest is necessary to permit a person to raise the question of constitutionality under article 14, a direct interest in the property will, I apprehend, be necessary to entitle a person to challenge a law which is said to infringe the right to that property under article 31.\n\nIn my opinion, although a shareholder may, in a sense, be interested to see that the company of which he is a shareholder is not deprived of its property he cannot, as held in Darnell v. Indiana('), be heard to complain, in his own name and on his own behalf, of the infringement of the fundamental right to property of the company, for, in law, his own right to property has not been infringed as he is not the owner of the company's properties. An interest in the company owning an undertaking is not an interest in the undertaking itself.\n\nThe interest in the company which owns an undertaking is the \"property\" of the shareholder under article 31 (2), but the undertaking is the property of the company and not that of the shareholder and the latter cannot be said to have a direct interest in the property of the company. This is the inevitable result of attributin~ a legal personality to a corporation.\n\nThe proceedings for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus appear to be somewhat different for the\n\n(1) ~26 U.S. 888,\n\nrules governing those proceedings permit, besides the person imprisoned, any person, provided he is not an utter stranger, but is at least a friend or relation of the imprisoned person, to apply for that particular writ.\n\nBut that special rule does not appear to be applicable to the other writs which re_q_uirt;_a direct and tangible interest in the app!icanl_ to port his application.\n\nThis must also be the case where the applicantseeks to raise the question of the constitutionality of a law under articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\nFor the reasons set out above the present petitioner cannot raise the question of constitutionality of the impugned law under article 31.\n\nHe cannot complain of any infringement of his own rights as a shareholder, because his \" property \" has not been acquired or taken possession of by the State although he has been deprived of his right to vote and to present a winding up petition by authority of law. Nor can he complain of an infringement of the company's right to property because he is not, in the eye of law, the owner ot the property in question and accordingly not directly interested in it. In certain exceptional cases where the company's property is injured by outsiders, a shareholder may, under the English law, after making all endeavours to induce the persons in charge of the affairs of the company to take steps, file a suit on behalf of himself and other shareholders for redressing the wrong done to the company, but that principle does not apply here for this is nut a suit, nor has lt been shown that any attempt was made by the petitioner to induce the old directors to take steps nor do these proceedings purport to have been taken by the petitioner on behalf of himself and the other shareholders of the.company.\n\nThe only other ground on which the Ordinance and the Act have been challenged is that they infringe the the fundamental rights guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. 'Equal protection of the laws\", as observed by Day J. in Southern Railway Company v.\n\nGreene ll), \"means subjection to equal laws, applying\n\n\\1) 216 U.S. 400.\n\nCh.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri\n\nTkiJ Union of\n\nIr.dia and\n\nOthers.\n\nDasJ.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthrs.\n\nDasJ.\n\nalike to all in the same situation\". The inhibition of the article that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws was designed to protect all persons against legislative discrimination amongst equals and to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. It does not, however, mean that every law must have universal application, for all persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, in the same position. The varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment and it is, therefore, established by judicial decisions that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution does not take away from the State the power to classify persons for legislative purposes. This classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. If law deals equally with all of a certain well-defined class it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of a denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other per, ons, for the class for whom the law has been made is different from other persons and, therefore, there is no discrimination amongst equals. It is plain that every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, but mere production of inequality is not by itself enough.\n\nThe inequality produced, in order to encounter the challenge of the Constitution, must be \" actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.\" Said Day J. in Southern Railway Company v. Greene(') :-\"While reasonable classification is permitted, without doing violence to the equal protection of the laws, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which such classification is imposed; and the classification cannot be arbitrarily made without any substantial basis.\n\nArbitrary selection, it has been said, cannot be justified by calling it classification\". Quite conceivably there may be a law\n\nrelating to a single individual if it is made apparent that, on account of some special reasons applicable only to him and inapplicable to anyone else, that single individual is a class by himself. In lvfiddleton v. Texas Power and Light Company(1) it was pointed out that there was a strong pre sum ption that a legislature understood and correctly appreciated the needs of its own people, that its laws were directed to problems made manifest by experience and that the discriminations were based upon adequate grounds. It was also pointed out in that case that the burden was upon him who attacked a law for unconstitutionality.\n\nIn Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company(') it was also said that one who assailed the classification made in a law must carry the burden of showing that it did not rest upon any reasonable basis but was essentially arbitrary.\n\nIf there is a classification, the Court will not hold it invalid merely because the law might have been extended to other persons who in some respects might resemble the class for which the law was made, for the legislature is the best judge of the needs of the particular classes and to estimate the degree of evil so as to adjust its legislation according to the exigency found to exist. If, however, there is, on the face of the statute, no classification at all or none on the basis of any apparent difference specially peculiar to any particular indivi- C.ual or class and not applicable to any other person or class of persons and yet the law hits only the particular individual or class it is nothing but an attempt to arbitrarily single out an individual or class for discriminating and hostile legislation. The presumption in favour of the legislature cannot in such a case be legitimately stretched so as to throw the impossible onus on the complainant to prove affirmatively that there are other individuals or class of individuals who also possess the precise amount of the identical qualities which are attributed to him so as to form a class with him. As pointed out by Brewer Jin the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe' Railway v. W. H. Ellis ('), while good faith\n\n(I/ 249 U.S. 152.\n\n(2) 220 U.S. 61.\n\n131 165 U.S .. 1501\n\nOhiranjitlal Chowdkuri\n\nTh~ Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nDaaJ.\n\nChiranjitla.l Chowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndill and\n\nOthrs,\n\nDa3.T.\n\nand a knowledge of existing conditions on the part of a legislature was to be presumed, yet to carry that presumption to the extent 0f always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation was to make the protecting clause a mere rope of sand, in no manner restraining State action.\n\nThe complaint of the petitioner on this head is formulated in paragraph 8 (iii) of the petition as follows :-\"The Ordinance denied to the company and its shareholders equality before the law and equal protection of the laws and was thus a violation of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe power to make regulations relating to trading corporations or the control or production of industries was a power which consistently with article 14 could be exercised only generally or with reference to a class and not with reference to a single company or to shareholders of a single company.\" The Act is also challenged on the same ground in paragraph ::1 of the petition.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contends that the petitioner as an individual shareholder cannot complain of discrimination against the company. It will be noticed that it is not a case of a shareholder complaining only about discrimination against the company or fighting the battle of the company but it is a case of a shareholder complaining of discrimination against himself and other shareholders of this company. It is true that there is no complaint of discrimination inter se the shareholders of this company but the complaint is that the shareholders of this company, taken as a unit, have been discriminated vis-a-vis the shareholders of other companies. Therefore, the question as to the right of the shareholder to question the validity of a law infringing the right of the company does not aiise.\n\nHere the shareholder is complaining of the infringement of his own rights and if such infringement can be established I see no reason why the shareholder cannot come within article 32 to vindicate his own rights.\n\nThe fact that these proceedings have been taken by\n\n1950 one single shareholder holding only one single fully paid up share does not appear to me to make any the Ohiranjitlal least difference in principle. If this petitioner has, by Chowdhuri the Ordinance or the Act, been di, criminated against and denied equal protection of the law, his fundamental right has been infringed and his right to approach this Court for redress cannot be made dependent on the readiness or willingness of other shareholders whose rights have also been infringed to join him in these p:oceedings or of the company to take substantive proceedings. To take an example, if any law discrimiv.\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia'and\n\nOth,, ra,\n\nnates against a class, say the Punjabis, any Punjabi may question the constitutionality uf the law, without joining the whole Punjabi community or without acting on behalf of all the Punjabis. To insist on his doing so will be to put a fetter on his fundamental right under article 02 which the Constitution has not imposed on him. Similarly, if any Jaw deprives a particular shareholder or the shareholders of a particular company of the ordina.ry rights of shareholders under the general law for reasons not particularly and specially applicable to him or them but also applicable to other shareholders of other companies, such law surely offends against article 14 and any one so denied the equal protection of law may legitimately complain of the infringement of his fundamental right and is entitled as of right to approach this Court under article 32 to enforce his own fundamental right under article 14, irrespective of whether any other person joins him or not.\n\nTo the charge of denial of equal protection of the laws the respondents in the affidavit of Sri Vithal N. Chandavarkar filed in opposition to the petition make the following reply :-\"With reference to paragraph 6 of the petition, I deny the soundness of the submissions that on or from the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution of India came into force the said Ordinance became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution or that the provisions thereof were inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the said Constitution or for any of the other grounds mentioned in paragraph 8\n\nDas J.\n\nL \"\"\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOkowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nDas J.\n\nof the said petition.\" In the whole of the affidavit in opposition there is no suggestion as to why the pro. mulgation of the Ordinance or the passing of the Act was considered necessary at all or on what principle or basis either of them was founded.\n\nNo attempt has been made in the affidavit to show that the Ordinance or the Act was based upon any principle of classification at all or even that the particular company and its shareholders possess any special qualities which are not to be found in other companies and their shareholders and which, therefore, render this particular company and its shareholders a class by themselves.\n\nNeither the affidavit in opposition nor the learned Attorney-General in course of his arguments referred to the statement of the objects and reasons for introducing the bill which was eventually enacted or the Parliamentary debates as showing the reason why and under what circumstances this Jaw was made and, therefore, apart from the question of their admissibility in evidence, the petitioner has had no opportunity to deal with or rebut them and the same cannot be used against him.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General takes his stand on the presumption that the law was founded on a valid basis of classification, that its discriminations were based upon adequate grounds and that the law was passed for safeguarding the needs of the people and that, therefore, the onus was upon the petitioner to allege and prove that the classification which he challenged did not rest upon any reasonable basis but was essentially arbitrary. I have already said that if on the face of the law there is no classification at all or, at any rate, none on the basis of any apparent difference specially peculiar to the individual or class affected by the law, it is only an instance of an arbitrary selection of an individual or class for discriminating and hostile legislation and, therefore, no presumption can, in such circumstances, arise at all. Assuming, however, that even in such a case the onus is thrown on the complainant, there can be nothing to prevent hiin from proving, if l)e can, from the text of the law itself, that\n\nit is \"actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary\" and thereby discharging the initial onus.\n\nThe Act is intituled an Act to make special provision for the proper management and administration of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited.\" There is not even a single preamble alleging that the company was being mismanaged at all or that any special reason existed which made it expedient to enact this law. The Act, on its face, does not purport to make any classification at all or to specify any special vice to which this particular company and its shareholders are subject and which is not to be found in other companies and their shareholders so as to justify any special treatment. Therefore, this Act, ex Jacie, is nothing but an arbitrary selection of this particular company and its shareholders for discriminating and hostile treatment and read by itself is palpably an infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General promptly takes us to the preambles to the Ordinance which has been replaced by the Act and suggests that the Act is based on the same considerations on which the Ordinance was promulgated. Assuming that it is right and permissible to refer to and utilise the preambles, do they alter the situation? The preambles were as follows:-\n\n\"Whereas on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and has caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community ; And whereas an emergency has ariseri which renders it necessary to make special provision for the proper management and administration of the aforesaid company;-\" The above preambles quite clearly indicate that the justification of the Ordinance rested on mismanagement and neglect producing certain results therein specified. It will be noticed that apart from . these preambles there is no material whatever before us establishing or even swgesting that this company p.nd its shareliolders have in fact been guilty of any\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nDas J,\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.\n\nDas J.\n\nmismanagement or neglect. Be that as it may, the only reason put forward for the promulgation of the Ordinance was mismanagement resulting in falling off of production and in producing unemployment.\n\nI do not find it necessary to say that mismanagement and neglect in conducting the affairs of corn panies can never be a criterion or basis of classification for legislative purposes.\n\nI shall assume that it is permissible to make a law whereby all delinquent companies and their shareholders may be brought to book and all companies mismanaging their affairs and the shareholders of such companies may, in the interest of the general public, be deprived of their right to manage the affairs of their companies. Such a classification made by a law would bear a reasonable relation to the conduct of all delinquent companies and shareholders and may, therefore, create no inequality, for the delinquent companies and their shareholders from a separate class and cannot claim equality of treatment with good companies and their shareholders who are their betters.\n\nBut a distinction cannot be made between the delinquent companies inter se or between shareholders of equal! y delinquent companies and one set cannot be punished for its delinquency while another set is permitted to continue, or become, in like manner, delinquent without any punishment unless there be some other apparent difference in their respective obligations and unless there be some cogent reason why prevention of mismanagement is more imperative in one instance than in the other. To do so will be nothing but an arbitrary selection which can nev.er be justified as a permissible classiffication.\n\nI am not saying that this particular company and its shareholders may not be guilty of mismanagement and negligence which has brought about serious fall in production of an essential commodity and also considerable unemployment. But if mismanagement affecting production and resulting in unemployment is to be the basis of a classification for making a law for preventing mismanagement and securing production and employment, the law must embrace within its\n\nambit all companies which now are or may hereafter become subject to the vice. This basis of classification, by its very nature, cannot be exclusively applicable to any particular company and its shareholders but is capable of wider application and, therefore, the Jaw founded on that basis must also be wide enough so as to be capable of being applicable to whoever may happen at any time to fall within that classification.\n\nMismanagement affecting production can never be reserved as a special attribute peculiar to a particular company or the shareholders of a particular company.\n\nIt it were permissible for the legislature to single out an individual or class and to punish him or it for some delinquency which may equally be found in other individuals or classes and to lea v.e out the other mdividuals or classes from the ambit of the law the prohibition of the denial of equal protection of the laws would only be a meaningless and barren form of words.\n\nThe argument that the presumption being in favour of the legislature, the onus is on the petitioner to show there are other individuals or companies equally guilty of mismanagement prejudicially affecting the production of an essential commodity and causing serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community does not, in such circumstances, arise, for the simple reason that here there has been no classification at all and, in any case, the basis of classification by its very nature is much wider and cannot, in it .application, be limited only to this company and its shareholders and, that being so, there is no reason to throw on the petitioner the almost impossible burden of proving that there are other companies which are in fact precisely and in all particulars similarly situated. In any event, the petitioner, in my opinion, may well claim to have discharged the onus of showing that this company and its shareholders have been singled out for discriminating treatment by showing that the Act, on the face of it, has adopted a basis of classification which, by its very nature, cannot be exclusively applicable to this company and its shareholders but which may be equally applicable to other companies\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nChowdhuri v.\n\nThe U1iion of India and\n\nOthers.\n\nDasJ.\n\nOhiranjitzaZ\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthtJTS.\n\nDasJ.\n\nDec. 14,\n\nand their shareholders and has penalised this particular company and its shareholders, leaving out other companies and their shareholders who may be equally guilty of the alleged vice of mismanagement and neglect of the type referred to in the preambles. In my opinion the legislation in question infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner and offends against article 14 of our Constitution.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this petition ought to succeed and the petitioner should have an order m terms of prayer (3) of the petition with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed .\n\nAgent for the.petitioner: M. S. K. Aiyengar .\n\nAgent for opposite party Nos. 1 & 2: P.A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for opposite party Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 to 10:\n\nRajinder Narain.\n\nJ ANARDAN REDDY AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SA!YID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 134, 136, 374(4)-Special leave to appeal-Judgment of Hyderabad High Court passed before !16th Jan.\n\n1950-Application for special leave-1'.faintainability-Pendency of application for leave to appeal to Judicial Committee of Hyikrabad when new constitution came into force, effect of-Scope of Art. 136- \" Any court or tribunal in the territory of India \"-Interpretation of •tatute.-Presumption of prospective operation--Right to appeal.\n\nThe petitioners, who v.ere convicted and sentenced to death by a special tribunal in the Hyderabad State, preferred appeals to the High Court of Hyderabad which were dismissed, and they applied to the.High Court on the 21st Jan., 1950, for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad against the judgments of the High Court. On the 26th Jan., 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and under the Constitution, Hyderabad became a part of India, the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before that", "total_entities": 416, "entities": [{"text": "CHIRANJIT LAL CHOWDHURI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 130, "source": 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fundamental rights goaran teed by Arts.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Arts. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2776, "end_char": 2784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2856, "end_char": 2863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2936, "end_char": 2941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-\n\n(i) that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioner under Art.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2948, "end_char": 2956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-\n\n(i) that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioner under Art.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2958, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-\n\n(i) that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioner under Art.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3869, "end_char": 3876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution 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(", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5362, "end_char": 5369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRIJ.-As", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5376, "end_char": 5397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per PATANJALI SASTRIJ.-As the impugned Act plainly denied to the shareholders of this particular company the protections of the law relating to incorporated Joint Stock Companies as embodied in the Indian Comp•nies Act, it wu.s prima facie within\n\nthe inhibition of Art.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRIJ.-As"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6909, "end_char": 6916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7135, "end_char": 7142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of\n\nInd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8809, "end_char": 8822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event, the petitioner,\n\nChiranjitfal\n\nChawdhurt\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd<ia and\n\nOther a,\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhiu~\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd-ia and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Union of\n\nInd-ia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8870, "end_char": 8886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event, the petitioner,\n\nChiranjitfal\n\nChawdhurt\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd<ia and\n\nOther a,\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhiu~\n\nThe Union of\n\nInd-ia and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9741, "end_char": 9748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9866, "end_char": 9873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MUKRERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MUKRERJEA J .-The fundamental rights guamnteed by the Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens but to corpol'ate bo:lies as well except where tho language of the provision or the nature of the right compels the inference that they are applicable only to natural persons.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10298, "end_char": 10311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An incorporated company, therefore, can come up to the Supreme Court for enforcement ol its fundamental rights and so may the individual shareholders to enforce their own; but as the company and its shareholilers are in law separate entities, it \\Yould not b9 open to an individual shareholder to complain of a law which affects the fundamental right of the company except to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his own rights as well."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10799, "end_char": 10809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11354, "end_char": 11361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11688, "end_char": 11695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12054, "end_char": 12059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 873\n\nThe guarantee against the denial of equal protection or the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12322, "end_char": 12329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12435, "end_char": 12442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13110, "end_char": 13120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13129, "end_char": 13136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14050, "end_char": 14057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14070, "end_char": 14077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14232, "end_char": 14239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14276, "end_char": 14283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MOKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14504, "end_char": 14513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL ALI, MOKHERJEA and DAS JJ.-Except in the matter of writs in the nature of h'beas corpils no one but those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of the constitutionality of • law and claim relief under Art.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14729, "end_char": 14736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "OhowdhuTi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14826, "end_char": 14835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nll~\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nOhowdhuTi\n\nv. '1.'he Union Of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&."}}, {"text": "Union Of\n\nIndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14847, "end_char": 14862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nll~\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nOhowdhuTi\n\nv. 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K. T. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16672, "end_char": 16686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, ]."}}, {"text": "S. Dawdo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16691, "end_char": 16699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Dawdo, Alladi Kuppuswami, and C. R. Pattabhi Raman, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Alladi Kuppuswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16701, "end_char": 16718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Dawdo, Alladi Kuppuswami, and C. R. Pattabhi Raman, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "C. R. Pattabhi Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Dawdo, Alladi Kuppuswami, and C. R. Pattabhi Raman, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16767, "end_char": 16781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16811, "end_char": 16823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi with him) for opposite party Nos.", "canonical_name": "G. N.\n\nJoshi"}}, {"text": "G.N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16868, "end_char": 16878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.N. Joshi, for opposite party Nos.", "canonical_name": "G. N.\n\nJoshi"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16986, "end_char": 16991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania a. J.\n\nKANIA C.J .-This is an application by the holder of one ordinary share of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under article 32 of the Constitution of India.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17077, "end_char": 17119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania a. J.\n\nKANIA C.J .-This is an application by the holder of one ordinary share of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under article 32 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17175, "end_char": 17185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17193, "end_char": 17214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17434, "end_char": 17443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have read the judgment prepared by Mr. Justice Mukherjea.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "articles 31 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17534, "end_char": 17552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17560, "end_char": 17581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17715, "end_char": 17725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18135, "end_char": 18145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18153, "end_char": 18174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18261, "end_char": 18271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18503, "end_char": 18586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18619, "end_char": 18629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act", "statute": "Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act"}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18755, "end_char": 18762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au J.-I am strongly of the opinion that this petition should be dismissed with costs.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18992, "end_char": 18998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts urged in the petition and the points raised on behalf of the petitioner before us are fully set forth in the judgments of my brethren, Sastri, Mukherjea and Das JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Sastri"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19014, "end_char": 19017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts urged in the petition and the points raised on behalf of the petitioner before us are fully set forth in the judgments of my brethren, Sastri, Mukherjea and Das JJ.,", "canonical_name": "DAS JJ."}}, {"text": "union of\n\nIndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19383, "end_char": 19398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XX VIII of 1950), which will hereinafter be referred to as \"the Act\", has been assailed, is that it infringes three fundamental rights, these being:-\n\nOhiranjttlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Fael Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19426, "end_char": 19434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nFael Ali J,\n\n!", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19563, "end_char": 19573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act", "statute": "Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19686, "end_char": 19696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19772, "end_char": 19782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20032, "end_char": 20038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle has been very clearly stated by Hughes J. in McCabe v. Atchison('), in these words :-\"It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear.", "canonical_name": "Hughes"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20989, "end_char": 20999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21341, "end_char": 21359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21611, "end_char": 21617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21763, "end_char": 21773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21950, "end_char": 21974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This article corresponds to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which declares that \"no\n\nState shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws\"."}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22101, "end_char": 22107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Professor Willis dealing with this clause sums up the law as prevailing in the United States in regard to it in these words:-\n\n\"Meaning and effect of the guaranty-The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22170, "end_char": 22183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Professor Willis dealing with this clause sums up the law as prevailing in the United States in regard to it in these words:-\n\n\"Meaning and effect of the guaranty-The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24123, "end_char": 24133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "\\Villis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24310, "end_char": 24317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that article 14 provides one of the most valuable and important guarantees in the Constitution which should not be allowed to be whittled down, and, while accepting the statement of Professor \\Villis as a correct exposition of the principles underlying this guarantee, I wish to lay particular emphasis on the principle enunciated by him that any classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed."}}, {"text": "Sholapur company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24772, "end_char": 24788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's case is that the shareholders of the Sholapur company have been subjected to discrimination vis a vis the shareholders of other companies, inasmuch as section 13 of the Act subjects them to the following disabilities which the shareholders of other companies governed by the Indian Companies Act are not subject to : -\n\n\" (a) It shall not be lawful for the shareholders of the company or any other person to nominate or appoint any person to be a director of the company."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24886, "end_char": 24896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25017, "end_char": 25030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sholapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26998, "end_char": 27006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The onus is therefore on the petitioner to show that the legislation which is impugned is arbitrary and unreasonable and there are other companies in the country which should have been subjected to the same disabilities, because the reasons which led the Legislature to impose State control upon the Sholapur\n\ncompany are equally applicable to them."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27058, "end_char": 27068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28005, "end_char": 28008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J.\n\nChiranjitlai Chawdhuri v.\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia an.cl\n\nOther a.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nAct, where the circumstances which necessitated it are clearly set out."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28649, "end_char": 28655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference to the Parliamentary proceedings shows that some time ago, a representation was made on behalf of a section of the shareholders of the Sholapur company to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies in Bombay, against the conduct of the managing agents, and the Government of Bombay was moved to order a special inquiry into the affairs of the company."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28878, "end_char": 28895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purpose of this inquiry, two special inspectors were appointed by the Bombay Government and their report revealed \"certain astounding facts\" and showed that the mill had been grossly mismanaged by the Board of Directors and the managing agents."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29443, "end_char": 29462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the Government of India was approached by the Provincial Government and requested to take special action in order to secure the early opening of the mill."}}, {"text": "Controller appointed under the Essential Supplies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29798, "end_char": 29851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sholapur mill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31108, "end_char": 31121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Minister for Industry, who sponsored the Bill, in explaining what distingnished the case of the Sholapur mill from the other mills against whom there might be charges of mismanagement, made it clear iu the course of the debate that \"certain conditions had to be fulfilled before the Government can and should intervene\", and he set out these conditions as follows :-\n\n\" (1) The undertaking must relate to an industry which is of national importance."}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal Chowdhi•ri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32220, "end_char": 32243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The enquiry should show that\n\n\\lS\n\nChiranjitlal Chowdhi•ri\n\nThe Unio11 of India and\n\nOthrs.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32292, "end_char": 32314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fa1:l Ali J.\n\nChiranjitlal Chowdhuri\n\nTh~ Un.ion of\n\nIndia and\n\nOt/er!.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Asia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32582, "end_char": 32586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the same proceedings that the Sholapur mill is one of the largest mills in Asia and employs 13,000 workers."}}, {"text": "29th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32779, "end_char": 32796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was working two shifts when it was closed down on the 29th August, 1949."}}, {"text": "Chiranjit1al Chowdhurt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36457, "end_char": 36479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27,\n\n19CO\n\nChiranjit1al Chowdhurt\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOther a.\n\nFa•l .Iii J.\n\nChirn.njitlai Chowdhurt\n\nv, Ths Uoiion.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36485, "end_char": 36499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27,\n\n19CO\n\nChiranjit1al Chowdhurt\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOther a.\n\nFa•l .Iii J.\n\nChirn.njitlai Chowdhurt\n\nv, Ths Uoiion.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "FIUl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36592, "end_char": 36600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India and\n\nOthsra,\n\nFIUl Ali J.\n\nproof it must be shown that there is no reasonable basis for the classification.\"(')"}}, {"text": "Sholapur Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36760, "end_char": 36776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this particular case, the Government initially took control of the Sholapur Company by means of an Ordinance (Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36966, "end_char": 37012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II of 1950), of which the preamble runs as follows:-\n\n\".Whereas on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential commocjity and has caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community; And whereas an emergency has arisen which renders it necessary to make special provision for the proper management and administration of the aforesaid Company; Now, therefore, ........................ \" In the course of the Parliamentary debate, reference was made to the fact that the country was facing an acute cloth shortage, and one of the reasons which apparently influenced the promulgation of the Ordinance and the passing of the Act was that the mismanagement of the company had gravely affected the production of an essential commodity."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38137, "end_char": 38147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39239, "end_char": 39249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, Sholapur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39403, "end_char": 39459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, Sholapur, in the State of Bombay, (hereinafter referred to as\n\n\"the Company\")."}}, {"text": "Bank of Baroda Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39943, "end_char": 39962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, the petitioner held one ordinary share in his own name and 80 preference shares which, however, having been pledged with the Bank of Baroda Ltd., now stand registered in the Bank's name."}}, {"text": "9th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40346, "end_char": 40363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the Governor-General intervened by p110mulgating on the 9th January, 1950, an Ordinance called the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance (No."}}, {"text": "Fad Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40585, "end_char": 40592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fad Ali J,\n\nPatanfa.ti\n\nBastri J,\n\nOhira>i;'itlal Chow, lhu.ri\n\nThe U•ii'ln of\n\nIndia a-id\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "Sastrt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40699, "end_char": 40705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patri.njali\n\nSastrt J.\n\ntake over the control and management of the company and its properties and effects by appointing their own Directors and to delegate all or any of their powers to the Provincial Government.", "canonical_name": "Sastri"}}, {"text": "10th April,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41124, "end_char": 41141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on 10th April,\n\n1950, the Ordinance was repealed and was replaced by an Act of Parliament containing similar provisions, namely the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company\n\n(Emergency Provisions) Act (No."}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41555, "end_char": 41577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41836, "end_char": 41850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He accordingly seeks relief by way of injunction and mandamus against the Union of India and the State of Bombay impleaded as respondents 1 and 2 respective.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41859, "end_char": 41874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He accordingly seeks relief by way of injunction and mandamus against the Union of India and the State of Bombay impleaded as respondents 1 and 2 respective."}}, {"text": "Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42432, "end_char": 42469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preamble to the repealed Ordinance stated that \"on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limit."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42854, "end_char": 42863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43039, "end_char": 43048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43565, "end_char": 43578, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43644, "end_char": 43653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44049, "end_char": 44059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44222, "end_char": 44232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44298, "end_char": 44301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44307, "end_char": 44362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45303, "end_char": 45316, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45442, "end_char": 45451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45457, "end_char": 45467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45667, "end_char": 45677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45813, "end_char": 45823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45894, "end_char": 45911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 16 provides for delegation of powers to the Government of Bombay to be exercised subject to the directions of the Central Government, and section 17 bars suits or other proceedings against the Central Government or the Government of Bum bay or any director \"for any damage caused or likely to be caused by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act.\""}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47090, "end_char": 47100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47337, "end_char": 47350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47450, "end_char": 47460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47874, "end_char": 47885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 162 and 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48246, "end_char": 48266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48592, "end_char": 48605, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48836, "end_char": 48849, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48893, "end_char": 48903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48934, "end_char": 48944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49265, "end_char": 49275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, Parliament,\n\nOhiranJ1tlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49337, "end_char": 49353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J,\n\nOhiranfit1al\n\nChowdhuri\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a,\n\nPala~.iali Sastri J,", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRIJ.-As"}}, {"text": "Pala~.iali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49420, "end_char": 49437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J,\n\nOhiranfit1al\n\nChowdhuri\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a,\n\nPala~.iali Sastri J,"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52863, "end_char": 52873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53100, "end_char": 53107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Legislation based upon mismar.agement or other misconduct as the differentia and made applicable to a specified individual or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think, receive judicial encouragement."}}, {"text": "Ohiranjitlal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53756, "end_char": 53768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whilst all reasonable presumption must undoubtedly be made in support of the constitutional v.alidity of a law made by a competent legislature, the circumstances of the present case would seem, .to my\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri'\n\nThs Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56140, "end_char": 56150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56594, "end_char": 56604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56688, "end_char": 56698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56989, "end_char": 57002, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57256, "end_char": 57266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57364, "end_char": 57382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlai\n\nChowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57453, "end_char": 57476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Chiranjitlai\n\nChowdhuri\n\n•• The Unio11 of Ind1a and\n\nOther I.\n\nPalattjali\n\nSastr' J.\n\nMuKHERJEA ].-This is an application presented by Mukhorj,.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Mukhorj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57588, "end_char": 57595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Chiranjitlai\n\nChowdhuri\n\n•• The Unio11 of Ind1a and\n\nOther I.\n\nPalattjali\n\nSastr' J.\n\nMuKHERJEA ].-This is an application presented by Mukhorj,.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57605, "end_char": 57627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. one Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri, a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and \\Veaving Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the company), praying for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under article 32 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Sholapur Spinning and \\Veaving Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57650, "end_char": 57696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. one Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri, a shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and \\Veaving Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the company), praying for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under article 32 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57802, "end_char": 57812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57954, "end_char": 57967, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Baroda Bank Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58757, "end_char": 58776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner states in his petition that he holds in his own right three ordinary shares and eighty preference shares in the company, though according to his own admission the preference shares do not stand in his name but have been registered in the name of the Baroda Bank Limited with which the shares are pledged."}}, {"text": "July 27, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58947, "end_char": 58960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on July 27, 1949, the directors of the company gave a notice to the workers that the mills would be closed, and pursuant to that notice, the mills were in fact closed on the 27th of August following."}}, {"text": "27th of August following", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59118, "end_char": 59142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on July 27, 1949, the directors of the company gave a notice to the workers that the mills would be closed, and pursuant to that notice, the mills were in fact closed on the 27th of August following."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59148, "end_char": 59163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1950, the Governor-General of lnd1a promulgated an Ordinance which purported to make special provisions for the proper management and administration of the company."}}, {"text": "Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59463, "end_char": 59508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated in the preamble to the Ordinance that \"on account of mismanagement and neglect, a situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and has caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community \", and it was on account of the emergency arising from this situation that the promulgation of the Ordinance was necessary."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59910, "end_char": 59919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60194, "end_char": 60203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60257, "end_char": 60266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60652, "end_char": 60665, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60814, "end_char": 60823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61131, "end_char": 61141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61304, "end_char": 61314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62083, "end_char": 62093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 62111, "end_char": 62130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only other material provision is that contained in section 15, under which the Central\n\nGovernment may, by no.lilied order, direct that all or any of the powers exercisable by it under this Ordin\n\nance may be exercised by the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62318, "end_char": 62328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62704, "end_char": 62724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nOn th.e next day, the Government of Bombay appofnted respondents 3 to 7 as directors of the company in terms of section 3 of the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62794, "end_char": 62803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th of April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63017, "end_char": 63035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th of April, 1950, the Ordinance was repealed and an Act was passed by the Parliament of India, known as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act which re-enacted almost in identical terms all the provisions of the Ordinance and provided further that all actions taken and orders made under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been taken or made under the corresponding provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Parliament of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63093, "end_char": 63112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th of April, 1950, the Ordinance was repealed and an Act was passed by the Parliament of India, known as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act which re-enacted almost in identical terms all the provisions of the Ordinance and provided further that all actions taken and orders made under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been taken or made under the corresponding provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Both the Ordinance and the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63796, "end_char": 63826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64363, "end_char": 64373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both the Ordinance and the Act", "statute": "Both the Ordinance and the Act"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64598, "end_char": 64608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both the Ordinance and the Act", "statute": "Both the Ordinance and the Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64900, "end_char": 64910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65114, "end_char": 65124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chirari.jitlal Chowdhuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 66815, "end_char": 66839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (2) of the article lays down that the\n\n11~\n\n195\"\n\nChirari.jitlal Chowdhuri\n\nTho Union of\n\nIndill and\n\nOther a.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1900 Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or _writs including writs in the nature of CMranjitlal h 'b Chowdhuri habeas corpus, mandamus, pro i ition, quo warranto\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthtJrs.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Mukherjeo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67281, "end_char": 67290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus anybody who complains of infraction of any of\n\nMukherjeo J. the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution is at liberty to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of such rights and this court has been given the power to make orders and issue directions or writs similar in nature to the prerogative writs of English law as might be considered appropriate in particular cases.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69157, "end_char": 69167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69247, "end_char": 69257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70050, "end_char": 70060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71483, "end_char": 71493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71890, "end_char": 71900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72061, "end_char": 72066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the third prayer, it has been contended by Mr. Joshi, who appears for one of the respondents, that having regard to the nature of the case and the allegations made by the petitioner himself, the prayer for a writ of mandamus, in the form in which it has been made, is not tenable."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73239, "end_char": 73249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74443, "end_char": 74453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74497, "end_char": 74507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukheriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75659, "end_char": 75668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheriea J.\n\nc:itizens under its protection may be taken or its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75799, "end_char": 75809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76293, "end_char": 76303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77018, "end_char": 77028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77446, "end_char": 77456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ckiranjitlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 77918, "end_char": 77930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ckiranjitlal It is argued by the learned Attorney-General that the Chowdhuri\n\nv taking of possession as contemplated by article 31 (2) means the taking of possession of the entire bundle of The Union of rights which the previous holder had, by excluding India and him from every part or item thereof.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Chowdhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77985, "end_char": 77994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ckiranjitlal It is argued by the learned Attorney-General that the Chowdhuri\n\nv taking of possession as contemplated by article 31 (2) means the taking of possession of the entire bundle of The Union of rights which the previous holder had, by excluding India and him from every part or item thereof.", "canonical_name": "Chowdhuri"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78038, "end_char": 78048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78454, "end_char": 78464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79382, "end_char": 79392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79403, "end_char": 79408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chari, on the other hand, has contended on behalf of the petitioner that after the management is taken over by the statutory directors, it cannot be said \\ that the company still retains possession or control over its property and assets."}}, {"text": "Ohiranjit!al Ohowdhuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80113, "end_char": 80135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Possession of an\n\n1950\"\n\nOhiranjit!al Ohowdhuri\n\nThe Union of Ind1a and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Union of Ind1a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80141, "end_char": 80155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Possession of an\n\n1950\"\n\nOhiranjit!al Ohowdhuri\n\nThe Union of Ind1a and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81003, "end_char": 81013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81225, "end_char": 81238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal Ohowdhurt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84434, "end_char": 84456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\¥hether the restrictions are such as would bring the case within\n\n11~\n\nChiranjitlal Ohowdhurt\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84492, "end_char": 84501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea .J.\n\n19~0\n\nChiranjitla!", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Chiranjitla!\n\nGhowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84513, "end_char": 84536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea .J.\n\n19~0\n\nChiranjitla!", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84602, "end_char": 84612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85102, "end_char": 85112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85269, "end_char": 85277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Setalvad, if a shareholder is not deprived of the entirety of his rights which he is entitled to exercise by reason of his being the owner or holder of the share and some rights, however insignificant they might be, still remain in him, there cannot be any dispossession as contemplated by article 31(2)."}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85559, "end_char": 85572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rich", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85932, "end_char": 85936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is relevant to refer in this connection to an observation made by Rich J. in a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Australia,(') where the question arose as to whether the taking of exclusive possession of a property for an indefinite period of time by the Commonwealth of Australia under Reg."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85972, "end_char": 85995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is relevant to refer in this connection to an observation made by Rich J. in a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Australia,(') where the question arose as to whether the taking of exclusive possession of a property for an indefinite period of time by the Commonwealth of Australia under Reg."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86275, "end_char": 86285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87292, "end_char": 87302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87758, "end_char": 87768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88605, "end_char": 88615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chiranjtllai ChowdhurS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88958, "end_char": 88980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the word \"deprived\" as used in clause (1) connotes the idea of 'destruction or confiscation of property, obviously no such thing has happened in the present\n\nChiranjtllai ChowdhurS\n\nv, The Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": ".Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89019, "end_char": 89029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Mukherjea J.\n\nOhiraajitlal Chowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89144, "end_char": 89154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89849, "end_char": 89859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90101, "end_char": 90117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90140, "end_char": 90153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90464, "end_char": 90478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91231, "end_char": 91247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93025, "end_char": 93035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93241, "end_char": 93251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uniori of\n\nIndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93490, "end_char": 93506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view, the other point does not arise for consideration, but I may state here that even if it is conceded for argument's sake that the\n\nChiranjitlal Ohowdhuri\n\nThe Uniori of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers,\n\nA1.ukherja.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Chiran.jitlal Chawdhur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93537, "end_char": 93559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nChiran.jitlal Chawdhur'\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther ii\n\nMukherj('a J,\n\ndisabilities imposed by the impugned legislation amount to restrictions on proprietory right, they may very well be supported as reasonable restraints imposed in the interests of the general public, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94011, "end_char": 94021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94217, "end_char": 94227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94405, "end_char": 94415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94438, "end_char": 94448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95002, "end_char": 95012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 95416, "end_char": 95430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have been referred in course of the arguments on this point by the learned Counsel on both sides to quite a number of cases decided by the American Supreme\n\nCourt, where questions turning upon the construction of the 'equal protection' clause in the American Consti."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95885, "end_char": 95895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96386, "end_char": 96399, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 97036, "end_char": 97060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been said by the Supreme Court of America, \"equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws('),\" and this means \"subjection to equal laws applying alike to all in the same situation(').\""}}, {"text": "S. 4Q", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97782, "end_char": 97787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Un.ion of\n\nIndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 97899, "end_char": 97915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohir11.njitlal Chowdhuri\n\n•• Th~ Union of India and\n\nOthers,\n\nMukherja J.\n\nChiran}itlal Chowdhuri\n\nTh6 Un.ion of\n\nIndia anci\n\nOther a.\n\nMukhrjea J,\n\nunconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character(').", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Mukhrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97932, "end_char": 97940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohir11.njitlal Chowdhuri\n\n•• Th~ Union of India and\n\nOthers,\n\nMukherja J.\n\nChiran}itlal Chowdhuri\n\nTh6 Un.ion of\n\nIndia anci\n\nOther a.\n\nMukhrjea J,\n\nunconstitutional if it is not discriminatory in its character(').", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98908, "end_char": 98918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99080, "end_char": 99086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Obviously the Act purports to make provisions which are of a drastic character and against the general law of the land as laid down in the Indian Companies Act, in regard to the administration and management of the affairs of one company in Indian territory."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99087, "end_char": 99100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 40J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100050, "end_char": 100056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102107, "end_char": 102111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ohiranjttlal\n\nChowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102133, "end_char": 102156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7\n\nOhiranjttlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nChiranjttlal\n\nCkowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nItidia and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Union of\n\nItidia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102236, "end_char": 102252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7\n\nOhiranjttlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nChiranjttlal\n\nCkowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nItidia and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "Mukhdrfea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102267, "end_char": 102276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhdrfea J.\n\nlean in favour of constitutionality and should support the legislation if it is possible to do so on any reasonable ground, and it is for the party who attacks the val.idity of the legislation to place all materials before the court which would go to show that the selection is arbitrary and unsupportable.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103289, "end_char": 103297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If we are to take judicial notice of the existence of similar other badly managed companies, we must take notice also of the facts which appear in the parliamentary proceedings in connection with this legislation which have been referred to by my learned brother, Fazl Ali J. in his judgment and which would go to establish that the facts connected with this corporation are indeed exceptional and the discrimination that has been made can be supported on just and reasonable grounds.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "S. 291", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104465, "end_char": 104471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chiran.jitlal Chowdhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106536, "end_char": 106559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-As I have arrived at a conclusion different from that reached by the majority of this Court, I\n\nChiran.jitlal Chowdhuri ..\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\n,.Wukherjea.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": ".Wukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106600, "end_char": 106610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-As I have arrived at a conclusion different from that reached by the majority of this Court, I\n\nChiran.jitlal Chowdhuri ..\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther a.\n\n,.Wukherjea.", "canonical_name": "MUKI!ERJEA"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106890, "end_char": 106900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106908, "end_char": 106937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107916, "end_char": 107929, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108058, "end_char": 108068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January IO, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108127, "end_char": 108143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January IO, 1950, the Government of Bombay appointed Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108229, "end_char": 108242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2, 1950, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108464, "end_char": 108480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime the new Constitution had come into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "February 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108486, "end_char": 108502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 7, 1950, the new directors passed a resolution sanctioning a call for H.s."}}, {"text": "High Court of\n\nS.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 108660, "end_char": 108681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "438 of 1950 was filed in the High Court of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOH.TS 917\n\nBombay by one Dwarkadas Shrinivas against the new directors challenging the validity of the Ordinance and the right of the new directors to make the call."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS 917", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 108683, "end_char": 108709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "438 of 1950 was filed in the High Court of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOH.TS 917\n\nBombay by one Dwarkadas Shrinivas against the new directors challenging the validity of the Ordinance and the right of the new directors to make the call."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108867, "end_char": 108875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J. who tried the suit held that the Ordinance was valid and dismissed the suit."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109060, "end_char": 109071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48 of 1950) was taken from that decision which was dismissed by a Division Bench (Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar J.) on August 29, 1950."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109076, "end_char": 109090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48 of 1950) was taken from that decision which was dismissed by a Division Bench (Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar J.) on August 29, 1950."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 109098, "end_char": 109113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48 of 1950) was taken from that decision which was dismissed by a Division Bench (Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar J.) on August 29, 1950."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 109135, "end_char": 109148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, on April 7, 1950, the Ordinance was replaced by Act No."}}, {"text": "May 29, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 109329, "end_char": 109341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 29, 1950, the present petition was filed by one Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri."}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 109381, "end_char": 109403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 29, 1950, the present petition was filed by one Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Bank of Baroda", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 109586, "end_char": 109600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preference shares, according to him, stand in the name of the Bank of Baroda to whom they are said to have been pledged."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 110080, "end_char": 110094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are the Union of India, the State of Bombay and the new directors besides the company itself."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 110100, "end_char": 110115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are the Union of India, the State of Bombay and the new directors besides the company itself."}}, {"text": "Chiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 110807, "end_char": 110830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19~0\n\nChiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nTha Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOther&.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Ohiranjitlal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 110873, "end_char": 110885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DaaJ.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOther a.\n\nDas J,\n\nThe validity of the Ordinance and the Act has been challenged before us on the following grounds :-(i) that it was not within the legislative competence-(a) of the Governor-General to promulgate the Ordinance, or (b) of the Parliament to enact the Act, and (ii) that the Ordinance and the Act infringe the fundamental rights of the shareholders as well as those of the said company and are, therefore, void and inoperative under article 13.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111369, "end_char": 111379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111452, "end_char": 111462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111896, "end_char": 111906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111989, "end_char": 111999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112507, "end_char": 112574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112640, "end_char": 112656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sections 83A and 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112784, "end_char": 112803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112820, "end_char": 112833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113745, "end_char": 113761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113799, "end_char": 113809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gapalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113814, "end_char": 113821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gapalan' s case (I) I pointed out that the rights conferred by article 19 (1) (a) to (e) and (g) would be available to the citizen until he was, under article 21, .deprived of his life or personal liberty accordin~ to procedure established by law and that the right to property guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) would like."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113877, "end_char": 113887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113965, "end_char": 113975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114106, "end_char": 114116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114178, "end_char": 114188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114393, "end_char": 114403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114499, "end_char": 114509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114560, "end_char": 114570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chirartjitlal\n\nChowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 115059, "end_char": 115083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chirartjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115359, "end_char": 115369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115569, "end_char": 115578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115670, "end_char": 115680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115737, "end_char": 115747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116003, "end_char": 116013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116020, "end_char": 116034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118414, "end_char": 118424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ohiraajitlal Ohowdkuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 119396, "end_char": 119418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohiraajitlal Ohowdkuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOtherJJ,\n\nDas J.\n\nChiranjiUal Cf!owdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Das J.\n\nChiranjiUal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119454, "end_char": 119473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohiraajitlal Ohowdkuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOtherJJ,\n\nDas J.\n\nChiranjiUal Cf!owdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120928, "end_char": 120938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120951, "end_char": 120961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121265, "end_char": 121275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122054, "end_char": 122064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "DasJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 123942, "end_char": 123946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ,\n\nOhiranjitlai Ghowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "DAS JJ."}}, {"text": "Ohiranjitlai Ghowdhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 123949, "end_char": 123971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ,\n\nOhiranjitlai Ghowdhuri\n\nThe Union of India and\n\nOthera.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Parliament from amending the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124591, "end_char": 124633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125631, "end_char": 125641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament from amending the Companies Act", "statute": "Parliament from amending the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125644, "end_char": 125654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125857, "end_char": 125867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126066, "end_char": 126076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127390, "end_char": 127400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127450, "end_char": 127460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128918, "end_char": 128928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129065, "end_char": 129075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129087, "end_char": 129097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129626, "end_char": 129636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "E.lemeutil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 130582, "end_char": 130592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the\n\n\\11 81:Jt:1 E.lemeutil ofL<1.w by Markby, 6th Editioo, Pa.ra."}}, {"text": "Markby", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 130604, "end_char": 130610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the\n\n\\11 81:Jt:1 E.lemeutil ofL<1.w by Markby, 6th Editioo, Pa.ra."}}, {"text": "s. 393", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132733, "end_char": 132739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 132802, "end_char": 132808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nan individual shareholder can complain.", "canonical_name": "DAS JJ."}}, {"text": "Chowdhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132979, "end_char": 132988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well settled in the United States that no one but those Ohiranjit!al whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise Chowdhuri\n\nv. the question of the constitutionality of that law.", "canonical_name": "Chowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133370, "end_char": 133376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho Union of Thus in McCabe v.\n\nAtchison(') which arose out India and of a suit filed by five Negros against five Railway Others, Companies to restrain them from making any distinction\n\nDas J, in service on account of race pursuant to an Oklahoma Act known as \"The Separate Coach Law,\" in upholding the dismissal of the suit Hughes ].", "canonical_name": "Hughes"}}, {"text": "S. 571", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134883, "end_char": 134889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134920, "end_char": 134926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134955, "end_char": 134960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 136835, "end_char": 136869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of the United States in Darnell v. The State of Indiana(')."}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137183, "end_char": 137189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das J.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137196, "end_char": 137227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "119\n\nDas J.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs.", "canonical_name": "Das J.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 137233, "end_char": 137261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "119\n\nDas J.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137860, "end_char": 137870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138001, "end_char": 138011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138165, "end_char": 138175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138341, "end_char": 138351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138994, "end_char": 139004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 888", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139384, "end_char": 139390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139895, "end_char": 139917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140046, "end_char": 140056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141302, "end_char": 141312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 400", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141485, "end_char": 141491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 141494, "end_char": 141519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri\n\nTkiJ Union of\n\nIr.dia and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "DasJ.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 141557, "end_char": 141587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthrs.", "canonical_name": "Das J.\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOhowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Day", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143265, "end_char": 143268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Said Day J. in Southern Railway Company v. Greene(') :-\"While reasonable classification is permitted, without doing violence to the equal protection of the laws, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which such classification is imposed; and the classification cannot be arbitrarily made without any substantial basis."}}, {"text": "Brewer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145863, "end_char": 145869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Brewer Jin the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe' Railway v. W. H. Ellis ('), while good faith\n\n(I/ 249 U.S. 152."}}, {"text": "S. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145963, "end_char": 145969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145982, "end_char": 145987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ohiranjitlal Chowdkuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 146011, "end_char": 146033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "131 165 U.S .. 1501\n\nOhiranjitlal Chowdkuri\n\nTh~ Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Chiranjitla.l Chowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 146076, "end_char": 146099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DaaJ.\n\nChiranjitla.l Chowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndill and\n\nOthrs,\n\nDa3.T.\n\nand a knowledge of existing conditions on the part of a legislature was to be presumed, yet to carry that presumption to the extent 0f always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation was to make the protecting clause a mere rope of sand, in no manner restraining State action.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "Union of\n\nIndill", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 146105, "end_char": 146121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DaaJ.\n\nChiranjitla.l Chowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndill and\n\nOthrs,\n\nDa3.T.\n\nand a knowledge of existing conditions on the part of a legislature was to be presumed, yet to carry that presumption to the extent 0f always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation was to make the protecting clause a mere rope of sand, in no manner restraining State action.", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146788, "end_char": 146798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146963, "end_char": 146973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148183, "end_char": 148193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chowdhuri the Ordinance or the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148457, "end_char": 148491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of\n\nIndia'and", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 148899, "end_char": 148918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of\n\nIndia'and\n\nOth,, ra,", "canonical_name": "Union of\n\nIndi11 and\n\nOthrs."}}, {"text": "article 02", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149205, "end_char": 149215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chowdhuri the Ordinance or the Act", "statute": "Chowdhuri the Ordinance or the Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149588, "end_char": 149598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149777, "end_char": 149787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149831, "end_char": 149841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vithal N. Chandavarkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 149999, "end_char": 150021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the charge of denial of equal protection of the laws the respondents in the affidavit of Sri Vithal N. Chandavarkar filed in opposition to the petition make the following reply :-\"With reference to paragraph 6 of the petition, I deny the soundness of the submissions that on or from the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution of India came into force the said Ordinance became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution or that the provisions thereof were inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the said Constitution or for any of the other grounds mentioned in paragraph 8\n\nDas J.\n\nL \"\"\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nOkowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150222, "end_char": 150243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150297, "end_char": 150310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "No attempt has been made in the affidavit to show that the Ordinance or the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150829, "end_char": 150908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153646, "end_char": 153656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ohiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 154862, "end_char": 154885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these preambles there is no material whatever before us establishing or even swgesting that this company p.nd its shareliolders have in fact been guilty of any\n\nOhiranjitlal\n\nChowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Ch.iranjitlal\n\nCliowdhuri"}}, {"text": "U1iion of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159353, "end_char": 159368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event, the petitioner, in my opinion, may well claim to have discharged the onus of showing that this company and its shareholders have been singled out for discriminating treatment by showing that the Act, on the face of it, has adopted a basis of classification which, by its very nature, cannot be exclusively applicable to this company and its shareholders but which may be equally applicable to other companies\n\nChiranj1tlal\n\nChowdhuri v.\n\nThe U1iion of India and\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159835, "end_char": 159845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 160069, "end_char": 160086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the.petitioner: M. S. K. Aiyengar ."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 160127, "end_char": 160137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 & 2: P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 160191, "end_char": 160206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 to 5 and 7 to 10:\n\nRajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "ANARDAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160211, "end_char": 160224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J ANARDAN REDDY AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE."}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160255, "end_char": 160268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SA!YID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts."}}, {"text": "SA!YID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160275, "end_char": 160290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SA!YID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts.", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160331, "end_char": 160351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SA!YID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 160358, "end_char": 160379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 134, 136, 374(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160381, "end_char": 160403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160678, "end_char": 160686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 160954, "end_char": 160977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, who v.ere convicted and sentenced to death by a special tribunal in the Hyderabad State, preferred appeals to the High Court of Hyderabad which were dismissed, and they applied to the."}}, {"text": "21st Jan., 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 161042, "end_char": 161057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court on the 21st Jan., 1950, for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad against the judgments of the High Court."}}, {"text": "26th Jan., 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 161166, "end_char": 161181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th Jan., 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and under the Constitution, Hyderabad became a part of India, the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before that"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161187, "end_char": 161208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 161291, "end_char": 161322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th Jan., 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and under the Constitution, Hyderabad became a part of India, the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before that"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_88_334_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "19~0\n\nMay, 19.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950)\n\nA.K.GOPALAN\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA : INTERVENER.\n\n[SHRl HAluLAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC.J.,\n\nSAIYID\n\nFAZL\n\nALI, l'ATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJF:A and S. R. DAs JJ.J\n\nPreventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), ss. 3, 7, 10-14.-VaJidity-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 13, 19 to 22, 32-Law relating :o preventive detention-Whether infringes Fundamental Right as to freedom of movement-Whether subject to judicial review a. to reasonableness under Art. 19 (5)-Scope of Art. 19- Right of free movement and Right to personal liberty, nature and incidents of-Art. 221 whether complete code as to preventive detro tion-Scope and applicability of Art. 21-\"Law,\" \"procedure established by law,\" meanings of-Whether incluile rules of natural justice-Construction of Art. 21-American decisions on °d\"e pro.- cess of U.W, n value of-Omission to provide objective standard for satisfaction of authorities, to pravirl< for oral hearing or leading of evidence, to fix maximum period of detention, and to specify \"circumstances\" and \"classes of cases\" where period of detention may be extended over 3 months, prohibiting detenu from disclosing grounds of detention-Validity of law-Construction of Constitution -Reference to debates and Report of Drafting Committee-\n\nPermissibility.\n\nThe Petitioner who was detained under the Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950) applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and for his release from detention, on the ground that the said Act contravened the proviSions of Arts. 13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and was consequently ultra vires and that his detention was therefore illegal:\n\nHeld, per KANIA C. )., PATA1'JAL1 SAsTIU, Mu1<HERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ. dissenting)-that the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, with the exception of Sec. 14 thereof did not contravene any of the Articles of the Constitution and even though Sec. 14 was ultra vires inasmuch as it contravened the provisions of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution,'\" this section was severable from the remaining sections of the, t, the invalidity of Sec. 14 did not affect the validity of the Act as a whole, and the detentiori of the petitioner was not illegal.\n\nFAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ.-Scction 12 of the Act was also ultra, vires, and since it contravened the very provision in the\n\nConstitution under which the Parliament derived its competence 19j0 to enact the law, the detention was illegal.\n\nHeld, by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., FAZL Au, l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.)-Section 14 of the v.\n\nPreventive Detention Act, 1950, contravenes the provisions of The Stall\n\nArt~ 22 ( 5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits a person detained trom disclosing to the Court the grounds on which a detention order has been made or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and is to that extent ultra vires and void.\n\nPer KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTR1, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAZL Au J. dissenting).-Article 19 of the Constitution has no application to a law which relates directly to preventive detention even though as a result of an order 'bf detention the rights referred to in sub-els. (a) to (e) and (g) in general, and sub-cl. (d) in particular, of d. (I) of Art. 19 may be restricted or abridged ; and .the constitutional validity of _a law relating to such detention cannot therefore, be judged in the light of the test prescribed in cl. ( 5) of the said Article.\n\nDAs J.-Article 19 ( 1) postulates a legal capacity to exercise the rights guaranteed by it and if a citizen loses the . freedom of his person by reason of lawful detention as a result of a conviction for an offence or otherwise he cannot claim the rights under sub-els. (a) to (e) and (g) of Art. 19 (I); likewise if a citizen's property is compulsorily acquired under Art. 31, he cannot claim the right under sub-cl. (f) of Art. 19 ( l) with respect to that property. In short the rights under sub-els. (a) to (e) and (g) nd where lawful detention begins and therefore the validity of a preventive detention Act cannot be judged by Art. 19 (5).\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Whatever bethe precise scope of Art. 19 (I) (d) and Art. 19 (5) the provisions of Art. 19 (5) do not apply to a law relating to preventive detention, inasmuch as there is a special self-contained provision in Art. 22 regulating it.\n\nF AZL Au J .-Preventive detention is a direct infringement of the right guaranteed in Art. 19.(J) (d), even if a narrow construction is placed on the said sµb-clause, ' and a law relating to preventive detention is therefore subject to such limited judicial review as is permitted by Art. 19 ( 5).\n\nPer KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsrn1, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAzL Au J. dissenting).-The concept of the right \"to move freely throughout the territory of India\" referred to in Art. 19 (I) ( d), of the Constitution is entirely different from the concept of the right to \"personal liberty\" referred to in Art. 21, and Art.· 19 should not, therefore, be read as controlled by the provisions of Art. 21.\n\nThe view that Art. 19 .guarantees substantive rights and Art. 21 prescribes the procedure is incorrect.\n\nDAs. J.-Article 19 protects some of the important attributes of personal liberty as independent rights and the expression \"Personal liberty\" is used in Art. 21 as a compendious term\n\n19j()\n\nA.K. Cop.Ian\n\n. v.\n\nT1\" Sl<JU\n\nincluding WJth1n . its meaning all varieties of rights which go to make up the personal liberties of men.\n\nFAzi. Ac1 ).-Even if it be assumed that Art. 19 (l)(d) does not .refer to \"personal liberty\" and that it. bears the restricted mean . ing attributed to it, that is to say, it signifies merely the right to move from one locality to .another, preventive detention must be held to affect this limited right of movement directly and sub. stantially.\n\nOne of the objects of preventive detentioq is. to res train a person detained from moving from place to place so that he may not sPread disaffection or indulge in dangerous activities in the places he visits.\n\nThe same consideration applies to the cases of persons who are interned or externcd.\n\nHence, extcrnment, internment and certain other forms of restriction on movement have always been treated as kindred matters belonging to the same group or family, :rnd the rule which applies to one must necessarily apply to the others.\n\nPer KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTa1 and DAs JJ. (MAHAJAN J. dissenting),_:_Article 22 does not form a complete code of constitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention.\n\nTo the extent that provision is made in Art. 22 it cannot be controlled by Art. 21 ; but on points of procedure which expressly or by necessary implication are not dealt with by Art. 22, Art. 21 will apply.\n\nDAs J.-Art. 21 protects substantive rights by requiring a procedure and Art. 22 lays down the minimum rules of procedure that even the Parliament cannot abrogate or overlook.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Art. 22 contains a self-contained code of constitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention and cannot be examined or controlled by the provisions of Art. 21.\n\nThe principles underlying Art. 21 are however kept in vic\\v in Art. 22 and there is no conflict between these articles.\n\nM UKHER JEA J .- Even assuming that Art. 22 is not a self.-contained cWe relating to preventive detention and that Art. 21 would apply, it is not permissible to supplement Art. 22 by the application of rules of natural justice.\n\nFAzL ALI J.-Art. 22 docs not form an exhaustive cod.e by itself relating to preventive detention.\n\nParliament can make further provisions and if it has done so Art. 19 (5) may be applied to see if those provisions have transgressed the bounds of reasonableness.\n\nPer KANIA C. J., MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAzL Au J. tfusttnting).-in Art. 21 the word \"law\" has been used in the sense of .State-made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general scn5': embodying the principles of natural justice; and \"procedure established by law\" means procedure established by law made by the State, that is to say, the Union Parliament or the Legislatures of the States.\n\nIt is not proper to construe this expression in the light of the meaning given to the expression \"due process of law\" in the American Constitution, by the Supme Court of America.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTP.I J.-'-\"Law~ .in Art. 21 docs not 'mean the jus naturale of civil law but means\n\npositive or State-made law. \"Procedure established by law\" 1950 does not however mean any procedure which may be prescribed by a competent legislature, but the ordinary well-established 1f.K •. Gopalan criminal procedure, i.e., those settled usages and normal modes v. of procedure sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code, which 7 M stak. is the general law of criminal procedure in this country.\n\nThe only alternative to this construction, if a constitutional transgression is to be avoided, is to interpret the reference to \"law\" as implying a constitutional amendment pro tanto, for it is only a law enacted by the procedure provided for such amendment .that could modify or override a fundamental right without contravening Art. 13 (2).\n\nFAZL Au ].-There is nothing revolutionary in the view that \"procedure established by law\" must include the four principles of elementary justice which inhere in and are at the root of all civilized systems of law, and which have been stated by the American Courts and jurists as consisting in (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, ( 3) impartial tribunal and ( 4) orderly course of procedure.\n\nThese four principles are really different aspects of the same right, namely, the right to be heard before one is condemned.\n\nHence the words \"procedure established by law\", whatever its exact meaning be, must necessarily include the principle that no person shall be condemned without hearing by an impartial tribunal.\n\nPer KANIA C. J., F.\\zL Au, PATANJAU SAsTRI,\n\nMAHAJAN and DAS JJ.-Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, does not delegate any legislative power to an executive officer but merely confers on such officer a discretion to enforce the law made by the legislature, and is not therefore invalid on this ground.\n\nThe fact that tbe section does not provide an objective standard for determining whether the requirements of law have been complied with, is not a ground for holding that it is invalid.\n\nFAZL Au ].-Section 3 is however a reasonable provision only for the first step, i.e., for arrest and initial detention and must be followed by some procedure for testing the so-called subjective satisfaction, which can be done only by providing a suitable machinery for examining the grounds on which the order of detention _is made and considering the representations of the persons detained in relation to those grounds.\n\nPer KANIA C. ]., MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.-Scction 7 of, the said Act is not invalid merely because it docs not provide for an oral hearing or an opportunity to lead evidence but only gives a right to make a representation. Right to. an oral hearing and right to give evidence arc not necessarily implm in the right to make a representation given by Art. , 22.\n\nfer KANIA C. J. and MAHAJAN J,-Thc _provision contained in Sec. 11 that a person may be detained for such period aa the\n\n12-A\n\nA.Jr. Goj>olan\n\nTlw StaU\n\nState thinks fit docs not contravene Art. 22 (7) and it is n<(t there. fore invalid.\n\nPer ~IA C. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ, (FAZL Au and MAHAJAN Jj. dissenting).-Article 22 (7) means that Parliament may prescribe either the circumstances under which, or the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period loqger than three months without reference to an advisory board.\n\nIt is not necessary that the . Parliament shoµld prescribe both.\n\nThe matters referred to in cla11ses (a) and (b) of s11b-sec. ( 1) of Sec. 12 constirute a sllfiiient description of such circumstances or classes of cases and Section 12 is not therefore open to -the objection that it does not comply ':Vith Art. 22(7). Das J.-Parliament has in fact .and substance prescribed both in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12.\n\nFAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ.-Article 22 (7) means that both the circumstances and the class or classes of cases (which are two different expressions with different meanings and connotations) should be prescribed, and the prescription . of one without the other will not be enough.\n\nThe enumeration of the subjects for reasons connected with which a law of preventive detention could be made contained in els. (a) and ( b) of sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 12 docs riot amount to pre§cribing the circustanccs under which, or the class or classes of cases in which, a person can be detained for mote than three months.\n\nPer KANIA C. J .-While it is not proper to take into consideration the individual opinions of members of. Parliament or Convention to construe the meaning of a particular clause, when a question . is raiScd whether a certain phrase or expression was up for consideration at all or not, a refrcnce to the debates may be permitted.\n\nPATANJALl SAsTR1 J~In construing the provisions of an Act, speeches made in the course of the debates on the bill should not be taken into consideration.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-In construing the Constitution it is better to leave out of account the debates in the Constituent Assembly, but a higher value may be placed on the report of the Drafting Committee.\n\nORIGINAL Jmuso1cnoN : PEnnoN No. XIII OF 1950.\n\nApplication under Art. 32 (1) of. the CoJ¥titution of India for a writ of habeas corpus :i.gainst the detention. of the appellant in the Madras jail in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The material facts of the case and arguments of counsel are set out in detail in the judgments. The relevant provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, are printed below.\n\nJ. Short title, extent and duration.-This Act may be called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\n(2) It extends to the whole of India ......\n\n(3) It shall cease to have effect on the lst day of April, 1951, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date.\n\n2. Definitions.-ln this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.\n\n (a) \".State Government\" means, in relation to a Part C State, the CKief Commissioner of the State ; and\n\n(b) '1detention order'' means an order made under Section 3 .. 3 .. Powq to make prders detaining certain persons.-(1) The Central Governmel!t--Or. the State Government may-\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any persn that _with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenanci: of supplies and services essential to the community, or ( b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigner~ Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or witha view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\n\n(2) Any District Magistrate . or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or in a Presidency-town, the Commissioner of Police, may, if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section ( 1), exercise th• power conferred by the said sub-section.\n\n(3) When any order is made under this section by a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the necessity for the order.\n\n7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order.-(J)When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been m:tde, and sha.11 afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order, in a case where such order has been made bv the Central Government, to that Government, and in a case where it has been made by a State Government or an officer subordinate thereto, to the State Government.\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stal8\n\n- . \\ 1950 ''\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1950}\n\ni\\. K. Gopa!an\n\n· 11. ConfiTmation of detention order.-In any case where the- Advisory Board has reported that -there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the Central Government or the State Goverllment, as the case ma.y be, may v.\n\nTke State cOnfirm the detention order and continue the detention of theperson concerned for stich .period as it thinks fit.\n\n- -,-~--'- 12. Duration of detention in certain cases.-(!} Any person\n\n\"detained in any of the following classes of cases or under any of\n\nthe following circumstances may be detained without obtainingc . the. opinion-, of an, Advisory Board for a period longer than three\n\nmonths, but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, namely, _where such person has been detained with lJo view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to- . (a} the defence of India, relations of India with foreign: powers or the security of India; or _\n\n(b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order. * \\..;* -· * .-o-. ~-~ . •\n\n14. Disclosure of grounds of detention, etc.-(1) No court shall, except for the purpose of a prosecution for -an offence punishable under sub-section (2), allow any statement to be made, or any evidence io -be given, before it of the substance of any communication made under section 7 -of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any1 person or of any representation made by him. against such order; and not- . withstanding anything contained in any other la.w, no court shall be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or~ to disclose the substance of, any such communication or repre .. - sentation made, or the proceedings of an Advisory Board or that - part of the report of an Advisory Board which is confidenti•l.\n\n(2) It shll be an offenee punishable with imprisonment for a term which maY extend to One );.ear, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish w_ithout the previous authorisation of. the Central __ Government or the State Govern .. ment, as the case may be, any contents or matter purporting to be contents Of any such communication' or representation as is referred to in subsection (1) : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made . to his legal adviser by a peson wh-o is the sub - ject of a. detention order. lYf. K. Nambiar (S. K. Aiyar and V. G. Rao,. with. him) for the petitioner.\n\nK. Rajali Aiyar, Advocate-General of JJfadras (C.R. Pattabhi Raman and R. Ganapathi, with him) for the State of Madras .\n\n. JJ{. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Jindra-· lal, with him) for the Union of India.\n\n1950.\n\nMay 19.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered.\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is a pet1t1on by the applicant under article 32 (1) of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas. corpus against his detention in the Madras Jail.\n\nIn the petition he has given various dates showing how he has been under \"'detention since December, 1947.\n\nUnder the ordinary Criminal Law he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment but those convictions were set aside.\n\nWhile he was thus under detention under one of the orders of the Madras State Government, on the 1st of March, 1950, he was served with an order made under section 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950. He challenges the legality of , the order as it is contended that Act IV of 1950 contravenes the provisions of articles 13, 19 and 21 and the provisions of that Act are not in accordance with article 22 of the <\"'A>nstitution. He has also challenge~ the validity of the order on the ground that it is issued mala fide. The burden of proving that allegation is on the applicant.\n\nBecause of the penal provisions of section 14 of the impugned Act the applicant has not disclosed the grounds, supplied to him, for his detention and the question of mala fides of the order therefore cannot be gone into under this petition.\n\nThe question of the validity of Act IV of 1950 was argued before us at great length. This is the first case in which the different articles of the Constitution of India contained in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights has come for discussion before us. The Court is indebted to the learned counsel for the applicant and the Attorney-General for their assistance in interpreting the true meaning of the relevant clauses of the Constitution.\n\nIn order to appreciate the rival contentions it is useful first to bear in mind the general scheme of the Constitution.\n\nUnder article 53 of the Constitution the executive power of the Union is vested in the President and is to be exercised by him in accordance with the\n\nJf.K. Gopa/1111\n\nTiu Stat1\n\nKania C.]\n\n195()\n\nA.K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nConstitution either directly or through officers subordinate to him. The legislative powers of the Union are divided between the Parliament and Legislatures of the States. The ambit and limitations on their respective powers are found in article 246 read with article 245, Schedule VII, Lists 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the Union of India the Supreme Court is established and its powers and jurisdiction are set out in articles 124 to 147.\n\nThis follows the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was the previous Constitution of the Government of India. Unlike the American Constitution, there is no article vesting the judicial power of the Union of India in the Supreme Court. The material points substantially altering the edifice are first in the Preamble which declares India a Sovereign Democratic Republic to secure to all its citizens justice, liberty and equality and to promote among them all, fraternity.\n\nPart III of the Constitution is an important innovation. It is headed \"Fundamental Rights\".\n\nIn that Part the word \"State\" includes both the Government of the Unio)l and the Government of the States. By articles. 13 it is expressly provided that all laws in force in the territory of India, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistenl with the provisions of this Part, to the extent of such inconsistency, are void. Therefore, all laws in operation in India on the day the Constitution came into force, unless otherwise saved, to the extent they are inconsistent with this Chapter on Fundamental Rights, become automatically void.\n\nUnder article 13 (2) provision is made for legislation after the Constitution comes into operation. It is there provided that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention, be void.\n\nTherefore, as regards future legislation also the Fundamental Rights in Part III have to be reS: pected and, unless otherwise saved by the provisions of the Constitution, they will be void to the extent they contravene the provisions of Part III.\n\nUnder article 245 (1) the legislative powers conferred under\n\narticle 246 are also made \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution,\" which of course includes Part III dealing with the Fundamental Rights.\n\nThe term law in article 13, is expressed to be wide enough to .include Acts, Ordinances, Orders, Bye-laws, Rules, Reg\\llations and even custom or usage having, in the territory of India, the force of law. The rest of this Part js divided in seven divisions. \"Right to Equality\" is found in articles 14-18, \"Right to Freedom\" in articles 19-22, \"Right against Exploitation\" in articles 23 and 24, \"Right to Freedom of Religion\" in articles 25-28, \"Cultural and Educational Rights\" in articles 29 and 30, \"Right to Property\" in article 31 and \"Right to Constitutional Remedies\" in artciles 32-35.\n\nIn this case we are directly concerned only with the articles under the caption \"Right to Freedom\" (19-22) and article 32 which gives a remedy to enforce the right§ conferred by this Part. The rest of the articles may have to be referred to only to assist in the interpretation of the above-mentioned articles.\n\nIt is obvious that by the insertion of this Part the powers of the Legislature and the Executive, both of the Union and the States, are further curtailed and the right to enforce the Fundamental Rights found in Part III by a direct application to the -Supreme Court is removed from the legislative control. The wording of article 32 shows that the Supreme Court can be moved to grant a suitable relief, mentioned in article 32 (2), only in respect of the FuJ?damental Rights '1 mentioned in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioner is detained under a preventive detention order, made under Act IV of 1950, which has been passed by the Parliament of India.\n\nIn the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, List I contains entries specifying items in respect of whieh the Parlia- . ment has exclusive legislative powers. Entry 9 is in these terms : \"Preventive detention for reasons connected with Defence, Foreign Affairs or the Security of India ; persons subjected to such detention.\" List III of that Schedule enumerates topics on which both the Union and the States have concurrent legislative\n\nA.K. Copalan\n\nTJ.e Slate\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA.Jr. -G•J>alan\n\n. v.\n\nKania C.J.\n\npowers.\n\nEntry 3 of that List is in these terms: \"Preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of. a State, the maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community ; persons subjected to such detention.\" It is not disputed that Act IV of 1950 is covered by these two Entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule. The contention of the petitioner is that the impugned legislation abridges or. infringes the rights given by articles 19-21 and is also not in accordance with the permissive legislation on preventive detention allowed under articles 22 ( 4) and (7) and in particular is an infringement of the provisions of article 22 (5). It is therefore neces>ary to consider in detail each of these articles and the arguments advanced in respect thereof.\n\nArticle 19 is for the protection of certain rights of freedom to citizens. It runs as follows :-\n\n\"19. (1)-All citizens shall have the right-\n\n(a) to freedom of speech and expression ;\n\n(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms ; ( c) to form associations or unions ; ( d) to move freely throughout the territory of India: ( e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India ; ( f) to acquire, .hold and dispose of property ; and ·\n\n(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.\n\n\"(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends .to overthrow, the State.\n\n(3) Nothing in sub-clause\n\n(b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order\n\n•· '\n\nreasonable restrictions on the exercise. of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.\n\n(4) Nothing in sub-clause\n\n(c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.\n\n(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise, of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\n\n(6) Nothing in sub-clause\n\n(g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, 9r prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.\"\n\nClause\n\n(2) specifies the limits up to which the abridgement of the right contained in 19 (1) (a) may be permitted.\n\nIt is an exceptionr Similarly clause\n\n(3) sets out the limit of abridgement of the right in 19\n\n(1) (b) and clause (4) specifis such limits in respect of the right in 19 (1) (c). Clause (5) .is in respect of the rights mentioned in 19 (I) (d), (e) and (f) and clause . (6) is in respect .of the rights contained in 19 (l) (g).\n\nIt cannot be disputed that the articles collected under, the caption \"Right to Freedom\" have to be considered together to appreciate the extent of the Fundamental Rights.\n\nIn the first place it is necessary to notice that 2-3 S. C. India/58.\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Slate\n\nKania C.J.\n\n.4.E. Gap.Ian\n\nKania C.J.\n\nthere is a distinction between rights given to citizens and persons. This is clear on a perusal of the provisions of article 19 on the one hand and articles 20, 21 and 22 on the other.\n\nI~ order to determine whether a right is abridged or infringed it is first necessary to determine the extent of the right given by the articles and the limitations prescribed in the articles themselves permitting its curtailment.\n\nThe inclusion of article 13 (1) and (2) in the Constitution appears to be a matter of abundant caution. Even in their absence, if any of the fundamental rights was infringed by any legislative enactment, the Court has always the power to declare the enactment, to the extent it transgresses the limits, invalid. The existence of article 13( 1) and\n\n(2) in the Constitution therefore is not material for the decision of the question what fundamental right is given and to what extent it is permitted to be abridged by the Constitution itself.\n\nAs the preventive detention order results in the detention of the applicant in a cell it was contended on his behalf that the rights specified in article 19 (1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) have been infringed.\n\nIt was argued that because of his detention he cannot have a free right to speech as and where he desired and the same argument was urged in respect of the rest of the rights mentioned in sub-clauses (b )', ( c), ( d),\n\n(e) and (g). Although this argument is advanced in a case which deals with preventive detention, if correct, it should be applicable in the case of punitive detention also to any one sentenced to a term of imprisonment under the relevant section of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSo considered, the argument must clearly be rejected. In spite of the saving clause's (2) to (6), permitting abridgement of the rights connected with each of them, punitive detention under several sections . .of the Penal Code, e.g., for theft, cheating, forgery and\n\neven ordinary assault, will be illegal. Unless sui:h conclusion necessarily follows from the article, it is obvious that such construction should be avoided. In my opinion, such result is clearly not the outcoe of the Constitution. The article has to be read wh:hout any pre-conceived notions.\n\nSo read, it clearly means\n\nthat the legislation to be examined must be directly in respect of one of the rights mentioned in the subclauses. If there is a legislation directly attemping to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., the question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise.\n\nIf, however, the legislation is l)Ot directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these subclauses is abridged, the question of the application of article 19 does not arise. The true approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenue's life. On that short ground, in my opinion, this argument . about the infringement of the rights mentioned in article 19 (I) generally must fail. Any other construction put on the article, it seems to me, will .be unreasonable.\n\nIt was next urged that while this interpretation may meet the contention in respect of rights under article 19 (1) (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g), the right given by article 19 (1), (d) is left untouched. That sub-clause expressly gives. the right \"to move freely throughout the territory of India\".\n\nIt was argued that by the confinement of the petitioner under the preventive detention order his right to move freely throughout the territory of India is directly abridged and therefore the State must show that the impugned legislation imposes onlv reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe, under article 19 (5).\n\nThe Court is thus enjoined to inquire whether the res.tnct10ns imposed on the detained person are reasonable in the -interests of the general public.\n\nArticle 14 of the Constitution gives the right to equality in these terms :\n\n\"The State shall not denv to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.\"\n\nA.K. Copa/an.\n\nThe Stale\n\nKanin C.J.\n\nA.Jr. Gopalan\n\nThe Stat•\n\nKama C.J.\n\nIt was argued that the words \"within the territory of India\" are unnecessary in that article because the Parliament is supreme to make laws operative only within the territory of India.\n\nWithout those words also the article will bear the same meaning. Similarly, it was urged that the words \"territory of India\" in article 19 (1) (d) may be treated as superfluous, and preventive detention would thus be an abridgement of the right to move freely. In my opinion, this rule of construction itself is faulty.\n\nBecause certain words may be considered <uperfluous (assuming them to be so in article 14 for the present discussion) it is quite improper to assume that they arc superfluous wherever found in the rest of the Constitution. On the contrary, in my opinion, reading sub-clause ( d) as a whole the words \"territory of India\" arc very important.\n\nWhat is sought to be protected by that sub-clause is the right to freedom of movement, i.e., without restriction, throughout the territory of India.\n\nRead with their natural grammatical meaning the sub-clause\n\nonly means that if restrictions are sought to be put upon movement of a citizen from State to State or even within a State such restrictions will have to be tested by the permissive limits prescribed in clause\n\n(5) of that Article. Sub-clause ( d) has nothing to do with detention, preventive or punitive. The Constitution mentions a right to freedom of movement throughout the territorv of India. Every word of that clause must be given its true and legitimate meaning and in the construction of a Statute, particularly a Constitution, it is improper to omit any word which has a reasonable and proper place in it or to refrain from giving effect to its meaning. This position is made quite clear when clause (5) is read along with this sub-clause.\n\nIt permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such right either in the interest of general public or the protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe. It is difficult to conceive of a reasonable restriction necessary in the interests of the general public for confining a person in a cell. Such restriction may be appropriate to prevent a person from going from one Province to another or\n\none area to another; having regard to local conditions prevailing in particular areas.\n\nThe point however is made abundantly clear by the alternative, viz., for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\n\nWhat protection of the interests of a Scheduled Tribe requires the confinement of a man in a cell? On the other hand, preventing the movement of a person from one part of the territory of India to another and the question of reasonable restriction imposed to protect the interests of a Scheduled Tribe is clearly intelligible and often noticed in the course of the administration of the country.\n\nScheduled Tribes have certain rights, privileges and also disabilities.\n\nThey have their own civilization, customs and mode of life and prevention of contact with persons or groups with a particular Scheduled Tribe may be considered undesirable during a certain time or in certain conditions.\n\nThe legislative history of India shows that Scheduled Tribes have been given a separate place on these grounds. Reading article 19 as a whole, therefore, it seems to me that it has no application to a legislation dealing with preventive or punitive detention as its direct object.\n\nI may point out that the acceptance of the petitioner's argument on the interpretation of this clause will result in the Court being called upon to decide upon the reasonableness of several provisions of the Indian Penal Code and several other penal legislations as abridging this right. Even under clause (5), the Court is permitted to apply the test of reasonableness of the restrictions or limits not generally, but only to the extent they are either in the interests of the general public, e.g., in case , of an epidemic, riot, etc., or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\n\nIn my opinion, this is not the intention of the Constitution.\n\nTherefore the contention urged in respect of article 19 fails.\n\nIt was argued that article 19 and article 21 should be read together as implementing each other.\n\nArticle 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while article 21 prescribed that no person can be deprived of hrs life and personal liberty except by procedure\n\nA .K. Gopal an\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\n19 0\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\nKania C.J.\n\nestablished by law.\n\nEven so, on a true construction of article -19, it seems to me that both preventive and punitive detention are outside the scope of article 19.\n\nIn order to appreciate the true scope of article 19 it is useful to read it by itself and then to consider how far the other articles in Part III affect or control its meaning. It is the first article under the caption \"Right to Freedom\".\n\nIt gives the rights mentioned in 19 (1) (a) to (g) to all citizens of India. These rights read by themselves and apart from the controls \"found in clauses (2) to (6} of tht same article, specify the different general rights which a free citizeD. in a democratic country ordinarily has.\n\nHaving .specified those rights, each of them is considered separately from the point of view of a similar right in the other citizens, and also after taking into consideration the principle that individual liberty must give way, to the extent it is necessary, when the good or safety of the peope genlerally is concerned. - Thus the right to freedom of speech and expression is given by 19 (1) (a).\n\nBut clause (2) provides that such right shall not prevent the operation of a law which relates to libel\", slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.\n\nClause (2) thus only emphasizes that while the individual citizen has a free right of speech or expression, he cannot be permitted to use the same to the detriment of a similar right in another citizen or to the detriment of the State. Thus, all laws of libel, slander, contempt of Court or laws in respect of matters which offend against decency or morality. are reaffirmed to be operative in spite of this individual right of the citizen to freedom of speech and expression. Similarly, that right is also subject to laws which prevent undermining the securitv of the State or against activities which tend to overthrow the State. A similar analysis of clauses (3) and (4) shows similar restrictions imposed on. similar grounds. In the same way clause (5) al5o permits reasonable restrictions in the exercise of the right to freedom of movement throughout the territoq of India, th~ right to reside and settle in any part of the\n\nterritory of India o_r the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, being imposed by law provided such reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such right are in the interest of the general public. The Constitution further provides by the same clause that similar reasonable restrictions could be put on the exercise of those rights for the protection of the interest of a Scheduled Tribe. This is obviously to prevent an argument being advanced that while such restriction could be put in the interest of general public, the Constitution did not provide for the imposition of such restriction to protect the interests o_f a smler group of people only. Reading article 19 in that way as a whole the only concept appears to be that the specified rights of a free citizen are thus controlled by what the tramers of the Constitution thouEfht were necessary restrictions in the interest of the rest of the citizens.\n\nReading article 19 in that way it appears to me that the concept of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India is an entirely different concept from the right to \"personal liberty\" contemplated by article 21. \"Personal liberty\" covers many more rights in one sense and has a restricted meaning in another sense. For instance, while the right to move or reside may be covered by the expression \"personal liberty\" the right to freedom of speech [mentioned in article 19 (1) (a)J or the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property (mentioned in 19 (1) (f) cannot be considered a part of the personal liberty of a citizen.\n\nThey form part of the liberty of a citizen but the limitation imposed by the word \"personal\" leads me to believe that those rights an not covered by the expression personal liberty.\n\nSo read there is no conflict between articles 1'9 and 21.\n\nThe contents and subject matters of articles 19 and 21 are thus not the same and they proceed to deal with the rights covered by their respective words from totally different angles.\n\nAs already mentioned in respect of each of the rights specified in sub-clauses of article 19 ( 1) specific limitations in respect of each is provided, while the expression \"personal\n\n19:;0\n\n.A.K. Gopola\n\nTiii Stau\n\nKania C.j.\n\n.1950\n\nAS. c., aiao\n\n•• TIN Sia#\n\nKaaioC.J.\n\nliberty\" in article 21 is generally controlled by the general expression \"procedure established by law.\" The Constitution, in article 19, and also in other . articles in Part HI, thus attempts to strike a balance petween individual liberty and the general interest of the society. The restraints provided by the Constitution on the legislative powers or the exectifive authority of the State thus operate as guarantees of life and personal liberty of the individuals.\n\nDeprivation (total loss) of personal liberty, which inter alia includes the right to eat or sleep when one likes or to work or not to work as and when one pleases and several such rights sought to be protected by the expression \"personal liberty\" in article 21, is .quite different from restriction (which is only a partial control) of the right to move freely (which is relatively a minor right of a citizen) as safeguarded by article 19 ( 1) ( d).\n\nDeprivation of personal liberty has not the same meaning as restriction of free movement in the territory of India.\n\nThis is made clear .. when the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code In Chapter\n\nVIU relating to security of peace or maintenance \"f public oraer arc read. Therefore article 19 (5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty. I am unable; to accept the contention that the word \"deprivation\" includes within its scope \"restriction\" when interpreting article 21. Article 22 envisages the law of preventive detention.\n\nSO does article 246 read with Scheduk Seven, List I, Entry 9 and List HI, Entry 3. Therefore, when the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights I do not think it is proper to consider a legislation permitting preventive detention as in conflict with the rights mentioned in article 19 ( 1). Article 19 ( 1) does not purport to cover all aspects of liberty or of personal liberty. In that article only certain phases of liberty arc dealt with. \"Personal liberty\" would primarily mean liberty of the physical body.\n\nThe rights given under article 19 ( 1) do not directly come under that description.\n\nThey are rights which accompany the freedom or liberty of the person.\n\nBy their very.\n\nnature they are freedoms of a person assumed to be in full possession of his personal liberty. If article 19 is considered to be the only article safeguarding personal liberty several well-recognised rights, as for instance, the right to eat or drink, the right to work, play, swim and numerous other rights and activities and even the right to life will not be deemed protected under the Constitution.\n\nI do not think that is the intention. It seems to me improper to read article 19 as dealing with the same subject as article 21. Article 19 gives the rights specified therein only to the citizens of India while article 21 is applicable to all persons.\n\nThe word citizen is expressly defined in the Constitution to indicate only a certain section of the inhabitants of India. Moreover, the protection given by article 21 is very general. lt is of \"law\"-whatever that expression is interpreted to mean. The legislative restrictions on the law-making powers of the legislature are not here prescribed in detail as in the case of the rights specified in article 19.\n\nIn my opinion therefore article 19 should be read as a separate complete article.\n\nArticle 21 which is also in Part III under the caption \"Right to Freedom\" runs as follows :-\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.\"\n\nThis article has been strongly relied upon by the petitioner in support of his contention that the impugaed Act is ultra vires the Parliament as i~ abridges the right given by this article to every person. It was argued that under the Constitution of the United States of America the corresponding provision is found in the 5th and 14th Amendments where the provision, inter alia, is \"that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty or property except by due process of law.\" It was contended for the petitioner that the Indian Constitution gives the same protection to every person in India, except that in the United States \"due process of law\" has been construed by its Supreme Court to cover both\n\ni.5(1\n\n, f K. Gop.'llan\n\nT/,. Stau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA..K. Gopalt111\n\nT1\" Siok\n\nKania C.J.\n\nsubstantive and procedural law, while in. India only the protection of procedural law is guaranteed. It was contended that the omission of the word \"due\" made no difference to the interpretation of the words in article 21.\n\nThe word \"established\" was not equivalent to \"prescribed\".\n\nIt had a wider meaning.\n\nThe word \"law\" did not mean enacted law because that will be no legislative protection at all. If so construed, any Act passed by the Parliament or the State Legislature, which was otherwise within its legislative power, can destroy or abridge this right. On the same line of reasoning, it was argued that if that was the intention there was no necessity to put this as a fundamental right in Part III a.t all. As to the meaning of the word \"law\" it was argued that it meant principles of natural justice.\n\nIt meant \"jus\", i.e., law in the abstract sense of the principles of natural justice, as mentioned in standard works of Jurisprudeace, and not \"lex\", i.e., enacted law. Against the contention that such construction will leave the meaning vague, it was argued that four principles of natural justice recognised in all civilized countries were covered, in any event, by the word \"law\".\n\nThey are: (1) An objective test, i.e., a certain, definite and ascertainable rule of human conduct for the violation of which one can be detained ; (2) Notice of the grounds of such detention;\n\n(3) An impartial tribunal, administrative, judicial or advisory, to decide whether the detention is justified ; and\n\n(4) Orderly course of procedure, induding an opportunity to be heard orally (not merely by making a written repres.entation) with a right to lead evidence and call witnesses.\n\nIn my opinion, this line of approach is not proper and indeed is misleading.\n\nAs regards the American Constitution its general structure is noticed in the5e words in \"The Government of the United States\" by Munro (5th Edition) at page 53 : \"The architects of 1787 built only the basement.\n\nTheir descendants have kept adding walls and windows, wings and\n\ngables, pillars and porches to make a rambling struc ture which is not yet finished.\n\nOr, to change the metaphor, it has a fabric which, to use the words of\n\nJames Russell Lowell, is still being 'woven on the roaring loom of time'. That is what the framers of the original Constitution intended it to be.\n\nNever was it in their mind to work out a final scheme for the government of the country and stereotype it for all time.\n\nThey sought merely to provide a starting point.\" The same aspect is emphasized in Professor Willis's book on Constitutional Law and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.\n\nIn contrast to the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution is a very detailed one. The Constitution itself provides in minute details the legislative powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures.\n\nThe same feature is noticeable in the case of the judiciary, finance, trade, commerce and services.\n\nIt is thus quite detailed and the whole of it has to be read with the same sanctity, without giving undue weight to Part III or article 246, except to the extent one is legitimately and clearly limited by the other.\n\nFour markt!d points of distinction between the clause in the American Constitution and article 21 of . the Constitution of India may be noticed at this stage.\n\n'Ilhe first is that iii. U.S.A. Constitution the word\n\n'\"liberty\" is used simpliciter while in India it is restricted to personal liberty. (2) In U.S.A. Constitution the same protection is given to property, while . in India the fundamental right in respect of property is contained in article 31. (3) The word \"due\" is omitted altogether and the expression \"due process of law\" is not used deliberately. ( 4) The word \"established\" is used and is limited to \"Procedure\" in our article 21.\n\nThe whole argument of the petitioner is founded on the meaning of the word \"law\" given to it by the Supreme Court of America. It seems unnecessary to embark on a discussion of the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. and how they\n\name to enlarge or abridge the meaning of law in the expression \"due process of law\" Without going into details, I think there is no justification to adopt the meaning of the word \"law\" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. m the expression \"due\n\n19:o\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Slau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA.K. Goftalan\n\n•• Till SIOll\n\nKania C.j.\n\nprocess of law\" merely because the word \"law\" is used in article 21. The discussion of the meaning of \"due process of law\" found in Willis on Constitutional Law and in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations shows the diverse meanings given to that expression at different times and under different circumstances by the Supreme Court of U.S.A., so much so that the conclusion reached by these authors is that the expression means reasonable law. according to the view of the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court at a particular time holding office. It also shows how the meaning of the expression was widened or abridged in certain decades. Moreover, to control the meaning so given to that expression from time to time the doctrine of police powers was brought into play.\n\nThat doctrine, shortly put, is that legislation meant for the good of the people generally, and in which the individual has to surrender his freedom to a certain extent because it is for the benefit of the people at large, has not to be tested by the touchstone of the \"due process of law\" formula.\n\nOur attention was drawn to the debates and report of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly in respect of the wording of this clause.\n\nThe report may be read not to contrbl the meaning of the article, but may be seen in case of ambiguity.\n\nIn The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth ( ), it was tho'!ght that individual opinion of members of the Convention expressed in the debate cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Constitution. The same opinion was expressed in United States v. Wong Kim Ark ( ' ). The result appears to be that while it is not proper to take into consideration the individual opinions of Members of Parliament or Convention to construe the meaning of the particular clause, when a question is raised whether a certain phrase or expression was lip for consideration at all or not, a reference to the debates may be permitted.\n\nIn the present case the debate~ were referred to to show that the expression • \"due process of law\" was known to exist in the American .Constitution (') (1904) 1 Com, L:R. 208.\n\n(1) (169) U.S. &19 at 699.\n\n•.'\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPU.ME COURT REPORTS 111\n\nand after a discussion was not adopted by the Constituent Assembly in our Constitution. In Administrator- General of Bengal v. Prem/al Mullick (1), a reference to the proceedings of the Legislature which resulted in the passing of the Act was not considered legitimate aid in the construction of a particular section.\n\nThe same reasons were held as cogent for excluding a reference to such debate.s in construing an Indian Statute.\n\nResort may be had to these sources with great caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be resolved.\n\nSee Craies' Statute. Law. (4th Edition) page 122, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (9th Edition)' pp. 28-29 and Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) p. 379, article 214.\n\nA perusal of the report of the drafting committee to which our attention was drawn shows clearly that the Constituent Assembly had before it the American article and the expression \"due process of law\" but they deliberately dropped the use of that expression from our Constitution.\n\nNo extrinsic aid is needed to interpret the words of article 21, which in my opinion, are not ambig\\lous.\n\nNormally r¢ad, and without thinking of other Constitutions, . the expression \"procedure established by law\" must mean procedure prescribed by the law of the State.\n\nIf the Indian Constitution wanted to preserve to every person the ·\n\nprction given by the due process clause of the American Constitution there was nothing to prevent the Assembly from adopting the phrase, or if they wanted to limit . the same to procedure only, to adopt that expression with only the word \"procedural\" prefixed to \"law\".\n\nHowever, the correct question is what is the right given by article 21 ? The only right is that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty . except according to procedure established by law. One\n\nmay like that right to cover a larger area, but to give such a right is not the function of the Court ; it is the function of the Constitution. To read the word \"law\" as meaning rules of natural justice will land one in\n\n(1) (1895) L.R. 22 I.A. 107 ..\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThi Stau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA.Jr. Gopalan\n\nTill Stau\n\nKania C.J.\n\ndifficulties because the rules of natural justice, as regards procedure, are nowhere defined and in my opinion the Constitution canriot be read as .laying down a vague standard.\n\nThis is particularly so when in omitting to adopt \"due process of law\" it was considered that the expression \"procedure established by law\" made the standard specific.\n\nIt cannot be specific except by reading the expression .as meaning procedure prescribed by the legislature, The word, \"law\" as used in this Part has different shades of meaning but in no other article it appears to bear the indefinite meaning of natural justice. If so, there appears no reason why in this article it should receive this peculiar meaning. Article 31 which is also in Part III and relates to the fundamental rights in respect of property runs as follows :--\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.\"\n\nIt is obvious that in that clause \"law\" must mean enacted law. The obiect of dealing with property under a different article appears more to provide the exceptions found in article 31 (2) to (6), rather than to give the word \"law\" a different meaning than the one given in article 21. The word \"established\" according to the Oxford Dictionarv means \"to fix, settle; institute or ordain by enactment or agreement.\" The word \"established\" itself suggests an agency which fixes the limits. According to the dictionary this agency can be either the legislature or an agreement between the parties. There is therefore no justification to give the meaning of \"jus\" to \"Jaw\" in article 21.\n\nThe phrase \"procedure established by law\" seems to be borrowed from article 31 of the Japanese Constitution.\n\nBut other. articles. of that Constitution which express! y preserve other personal liberties in different clauses have to be read together to determine the meaning of \"law\" in the expression \"procedure established by law.\" These articles of the Japanese Constitution have not been incorporated in the Constitution of India in the same language. It is not shown that the word \"law\" means \"jus\" in the Japanese Constitution. In the Japanese Constitution these\n\nrights claimed under the rules of natural justice are not given by the interpretation of the words \"procedure established by law\" in their article 31.\n\nThe word \"due\" in the expression \"due process of law\" in the American Constitution is interpreted to meah \"just,\" according to the opinion of the Supreme Court of U.S.A. That word imparts jurisdiction to the Courts to pronounce what is \"due\" from otherwise, according to law. The deliberate omission of the word \"due\" from article 21 lends strength to the contention that the justiciable aspect of \"law\", i.e., to consider whether it is reasonable or not by the Court, does not form part of the Indian Constitution. The omission of the word \"due'', the limitation imposed by the word \"procedure\" and the insertiop. of the word \"established\" thus brings out more clearly the idea of legislative prescription in the expression used in article 21.\n\nBy adopting the phrase \"procedure established by law\"\n\nthe Constitution gave the legislature the final word to determine the law.\n\nOur attention was drawn to The King v. The Military Governor of the Hair Park Camp (1 ), where articles 6 and 70 of the Irish Constitution are discussed.\n\nUnder article 6 it is provided that the liberty of the person is inviolable and no person shall be deprived of such except \"in accordance with law\" ..... .\n\nIn article 70 it is provided that no one shall be tried \"save in due course of law\" and extraordinary Courts were not permitted to be established except the Military Courts to try military offences.\n\nThe expression \"in accordance with law\" was interpreted to mean not rules of natural justice but as the law in force at the time. The Irish Court\" gave the expression \"due course of law\" the meaning given to it according to the English law and not the American law .. It was observed by Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria ( 2), that in accordance with British --J'w-isprudence no member .of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except when he can support the legality of his act before a Court of justice.\n\n(1) [1924] Irish Reports K.B. 104.\n\n(1) [1931] A. C. 662 at 670.\n\nA. K. Gopa/1J11\n\nTheStalii\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu State\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nIn The King v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs ( ), Scrutton L. J. observed : \"A man undoubtedly guilty of murder must yet be released if due forms of law have not been followed in his conviction.\" It seems .very arguable that in the whole set-up of Part III _of our Constitution these principles only remain guaranteed by article 21.\n\nA detailed discussion of the true limits of article 21 will not be necessary if article 22 is. considered a code to the extent there are provisions therein for preventive detention. In this connection it may be noticed that the articles in Part III deal with different and separate rights.\n\nUnder the caption \"Right to Freedom\" articles 19-22 are grouped bur each with a separate marginal note, It is obvious that article 22\n\n(1) and (2) prescribe limitations on the right given by article 21. If the procedure mentionedin those articles is followed the arrest and detention contemplated by article 22\n\n(1) and (2), although they infringe the personal liberty of the individual, will be legal, because that becomes the established legal procedure in respect of arrest and detention. Article 22 is for protection against arrest and detention in certain cases, and runs as follows :-\n\n\"22. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitiorier of his choice.\n\n(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.\n\n(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall. apply- ( a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien ; or\n\n(1) [1923] to K.B. 361 at 382\n\n(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless- ( a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as.\n\nJudges of a High Court, has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention : Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause ( 1) ; or\n\n(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).\n\n(5) )Vhen any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as spon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\n\n(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.\n\n(7) Parliament may by law prescribe- ( a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) ;\n\n(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or clas5es of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention ; and ( c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) .\"\n\nThe learned Attornev-General contended that the subject of preventive detention does not fall under\n\n3-3 S. C. India{5 8.\n\nA. K. Gopa/an v.\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. IC Gopa!an\n\nTIN Siau\n\nKania C.J.\n\narticle 21 at all and is covered wholly by article 22.\n\nAccording to him, article 22 is a complete code.\n\nI am unable to accept that contention. It is obvious that in respect of arrest and detention article 22 (1) and (2) provide safeguards.\n\nThese safeguards are excluded in the case of preventive detention by article 22 (3), but safeguards in connection with such detention are provided by clauses ( 4) to (7) of the same article. It is therefore clear that article 21 has to be read as supplemented by article 22. Reading in that way the proper mode of construction will be that to the extent the procedure is prescribed by article 22 the same is to be observed ; otherwise article 21 will apply. But if certain procedural safeguards are expressly stated as not required, or specific rules on certain points of procedure are prescribed, it seems improper to interpm these points as not covered by article 22 and left open for consideration under article 21. To the extent the points are dealt with, and included or excluded, article 22 .is a complete code. On the points of procedure which expressly or by necessary implication are not dealt with by article 22, the opetation of article 21 will remain . unaffected. It is thus necessary first to look at article 22 ( 4) to (7) and next at the provisions_ of the impugned Act to determine if the Act or any of its provisions are ultra vires. It may be noticed that neither the American nor the Japanese Constitution contain provisions permitting preventive detention, much less laying down limitations on such right of detention, in normal times, i.e., without a declaration of emergency.\n\nPreventive detention in normal times, i.e., without the existence of an emergency like war, is recognised as a normal topic of legislation in List I, Entry 9, and List III, Entry 3, of the Seventh Schedule.\n\nEven in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights article 22 envisages legislation in respect of preventive detention in normal times. The provisions of article 22 ( 4) to (7) by their very wording leave unaffected the large powers of legislation on this point and emphasize particularly by article 22\n\n(7) the power of the Parliament to deprive a person of a right to have his case considered by an advisory board.\n\nPart\n\nIII and\n\narticle 22 in particular are the only restrictions on that power . and but for those provisions the power to legislate on this subject would have been quite unrestricted. Parliament could have made a faw without any safcglJMd or any procedure for preventive detention.\n\nSuch an autocratic supremacy of the legislature is certainly cut down by article 21. Therefore, if the legislature prscribes arprocedure by a validly enacted law and such procedure in the case of preventive detention does not come in conflict with the express provisions of Part III or article 22 (4) to (7), _the Preventive Dentention Act must be held valid notwithstanding that . the Court may not fully approve of the procedure prescribed under such Act.\n\nArticle 22 (4) opens with a double negative. Put in a positive form it will mean that a law which provides for preventive detention for a perioo longer than three months shall contain a provision establishing an advisory board, (consisting of persons with the qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (a), and which has to report before the expiration of three months if in its opinion there was sufficient cause for -such detention.\n\nThis clause, if it stood by itself and without the remaining provisions of article 22, will apply bothto the Parliament and the State Legislatures.\n\nThe proviso to this clause further enjoins that even though the ad~ visory board may be of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for such detention, i.e., detention I\" yond the perioo of three months, still the detention is not to be permitted beyond the maximum perioo, if any, prescribed by Parliament under article 22 (7) (b).\n\nAgain the whole of this sub-clause is made inoperative by article 22 ( 4) (b) in respect of an Act of preventive detention passed by Parliament under clauses (7) (a) and (b). Inasmuch as the impugned Act is an Act of the Parliament purported to be so made, clause 22 (4) has no operation and may for the present discussion be kept aside. Article 22 (5) prescribes that when any person under a preventive detention law is detained, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the\n\n- 1950\n\nJt. K. O.J.fltin v.\n\nTlrlS\"1#\n\nKani4 C.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTlw Stot. x.,,;,, C.}.\n\nearliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. This. clause is of general operation in respect of every detention order made under any law permitting detention.\n\nArticle 22 ( 6) permits the authority making the order to withhold disclosure of facts which such authority considers against the public interest to disclose. It may be noticed that this clause only permits the non-disclosure of facts, and reading clauses\n\n(5) and (6) together a distinction is drawn between facts and grounds of detention. Article 22 ( 4) and (7) deal not with the period of detention only but with other requirements in the case of preventive detention also. They provide for the establishment of an advisory board, and the necessity of furnishing grounds to the detenue. and also to give him a right to make a representation.\n\nReading article 22 clauses ( 4) and (7) together it appears to be implied that preventive detention for less than three months, without an advisory board, is permitted under the Chapter on Fundamental\n\nRights, provided such legislation is within the legislative competence of the Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be. .\n\nArticle 22 (5) permits the detained person to make a representation.\n\nThe Constitution is silent as to the person to whom it has to be made, or how it has to be dealt with.\n\nBut that is the procedure laid down by the Constitution. It does not therefore mean that if a law made by the Parliament in respect of preventive detention docs not make provision on those two points it is invalid.\n\nSilence on these points does not make the impugned Act in contravention of the Constitution because the first question is what are the rights given by the Constitution in the case of preventive detention.\n\nThe contention that the representation should be to an outside body has no support in law.\n\nEven in the Liversidge case the representation had to be made to •.he Secretary of State 'and not to another body. After such representation was made, another advisory board had to consider it, but it was not necessary to make the representation itself to a third party. Article 22 ( 4) and (7) permit the non-establishment of an advisory board expressly in a parliamentary legislation\n\nproviding for preventive detention beyond three months. If so, how can it be urged that the nonestablishment of an advisory board is a fundamental right vio1ated by the procedure prescribed in the Act passed by the Parliament ?\n\nThe important clause to be considered is article 22 (7).\n\nSub-clause (a)·. is important for this ca5e. In the case of an Act of -preventive detention passed by the Parliament this clause contained in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, thus permits detention beyond a period of three months and excludes the necessity of consulting an advisory board, if the opening words of the sub-clause are complied with. Sub-clause\n\n(b) is permissive. It is not obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe any maximum period. It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely. If that construction is correct, it springs out of the words of sub-clause: (7) itself and the Court cannot help in the matter. Subclause\n\n(c) permits the Parliament to lay down the procedure: to be: followc:q by the advisory board in an inquiry under sub-clause (~) of clause (4). I am unable to accept the contention tliat article 22 ( 4) (a) is the rule and article 22 (7) the exception. I read them as two alternatives, provided by the Constitution for making lawson preventive detention.\n\nBearing in mind the provisions of article 22 read with article 246 and Schedule VII, List I, Entry 9, and, List III, Entry 3, it is thus clear that the Parliament is empowered to enact a law of preventive detention\n\n(a) for reasons connected with defence, (b) for reasons connected with foreign affairs, ( c) fer reasons connected with the security of India ; and (under List III}, ( d) for reasons connected with the security of a State, ( e) for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order, or (£) for rea.Sons connected with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of several provisions of the Act. . In respect of the construction of a Constitution Lore~ Wright in James v. The Commonwealth of Australif' (1),\n\n(') (1936) A.C. 578 at 614.\n\nA. K. GoltJlaa\n\nT1\" Stall\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. E. Gop,/an\n\nT/,. Stat<\n\nKania C.J.\n\nobserved that \"a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense.\" Mr. Justice Higgins in Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees' Union (1), observed: \"Although we are to interpret words of the Constitution on the same principles of interpretation as we apply to any ordinary law, these very principles of interpretation compel us to take into account the nature and scope of the Act that we are interpreting-to remember that it is a Constitution, a mechanism under which laws are to be made and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be.\" In In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act XIV of 1938 ( 2), Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. after adopting these observations said : \"especially is this true of a Federal Constitution with its nice balance of jurisdictions.\n\nI conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it ; but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or prevert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory o.r even for the purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors.\" There is considerable authority for the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an A, ct void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words.\n\nWhere the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the Legislature we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the spirit of the Constitution which is not even mentioned in the. instrument.\n\nIt is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition, except so far as the express :words of a written Constitution give that authority. It is also stated, if the words be positive and without ambiguity, there is no authority for a Court to vacate or repeal a Statute on that ground alone. But it is only in express constitutional . provisions limiting legislative power and controlling the temporary will of a majority by a permanent and\n\n(') (1908) 6 Com. L.R. 469 at 611-12.\n\n(2) (1939) F.C.R. 18 at 37.\n\nparamount law settled. by the ddibcrate wisdom of the nation that one can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of Courts of justice to declare void any legislative enactment.\n\nAny assumption of authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the judiciary powers too great and too indefinite either for its own security or the protection of private rights.\n\nIt was first argµcd that by section 3 the Parliament had delegated its legislative power to the executive officer in detaining a person on his being satisfied of its necessity.\n\nIt was urged that the satisfaction must be of the legislative body. This contention of delegation of the legislative power in such cases has been considered and rejected in numerous cases by our Federal Court and by the English Courts. It is unnecessary to refer to all those cases. A reading of the various speeches in liversidge v. Anderson (1)\n\nclearly negatives this contention. Section 3 of the impugned Act is no delegation of legislative power to make laws. It only confers discretion on the officer to enforce the law made by the legislature.\n\nS.ection 3 is also impugned on the ground that it does not provide ?Jl objective standard which the Court can utilize for determining whether the requirements of law have been complied with.\n\nIt is clear that no such objective standard of conduct can be prescribed, except as laying down conduct tending to achieve or to avoid a particular object.\n\nFor preventive detention action must be taken on good suspicion. It is a subjective test based on the cumulative effect of different actions, perhaps spread over a considerable period. . As observed by Lord Finlay in The King v. Halliday (•), a Court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person. The contention is urged in respect of preventive detention and not punitive detention. Before a person can be held liable for an offence it is obvious that he should be in a position to know what he may do or not do, and an omission to do or not to do will result in the State\n\n(I) (1942) A.C. 206.\n\n(2) (1917) A.C.260 at 269.\n\nA.K.~• v. 7/wSll*\n\nKaia C.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nconsidering him guilty according to the penal enactment. When it comes however to preventive detention, the very purpose is to prevent the individual not merely from acting in a particular way but, as the sub-heads summarized above show, from achieving a particular object. It will not be humanly possible to tabulate exhaustively all actions which may lead to a particular object.\n\nIt has therefore been considered that a punitive detention Act which sufficiently prescribes the objects which the legislature considers have not to be worked up to is a sufficient standard to prevent the legislation being vague.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, the argument of the petitioner against section 3 of the impugned Act fails. It was also contended that section 3 prescribes no limit of time for detention and therefore the legislation is ultra vires.\n\nThe answer is found in article 22 (7) (b). A perusal of the provisions of the impugned Act moreover shows that in section 12 provision is made for detention for a period longer than three months bur not exceeding one year in respect of clauses (a) and (b) of that section_ It appears therefore that in respect of the rest of the clauses mentioned in section 3 ( 1) (a) the detention is not contemplated to be for a period longer than three months, and in such cases a reference to the advisory board under section 9 is contemplated.\n\nSection 7 of the Act which is next challenged, runs on the same .lines as article 22 (5) and (6) and in my opinion infringes no provision of the Constitution.\n\nIt' was argued that this gave only the right of making a representation without being heard orally or without affording an opportunity to lead evidence and therefore was not an orderly course of procedure, as required by the rules of natural justice. The Parliament by the Act has expressly given a right to the person detained under a preventive detention order to receive the grounds for detention and also has given him a right to make a representation.\n\nThe Act has thus complied with the requirements of article 22 (5).\n\nThat clause, which prescribes what procedure has to be followed as a matter of fundamental right, is silent, about the person detained having a right to be heard\n\norally or by a lawyer. The Constituent Assembly had before them the provisions of clause (I) of the same article. The Assembly having dealt with the requirements of receiving grounds and giving an opportunity to make a representation has deliberately refrained from providing a right to be heard orally. If so,. I do not read the clause as guaranteeing such right under article .22 (5).\n\nAn \"orderly course of procedure\" is not limited to procedure which has been sanctioned by settled usage. New forms of procedure are as much, held even by the Supreme Court of America, due process of law as old forms, provided they give a person a fair opportunity to present his ca5e. It was contended that the right to make a representation in article 22 (5) must carry with it a right to be heard by an independent tribunal ; otherwise the making of a repn:sentation has no substance because it is not an effective remedy. I am unable to read clause (5) of article 22 as giving a fundamental right to be heard by an. ind¢pendent tribunal. The Constitution deli- .berately stops at giving the right of representation.\n\nThis is natural because under article 22 (7), in terms, the Constitution permits the making of a law by Parliament in which a reference to an advisory board may be omitted.\n\nTo consider the right to make a representation :rs necessarily including a right to be heard by an independent judicial, administrative or advisory tribunal will thus be directly in conflict with the express words of article 22 (7).\n\nEven according to the Supreme Court of U.S.A. a right to a judicial trial is not absolute. In the United States v. Ju Toy (1 ), a question arose about the exclusion from entry into the States, of a Chinese who claimed to be a citizen of the United States. At page 263 the majority judgment contains the following passage :-\"If for the purpose of argument, we assume that the Fifth Amendment applies to him, and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheles5 are of opinion that with regard to him due process of law does not require juclicial trial: That is the result of the cases which we have cited, and the almost necessary result of the\n\n(I) (198)U.S. 253 at 263.\n\nA.K.Gopalatt\n\n11.\n\nTiii S\"1U\n\nKania C.].\n\nA. K. Copa/a• - v.\n\nTM Siok\n\nKama C.J.\n\npower of the Congress to pass exclusion laws. That the decision may be entrusted to an executive officer, and that his decision is due process of law, was affirmed and explained in several cases.\n\nIt is unnecessary to\n\nepeat the often-quoted rema, ks of Mr. Justice Curits, speaking for the whole Court, in Den Exden ltfurray v.\n\nHoboken Land and Improvement Company ( 1), to show that the requirement of a judicial trial does not prevail in every case.\"\n\nAgain, I am not prepared to accept the contention that a right to be heard orally is an essential right of procedure even according to the rules of natural justice. The right to make a defence may be admitted, but there is nothing to support the contention that an oral interview is compulsory. In the Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1 ), the respondent applied to the Board constituted under the Housing Act to state a special case for the opinion of the High Court, contending that the order was invalid because ( 1) the report of the Inspector had been treated as a confidential document and had not been disclosed to the respondent, and (2) because the Board had declined to give the respondent an opportunity of being heard orally by the person or ptrsons by whom the appeal was finalry decided.\n\nThe Board rejected the application.\n\nBoth the points were urged before the House of Lords on appeal. Viscount Haldane L. C. in his speech rejected the contention about the necessity of an oral hearing by observing \"But it does not follow that the procedure of every tribunal must be the same.\n\nIn the case of a Court of law tradition in this country has prescribed certain principles to which, in the main, the procedure must conform.\n\nBut what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of a tribunal.\" In rejecting the contention about the disclosure of the report of the Inspector, the Lord Chancellor stated: \"It might or might not have been useful to disclose this report, but I do not think that the Board was bound to do so any more than it would have been bound to disclose all the minutes made on the papers in the office before (I) 18 H.O.W. 272 at 280.\n\n(2) (1915) A.C. 120.\n\na decision was come to . . . . What appears to me to have been the fallacy of the judgment of the majority in the Court of appeal is that it begs the question at . the beginning by setting up the test of the procedure of a Court of justice instead of the other standard which was laid down for such cases in Board of Education v. Rice (1 ). I do not think the Board was bound to hear the respondent orally provided it gave him the opportunities he actually had.\" In spite of the fact that in England the Parliament is supreme I am unable to accept the view that the Parliament in making laws, legislates against the well-recognised principles of natural justice accepted as such in all civilized countries. The same view is accepted in the United States in Federal Communications Commission\n\nv. W/R The Goodwill Station (• ).\n\nA right to lead evidence against facts suspected to exist is also not essential in the case of preventive detention. Article 22 ( 6) permits the non-disclosure of facts. That is one of the:_ clauses of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. If even the non-disclosure of facts is permitted, I fail to see how there can exist a right to contest facts by evidence and the noninclusion of such procedural right could make this Act invalid.\n\nSection 10 (3) was challenged on the ground that it excludes the right to appear in person or by any lawyer before the advisory board and it was argued that this was an infringement of a fundamental right.\n\nIt must be noticed that article 22 (1) which gives a detained person a right to consult or be defended by his own legal practitioner is specifically excluded by article 22 (3) in the case of legislation dealing with preventive detention.\n\nMoreover, the Parliament is expressly given power under article 22 (7) (c) to lay down the procedure in an inquiry by an advisory board.\n\nThis is also a part of article 22 itself. If so, how can the omission to give a right to audience be considered against the constitutional rights ? It wa.~ pointed 'out that section 10 (3) prevents even the disclosure of a (I) (191 n A.C. 179.\n\n(2) 337 U.S. 265 at 276.\n\nA. K. Gopalaa\n\nTu Stall\n\nKlllfia C.].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\nKania C.J.\n\nportion: of the report and opinion of the advisory board.\n\nIt was argued that if so how can the detained person put forth his case before a Court and challenge the conclusions ? This argument was similarly advanced in.\n\nLocal Government Board v. Arlidge ( 1 ) and rejected, as mentioned above.\n\nIn my opinion, the answer is in the provision found in article 22 (7) ( c) of the Constitution of India.\n\nIt was argued that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance cif the detention for such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit.\n\nThis may mean an indefinite period. In my opinion this argument has no substancebecause the Act has to be read as a whole.\n\nThe whole life of the Act is for a year and therefore the argument that the detention may be for an indefinite period is unsound. Again, by virtue of article 22 (7) (b ), the Parliament is not obliged to fix the maximum term of such detention. It has not so fixed it, except under section 12, and therefore it cannot be stated that section 11 is in contravention of article 22 (7).\n\nSection 12 of the impugned Act is challenged on the ground that it does not conform to the provisions of article 22 (7). It is argued that article 22 (7) permits preventive detention beyond three months, when the Parliament prescribes \"the circumstances in which, and the class or classes of cases in which,\" a person: may be detained. It was argued that both these conditions must be fulfilled. In my opinion, this argument is unsound, because the words used in article 22 (7) themselves are against such interpretation. The use of the word \"which\" twice in the first part of the sub-clause, read with the. comma put after each, shows that the legislature wanted these to be read as disjunctive and not conjunctive.\n\nSuch argument might have been possible ( tl, JOugh not necessarily accepted) if the article in the Constitution was \"the circumstances and the class or classes of cases in which .... \" I have no doubt that by the clause, as worded, the legislature\n\n(l) (1915) A.C. 120.\n\nintended that the power of preventive detention beyond three months may be exercised either if the circumstances in which, or the class or classes of cases in which, a person is suspected or apprehended to be doing the objectionable things mentioned in the section.\n\nThis contention therefore fails.\n\nIt was next contended that by section 12 the Parliament had provided that a perso.n might be detained for a period longer than three months but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board, with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (a) the defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India ; or (b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order. It must be noticed that the contingency provided in section 3 (1) (a) (iii), viz., the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community is omitted in section 12. Relying on the wording of these two sub-sections in section 12, it was argued that in the impugned Act the wording of Schedule VII List I, Entry 9, and List III, ntry 3, except the last part are only copied. This did not comply with the requirement to specify either the circumstances or the class or classes of cases as is necessary to be done under article 22 (7) of the Constitution.\n\nCircumstances ordinarily mean events or situation extraneous to the actions of the individual concerned, while a class of cases mean determinable groups based on the actions of the individuals with a common aim or idea.\n\nDeterminable may be according to the nature of the object also.\n\nIt is obvious that the classification can be by grouping the activities of people or by specifying the objectives to be attained or avoided. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner on this point does not appeal to me because it assumes that the words of Schedule VII List I, Entry 9, and List III, Entry 3 t<re never capable of being considered as circumstances or classes of cases.\n\nIn my opinion, th.at assumption is not justified, particularly when we have to take into consideration cases of preventive\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTh• State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nTlv Stall\n\nKania G.].\n\ndetention and not of conviction and punitive detention.\n\nEach of the expressions used in those entries is capable of complying with the requirement of mentioning circumstances or classes of cases.\n\nThe classification of cases, having regard to an object, may itself amount to a description of the circumstances.\n\nIt is not disputed that each of the entries in the Legislative Lists in the Seventh Schedule has a specific connotation well understood and ascertainable in law.\n\nIf so, there appears no reason why the same expression when used in section 12 (1) (a) and (b) of the impugned Act should not be held to have such specific meaning and thus comply with the requirement of prescribing circumstances or classes of cases. This argument therefore must be rejected.\n\nSection .. 13 (2) was attacked on the ground that even if a detention order was revoked, another detention order under section 3 might be made against the same person on the same grounds.\n\nThis clause appears to be inserted to prevent a man being released if a detention order was held invalid on some technical ground.\n\nThere is nothing in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and in article 21 or 22 to prevent the inclusion of such a clause in a par liame11tary legislation, permitting preventive detention.\n\nArticle 20 (2) may be read as a contrast on this point.\n\nDealing with the four fundamental principles of natural justice in procedure claimed by the petitioner, it is thus clear that in respect of preventive detention no question of an objective standard of human conduct can be laid down.\n\nIt is conceded that no notice before detention can be claimed by the very nature of such detention. The argument that after detention i.ntimation of the grounds should be given has been recognised in article 22\n\n(5) and incorporated in the impugned Act.\n\nAs regards an impartial tribunal, article 22 ( 4) and (7) read together give the Parliament ample discretion. When in specified circumstances and classes of cases the preventive detention exceeds three months, the absence of an advisory board is expressly permitted\n\nby article 22 (7). Under article 22 (4) it appears implied that a provision for such tribunal is not necessary if the detention is for less than three months. As regards an opportunity to be heard, there is no absolute natural right recognised in respect of oral representation. It has been held to depend on the nature of the tribunal. -The right to make a representation, is affirmed by the Constitution in artitie 22 (5) and finds a place in the impugned Act. The right to an orderly course of procedure to the extent it is guaranteed by article 22 (4) read with article 22 (7) (c), and by article 22 (7)\n\n(a) and (b), has also been thus provided in the Act.\n\nIt seems to me therefore that the petitioner's contentions even on these po in ts fail. - Section 14 was strongly attacked on the ground that it violated all principles of natural justice and even infringed the right given by article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It runs as follows :\n\n\"14. (1) No Court shall, except for the purposes of a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any statement to be made, or any evidence to be given, before it of the substance of any communication made under section 7 of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any person or of any representation made by him against such order ; and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no Court shal be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or to Jisclose the substance of, any such communication or representation made, or the proceedings of an Advisory Board or that part of the report of an Advisory Board which is confidential.\n\n(2) It shall be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish without the previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State. ·.Government, as the case may be, any contents or matter purporting to be contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section (1) :\n\nA. K. Gopalara\n\nTll4 State\n\nKania C.].\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nKania C.J.\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made to his legal adviser by a person who is the subject of a detention order.\"\n\nBy that section the Court is prevented (except for the purpose of punishment for such disclosure) from being informed, either by a statement or by leading evidence, of the substance of the grounds conveyed to the detained person under section 7 on which the order was made, or of any representation made by him against such order.\n\nIt also prevents the Court from calling upon any public officer to disclose the substance of those grounds or from the production of the proceedings or report of the advisory board which may be declared confidential.\n\nIt is clear that if this provision is permitted to stand the Court can have no material before' it to determine whether the detention is proper or not. I do not mean whether the grounds are sufficient or not. It even prevents the Court from ascertaining whether the alleged grounds of detention have anything to do with the circumstances or class or classes of cases mentioned in section 12 ( 1) (a) or (b).\n\nIn Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. The King (1), the Federal Court held that the Court can examine the grounds given by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view. The provisions of article 22 (5) do not exclude that right of the Court. Section 14 of the impugned Act appears to be a drastic provision which requires considerable support to sustain it in a preventive detention Act.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General urged that the whole object of the section was to prevent ventilation in public of the grounds and the representations, and that it was a rule of evidence only which the Parliament could prescribe.\n\nI do not agree.\n\nThis argument is clearly not sustainable on the words of article 22 clauses (5) and (6). The Government has the right under article 22 ( 6) not to disclose facts which it considers undersirable to disclose in the public interest. It does not permit the Government to refrain from disclosing grounds which fall under clause (5).\n\n(1) [1949-50) F.C.R. 827.\n\nTherefore, it cannot successfully be contended t,, hat the disclosure of grounds may be withheld from the Court in public interest, as a rule of evidence. Moreover, the position is made clear by the words of article 22 (5). It provides that the detaining authority shall communicate to such detained person the grounds on which the order hat been made.\n\nIt is therefore essential that the grounds mtist be connected with the order of preventive detention.\n\nIf they are not so connected the requirements of article 22 (5) are not complied with and the detention order . will be invalid.\n\nTherefore, it is open to a detained person to contend before a Court that the grounds on which the order has been made have no connection at all with the order; or have no connection with the circumstances or class or classes, of cases under which a preventive detention order cou1d be supported under section 12. To urge this argument tltc: aggrieved party must have a right to intimate to the Cqurt the grounds given for the alleged detention and the representation made by him.\n\nFor instance, a person is served with a paper on which there are written three stanzas of a poem or three alphabets written in three different ways.· For the va!Wity of the detention order it is necessary that the grounds should be thost on which the order has been made. H the detained persori is not in a position to put before the Court this paper, the Court will be prevented from considering :yvhether the. requirement~ of article 22 (5) are complied with and that is a: right. which is guaranteed to. every person.\n\nIt seems to me therefore that the provisions of section 14 abridge the , right given under article 22 (5) and a:te therefore ultra vires.\n\nIt next remains to be considered how far the invalidity of this section affects the rest of the impugned ,'\\.ct.\n\nThe .impugned Act minu.s this section can remain unaffected.\n\nThe omission of this section will not change the. hature or .the structure or the object of the legislation. . Therefore the decision that section 14 is ultra ilires does no.t.affect the validity of the rest of the Act.\n\nIn my opinion therefore Act IV of 1950, except section 14, is not ultra vires. It does not infringe any\n\n4-3 s. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopa/11n\n\nv. tMState\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nprovJS1orts of Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act, except to the extent of section 14, fails.\n\nThe petition therefore fails and is dismissed.\n\nFAZL Au J.-The question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), is wholly or in part invalid and whether the petitioner who has been detained under that Act is entitled to a writ in the nature of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention is illegal. . The question being a pure question of law can be decided without referring to a long chain of facts which are narrated in the petitioner's application to this Court and which have a more direct bearing on the alleged mala {ides of the authorities who have detained him than on the validity of the Act.\n\nThe Act which is i!Ilpugned was enacted by the Parliament on the 26th February, 1950, and will cease to have effect on the 1st April, 1951, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date.\n\nThe main provisions of the Act are set out in sections 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, ll, 12 and 14.\n\nSection 3 (1) provides that \"the Central Government or the State Government may- ( a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n( i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to . makmg arrangements for his expulsi1 n from India,\n\nit is necessary so to do, make an .order directing that such person be detained.\"\n\nSub-sections\n\n(2) and (3) of this section empower a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistarte or the Commissioner of Police in a Presidency Town to exercise the power conferred by and make the order contemplated in sub-section ( 1), but with the qualification that any order made thereunder must be reported forthiwth to the Government of the State to which the officer in question is subordinate with the groi, mds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the necessity for the order.\n\nSection 7 of the Act provides that the authority making an order of detention shall as soon as may be communicate to the person detained the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order, in a case wh<; re such order has been made by the Central Government, to that Government, and in a case where it has been made by a State Government or an officer subordinate thereto, to the State Government. Section 8 provides that the Central Government and each State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more advisory boards for the purposes of the Act. and state the qualifications of persons of which the board should consist.\n\nSection 9 provides that when a detention order has been made with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or if it is made in regard to a person who is :i. foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or making arrangements for . his expulsion from India, the grounds on which the order I/as been made and the representation, if any, of the person detained shall, within six weeks from the date of detention, be placed before an advisory board.\n\nIt will be noticed that this section does not provide that the cases of persons who are detained under section 3 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) will also be placed before the advisory board.\n\nSection 10 lays down the\n\nA. K. Goftalan\n\nT!uSlall\n\nFazl Ali].\n\n.A. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nFa</ Ali J.\n\nprocedure to be followed by. the advisory board and section 11 provides that in any case where the advisory board has reported that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the detention order may be confirmed and the detention of the person concerned may be continued for such period as the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, thinks fit.\n\nSection 12 which is a very important section, as we shall presently see, runs as follows :-\n\n\"12 (I) Any person detained in any of the following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances may be detained without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months, but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, namely, where such person has been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n(a) the defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India; or\n\n(b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order.\n\n(2) The case of every person detained under a detention order to which the provisions of sub-section\n\n(1) apply shall, within a period of six months from the date of his detention, be reviewed where the order was made by the Central Government or a . State Government, by such Government, and where the order was made by any officer, specified in sub-section\n\n(2) of section 3, by the State Government to which such officer is subordinate, in consultation with a person who is or has been or is qualified to be appointed as Judge of a High Court nominated in that behalf by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be.\"\n\nSection 14, which is also a material section for the purpose of this case, is to the following effect :-\n\n\" ( 1) No Court shall, except for the purposes of a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any statement to be made, or any .\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COQRT REPORTS 135\n\nevidence to be given, before it of the substance of any communication made l.fnder section 7 of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any . person or of any representation made by him against such order ; and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other 1aw, no Court shall be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or to disclose the substance of, any such communication or representation made, or the proceedings of an Advisory Board or that part of the report of an Advisory Board which is confidential.\n\n(2) It shall be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish without the. previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, any contents or matter purporting to be the contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section (I) : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made to his legal adviser by a person who is the subject of a detention order.\" The point which has been pressed before us is that the Act is invalid, as it takes away or abridges certain fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and in support of this general proposition, reliance is placed on article 13 (2) which runs as follows:-\n\n\"The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, _-to the extent of the contravention, be void.\"\n\nThe rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are classified under seven broad heads, as follows :--,.\n\n(I) Right to equality ;\n\n(2) Right to freedom;\n\n(3) Right against exploitation ; ( 4) Right to freedom of religion ;\n\n(5) Cultural and educational rights ; ( 6) Right to property ; and\n\n(7) Right to constitutional remedies.\n\n,4. K,. Gopaltfl!\n\nv, TheSlaY\n\nFad.Ali J~·\n\nA. K. Gopd...,.\n\nT/,, Stat<\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nMost of the articles which are said to have been disregarded occur under the heading \"Right to freedom,\" these articles being articles 19 ( 1) ( d), 21 and 22.\n\nAnother article which is also said to have been violated is article 32, under which the present application for a writ of habeas corpus purports to have been made.\n\nArticle 19 ( 1) is divided into seven sub-clauses and runs as follows :-\n\n\"All citizens shall have the right- ( a) to freedom of speech and expression ;\n\n(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms ; ( c) to form associations or unions ; ( d) to move freely throughout the territory of India ; ( e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India ; ( f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property ; and\n\n(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.\" Clauses (2), (3), ( 4), (5) and (6) of this article provide that nothing in clause ( 1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in regard to the rights under that clause, under certain conditions which are mentioned therein.\n\nClause (5), with which we are directly concerned and which will serve as a specimen to show the nature of these provisions, is to the following effect :-\n\n'\"Nothing in ; ub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\"\n\nThe contentions acivanced on behalf of the petitioner with reference to this article are :-(1) that the Act under which he has been detained deprives him who is a citizen of the Republic of India of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, which is guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d), and (2)\n\nS.C.R SUPREME COURT REPOltTS 137\n\nthat under clause_ (5) of article 19, it is open to this Cou1 t to judge whether the restrictions imposed by the Act on the exercise of the right conferred by article 19 (1) (d) are reasonable or otherwise.\n\nBefore dealing with this argument, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d), and to have a clear comprehension as to the true nature of the right conferred thereunder.\n\nThe contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that freedom of movement is the essence of personal liberty and any restraint on freedom of movement must be held to amount to abridgment or deprivation of personal liberty, as the case may be, according to the nature of the restraint.\n\nAfter very careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that this contention is well-founded in law.\n\nBlackstone in his \"Commentaries on the Laws of England\" (4th Edition, volume 1, page 134) states that \"personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law\". The authority of this statement has never been questioned, and it has been bodily incorporated by H. J. Stephen in his \"Commentaries on the Laws of England\" and has been reproduced by Cooley in his well-known treatise on \"Constitutional Limitations\" (8th Edition, volume 1, page 710), which was extensively quoted by both parties in the course of their arguments.\n\nThe view that freedom of movement is the essence of personal liberty will also be confirmed by reference to any book on the criminal law of England dealing with the offence of false imprisonment or any commentary on the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offences of wrongful restraint or confinement.\n\nRussell in his book on \"Crimes and Misdemeanours\" (8th Edition, volume 1, page 861), dealing with the offence of false imprisonment states as follows :-\n\n\"False imprisonment is unlawful and total restraint of the personal liberty of another, whether by constraining him or compelling him to go to a particular place or by confining him in a prison or\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTill ;,'fall\n\nFa.:! Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\n. v.\n\nThe State\n\nFa</ Ali J.\n\npolice station or private place, or by detaining him against his will in a public place ........ the essential element in the offence is the unlawful detention of the person or the unlawful restraint on his liberty.\n\nSuch interference with the liberty of another's movements is unlawful, unless it may be justified ......... \"\n\nAgain, Dr. Gour in dealing wrongful restraint in his book British India\" (5th Edition, as follows :-\n\nwith the offence of on ''The Penal Law of page 1144) observes\n\n\"Following the principle that every man's person is sacred and that it is free, law visits with its penalties those who abridge his personal liberty, though he may have no design upon his person. But the fact that he controls its movements for ever so short a time is an offence against the King's peace, for no one has the right to molest another in his free movements.\" ·\n\nDealing with the offence of wrongful confinement, the same learned author observs as follows at page 1148 of his book :-\n\n\" 'Wrongful confinement' is a species of 'wrongful restraint' as defined in the last section.\n\nIn wrongful restraint, there is only a partial suspension of one's liberty of locomotion, while in wrongful confinement there is a total suspension of liberty 'beyond certain circumscribing limits'.\"\n\nBoth these authors speak of restraint on personal liberty and interference with the liberty of one's movements or suspension of liberty or locomotion as interchangeable terms.\n\nIn Bird v. Jones ( 1 ), Coleridge J. said that \"it is one part of the definition of freedom to be able t0go whithersoever one pleases\". A similar opinion has been expressed by several authors including Sir Alfred Denning in his book entitled. \"Freedom under the Law.\" There can therefore be no doubt that freedom of movement is in the last analysis the essence of personal liberty, and just as a man's wealth is generally measured in this country in terms of rupees, annas and pies, one's personal liberty depends upon the extent of his freedom of movement.\n\nBut it is contended on behalf of the State that freedom of move-\n\n(1) 7 Q.B. 742.\n\nment to which reference has been made. in art!cle 19 ( 1)\n\n(d) is not the freedom of movement to which Blackstone and other authors have referred, but is a different species of freedom which is qualified by the words \"throughout the territory of India.\" How the ue of the expression \"throughout the territory of India\" can qualify the meaning of the rest of the words used in the article is a matter beyond my comprehension.\n\nIn my opinion, the words \"throughout the territory of India\" were used to stretch the ambit of the freedom of movement to the utmost extent to which it could be guaranteed by our Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution could not guarantee feedom of movement outside the territorial limits of India, and so has used those words to show that a citizen was entitled to move from one corner of the country to another freely and without any obstruction. \"Throughout!' is an amplifying and not a limiting expression, and I am surprised to find that the expression \"throughout the territory of India,\" which was used to give the widest possible scope to th~ freedom of movement, is sought to be construed as an expression limiting the scope and nature of the freedom.\n\nIn my opinion, the words \"throughout the territory of India;'' having regard to the context in which they have been used here, have the same force and meaning as the expression \"to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct\" used by Blackstone, or the expression \"freedom to be able to go whithersoever one pleases\"\n\nused by Coleridge J. in Bird v. Jones (l ).\n\nI am certain that neither of these authorities . contemplated that the freedom of movement which is vouchsafed to a British citizen, is guaranteed bevond the territorial limits of British territories. The question as to wh, ether preventive detention is an encroachment on the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d) has been considered by the Nagpur, Patna and Calcutta High Courts. The view which has been ultimately adopted by these High . Courts is . that preventive detention is not a violation of the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d), but, in the Calcutta\n\n(!\\ 7 Q.B. 742.\n\nA .• K. Gopal~\n\nT~S~\n\nFri.ti li_J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFa.r:l Ali J.\n\nHigh Court, where the matter has been elaborately discussed, at least five Judges have held that it does, and in the ultimate analysis the number of Judges who have held the contrary view appears to be the same.\n\nHaving regard to the fact that the view expressed by so many learned Judges is opposed to the view I am inclined to take, I consider it necessary to deal briefly with the main objections which have been raised in support of the narrow meaning sought to be attached to the Words in article 19 ( 1) ( d).\n\nI have already dealt with one of them which is based on the expression \"throughout the territory of India.\" And I shall now proceed to deal with the other seriatim.\n\nI. It will be recalled that clause (5) of article 19, which I have already quoted in full provides among other things that nothing in clause ( 1) ( d) shall affect the operation of any law, present or future, imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right of freedom of movement either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\n\nIt has been argued that the use of the words \"interests of any Scheduled Tribe\" in this clause shows that the right guaranteed by article 19 ( 1) ( d) is a limited right of movement, such as the right to visit different localities and to go from one place to another and is different from the expression \"freedom of movement\" which has been stated by Blackstone to be another name for personal liberty.\n\nIt is pointed out that the restrictions in contemplation here are mainly restrictions preventing undesirable outsiders from visiting Scheduled Areas and exploiting Scheduled Tribes, and if the words \"freedom of movement\" had been used in the larger sense, such a small matter would not have found a place in clause (5) of article 19.\n\nI must frankly confess that I am unable to appreciate this argument and to hold that a mere reference to Scheduled Tribes affects the plain meaning of the words used in clause (1) (d) of article 19. The words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) are very wide and mean that a person can go at his will in any direction to any locality and to any distance.\n\nRestraint on a freedom\n\nso wide in scope and extent may assume a variety of forms and may include internment or externment of a person, his confinement to a particular locality or within the walls of a prison, his being prevented from visiting or staying in any particular area, etc. The framers of the Constitution wanted to save all restrictive legislation affecting freedom of movement made in the interests of the general public (which expression means the same thing as \"public interests\") and I think that the law in regard to preventive detention is fully covered by the expression \"restrictions imposed in the public interests.\" But they also remembered that there were restrictive laws made in the interests of an important community and that similar laws may have to be made in future and hence they added the words \"for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\" A reference to the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Government of India: Act, 1935, as well as to certain laws made for Chota Nagpur, Santhal Parganas and other localities will show that great importance has been attached in this country to the protection and preservation of the members of the scheduled tribes and maintenance of order in tribal areas, and. this, in my opinion, is sufficient to account for the special mention of the scheduled tribes in clause (5).\n\nIt may, at first sight, appear to be a relatively small matter, but in their anxiety to cover the whole field of restrictive laws made whether in the public interest or in the interests of a particular community and not to leave the smallest loophole, the framers of the Constjtution apparently decided to draft the clause in the present form. As far as I am aware, there are no restrictive laws made in the interests of any community other than the scheduled tribes, and I think clause (5) is sufficiently comprehensive to include the smallest as well as the most complete restrictions on freedom of movement.\n\nI am also satisfied that the mere mention of scheduled tribes in clause\n\n(5) eannot change the plain meaning ot the words of the main provision which we find in article 19(1) (d) and confine it to some kind of peculiar and truncated freedom of\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stall\n\nFl Ali J.\n\nl95o\n\nA.. /[, Gopalan\n\nThi SlaU\n\nFad A.II J.\n\nmovement which is unconnected with personal liberty and which is unknown to any Constitution witb which we are familiar.\n\nIt will perhaps be not out of place to refer in this connection to Ordinance XIV of 1943, which is one of tbe ordinances by whicb the Defence of India Act, 1939, was partly amended.\n\nThis ordinance provides for-\n\n\"the apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as tbe case may be su5pects, on grounds appearing to such autbority to be reasonable, of being of hostile origin, or of having acted, acting, being about to act, or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or interest, the defence of British India, . the maintenance of public order, His Majesty's relations with foreign powers or Indian States, tbe maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas or tbe efficient prosecution of the war,\n\no~ wiJ; li respect to whom ouch autbority is satisfied that liis apprehension and detention are necessary for tbe purpose . of preventing him from acting in any sucb prejudicial manner, the prohibition of such person from entering or residing or remaining in any area, and the compelling of sucb person to reside and remain in anY area, or to do or abstain from doing anything.\" The points to be noted in connection witb the ordinance are :-\n\n( l) that it is an ordinance specifically providing for apprehension and detention ;\n\n(Z) that notwitbstanding the fact that there is a general reference in it to acts prejudicial to public safety ot interests and maintenance of public order there is also a specific reference to maiii.tenance of peaceful ainditicins in tribal areas ;\n\n(3) that .tribal areas and scheduled tribes are kfudriid' . subjects as would appear from the Fifth SchcdillC appended to the Constitution ; and\n\n(4) that maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas may be as much in the public interest as in the hitercsts of. persons living in those areas. •\n\nThis ordinance shows at least this much that sometimes the law of preventive detention can also be made in the interests of scheduled tribes or scheduled areas\n\nand consequently the mere mention of scheduled tribes in clause (5) does not necessarily exclude laws relating to preventive detention from the scope of article 19 (5). The same remarks apply to the ordinance called \"The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944\" (Ordinance No. III of 1944) which empowered the Central Government or the Provincial Government to detain and make orders restricting the movements of certain persons in the interest of public safety, maintenance of public order as well as maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas, etc.\n\nII. It is also argued that since preventive detention amounts to a total deprivation of freedom of movement, it is not a violation of the right granted under article 19 (1) ( d) in regard to which the word \"restriction\" and not \"deprivation\" has been used in clause (5).\n\nThis argument also does not appeal to me.\n\nThere are really two questions which fall to be decided\n\nin this case, viz., (a) Does preventive detention take away the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d) ? ; and\n\n(b) if so, what are the consequences, if any ?\n\nIt seems obvious to me that preventive detention amounts to a complete deprivation of the right guaranteed by article ( 19) ( d). The meaning of the word \"restriction\" is to be considered with reference to the second question and I think that it will be highly technical to argue that deprivation of a right cannot be said to involve restriction on the exercise of the right.\n\nIn my opinion, having regard to the context in which the word \"restriction\" has been used, there is no antithesis between that word and the word \"deprivation.\" As I have already stated, restraint on the right to move can assume a variety of forms and restriction would be the most appropriate expression to be used in clause (5) so as to cover all those forms. ranging from total to various kinds of partial deprivation of freedom of movement.\n\nI will however have to advert to this subject later and will try to show that the\n\n.A. •• K. Gopalil/I\n\nT/14.Slak\n\nFa1:.I .dli J,\n\nA. Ir. Gopalon\n\nTheStau\n\nFa<! Ali J.\n\nconstruction I have suggested is supported by good authority.\n\nIII. It appears that some of the Judges who had to deal with the question which we have before us were greatly influenced by the argument that if the deprivation of personal liberty amounts to deprivation of the right granted under article 19 (!) (d); any conviction for an offence under the Indian Penal Code involving a sentence of imprisonment will be subject to judicial review on the ground of reasonableness of the provisions of the Code under which tlle conviction is recorded. Meredith C. J. of the Patna High Court has given expression to his concern for the situation which will thereby arise, in these words :-\n\n\"It will be seen that the claim made is very sweeping indeed.\n\nIt would mean that eyery law under which a person may be imprisoned, including all the provisions of the Penal Code, is open to examination by the Courts on the ground of reasonableness.\n\nIt makes the Courts supreme arbiters in regard to any such legislation, and they can reject it or accept it in accordance with their ideas of whether it appeals to their reason.\n\nBu't ideas of reasonableness or otherwise are apt to vary widely.\n\nTake for example, laws relating to prohibition or take such a matter as adultery which the Indian law regards as a crime punishable with imprisonment but the English law does not.\n\nIt is difficult to believe the framers of the Constitution ever intended to place so enormous a power in the hands of the Courts ........ \" [Rattan Roy v. The State of Bihar].\n\nThe obviqus and strictly legal reply to this argument is that the consideration, which has so greatly weighed with the learned Chief Justice, is not enough to cut down the plain meaning of the general words used in article 19 (5) of the Constitution. As has been pointed out in a number of cases, \"in construing enacted words, we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results injurious or otherwise which may follow bv ving effect to the lmguage\n\nused\" [King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma and others.\n\n(1) ].\n\nApart from this aspect of -the matter, I agree with one of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in his remark that \"no calamitous or untoward result will follow even if the provisions of the Penal Code become justiciable.\" I am certain that no Court would interfere with a Code which has been the law of the land for nearly a century and the provisions of which are not in conflict with the basic principles of any system of law.\n\nIt seems to me that this Court should not be deterred from giving effect to a fundamental right granted under the Constitution, merely because of a vague and unfounded fear that something catastrophic may happen.\n\nI have so far proceeded on the assutnption that the basis of the objection raised by Meredith C. J. is correct in law, but, in my opinion, it is not.\n\nCrime has been defined to consist in those acts or omissions \\nvolving breach of a duty to which a sanction is attached by law by way of punishment or pecuniary penalty in the public interests. (See Russell's \"Crimes and Misderneanours\".) Section 2 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provides that \"every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within British India.\" The Indian Penal Code does not primarily or necessarily impose restrictions on the freedom of movement, and it is not correct to say that it is a law imposing restrictions on the right to move freely.\n\nIts primary object is to punish crime and not to restrict movement.\n\nThe punishment may consist in imprisonment or a pecuniary penalty. If it consists in a pecuniary penalty, it obviously involves no restriction on movement ; but if it consists in imprisonment, there is a restriction on movement. This restraint is imposed not under a law imposing restrictions on movement but under a law defining crime and making it punishable.\n\nThe punishment is correlated directly with the violation of some other person's riht and not with the right of (I) (19!5) F.C.R. 161 at p. 177.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Statt\n\nFad Ali].\n\n19.0\n\nA~ K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nFat! Ali J.\n\nmovement possessed by the offender himself.\n\nIn my opm10n, therefore, the Indian Penal Code does not come within the ambit of the words \"law imposing restriction on the right to move freely\".\n\nIn the course of the arguments, the expression \"punitive detention\" was frequent! y used and the tendency was to put it on the same footing as preventive detention for the purpose of certain arguments.\n\nPunitive detention is however essential! y different from preventive detention.\n\nA person is punitively detained only after a trial for committing a crime and after his guilt has been established in a competent Court of justice.\n\nA person so convicted can take his case to the State High Court and sometimes bring it to this Court also ; and he can in the course of the proceedings connected with his trial take all pleas available to him including the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Court of trial and the invalidity of tbe . law under which h~ has been prosecuted.\n\nThe final judgment in the criminal trial will tbus constitute\" a serious obstacle in his wav if be chooses to assert even after his conviction that his right under article 19 (!) (d) has been 1 violated. But a person who is preventively detained has not to face such an obstacle whatever other obstacle may be in his way.\n\nIV. It was pointed out tbat article 19 being confined to citizens, the anomalous situation will follow that in cases of preventive detention, a citizen will be placed in a better position than a non-citizen, because if a citizen is detained his detention will be open to some kind of judicial review under article 19 (5), but if a non-citizen has been detained his case will not be open to such review.\n\nIn this view, it is said that the whole Act relating to preventive detention may be declared to be void if it is unreasonable, though it concerns citizens as well as persons other than citizens.\n\nI must frankly state th?t I am not at all perturbed by this argument. It is a patent fact that the Constitution has confined all the rights mentioned in article 19 ( 1) to citizens.\n\nIt is equally clear that restrictions on those rights are to a limited extent at least open to judicial review.\n\nThe very same question which is\n\nraised m regard to article 19 (1) (d) will arise with regard to most of the other sub-clauses.\n\nA citizen has the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, to form associations or unions and so on.\n\nIf there is any law imposing u1ireasonable restrictions on any of these rights, that law will not be good law so far as citizens are concerned,' but it may be good law so far as non-citizens are concerned. I do not see why a similar situation arising with regard to the right granted under sub-clause ( d) should be stated to be anomalous. So far as the right of free movement is concerned, a non-citizen has been granted certain p£.otections in articles 21 and 22. If a citizen has been granted certain other additional protections under article 19 (1) (d), there is no anomaly involved in the discrimination. I think that it is conceivable that a certain law may be declared' to be void as aginst a citizen but not against a non-citizen.\n\nSuch a result however should not affect our mind if it is found to have been clearly within the contemplation o! the framers of the Constitution.\n\nIt was contended that the rights declared by article 19 are the rights of a free citizen and if he has already been deprived of his liberty in the circumstances referred to in articles 20, 21 and 22, then it would be idle to say that he still enjoys the right referred to in article 19. After giving my fullest consideration to this argument, I have not been able to appreciate how it arises in this case. There is nothing in article 19 to suggest that it . applies only to those cases which do not fall under articles 20, 21 and 22.\n\nConfining ourselves to preventive detention, it is enough to point out that a person who is preventively detained must have been, before he lost his liberty, a free man.\n\nWhy can't he say to those who detained him: \"As a citizen I have the right to move freely and you cannot curtail or take away my right beyond the limits imposed by clause (5) of article 19.\" This is the only question which arises in the case and it should not be obscured by any abstruse or metaphysical considerations. It is true that if you put a man under detention, he cannot move and therefore he is not in a position to\n\n5-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopa/an v.\n\nThe State\n\nFaz/ Ali].\n\nA. /(. Gopalon\n\nThe Sta11\n\nFa<I Ali].\n\nexercise the right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d), but this is only the physical aspect of the matter and a person who is bed-ridden on account of disease suffers from a similar disability. In law, however, physical duress does not deprive a person of the right to freedom of movement. If he has been detained under some provision of law imposing restrictions on the freedom of movement, then the question will arise whether the restrictions are reasonable.\n\nIf he has been detained under no provisien of law or under some law which is invalid. he must be set at liberty.\n\nTo my mind. the scheme of the Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights does not contemplate what is attributed to it. namely, that each article is a code by itself and is independent of the others. In my opinion, it cannot be sid that articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent overlap each other. The case of a person who is convicted of an offence will come under articles 20 and 21 and also under article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with in article 22, also amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in article 21, and is a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in article 19 (1) (d). That there arc other instances of overlapping of articles in the Constitution may be illustrated by reference to article 19 ( 1) ( £) and article 31 both of which deal with the right to property and to some extent overlap each other. It appears that some learned High Court Judges, who had to deal with the very question before us, were greatly impressed by the statement in the report of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assemblv on article 15 ( corresponding to the present article 21 ), that the word \"liberty\" should be qualified by the insertion of the word \"personal\" before it for otherwise it may be construed very widely so as to include the freedoms dealt with in article 13 (corresponding to the present article 19). I am not however preparded to hold that this statement is decisive on the question of the construction nf the words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) which are quite plain and can be construed without any\n\nextraneous help. Whether the report of the Drafting Committee and the debates on the floor of the House should be used at all in construing the words of a statute, which are words of ordinary and common use and are not used in any technical or peculiar sense, is a debatable question ; and whether they can be used in aid of a construction which is a strain upon the language used in the clause to be)nterpreted is a still more doubtful matter. But, apart from these legal considerations, it is, I think, open to us to analyse the statement and see whether it goes beyond adding a somewhat plausible reason-a superficially plausible reason-for a slight verbal change in article 21.\n\nIt seems clear that the addition of the word \"personal\" before \"liberty\" in article 21 cannot change the meaning of the words used in article 19; nor can it put a matter which is inseparably bound up with personal liberty beyond its place. Personal liberty and personal freedom, in spite of the use of the word \"personal,\" are, as we find in several books, sometimes used in a wide sense and embrace freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc.\n\nThese rights are some of the most valuable phases or elements of liberty and they do not cease to be so by the addition of the word \"personal.\" A general . statement by the Drafting Committee referring to freedom in plural cannot take the place of an authoritative exposition of the meaning of the words used in article 19 (1) (d), which has not been specifically referred to and cannot be such an overriding consideration as to compel us to put a meaning opposed to reason and authority. The words used in article 19\n\n(1) ( d) must be construed as they stand, and we have to decide upon the words themselves whether in the case of preventive . detention the right under article 19 ( 1) ( d) is or is not infiinged. But, as I shall point out later, however, literally we may construe the words used in article 19 (1) (d) and however restricted may be the meaning we may attribute to those words, there can be no escape 'from the conclusion that preventive detention is a <lirect infringement of the right guaranteed in article 19 (1) (d).\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTheStlJU\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFa</ Ali].\n\nHaving dealt with the principal objections, I. wish to revert once again to the main topic. The expressions \"personal liberty\" and \"personal freedom\" have, as we find in several books, a wider meaning and also a narrower meaning.\n\nIn the wider sense, they include not only immunity from arrest and detention but also freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc. In the narrower sense, they mean immunity from arrest and detention.\n\nI have shown that the juristic conception of \"personal liberty,\" when these words are used in the sense of immunity from arrest, is that it consis~ in freedom of movement and -locomotion. I have also pointed out that this conception is at the root of the criminal law of England and of this country, so far as the offences of false imprisonment and wrongful confinement are concerned. The gravamen of these offences is restraint on freedom of movement. With these facts in view, I have tried to find out whether there is any freedom of movement known in England apart from personal liberty used in the sense of immunity from arrest and detention, but I find no trace of any such freedom.\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd Edition, volume 6, page 391), the freedoms mentioned are the right to personal freedom (or immunity from detention or confinement), the right to property, the right to freedom of speech, the right of public meeting, the right of association, etc. Similar classifications will be found in Dicey's \"Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution\" and Keith's \"Constitutional Law\" and other books on constitutional subjects, but there is no reference anywhere to any freedom or right of movement in the sense in which we are asked to construe the words used in article l9 (1) (d) .. In the Constitutions of America, Ireland. and many other countries when: freedom is prized, there is no reference to freedom or right of movement as something distinct from personal liberty used in the sense of immunity from arrest and confinement.\n\nThe obvious explanation is that in lep; al conception no freedom or right of movement exists apart from what personal liberty connotes and therefore a separate treatment of this freedom was not necessary. It is only in the Constitution of the Free\n\nCity of Danzig, which covers an area of 791 square miles, that we find these words in article 75:-\"All nationals shall enjoy freedom of movement within the City.\" There is however no authoritative opinion available to support the view that this freedom is anything different from what is otherwise called personal liberty. The problem of construction in regard to this particular right in the Constitution of Danzig is the same as in our Constitution.\n\nSuch being the general position, I am confirmed in my view that the juristic conception that personal liberty and freedom of, movement connote the same thing is the correct and true conception, and the words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) must be construed according to this universally accepted legal concepuon.\n\nThis conclusion is further supported by reference to the war legislation in England and in India, upon which the law of preventive detention, which has been in force in this country since the war, is based. In the first world war, the British Parliament passed the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, in 1914, an<l a number of regulations were made under it including regulation\n\n14-B, which permitted the Secretary of State to subject any person \"to such obligations and restrictions as hereinafter mentioned in view of his hostile origin or associations.\" Lord Atkin in referring to this regulation said in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson e ), \"that the regulation undisputedly gave to a Secretary of State unrestricted power to detain a suspected person.\" Apparently, Lord Atkin meant that the restriction referred to in the Act included pre~ ventive detention.\n\nUnder this regulation, one Arthur Zadig was interned, and he applied to the King's Bench for a writ of habeas corpus which was refused.\n\nThe matter ultimately came up before the House of Lords in Rex v. Halliday (2) , and the noble Lords in dealing with he case proceeded on the assumption that there was no difference between internment and incarceration or imprisonment. Lord Shaw in narrating -::he facts of th case stated:-\n\n(I) [19~2] A. C. 238.\n\n(2) [1917] A. C. 260.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stau\n\nFaz! Ali J.\n\nf930\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe Stat<\n\nFaz/ Ali ].\n\n\"His person was seized, he has been interned ... .\n\nThe appellant lost his liberty and was interned ...... \"\n\nHe then proceeded to state that there was no difference between internment and imprisonment and quoted the following passage from Blackstone:-\n\n\"The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment. So that the keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an imprisonment.'' Proceeding onthis footing (which I find to be the common basis in all other speeches delivered in the case, though Lord Shaw had given a dissenting judgment}, Lord Finlay while dealing with the provisions of the\n\nregwations observed :-\n\n\"One of the most obvious means of taking precautions against dangers such as are enumerated is to impose some restriction on the freedom of movement of persons whom there may be any reason to suspect of being disposed to help the enemy\" (' ).\n\nAgain, Lord Atkinson while dealing with the merits of the case made the following observation :-\n\n\"If the legislature chooses to enact that he can be deprived of his liberty and incarcerated or interned for certain things for which he could not have been heretofore incarcerated or interned, that enactment and the orders made under it if intra vires do not inringe upon the Habeas Corpus Acts or take away any right conferred by Magna Charta ...... \" ( • ) This passage read with the previous passage quoted by me will show that both internment and incarceration were regarded as \"restrictions on the freedom of movement\" and that deprivation of liberty and restriction on freedom of movement were used as alternative expressions bearing the same meaning.\n\nThe same conclusion is to be drawn by referente to the regulations made in the last world war under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, l939. The regulation which directly dealt with detention orders was 18-B.\n\nThis regulation and a number of other regulations have been placed in Part I under the heading \"Restrictiom\n\n(I) [!917] A. C. 269.\n\n(2) [1917] A. C. 272.\n\non movements and activitie~ of persons.'' The . classification is important, because it meets tWo . principal arguments advanced in this case.\n\nIt shows firstly that detention is a form of restriction and secondly that it is a restriction on movement. I have noticed that \"movement\" is used in plural, and the heading also refers to restncttons on activities, b1,1t, having regard t<f the subjects classified under this head, move-. ment undoubtedly refers to physical movement and includes such movements as entering a particular locality, going from one place to another, etc., i.e., the very things to which article 19 (1) (d~ is said to have reference. In Liversidge's case, in construing the provisions of the Act . of 1939, Viscount Maugham observed as follows:-\n\n\"The language o£ the Act of 1939 (above cited) shows beyond doubt that Defence Regulations may be made which must deprive the subject \"whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of public safety\" of all his liberty of move\" ment while the regulations remain in force\" ( 1 ).\n\nThus Viscount Maugham .also considered detention to be synonymous with deprivation of liberty of movement.\n\n'.The classification that we find in the Defence of the Realm Regulations was with a little verbal modification adopted in the Defence of India Rules, and we .find that here also rule 26, which dealt with preventive detention, has been placed under the heading \"Restriction of movements and activities of persons.\" A somewhat similar classification has also been adopted in a series of Provincial Acts and Ordinances relating to maintenance of order [see section 2 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, section l6 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, section 4 of the East unjab Public Safety Act, 1949, section 2 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, section 3 of the U:P. Maintenance of Public Order Temporary Act, 1947, and section 2 of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947].\n\nIn these Acts and Ordinances, preventive detention and certain\n\n(1) [194-2] A. C. 219.\n\n..f. K. Copa/an v. '1\"111 StaU\n\nFtul Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nT\"6 StaU -<- Fad Alij\n\nother forms of restriction ·n, movement such as internment, externment, etc.. have been classed together and dealt wi~ more or less on the same footing, and sometimes they have been dealt with in different clauses of the same section. In one of the Acts, the same advisory board is to deal with the case of a dctenue as well as that of an externed person, and there are also similar provisions giving them the right to represent their case to the Government.\n\nI will now assume for the sake of argument that the freedom of movement to which reference is made in article 19 ( 1) ( d) has nothing to do with personal liberty and that the words which occur in the article bear the restricted meaning attributed to them by the learned Attorney-General and some of my colleagues.\n\nIt seems to me that even on this assumption, it is difficult to arrive at an} conclusion other than what I have already anived at. There can be no doubt that preventive detention does take away even this limited freedom of movement directly and substantially, and, if so, I d6 not see how it can be argued that the right under article 19 ( 1) ( J) is not infringed if the alternative interpretation is accepted.\n\nWe have only to ask . ourselves : Does a person who is detained retain even a fraction of his freedom of movement in howsoever restricted sense the term may be used and does he not lose )lls right to move freely from one place to another or visit any locality he likes as a necessary result of his detentipn ? I think'. I should refer here once more to the fact that in the Defence of the Realm Regulations and Defence of India Rules, preventive detention is classed under the heading \"Restriction of movements and activities,\" \"Movement\" is here used in plural and refers to that very type of movement which is said to be protected by article 19 ( 1) ( d), moving from one State or place to another, visiting different localities, etc. One of the objects . of preventive detention is to restrain the person detained from moving from place to place so that he may not spread disaffection or indulge in dangerous activities in the places he visits. The same consideration applies to the cases of persons who are interned or, externed.\n\nHence, externment,\n\ninternment and certain other forms of retriction on movement have always been treated as kindred matters belonging to the same group or family and the rule which applies to one must necessarily apply to the other.\n\nIt is difficult to hold that the case of extemment can possibly be dealt with on a different footing from the case of preventive detention. I am however interested to find that the Patna and Bombay Righ\n\nCourts have held that a person who is externed can successfully assert that the right granted to him under article 19 (1) (d) has been violated. This view has not been seriously challenged before us, ai:id, if it is correct, I really do not see how it can be held that preventive detention is also not a direct invasion of the right guaranteed in article 19 ( 1) ( d).\n\nPerhaps, one may pause here to ask wht kind of laws were in contemplation of the framers .of the Constitution when they referred to laws imposing restrictions in the public interest in article 19 (5). l think the war laws and the Provincial Ac!s and Ordinances to which I have already referred must have been among them, these being laws which expressly purport to impose restrictions on movements. If so, we should not overlook the fact that preventive detention was an inseparable part of these laws and was treated as a form of restriction on movement and classified as such. It seems to me that when the matter is seriously considered, it would be found that the interpretation of the learned Attorney-General attracts the operation of article 13 (2) no less strongly and directly than the interpretation I have suggested, and I prefer the latter only because I consider that it is legally unsound to treat what is inseparably bound up with and is the essential element in the legal concept of personal liberty as a wholly separate and unconnected entity. But as I have already indicated, it will be enough for the purpose of this case if we forget all about personal liberty and remember only that detention is, as is self-evident and as has been pointed /)ut by Viscount Maugham and other eminent judges, another name for depriving a person of all his \"liberty of movement.\" •\n\nIt was pointed out in the course of the arguments\n\nA. K. Goj1alan\n\n• v.\n\nTlllSllJU\n\nFaz/ Ali J,\n\nA. /(. C.J>alan\n\nTt.. SJau\n\nFa1:ol Ali ].\n\nthat preventive detention not only takes away the right in article 19 (1) (d) but also takes away all the other rights guaranteed by article 19 ( 1), except the right to hold, acquire and dispose of property. Where exactly this argument is intended to lead us to, I cannot fully understand, but it. seems to me that it involves an obvious fallacy, because it overlooks the difference in the modes in which preventive detention operates on the right referred to in sub-clause ( d) and other sub-clauses of article 19 ( l). The difference is that while preventive detention operates on freedom of movement directly and inevitably, its operation on the other rights is indirect and consequential and is often only notional. One who is preventively detained is straightaway deprived of his right of movement as a direct result of his detention, but he foses the other rights only in consequence of his losing freedom of movement.\n\nBesides, while freedom of movement is lost by him in all reality and substance, some of the other rights may not be lost until he wishes to exercise: them or is interested in exercising them.\n\nA person who is detained may not be interested in freedom of association or may not pursue any profession, OCC\\lpation, tr; ide or business.\n\nIn such a case, the rights referred to are lost only in theory and not as a matter of substance. I wish only to add that when I said that l was not able to understand the full force of the argument which 11 have tried to deal with, what I had in mind was that if preventive detention sweeps away or affects almost all the rights guaranteed in article ( 19) ( l), the matter deserves very serious consideration and we cannot lightly lay down that article l3 (2) docs not come into operation.\n\nBeing fully alive to the fact that it is a serious matter to be asked to declare a law enacted by Parliament to be unconstitutional, I have again and again asl_ted myself the question : What are we to put in the scales against the construction which I am inclined to adopt and 1n favour of the view that preventive detention does not take away the freedom of movement guaranteed in article 19 (1) (d) ? 'The inevitable answer has always been that while in one of the scales\n\nwe have plain and unambiguous language, the opinion of eminent jurists, judicial dicta of high authority, constitutional practice in the sense that no Constitution refers to any freedom of movement apart from personal liberty, and the manner in which preventive detention has been treated in the very laws on which .our law on this subject is based, all that we can put in the opposite scale is a vague and ill-founded apprehension that some fearful object .. such as the revision of the Penal Code is looming obscurely in the distant • horizon, the peculiar objection that the mere mention of the scheduled tribes will alter the meaning of certain plain words, the highly technical and unreal distinction between restriction and deprivation and the assumption not warranted by any express provision that a person who is preventively detained cannot claim the right of freedom of movement because he is not a free man and certain other things which, whether taken singly or collectively, are too unsubstantial to carry any weight.\n\nIn these circumstances, I am strongly of the .view that article 19 (1) (d) guarantees the right of freedom of movement in its widest sense, that freedom of movement being the essence of personal liberty, the right guaranteed under the article is really a right to personal liberty and that preventive detention is a deprivation of that right. I am also of the view that even on the interpretation suggested by the learned Attorney-General, preventive detention cannot but be held to be a violation of the ri, ght conferred by article 19\n\n(1) (d). In either view, therefore, the law of preventive detention is subject to such limited judicial review as is permitted under article 19 (5). The scope of the review is simply to see whether any particular law imposes any unreasonable restrictions.\n\nConsidering that the restrictions are imposed on a most valuable right, there is nothing revolutionary in the legislature trusting the Supreme Court to examine whether an Act which infringes upon that right is within the limits of reason.\n\nI will now pass on to the consideration of article 21, which runs as foilows :-\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal\n\n.A. K. Gopaloa\n\nv,..\n\nThe.SIJIU\n\nFad .Ali].\n\nA. E. Gopalan\n\nTi.. SlaU\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nliberty except according to procedure established by law.\"\n\nHere again, our first step must be to arrive at a clear meaning of the provision. The only words which cause some difficulty in the proper construction of the article are \"procedure established by law,\"\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended e us that the word \"law\" which is used in article 21 means State-made law or law enacted by the State.\n\nOn the other hand, the learned counsel for the peaaoner strongly contended that the expression \"procedure established by law\" is used in a much wider sense and approximates in meaning to the expression \"due process of law\" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of America in the earliest times and, if that is so, it means exact! y what some of the American writers mean to convey by the expression \"procedural due process.\" In the course of the arguments, the learned Attorney-General referred us to the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of showing that the article as originally drafted contained the words \"without due process of law\" but these words were subsequently replaced by the words \"except according to procedure established by law.\" In my opinion, though the proceedings or discussions in the Assembly are not relevant for the purpose of construing the meaning of the expressions used in article 21, especially when they are plain and unambiguous, they . are relevant to show that the Assembly intended to avoid the use of the expression \"without due process of law.\" That expression had its roots in the expression \"per legem .terrae\" (law of the land) used in Magna Charta in 1215.\n\nIn the reign of Edward III, howver, the words \"due process of law\" were used in a statute guaranteeing that no person will be deprived of his property or imprisoned or indicted or put to death without being brought in to answer by due process of law (28, Edward III, Ch. III) .. The expression was afterwards adopted in the American Constitution and also in the Constitutions of some of the constituent States, though some of the States preferred to U5e the\n\n...\n\nwords \" in due course of law\". or \"according to the law of the land.\" .[See Cooley on \"Constitutional Limitations,\" 8th Edu.Vol. II, pages 734-5].· Jri the\n\nearliet times, the American Supreme Court construed \"due process of law\"· to cover matters of procedure only, but gradually the meaning of the expression was widened so as to cover substantive law also, by laying emphasis. on the word \"due.\" The expression was used in such a wide sense that\" the judges found it difficult to define it and in o::e of the cases it was observed as follows :- . \" It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to ·· give to those words a definition, at once accurate, and broad enough to cover every case. This _difficulty and perhaps impossibility was referred. to by Mr. Justice 11Iiller in Davidson v. New Orleans, where the opinion was expressed that it is wiser to ascertairi their intent and application by the_' gradual process of judicial inclusion. and exclusion,' as the cases presented.for decision shall require, with the reasoning on which such - decisions may be founded:\" l.fissouri Pacific Railway\n\nCo. v. Hitmes ('). . . . . . _ It eems plain that the Constituent Assembly did not adopt this expression on account of the very elastic meaning gtven to it, but preferred . to use the words\n\n''according to procedure. established by law\" which occur in the Japanese Constitution framed in 1946. . It will not be out of place to state here in a few words how the Japanese Constitution came into existence. It. appears that on the I Ith October, 1945, General l\\IcArthur. directed the Japanese Cabinet to initiate measures for the preparation of the Japanese Constitution, but, , as no. progress was made, it was decided in February, 1946, that the problem of constitutional reform should be taken over by the Government Section of. the Supreme Commander's Headquarters. Subsequently the Chief of this Section and the staff drafted the Constitution with the help of American constitutional lawyers who . were called to ·\n\nassist the Government Section inthe task. This\n\nonstitution, as a learned writer Ii.as remarked,. bore .\n\n(1) 115 U.S. 512 at page 518 •\n\nA. K. Gopa!a, t.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali J-.\n\n1950 on almost every page evidences of its essentially · \\Vestern origin,. and _this characteristic was especially l. K. Gopalan , v.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl A!i J.\n\nevident in the preamble•-\" particularly reminiscent of the American Declaration of Independence, a preamble which, it has been observed, no Japanese could possibly have conceived or written and which few could evenunderstand.\" [See Ogg and Zink's \"Modern Foreign _Governments\"]. One of the characteristics of the Constitution which undoubtedly bespeaks - of direct American influence is to be found in a lengthy chapter, consisting of 31 articles, entitled \" Rights and Duties of the People,\" which provided for the first time an effective \"Bill of Rights\" for the Japanese _people. The usual .safeguards have been provided there against apprehension without a warrant and against arrest or detention without being informed of the charges or without adequate cause (articles 33 and 34). Now there are two matters which deserve to be noticed :-(1) that the Japanese . Constitution was framed wholly under American influence; and (2) that at the time it was framed the trend of judicial opinion in_America was in favour of confining the meaning. of\n\n- • theexpression \"due process of law \" to wb-at is ex- , •pressed by certain American writers by the somewhat quaint but useful expression \"procedural due process.\" That there was such a trend would be clear from the following passage which I quote from. Carl Brent\n\nSwisher's\" The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States\" (page 107) :- _ · \" The American history of its interj>retation falls into three periods. During the first period, covering roughly the first century of government under the Constitution, due process was interpreted principally as a restriction upon procedure-_ and largely the judicial procedure-by which the government exercised its -\n\n- powers. During the second period, which, again roughly\n\nspeaking, extended through 1936, due process was expanded to serve as a restriction not merely upoµ\n\nprocedur~ but upon the substance of the activities in which the government might engage. During the third period, extending from 1936 to date, the use of due\n\nprocess as a substantive restriction has been largely suspended or abandoned, leaving it principally in. its original status as a restriction upon procedure.\"\n\nIn the circumstances mentioned, it seems permissible to surmise that the expression \"procedure established by law\" as used in the Japanese Constitution represented the current trend . of American judicial opinion with regard to \"due process of law,\" and, if that is so, the expression as used in our Constitution means all that the American writers have read into the words \"procedural due process.\" But I do not wish to base any conclusions upon mere surmise and will try to examine the whole question on its merits.\n\nThe word \"law\" may be used in an abstract or concrete sense.\n\nSometimes it is preceded by an article such as \"a\" or \"the\" or by such words as \"any\" \"all,\" etc., and sometimes it is used without any such prefix.\n\nBut, generally, the word \"law\" has a wider meaning when used in the abstract sense without being preceded by an article.\n\nThe question to be decided is whether the word \"law\" means nothing more than statute law.\n\nNow whatever may be the meaning of the expression \"due process of law,\" the word \"law\" is common to that expression as well as \"procedure established by law\" and though we are not bound to adopt the construction put on \"law\" or \"due process of law\" in America, yet since a number of eminent American Judges have devoted much thought to the subject, I am not prepared to hold that we can derive no help from their opinions and we should completely ignore them.\n\nI will therefore in the first instance set out certain quotations from a few of the decisions of the American Supreme Court construing the word \"law as used in the expression \"due process of law,\" in so far as it bears on the question of legal procedure.\n\n( 1) \"Although the legislature may at its pleasure provide new remedies or change old ones, the power is nevertheless subject to the condition that it cannot remove certain ancient land-marks, or take away certain fundamental rights , which have been always\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTiu State\n\nFazl Ali:J.\n\n.d. K. Gopalan\n\nTlie Stai.\n\nFat:I Ali].\n\nrecognized and observed in judicial procedures :\" Bardwell v. Collin ( 1 ) •\n\n(2) \"By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law : a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgments only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty and property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society:\" Dartmouth College Case(')\n\n(3) \"Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's defence ? If the legislative department of the government were to enact a statute conferring the right to condemn the citizen without any opportunity .whatever of being heard, would it. be pretended that such an enactment would not be violative of the Constitution ? If this be true, as it undoubtedly is, how can it be said that the judicial department, the source and fountain of justice itself, has yet the authority ro render lawful that which if done under express legislative sanction would be violative of tb, e Constitution? If such power obtains; then the judicial department of the government sitting to uphold and enforce the Constitution is the only one possessing a power to disregard it.\n\nIf such authority exists then in consequence of their establishment, to compel obedience to law and enforce justice, Courts possess the right to inflict the very wrongs which they were created to prevent:\" Hovey v. Elliott(•).\n\n(4) \"It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to respected than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his say in Court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without ·.such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination ; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly administered: \"Gatpin v. Page ( • ).\n\nThus, in America, the word \"law\" does not mean merely State-made law or law enacted by the State and does not exclude certain fundamental principles of\n\n(1) 44 Minn.117; 9L.ll.A. 152.\n\n(1) 167 u. s. 409 .. _ 417.\n\n(1) 17 U.S. 4.\n\n(') 85 U.S. 18.\n\njustice which inhere in every civilized system of law and which are at the root of it. The result of the numerou.s decisions in America has been summed up by Professor Willis in his book on \"Constitutional Law\" at page 662, in the statement that the essentials of due process are: (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) an impartial tribunal, and (4) orderly course of procedure. It is pointed out by the learned author that these essentials may assume different forms in different circumstances, and so long as they are conceded in principle, the requirement of law will be fulfilled. For example, a person cannot require any particular form or method of hearing, but all that he can require is a reasonable opportunity to be heard.\n\nSimilarly, an impartial tribunal does not necessarily mean a judicial tribunal in every case.\n\nSo far as orderly course of procedure is concerned, he explains that it does not require a Court to strictly weigh the evidence but it does require it to examine the entire record to ascertain the issues, to discover whether there are facts not reported and to see whether or not the law has been , correctly applied to facts. The view expressed by other writers is practically the same as that expressed . by Professor Willis, though some of them do not expressly refer to the fourth element, viz., orderly course of procedure.\n\nThe real point however is that these four elements are really different aspects of the same right, viz .. the right to be heard before one is condemned.\n\nSo far as this right is concerned, judicial opinion in England appears to be the same as that in America.\n\nIn England, it would shock one to be told that a man can be deprived of his personal liberty without a fair trial or hearing. Such a case can happen only if the Parliament expressly takes away the right in question in an emergency as the British Parliament did during the last two world wars in a limited number of cases.\n\nI will refer here to a few cases which show that the fuf!damental principle that a person whose right is affected must be heard has been observed not onlv in cases involving personal liberty but also in proceedings affecting other rights, even though they may have &-3 S. C. lndia/58\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTh. Stat.\n\nFl Ali].\n\nA. 1'. Gopaian\n\nThe Stak\n\nFa.cl Ali].\n\ncome before administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals.\n\nCooper v. The Wadsworth Board of Works (1) was a case under an Act which empowered the District Board to alter or demolish a house where the builder had neglected to give notice of his intention seven days before proceeding to lay or dig the foundation.\n\nActing upon th.is power, the Board directed the demolition of a building without notice to the builder, but this was held to be illegal. Byles J. in dealing with the matter observed as follows :-\n\n\"I conceive they acted judicially because they had to determine the offence. and they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy. That being so, a long course of decisions, beginning with Dr.\n\nBentley's case, and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue, in Dr. Bentlev's case, is somewhat quaint, but it is very applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present. He says, \"The objection for want of notice can never be got over The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, .if he has any.\"\n\nIn the same case Erle C. J. observed :- \"It has been said that the principle that no man shall be deprived of his property without an opportunity of being heard, is limited to a judicial proceeding ...... I do not quite agree with that ; ...... the law, I think, has been applied to many exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all more a judicial proceeding than would be the act of the District Board in ordering a house to be pulled down.\"\n\nThe observations made bv Erle C. J. were quoted and applied by Sir Robert Collier in Smith v. The\n\nQueen('), and the observations of Lord Campbell in Regina v. The Archbishop of Canterbury (1) were to the same effect.\n\n(1) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180.\n\n(') 3 A.G. 614.\n\n(') I E. & E. 559.\n\nA similar opinion was expressed by Sir George Jessel in Fisher v. Keane (1), Labouchere v. Earl of W harncliffe, (2) and Russel v.\n\nRussel (8) • In the last mentioned case, he observed as follows:-\n\n\"It [Wood v. Woad(')] contains a verv valuable statement by the Lord Chief Baron as to his view of the mode of administering justice by persons other than Judge~ who have judicial functions to perform which I should have been very glad to have had before me on both those club cases that I recently heard, namely, the case of Fisher v. Keane and the case of Labouchere v. Earl of W harncliffe.\n\nThe passage I mean is this, referring to a committee : \"They are bound in the exercise of their functions by the rule expressed in the maxim \"audi alteram partem\", that no man should be condemned to conseauences without having the opportunity of making his defence.\n\nThis rule is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adiudicate upon matters involving .civil consequences to individuals'.\"\n\nThis opinion was quoted with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v.\n\nL'Association etc. de Montreal (5).\n\nIn that case, on an application for pension by the appellant, who had been obliged to resign, the Board of Directors, without any judicial inquiry into the circumstances, resolved to refuse the claim on the ground that he was obliged to tender his resignation. This procedure was condemned by Lord Macnaghten as being \"contrary to rules of society and above all contrary to the elementary principles of justice.\" These observations of Lord Macnaghten were referred to and relied on in The King\n\nv. Tribunal of Appeal under the Housing Act, 1919 (6).\n\nIn that case, a company proposed to build a picture house and the local authority having prohibited the building, the company appealed under the Housing l') 11 Ch. D. 1.5:;,\n\n(4) [1874] L. R. 9 Ex. 190.\n\n( 11 13 Ch. D. 3-IU.\n\n{') [1906] A. C. 535. (') 14 Ch. D. 471.\n\n('\\ [1920] T. B. 334.\n\n1950\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTheSlaU\n\nFozl Ali].\n\n• 1950\n\nA. Ir. Gopal•n\n\nThe Stall\n\nFaz;/ Ali].\n\n(Additional Powers) Act, 1919, which contained a provision that an appeal could in certain cases be properly determined without a hearing and that the appellate Court could dispense with the hearing and determine the appeal summarily. It was held that . the meaning of rule 7 was that the tribunal on appeal might dispense with an oral hearing, not that they might dispense with a hearing of any kind, and that they were bound to give the appellants a hearing in the sense of an opportunity to make <lut a case. The Earl of Reading in delivering the judgment observed :\n\n\"The principle of law applicable to such a case is well stated by Kelly C.B. in Wood v. Woad in a passage which is cited with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v. L' Association etc. de Montreal ...... \"\n\nIn Local Government Board v. Arlidge ('), the Local Government dismissed an appeal by a person against whom a closing order had been made under Housing, Town Planning, &c. Act, without an oral hearing and without being allowed to see the report made by the Board's Inspector upon public local inquiry. The House of Lords did not interfere with the order on the ground that the appeal had been dealt with by an administrative authority whose duty was to enforce obligations on the individual in the interests of th~ community and whose character was that of an organization with executive functions.\n\nThe principle however was conceded and lucidly set forth that when the duty of deciding an appeal is il\\lposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially, and they must deal with the question referred to them without bias and must give to each of the parties an opportunity of presenting its case, and that the decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. Commenting upon this case, which is generally regarded as an extreme case, Mr. Gavin Simonds, who afterwards became a member of the House of Lords observes :-\n\n(') [19U) A. C. 120.\n\n\"I think you would agree that if the subjectmatter of such proceedings as are here indicated was the liberty of the subject, or 'indeed his life, you would regard such a judicial procedure as outrageous.\" (See C K. Allen's \"Law and Orders,\" page 167).\n\nI have particularly referred to cases which were before administrative tribunals, because I have to deal in this case with preventive detention which is said to be an executive act and because I wish to point out that even before executive authorities and administrative tribunals an order cannot generally be passed affecting one's rights without giving one such hearing as f?ay be appropriate to the circumstances of the case. I have only to add that Halsbury .after enumerating the most important liberties which are recognized ' in England, such as right of personal freedom, right to freedom of speech, right of public meeting, etc.,· adds :-\n\n\"It seems to me that there should be added to this list the following rights which appear to have become well-established-the right of the subject to have any case affecting him tried in accordance with the principles of natural justice, particularly the principles that a man may not be a judge in his own cause, and that no party ought to be condemned unheard, or to have a decision given against hi1Il unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of putting forward his case ...... \" (Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, volume 6, page 392).\n\nThe question is whether the principle that no person can be condemned without a hearing by an impartial tribunal , which is well-recognized in all modern civilized systems of law and which Halsbury puts on a par with well-recognized fundamental rights cannot be regarded as part of the law of this country. I must confess that I find it difficult to give a negative answer to this question.\n\nThe principle being part of the British system of law and procedure which we have inherited, has been observed in this country for a very long time and is also deeply rooted in our ancient history, being the basis of the\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTluStilU\n\nF\"l Ali].\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\npanchayat system from the earliest times. The whole of the Criminal Procedure Code, whether it deals with trial of offences or with preventive or quasiadministrative measures such as are contemplated in sections 107, 108, 109, 110 and 145, is based upon the foundation of this principle, and it is difficult to see that it has not become part of the \"law of the land\" and does not inhere in our system of law.\n\nIf that is so, then \"procedure established by law\" must include this principle, whatever else it may or may not include. That the word \"law\" used in article 21 does not mean only State-made law is clear from the fact that though there is no statute laying down the complete procedure to be adopted in contempt of Court cases, when the contempt is not within the view of the Court, yet such procedure as now prevails in these cases is part of our law.\n\nThe statute-law which regulates the procedure of trials and enquiries in criminal cases does not specifically provide for arguments in certain cases, but it has always been held that no decision should be pronounced without hearing arguments.\n\nIn a number of cases, it has been held that though there may be no specific provision for notice in the statute, the provision must be read into the law.\n\nI am aware that some Judges have expressed a strong dislike for the expression \"natural justice\" on the ground that it is too vague and elastic, but where there are well-known principles with no vagueness about them, which all systems of law have respected and recognized, they cannot be discarded merely because they are in the ultimate analysis found to be based on natural justice.\n\nThat the expression \"natural justice\" is not unknown to our la:w is apparent from the fact that the Privy Council has in many criminal appeals from this country laid down that it shall exercise its power of interference with the course of criminal justice in this country when there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or departure from the requirements of justice. [See In re Abraham Mallory Di/let (1 ), Taha .ingh v. King Emperor '), George Gfeller v. The\n\n{') 12 A. C. 459.\n\n(1) I. L. R. 46 Bom. 515.\n\nKing ( 1), and Bugga and others v. Emperor (2)]. In the present case, there is no vagueness about the right claimed which is the right to have one's guilt or innocence considered by an impartial body and that right must be read into the words of article 21.\n\nArticle 21 purports to protect life and personal liberty, and it would be a precarious protection and a protection not worth having, if the elementary principle of law under discussion which, according to Halsbury is on a par with fundamental rights, is to be ignored and excluded. In the course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner repeatedly asked whether the Constitution would permit a law being enacted, abolishing the mode of trial permitted by the existing law and establishing the procedure of trial by battle or trial by ordeal which was in vogue in olden times in England. The question envisages something which is not likely to happen, but it does raise a legal problem which can perhaps be met only in thi~ way that if the expression \"procedure established by law\" simply means any procedure established or enacted by statute it will be difficult to give a negative answer to the question, but if the word \"law\" include~ what I have endeavoured to show it does, such an answer may be justified. It seems to me that there is nothing revolutionary in the doctrine that the words \"procedure established by law\" must include the four principles set out in Professor Willis' book, which, as I have already stated, are different aspects of the same principle and which have no vagueness or uncertainty about them. These principles, as the learned author points out and as the authorities show, are not absolutely rigid principles but are adaptable to the circumstances of each case within certain limits. I have only to add that it has not been seriously controverted that \"law\" in this article means valid law and \"procedure\" means certain definite rules of proceeding and not something which is a mere pretence for procedure.\n\nI will now proceed to examine article 22 of the Constitution which specifically deals with the subject\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1943, P. C. 21 J.\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1919 P. C. 108.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThi S1au\n\nF<U:l Ali J.\n\n19SO\n\nA. K. Gopalon v.\n\nThe State\n\nFa</ A/; J.\n\nof preventive detention. The first point to be noted in regard to this article is that it does not exclude the operation of articles 19 and 21, and it must be read subject to those two articles, in the same way as articles 19 and 21 must be read subject to article 22.\n\nThe correct position is that article 22 must prevail in so far as there are specific provisions therein regarding preventive detentio1f, but, where there are no such provisions in that'a{_ticle, the operation of articles 19 and 21 cannot be , exclllded. The mere fact that different aspects of the same right have been dealt with in three different articles will not make them mutually exclusive except to the extent I have indicated.\n\nI will now proceed to analyse the article and deal with its main provisions. In my opinion, the main provisions of this article are:-( l) that no person can be detained beyond three months without the report of an advisory board [clause 4 (a)] ; (2) that the Parliament may prescribe the circumstances and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for more than three months without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board [clause 7 (a)] ; (3) that when a person is preventively detained, the authority making the order of detention shall communicate to such person the grounds on which the order is made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order [clause (5)] ; and ( 4) that the Parliament may prescribe the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention [clause 7 (b)]. The last point does not require any consideration in this case, but the first three points do require consideration.\n\nIn connection with the first point, the. question arises as to the exact meaning of the words \"such detention\" occurring in the end of clause 4 (a). Two alternative interpretations were put forward : (1) \"such detention\" means preventive detention ; (2) \"such detention\" means detention for a period longer than three months. If the first interpretation is correct, then the function of the advisory board would be to go into the merits of the case of each person and simply\n\nreport whether there was sufiicient cause for his detention. According to the other interpretation, the function of the advisory board will be to report to the government whether there is sufficient cause for the person being detained for more than three months. On the whole, I am inclined to agree with the second interpretation.\n\nPrima facie, it is a serious matter. to detain a person for a long period (more than three months) without any enqmry or trial. But article 22\n\n(4) (a) provides that such detention may be ordered on the report of the advisory board.\n\nSince the report must be directly connected with the object for which it is required, the safeguard provided by the article,\n\nviz., calling for a report from the advisory board, loses its value, if the advisory board is not to apply its i:nin, d to the vital question before the government, namely, whether prolonged detention (detention for more than three months) is justified or not. . Under article 22 (4) (a), the advisory board has to submit its report before the expiry of three months and may therefore do so on the eighty-ninth day. It would be somewhat farcical to provide, that after a. man has been detained for eighty-nine days, an advisory board is to say whether his initial detention was. justified. On the other hand, the determination of the question whether prolonged detention (detention for more than three motnhs) is justified must necessarily involve the determination of the question whether the detention Wl!~ justified at all, and such an interpretation only can give real meaning and effectiveness to the provision. The provision being in the nature , of a protection or safegi:iard, I must naturally lean towards the interpretation which is favourable to the subject and which is also in accord with the object in view.\n\nThe next question which we have to discuss _relates to the meaning and scope of article 22 (7) (a) which runs as follows :-\n\n\"Parliament may by law prescribe-\n\n(a) the circumstances under which, and the , clas or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer. than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without . obtaining\n\n19:0\n\nA- K. Gopalt111\n\nTire State\n\nFar.I Ali J.\n\nA. /(. Gopalan\n\nTl.1 State\n\nFtu::l Ali :J.\n\nthe opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4).\"\n\nThe question is what is meant by \"circumstances\" and \"class or classes of cases\" used in this provision.\n\nThis question has arisen because of the way in which these expressions appear to have been interpreted and applied in the Act of Parliament with which we are concerned. As the matter is important and somewhat complicated, I shall try to express my meaning as clearly as possible even at the risk of some repetition, and, in doing so, I must necessarily refer to the impugned Act as well as Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, under which Parliament had jurisdiction to enact it.\n\nItem 9 of List I-Union List-shows that the Parliament has power to legislate on preventive detention for reasons connected with (1) defence, (2) foreign affairs, and (3) security of India.\n\nUnder List III-Concurrent List-the appropriate item is item 3 which shows that law as to preventive detention can be made for reasons connected with (1) the security of the State, (2) the maintenance of public order, and (3) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.\n\nThe impugned Act refers to all the subjects mentioned in Lists I and III in regard to which law of preventive detention can be made.\n\nSection 3 (1) of the Act, the substance of which has already been mentioned, is important, and I shall reproduce it verbatim.\n\n\"The Central Government or the State Government may- ( a) if satisfied wit!}. respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that all the subjects of legislation concerning preventive detention occurring in item 9 of List I are grouped in sub-clause (1) of clause (a).\n\nThe subjects in this group are three in number and, for convenience of reference, I shall hereafter refer to them as A, B and C.\n\nIn sub-clause (ii), we find grouped two of the matters referred to in item 3 of List III, these being security of the State and the maintenance of public order. These two subjects, I shall refer to as D and E. In sub-clause (iii), reference has been made to the third matter in item 3 of List Ill, anci I shall refer to this subject as F. With this classification, let us now turn to the Constitution itself.\n\nOn reading articles 22 ( 4) and 22 (7) together, it would be clear that so long as article 22 ( 4) (a) holds the field and Parliament .does not act under clause (7)\n\n(a) of article 22, there must be an advisory board in every case, i.e., if the legislation relates to groups A to F, as it does here,. there must be an advisory board for all these groups.\n\nArticle 22 .(7) however practically engrafts an exception. It states in substance that the Parliament may by an Act provide for preventive detention for more than three months without reference to an advisory board, but in such cases it shall be incumbent on the Parliament to prescribe ( 1) the circumstances and\n\n(2) the class or classes of cases in which such course is found to be necessary. If the case contemplated in clause ( 4) (a) is the rule and that contemplated in clause (7) (a) is the exception, then the circumstances and the class or classes of cases must be of a special or extraordianry nature, so as to take the case out of the rule and bring it within the excef>tion. It is always\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFa<I Ali J.\n\npossible to draw the line between the normal or ordinary and the abnormal or extraordinary cases, and this is what, in my opinion, the Parliament was expected to do under clause (7) (a). I do not tlunk that it was ever intended that Parliament could at its will treat the normal as the abnormal or the rule as the exception. But this is precisely what has been done in this case. All the items on which preventive legislation is possible excepting one, i.e., A to E, have been put within the exception, and only one, F, which relates to maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, has been allowed co remain under the rule. In other words, it is provided that there shall be an advisory board only for the last category, F, but no provision having been made for the other categories, A to E, it may be assumed that the advisory board has been dispensed with in those cases.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General maintained that it would have been open to the Parliament to dispense with the advisory board even for the category F, and if such a course had been adopted it would not have affected the V'alidity of the Act. This is undoubtedly a logical position in the sense that it was necessary for him to go as far as this to justify his stand ; but, in my opinion, the course adopted by the Parliament in enacting section 12 of the impugned Act is not what is contemplated under article 22 (7) (a) or is permitted by it.\n\nThe circumstances to be prescribed must be special and extraordinary circumstances and the class or classes of cases must be of the same nature. In my opinion, the Constitution never contemplated that the Parliament should mechanically reproduce all or most of the categories A to F almost verbatim and not. apply its mind to decide in what circumstances and in what class or classes of cases the sateguard of an advisory board is to be dispensed with.\n\nI may state here that two views are put forward before us as to how clauses (4) (a) and 7 (a) of article 22 are to be read:-(1) that clause (4) (a) lays down the rule that in all cases where detention for more than three months is ordered, it should be done in consultation with and on the report of the advisory\n\nboard, and tause (7) (a) lays down an exception to this rule h¥ . providing that Parliament may pass an Act permitting detention . for more than three months without reference to an advisory board ; (2) that clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) are independent clauses ' making two separate and alternative provisions regarding detention for more than three months, in one case on the report of an advisory board and in other case without reference to an advisory board. Looking at the substance and not merely at the wordsJ I am inclined to hold that clause (7) (a) practically engrafts an exception on the rule that preventive detention for . more than three months can be ordered only on the\n\nreport of an advisory board, and so far I have proceeded on that footing. But it seems to me that it will make no difference to the ultimate conclusion, whichever of the two views we may adopt. Even on the latter view, it must be recognized that the law which the Constitution enables the Parliament to . make under article 22 (7) (a) would be an exceptionally drastic law, and, on the principle that an exceptionally drastic law must be intended foran exceptional situation, every word of what I have said so far must stand. Clause (7) (a) is only an enabling provision, and it takes care to provide that the Parliament cannot go to the extreme limit to which it is permitted to go without prescribing the class or classes of cases and the circumstances to which the extreme law would be applicable. It follows that the class or classes of cases and the circumstances must be of a special nature to require such legislation.\n\nIt was urged that the word \"and\" which occurs between \"circumstances\" and \"class or classes of cases\" is used in a disjunctive sense and should be read as \"or\", and by way of illustration it was mentioned that when it is said that a person may do this and that; it means that he is at liberty to do either this or that. I do not think that this argument is sound. I think that clause (7) (a) can be accurately paraphrased somewhat as follows :-\"Parliament may dispense with an advisory board, but in that case it shall prescribe the circumstances and the class or\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nF!Jl{.l Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopolan ·\n\nv. 1\"he State\n\nFaz/ Ali].\n\nclasses of cases .... \" If this is the meaning, then \"and\" must be read as ''and\" and not as \"or\"; and \"may\" must be read as \"'shall\" Supposing it was said that Parliament may prescribe the time and place for the doing of a thing, then can it be suggested that both time and place should not be prescribed? It seems obvious to me that the class or classes of cases must have some reference to the persons to be detained or to their activities and movements or to both. \"Circumstances\" on the other hand refer to something extraneous, such as surroundings, background, prevailing conditions, etc., which might prove a fertile field for the dangerous activities of dangerous persons. Therefore the provision clearly means that both. the circumstances and the class or classes of cases (which are two different expressions with different meanings and connotations and cannot_ be regarded as synonymous) should be prescribed, and prescription of one without prescribing the other will not be enough. As T have already stated, such law as can be enacted under article 22 (7) (a) must involve, by reason of the extreme limit to which it can go, serious consequences to the persons detained. It will mean (1) prolonged detention, i.e., detention for a period longer than three months, and (2) deprivation of the safeguard of an advisory board.\n\nHence article 22 (7) (a) which purports to be a protective provision will cease to serve its object unless it is given a reasonable interpretation. To my mind, what it contemplates is that the law in question must not be too general but its scope should be limited by prescribing both the class or classes of cases and the circumstances.\n\nIt was contended that the expression \"class or classes of cases\" is wide enough to enable the Parliament to treat any of the categories mentioned in Lists I and III, items 9 and 3 respectively, (i.e., any of the categories A to F) as constituting a class.\n\nAt first sight, it seemed to me to be a plausible ari; tument, but the more I think about it the more unsound it appears to me. The chief thing to be remembered is what I have already emphasized more than once,. viz., that a special or extreme type of law must be limited to special classes of cases and circumstances. Under the\n\nConstitution, the Parliament has to prescribe \"the class or classes\", acting within the limits of the power granted to it under Lists I and III. The class or ·\n\nclasses must be its own prescription and must be so conceived as to justify by their contents the xemoval of an important safeguard provided by the Constitution.\n\nPrescribing is more than a mere mechanical process.\n\nIt involves a me11tal effort to select and adapt the thing prescribed to the object for which it has. to be prescribed. We find here that what is to be prescribed is \"class or classes\" (and also \"circumstances\"). We also find that what the law intends to provide is prolonged detention (by which words I shall hereafter mean detention for more than three months) and elimination of the advisory board. The class or classes to be prescribed must therefore have a direct bearing on these matters and must be so selected and stated that any one by looking at them may say:-\"That is the reason why the law has prescribed prolonged detention without reference to an advisory board.\" In other words, there must be something to make the class or classes prescribed fit in with an extreme type of legislation-some element of exceptional gravity or menace which cannot be easily and immediately overcome and therefore necessitates prolonged detention; and there must be something to show that rerence. to an advisory board would be an undesiral;>le and cumbersome process and wholly unsuitable for . the exceptional sit9ation to which the law applies. Perhaps a simple .illustration may make the position still clearer.\n\nUnder the Lists, one of the subjects on which Parliament may make a law of preventive detention is ·\"matter connected with. the maintenance of puolic order.'~ The Act simply repeats this phraseology and states. in .section 3: \"with a view to preventing him (the person to be detained) from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\" This may be all right for section 3, but section 12 must go further. An act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order may. be an ordinary act or it may be an act of special gravity. l think that article 22 (7) (a) contemplates that. the graver and\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\n- .v.\n\nTll4StaU\n\nFiu:l Ali].\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nTl:.t State\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nmore heinous types of acts falling within the category of acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order (or other heads) should be prescribed so as to define and circumscribe the area of an exceptional piece of legislation.\n\nThat some kind of sub-classification (if I may be permitted to use this word) of the categories A to F was possible can be . illustrated by reference to regulation 18-B of the British Defence of the Realm Regulations. This regulation was made under an Act of 1939 which authorized \"the making of regulations for the detention of persons whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of public safety or the defence of the realm.\" The two matters \"public safety\" and \"defence of the realm\" are analogous to some of the heads stated in Lists I and III. It will be instructive to note that under these two heads, regulation 18-B has set forth several subheads or class or classes of cases in which preventive detention could be ordered.\n\nThese classes are much more specific than what we find in section 3 of the impugned Act and therefore there is less chance of misuse by the executive of the power to order preventive detention. The classes set out are these:-(1) If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations, (2) if the Secretary of Sta.te has reasonable cause to believe any person to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts,\n\n(3) if the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to have been or to be a member of or to have been or to be active in the furtherance of the objects of, any such organization as is hereinafter mentioned .... (a) the organization is subject to foreign influence or control (b) the persons in control of the organization have or have had associations with persons concerned in the government of, or sympathies with the system of government of, any Power with which His Majesty is at war, and in either case there is danger of the utilization of the organization for purposes prejudicial to the public safety, etc., (4) if the Secretary\n\nof State has reasonable cadse to believe that the recent conduct of any person for the time being in an area or any words recently writen or spoken by such a person expressing sympathy with the enemy, indicates or indicate that that person is likely to assist the enemy.\n\nI have only to point out that the scope within which preventive detention can be legislated upon in this country is much larger than the scope indicated in the British Act under which Regulation 18-B was framed, and therefore there is more scope for specification of the circumstances as well as the class or classes of cases under the impugned Act. But all that has been done is that words which occur in the legislative Lists have been taken and transferred into the Act.\n\nWhat I have stated with regard to class or classes of cases also applies to the circumstances which are also to be prescribed under article 22 (7) (a). These circumstances are intended to supply the background or setting in which the dangerous activities of dangerous persons might prove specially harmful.· They must be special circumstances which demand a specially drastic measure and under which reference to an advisory board might defeat the very object of preventive action. The evident meaning of article 22 (7) (a) seems to be. that the pic_ture will not be complete without mentioning both the classes and the circumstances.\n\nThere was some discussion at the Bar as to what kind of circumstances might haV(;... _been specified. It is not for me to answer this question, but I apprehend that an impending rebellion or war, serious disorder in a particular area such as has induced the Puniab Government to declare certain areas as \"disturbed areas,'.' tense communal situation, prevalence of sabotage or widespread yolitical dacoities and a -variety of other matters might answer the purpose the Constitution had in view.\n\nI will now try to sum up th~ result of a somewhat protracted discussion into which I had to enter merely to clarify .the meaning of a very important provision of the Constitution which has. in mv opinion, been completely misunderstood by the framers of the 7-1 S. C. Ind'af58 .\n\n19.o\n\nA. K. GopalM\n\nThe Stat•\n\nFl Ali].\n\n1950 \\ '\n\nA. K.-Gopalan\n\n\"· The Stat~\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nimpugned Act. It appears. to .me that article 22 deals. with three classes of preventive detention :- (I) prev_entive detention for. three months ;\n\n· (2) preventive . detention for more than three months on the report of the advisory board ; and\n\n (3fpreentive detention for .more than three I months without reference to the advisory board. ·\n\nIf one has to find some kind of a label for these classes for a clear understanding of the subject, one may label them as \"dangerous,\" \"more dangerous\" and \"most dangerous.\" . Now so far as the first twoclasses are concerned, there is not)ling to be prescribed . . under the Constitution. Apparently.the authors of the Constitution were not much concerned.about class No. (I), and they thought that in so far as class No. (2} was concerned the provision that a reference to the advisory board was necessary coupled with the provision that detention was not to exceed the maximum. period which may be fixed by the . Parliament was . enough. But they did take care to. make a special. provision for class No. (3), and it is extermly important for the liberty of the subject as well as for the smooth working of the Constitution that this provision should not be lightly treated but should receive a wellconsidered and reasonable construction. It js ele-· mentary that the rigour of a law should correspond to\n\nor fit the gravity of the evil or danger it aims at.com-· bating, and , it is also evident that the law which the Parliament has been permitted to enact under article 22 (7) (a) can, so far as rigour is concerned, go to the farthest limit. It follows that the law must have been intended for exceptionally grave situations and exigencies. Hence the authors of the Constitution have made it necessary that the Parliament should put certain specifications into the Act which it is empowered to. pass under article 22 (7) (a), so that by means of these specifications the necessity for enacting so drastic a law should be apparent on the face of it, and its application. should be confined to the classes and circumstances. specified. The Act must prescribe (I) \" ch:.ss or classes of cases\" which are to have reference to the persons~\n\nagainst whom the law is to operate and their activities and movements and (2) \"circumstances\" which would bring into prominence the conditions and the backgrounds against which dangerous activities shoul, d call for special measures.\n\nBy means <!f such two.fold prescription, the sphere for the application of the law will be confined only to a special type of cases-it will be less vague, less open to abuse and enable those who have to administer it to determine objectively when a condition has arisen to justify the use of the power vested in them by the law.\n\nThis, in my opinion, is the true meaning and significance of article 22 (7) (a) and any attempt to whittle it down will lead to deplorable results.\n\nHaving stated my views as to the construction of article 22 (7) (a), I propose to consider at once whether section 12 of the impugned Act conforms to the requirements of that provision. In my opm1on, it does not, because it fails to prescribe' either -the circumstances or the class or classes of cases in the manner\n\n- required by the Constitution. It does not prescribe circumstances at all, and, though it purports to prescribe the class or classes, it does so in a manner showing that the. true meaning of the provision from which the Parliament derived its power has not been grasped. I have sufficiently dwelt on this part of the case and shall not repeat what I have already said.\n\nBut I must point out that even if it be assumed that the view advanced by the learned Attorney-General is correct and it was within the competence of Parliament to treat any of the categories mentioned in items 9 and 3 of Lists I and III as constituting a class :ind to include it without any qualification or cha?ge, the impugned section cannot be saved on account of a two-fold error :-\n\n(1) the word \"and\" which links \"class or classes\" with \"circumstances\" in article 22 (7) (a) has been w.rongly construed to mean \"or;\" and- (2) the distinction between \"circumstances\" and \"class or classes\" has been completely ignored and they are used as interchangeable terms.\n\nThe first error appears to me to be quite a serious one, because though the Constitution lays down two requirements and 'insists\n\nA. K. Gopolan v.\n\nThe State\n\nFar.I Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali].\n\non the prescnption of circumstances as well as class or classes, it has been assumed m enacting section 12 that prescription of one of them only will be enough. The other error is still more serious and goes to the root of the matter. There can be no doubt that circumstances and dass or classes are two different expressions and have different meanings, but the Act proceeds on the assumption that circumstances are identical with class or classes, as will appear from the words \"any person detained in any of the following classe~ of cases or under any of the following circumstances\" used in the section. I have already shown how important the specification of circumstances is in legislation of such an extreme and drastic character. Therefore, to confuse \"classes\" with\n\n0 circumstances\" and to omit to mention \"circumstances\" at all are in my opinion grave errors. There can, in my opinion, be no escape from the conclusion that section 12 of the Act by which a most important protection or safeguard conferred on the subject by the Constitution has been taken away, is not a valid provmon, since it contravenes the very provmon in the Constitution under which the Parliament derived its competence to enact it.\n\nI will now briefly deal with article 22 (5) which makes it incumbent on the authority ordering preventive detention to communicate to the person detained the grounds on which the order has been made and to give him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. It must be remembered that this provision is intended to afford protection to and be a safeguard in favour of a detained person, and it cannot be read as limiting any rights which he has under the law or any other provisions of the Constitution. If article 21 guarantees that before a person is deprived of his liberty he must be allowed an opportunity of establishing his innoceQce before an impartial tribunal, that right still remains.\n\nIn point of fact, there is no express exclusion of that right in the Constitution and no prohibition against constituting an impartial tribunal.\n\nOn the other hand, the right to make a representation which has\n\nbeen granted under the Constitution, must carry with it the right to the representation being properly oonsidered by an impartial person or persons.\n\nThere mtist therefore be some machinery for properly cx:uhining the qses of the detenus and coming to the . conclusion that they have not been detained without reason. If this right had been expressly taken away by the Constitution, there would have been an end gf the matter, but it has not been expressly taken away, . and I am not prepared to read any implicit deprivation 'Of. such a valuable right. The mere reference to an advisory board in article 22 ( 4) (a) does_ not, if my interpretation of the provision is correct, exclude the oonstitUtion of a proper machinery for the piirpose of examining the cases of detenus on merits.\n\nThe constitutio1' of an advisory board for the purpose of reporting whether a person should be detained for more than three months or not is a very different thing from constituting a board for the purpose of reporting whether a man should be detained for a single day. In the view I take, all that Parliament could do under clause (7) (a) of article 22 was to dispense with an advisory board for die purpose contemplated in clause ( 4)\n\n(a) of that article and not to dispense with the proper machinery, by , whichever name it may. be called, for the purpose of examining the merits of the case of a detained person. .\n\nIt was argued that article 22 is a code by itself and the whole law of preventive detention is to be found within its four corners: I cannot however easily , subscribe to this sweeping statement. ' The article does provide for some ers of procedure, but it does not exhaustively provide for them.. It is, said that it prcr\n\nvides for notice, an opportunity to the det<; nu to represent his ca5e, an advisory board which may deal . with his .case, and for the maximum period beyond which a ~):\"son. cannot be detained.\n\nThese points have un- doubtcdly been . touched, but it cannot be said that they. have been exhaustively treated. The right to represent is given, but it is left to the legislature to provide the machinery for dealing with the representation. The advisory board has been .·mentioned, but\n\nA. K. G1; palan\n\nThe Stau\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stat•\n\nFa<l Ali].\n\nit is only to safeguard detention for a period longer than three months. There is ample latitude still left to the Parliament, and if the Parliament makes use of that latitude unreasonably, article 19 (5) may enable the Court to see whether it has transgressed the limits of reasonableness.\n\nI will now proceed to deal with the Act in the light of the conclusions I have arrived at. So far as section 3 of the Act is concerned, it was contended that it is most unreasonable, because it throws a citizen at the mercy of certain authorities, who may at their own will order his detention and into whose minds we cannot probe to see whether there is any foundation for the subjective satisfaction upon which their action is to rest. I am however unable to accept this argument. The administrative authorities who have to discharge their responsibilities have to come to quick decisions and must necessarily be left to act on their own judgment. This principle is by no means unreasonable - and it underlies all the preventive or quasiadministrative measures which are to be found in the Criminat Procedure Code.\n\nUnder section 107 of that code, it is left to the discretion. of the magistrate concerned to determine whether in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding against any person who is likely to occasion a breach of the peace. Under section 145 also, his initial action depends upon his personal satisfaction.\n\nTherefore I do not find anything wrong or unconstitutional in section 3 of the Act. But I must point out that it is a n:asonable provision only for the first step, i.e., for arrest and initial detention, and must be followed by some procedure for testing the so-called subjective satisfaction, which can be done only by providing a suitable machinery for examining the grounds on which the order of detention is made and considering the representations of the persons detained in relation to those grounds.\n\nI do not also find anything radically wrong in section 7 of the Act, which makes it incumbent on the authority concerned to communicate to a detenu the grounds on which the order has been made and to\n\nafford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Section 10 which provides that the advisory board shall make its report within ten weeks from the date of the detention order is in conformity with article 22 ( 4) (a) of the Constitution, and the only comment which one can make is that Parliament was not obliged to fix sue~ a long period for the submission of a report and could have made it shorter in ordinary cases. . The real sections which appear to me to offend the Constitution are sections 12 and 14. I have already dealt with the principle objection to section 12, while .discussing the provisions of article 22 (7) (a) and I am of the opinion that section 12 does not conform to the provisions of the Constitution .and is therefore ultra vires.\n\nI also think that even if it be held that it technically complies with the requirements of article 22 (7) (a), Parliament has acted unreasonably in exercising its discretionary . po'wer without applying its mind to essential matters and thus depdving the detenus of the safeguard of an advisory board which the Constitution has provided in normal cases. So far as section 14 is concerned, all my colleagues have held it to be ultra vires, and, as I agree with the .views expresse.d by them, I do not wish to encumber my judgment by repeating in my own words what has been said so clearly and so well by them. Section 14 may be severable from the other provisions of the Act and it may not be possible to grant any relief to the petitioner on the ground tM.t section 14 is invalid.\n\nBut I think that section 12 goes to the very root of the legislation inasmuch as it deprives a detenu of an essential safeguard, and in my opinion the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that an essential provision of the Constitution has not been complied with. This writ will of course be without prejudice to any action which the authorities may have taken or may hereafter take against the petitioner under the penal law. I have to add this qualification because there were allegations of his being involved in some criminal cases but the actual facts were not clearly brought out before us.\n\nA. K. Gopal1J11\n\nThe Stau\n\nFazlAli J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu Stal<\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nI have only to add a few concluding' remarks to my judgment.\n\nIn studying the provisions of the impugned Act, I could not help instituting a comparison in my own mind between it and similar legislation in England. during the last two world wars. I could not also help noticing that the impugned Act purports to be a peacetime Act, whereas the legislation to which I have referred was enacted during the war.\n\nDuring the first war as well as the second, a number of persons were detained and a number of cases were brought to Court in connection with their detention, btit the two leading-eases which will be quoted again and again are Rex v. Halliday ( 1 ) and Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson ( • ). We are aware that in America certain standards which do not conform to ordinary and normal law have been applied by the Judges during the period of the war nd sometimes they are compendiously referred to as being included , in \"war power.\" The two English cases to ~Qich I ha\".e referred also illustrate the same principle, as willappear from two short extracts which I wish to reproduce. In Rex v. Halliday (' ), Lord Atkinson observed as follows:-\"However precious .the personal liberty . of the subject may be, there is something for which it may well be, to some extent, sacrified by legal enactment, namely, national success in the war, or escape from national plunder or enslavement.\"\n\nIn Liversidge v.\n\nSir John Anderson ( '), Lord Macmillan struck the same note in these words:~\n\n\"The liberty whlch we so justly extol is itself the gift of the law and as Magna Charta recognizes may by the law be forfeited or abridged. At a time when it is the undoubted law of the land that a citizen may by conscription or requisition be compelled to give up his life and all that he possesses for his country's cause it may well be no matter for surprise that there should be confided to the Secretary of State a discretionary power of enforcing the relatively mild precaution of detention.\"\n\n(1) (1917] A: C. 260.\n\n(•) [194Z] A. C. 206.\n\n (3) [1917] A. C. 260 at p. 271.\n\n(4) [1942] A. C. 206 at p. 257.\n\nThese passages represent the majority view in the two cases, but the very elaborate judgments of Lord Shaw in Rex v. Halliday and that of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Sir fohn Anderson show that there was room for difference of opinion as well as for a more dispassionate treatment of the case and the points involved in it. It is difficult to say that there is not a good substratum of sound law in the celebrated dictum of Lord Atkin that even amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent and that they speak the same language in war as in peace. However that may be, what I find is that in the regulations made in England during the first war as well as the second war there was an elaborate provision for an advisory board in all cases without any exception, which provided a wartime safeguard for persons deprived of their liberty. There was also a provision in the Act of 1939 that the Secretary of State should report at least once in every month as to the action taken under the regulation including the number of persons detained under orders made thereunder. I find that these reports were printed and made available to the public. I also find that the Secretary of State stated in the House of Commons on the 28th January, 1943, that the general order would be to allow British subjects detained under the Regulation to have consultations with their legal advisers out of the hearing of an officer. This order applied to consultations with barristers and solicitors but not to cases where solicitors sent to inter- . view a detained person a clerk who was not an officer of the High Court. The impugned Act suffers in comparison, on account of want of such provisions, though, so far as I can see, no great harm was likely to have been caused by setting up a machinery composed of either administrative or judicial authorities for examining the cases of detained persons so as to satisfy the essentials of fairness and justice. The Act also suffers in comparison with some of the later Provincial Acts in which the safeguard of an advisory board is expressly provided for.\n\nI_ find that there is a provision in section 12 (2) of the Act for the review of the cases of detenus after six months, but this is quite different\n\nA. IC GojJala\n\nT/rt f; au\n\nFazl Ali_}.\n\nA. I(. Gopalan\n\nTJ,. 811111\n\n'.-jail Sann].\n\nfrom examining the merits of the case. The object of such a review is obviously to find out whether by reason of any change in the circumstances, a review of the original order is required.\n\nI hope that in pointing out the shortcomings of the Act I will not be misunderstood. I am aware that both in England and jn America and also in many other countR<:s, there has been a reorientation of the old notions of individual freedom which is gradually yielding to social control in many matters. I also realize that those who run the State have very onerous responsibilities, and it is not correct to say that emergent conditions have altogether disappeared from this country.\n\nGranting th.en that private rights must often be subordinated to the public good, is it not essential in a free community to strike a just balance in the matter ? That a person should be deprived of his\n\npesonal liberty without a trial is a serious matter, but the needs of society may demand it and the individual may often have to yield to those needs.\n\nStill the balance between the maintenance of individual rights and public good can be struck only if the person who is deprived 6f his liberty is allowed fair chance to establish his innocence. and I do not see how the establishment of ; m appropriate machinery giving him such a chance can be an impediment to good and just government\n\nPATANJALI\n\nS11STRI J.-This is an application under article 32 of the C', onstitution of India for rckasing the pettt10ncr from detention jn jail without trial under directions purporting to be issued by the Government of Madras under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and it has the distinction of being the first application invoking the p; uaranteed protection of this Court as the guardian of Fundamental Rights against alleged infringement of the petitioner's right to freedom of movement. As the case involved issues of great public importance and breaking of new ground it was argued with thoroughness and ability on both sides, reference being made to more or less analogous provisions of the Constitutions of\n\nother countries and in particular the Constitution of the United States of America.\n\nThe pet1t1oner ha<l been under detention previous! y un<ler orders passed by the said Government under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, but as the validity of that Act and all other similar local public safety enactments had been questioned in some of the High Courts in India after the new Constitution came into force, the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) extending to the whole of India with a certain exception not material hee.\n\nThe Act came into force on 25th February 1950, and, on the 27th February, the Government of Madras, in purported exercise of the powers conferred by the impugned Act and in supersession of earlier orders, directed the detention of the petitioner, and - the' Qrder was served on him on 1st March. The petitioner contends that the impugned Act and in particular sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 thereof take away or abridge the fundamental right to freedom of movement in contravention of article 13 (2) of the Constitution and is, therefore, void as declared therein.\n\nArticle 13 is one of a fasciculus of articles which are comprised in part III of the Indian Constitution headed \"Fundamental Rights.\" This Part forms a new feature of the Constitution and is the Indian \"Bill of Rights.\" It is modelled on the first ten Amendments of the American Constitution which declare the fundamental rights of the American\n\ncitizen~ Article 12, which is the first article in this Part, defines \"the State\" as including the Governments and Legislatures of the Union and the States as well as all local and other authorities against which the fundamental rights are enforceable, and article 13 ( 1) declares that all existing laws inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.\n\nClause (2) of the article, on which the petitioner's contention is primarily founded reads as follows :\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nPalanja/i Sastri }.\n\nA., K. G.pa!an\n\nTh•S<au\n\nPatlJl!iali Sastri ].\n\n\"The State_ shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.\"\n\nAs the constitutional inhibition against deprivation or abridgement relates only to \"the rights conferred by this Part,\" it is necessary first to ascertain the nature and extent of the right which, according to the petitioner, Part III has conferred on him, and, second I y, to determine whether the right so ascertained has been taken away or abridged by the impugned Act or by any of its provisions.\n\nThe first question turns on the proper interpretation of the relevant articles of the Constitution, ; md the second involves the consideration of the provisions of the impugned Act.\n\nMr. Nambiar appearing for the petitioner advanced three main lines of argument. In the first place, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India referred to in article 19 ( 1) ( d) is of the very essence of personal liberty, and inasmuch as the detention authorised by the impugned Act was not a \"reasonable restriction\" which Parliament could validly impose on such right under \\Clause (5) of the article, the impugned Act is void. Alternatively, the petitioner had a fundamental right under article 21 not to be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and the impugned Act by authorising detention otherwise than in accordance with proper procedure took away that right and was therefore void. And. lastly, the provisions . of the impugned Act alreadv referred to were ultra vires and inoperative as Parliament in enacting them has overstepped the limitations placed on its legislative power by article 22 clauses ( 4) to (7).\n\nAccordingly, the first question for consideration is whether article 19 (1) (d) and (5) is applicable to the present case : \"Liberty,\" says John Stuart Mill, \"consists in doing what tine desires.\n\nBut the liberty of the individual must be thus far limited-he must not make himself a nuisance to others.\" Man, as a rational being, desires to do many things, but in a civil society his desires have to be controlled, regulated\n\nand reconciled with the exercise of similar desires by other individuals.\n\nLiberty has, therefore, to be limited in order to be effectively possessed. Accordingly, article 19, while guaranteeing some of the most valued phases or elements of liberty to every citizen as civil rights, provides for their regulation for the common good by the State imposing certain \"restrictions\" on their exercise.\n\nThe power of locomotion is no doubt an essential element of personal liberty which means freedom from bodily restraint, and detention in jail is a drastic invasion of that liberty. But the question is : Does article 19, in its setting in Part III of the Constitution, deal with the deprivation of personal liberty in the sense of incarceration ? Sub-clause ( d) of clause ( 1) does not refer to freedom of movement simpliciter but guarantees the right to move freely \"throughout the territory of India.\" Sub-clause ( e) similarly guarantees the right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India.\n\nAnd clause (5) authorises the imposition of \"reasonable restrictions\" on these rights in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Reading these provisions together, it is reasonably clear that they were designed primarily to emphasise the factual unity of the territory of India and to secure the right of a free citizen to move from one place in India to another and to reside and settle in any part of India unhampered by any barriers which narrow-minded provincialism may seek to interpose.\n\nThe use of the word \"restrictions\" in the . various sub-clauses seems to imply, in the context, that the rights guaranteed by the article are still capable of being exercised, and to exclude the idea of incarceration though the words \"restriction!' and \"deprivation\" are sometimes used as interchangeable terms, as restriction may reach a point where it may well amount to deprivation. Read as a whole and viewed in its setting among the group of provisions (articles 19-22) relating to \"Right to Freedom,\" article 19 seems to my mind t.o pre-suppose that the citizen to whom the possession of these fundamental rights is secured retains the substratum\n\nA. K. Gopalan v: The State\n\nPatanjali Sastri ].\n\nA. Jr. Goj>alan\n\n\"· T/,.S•ate\n\nPattnfialiSa>lri j.\n\nI of personal freedom on which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests. lt was said that subclause (f) would militate against this view, as the enjoyment of the right \"to acquire, hold and dispose of propsrty\" does not depend upon the owner retaining his personal freedom. This assumption is obviously wrong as regards moveable properties , and even as regards immoveables he could not acquire or dispose of them from behind the prison bars ; nor could he \"hold\" them in the sense of exercising rights of possession and control over them which is what the word seems to 'mean in the context. But where, as a penalty for committing a crime or otherwise, the citizen is lawfully deprived of his freedom, there could no longer be any q uc:stion of his exercising or enforcing the rights referr:d to in clause (1). Deprivation of personal liberty in such a situation is not, in my opinion, within the purview of article 19 at all but is dealt with by the succeeding articles 20 and 21. In other words, article 19 guarantees to the citizens the enjoyment of certain civil liberties while they are free, while articles 20-22 secure to all persons-citizens and non-citizens-certain constitutional guarantees in regard to punishment and prevention of crime. Different criteria are provided by which to measure legislative\n\njudgments in the two fields, and a construction which would bring within article 19 imprisonment in punishment of a crime committed or in prevention of a crime threatened would, as it seems to me, make a reductio ad absurdum of that rrovision. If imprisonment were to be regarded as a \"restriction\" of the right mentioned in article 19 (1) (d), it would equally be a restriction on the rights mentioned by the other subclauses. of clause ( l), with the result that all penal laws providing for imprisonment as a mode of punishment would have to run the gauntlet of clauses (2) to ( 6) before their validity could be accepted.\n\nFor instance, the law which imprisons for theft would, on that view, fall to be justified under clause (2) as a law sanctioning restriction of freedom of speech and expression.\n\nIndeed, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a recent unreported decision brought to our notice,\n\napplied the test of undermining the security of the State or tending to overthrow it in determining the validity or other wise of the impugned Act. The learned Judges construed article 19 as covering cases of deprivation of pers_onal liberty and lJ.eld, logically enough, that inasmuch as the impugned Act, by authorising preventive detention, infringed the right to freedom of speech and expression, its validity should be judged by the reservations in clause (2), and as it failed to stand that test, it was unconstitutional and void.\n\nMr. Nambiar did not seek to g0 so far. He drew a distinction between the right conferred by sub-clause\n\n(d) and those conferred by the other - sub-clauses.\n\nHe urged, referring to Blackstone's Commentaries, that personal liberty consisted \"in moving one's person to whatever place one's inclination might direct,\" and - that any law which deprived a person of such power of locomotion was a direct invasion of the right mentioned in sub-clause (d), whereas it interfered only indirectly and consequentially with the rights mentioned in the other sub-clauses. There is no substance in the distinction suggested.\n\nIt would be illogical, in construing article 19, to attribute. to one of the sub-clauses a scop~ and effect totally different from the scope and effect of the others or to draw a distinction between one right and another in the group.\n\nAll the rights mentioned in clause (1) are equally essential elements in the liberty of the individual in any civilised and democratic community, and imprisonment operates as an extinction of all of them alike. It cannot therefore, be said that deprivation of personal liberty is an infringement of the right conferred by sub-clause (d) alone but not of the others.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court realised this and were perfectly logical in holding that the constitutional validity of a law providing for deprivation of personal liberty or imprisonment must be judged by the tests laid down not only in clause (5) of-article 19 but also in the other clauses including clause (2), though their major premise that deprivation of personal liberty was a \"restriction\" within the meaning of •article 19 is, in my judgment, erroneous.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nPatanjali Sastri ].\n\nA. K.Gopalan\n\nV, Tlw Stau\n\nPatatifali Sastri ].\n\nIt was said that preventive detention being a drastic restriction of the right to move fredy was, in its \"pith and substance'', within article 19 (1) (cl) read with clause. (5) and not within article 21 which deals with crime anp its punishment and prevention. There is no room here, in my opinion, for the application of the rule of \"pith and substance.\" As pointed out by the Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna ( 1 ), approving the observations of the Federal Court in Subrahmanyan\n\nChettiar v. Muttuswamy Goundan { 1 ), the rule was evolved by the Board for determining whether an impugned statute was, in its true character, legislation with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of one legislature or another in a scheme of divided legislative power. No such question arises here. What the Court has to ascertain is the true scope and meaning of article 19 in the context of Part Ill of the Constitution, in order to decide whether deprivation of° personal liberty falls within that article, and the pith and substance rule will be more misleading than helpful in the decision of that issue.\n\nArticle 19, as I have already indicated, guarantees protection for the more important civil liberties of citizens who are in the enjoyment of their. freedom, while at the same time laying down the restrictions which the legislature may properly impose on the exercise of such rights, and it has nothipg to do with deprivation of personal liberty or imprisonment which is dealt with by the succeeding three articles.\n\nThere is also another consideration which points to the same conclusion.\n\nThe Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, to whose Report reference was freely made by both sides during the argument, recommended \"that the word liberty should be qualified by the insertion of the word 'personal' before it, for otherwise it might be construed very widely so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with in artirl~ 13\" (now article 19).\n\nThe acceptance of this suggestion shows that whatever may be the generally accepted\n\n11)\n\n74 I.A. •3\n\n(•) [J940J F.C.R. 188.\n\nconnotation of the expression \"personal liberty'', it was used in article 21 in a sense which excludes the freedoms dealt with in article 19, that is to say, personal liberty in the context of Part III of the Constitution is something distinct from the freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India.\n\nIt was further submitted that article 19 declared . the substantive rights of personal liberty while article 21 provided the procedural safeguard against their deprivation.\n\nThis view of the correlation between the two articles has found favour with some of the Judges in the High Courts which have had occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the impugned Act.\n\nIt is, however, to be observed that article 19 confers the rights therein specified only on the citizens of India, while article 21 extends the protection of life and personal liberty to all persons-citizens and noncitizens alike.\n\nThus, the two articles do not operate in a conterminous field, and this is one reason for rejecting the correlation suggested.\n\nAgain, if article 21 is to be understood as prnviding only procedural safeguards, where is the substantive right to personal liberty of non-citizens to be found in the Constitution ? Are they denied such right altogether ?\n\nIf they are to have no right of personal liberty, why is the procedural safeguard in article 21 exended to them ?\n\nAnd where is that most fundamental right of all, the right to life, provided for in the Constitution ? The truth is that article 21, like its American prototype in the Fifth and Fourceenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, presents an example of the fusion of procedural and substantive rights in the same provision.\n\nThe right to live, though the most fundamental of all, is al so one of the most difficult to define and its protection generally takes the form of a declaration that no per~:on shall be deprived of it save by due process of law or by authority of law. \"Process\" or \"procedure\" in this context connotes both the act and the manner of proceeding to take away a man's life or personal liberty.\n\nAnd the first and essential step in a procedure established by law for such deprivation must be a law made by a competent legislature 8-3 S .C. India/SP\n\nA. K. Copa/an v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nPatmefali Sastri J.\n\nauthorising such deprivation.\n\nThis brings me to the consideration of articles 21 and 22 to which was devoted the greater part of the debate at the Bar.\n\nThese articles run as follows :\n\n\"21. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.\n\n22.\n\n(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest. nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. '(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.\n\n(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply- ( a) to any person who for the time bemg is an enemy alien ; or\n\n(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless- ( a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention :\n\nProvided that nothing n this sub-Clause shall authorise the detention of any - person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7) ; or\n\n(b) such person . is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).\n\n(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made -under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. ( 6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authoritv considers to be against the public interest to disclose. .\n\n(7) Parliament may by law prescribe- ( a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an. Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) :\n\n(b) t.he maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for 'preventive detention ; and\n\n(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).\"\n\nMr.\n\nNambiar urged that the word \"law\" in article 21 should be understood, not in the sense of an enactment but as signifying the immutable and universal principles of natural justice-the jus naturale of the civil law-artd that the expression \"procedure established by law\" meant the same thing as that famous phrase \"due prncess of law\" in the American Constitution in its procedural aspect.\n\nNumerous American decisions were cited to show that the phrase implied the basic requirements of (1) an objective and a!certainable standard of conduct to which it is possible to conform,\n\n(2) notice to the party of the accusation against him,\n\n(3) a reasonable opportunitv for him to establish his innocence, and ( 4) an impartial tribunal capable of giving an unbiased judgment.\n\nMr. Nambiar conceded that these reauirements might have to be modified or adapted to suit the nature of the particular proceeding and the object it had in\n\nA. K Gopalti.n\n\nTM State\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nd. K. Gopalan\n\nTJt, Stat•\n\nP atatliali S4\"'i ].\n\nview, as for instance, in a case of preventive detention, previous notice, which might result in the person concerned going underground might be dispensed with.\n\nLearned counsel insisted that these requirements, being the very core of the principles of natural justice which transcended all State-made laws, must be substantially complied with by any law governing the process of deprivation of life or personal liberty, subject, of course, to any express provision in the Constitution sanctioning their relaxation or dispensation in any case or class of cases.\n\nHe also appealed to the Preamble of the Constitution as the guiding star in its interpretation to support his thesis that, in view of the democratic Constitution which the people of India have purported to give themselves guaranteeing to the citizens certain fundamental rights which are justiciable, the provisions of Part III must be construed as being paramount to the legislative will, as otherwise the socalled fundamental right to life and personal liberty would have no protection against legislative action, and article 13(2) would be rendered nugatory.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the people of India have, in exercise of their sovereign will as expressed in the Preamble, adopted the democratic ideal which assures to the citizen the dignity of the individual and other cherished human values as a means to the full evolution and expression of his personality, and in delegating to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary their respective powers in -the Constitution, reserved to themselves certain fundamental rights, s<>- called, I apprehend, because thev have been retained by the people and made paramount to the delegated powers, as in the American model. Madison (who played a prominent part in framing the First Amendment of the American Constitution) pointing out the distinction, due to historical reasons, between the American and the British ways of securing \"the great and sscn tial rights of the people,\" observed \"Here they arc secured not by laws paramount to prerogative but by Constitutions paramount to laws\" : Report on the Virginia Resolutions, quoted in Near v. Minnesota ( 1 ).\n\n(') 283 U.S. 697.\n\nThis has been translated into positive law in Part III of the Indian Constitution, and I agree that in construing these provisions the high purpose and spirit of the Preamble as well as the constitutional significance of a Declaration of Fundamental Rights should be borne in mind.\n\nThis, however, is not to say that the language of the provisions should be stretched to square with this or that constitutional theory in disregard of the cardinal rule of interpretation of any enactment, constitutional or other, that its spirit, no less than its intendment should be collected primarily from the natural meaning of the words used.\n\nGiving full effect to these principles, however, I am unable to agree that the term \"law\" in article 21 means the immutable and universal principles of natural justice. \"Procedure established by law\" must be taken to refer to a procedure which has a statutory origin, for no procedure is known or can be said to have been established by such vague and uncertain concepts as \"the immutable and universal principles of natural justice.\" In my opinion, \"law\" in article 21 means \"positive or State-made law.\" No doubt, the American Judges have adopted the other connotation in their interpretation of the due process clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the American Con.stitution (\"Nor shall any person be deprived of life. liberty or property without due process of law\").\n\nBut that clause has an evolutionary history behind it.\n\nThe phrase has been traced back to 28 Edw. III Ch. 3, and Coke in his Institutes identified the term with the expression \"the law of the\n\nland\" in the great Charter of John. Even in England where the legislative omnipotence of Parliament is now firmly established.\n\nCoke understood these terms as implying an .inherent limitation on all legislation, and ruled in Dr. Bonham's Case (1) that \"the common law will control Acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void when they are against common right and reason.\" Though this doctrine was later discarded in England as being \"a warning\n\n(1) 8 Rep. 118 (a).\n\nA. K. Goj>lllt111\n\nThe Stat•\n\nPala, Yali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Staie\n\nPatanja{i Sastri ].\n\nrather than an authority to be followed\" [per Willes }. in Lee v. Dude and Torrington Ry. (1 )] it gained ground in America, at first as a weapon in the hands of the Revolutionists with which to resist the laws of Parliament, and later as an instrument in the hands of the Judges for establishing the supremacy of the judiciary [see Calder v. Bull ( ') ].\n\nIn the latter half of the 19th century, this doctrine of a transcendental common law or natural justice was absorbed in the connotation afthe phrase \"due process of law\" occurring i1_1 the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; By laying' emphasis on the word \"due'', interpreting \"law\" as the fundamental principles of natural justice and giving the words \"liberty\" and \"property\" their widest meaning, the Judges have made the due process clause into a general restriction on all legislative power.\n\nAnd when that power was threatened with prostration by the excesses of due process, the equally vague and expansive doctrine of \"police power\", i.r:., the power of Government to regulate private rights in public interest, was evolved t-0 counteract such excesses. All this has been criticised as introducing great uncertainty in tH, e state of the law in that country, for no one could he sure how due process of law would affect a particular enactment.\n\nA century after the phrase had been the subject of judicial interpretation one learned Judge observed in 1877 that it was incapable of precise definition and that its intent and application could only be ascertained by \"the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion\" [Davidson v. New Orleans (•)] and, as recently as 1948, another Judge referred to the difficulty of \"giving definiteness to the vague contours of due process\" and \"of spinning judgment upon State action out of that gossamer concept:\" Haley v.\n\nState of Ohio ( ').\n\nIt is not a matter for surprise, therefore, that the Drafting Committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly of India recommended the substitution of the expression • \"except according to procedure\n\n(') (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 576. 582.\n\nt'l\n\n(1798) 3 Dalhas as.\n\n('1 96 U.S. 97.\n\n(') 332 U.S.596.\n\nestablished by law\" taken from the Japanese Constitution, 1946, for the words \"without due process of law\" which occurred in the original draft, \"as the former is more specific.\" In their Report the Committee added that they have \"attempted to make these rights (fundamental rights) and the limitations to which they must necessarily be subject as definite as possible, since the Courts may have to pronounce upon them\" (para. 5). In the face of all these considerations, it is difficult to accept the suggestion tha, t \"law\" in article 21 stands for the jus naturale of the civil law, and that the phrase \"according to procedure established by law\" is equivalent to due process of law in its procedural aspect, for that would have the effect of itroducing into our Constitution those \"subtle and elusive criteria\" implied in that phrase which it was the deliberate purpose of the framers of our Constitution to avoid.\n\nOn the other hand, the interpretation suggested by the Attorney-General on behalf of the intervener that the expression means nothing more than procedure. prescribed by any law made by a competent legislature is hardly more acceptable. \"Established\" according to him, means prescribed, and if Parliament or the Legislature of a State enacted a procedure, however, novel and ineffective for affording the accused person a fair opportunity of defending himself, it would be sufficient for depriving a person of his life or personal liberty. He submitted that the Constituent Assembly definitely rejected the doctrine of judicial supremacy when it rejected the phrase \"due process of law\" and made the legislative will unchallengeable, provided only \"some procedure\" was laid down. The Indian Constitution having thus preferred the English doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, the phrase \"procedure established by law\" must be construed in accordance with the English view of due process of law, that is to say, any procedure which Parliament ma:y . choose to prescribe.\n\nLearned counsel drew attention to the speeches made by several members of the Assembly on the floor of the House for explaining, _ as he put it, the \"historical background.\" A speech\n\nA. K. Gopl'11111\n\nTlllStaU\n\nPatanjali So.slri J.\n\nA. IC. Gopalan\n\nTlw Stat•\n\nPatan; ali Sastri J.\n\nmade in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not .reflect the inarticulate mental processes I ying behind the majority vote which carried the bill.\n\nNor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.\n\nThe Court could only search for the objective intent of the legislature primarily in the words used in the enactment, aided by such historical material as reports of statutory committees, preambles etc.\n\nI attach no importance, therefore, to the speeches made by some of the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debate on article 15 (now article 21).\n\nThe main difficulty I feel in accepting the construction suggested by the Attorney-General is that it completely stultifies article 13(2) and, indeed, the very conception of a fundamental right.\n\nIt is of the essence of that conception that it is protected by the fundamental law of the Constitution against infringement by ordinary legislation.\n\nIt is not correct to say that the Constitution has adopted the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy.\n\nSo far, at any rate, as Part III is concerned, the Constitution, as I have already observed, has accepted the American view of fundamental rights. The provisions of articles 13 and 32 make this reasonably clear.\n\nCould it then have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the most important fundamental rights to life and personal liberty should be at the mercy of legislative majorities as, in effect, they would be if \"established\" were to mean merely \"prescribed?\". In other words, as an American Judge said in a similar context, does the constitutional prohibition in article 13 (2) amount to no more than \"You shall not take away life or personal freedom unless you choose to take it' away,\" which is mere verbiage.\n\nIt is no sound answer to say that, if article 21 conferred no right immune from legislative invasion, there would be no question of contravening article 13 (2).\n\nThe argument seems, to my mind, to beg the question, for it assumes that the article affords no such immunity. It is said that article 21 affords no protection against competent legislative action in\n\nthe field of substantive criminal law, for there is no provision fQr judicial review, on the ground of reasonableness or otherwise, of such laws, as in the case of the rights enuinerated in article 19.\n\nEven assuming it to be so the construction of the learned Attorney- General would have the effect of rendering wholly ineffective and illusory even the procedural protection which the article was undoubtedly designed to afford.\n\nIt was argued that .. law\" in article 31 which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property ''save by authority of law\" must mean enacted law and that if a person's prqperty could be taken away by legislative action, his right to life and personal liberty need not enjoy any greater immunity.\n\nThe analogy is misleading.\n\nClause (2) of article 31 provides for payment of compenSiation and that right is justiciable except in the two cases mentioned in clauses ( 4) and\n\n(6) which are of a transitory character The constitutional safeguard of . the right to property in the said article is, therefore, not so illusory or ineffective as clause (1) by itself might make it appear, even assuming that \"law\" there means ordinary legislation.\n\nMuch reliance was placed on the Irish case The King v. The Military Governor of Hare Park Camp (1 ) where the Court held that the term \"law\" in article 6 of the Irish Constitution of 1922 which provides that \"the liberty of the person is inviolable and no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with law\" meant a law enacted by the Parliament, and that therefore the Public Safety Act of 1924 did not contravene the Constitution. The Court followed The King v. Halliday (2) where the House of Lords by a majority held that the Defence of the Realm. (Consolidation) Act, 1914, and the Regulations framed theretinder did not infringe upon the Habeas Corpus Acts and. the~Magna Carta \"for the simple reason that the Act and the Orders become part of the law of the land.'; But that was because, as Lord Dunedin pointed out \"the British Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses of Parliament subject to the assent\n\n(') [1924) 2 I.R; 104.\n\n(1) (1917) A.C. 260.\n\nA. IC Gopalan , ..\n\nTiu Stau\n\nPatanjali Saslri ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stl.tt\n\nPatanjaJi SastriJ.\n\nof the King, an absolute power untrammelled by any written instrument obedience to which may be compelled by some judicial body,\" whereas the Irish Constitution restricted the legislative powers of the Irish Parliament by a formal declaration of fundamental rights and by providing for a judicial review of legislation in contravention of the Constitution (article 65).\n\nThis radical distinction was overlooked.\n\nThe Attorney-General further submitted that, even on his interpretation, article 21 would be a protection against violation of the rights by the executive and by individuals, and that would be sufficient justification for the article ranking as a fundamental safeguard.\n\nThere is no substance in the suggestion.\n\nAs pointed out in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria (Officer Administering) (1 ), the executive could only act in pursuance of the powers given by law and no constitutional protection against such action is really needed.\n\nEven in monarchical Britain the struggle between prerogative and law has long since ended in favour of the latter. \"In accordance with British jurisprudence\" said Lord Atkin in the case cited above, \"no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a Court of justice.\" As for protection against individuals, it is a misconception to think that constitutional safeguards are directed against individuals.\n\nThey are as a rule directed against the State and its organs.\n\nProtection against violation of the rights by individuals must be sought in the ordinary law.\n\nIt is therefore difficult to accept the suggestion that article 21 was designed to afford protection on! y against infringements by the executive or individuals.\n\nOn the other hand, the insertion of a declaration of .Fundamental Rights in the forefront of the Constitution, coupled with an express prohibition against legislative interference with these rights (article 13) and the provision of a constitutional sanction for the enforcement of such prohibition by means of a judicial review (article 32) is, in my\n\n(') [1931] A.O. 662.\n\nopm1on, a clear and emphatic indication that these rights are to be paramount to ordinary State-made laws.\n\nAfter giving the matter my most careful and anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion that there are only two possible solutions of the problem.\n\nIn the first place, a satisfactory via media between the rwo extreme positions contended for on either. side may be found by stressing the word \"establislied\" which implies some degree of firmness, permanence and general acceptance, while it does not exclude origination by statute. \"Procedure established by law\" may well be taken to mean what the Privy Council referred to in King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma ( 1) as \"the ordinary and well-established criminal procedure,\" that is to say, those settled usages and normal modes of . proceeding sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code which is the general law of criminal procedure in the country.\n\nTheir Lordships were referring to the distinction between trial by special Courts provided by an Ordinance of the Governor-General and trial by ordinary Courts under the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIt can be no objection . to this view that the Code prescribes no single and uniform procedure for all types of cases but provides varying procedures for different classes of cases.\n\nCertain basic principles emerge as the constant factors common to all those procedures, and they form the core of the procedure established by law. I realise that even on this view, the life and liberty of the individual will not be immune from legislative interference, for a competent legislature may change the procedure so as to whittle down the protection if so minded. But, in the view I have indicated, it must not be a change ad hoc for any special purpose or occasion, but a change in the general law of procedure embodied in the Code. So long as such a change is not effected.\n\nThe protection under article 21 would be available. The different measures of constitutional protection which the fundamental right to life and personal liberty will enjoy under article 21 as interpreted in the three ways (1)\n\n[1945] F.C.R. 161, 175.\n\nA. K. Gopa/an\n\nThe State\n\nPatanja/i Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe Stale\n\nPatmiia/i Sastri ].\n\nreferred to above will perhaps be best illustrated by a concrete example.\n\nSuppose that article 22 ( 1) was not there and Parliament passed an Act, as a temporary measure, taking away in certain cases the right of an accused person to be defended by a legal practitioner.\n\nAccording to the petitioner's learned counsel the Act would be void as being contrary to the immutable principles of natural justice embodied in article 21, whereas on the construction contended for by the Attorney-General, the Act would be perfectly valid, while, on the view I have indicated above, the Act would be bad, but if the denial of such right of defence is made a normal feature of the ordinary law of criminal procedure by abrogating section 340 ( 1) of the Code, article 21 would be powerless to protect against such legislative action.\n\nBut in a free democratic republic such a drastic change in the normal law of procedure, though theoretically possible, would be difficult to bring about, and that practical difficulty will be the measure of the protection afforded by article 21.\n\nIt was said that the safeguards provided in clauses (1) and (2) of article 22 are more or less covered by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and this overlapping would have been avoided if. article 21 were intended to bear the construction as indicated above.\n\nThe argument overlooks that, while the provisions of the Code would be liable to alteration by competent legislative action, the safeguards in clauses ( 1) and (2) of article 22, being constitutional, could not be similarly dealt with and this sufficiently explains why those safeguards find a place in the Constitution.\n\nThe only alternative to the construction I have indicated above, if a constitutional transgression is to be avoided, would be to interpret the reference to \"law\" as implying a constitutional amendment pro tanto, for it is only a law enacted by the procedure provided for such amendment (article 368) that could modify or override a fundamental right without contravening article 13 (2).\n\nThe question next arises as to how far the protection under article 21, such .as it has been found to be, is available to persons under. preventive detention.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended that article 21 did not apply to preventive detention at all, as article 22 clauses . ( 4) to (7) formed a complete code of constitutional safeguards in respect of preventive detention and, provided only these provisions are conformed to, the validity of any law relating to preventive detention could not be challenged.\n\nI am unable to agree with this view. The language of article 21 is perfectly general and covers deprivation of personal liberty or incarceration, both for punitive and preventive reasons. If it was really the intention of the framers of the Constitution to exclude the application of article 21 to cases of preventive detention, nothing would have been easier than to add a reference to article 21 in clause (3) of article 22 which provides that clauses (1) and (2) of the latter shall not apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.\n\nNor is there anything in the language of clauses (4) to\n\n(7) of article 22 leading necessarily to the inference that article 21 is inapplicable to preventive dentention.\n\nThese clauses deal only with certain aspects of preventive detention such as the duration of such detention, the constitution of an advisory board for reviewing the order of detention in certain cases, the communication of the grounds of detention to the person detained and the provision of an opportunity to him of making a representation against the order.\n\nIt cannot be said that these provisions form an exhaustive code dealing with all matters relating to preventive detention and cover the entire area of protection which article 21, interpreted in the sense I have indicated above, would afford to the person detained.\n\nI am, . therefore, of opinion that article 21 is applicable to preventive detention as well.\n\nI will now proceed to examme whether the impugned Act or any of its provisions under which the petitioner has been ordered to be detained, takes away any of the rights conferred by articles 2~ and 22 or infringes thei protection afforded thereby.\n\nThe\n\n1950\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu State\n\nPaJQl/jali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nPatanjali Sastri ].\n\noutstanding fact to be borne in mind in this connection is that preventive detention has been given a constitutional status.\n\nThis sinister-looking feature. so strangely out of place in a democratic constitution. which invests personal liberty with the sacrosanctity of a fundamental right and so incompatible with the promises of its preamble is doubtless designed to prevent an abuse of freedom by anti-social and subversive elements which might imperil the national welfare of the infant Republic.\n\nIt is in this spirit that clauses (3) to (7) of article 22 should, in my opinion, be construed and harmonised as far as possible with article 21 so as not to diminish unnecessarily the protection afforded for the legitimate exercise of personal liberty.\n\nIn the first place, as already stated, clause (3) of article 22 exclurles a person detained under any law providing for preventive detention from the benefit of the safeguards provided in clauses (1) and (2).\n\nNo doubt clause\n\n(5) of the same article makes some amends for the deprivation of these safeguards in that it provides for the communication to the person detained the grounds on which the order has been made and for an opportunity being afforded to him of making a representation against the order, but the important right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice is gone. Similarly, the prohibition against detention in custody beyond a period of 24 hours without the authority of a magistrate has also been taken away in cases of preventive detention.\n\nIt was not disputed that, to the extent to which the express provisions of clauses ( 4) to (7) authorised the abrogation or abridgement of the safeguards providec'.l under other articles or substitution of other safeguards in a modified form, those express provisions must rule.\n\nOf the four essentials of the due process on which Mr. Nambiar insisted, (which also form part of the ordinary and established procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code, though I cannot agree that they are immutable and beyond legislative change) the requirements of notice and an opportunity to establish his innocence must, as already stated, be taken to have\n\nbeen provided for by clause (5) of article 22.\n\nAs for an ascertainable standard of conduct to which it is possible to conform, article 22 makes no specific provision in cases of preventive detention, and if such a safeguard can be said to be implicit in the procedure established by law in the sense explained above in preventive detention cases, it could no doubt be invoked.\n\nThis point will be considered presently in dealing with provisions of the impugned Act. The only other essential requirements, and the most essential of all, is an impartial tribunal capable of giving an unbiassed verdict.\n\nThis, Mr. Nambiar submitted, was left unprovided for by article 22, the advisory board referred to in clause ( 4)\n\n(a) being, according to him, intended to deal solely with the question of duration of -the detention, that is to say, whether or not there was sufficient cause for detaining the person concerned for more than three months, and not with judging whether the person detained was innocent.\n\nA tribunal which could give an unbiassed judgment on that issue was an essential part <>f the protection afforded by article 21 in whichever way it may be interpreted, and reference was . made in this connection to the preventive provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. VIII). The impugned Act, not having provided for such a tribunal contravened article 21 and was -therefore void.\n\nIt will be seen that the whole of this argument is based on the major premise that the advisory board mentioned in clause (4) (a) of article 22 is not a tribunal intended to deal with the issue of justification of detention.\n\nIs that view correct ?\n\nIt was argued that the words \"sufficient cause for such detention\" in sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) had reference to the detention beyond three months mentioned in clause (4) and that this view was supported by the language of sub-clause (a) of clause (7) whereby Parliament is authorised to prescribe the circumstances under which and the class or classe, of cases in which a person may be detained for a period. longer than three months without the opinion of an advisory board.\n\nIn other words; learned counsel s1:1bmitted,\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nPatanjali Sastri ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\n Patanjali Sastri J.\n\nthe combined effect of clauses ( 4) and ( 7) was that no person could be detained for a period over three months without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board that there was sufficient cause for detention for the longer period, except in cases where Parliament passed a law authorising detention for such period even without the opinion of an advisory board.\n\nThus, these two clauses were concerned solely with the duration of the preventive detention, and so was the advisory board which those clauses provided for that purpose.\n\nI am unable to accept this view.\n\nI am inclined to think that the words \"such detention\" in sub-clause\n\n(a) refer back to the preventive detention mentioned in clause ( 4) and not to detenuon for a longer period than three months.\n\nAn advisory board, composed as it has to be of Judges or lawyers, would hardly be in a position to judge how long a person under preventive detention, say for reasons connected with defence, should be detained.\n\nThat must be a matter for the executive authorities, the Department of Defence, to determine, as they alone are responsible for the defence of the country and have the necessary data for taking a decision on the point.\n\nAll that an advisory board can reasonably be asked to do, as a safeguard against the misuse of the power, is to judge whether the detention is justified and not arbitrary or mala fide.\n\nThe fact that the advisory board is required to make its report before the expiry of three months and so could submit it only a day or two earlier cannot legitimately lead to an inference that the board was solely concerned with the issue whether or not the detention should continue beyond that period.\n\nBefore any such tribunal could send in its report a reasonable time must elapse, as the grounds have to be communicated to the person detained, he has to make his r<; presentation to the detaining authority which has got to be placed before the board through the appropriate departmental channel.\n\nEach of these steps may, in the course of official routine, take some time, and three months' period might well have been thought a reasonable period to allow before the board could be required to submit its report.\n\nAssuming, however, that the words \"such detention'.'. had reference to the period of detention, there is no apparent reason for confining the enquiry by the advisory board to the sole issue of duration beyond three months without reference to the question as to whether the detention was justified or not.\n\nIndeed, it is difficult to conceive how a tribunal could fairly judge whether a person should be detained for more than three months without at the same time considering whether there was sufficient cause for the detention at all.\n\nI am of opinion that the advisory board referred to in clause ( 4) is the machinery devised by the Constitution for reviewing orders for preventive detention in certain cases on a consideration of the representations made by the persons detained.\n\nThis is the view on which Parliament has proceeded in enacting the impugned Act as will be seen from sections 9 and 10 thereof, and I think it is the correct view.\n\nIt follows that the petitioner cannot claim to have his case judged by any other impartial tribunal by virtue of article 21 or otherwise.\n\nMr. Nambiar, however, objected that, on this view, a law could authorise preventive detention for three months without providing for review by any tribunal, and for even longr periods if Parliament passed an Act such as is contemplated in sub-clause (a) of clause (7).\n\nThat may be so, but, however deplorable such a result may be from the point of view of the person detained, there could be no remedy if, on a proper construction of clauses ( 4) and (7), the Constitution is found to afford no higher protection for the personal liberty of the individual.\n\nTurning next to the provisions. of the impugned Act, whose constitutional validity was challenged, it will be necessary to consider only those provisions which affect the . petitioner before us. In the first place, it w::i~ contended that section 3, which empowers the Central Gov&nment or the State Government to detain any person if it is \"satisfied\" that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (among other 9-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gojialan\n\nThe Slat•\n\nPatanjali Sa.riri ].\n\nA. K. Gopa/an\n\nv, Tire State\n\nPatmija/i Sastri J.\n\nthings) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, cannot be said to comply with the procedure established by law, as the section prescribes no objective and ascertainable standard of conduct to which it will be possible to conform, but leaves it to the will and pleasure of the Government concerned to make an order of detention. .The argument proceeds on the assumption that the procedure established by law is equivalent to the due process of law.\n\nI have already endeavoured to show that it is not.\n\nApart from this, the argument overlooks that for the purposes of preventive detention it would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down objective rules of conduct failure to conform to which should lead to such detention.\n\nAs the very term implies, the detention in such cases is effected with a view to prevent the person concerned from acting prejudicially to certain objects which the legislation providing for such detention has in view.\n\nNor would it be practicable to indicate m enumerate in advanc~ what acts or classes of acts would be regarded as prejudicial.· The responsibility for the security of the State and the maintenance of public order etc. having been laid on the executive Government it must naturally be left to that Government to exercise the power of preventive detention whenever they think the occasion demands it. ' Section 12 came in for a good deal of criticism.\n\nThat section, which governs the duration of the petitioner's detention reads as follows :-\n\n\"Duration of detention in certain cases.-Any person detained in any of th.! following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances may be detained without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months, but not exceeding orie year from the date of his detention, namely, where such person has been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n(a) the defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India ; or\n\n(b) the securit}r of a State or the maintenance of public order.\n\n(2) The case of every person detained under a detention order to which the provisions of sub-section ( 1) apply shall, within a period of six months from the date of his detention, be reviewed where the order was made by the Central Government or a State Government, by such Government, and where the order was made by any officer specified in sub-section\n\n(2) of section 3, by the State Government to which such officer is subordinate, in consultation with a person who is, or has been, or is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court nominated in that behalf by the , Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be.\"\n\nIt was urged that this did not comply with the requirements of clause (7) of article. 22 as it merely repeated the \"matters\" or legislative topics mentioned in Entry 9 of List I and Entry 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nWhat Parliament has to do under clause (7) of article 22 is to prescribe \"the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases in which\" a person may be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board.\n\nIt was said that clause ( 4)\n\n(a) provided for ordinary !ases of preventive detention where such detention could not continue beyond three months without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board, whereas clause (7) (a) made provision for special cases of detention for more than three months without the safeguard of the advisory board':; opinion, for aggravated forms of prejudicial conduct.\n\nIn other words, clause ( 4) (a) laid down the rule and clause (7) (a) enacted an exception.\n\nIt was therefore necessary for Parliament to indicate to the detaining authority for its guidance the more aggravated forms of prejudicial activity, and mere mention of the subjects in respect of which Parliament is authorised under the legislative lists to make laws in respect of preventive detention could hardly afford any guidance to such authority and should not be regarded as sufficient compliance with the requirements of clause (7). There is a two-fold fallacy in\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu Stall\n\nPatanJaJi Sastri J.\n\nA.. K. Gopcla•\n\n•• Tlw S'°\"\n\nPatatrjali SasJri \"].\n\nthis argument.\n\nIn the first place, the suggested correlation between clause (4) (a) and clause (7) (a) as enacting a rule and an exception is, as a matter of construction, without foundation.\n\nReading clauses ( 4) and (7) together it is reasonably clear that preventiv.t detention could last longer in two cases : ( 1) where the opinion of an advisory board is obtained, subject however to a prescribed period [sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4)] and (2) where a person is detained under a law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7) [sub-clause (b) of clause (4)].\n\nThese are two distinct and independent provisions.\n\nIt is significant that sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4) is not worded as a proviso or an exception to sub-clause (a) of the same clause as it would have been if it was intended to operate as such.\n\nThe attempt to correlate clause (4) (a) and clause (7) (a) as .a rule and an exception respectively is opposed both to the language and the structure of those clauses.\n\nSecondly, the argume, nt loses sight of the fact that clause (7) deals with preventive detention which is a purely precautionary measure which \"must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as .distinct from proof\" [per Lord Atkinson in Re:r v. Halliday (' ']. The remarks I have already made with reference to the absence of any objective rules of conduct in section 3 of the impugned Act apply also to this criticism of section 12. It would be difficult, if not impracticable, to mention the v; irious\n\ncircumstances, or to enumerate the various classes of cases exhaustively in which a person should be detained for more than three months for preventive purposes, except in broad outline.\n\nSuppose a person belongs to an organization pledged to violent and subversive activity as its polil:; y.\n\nBeyond his membership of the party the person might have done nothing until he was arrest; ed and detained. But if released he might indulge in anything from the mildest form of _prejudicial activity, like sticking an objectionable handbill on a hoarding, to the most outrageous acts of sabotage.\n\n('} L. R. 1917 A. C. 260, 275.\n\nHow could the insertion in section 12 of a long series of categories of aggravated forms of prejudicial activities, or the enumeration of the various circumstances in which such activities are likely to be indulged in, be of any assistance to the detaining authority in determining whether the person concerned should be detained for three months or for a longer period ?\n\nAll that would be necessary and sufficient for him to know for coming to a decision on the point is that the person is a member of such an organisation and will probably engage in subversive activities prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order or, in other words, he belongs to class (b) in section 12.\n\nWhile enumeration and classification in detail would undoubtedly help in grading punishment for offences committed, they would not be of much use in fixing the duration of preventive detention.\n\nSufficient g!lidance in such cases could be given by broadly indicating the general nature of the prejudicial activity which a person is likely to indulge in, and that in effect is what Parliament has done in -section 12.\n\nReference was made in this connection to Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939, where \"prejudicial act\" is defined by enumeration.\n\nBut it was also for the purpose of prohibiting such acts [Rule 38 sub-rule (I)] and making them offences (sub-rule 5). And even there, the definition had to end in a residuary clause sweeping in acts likely \"to prejudice the efficient prosecution of the war, the defence of British India or the public safety or interest.\"\n\nIn Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule _to the Constitution six topics are mentioned in respect of which Parliament could make laws providing for preventive detention, and section 12 of the impugned Act mentions five of them as being the classes of cases or the circumstances in which longer detention is authorised.\n\nI fail to see why this could not be regarded as a broad classification of cases or a broad description of circumstances where Parliament considers longer detention to be justifiable.\n\nA class can well be designated with reference to the end which one desires to secure, and the matters referred to as classes (a)\n\n19.~0\n\nA. K. Gopa/1J11\n\nTill State\n\nPa11J11jali Saslri ].\n\n.4. Ir. Gop.Ian\n\nTJ..Sta11\n\nPatmijali Sastri ].\n\nand (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 12 being clearly the objects which Parliament desired to secure by enacting the section, it seems to me that the classification with reference to such general aims does not contravene article 22 (7)·\n\nIt was argued that Parliament did not, in enacting section 12, perform its duty of prescribing both the circumstances and the class or classes of cases where detention without obtaining the advisory board's opinion could be for a period longer than three months.\n\nThe use of the. disjunctive \"or\" between the word \"circumstances\" and the words \"class or classes of cases\" showed, it was said, that Parliament proceeded on the view that it need not prescribe both.\n\nThis was in contravention of article 22 (7) which used the conjunctive. \"and\" between those words.\n\nThere is no substance in this objection.\n\nAs I read article 22 (7) it means that Parliament may prescribe either the circumstances or the classes of cases or both, and in enacting section 12 Parliament evidently regarded the matters mentioned in clause (a) and (b) of sub-section ( 1) as sufficiently indicative both of the circumstances under which and the classes in which a person could be detained for the longer period.\n\nTo say, for instance, that persons who are likely to act prejudicially to the defence of India may be detained beyond three months is at once to \"prescribe a class of persons in which and the circumstances under which\" a persnn may be detained for the longer period. In other words, - the classification itself may be such as to amount to a sufficient description of the circumstances for purposes of clause (7).\n\nThe circumstances which would justify precautionary detention beyond three months without recourse to an advisory board must be far too numerous for anything approaching an exhaustive enumeration, and it can, in my judgment, be no objection to the validity of section 12 that no circumstances arc mentioned apart from the matters 11Cferred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1).\n\nIt would\n\ninded be singular for the Court to strike down a parliamentary enactment because in its opinion a\n\ncertain classification therein made is imperfect or the mention of certain circumstances is unspecific or inadequate.\n\nLastly, Mr. Nambiar turned his attack on section 14 which prohibits the disclosure of the grounds of detention communicated to the person detained and of the representation made by him against the order of detention, and debars the Court from allowing such disclosure to be made except for purposes of a prosecution punishable under sub-section (2) which makes it an offence for any person to disclose or publish such grounds or representation without the previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be. The petitioner complains that this provision nullifies in effect the rights conferred upon him under clause (5) of article 22 which entitles him to have the grounds of his detention communicated to him and to make a representation against the order. If the grounds arc too vague to enable him to make any such representation, or if they are altogether irrelevant to the object of his detention, or are such as to show that his detention is not bona fide, he has the further right 6f moving this Couri and this remedy is also guaranteed to him under article 32.\n\nThese . rights and remedies, the petitioner submits, cannot be effectively exercised, if he is prevented on pain of prosecution, from disclosing the grounds to the Court.\n\nThere is great force in this contention.\n\nAll that the Attorney-General could say in an$Wer was that if the other provisions of the Act were held to be' valid, it would not be open to the Court to examine the sufficiency of the grounds on which the executive authority was \"satisfied\" that detention was necessary, as laid down in Machindar Sliivap Mahar v. The King ( 1 ), and so the petitioner could not complain of any infringement of his rights by reason of section 14 which enacted only a rule of evidence.\n\nThe argument overlooks that it was recognised in the decision referred to above that it would be open to the Court to examine the grounds of detention in order to. sec whether they were relevant to the object which the legislature had\n\n(') [1949] F. C.R. 827.\n\n..t. K. Gopa/41.•\n\nTluSUU\n\nP\"\"'11jali Sa.dri ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTM State\n\nMa/w.jan].\n\nin view, such as, for instance, the prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety and tranquillity, or were such as to show that the detention was not bona fide.\n\nAn examination of the grounds for these purposes is made impossible by section 14, and the protection afforded by article 22 (5) and article 32 is thereby rendered nugatory. It follows that section 14 contravenes the provisions of article 22 (5) and article 32 in so far as it prohibits the person detained from disclosing to the Court the grounds of his detention communicated to him by the detaining authority or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and prevents the Court from examining them for the purposes aforesaid, and to that extent it must be held under article 13 (2) to be void.\n\nThis however, does not affect the rest of the Act which is severable.\n\nAs the petitioner did not disclose the grounds of his detention pending our decision on this point, he will now be free to seek his remedy, if so advised, on the basis of those grounds.\n\nIn the result, the application fails and is dismissed.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The people of India having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic on the 26th day of November 1949 gave to themselves a Constitution which came into force on the 26th January 1950.\n\nThis is the first case in which this Court has been called upon to determine how far the Constitution has secured personal liberty to the citizens of this country.\n\nA. K. Gopalan, the petitioner, who was already under the custody of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Cuddalore, was served with an order of detention under section 3 ( l) of the Preventive Detention\n\nA~~, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) on the 27th February 1950. It was said in the order that the Governor of Madras was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order. On 20th March 1950 a petition was presented to this Court under article 32\n\nof the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus directing the State of Madras to produce him before the Court and to set him at liberty. A writ was accordingly issued. The return to the writ is that the detention is legal under Act IV of 1950, enacted by Parliament. The petitioner contends that the Act abridges and infringes certain provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is thus outside the constitutional limits of the legislature and therefore void and unenforceable.\n\nThe matter is one of great importance both because the legislative power expressly conferred by the 7th Schedule has been impugned and because the liberty of the citizen is seriously affected The decision of the question whether Act IV of 1950. takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part !J III of the Constitution depends on a consideration of J two points :\n\n(1) In what measure has the Constitution secured personal liberty to a citizen of India, and\n\n(2) has the impugned legislation in any way taken away or abridged the rights so secured and if so, to what extent ?\n\nAct IV of 1950 provides for preventive detention in certain cases and it has been enacted as a temporary measure. It will cease to have effect on 1st April 1951. It empowers the Central Government and the State Governments to make an order directing a person to be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India. It also gives power to detain a person who acts in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.\n\nIt came into force on 26th February 1950 and was enacted by virtue of the powers conferred on Parliament by article 22 clause (7) of Part III of the Constitution read with the entries in the 7th Schedule. There can be no doubt that the legislative will expressed herein\n\nA. K. (' , paian\n\nTM State\n\nMahqian].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nT/reStau\n\nMahajan].\n\nwould be enforceable unless the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits. It is quite obvious that the Court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional and void simply on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions or because it is supposed to violate natural, social or political rights of citizens unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights are guaranteed or protected by the Constitution. It may also be observed that an Act cannot be declared void because in the opinion of the Court it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not so expressed in words. It is difficult on any generaf principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition except in so far as the express words of a written Constitution give that authority. Article 13(2) of our Constitution gives such an authority and to the extent stated therein. It says that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention be void.\n\nPreventive detention laws are repugnant to democratic constitutions and they cannot be found to exist in any of the democratic countries of the world. It was stated at the Bar that no such law was in force in the United States of America.\n\nIn England for the first time during the first world war certain regulations framed under the Defence of the Realm Act provided for preventive detention at the satisfaction of the Home Secretary as a war measure and they ceased to have effect at the conclusion of hostilities. The same thing happened during the\n\nsecod world war.\n\nSimilar regulations were introduced during the period of the war in India under the Defence of India Act. The Government of India Act, 1935, conferred authority on the Central and Provincial Legislatures to enact laws on this subject for the first time and since then laws on this subject have taken firm root here and have become a permanent part of the statute book of this country.\n\nCuriously enough this subject has found place irl the Constitution in the\n\nchapter on Fundamental Rights. Entry 9 of the Union List and Entry 3 of the Concurrent List of the 7th\n\nSchedule mention the scope of legislative power of Parliament in respect of this topic. The jurisdiction, however, to. enact these laws is subject to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution Article 22 in this Part provides :-\n\n\" ( 1) No person who is arrested shal~ be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of is choice.\n\n(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in cust9<iy shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a IQagistrate.\n\n(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply-\n\n(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien ; or ·\n\n(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. ( 4} . No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless-\n\n(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or arc qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion -sufficient cause for such detention: Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7) ; or\n\n(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTheStak\n\nMahajan].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTh<Statt\n\nMahajan].\n\n(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. ( 6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.\n\n(7) Parliament may by law prescribe- ( a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) ;\n\n(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention ; and ( c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).\"\n\nThe question of the constitutional validity of the impugned statute has to be approached with great caution in view of these provisions of the Constitution and has to be considered with patient attention.\n\nThe benefit of reasonable doubt has to be resolved in favour of legislative action, though such a presumption is not conclusive.\n\nIt seems that the subject of preventive detention became the particular concern of the Constitution because of its intimate connection with deprivation of personal liberty to protect which certain provisions were introduced in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and because of the conditions prevailing in the newly born Republic.\n\nPreventive detention means a complete negation of freedom of movement and of personal liberty and 1s incompatible with both those subjects and yet it is placed in the same compartment with them in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThough the Constitution has recognised the necessity of laws as to preventive detention it has also provided certain safeguards to mitigate their harshness by placing_ fetters on legislative power conferred on this subject. These are- ( 1) That no law can provide for detention for a period of more than three months unless the sufficiency for the cause of the detention is investigated by an advisory board within the said period of three months.\n\nThis provision limits legislative power in the matter of duration of the period of detention.\n\nA law of preventive detention would be void if it permits detention for a longer period than three months without the intervention of an advisory board.\n\n(2) That a State law cannot authorize detention beyond the maximum period prescribed by Parliament under the powers given to it in clause (7). This is a limitation on the legislative power of the State legislature.\n\nThey cannot make a law authorizing preventive detention for a longer period than that fixed by Parliament.\n\n(3) That Parliament also cannot make a law authorizing detention for a period beyond three months without the intervention of an advisory board unless the law conforms to the conditions laid down in clause\n\n(7) of article 22. Provision also has been made to enable Parliament to make laws for procedure to be followed by advisory boards.\n\nThis is a safeguard against any arbitrary form of procedure that may otherwise find place in State laws.\n\nApart from these enabling and disabling provisions certain procedural rights have been expressly safeguarded by clause (5) of article 22. A person detained under a law of preventive. detention has a right to obtain information as to the grounds of his detention and has also the right to make a representation protestil}g against an order of preventive detention.\n\nThis right has been guaranteed independently of the duration of the period of detention and irrespective of the . existence or non-existence of an advisory board.\n\nNo machinery, however, has been provided or expressly\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe Stat1\n\nMahajan].\n\nA.E.GarJ•\n\nTlwSt\"'6\n\nMahqjan].\n\nmentioned for dealing with this representation. It seems to me that when a constitutional right has been conferred as a necessary consequence, a constitutional remedy for obtaining redress in case 1of infringement of the right must be presumed to have been contemplated and it could not have been intended that the right was merely illusory and that a representation made may well find place in cold storage. Consideration of the representation made by virtue of clause (5) by an unbiassed authority is, in my opinion, a necessary consequence of the guaranteed right contained herein.\n\nThe right has been conferred to enable a detained person to establish his. innocence and to secure justice, and no justice can be said to be secured unless the representation is considered by some impartial person.\n\nThe interpretation that I am inclined to place on clause\n\n(5) of article 22 is justified by \"the solemn words of the declaratl'on contained in the Preamble to the Constitution. It is this declaration that makes our Constitution sublime and it is the guarantees mentioned in the chapter on Fundametal Rights that, make it one of the greatest charters of liberty and of which the people of this country may well be . proud.\n\nThis charter has not been forced out of unwilling hands of a sovereign like the Magna Carta but it has been given to themselves by the people of the counrty through their Constituent Assembly.\n\nAny interpretation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution without reference to this solemn declaration is apt to lead one into error. If the right of representation given to a <\\etained person by clause (5) of article 22 is a guaranteed right and has. been given for the purpose of securing justice, then it follows that no justice can be held secured to him unless an unbiassed person considers the merits of the representation and gives his opinion on the guilt or the innocence of the persons detained. In my view, the right cannot be defeated or made elusive by presuming that the detaining authority itself will consider the representation with an unbiassed mind and will render justice.\n\nThat would in a way make the prosecutor a judge in the case and such a procedure is repugnant to all notions\n\nof justice. The Constitution has further curtailed the rights given in clause (5) by providing in clause\n\n(6) a privilege on the detaining authority of withholding facts which the said authority considers not in public interests to disclose.\n\nThis privilege has been conferred for the security of the State and possibly for the security of the Constitution itself, but in view of these stringent provisions no additional clogs can be put on the proper consideration of the representation of the detained person by presuming that the detaining authority itself will properly consider the representation. It has also to be remembered in this context that a person subjected to the law of preventive detention has been deprived of the rights conferred on persons who become subject to the law of punitive detention [ vide clauses (1) and (2) of article 22]. He has been denied the right to consult a lawyer or be defended by him and he cap be kept in detention without being produced before a magistrate.\n\nHaving examined the provisions of article 22, I now proceed to consider the first question that was canvassed before us by the learned Attorney-General; i.e., that article 22 of the Constitution read with the entries in the 7th Schedule was a complete Code on the subject of preventive detention, and rhat being so, the other articles of Part III could .oot be invoked in the consideration of the v.alidity of the impugned statute. It was conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that to the extent that express provisions exist in article 22 on the topic of preventive detention those provisions would prevail and could not be controlled by, the other provisions of Part III.\n\nIt was, however, urged that on matters on which this article had made no special provision on this topic the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution had application, namely, articles 19 and 21 and to that extent laws made on this subject were justiciable.\n\nIn order to draw the inference that the framers of the Constitution intended the provisions as regards preventive detention in article 22 to be self-contained a clear indication of such an intention has to be gathered.\n\nIf the provisions embodied in this article have dealt\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTheStau\n\nMahajan].\n\nA. IC Gopalan\n\nThe Stalt\n\nMahajan].\n\nwith all the principal questions that are likely to arise in matters of procedure or on questions of the reasonableness of the period of detention, the inference of such an indication would be irresistible.\n\nOrdinarily when a subject is expressly dealt with in a constitution in some detail, it has to be assumed that the intention was to exclude the application of the general provisions contained therein elsewhere.\n\nExpress mention of one thing is an exclusion of the other.\n\nExpressio unius est exclusio alterius. I am. satisfied on a review of the whole scheme of the Constitution that the intention was to make article 22 self-contained in respect of the laws on the subject of preventive detention. It was contended that all the articles in the Constitution should be read in an harmonious manner and one article should not be read as standing by itself and as having no connection with the other articles in the same part. It was said that they were all supplementary to one another. In this connection it was argued that a law made under article 22 would not be valid unless it was in accord with the provisions <>f article 21 of the Constitution. This article provides that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty except according to procedure established by law.\n\nIt was contended that in substance the article laid down that no person will be deprived of life or liberty without having been given a fir trial or a fair hearing and that unless a law of preventive detention provided such a hearing that law would be in contravention of this article and thus void. Conceding for the sake of argument (but without expressing any opinion on it) that this contention of the learned counsel is correct, the question arises whether there is anything in article 22 which negatives the application of article 21 as above construed to a law on preventive detention.\n\nIn my opinion, sub-clause\n\n(5) of article 22 read with clauses (1) and (2) leads to the inference that the contention raised by the learned counsel is unsound.\n\nClause (5), as already stated, provides that notice has to be given to a detenu of the grounds of his detention. It also provides a limited hearing inasmuch as it gives him an opportunity to\n\nestablish his innocence. As, in my .opinion. the consideration of a representation made by a detained person by an unbiassed authority is implicit in clause (5), it gives to the detained person all that he is entitled to under the principles of natural justice. The right to consult and to be represented by a counsel of his own choice has been denied in express terms to such a person by the Constitution. He is also denied an opportunity of appearing before a magistrate. When the Constitution has taken away certain rights that ordinarily will be possessed by a detained person and in substitution thereof certain other rights have been conferred on him even in the matter of procedure, the inference is clear that the intention was to deprive such a person of the right of an elaborate procedure usually provided for in judicial proceedings.\n\nOla use ( 6) of article 22 very strongly supports this conclusion.\n\nThere would have been no point in laying <lown such detailed rules of procedure in respect of a law of preventive detention if the intention was that such a law would be subject tJ the provisions of article 21 of the Constitution. In its ultimate. analysis the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner resolves itself to this : that the impugned statute does not provide for an impartial tribunal for a consideration of the representation of the detained person and to this extent it contravenes article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nAs discussed above, in my opinion, such a provision is imolicit within article 22 itself and that being so, the application of article 21 to a law made under article 22 is excluded.\n\nIt was next contended that a law of preventive detention encroaches on the right of freedom of movement withiri the territory of India guaranteed to a citizen under article 19 ( 1) ( d) and that being so, by reason of the provisions of sub-clause (5) of article 19 it was justiciable on the ground of reasonableness. It is true, as already pointed out, that a law of preventive detention is wholly incompatible with the right of freedom of movement of a citizen. Preventive detention in substance is a negation of the freedom of locomotion guaranteed under article 19 (l) ( d) but it cannot be said that it merely restricts it. Be that as it may, the\n\n10-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nv, ThtState\n\nMahajan].\n\nA.. Jr. Gopalan\n\nTheStau\n\nMahajan j.\n\nquestion for consideration is whether it was intendd that article 19 would govern a law made under the provisions of article 22. Article 19 (5) is a saving and an enabling provision. It empowers Parliament to make a law imposing reasonable restriction on the right of freedom of movement while article 22 (7) is another enabling provision empowering P.arliament to make a law on the subject of preventive detention in certain circumstances. If a law conforms to the conditions laid down in article 22(7), it would be a good law and it could not have been intended that that law validly made should also conform itself to the provisions of article 19 (5). One enabling provision cannot be considered as a safeguard against another enabling provision. Article 13 (2) has absolutely no application in such a situation. If the intention of the constitution was that a law made on the subject of preventive detention had to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness, then it would not have troubled itself by expressly making provision in article 22 about the precise scope of the limitation subject to which such a law could be made and by mentioning the procedure that the law dealing with that subject had to provide.\n\nSome of the provisions of article 22 would then have been redundant, for instance, the provision that no detention can last longer than three months without the necessity of such detention being examined by an advisory board.\n\nThis provision negatives the idea that the deprivation of liberty for a period of three months without the consultation of the advisory board would be justiciable on the ground of reasonableness.\n\nAgain article 22 has provided a safeguard that if an advisory board has to be dispensed with, it can only be so dispensed with under a law made by Parliament and that Parliament also in enacting such a law has to conform to certain conditions. This provision would have\n\nbeen unnecessary in article 22 if a law on this subject was justiciable.\n\nIn sub-clause\n\n(b) of clause (7) of article 22 prov1S1on has been made enabling Parliament to fix the maximum period for which a person can be detained under a law on the subject of preventive detention.\n\nUnder\n\nthis express provision it is open to Parliament to fix any period, say, even a period of five to ten yeJ.rs as the maximum period of detention of a person. Can it . be said that in view of this express provision of the Constitution such a law was intended to be justicfablc by reason of article 19 (5) ?\n\nDui:ation of detention is the principal matter in preventive detention laws which possibly could be examined on the touchstone of reasonableness under article 19(5), but this has been expressly excluded by express provisions in article 22.\n\nIn my judgment, therefore, an examination of the provisions of article 22 ckarly suggests that the intention was to -make it self-contained as regards the law of preventive detention and that the validity of a law on the subject of preventive detention cannot be examined or controlled either by the provisions of article 21 or by the provisions of article 19 (5) because article 13 (2) has no application to such a situation and article 22 is not subject to the provisions of these two articles. The Constitution in article 22 has gone to the extent of even providing that Parliament may by law lay down the procedure to be followed bv an advisory board.\n\nOn all important points that could arise in connection with the subject of preventive detention provision has been made in article 22 and that being so, the only correct approach in examining the validity of a law on the subject of preventive detention is by considering whether the law made satisfied the requirements of article 22 or in any way abridges or contravenes them and if the answer is in the affirmative, then the law will be valid, but if the answer is in the negative, the\n\nlaw would be void.\n\nIn expressing the view that article 22 is in a sense • self-contained on the law of preventive detention I should not however be understood as laying down that the framers of the article in any way overlooked the safeguards laid down in article 21.\n\nArticle 21 in my opinion, lays down substantive law as giving pwtection to life and liberty inasmuch as it says that ;:hey cannot be deprived except according to the procedure established by law; in other words, it means that before a person can be deprived of his life or liberty\n\nA. K. Copa/an v .\n\nThe State\n\nMahejan J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nMahajan].\n\nas a condition precedent there should exist some substantive law conferring authority for doing so and the law should further provide for a mode of procedure for such deprivation.\n\nThis article gives complete immunity against the exercise of despoticpower by the executive.\n\nIt further gives immunity against invalid laws which contravene the Constitution.\n\nIt gives also further guarantee that in its true concept there should be some form of proceeding before a person can be condemned either in respect of his life or his liberty.\n\nIt negatives the idea of fantastic, arbitrary and oppressive forms of proceedings.\n\nThe principles therefore underlying article 21 liave been kept in view in drafting article 22. A law properly ma(ie under article 22 and which is valid in all respects under that article and lays down substantive as well as adjective law on this subject woulcl fully satisfy the requirements of article 21, and that being so, there is. no cpnflict between these two articles.\n\nThe next question that aris~ for decision is whether there is anything in Act IV of 1950 which offends against the provisions of article 22 of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe learned counsel for the petitioner contended that section 3 of the Act was bad inasmuch as it made \"satisfaction of the Government\" as the criterion for detaining a person. It was said that as section 3 laid dqwn no objective rule of conduct for a person and as people were not told as to what behaviour was expected of them, the result was that it could not be known what acts a person was expected to avoid and what conduct on his part was prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order ; in other words, it was argued that section 3 left the determination of the prejudicial act of a person to the arbitrary judgment of the Government and that even the officer who was to administer this law had been furnished no guide and no standard of conduct in arriving at his own satisfaction whether the conduct was prejudicial to the security of the State etc.\n\nThis criticism of the learned counsel, in my opinion, is not valid. It is no do!!bt true that a detention order depends on the satisfaction of the\n\nGovernment but this provmon is in accordance with article 22 of the Constitution which to my mind contemplates detention on the satisfaction of the executive authority.\n\nBy its very nature the subject is such that it implies detention on the judgment of the authority entrusted with the making of the order.\n\nThe whole intent and purpose of the law of preventive detention would be defeated if satisfaction of the authority concerned was subject to such an objective standard and was also subject to conditions as to legal proof and procedure. In the 7th Schedule jurisdiction to make thi.:. law on this subject has been given for reasons connected with defence etc. and the maintenance of public order. These are subjects which concern the life and the very existence of the State.\n\nEvery citizen is presumed to know what behaviour is ' prejudicial to the life Qf the State or to its existence as an ordered State.\n\nConsidering that the State is presumed to have a government that conducts itself in a reasonable way and also presuming that its officers\n\nusually wilf be reasonable men, it cannot be said that in making \"satisfaction of the government\" as the standard for judging prejudicial acts of persons who are subject to the law of preventive detention section 3 in any way contravenes article 22 of the constitution.\n\nSection 7 of the impugned Act gives full effect to the provisions of article 22 sub-clause (5) and enacts that representation has to be made to the Central or\n\nState Government as the case may be. It was impeached on the ground that no machinery has been provided herein to consider and adjudicate on the merits of the representation. To this extent, as already indicated, the law is defective.\n\nIn the absence of a machinery for the investigation of the contentions raised in the representation it may be open to the detenu to move this Court under article 32 for a proper relief.\n\nIt is, however, unnecessary to express any opinion as to the precise remedy open to a detained person in this respect.\n\nThe absence of a provision of this nature in the statute however would not make the law wholly . void.\n\nSection 9 of the Act makes reference\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\n' TheStau\n\nMahajan].\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Statt\n\nto . the advisory board obligatory in cases falling under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 3 within six weeks of the order. The procedure to be followed by the advisory board is laid down in section 10.\n\nParliament has been authorized to lay down such a procedure to be followed by an advisory board in sub-clause (c) of clause (7).\n\nIt was contended that the law had not provided a personal hearing to the detenu before an advisory board. nor had it given him a right to lead evidence to establish his innocence.\n\nIn my opinion, this cnt1c1Sm is not sound and does not in any way invalidate the law. The advisory board has been given the power to call for such information as it requires even from the person detained.\n\nIt has also been empowered to examine the material placed before it in the light of the facts and arguments contained in the representation.\n\nThe opportunity afforded is not as full as a person gets under normal judicial procedure but when the Constitution . itself contemplates a special procedure being prescribed for preventive detention cases, then the validity of the law on that subject cannot be impugned on the grounds contended for.\n\nSection 11 of the Act was also impugned on the ground that it offended against the Constitution inasmuch as it provided for preventive detentiaTt for an indefinite. period.\n\nThis section in my opinion has to be read in lhe background of the provision in\n\nsub-clause\n\n(3) of section 1 of the Act which says that the Act will cease to have effect on 1st April, 1951.\n\nBesides, the words \"for such period as it thinks fit\" do not in any way offend against the provisions of article 22 wherein Parliament has been given the power to make a law fixing the maximum period for preventive detention.\n\nIt has to be noted that Parliament has fixed a period of one year as the maximum period for the duration of detention where detention has to be without reference to an advisory board. In my opinion, there is nothing in section 11 which is outside the constitutional limits of the powers of the supreme legislature.\n\nIt is section 12 of the Act which was assailed bv the learned counsel for the petitioner rather vehemently. This section is of a very controversial character.\n\nIt has been enacted on the authority of clause\n\n(7) of article 22 and runs thus :-\n\n\" {1) Any person detained in any of the following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances may be detained without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months, but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, namely, where such person has been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prcVudicial to-\n\n(a) the defence of India. relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India ; or\n\n(b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order.\n\n(2) The case of every person detained under a detention order to which the provisions of sub-section\n\n(1) apply shall, within a period of six months from the date of his detention, be reviewed where the order was made by the Central Government or a State Government, by such Government, and where the order was made by any officer specified in sub-section (2) of section 3, by the State Government to which such officer is subordinate, in consultation with a person who is, or has been, or is qualified to be appointed as, a Judge of a High Court nominated in that behalf by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be.\"\n\nThe section purports to comply with the conditions laid down in clause (7) of article 22. It was, however, argued that in substance and reality it has failed to comply with any of the conditions laid down therein ; that it neither mentions the circumstances under which nor the classes of cases in which preventive detention without recourse to the machinery of an advisory board could be permitted. The cruciaf question for consideration is whether section 12 mentions any circumstances under which or defined the classes of cases in which authority was conferred by clause (7)\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\n.. , Tiu State\n\nMahajan].\n\nA. K. Copa/an v.\n\nThe State\n\nMahajan J.\n\nto dispense with an advisory board.\n\nSo far as I have been able to gather from opinions of text-book writers on the subject of classification, the rule seems clear that in making classification of cases there has to be some relationship to the classification to the objects sought to be accomplished.\n\nThe question for consideration therefore is what object was sought to be accomplished when the Constitution included clause (7) in article 22.\n\nIt seems clear that the real purpose of clause (7) was to provide for a contingency where compulsory requirement of an advisory board may defeat the object of the law of preventive detention.\n\nIn my opinion, it was incorporated ; n the Constitution to meet abnormal and exceptional cases, the cases being of a kind where an advisory board could not he taken into confidence.\n\nThe authority to make such drasnc legislation was entrusted to the supreme legislature but with the further safeguard that it can only enact a law of such a drastic nature provided it prescribed the circumstances under which such power had to be used or in the alternative it prescribed the classes of cases or stated a determinable group of cases in which this could be done. The intention was to lay down some objective standard for the guidance of the detaining authority on the basis of which without consultation of an advisory board detention could be ordered beyond the period of three months. In this connection it has to be remembered that the Constitution must have thought of really some abnormal situation and of some dangerous groups of persons when it found it necessary to dispense with a tribunal like an advisory board which functions in camera and which is not bound even to give a personal hearing to the detenu and whose proceedings are privileged. The law on the subject of preventive detention in order to avoid even such an innocuous institution could only be justified on the basis of peculiar circumstances and peculiar situations which had to be objectively laid down and that fvas what in my opinion was intended by clause (7). If the peculiarity lies in a situation outside the control or view of a detained person, then it may be said that the description of such a situation would\n\namount to a prescription of the circumstances justifying the detention for a longer period than three months by a law without the intervention of an advisory board.\n\nIf, however, the abnormality relates to the conduct and character of the activities of a certain determinable group of persons, then that would amount to a class of cases which was contemplated to be dealt with under clause (7). In such cases alone arbitrary detention could be held justifiable by law beyond a period of three months . . It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the phrase \"circumstances under which, and the classes of cases in which\" used in clause (7) had to be construed in a cumulative sense ; on the other hand, the learned Attorney-General contended that the word \"and\" had been used in this clause in the same sense as \"or.\" He further argued that even if the word \"and\" is not given that meaning the true construction of the phrase was that Parliament could prescribe either the circumstances or the classes .of cases .for making a law on the subject of preventive detention authorizing detention for a longer period than three months without the machinery of an • advisory board.\n\nIn Full Bench Reference No. 1 of 1950, Das Gupta J. of the Calcutta High Court held that the intention of the legislature in enacting the clause was t\\lat the law of preventive detention authorizing detetion for a longer period than three months without the intervention of an advisory board had to fulfil both the requirements laid down in clause (7) and not only one of the requirements in the alternative.\n\nThe same view has been expressed by my brother Sir Faz! Ali. I share this view with him.\n\nI would, however, like to consider this matter from a different aspect on the assumption that the contention raised by the learned Attorney-General is right.\n\nDealing first with the question whether section 12 mentions any circumstances, so far as I have been able to see, it does not prescribe any circumstances unless it can be said that the prejudicial acts for reasons connected with the security of State, maintenance of public order, etc. are both the circumstances as well as\n\nA. K. Gopal1111\n\nThe Stale\n\nMahajan].\n\n.d. IC Gopalan\n\nT\"4 Stal<\n\nMalzqjon J.\n\nSD~REME COURT REPORTS ' (1950]\n\nthe classes of cases.\n\nIn my opinion, this line of approach cannot be held to be correct in the construction of clause (7) of article 22. I am inclined to agree with the learned Attorney-General that the phrase \"circumstances under which\" means some situation extraneous to the detenu's own acts, in other words, it means some happening in the country with which the detenu is not concerned, such as a situation of tense communal feelings, an apprehended internal rebellion pr disorder, the crisis of an impending war or apprehended war, etc.\n\nIn such a situation the machinery of an advisory board could be dispensed with because it may become cumbersome or it may hamper the exercise of necessary powers.\n\nIn this view .of the matter I have no hesitation in holding that no circumstances have been stated . in section 12, though the section ostensibly says so. If it was permissible to conjecture, it seems that the draftsman of section 12 repeated the words of clause (7) of article 22 without an. application of his mind to the meaning of those words and as the legislation was passed in haste to meet an emergent situation, it suffers from the defects which all hasty legislation suffer from.\n\nI now proceed to consider whether section 12 has classified the cases in• which detenti011 for a longer period beyond three months could be suffered by citizen without , the benefit of the machinery of an advisory board. The section has placed five subjects out of the legislative list within its ambit and these arc described as the classes of cases. The question is whether it can be said that a mere selection of all or any of the categories of the subjects for reasons connected , with which a law of preventive detention could be\n\nmade under the 7th Schedule amounts to a classification of eases as contemplated in clause (7) of article 22.\n\nEntry 9 of the UniOn List and Entry 3 of the Concurrent List of the 7th Schedule lay down the ambit of legislative power of Parliament on the subject of preventive detention on the following six subjects :-\n\n( l) Defence of India, (2) Foreign Affairs, (3) Security of India, ( 4) Security of the State, (5) Maintenance of public order, ( 6) Maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.\n\nClause ( 4) of article 22 enjoins in respect of all the six subjects that no law can provide for preventive detention for a longer period than three months without reference to an advisory board.\n\nClause (7) gives permission to make a law for dispensing with an advisory board by a prescription of the circumstances and by a prescription of the classes of cases in which such a dispensation can be made.\n\nThe legislative authority under clauses ( 4) and (7) in my opinion, extends to all these six subjects.\n\nThe normal procedure to be followed when detention is intended to be beyond a period of three months in respect of the six subjects is provided in sub-clause ( 4). The extraordinary and unusual procedure was intended to be adopted in certain abnormal cases for which provision could be made by a parliamentary statute under clause (7). ft seems to me, however, that section 12 of Act IV of 1950 has reversed this process quite contrary to the intention of the Constitution. By this section Act IV of 1950 has dispensed with the advisory board in five out of the six subjects above mentioned and the compulsory procedure of an advisory board laid down in clause (4) of article 22 has been relegated to one out of these six subjects. This has been achieved by giving a construction to the phrase \"circumstances under which and the classes of cases in which\" so as to make .\n\nit co-extensive and coterminous with the \"subjects of legislation.\n\nIn my opinion, this construction of clause (7) is in contravention of the clear. provisions of article 22, and makes clause ( 4) of article 22 to all intents and purposes nugatory. Such a construction of the clause would amount to the Constitution saying in one breath that a law of preventive detention cannot provide for detention for a longer period than three months without reference to an advisory board and at the same breath and moment saying that Parliament, if it so chooses, can do so in respect of all or any of the subjects mentioned in the legislative field. If that was so, it would have been wholly unnecessary to provide such a safeguard in the Constitution on a matter\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Swe\n\nMahajan].\n\nA. /(. Bopa/an\n\nThi State\n\nMahajan].\n\nwhich very seriously affects personal -liberty. On the other hand, it would be a reasonable construction of the clause to hold that the Constitution authorized Parliament that in serious classes of cases or in cases of those groups of persons who are incorrigible or whose activities are secret the procedure of an advisory board may well be dispensed with, that being necessary in the interests of the State. On the other construction as adopted by the framers of section 12, the Constitution need not have troubled itself by conferring an authority oi: Parliament for making such a law.\n\nMoreover, if that was the intention, it would have in very clear words indicated this by drafting article 22 clause (4) thus:-\n\n\"Unless otherwise provided by Parliament no law providing for preventive detention shall authoriu detention for a longer period than three months unless an Advisory Board has investigated the sufficiency of the cause of such detention.\"\n\nThe .words \"Unless otherwise provided for by Parliament\" would have been in accord with the construction which the framers of section 12 have placed on article 22 clause (7).\n\nI am further of the opinion that the construction placed by the learned Attorney-General on clause (7) of article 22 and adopted by the framers of Act IV of 1950 creates a verv anomalous situation. The matter may be examined from the point of view of the law of preventive detention for reasons connected with supplies and services essential to the life of the community. This subject has been put under section 9 in Act IV of 1950. Suppose a tense situation arises and there is a danger of the railway system being sabotafed and it becomes necessary co pass detention orders against certain persons. According to Act IV of 1950 in such a serious state of affairs the procedure of au advisory board is compulsory, while on the other hand, if there is an apprehension of disturbance of public order by reason of a wrong decision of an umpire at a cricker match or on account of conduct of persons celebrating the festival of Holi, then detention beyond three\n\nmonths can be ordered without reference to an advisory board.\n\nCould such an anomalous result be in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution ? The construction that I am inclined to place on the section is in accord with the scheme of the law of punitive detention. Hurt is an offence under the Indian Penal Code and this is one of the subiects of punitive detention.\n\nThe cases on the subject have been classified in different groups, namely, simple hurt, grievous hurt, grievous hurt with dangerous weapons, grievous hurt to extort a confession, grievous hurt to restrain a public officer from doing his duty, grievous hurt by a rash act, and grievous hurt on provocation. Even simple hurt ha\"s been classified in different categories. The subject of assault has also been similarly dealt with.\n\nSections 352 to 356 deal with cases classified according to the gravity of the offence, i.e., cases of simple assault, assault on a public servant, assault on women, assault in attempt to commit theft, assault for wrongfully confining a person and assault on grave provocation have been separately grouped. Another illustration is furnished by the Criminal Procedure Code in the preventive sections 107 to 110. These deal with different groups of persons; vagrants are in one class, habitual offenders in another, bad characters in the third and disturbers of peace in the fourth. It seems that it is on lines similar to these that it must have been contemplated by the Constitution that classes of cases would be prescribed by Parliament, but this has not been done. The Constitution has recognised varying scales of duration of detention with the idea that this will vary with the nature of the apprehended act, detention for a period of three months in ordinary cases, detention for a longer period than three months with the intervention of an advisory board in more serious cases, while detention for a longer period than three months without the intercession of an advisory board for a still more dangerous class and for acts committed in grave situations. It can hardly be said that all cases of preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order stand on the same footing in the degree of gravity and deserve the same\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe State\n\nlvlahajan J.\n\nA. K. Gopalon v.\n\nTM State\n\nMahqjan ].\n\nduration of detention and all cases connected with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community stand in the matter of their gravity on such a footing as to require a lenient treatment. It is true that in a sense all persons who act prejudicially to the defence of India may be comprehensively said to form ne group and similarly persons who act prejudicially to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community may form another class but the question is, whether it was in this comprehensive sense that classification was intended by the Constitution in clause (7) or was it intended in a narrower and restricted sense ? It has to be remembered that the law under clause (7) was intended to provide detention for a longer period and such a law very seriously abridges personal liberty and in this situation giving a narrower and restricted meaning to this expression will be in accordance with well established canons of construction of statutes.\n\nThe wide construction of clause (7) of article 22 brings within the ambit of the clause all the subjects in the legislative list and very seriously abridges the personal liberty of a citizen. This could never have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution.\n\nThe narrow and restricted interpretation is in accord with the scheme of the ar_!icle and it also operates on the whole field of the legislative list and within that field it operates by demarcating certain portions out of each subject which requires severe treatment. If I may say so in • conclusion, section 12 treats the lamb and the leopard in the same class because they happen to be quadruj5eds. Such a classification could not have been in the thoughts of the Constitutions-makers when clause (7) was introduced in article 22. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that section 12 of Act IV of 1950 does not fulfil the requirements of ciause (7) of article 22 of the Constitution and is not a law which falls within the ambit of that clause.\n\nThat being so, this section of Act IV of 1950 is void and by reason of it the detention of the petitioner cannot be justified. There is no other provision in\n\nthis law under which he can be detained for. any period whatsoever.\n\nIt was argus; d that it was neither practicable nor possible to make a classification on any definite basis in the case of apprehended acts of persons '\"'.hose activities are of a prejudicial character to the maintenance of public -order or to the security of the State or to the defence of India. This contention to my mind is not sound. Such a classification was made in the rules under the Defence of India Act by defining \"a prejudicial act\" in regulation 34. Mere difficulty in precisely ascertaining the groups or in defining objectively the conduct of such groups is no ground for not complying with the clear provisions of the statute or for disobeying it. I see no difficulty whatsoever if a serious effort was made to comply with the provisions of clause (7). I cannot see that the compulsory rtquirement of an advisory board is likely to lead to such disastrous or calamitous results that in all cases or at least in five out of the six . subjects of legislation it becomes necessary to dispense with this requirement.\n\nThe requirement of an advisory board is in accordance with the preamble of the Constitution and is the barest minimum that can make a law of preventive detention to some little degree tolerable to a deme>- cratic Constitution. Such a law also may have some justification even without the requirement of an advisory board to meet certain defined dangerous situations or to deal with a class of people who are a .danger to the State but without such limitation the law would be destructive of all notions of personal,, liberty.\n\nThe Constitution must be taken to have-,\\ furnished an adequate safeguard to its citizens when it laid down certain conditions in clause (7) and_ it could not be considered that it provided no safeguard to them at all and that the words used in clause (7) were merely illusory and had no real meaning.\n\nSection 14 of Act IV of 1950 has been impugned on the ground that it contravenes ruid abridges the provisions of articles 22 (5) and 32 of the Constitution. This section is in these terms :-\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stau\n\nMahaj\"\" J.\n\nA. K. G•polan\n\nThe Stale\n\nMaliDjan :J.\n\n\" ( 1) No Court shall except for the purposes ot a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any statement to be . made, or any evidence to be given, before it of the substance of any , communication made under section 7 of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any person or of any representation made by him against such order, and 11otwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no Court shall be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or to disclose the substance of, any such communication or representation made, 'or the proceedings of an advisory board or that part of the report of an advisory board which is confidential.\n\n(2) It shall be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a terru which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish without the previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, any ccmtents or matter purporting to be contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section ( l):\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made to his legal adviser by a person who is the subject of a detention order.\"\n\nThis section is in the nature of an iron curtain around the acts of the authority making the order of preventive detention. The Constitution has guaranteed\n\nto the detained person the right to, be told the grounds {/of detention. He has been given a right to make a representation [ vide article . 22 (5) ], yet section 14 prohibits the disclosure of the ground~ furnished to him or the coptents of the representation made by him in a Court of law and makes a breach of this injunction punishable with imprisonment.\n\nArticle 32 ( 1) of the Constitution if. in these terms:- ' \"The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.\"\n\nSub-sectien (4) says:- \"The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.\" Now it is quite clear that if an authority passes an order of preventive detention for reasons not connected with any of the six subjects mentioned in the 7th Schedule, this Court can always declare the detention illegal and release the detenu, but it is not possible for ' this Court to function if there is a prohibition against disclosing the grounds which have been erved\n\nupon him. It is only by an examination of the grounds that it is possible to say whether the grounds fall within the ambit of the legislative power contained in the Constitution or are outside its scope. Again something may be served on the detenus as being grounds which are not grounds at all. In this contingency it is the right of the detained person under article 32 to move this Court for enforcing the right under article 22(5) that he be given the real grounds on which the detention order is based. This Court would be. disabled from exercisil).g its functions under article 32 and adjudicating on the p9int that the ·. grounds given satisfy the requirements of the sub-clause if it is not open to it to see the grounds that have been furnished. It is a guaranteed right of the person detained to have the very grounds which are the basis of the order of detention.\n\nThis Court would be entitled to examine the matter and to see whether the grounds furnished are the grounds on the basis of which he his been detained or they contain some other vague or irrelevant material.\n\nThe whole purpose of furnishing a detained person with the grounds is to enable him to make a representation refuting these grounds and of proving his innocence.\n\nIn order that this Court may be able to safeguard this fundamental righc and to grant him relief it is absolutely essential that the detenu is not prohibited under penalty of punishment to disclose the grounds to the Court and no injunction by law can be issued to this Co1 rt disabling it from having a look at the grounds.\n\nSection 14 creates a substantive offence if the irrounds are disclosed and it also lays a duty on the Court not 11-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gol'Jl1J11\n\nTire State\n\nMahajan].\n\nA. 1(. G•palan\n\nT 1\" Siok\n\nMahajan]. -\n\nMu/c\"'1; iea].\n\nto permit the disclosure of such grounds.\n\nIt virtually amounts to a suspension of a guaranteed right provided by the Constitution inasmuch as it indirectly by a stringent provision makes administration of the law by this Court impossible and at the same time it deprives a detained person from obtaining justice from this Court. In my opinion, therefore, this section when it prohibits the disclosure of the grounds contravenes or abridges the rights given by Part III to citizen and is ultra vires the powers of Parliament to that extent.\n\nThe result of the above discussion is that, in my <,>pinion, sections 12 and 14 of Act IV of 1950 as above indicated are void and the decision of the detenu's case has to be made by keeping out of sight these two provisions in the 'l'\\ct. If sections 12 and 14 are deleted from 'the impugned legislation, then the result is that the detention of the petitioner is not legal. The statute has not provided for detention for a period of three months or less in such cases as it could have done under article 22(4) of the Constitution and that being so, the petitioner cannot be justifiably detained even for a period of three months. I would accordingly order his release.\n\nIn view of the decision above arrived at I do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the other points that were argued at great length before us, namely, (1) what is the scope and true meaning of the expression \"procedure established by law\" in article 21 of the Constitution, and , (2) what is the precise scope of articles 19(1) (d) and 19(5) of the Constitution.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of habeas corpus upon the respondents with a view to release the petitioner who, it is alleged, is being unlawfully detained in the Central Jail, Cuddalore, within the State of Madras.\n\nThe petitioner, it is said, was initially arrested in Malabar on 17th of December, 1947, and prosecution was started against him on various charges for having\n\nS, C.R.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS 245\n\ndelivered certaiq violent speeches. While these criminal\n\ncase~ were going on, he was served with an order of detention under the Madr.as Maintenance of Public Order Act on 22nd April, 1948. This order of detention was held to be illegal by the Madras High Court, but 011 the same day that the judgment was pronounced, a second order of detention was served upon him. On his moving the High Court again for a writ of habeas corpus in 1espect to the subsequent order, his application was dismissed on the ground that as he was riot granted bail in one of the three criminal cases that were pending against him, the detention could not be said to be unlawful. Liberty,. however, was given\n\nto him to renew his application if and when his detention under the criminal proceedings ceased. In two out of the three criminal cases the trial before the magistrate ended on February 23, 1949, and the petitioner was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months in each of the cases. These sentences however, were set aside in appeal on 26th September, 1949.\n\nAs regards the third case he was tried by the Sessions Judge of North Malabar and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years but this sentence was redi1ced to 6 months' imprisonment by the Madras High Court on appeal. The petitioner made a fresh application to the High Court praying for a writ of habeas corpus in respect of his detention under the Madras Maintenance .of Public Order Act and this application, which was heard after he had served out his sente11-ces of imprisonment referred to above, was dismissed in January, 1950.\n\nOn 25th February, 1950, the Preventive Detention Act wa:s passed by the Parliament and on the 1st of March following, the detention of 'the applicant under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act was cancelled and he was served with a fresh order of detention under section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act\n\n1950. On behalf of he respndents the detention of the petitioner is sought to be justified on the strength of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950.\n\nThe position taken up on behalf of the petitioner on the other hand is that the said Act is invalid and ultra vires the constitution by reason of its being in conflict with certain\n\n19.'iO\n\n.d. K. GoJa!IJn\n\nTiu S1a11\n\nMukherjea ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nMukherjeaJ.\n\nfundamental rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution. It is argued, therefore, that the detention of the petitioner is invalid and that he should be set at liberty.\n\nThe contentions that have beel put forward by Mr. Nambiar who appeared in support of the petition, may be classified under four heads.\n\nHis first contention is that as preventive detention is, in substance, a restriction on the free movements of a person throughout the Indian territory, it comes within the purview of article 19(1)\n\n(d) of Part III of the Constitution which lays down the fundamental rights. Under clause (5) of the article, any restriction imposed upon this right of free movement must be reasonable an<l should be prescribed in the interests of the general public.\n\nThe question as to whether it is reasonable or not is a . justiciable matter which is to be determined by the Court. This being the legal position the learned Counsel invites us to hold that the main provisions of the impugned Act, particularly those which are contained in sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are wholly unreasonable and should be invalidated on that ground.\n\nThe second contention advanced by the learned Counsel is that the impugned legislation is in conflict with the provision of article 21 of the Constitution inasmuch as it provides for deprivation of the personal liberty of a man not in accordance with a procedure established by law. It is argued that the word 'law' here does not mean or refer to any particular legislative enactment but it means the general law of the land, embodying those principles of natural justice with regard to procedure which are regarded as fundamental, in all systems of civilised jurisprudence.\n\nIt is conceded by the learned counsel that the procedure, if any, with regard to preventive detention as has been. prescribed by article 22 of the Constitution which itself finds a place in the chapter on Fundamental Rights must override those general rules of procedure which are cnntemplated by article 21 but with regard to matters for which no provision is made in article 22, the general provision made in article 21\n\nmust apply. He has indicated in course of his arguments what . the essentials of such procedure are and the other point specifically raised in this connection is . that the provision of section 12 of . the Preventive Detention Act is in conflict with article 22(7) of the Constitution.\n\nThe last argument in support of this application is that the provisions of sections 3 and 14 of the Preventive Detention Act are invalid as they take away and render completely nugatory the fundamental right to constitutional remedies as is provided for in article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nIn discussing these points it should be well to keep in mind .the general scheme of the Indian Constitution relating to the protection of the fundamental rights . of the citizens and the limitations imposed in this respect upon the. legislative powers of the Government. The Constitution of India is a written Constit9tion and though it has adopted many of the principles of the English Parliamentary system, it has not accepted the English doctrine of the absolute Supremacy of Parliament in matters of legislation.\n\nIn this respect it has followed the American Constinition and other systems modelled on it. Notwithstanding the representative character of their political .institutions, the Americans regard the limitations imposed by their Constitution upon the action of the Government, both legislative and executive, as -essential to the preservation of public and private rights. They serve as a check upon what has been described :\\s the despotism of the majority; and as was observed in the case of Hurtado v. The People of California ( 1 ) \"a government which holds the lives, the liberty apd the property . of its citizens, subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism.\" In India it is the Constitution that is supreme and Parliament as well as the State Legislatures must not only act within the limits of their respective legislative spheres as demarcated in the three\n\n(IJ\n\n110 U.S. 516.\n\nA. K. Copola11\n\nT/,. Stall\n\nMukherj1a J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Staie\n\nM11kherJea J.\n\nlists occuring in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but Part Ill of the Constitution guarantees to the citizens certain fundamental rights which the legislative authority can on no account transgress. A statute law to be valid must, in all cases, be in conformity with the constitutional requirements and it is for the judiciary to decide whether any enactment is unconstitutional or not.\n\nArticle 13(2) is imperative on this . point and provides expressly that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the right conferred by this Par~ and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention, be void.\n\nClause (!) of the article similarly invalidates all existing laws which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part of the Constitution.\n\nThe fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution have been classified under seven heads or categories. They are: ( l) Right to equality;\n\n(2) Right to freedom;\n\n(3) Right against exploitation;\n\n(4) Right to freedom of religion;\n\n(5) Cultural and educational rights;\n\n(6) Right to property; and\n\n(7) Right to constitutional remedy.\n\nThe arrangement differs in many respects from that adopted in the American Constitution and bears a likeness on certain points to similar declarations in the <:; onstitutions of other countries.\n\nOf the different classes of fundamental rights spoken of above, we are concerned here primarily with right to freedom which is dealt with in four articles beginning from article 19 and also with the right to constitutional remedy which ts embodied m article 32.\n\nArticle l(J enumerates certain forms of liberty or freedom, the otection of which is guaranteed by the Constitution.\n\nJn article 20, certain protections are given in cases of persons accused of criminal offences.\n\nArticle 21 lays down in general terms that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME CdURT REPORTS 249\n\naccording to procedure established by law.\n\nArticle 22 provides for certain additional safeguards in respect to arrest and detention and by way of exception to the rules so made, makes certain special provisions for the particular form of detention known as Preventive Detention.\n\nThe first contention advanced by Mr. Nambiar involves a consideration of the question as to whether\n\nPreventive Detention, which is the subject matter of the impugned legislative enactment, comes within the purview of article 19(1) (d) of the Constitution, according to which a right to move freely throughout the territory of India is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens.\n\nIf it comes within that sub-clause, it is not disputed that clause (5) of article 19 would be attracted to it and it would be for the courts to decide whether the restrictions imposed upon this right by the Parliament are reasonable restrictions and are within the permissible limits prescribed by clause\n\n(5) of the article.\n\nThere is no authoritative definition of the term 'Preventive Detention' . in Indian law, though as description of a topic of legislation it occurred in the Legislative Lists of the Government of India . Act, 1935, and has been used in Item 9 of List I and Item 3 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nThe expression has its origin in the language used by Judges or the law Lords in England while explaining the nature of detention under Regulation 14 (B) of the Defence of Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, passed on the outbreak of the First World War; and the same language was repeated in connection with the emergency regulations made during the last World War.\n\nThe word 'preventive' is used in contradistinction. to the word 'punitive.' To quote the words of Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday ( 1 ), it is not a punitive but a precautionary measure.\" The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. No offence is proved, nor any charge formulated; and the justification of such detention is suspicion\n\n(') [1917] A. c. 260 at p. 269.\n\nA.K. Gan\n\n•• Tlw St\"'4\n\nMuklwrJla J.\n\nA. IC Gopalon\n\nThe Stott\n\nMukheefea ].\n\nor reasonable probabi1ity and not criminal conv1ctton which can only be warranted by legal evidence ( 1 ).\n\nDetention in such form is unknown in America. It was resorted to in England only during war. time but no country in the world that I am aware of.. has made this an integral part of their Constitution as has been done in India. This is undoubtedly unfortunate, but it is not our business to speculate on questions of policy or to attempt to explore the reasons which led the representatives of our people to make such a drastic provision in the Constitution itself, which cannot but be :regarded as a most unwholesome encroachment upon the liberties of the people.\n\nThe detention of a man even , as a precautionary measure certainly deprives him of his personal 1ibcrty, and as article 21 gtiarantees to every man, be he a citizen or a foreigner, that he shall not be deprived of his life and personal liberty, except in accordance with the procedure established by law, the requirements of article. 21 woula certainly have to be fomplied with, to make preventive detention valid in law. What these requirements are I will discuss later on. Article 22 comes immediate~ after article 21.\n\nIt secures to all persons certain fundamental rights in relation to arrest and detention, and as already said, by way of exception to the rights thus declare, makes certain specific provisions relating to preventive detention. The subject of preventive detention is specified in and constitutes Item No. 9 in the Union Legislative List and it also forms Item No. 3 in the Concurrent List.\n\nUnder article 246 of the Constitution, the Parliament and. the State Legislatures are empowered to legislate on this subject within the ambit of their respective authorities.\n\nClause (3) of article 22 expressly enjoins _that the protective provisions of clauses ( 1) and (2) of the article would not be available tQ persons detained under any law providing for preventive detention.\n\nThe only fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution in the matter of preventive detention and which to that extent impose restraints upon the exercise of legislative powers in that respect are\n\n(') Vide Lord Macmillan in LiwsiM v. Antl,,., on (1912] A.C. 206 at p.2~.\n\ncontained in clauses ( 4) to (7) of article 22. Clause\n\n(4) lays down that no law of preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a period longer than three months, unless an advisory board constituted in the manner laid down in sub-clause (a) of the clause has reported before the expiration of the period that there is sufficient cause for such detention.\n\nThe period of detention cannot, in any event, exceed the maximum which the Parliament is entitled to prescribe under clause (7) (b). The Parliament is also given the authority to prescribe the circumstances and the class of cases under which a person can be detained for a period longer than three months under any law of preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of the advisory board.\n\nThere is one . safeguard provided for all cases which is contained in clause (5) and which lays down that the authority making the order of detention shall; as soon as possible communicate to such person the grounds on which . the order has been made and shall afford him the .earliest opportunity of making a represtntation against the order. But even here, the authority while giving the grounds of detention need not disclose such facts which it considers against public interest to disclose.\n\nThe question that we have to consider is whether a law relating to preventive detention is justiciable in a Court of law on the ground of reasonableness under article 19 (5) of the Constitution inasmuch as it takes away or abridges the right to free movement in the territory of India guaranteed . by clause ( 1) ( d) of the article. It will be seen from what has been said above that article 22 deals specifically with the subject of preventive detention and expressly takes away the fundamental rights relating to arrest and detention enumerated in clauses (1) and (2) of the article from persons who are detained under any law which may be passed by the Parliamnt or State Legislatures acting under article 246 of the Constitution read with the relevant items in the legislative lists. I will leave aside for the moment the question as to how far the court can examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the procedure . that is prescribed by any law relating\n\n.d. K, Gopalan\n\nTJwSJ:iu\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\nl950\n\nA. I(, G.,,.i...\n\nv. nt.lld\n\nMakJr,, jra J.\n\nto preventive detention. for that would involve a consideration of the precise scope and meaning of article 21; but this much is beyond controversy that so far as substantive law is concerned, article 22 of the Constitution gives a dear authority to the legislature to take away the fundamental rights relating to arrest and detention, which are secured by the first two clauses of the article. Any legislation on the subject would only have to conform to the requirements of clauses ( 4) to (7) and provided that is done, there is nothing in the language employed nor in the context in which it appears which affords any ground for suggestion that such law must be reasonable in its character and that it would be reviewable by the Court on that ground.. Both articles 19 and 22 occur in the same Part of the Constitution and both of them purport to lay down the fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees. It is well settled that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner giving effect to all its parts, and the presumption .should , be that no conflict or repugnancy was intended by its framers. In interpreting the words of a Constitution, the same principles undoubtedly apply which are applicable in construing a statute, but as was observed by Lord Wright in /11mes v. Commonwealth of Australia( 1 ), \"the ultimate result must be determined upon the actual words used not in· vacuo but as occurring in a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other.\" \"The Constitution,\" his Lordship went on saying, \"has been described as the federal compact and the construction must hold a balance between all its parts.\"\n\nIt seems to me that there is no conflict or repugnancy between the two provisions of the Constitution and an examination of the scheme and language of the r.atena cl articles which deal with the rights to\n\nfreedom would be sufficient to show that what clause\n\n(1) (d) of article 19 contemplates is not freedom from &tention, either punitive or preventive; it relates to and speaks of a different aspect or phase of civil\n\nliberty. '\n\n(') {19,361 A. c. 57,8 at p. 613.\n\nArticle 19, which is the first of this series of articles, enumerates seven varieties or forms of freedom beginning with liberty of speech and expression and ending with free right to practise any trade, profession or business. The rights declared in articles 19 to 22 do not certainly exhaust the whole list of liberties which people possess under law. The object of the framers of the Constitµtion obviously is to enuerate and guarantee those forms of liberty which come under well-known categories recognised by constitutional writers and are considered to be fundamental and of vital importance to the community.\n\nThere cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restraint, for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights, as was observed by. the Supreme Cour, t of America in Jacobson v. Massachusetts\n\n( 1 ), are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and morals of the community. The question, therefore arises in each case of adjusting the conflicting interests of the individual and of the society. In some cases, restrictions have to be placed upon free exercise of individual rights to safeguard the interests of the society; on the other hand, social control which exists for public good has got to be restrained, lest it should be misused to the detriment of individual rights and liberties. Ordinarily, every man has the liberty to order his life as he pleases, to say what he will, to go where he will, to follow any trade, occupation or calling at his pleasure and to do any Qther thing which he can lawfully do without let or hindrance by any other person. On the other hand for the very protection of' these liberties the society must arm itself with certain powers. No man's liberty would be worth its name if it' can be violated with impunity by any wrong-doer and if his property or possessions could be preyed upon by a thief or a marauder. The society, therefore, has got to exercise certain powers for the protection of these liberties and to arrest, search imprison and\n\n(1) 197 U.S. 11.\n\nA. K. Gopalllll\n\nThe Stale\n\nMukhtrjea J.\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe State\n\nMukhnjta].\n\npunish those who break the law. If these powers are properly exercised, they themselves are the safeguards of freedom, but they can certainly be abused. The police may arrest any man and throw him into prison without assigning any reasons; they may search his belongings on the slightest pretext; he may be subjected to a sham trial and even punished for crimes unkonwn to law. What the <; onstitution, therefore, attempts to do in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a balance between individual liberty and social control.\n\nTo me it seems that article 19 of the Constitution gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restraints that may be placed upon them by law so that they may not conflict with public welfare or general morality. On the other hand, articles 20, 21 and 22 are primarily c.oncerned with penal enactments or other laws under which personal safety or liberty of persons could be taken away in the interests of the society and they set down the limits within which the State control should be exercised.\n\nArticle 19 uses the expression \"freedom\" and mentions the several forms and aspects of it which are secured to individuals, together with the limitations that could be placed upon them in the general interests of the society. Articles 20, 21 and 22 on the other hand do not make use of the expression \"freedom\" and they lay down the restrictions that are to be placed <in State control where an individual is sought to be deprived of his life or personal liberty. The right to the safety of one's life and limbs and to enjoyment of personal liberty in the senae of freedom from physical restraint ll!ld coercion of any sort, are the inherent birthrights of a man. The essence of these rights consists in restraining others from interfering with them and hence they cannot be described in terms of \"free<!<>m\" to do particular things. There is also no question of imposing limits on the activities of ihdividuals so far as the exercise of these rights is concerned. For these reasons, I think, these rights have not been mentioned in article 19 of the Constitution. An individual can be deprived of his life or personal liberty only by action\n\nof the State, either under the provisions of any penal enactment or in the exercise of any other coercive process vested in it under law. What the Constitution dqes therefore is to put restrictions upon the powers of the State for protecting the rights of the individuals. The restraints on State authority operate as guarantees of individual freedom and secure to the people the enjoyment of life and personal liberty which are thus declared to be inviolable except in the manner indicated in these articles.\n\nIn my opinion, the group of articles 20 to 22 embody the entire protection guaranteed by the Constitution in relation to deprivation of life and personal liberty both with regard to substantive as well as to procedural law~--I! is not correct to say,. as I shall show more fully later on, that article ..21 is confined to matters of procedure only.\n\nThere must be a substantive law, under which the State is empowered - to deprive a man of his life and personal liberty and such law must be a valid law which the legislature is competent to enact within the limits of the powers assigned to it and which does not transgress any of the fundamental rights that the Constitution lays down. Thus a person cannot be convicted or punished under an ex post facto law, or a law which compels the accused to incriminate himself in a crimin.al trial or punishes him for the same offence more than once. These are the protections provided for by. article 20. Again a law providing for arrest and detention must conform to the limitations prescribed by clauses (1) and (2) or article 22. These provisions indeed have been withdrawn expressly in case of preventive detention and protections of much more feeble and attenuated character have been substituted in their place; but this is a question of the policy adopted by the Constitution which does not concern us at all. The position, therefore, is that with regard to life and personal liberty, the Constitution guarantees protection to this extent that no man could be deprived of these rights except under a valid law passed by a competent legislature within the limits mentioned above and in accordance with the procedure which such law lays down.\n\nArticle 19, on the other hand,\n\n19~0\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nMukhtl}aa J.\n\nenunciates certain particular forms of civil liberty quite independently of the rights dealt with under article\n\n21. Most of them may be connected with or dependent upon personal liberty but are not identical with it ; and the purpose of article 19 is to indicate the limits within which the State could,. by legislation, impose restrictions on the exercise of these rights by the individuals. The reasonableness or otherwise or such legislation can indeed be determined by the Court to the extent laid down in the several clauses or article 19, though no such review is permissible with regard to laws relating to deprivation of life and personal liberty.\n\nTh.is may be due to the fact that life and personal freedom constitute the most vital and essential rights which people enjoy under any State and in such matters rhe precise and definite expression of • the intention of the legislature has been preferred by the Constitution\\ to the variable standards which the judiciary might lay down. We find the rights relating to personal liberty being declared almost in the same terms in the Irish Constitution article 40 (1) (4) (1) of which lays down that \"no citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.\" In the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, \"the liberty of the person has been declared to be inviolable and no limitation or deprivation of personal liberty may be imposed by public authority except by virtue of a law\" ( vide article 74). Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution is the closest parallel to article 21 of the Indian Constitution and the language is almost identical.\n\nThis is the scheme adopted by the Constitution in dealing with the rights to freedom described in the chapter on fundamental rights and fo my opinion, therefore, the proper tst for delermining the validity of an enactment llnder which a person is sought to be deprived of his life and personal liberty has to be found not in article 19, but in the three following articles of the Constitution. Article 20 of course has no application so far as the law relating to preventive detention is concerned.\n\nMr. Nambiar's endeavour throughout has been to\n\nestablish that article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Constitution read with article 19 (5) enunciates the fundamental rights of the citizens regarding the substantive law of personal liberty, while article 21 embodies the protection as regards procedural !_aw. This, in my opinion, would be looking at these; provisions from a wrong angle altogether, Article 19 cannot be S, flid to deal with substantive law merely, nor article 21 with mere matters of procedure.\n\nIt cannot also be said that the provisions of article 19(1) (d) read with clause (5) and article 21 are complementary to each other.\n\nThe contents and subject matter of the two provisions are not indentical and they proceed on totally different principles.\n\nThere is no mention of any \"right to life\" in article 19, although that is the primary and the most important thing for which provision is made in article 21. If the contention of the learned counsel is correct, we would have to hold /that no protection is guaranteed by the Constitution as regards right to life so far as substantive law is concerned. In the second place; even if freedom of movement may be regarded as one of the ingredients of personal liberty, surely there are other elements included in the concept and admittedly no provision for other forms of personal liberty are to be found in article 19(5) of the Constitution. Furthermore article 19 is applicable to citizens only, while the rights guaranteed by article 21 are for all persons, citizens as well as aliens. The only proper way of\n\navoiing these anomalies is to interpret the two provisions as applying to different subjects and this would . be the right conclusion if we have in mind the scheme which underlies this group of articles.\n\nI will now turn to the language of article 19(1) (d) and see whether preventive detention really comes within its purview. Article 19(1) (d) provides that all citizens shall have the i; ight to move freely throughout the territory of India. The two sub-clauses which come immediately after sub-clause (d) and are intimately conn\\!cted with it, are in these terms:\n\n\"(e) To reside and settle in any part. of the territory of India;\n\nA. K. Copa/an v.\n\nThi State\n\nMukhejea ].\n\nA. IC Gopalan\n\nTire si.11\n\nMul<i..efea J.\n\n( f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.\" Clause (5) relates to all these three sub-clauses and lays down that nothing in them shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the . said sub-clause either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe.\n\nI agree with the learned Attorney-General that in construing article 19 (1) (d) stress is to be laid upon the expression \"throughout the territory of India,\" and it is a particular and special kind of right, viz., that of free movement throughout the Indian territory, that is the aim and object of the Constitution to secure. In the next sub-clause, right to reside and settle \"in any part of the territory of India\" is given and here again the material thing is not the right of residence or settlement but the right to reside or settle in any part of the Indian territory. For an analogous provision, we may refer to article 301 which says that subject to the other provisions of this Part, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. The meaning of sub-clause (d) of article 19 (1) will be clear if we take it along with sub-clauses ( e) and (f), all of which have been lumped together in clause\n\n(5) and to all of which the same restrictions including .those relating to protection of the interest of any scheduled tribe have been made applicable. It wjll be remembered that these rights are available otily to citizens.\n\nTo an alien or foreigner, no guarantee of such rights has been given. Normally all citizens would have the free right to move from one part of the Indian territory to another. They can shift their residence from one place to any other place of their choice and settle anywhere they like. The right of free trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India is also secured. What the Constitution emphasises upon by guarariteeing these rights is that the whole of Indian Union in spite of its being divided into a number of States is really one unit so far as the citizens of the Union are concerned. All the\n\ncitizens would have the same privileges and the same facilities for moving into any part of the territory and they can reside or carry on business anywhere they like; and no restrictions either inter-State or otherwise would be allowed to set up in these respects qetween one part of India and another.\n\nSo far as free movement throughout the territory is concerned, the right. is subject to the provision of clause (5), under which reasonable limitation may be imposed upon these liberties in the interests of the general public or protection of any scheduled tribe.\n\nThe interests of the public which necessitates such restnct1ons may be of various kinds. They may be connected with the avoidance of pestilence ot spreading of contagious diseaes; certain places again may be kept closed for military purposes and' there . may be prohibition of entry into areas which are actual or potential war zones or where ciisturbances of some kind or other prevail. Whatever the reasons might be, it is necessary that these restrictions must be reasonable, that is to say, commensurate with the purpose for which they are laid down. In addition to general interest, the Constitution has specified the protection of the interests of the scheduled tribes as one of the factors which has got to be taken into consideration in the framing of these restrictions.\n\nThe scheduled tribes, as is well known, are a backward and unsophisticated class of people who are liable to be imposed upon be shrewed and designing persons. Hence there are_, various provisions disaDiing them from alienating even their own properties except under special conditions.\n\nIn their interest and for their benefit. laws may be made restricting the ordinary right of citizens to go oi settle in particular areas or acquire property in them.\n\nThe reference to the interest of scheduled tribe makes it quite clear-that the free movement spoken of in' the clause relates not to general rights of locomotion but to the particular right of shifting or moving from one part of the Indian territory to another, without :my sort of discriminatory barriers.\n\nThis .view will receive further support .. if we look to some analogous provisions in the Constitution of\n\n12-s S. C. India/ 8\n\nA. E. Gopalan\n\nThe Stau\n\nMuklrlrj•tt].\n\nA. E. c.,.J .. v.\n\nTlvS-\n\n'>fuk/rerfaa J.\n\nother countries.\n\nIt will be seen that sub-clauses (d), ( e) and ( f) of article 19 ( 1) are embodied in almost identical language in one single article viz., article 75 of the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig. The article runs as follows :\n\n\"All nationals shall enjoy freedom of movement within the free city and shall have the right to stay and to settle at any place they .may choose, to acquire real property and to earn their living in any wav.\n\nThis right shall not be curtailed without legal sanctions.\"\n\nThe several rights are thus mentioned together as being included in the same category, while they are differentiated from the \"liberty of the person\" which is \"described to be inviolable except by virtue of a law\" in article 74 which appears just previous to this article. An analogous provisions in slightly altered language occurs in article 111 of the Constitution of the German Reich which is worded in the following manner:\n\n\"All Germans enjoy the right of change of .domicile within the whole Reich. Every one has the right to stay in any part of the Realm that he chooses, to settle there, acquire landed property and pursue any means of livelihood.\" Here again the right to personal liberty has been dealt with serarately in article\n\n114. A suggestion was made in course of our discussions that the expression \"throughout the territory of India\" occurring in article 19 ( 1) ( d) might have been used with a view to save Passport Regulations or to emphasise that no rights of free emigration are guaranteed by the Constitution. The suggestion does not seem to me to be proper. No State can guarantee to its citizens the free right to do anything outside its own territory.\n\nThis is true of all the fundamental rights mentioned in article 19 and not merely of the right of free movement. Further it seems to me that the words \"throughout the territory of India\" have nothing to do with rights of emigration.\n\nWe find that both in the Danzing as well as in the German Constitution, where similar words have been used with regard to the exercise of the riht of free movement throughout the\n\nterritory, there are specific provisions which guarantet to all nationals the free right of emigration to othe• countries ( vide article 76 of the Danzing Constitution and article 112 of the Constitution of the German Reich).\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, preventive detention does not come either within the express language 01 within the spirit and intendment of clause ( 1) ( d) of article 19 of the Constitution which deals with a totally different aspect or form of civil liberty.\n\nIt is true that by reason of preventive detention, a man may be prevented from exercising the right of free movement within the territory of India as contemplated by article 19(1) (d) of the Constitution, but that is merely incidental to or consequential upon loss of liberty resulting from the order of detention.\n\nNot merely the right under clause ( 1) ( d), but many of the other rights which are enumerated under the other sub-clauses of article 19 (1) may be lost or suspended so long as preventive detention continues.\n\nThus a detenu so long as he is under detention may not be able to practise any profession, or carry on any trade or business which he might like to do; but this would not make the law providing for preventive detention a legislation taking away or abridging the rights under article 19 (1)' (g) of the Constitution and it would be. absurd to suggest that in such cases the validity of the legislation should be tested in accordance with the requirement of clause (6) of article 19 and that the only restrictions that could be placed upon the person's free exercise of trade and profession are those specified in that clause.\n\nMr. Nambiar concedes that in such cases we must look to the substance of the particular legislation and the mere fact that it incidentally trenches upon some other right to which it does not directly relate is not material.\n\nHe argues, however, that the essence or substance of a legislation which provides for preventive detention is to take away. or curtail the right of free movements and in fact, \"pr.rsonal liberty\" according to him, connotes nothing else but unrestricted right of locomotion.. 'The learned counsel refers in this connection to certain passages in 13lackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, where\n\n19:;0\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTlte Stat1\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nA. Ir. Gopalan\n\nTire State\n\nMukherjta J.\n\nthe author discusses what he calls the three absolute rights inherent in every Engiishman, namely, rights of personal security, personal liberty and property. \"Personal security'', according to Blackstone, consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limb, his body, his health and his reputation; whereas \"personal liberty\" consists in the power of locomotion, of changing of situation or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law ( 1 ).\n\nIt will be seen that Blackstone uses the expression \"personal liberty\" in a somewhat narrow and restricted sense.\n\nA much wider and larger connotation . is given to it by later writers on constitutional documents, particularly in America. In ordinary language \"personal liberty\" means liberty relating to or concerning the person or body of the individual; and \"persooal liberty\" in this .sense is the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion.\n\nAccording to Dicey, who is an acknowledged authority on the subject \"personal liberty\" means a personal right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest or other physical coercion in anv manner that does not admit of legal justification ( 1 ).\n\nIt is, in my opinion, this negative right of not being subjected to any form of physical restraint or coercion that constitutes the essence of personal liberty and not mere freedom to move to any part of the Indian territory.\n\nln this connection, it may not be irrelevant to point out that it was in accordance with the recom mendation of the Drafting Committee that the word \"personal\" was inserted before \"liberty\" in article 15 of the Constitution which now stands as article 21.\n\nIn the report of the Drafting Committee it is stated that the word \"liberty\" should be qualified by the insertion of the word \"personal\" before it; otherwise, it might be construed very widely so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with in article 13. Article 13, it should be noted, is the present article 19. If the views of the Drafting Committee were accepted by th~\n\n(1) Vide Chase's Blackstone, \"th Edn .. pp. 68, 73. (2) Vide Dicey on Constitutional Law, 9th Edn. pp. 207 208.\n\n....\n\nConsituent Assembly, the intention obviously was to exclude the contents of article 19 from the concept of \"personal liberty\" as used in article 21.\n\nTo what extent the meaning of words used in the Constitution could be discovered from reports of Drafting Committee or debates on the floor of the House is a matter not quite free from doubt and I may have to take up this matter later on when discussing the meaning of the material clause in article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is enough to say at this stage that if the report of the Drafting Committee is an appropriate material. upon which the interpretation of the words of the Constitution could be based, it certainly goes against the contention of the applicant and it shows that the words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Contitution do not mean the same thing as the expression \"personal liberty\" in article 21 does.\n\nIt is well known that the word \"liberty\" standing by itself has been given a very wide meaning by the Supreme Court of the United States of America.\n\nIt includes not only personal freedom from physical restraint but the right to the free . use of one's own property and to enter into free contractual relations.\n\nIn the Indian Constitution, on the other hand, the expression \"personal liberty\" has been deliberately used to restrict it to freedom from physical restraint of person by incarceration or otherwise.\n\nApart from the report of the Drafting Committee, that is the plain grammatical meaning of the expression as I have already explained. It may not, I think, be quite accurate to state that the operation of article 19 of the Constitution is limited to free citizens only and that the rights have been described in that article on the presupposition that the citizens are at liberty: The deprivation of personal liberty may entail as a consequence the loss or abridgement of many of the rights described in article 19, but that is because the nature of these rights is such that free exercise of them is not possible in the . absence of personal liberty.\n\nOn the other hand _the right to hold and dispose of property which is in subclause (£) of article 19 (1) and wbich is not dependent on full possession of person:)! liberty_ by the owner may\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTluStau\n\n-Muklurjea ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nMuk\"4rjea J.\n\nnot be affected if the owner is imprisoned or detained.\n\nAnyway, the point is not of much importance for purposes of the present discussion. The result is that, in my opinion, the first contention raised by Mr. Nambiar cannot succeed and it must be held that we are not entitled to examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the Preventive Detention Act and see whether it is within the permissible bounds specified in clause (5) of article 19.\n\nI now come to the second point raised by Mr.\n\nN\"ambiar in support of the application; and upon this point we had arguments of a most elaborate nature addressed to us by the learned counsel on both sides, displaying a considerable amount of learning and research.\n\nThe point, however, is a short one and turns upon the interpretation to be put upon article 21 of the Constitution, which lays down that \"no person shall be deprived o_f his ........ personal liberty, except according to procedure established by law.\" On a plain reading of the article the meaning seems to be that you cannot deprive a man of his personal liberty, unless you follow and act according to the law which provides for deprivation of such liberty. The expression \"procedure\" means the manner and form of enforcing the law.\n\nIn my opinion, it cannot be disputed that , in order that there may be a legally established\n\nprocedre, the law which establishes it must be a valid and lawful law which the legislature is competent to enact in accordance with article 245 of the Constitution and the particular items in the legislative lists which it relates to. It is also not disputed that such law must not offend against the fundamental rights which are declared in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe position taken up by the learned Attorney-General is that as in the present case there is no doubt about the competency of that Parliament to enact the law relating to preventive detention which is fully covered by Item 9 of List I, and Item 3 of List III, and as no question of the law being reasonable or otherwise arises for consideration by reason of the fact that article 19 ( 1) ( d) is not attracted to this case, the law must be held to be a valid piece of legislation and if the procedure\n\nlaid down by it has been adhered to, the validity of the detention cannot possibly be challenged.\n\nHis further argument is that article 22 specifically provides for preventive detention and lays down fully what the requirements of a legislation on the subject should be. As the impugned Act conforms to the requirements of article 22, no further question of its validity under article 21 of the Constitution at all arises.\n\nThe latter aspect of his arguments, I will deal with later on.\n\nSo far as the main argument is concerned, the position taken up bv Mr. Nambiar is that article 21 refers to procedure only and not to substantive law; the procedure, however, must be one which 1s established by law. The expression \"law\" m this context does not mean or signify, according to the learned counsel, any particular law enacted by the legislature in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution or otherwise possessing a binding authority.\n\nIt referes to law in the abstract or general sense-in the sense of jus and not lex-and meaning thereby the legal principles or fundamental rules that lie at the root of every system of positive law including our own, and the authority of which is acknowledged in the jurisprudence of all civilised countries.\n\nIt is argued that if the word \"law\" is interpreted in the seme of any State-made law, article 21 could not rank as a fundamental right imposing a check or limitation on the legislative authority of the Government.\n\nIt will be always competent to the legislature to pass a law laying down a thoroughly arbitrary and irrational procedure opposed to all elementary principles of justice and fairness and the people would have no protection whatsoever, provided such procedure was scrupulously adhered to. In support of this argument the learned counsel has relied upon a large number of American cases, wherethe Supreme Court of America applied the doctrine of \"due process of law\" as it appears in the American Constitution for the purpose of invalidating various legislative enactments which appeared to that Court to be capricious and arbitrary and opposed to the 'fundamental principles of law.\n\nA. K. Gopalat1\n\nThe Stale\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n.4. K. Gopalan\n\n.v.\n\nThe State\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nIt may be noted here that in the original draft of the Indian Constitution the words used in article 15 (which now stands as article 21) were \"in accordance with due process of law\".\n\nThe Drafting Committee recommended that in place of the \"due process\" clause, the. expression \"according to procedure established by law\" should be substituted.\n\nThe present article 21 seems to have been modelled on article 31 ot the Japanese Constitution, where the language employed is \"no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, excep< according to procedure established by law\" Mr.\n\nN ambiar argues that the expression \"procedure established by law\" in article 21 of the Constitution bears the same meaning as the \"due process\" clause does in America, restricted only to this extent, viz., that it is limited to matters of procedure and does not extend to questions of substantive law. To appreciate the arguments that have been advanced for and against this view and to fix the precise meaning that is to be given to this clause in article 21, it would be necessary to discuss briefly the conception of the doctrine of \"due process of law\" as it appears in the American Constitution and the wav in which it has been developed and applied by the Supreme Court of America.\n\nIn the history of Anglo-American law, the concept of \"due process of law\" or what is . considered to be its equivalent \"law of the land\" traces its lineage far back into the beginning of the 13th Century A.O.\n\nThe famous 39th chapter of the Magna Charta provides that \"no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or di; seized, or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him but by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.\" Magna Charta as a charter of English liberty was confirmcJ by successive Engiist1 monarchs and it is in one of these confirmations (28 Ed. III, Chap. 3) known as \"Statute of Westminster of the liberties of London\", that the expression \"due process of lw\" for the first time appears. Neither of these phrases was explained or dfined in any of the\n\ndocuments, but on the authority of Sir Edward Coke it may be said that both the expressions have the same meaning.\n\nIn substance, they guaranteed 'that persons should not be imprisoned without proper indictment and trial by peers, and that property should not be seized except in proceedings conducted in due form in which the owner or the persons in possession should have an opportunity to show cause why seizure should not be made (' ). These concepts came into America as part of the rights of Englishmen claimed by the colonists.\n\nThe expression in one form or other appeared in some of the earlier State Constitutions and the exact phrase \"due process of law\" came to be a part of the Federal Constitution by the Fifth Amendment which was adopted in 1791 and which provided that \"no person shall. . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.\" It was imposed upon the State Constitution in almost identieal language by the Fourteenth Amendment in the year 1868.\n\nWhat \"due process of law\" exactly means 1s difficult to define even at the present day. The Constitution contains no description of what is \"dur. process of law\" nor does it declare the principles by application of which it could be ascertained.\n\nIn Twining v. New Jersey ( ~) the Court observed:\n\n\"Few phrases in the law are so elusive of exact apprehension as this.\n\nThis Court has always declined to give a comprehensive <lefinition of it and has preferred that its foil meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise.\"\n\nIt is clear, however, that the requirement of \"due process of law\" in the United States Constitution imposes a limitation upon all the powers of Government, legislative as well as executive and judicial.\n\nApplied in England only as protection against executive usurpation and royal tyranny, in America it became a bulwark against arbitrary legislation (a ).\n\n(1) Vide Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol.IP, p.1087.\n\n(2) 2 ll u. s. 79.\n\n(3) Vide Hurtado v. People of California,' 110 U.S. 516 at p. 532.\n\n.it. K. GoJialan\n\nT\"4Stau\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\n19~0\n\nA. X. Gopalan\n\nThe Staie\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\nAs it is a restraint upon the legislative power and the\n\nobjet. is to protect citizens against arbitrary and capnc10us legislation, it is not within the competence of the Congress to make any process a \"due process of law\" by its mere will; for that would make the limitation quite nugatory.\n\nAs laid down in the case cited above, \"it is not any act legislative in form that is law; law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power.\" It means and signifies the general law of the land, the settled and abiding principles which inhere in the Constitution and lie at the root of the entire legal system. To quote the words of Daniel Webster in a famous argument before _ the Supreme Court ( 1 ) :\n\n\"By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law-a faw which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon enquiry and renders judgment only after trial.\n\nThe meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.\" What these principles of general law are nobody has ever attempted to enumerate.\n\nTo a large extent they are the principles of English common law and modes of judicial proceedings obtaining in England, the traditions of which came along with the settlers in America. Some Judges seem to have alluded to the principles of natural justice in ·xplaining what is meant by general law or \"law of the lanti\", though the doctrine of a law of nature did not obtain a firm footing at any time. In Wynehamer v. New York.(' ), Justice Hubbard declared himself opposed to the judiciary attempting to set bounds to the legislative authority or declaring a statute invalid upon any fanciful theory of higher law or first principles of natural right outside of the Constitution. Coke's dictum of a supreme fundamental law which obviously referred to principles of English common law certainly did exercise considerable influence upon the minds of the American Judges ( ') -and there are observations in some cases ( 1) DartTWuth College case, 4 Wheaton p. S 1 R.\n\n(2) 13 N. Y. 379.\n\n(3) Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 647.\n\nwhich go to suggest that the principles of natural justice were regarded as identical with those of common law, except where the rules of common law were not considered to be of fundamental character or were not acted upon as being unsuited to the progress of time or conditions of the American Society ( 1 ). In the case of Loan Association v. Topeka(9 ), it was observed that there are limitations upon powers of Government which grow out of the essential nature of free Governments-implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact could not exist and which are respected by all Governments entitled to the name.\n\nWhat is hinted at, is undoubtedly the old idea of a social compact under which political institutions were supposed to come into being; and the suggestion is that when the Americans formed themsdves into a State by surrendering a portion of their rights which they possessed at that time and which presumably they inherited from their English ancestors, there were certain rights of a fundamental character still reserved by them which no State could possibly take away.\n\nAs has been said already, \"due process of law\" has never been defined by Judges or Jurists in A!11erica.\n\nThe best description of the expression would be to say that it means in each particular case such an exercise of the powers of Government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs ( 8 ).\n\nIn the actual application of the clause relating to \"due process of law\" to particular cases the decisions of the Supreme Court of America present certain peculiar and unusual features and there is total lack of uniformity and consistency in them. Ever since the appearance of the clause in the Fifth Amendment and down to the middle of the 19th century, it was interpreted as a restriction on procedure, and particularly the judicial procedure; by which the Government\n\n(1) Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, pp. 739.40.\n\n(2) 20 Wall, p. 655. (') Co.lley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 11, p,741.\n\n19~0\n\nA. K. Gop:dan\n\nTiu State\n\nMul.herjea J,\n\nA.. K. Gopaian\n\nTiil Stau\n\nMukhnj1aJ.\n\nexercises its powers.\n\nPrincipally it related to the procedure by which person:; were tried for crimes and guaranteed to accused persons the right to have a fair trial in compliance with well established criminal proceedings.\n\nThe same principle applied to the machinery or proceeding hy which property rights were adjudicated and by which the powers of eminent domain and taxation were exercised.\n\nDuring this period it was not considered to have any bearing on . substantial law at all.\n\nChange, however, came in and the period that followed witnessed a growing recognition of the doctrine that substantive rights of life, liberty and property are protected by the requirement of due process of law against any deprivation attempted at by legislative authority; and the political and economic conditions of the countryaccounted to a great extent for this change iin judicial outlook.\n\nThe close of the civil war brought in a new period of industrial development leading to accumulation of large capital in the hands of industrialists and the emergence of a definite labouring class.\n\nNew and important problems arose which the States attempted to deal with by various laws and regulations. Some of them seem to have been ill-advised and arbitrary and there was a clamour amon, gst businessmen against what they described as legisla.tive encroachments upon their vested private rights.\n\nThe Supreme Court now began to use the rule of due process of law as a direct restrain upon substantial legislation. and any . statute or administrative act, which imposed a limitation upon rights of private property or free contractual relations between the employe.rs and employed, was invalidated as not being in accordance with due process of law ( 1 ).\n\nWhat constituted a legitimate exercise of the powers of legislation now came to be a judicial question and• no statute was valid unless it was reasonable in the opinion of the Court. The question of reasonableness obviously depends largely upon the ideas of particular individuals and the Courts or r4ther the majority of Judges thus marshalled their own\n\n(1) Vidc Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. V, pp. 265-67.\n\nviews of social and economic policy in deciding the reasonableness or otherwise of the statutes. In the language of a well-known writer, the Courts became a kind of negative third chamber both to the State Legislatures and the Congress( 1 ). To what extent the Courts laid stress upon the doctrine of freedom of contract is illustrated in tht case of Lochner v. New York( t ). In that case the question arose as to the validity of a labour legislation which prohibited the employ!llent of persons in certain fields of activity for more than 60 hours a week. Lochner was indicated for violating this law by employing a man in his Biscuit and Cake Factory who was to work more than 60 hours in a week.\n\nThe Court by a majority of 5 to 4 held the statute to be invalid on the ground that the \"right to purchase or sell labour is part of the liberty protected by the Amendment unless there are circumstances which excluded the right.\" That decision has been criticized not merely on the ground that it rested upon an economic theory which to quote the language of Holmes J., who was one of the dissentient Judges \"was not entertained by a large part of the country;\" but it ignored that such regulation was necessary for protecting the health of the employees, that is to say, it was in substance an exercise of police powers with a view to accomplish some object of public interest( 3 ).\n\nIt may be mentioned here that while the due process doctrine was being extended by judicial pronouncements, the doctrine of police power which operates to some extent as a check upon the \"due\" process\" clause was simultanously gaining importance.\n\nRoughly speaking, police power may be defined as \"a right of a Government to regulate the conduct of its people in the interests of public safety, health, morals anJ convenience.\n\nUnder this authority, a Government may make regulations concerning the safety of building, the regulation of traffic, the reporting of incurable diseases, the inspection of markets, the sanitation of factories, the hours of work for women\n\n(1) Vi de Kelley and Harbinson on the American Constitution, p. 539.\n\n(2) 198 u s. 45.\n\n(3) Vide Willoughby on the Constitution or th~ U.S., Vol. Ill, p, 171.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nMukhtrjea J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nv. ' T/1• Stol8\n\nMu!Wrjea ].\n\nand children, the sale of intoxicants and such other matters\"( ').\n\nHere again, the extent to which the Court can interfere with exercise of police powers by the State has not been clearly defined by judicial pronouncements.\n\nThe doctrine generally accepted is that although any enactment by legislature under the guise. of exercise of police powers would not necessarily be constitutional, yet if the regulation has a direct relation to its proposed object which is the accomplishment of some legitimate public purpose, the wisdom or policy of the legislation should not be examined by the Courts.\n\nThe rule is not without its exceptions but it is not necessary to elaborate them for our pesent purpose( • ). The later decisions, though not quite uniform, reveal the growing influence of the police power doctrine. It may be said that since 1936 there has been a definite swing of the judicial pendulum in the other direction.\n\nIn the case of West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (3 ) which related to the legality of a Statute for regulating the minimum wages of women, Chief Justice Hughes, who delivered the opinion of the Court, observed as follows :\n\n\"In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract .. , What is the freedom?\n\nThe Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.\n\nIt speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.\n\nIn prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution• does not recognise an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.\n\nLiberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.\n\nBut the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organisation which requires the protection of law against tfi.e evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people.\"\n\nIn the succeeding years the indications certainly are that the requirement of due process of law as a substantial restriction on Government control is becoming a thing of the past and the rule is being restricted more (I) Vide Munroe_:The Government of the U.S., p. 522.\n\n(2) Vidc Willoughby on the Constitution of the U.S., Vol. I.II, pp. 1709-70.\n\n(3) 300 u. s. 379\n\n...\n\nand more to its original procedural meaning. What will happen in future cannot certainly be predicted at this stage ( 1. ) •\n\nThus it will be seen that the \"due process\" clause in the American Constitution came to be used as a potent instrument in the hands of the judiciary for exercising control over social legislation.\n\nThe judicial pronouncements are not guided by any uniform principle, and the economic and social ideas of the Judges, who form the majority in the Supreme Court for the time being, constitute, so to say, the yard-stick for measuring the reasonableness or otherwise of any enactment passed during that period. No writer of American Constitutional Law has been. able uptil now to evolve anything like a definite and consistent set of principles out of the large mass of cases, where the doctrine of \"due process of law\" has been invoked or applied.\n\nIt is against this background that we must consider how the constitution-makers in India dealt with and gave finat shape to the provisions, on an analogous subject in the Indian Constitution.\n\nIn the Draft Constitution, article 15 (which now stands as article 21) was apparently framed on the basis of the 5th and 14th Amendments in the American Constitution.\n\nThe article was worded as follows.:\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his life or liberty without due process of law.\"\n\nThe Drafting Committee in their report recommended a change in the language of this article.\n\nThe first suggestion was that the word \"personal\" shall be inserted before the word \"liberty'.' and the seco11d was that the expression \"in accordance with procedtite established by law\" shall be substituted for \"due p.rocss of law\", the reason given being that the former expression was more specific.\n\nThe learned AttorneycGeneral has placed before us the debates in the Constituent Assembly centering round the adoption of this recommendation of the Drafting Committee and he has referred us to the (I) Swisher- The Growth of Conatitutionat power in the United States,\n\npp. 123-25.\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThi Stat1\n\nMuklrerjea J.\n\n19:i0\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTM S1at1\n\nspeeches of several members of the Assembly who played an important part in the shaping of the Const1tut1on.\n\nAs an aid to discover the meaning of the words in a Constitution, these debates are of doubtful value. \"Resort can be had to them\", says Willoughby, \"with great caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be solved.\n\nThe prceedings may be of some value when they clearly point out the purpose of the provmon.\n\nBut when the question is of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much material assistance in interpretation\" ( 1 ) • The learned Attorney-General concedes that these debates are not admissible to . explain the meaning of the words used and he wanted to use them only for the purpose of showing that the Constituent Assembly when they finally adopted the recommendation of the Drafting Committee, were fully aware of the implications of the differences between the old form of expression and the new. In my opinion, in interpreting the Constitution, it will be better if such extdnsic evidence is left out of account. In matters like this, different members act upon different impulses and from different motives and it is quite possible that some members accepted certain words in a particular sense, while others took them in a different light.\n\nThe report of the Dra'fting Committee, however, has been relied upon by both 1X1rties and there are decided authorities in which a higher value has been attached to such reports than the debates on the floor of the House.\n\nIn Caminetti v. United States(' ), it is said that reports to Congress accompanying the introduction of proposed law may aid the Courts in reaching the true meaning of the legislation in case of doubtful interpretation. The report is extremely short.\n\nIt simply says that the reason for the suggested change is t~ make the thing more specific.\n\nI have no doubt in my mind that if the \"due process\" clause which appeared in the original draft was finally retained by the Constituent Assembly, it could be safely prc<umed that the framers of the Indian\n\n(1) Vide Willouhbyon tbt' Constitution of the United States, p. 64.\n\n(2) 242 u. s. 470.\n\nConstitution wanted that expression to bear the same sense as it does in America.\n\nBut when that form was abandoned and another was deliberately substituted m its. place, it is not possible to say that in spite of the difference in the language and expression, they should mean the same thing and convey the same idea.\n\nMr.\n\nNambiar'scontention is that in view of the somewhat uncertain and fluidic state of law as prevails in America on the subject, the Drafting Committee recommended an alteration for the purpose of making the language more specific and he would have us. hold that it was made specific in this way, namely, that instead of being extended over the whole sphere of law, substantive as well as adjective, it was limited to procedural law merely.\n\nThat is the reason, he says, why instead of the word \"process\" the expression \"procedure\" was adopted, but the world \"law\" means the same thing as it does in the \"due process\" clause in America and refers not to any State-t; nade law but to the fundament- :i.l principles which are inherent in the legal system and are based upon the immutable doctrines of natural justice.\n\nAttractive though this argument might at first sight appear, I _do not think that it would be possible to aci,:ept it as sound.\n\nIn the first place, it is quite clear that the framers of the Indi:)n Constitution did not desire to introduce into our svstem the elements of uncertainty, vagueness and changeability that have grown round the \"due process\" doctrine in America. They wanted to make the provision dear. definite and precise and deliberately chost:: the words \"procedure established by law\", as in their opinion no doubts would ordinarily arise about the meaning of this expression.\n\nThe indefiniteness in the application of the \"due process\" doctrine in America has nothing to do with the distinction between substantive and procedural law.\n\nThe uncertainty and elasticity are in the doctrine itself which is a sort of hidden mine, the contents of which nobody knows and is merely revealed from time to time . to the judicial conscience of the Judges. This theory, the Indian Consdtution deliberately discarded\n\n13-3 S. C. Jndia/58 ·\n\nA. K.Gopal\"\"\n\nThe State\n\nMukheijea J\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTht State\n\nand that is why they substituted a different form in its place which, according to them, was more specific. In the second place, it appears to me that when the same words are not used, it will be against the ordinary canons of construction to interpret a provision in our Constitution in accordance with the interpretation put upon a somewhat analogous provision in the Constitution of another country, where not only the language is different, but the entire political conditions and constitutional set-up are dissimilar. In the Supreme Court of America stress has been laid uniformly upon the word \"due\" which occurs before and qualifies the expression \"process of law\". \"Due\" means \"what is iust and proper\" according to the circumstances of a particular case. It is this word which introduces the variable element in the application of the doctrine; for what is reasonable in one set of circumstances may not be so in another and a different set.\n\nIn the Indian Constitution the word \"due'\" has been deliberately omitted and this shows clearly thn the Comtitution-makers of India had no in-.ention of introducing the American doctrine.\n\nThe word \"established\" ordinarily means \"fixed or laid down\" and if ·\"law\" means, as Mr. Nambiar contends, not any particular piece of law but the indefinite and indefinable principles of natural justice which underlie positive systems of law, it would qot at all be appropriate to use the expressi.an \"established\", for natural law or natural justice cannot establish anything like a definite procedure.\n\nIt does not appear that in any part of the Constitution the word \"law\" has been used in the sense of \"general law\" connoting what has been described as the principles of natural justice outside the realm of positive law.\n\nOn the other hand, the provision of article 31 of the Constitution, which appears in the chapter on Fundamental Rights, makes it clear that the word \"law\" is equivalent to State-ma. le law and to deprive a person of his property, the authority rot sanction of such law is necessary.\n\nAs has been said already, the provision of article 21 ot the Indian Constitution reproduces, save in one particular, the\n\nlanguage of article 31 of the Japanese Constitution and it is quite clear from the scheme and provisions of the Japanese Constitution that in speaking of law it refers to law passed or recognised as such by the State. In the Irish Constitution also, there is provision in almost similar language which convi:ys the same idea. Article 40 (4) (1) provides that \"no citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law,\" and by law is certainly meant the law of the State.\n\nPossibly the strongest_ argument in support of Mr. Nambiar's contention is that if law is taken to mean State-made law, then article 21 would not be a restriction on legislation at all. No question of passing any law abridging the right conferred by this article could possibly arise and article 13(2) of the Constitution would have no operation so far as this provision is concerned.\n\nTo quote the words of an American Judge it would sound very much like the Constitution speaking to the legislature that the later could not infringe the right created by these articles unless it chose to do so(1 ) .\n\nApparently this is a plausible argument but it must be admitted that we are not concerned with the policy of the Cbnstitution.\n\nThe fundamental rights not merely impose limitations upon the legislature, but they serve as checks on the exercise of execunve powers as well, and in the matter of depriving a man of his personal liberty, checks on the high-handedness of the executive in the shape of preventing them from taking any step, which is not in accordance with law, could certainly rank as fundamental rights.\n\nIn the Constitutions of various other countries, the provisions relating to protection of personal liberty are couched very .much in the same language as in article 21.\n\nIt is all a question of policy as to whether the legislature or the judiciary would have the final say in such matters and the Constitution-makers of India deliberately decided to place these powers in the hands of the legislature.\n\nArticle 31 of the Japanese Constitution, upon which article 21 'of our Constitution is modelled, also (I) Vide per Bronson]. in Taylorv. Poru 4Hill 140.\n\n1950.\n\n..4. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stall\n\nMu/c/wrfa11 J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Statt\n\nMukherjea J_.\n\nproceeds upon the same principle.\n\nThe Japanese Constitution, it is to be noted, guarantees at the same time other rights in regard to arrest, detention and access to Court which might serve as checks on legislative authority as well.\n\nThus article 32 provides : \"No person shall be denied the right of access to the Courts.\" Article 34 lays down :\n\n\"No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel, nor shall - he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person, such cause must be immediately shown in open Court in his presence and in the presence of his counsel.\"\n\nIt was probably on the analogy of article 3.4 of the Japanese Constitution that the first two clauses. of article 22 of the Indian Constitution were framed.\n\nArticle 22 was not in the original Draft Constitution at all; and after the \"due process\" clause was discarded by the Constituent Assembly and the present form was substituted in its place in article 21, article 22 was introduced with a view to provide for some sort of clieck in matters of arrest and detention and the protection it affords places limitations upon the authority of the legislature as well.\n\nThese protections indeed have been denied to cases of preventive detention but that again is a question of policy which does not concern us as a Court. My conclusion, therefore, is that in article 21 the word \"law\" has been used in the sense of State-made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general sense embodying the principles of natural justice. The articl~ presupposes that the law is a valid and binding law under the provisions of the Constitution having regard to the competency .of the legislature and the !\"tbject it relates to and does not infringe any of the fundamental rights which the Constitution provides for.\n\nIn the view tha~ I have taken, the question raised by Mr. Nambiar that the Preventive Detention Act is invalid, bv reason of the fact that the procedure it lays\n\ndown is not in conformity with the rules of natural justice, does not fall for consideration.\n\nIt is enough. in my opinion, if the law is a valid law which the legislature is competent to pass and which does not transgress any of the fundamental rights declared m Part III of the Constitution. It is also unnecessary to enter into a discussion on the question raised by the learned Attorney-General as to whether article 22 by itself is a self-containe<, l Code with regard to the law of P.reventive Detention and whether or not the procedure it lays down is exhaustive.\n\nEven if the procedure is not exhaustive, , it is not permissible to supplement it by application of the rules of natural justice. On the third point raised by Mr.\n\nNambiar, the only question, therefore, which requires consideration is whether section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act is ultra vires of the Constitution by reason of its being not in conformity with the provision of article 22 (7) (a). Article 22 (7) (a) of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to prescribe the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period lo 1ger than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4).\n\nSection 12 of the Preventive Detention Act which purports to be an enactment in pursuance of article 22(7) (a) of the Constitution provides as follows :\n\n\" ( 1) Any person detained in any of the fol.lowing\n\nclasss of cases or under any of the following circumstances may be detained without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board for a period longer than three months, but not exceeding one year from the <late of Iris detention, namely, where such person has been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-\n\n(a) the defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India; or\n\n(b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that there are altogether six\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nMukhtrjea ].\n\nA. IC Gopalan\n\nThi Stale\n\nMukhldta J.\n\nheads or subjects in the two Items in the legislative lists, namely, item No. 9 of List I and Item No. 3 of List III which deal with preventive detention.\n\nItem No. 9 of List I mentions reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs and security of India, while Item No. 3 of List III speaks of reasons connected with security of a State, the maintenance of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the co!!lmunity.\n\nWith the exception of the last head, all the remaining five have been listed in section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act and they have been mentioned both as cir.cumstances and classes of cases in which detention for more than three months would be permissible without the opinion of any advisory board.\n\nMr. Nambiar's argument is that the mentioning of five out of the six legislative heads in section 12 does not amount to prescribing the circumstances under which, or the classes of cases in which, a person could be detained for more than three months as contemplated by article 22(7) (a). It is also contended that in view of the fact that the two items \"circumstances\" and \"classes\" are separated by the conjunction \"and\", what the Constitution really contemplated was that both these items should be specified and a statement or specification of any one of them would not be a proper compliance with the provisions of the clause.\n\nIt is further pointed out that the mentioning of the same matters as \"circumstances\" or \"classes\" is not warranted by article 22(7) of the Constitution and is altogether illogical and unsound.\n\nI must say that section 12 has been drafted in a rather clumsy manner and certainly it could have been framed in a better and more proper way.\n\nUnder article 22(7) (a), the Parliament may specify the circumstances under which, and the classes of cases in which, the necessity of placing the cases of detention for examination by the advisory board could be dispensed with.\n\nBy \"classes of cases\" we mean certain determinable group, the ifi\\lividlials comprised in each group being related to one another in a particular way which constitutes the determining factor of that group. \"Circumstances' on the other hand\n\nconnote situations or conditions which are external to the persons <; oncerned.\n\nPreventive detention can be provided for by law for reasons connected with six different matters specified in the relevant items in the legislative lists, apd whatever the reasons might be, there is a provision s:ontained in article 22 ( 4) (a) which lays down that detention for 11).ore than three months could not be permitted except with the sanction of the advisory board.\n\nAn alternative however has been provided for by clause (b) and Parliament has been given the option to take away the protection given by clause (a) and specify the circumstances and the cases when this rule will not apply.\n\nI am extremely doubtful whether the classification of cases made by Parliament in section 12 of the Act really fulfils the object which the Constitution had in view.\n\nThe basis of classification has been the apprehended acts of the persons detained described with reference .to the general heads mentioned ih the items in the legislative lists as said above.\n\nFive out of the six heads have been taken out and labelled as classes of cases to which the protection of clause ( 4) (a) of the article would not be available.\n\nIt is against common sense that ali forms of activities connected with these five items are equally dangerous and merit the same drastic treatment. The descriptions are very general and there may be acts of various degrees of intensity and danger under each one of these heads.\n\nAlthough I do not think that section 12 has been framed with due regard to the object which the Constitution had in view. I am unable to say that the section is invalid as being ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution has given unfettered powers to Parliament in the matter of making the classifications and it is open to the Parliament to adopt any method or principle as it likes.\n\nIf it chose the principle implied in the enumeration of subjects under the relevant legislative heads, it cannot be said that Parliament has exceeded its powers.\n\nI am also unable to hold that both \"circumst:mi:es\" as well as \"clas1es\" have to be prescribed in order to\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThi Stale\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe St.u\n\nMukherjea ].\n\ncomply with the requirement of sub-clause (a) of article 22(7).\n\nThe sub-clause (a) of the article lays down a purely enabling provision and Parliament, if it so chooses, may pass any legislation in terms of the same.\n\nWhere an optional power is conferred on certain authority to perform two separate acts, ordinarily it would not be obligatory upon it to perform both; it may do either if it so likes. Here the classes have been specified and the classes apparently are composed of persons who are detained for the purpose of preventing them from committing certain apprehended acts.\n\nI am extremely doubtful whether the classes themselves could be described as \"circumstances\" as they purport to have been done in the section. \"Circumstances\" would ordinarily refer to conditions like war, rebellion, communal disturbances and things like that, under which extra precaution might be necessary and the detention of suspected persons beyond the period of three months without the sanction of the advisory board might be justified.\n\nIt is said that the likelihood of these persons committing the particular acts which are specified might constitute \"circumstances.\" In my opinion, that is not a plain and sensible interpretation.\n\nBut whatver that may be, as I am of opinion that it is not obligatory on Parliament to prescribe both the circumstances and the classes of cases, I am unable to hold that section 12 is ultra vires the Constitution because the circumstances are not mentioned.\n\nAs I have said at the beginning, the draft is rather clumsy and I do not know why Parliament used the word \"or\" when in the Constitution itself the word \"and\" has been used.\n\nIn the fourth and last point raised by Mr. Nambiar the principal question for consideration is the validity of section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act.\n\nSubsection (1) of section 14 prohibits any Court from allowing ariy statement to be made or any evidence to be given before it of the substance of any communication made under section 7 of the grounds on which , detention order has been made against any person or anv representation made by him against such order.\" It further provides that no Court shall be\n\nentitled to require any public officer to produce before it or to disclose the substance of any such communication or representation made or the proceedings of an advisory board or that part Qf the report of an advisory board which is confidential.\n\nSUb-section (2) further provides that .\n\n\"It shall' be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish without the previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, any contents or ihatter purporting to be contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section ( 1) :\n\nProvided that nothing in this . sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made to his legal adviser by a person who is the subject of a detention order.\"\n\nThe provisions of this section are obviously of a most drastic character.\n\nIt imposes a ban on the Court and prevents it from allowing any statement to be made or any evidence produced before it of the substance of any communication made to the detenu apprising him of the grounds upon which the detention order was made.\n\nThe Court is also incompetent to look into the proceedings before the advisory board or the report of the latter which is confidential.\n\nFurther the disclosure of such materials has been made a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. Mr. Nambiar's contention is that these restrictions render utterly nugatory the provisions of article 32 of the Constitution v.:hich guarantees to every person the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.\n\nIt is not disputed that the petitioner has the right of moving this Court for a writ of habeas .corpus, and unless the Court is in a position to look into and examine the groun9s upon which the detention order has been made, it is impossible for it to come to any decision on the point and pass a proprr judgment.\n\nThough th-: right to move this\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Su•\n\nMukbtrjea ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTM Stal4\n\nMu/Wrjeo J.\n\nCourt is not formally taken away, the entire proceedings are rendered ineffective and altogether illusory.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, it is pointed out that article 32 guarantees only the right to constitutional remedy for enforcement of the rights which are declared by the Constitution.\n\nIf there are no rights under the Constitution, guaranteed to a person who is detained under any law of preventive detention, no question of enforcing such rights by an approach to this Court at all arises.\n\nI do not think that this argument proceeds on a sound basis; and in my opinion, section 14 does . take away and materially curtails some of the fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution itself.\n\nArticle 22, clause (5), of the Constitution lays down as a fundamental right that when a person is detained for preventive detention, /the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Under clause (6), the authority need not disclose such facts as it considers to be against public interest to disclose. But so far as the grounds are concerned, the disclosure is not prohibited under any circumstance. It is also incumbent upon the detaining authority to afford a detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order. It has been held in several cases, and in my opinion quite rightly, that if the grounds supplied to a detained person are of such a vague and indefinite character that no proper and adeq, uatr. representation could be made in reply to the same, that itself would be an infraction of the right which has been given to the detenu under law. In my opinion, it would not be possible for the Court to decide whether the provisions of article 22, clause (5), have been duly complied with and the fundamental right guaranteed by it has been made available to the detenu unless the grounds communicated to him under the provisions of this article arc actually produced before the Court.\n\nApart from this, it is also open to the person detained to contend that the detention\n\norder has been a mala fide exercise of power by the detaining authority and that the grounds upon which it is based, are not proper or relevant grounds which would justify detention under the provisions of the law itself. These rights of the detenu would for all practical purposes be rendered unenforceable if the Court is precluded from looking into the grounds which have been supplied to him undr section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act.\n\nIn my opinion, section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act does materially affect the fundamental rights declared under Part III of the Constitution and for this reason it must be held to be illegal and ultra vires.\n\nIt is not disputed, however, that this section can be severed from the rest of the Act without affecting the other provisions of the Act in any way.\n\nThe whole Act cannot, therefore, be held to be ultra vires.\n\nMr. Nambiar has further argued that section 3 of the Act also contravenes the provisions of article 32 of the Constitution, for it makes satisfaction of the particular authorities final in matters of preventive detention and thereby prevents this Court .from satisfying itself as to the propriety of the detention order. This contention cannot succeed as no infraction of any fundamental right is involved in it. As has been pointed out already, this Court cannot interfere unless it is proved that the power has been exercised by the authorities in a mala fide manner or that the grounds are not proper or relevant grounds which justify detention.\n\nThe provisions are undoubtedly harsh, but as they do not take away the rights under articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, they cannot be held to be illegal or ultra vires.\n\nThe result, therfore, is that, in my op1mon, the Preventive Detentibn Act must be declared to be intra vires the Constitution with the exception of section 14 which is held to be illegal and ultra vires.\n\nThe present petition, however, must stand disinised, though it may be open to the petitioner o make a fresh application if he so chooses and if the grounds that have been supplied to hiin under section 7 of the Act do furnish adequate reasons for making such application.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe S1ate\n\nMu!rherjea ].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu StaU\n\nDo.].\n\nDas J.-I am likewise of opinion that this application should be dismissed.\n\nThe contention of learned counsel appearing in support of this application is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, !950 (Act IV at 1950), are extremely drastic and wholly unreasonable and take away or, in any event, considerably abridge the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens by the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution and that this Court should declare the Act wholly void under article 13(2) of the Constitution and set the petitioner at liberty.\n\nIt is necessary to bear in mind the scope and ambit of the powers of the Court under the Constitution.\n\nThe powers of the Court are not the same under all Constitution~.\n\nIn England Parliament is supreme and there is no limitation upon its legislative powers.\n\nTherefore, a law duly made by Parliament, cannot be challenged in any Court. The English Courts have to interpret and apply the law; they have no authority to declare such a law illegal or unconstitutional. By the American Constitution the legislative power of the Union is vested in the Congress and in a sense the Congress is the supreme legislative power.\n\nBut the written Constitution of the United States is supreme above all the three limbs of Government and, therefore, the law made by the Congress, in order to be valid, must be in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. If it is not, the Supreme Court will intervene and declare that law to be unconstitutional and void.\n\nAs will be seen more fully hereaf1er, the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law'', an expression tp be found in the Fifth . Amendment (1791) of the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment ( 1868) which related to the State Constitutions. It is thus that the Supreme Court established its own supremacy over the executive and the Congress. [n India the position of the Judiciary is somewhere in\n\nbetween the Courts in England and the United States.\n\nWhile in the main leaving our Parliament and the State Legislatures supreme in their respective legislative fields, our Constitution has, by some of the articles, put upon the Legislatures certain specified limitations some of which will have to be discussed hereafter.\n\nThe point to be noted. however, is that in so far as there is anv limitation on the legislative power, the Court must, on a complaint being made to it, scrutinise and ascertain whether such limitation has been transgressed and if there has been any transgression the Court will courageously declare the law unconstitutional, for the Court is bound by its oath to uphold the Constitution. But outside the limitations imposed on the legislative powers our Parliament and the State Legislatures are supreme in their respective legislative fields and the Court has no authority to question the wisdom or policy of the law duly made by the approprl!ite legislature. Our Constitution. unlike the English Constitution, recognises the Court's supremacy over the legislative authority, but such supremacy is a very limited one, for it is confined to the field where the legislative power is circumscribed by limitations put upon it by the Constitution itself.\n\nWithin this restricted field the Court may, on a scrutiny of the la, w made by the Legislature, declare it void if it is found to have transgressed the constitutional limitations.\n\nBut our Constitution, unlike the American Constitution, does not recognise the absolute supremacy of the Court over the legislative authority in all respects, for outside the restricted field of constitutional limitations our Parliament and the State Legislatures are supreme in their respective legislative fields and in that wider field there is no scope for the Court in India to play the role of the Supreme Court of the United States.\n\nIt is well for us to constantly remember this basic limitation on our own powers.\n\nThe impugned Act has been passed by Parliament after the Constitution came into force. Article 246 gives exclusive power to Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule and it gives exclusive power to\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopalan V, The State\n\nDas].\n\nthe State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List II of that Schedule.\n\nIi also gives concurrent power to Parliament as well as to the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule. Residuary powers of legislation are vested in Parliament under article 248.\n\nThe first thing to note is that under Entry 9 of List I the Parliament and under Entry 3 in List III both, Parliament and the State Legislatures are empowered to make laws for preventive detention for reasons connected with the several matters specified in the respective entries.\n\nThis legislation is not conditioned upon the existence of any war with a foreign power or upon the proclamation of emergency under Part XVIII of the Constitution. Our Constitution has, therefore, accepted preventive detention as the subjectmatter of peace-time legislation as distinct from emergency legislation.\n\nIt is a novel feature to provide \"for preventive detention in the Constitution. There is no such provision in the Constitution of any other country that I know of. Be that as it may, for reasons good or bad, our Constitution has deliberately and plainly given power to Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact preventive detention laws even in peacetime.\n\nTo many of us a preventive detention law is odious at all times but what I desire to emphasise is that it is not for the Court to question the wisdom and policy of the Constitution which the people have given unto themselves.\n\nThis is another basic fact which the Court must not overlook.\n\nThe next thing to bear in mind is that, if there were nothing else in the Constituti1>n, the legislative powers of Parliament and the State Legislatures in their respective fields would have been absolute.\n\nIn such circumstances the Court would have been entitled only to scrutinise whether Parliament or the State Legislature had, in making a particular law, overstepped its legislative field and encroached upon the legislative field of the other legislative power, but could not have otherwise questioned the validity of any law made by the Parliament or the State Legislatures.\n\nThus under Entry 9 of List I the Parliament and under Entry 3 of List III the Parliament and the State Legislature could make as drastic a preventive detention law as it pleased.\n\nSuch a law might have authorised a policeman, not to speak of a, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, to take a man, citizen or non-ci:izen, into custody and keep him in detention for as lot 1g as he pleased.\n\nThis law might not have made any provision for supp1ying to the detenu the grounds of l11s detention or affording any opportunity to him to m1ke any representation to anybody or for setting up any advisory board at all. Likewise, under Entries 1 and 2 in List III the Parliament or the State Legislature might have added as many new and novel offences as\n\nit~ fancy might have dictated and provided for any cruel penalty ranging from the maiming of the limbs to bciling to death in oil or repealed the whole of the Codt of Criminal Procedure and provided for trial by battle or ordeal or for conviction by the verdict of a sorcerer or a soothsayer. Such law might have forbidden any speech criticising the Government, however mildly, or banned all public meetings or prohibited formation of all associations under penalty of law.\n\nUnder Entry 33 of List I the Parliament might have made a law for acquiring anybody's properties for the purposes of the Union without any compensation and under Entry 36 in List III the State Legislature could do the same subject to the provisions of Entry 42 in List III which empowers the making of a law laying down principles for payment of compensation which might be anything above nothing.\n\nUnder Entry 81 Parliament could have made any law restricting oreven 'prohibiting inter-State migration so that a Bengali would not be able to move into and settle in Bihar or\n\nvice versa.\n\nIt is needless to mqltiply instances of atrocious laws which Parliament or the State Legislature might have made under article 246 read with the different lists if there were nothing else in the Constitution.\n\nOur Legislatures, subject to the limitation of distribution of legislative powers, would have been as ..,. --supreme in their respective legislative fields as the\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe State\n\nDasJ.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nEnglish Parliament is and has been.\n\nThe Court in India, in such event, would have had to take the law duly made, interpret it and apply it. It would not have been entitled to utter a word as to the propriety of the particular law, although it might have shuddered at the monstrous atrocities of such law.\n\nOur Constitution, however has not accepted this abso.lute supremacy of our Parliament or the State Legislature.\n\nThus by article 245 (1) the legislative power is definitely made \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution.\" Turning to the Constitution; article 13(2) provides as follows:\n\n\"The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention, be void.\"\n\nThis clearly puts a definite limitation on the wide legislative powers given by article\n\n246. It is certainly within the competency of the Court to judge and declare whether there has been any contravention of this limitation.\n\nIn this respect again the Court has supremacy over the Legislature.\n\nFrom the provisions so far referred to, it clearly follows that there are two principal limitation to the legislative power of Parliament, namely,-\n\n(i) that the law must be within the legislative competence of Parliament as prescribed by article 246; and\n\n(ii) that such law must be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and must not take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III.\n\nThere can be no qu.estion-and, indeed, ihe learned Attorney-General does not .contend otherwise-that both these matters are justiciable and it is open to the Courts to decide whether Parliament has transgressed either of the limitations upon its legislative power.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner does nor say that the impugned Act is ultra vires the legislative powers of Parliament as prescribed by article 246.\n\nHis contention is that the impugned Act is VQid\n\n- .l\n\nbecause it takes away or abridges the fundamental rights of citizens conferreq by Part III of the Constitution. It is, therefore. necessary to ascertain first the exact nature, extent and scope of the particular fundamental right insisted upon and then to see whether the impugned Act has taken away or, in any way, abridged the fundamental right so ascertained.\n\nCivil riglits of a person are generally divided into two classes, namely, the rights attached to the person (jus personarum) and the rights to things, i.e., property (jus. rerum). Of the rights attached to the person, the first and foremost is _ the freedom of life, which me:i, ns the right to live, i.e., the right that one's life shall not be taken away except under authority of law.\n\nNext to the freedom of life comes the freedom of the person; which means that ne's body shall not be touched, violated, arrested or imprisoned and one's . limbs shall not be injured or maimed except under authority of law. The truth of the matter is that the right to live and the freedom of the person are the primary rights attached to the person.\n\nIf a man's person is free. it is then and then only that he can exercise a variety of other auxiliary rights, that is to say, he can, within certain limits, speak what he likes, assemble where he likes, form. any associations or unions, move about freely as his \"own inclination may direct,\" reside and settle apywhere he likes and practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. These are attributes of the freedom of the person and are consequently rights attached to the person.\n\nIt should be clearly borne in mind that these are not al.J the rights attached to the person.\n\nBesides them there are varieties of other rights which are also the attributes of the freedom of the person. All rights attached to the person are usually called personal liberties and they are too numerous to be enumerated. Some of these auxiliary rights are so important and fundamental that they are regarded and valued as separate and independent rights apart from the freedom of the person.\n\nPersonal liberties may be compendiously summed up as the. right to do as one pleases within the law. I\n\n14-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA.K. Copa/an\n\nThe Statt\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nTire State\n\nsay within the law because liberty is not unbridled licence. It is what Edmund Burke called \"regulated freedom.\" Said Montesquieu n Book III, Ch. 3, of his Spirit of the-Laws :\n\nDos J. \"In Governments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power or doing what we ought t.o will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-{; itizens would enjoy the same power.\"\n\nTo the same effect arc the following observations of Webster in his Works vol. II, p. 393:\n\n\"Liberty is the creation of law, essentially different from that authorised licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understands, and never can understand.\n\nLiberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws .... The working of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, executive and judicial power is favourable to liberty and justice. These checks and restraints arc so many safeguards set around individual rights and interests.\n\nThat man is free who is protected from injury.\"\n\nTherefore, putting restraint . on the freedom of w10ng doing of one person is really securing the liberty of the intended victims. To curb the freedom of the saboteur or surreptitiously removing the fish plates from the railway lines is to ensure the safety and liberty of movement of the numerously innocent and unsuspecting passengers. Therefore, restraints on liberty should be judged not only subjectively as applied to a few individuals who come within their operations but also objectively as securing the libetry of a far greater number of individuals. Social interest in individual\n\nliberty may well have to be subordinated to other greater social interests. If a law ensures and protects the greater social interests then such law will be a wholesome and beneficent law although it may infringe the liberty of some individuals, for it will ensure for the greater liberty of the rest of the members of the society. At the same time, our liberty has also to be guarded against executive, legislative as well as judicial usurpation of powers and prerogatives.\n\nSubject to certain restraints on individuais and reasonable checks on the State every person has a variety of personal liberties too numerous to be catalogued. As will be seen more fully hereafter, our Constitution has recognised personal liberties as fundamental rights.\n\nIt has guaranteed some of them under article 19(1) but put restraints on them by clauses (2) to (6). It has put ' checks on the State's legislative powers by articles 21 and 22. It has by providing for preventive detention, recognised that individual liberty may be subordinated to the larger social interests.\n\nTurning now to the Constitution I find that Part lll is headed and deals with \"Fundamental Rights\"\n\nunder seven heads, besides \"General\" provisions (articles 12 and 13), namely \"Right to Equality\" (articles 14 to 18), \"Right to Freedom\" (articles 19 to 22), \"Right against Exploitation\" (articles 23 and 24), \"Right to Freedom of Religion\" (articles 25 to 28), \"Cultural and Educational Rights\" (articles 29 and 30), \"Right to Property\" (article 31),. \"Right to Constitutional Remedies\" (articles 32 to 35).\n\nUnder the heading \"Right to Freedom\" are grouped four articles, 19 to 22. Article 19(1) is in the following terms:- \"(!) All citizens shall have the right-\n\n(a) to freedom of speech and expression;\n\n(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; ( c) to form associations or unions;\n\n(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India ; ( e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; (£) to acquire, hold and dispose of property;. and\n\nA.K. Gop:uar.\n\nTh4 StaJt\n\nDas J.\n\nA..K. GofJalan\n\nThi StoU\n\nDas].\n\n(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.\" It will be noticed that of the seven rights protected by clause (1) of article 19, six of them, namely, (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) are what are said to be rights attached to the person (ius personarum). The remaining item, namely, (f) is the right to property (jus rerum ). If there were nothing else in article 19 these rights would have been absolute rights and the protection given to them would have completely debarred Parliament or any of the State Legislatures from making any law taking away or abridging any of those rights. But a perusal of article .19 makes it abundantly clear that none of the seven rights enumerated in clause (1) is an absolute right, for each of these rig_hts is liable to be curtailed by laws made or to be made\n\nby the State to the extent mentioned in the several clauses (2) to (6) of that article. Those clauses save the p0wer of the State to make laws imposing certain specified restrictions on the several rights.\n\nThe nett result is that the unlimited legislative power given by article 246 read with the different legislative lists in the Seventh Scpedule is cut down by the provisions of article 19 and all laws made by the State with respect to these rights must. in order to be valid, observe these limitations. Whether any law has in fact transgressed these limitations is to be ascertained by the Court and if in its view the restrictions imposed by the law are greater than what is permitted by clauses (2) to (6) whichever is applicable the Court will declare the same to be unconstitutional and, therefore, void under article 13. Here again there is scope for the application of the \"intellectual yardstick\" of the Court. If, however, the Court finds, on scrutiny, that the law has not overstepped the constitutional limitations. the Court will have to uphold the law, whether it likes the law or not.\n\nThe first part of the argument is put broadly, namely, that personal liberty is generally guaranteed by the Constitution by article 19(1) and that the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 has imposed unreasonable\n\n.....\n\nrestrictions thereon in violation of the provisions of clauses (2) to ( 6) ot that article.\n\nThe very first question that arises, therefore, is as to whether the freedom of the person which is primarily and directly suspended or destroyed by preventive detention is at all governed by article 19(1).\n\nIf personal liberty as such is guaranteed by any of the sub-clauses of article 19(1) then why has it also been protected by article 21 ? The answer suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner is that personal liberty as a substantive right is protected by article 19(1) and article 21 gives only an additional protection by prescribing the procedure according to which that right may be taken away. I am unable to accept this contention.\n\nIf this argument were correct, then it would follow that our Constitution does not guarantee to any person, citizen or non-citizen, the freedom of his life as a substantive right at all, for the substantive right to life does not fall within any of the sub-clauses of clause ( 1) of article 19. It is retorted in reply that no constitution or human laws can guarantee life which is the gift of God who alone can guarantee and protect it.\n\nOn a parity of reasoning no Constitution or human laws can in that sense guarantee freedom of speech or free movement, for one may be struck dumb by disease or may lose the use of his legs by paralysis or as a result of amputation.\n\nFurther, what has been called the procedural protection of article 21 would be an act of supererogation, for when God takes away one's life whatever opportunity He may have had\n\ngiyen to Adam to explain his conduct before sending him down, He is not likely in these degenerate days to observe the requirements of notice or fair trial before ::.ny human tribunal said to be required by article 21.\n\nThe fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution give specific protection to life as a substantive right. So does article 31 of the japanese Constitution of 1946.\n\nThere is no reason why our Constitution should not do the same. The truth is that article 21 has given that protection to life as a substantive right and that as will be seen hereafter, that article properly understood does not purport to prescribe any particular procedre at all. The\n\nA.K. Copa/an v.\n\nThe Stare\n\nDas].\n\n19!i0\n\nA. IC. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nfurther astounding result of the argument of counsel for the petitioner will be that the citizen of India will have only the rights enumerated in article 19 clause ( 1) and no other right attached to his person.\n\nAs I have already stated, besides the several rights mentioned in the several sub-clauses of article 19(1) there are many other personal liberties which a free man, i.e., a man who has the freedom of his person, may exercise. Some of those other rights have been referred to by Harries C. J. of Calcutta in his unreported judgment in Miscellaneous Case No. 166 of 1950\n\n(Kshitindra v. The Chief Secretary of West Bengal) while referring the case to a Full Bench in the following words:- \"It must be remembered that a free man has far more and wider rights than those stated in article 19\n\n(1) of the Constitution. For example, a free man can eat what he likes subject to rationing laws, work as much as he likes or idle as much as he likes. He can drink anything he likes subject to the licensing laws and smoke ; ind do a hundered and one things which are not included in article 19.\n\nIf freedom of person was the result or article 19, then a free man would only have the seven rights mentioned in that article.\n\nBut obviously the free man in India has far greater rights.\"\n\nI find myself in complete agreement with the learned Chief Justice on this point. If it were otherwise, the citizen's right to eat what he likes will be liable to be taken away by the excutive fiat of the Civil Supply Department without the necessity of any rationing laws. The Government may enforce prohibition without any prohibition laws or licensing laws and so on.\n\nI cannot accept that our Constitution intended to give no protection to _the bundle of rights which, together with the rights mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to ( e) and\n\n(g) make up personal liberaty. Indeed, I regard it as a merit of our Constitution that it does not attempt t-0 enumerate exhaustively and the personal rights but uses the compendious expression 'personal liberty\" m article 21, and protects all of them.\n\nIt is pointed out that in the original draft the word \"liberty'' only wa. used as in the American\n\nConstitution but the Drafting Committee added the word \"personal\" to make it clear that what was being protected by what is now article 21 was not what had already been protected by what is now article 19.\n\nIf it were permissible to refer to the Drafting Committee's report, it would be another answer to the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner that personal liberty as a substantive right was protected by article 19.\n\nI do not, however, desire to base my judgment on the Drafting Committee's report 'and I express no opinion as to its admissibility.\n\nWh:ttever the intentions of the Drafting Committee might\n\nhave been, the Constitution as finally passed has in article 21 used the words \"personal-: liberty\" which have a definite connotation in law as I have explained.\n\nIt does not mean only liberty of the person but it means liberty or the rights attached to the person (ius personarum ).\n\nThe expressions \"freedom of life\" or \"personal liberty\" are not to be found in article 19 and it is straining the language of article 19 to squeeze , in personal liberty into that article. In any case the right to life cannot be read into article 19.\n\nArticle 19 being confined, in its operation, to citizens only, a non-citizen will have no protection for his life and personal liberty except what has been called the procedural protection of article 21. If there be no substantive, right what will the procedure protect?\n\nI recognise that it is not imperative .that a foreigner should have the same priviieges as are given to a citizen, but if article 21 is construed in the way I have suggested even a foreigner will have equal protection for his life and , pt!rsonal liberty before the laws of our country under our Constitution.\n\nI am unable, therefore, for all the reasons given above, to agree that personal liberties are the result of article 19 or that that article purports to protect all of them.\n\nIt is next urged that the expression \"personal liberty\" is synonymous 'with the right to move freely and, therefore, comes directly under article 19(1) (d).\n\nReference is made , to the unreported dissenting judgment of Sen J. of Calcutta in Miscellaneous Case No. 166 of 1950 while referring that case to a Full Bench.\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nTlw State\n\nDas J.\n\nA.K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nIn his judgment Sen J. quoted the following passage from Blackstone's Commentaries:-\n\n\"Next to personal security the law of England regards, asserts and preserves, the personal liberty of individuals.\n\nThis personal libertv consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.\" [Page 73 of George Chase's Edition (4th Edition) of Blackstone, Book I, chapter I.]\n\nOn the authority of the above passage the learned Judge concluded that personal liberty came within article 19(1)(d). I am unable to.agree with the learned Judge's conclusion.\n\nOn a perusal of Chapter I of Book I of Blackstone's Commentaries it will appear that the learned commmator divided the rights attached to the person (jus personarum) into two classes, namely, \"personal security\" and \"personal liberty.\" Under the head \"personal security\" Blackstone included several rights, namely, the rights to life, limb, body, health and reputation, and under the head \"personal liberty\" he placed only the right of free movement.\n\nHe first dealt with the several rights, classified by him under the head \"personal security\" and then proceeded to say that next to those rights came personal liberty which according to his classification consisted only in the right of free locomotion.\n\nThere is no reason to suppose that in article 21 of our Constitution the expression \"personal liberty\" has been used in the restricted sense in which Blackstone used it in his Commentaries.\n\nIf \"personal liberty\" in article 21 were synonymous with the tight to move freely which• is mentioned in article 19(1) (d}, then the astounding result will be that only the last mentioned right has~ what has been called the procedural protection of article 21 but none of the other rights in the other sub-clauses of article 19 ( 1) has any procedural protection at all.\n\nAccording to learned counsel for the petitioner the procedure required by article 21 consists of notice and a right of hearing before an impartial tribunal.\n\nTherefore, according to him, a man's right of movement cannot be taken away without giving him notice and a fair trial\n\nbefore an impartial tribunal but he may be deprived of his freedom of speech or his property or any of his other rights Without the formality of any procedure at all. The proposition has only to be stated to be rejected.\n\nIn my judgment, article 19 protects some of the important attributes of personal liberty as independent rights and the expression \"personal liberty\" has been used in article 21 as a compendious term including within its meaning all the varieties of rights which go to make up the penonal liberties of men.\n\nLearned counsel for. the petitioner next contends that personal liberty undoubtedly means or includes the freedom of the person and the pith and substance of the freedom of the person is right w move about freely and consequently a pr.eventive detention law which destroys or suspends the freedom of the\n\npeon must inevitably destroy or suspend the right of free movement and must necessarily offend against the protection given to the citizen by article 19 ( 1) ( d) unless it -satisfies the test of reasonableness laid clown in clause (5). The argument is attractive and requires serious consideration as to the exact purpose and sc\"pe of sub-clause (d) of article 19(1).\n\nThere are indications in the very language of article 19 ( 1) ( d) itself that its .purpose is to protect not the general right •of free movement hich emanares from the freedom of the person but only a specific and limited aspect of it, namely, the special right of a free citizen of Indian to move freely throughout the Indian territory, i.e., from one State to another within the Union.\n\nIn other words, it guatantees, for exampie, that a free Indian citizen ordinarily residing in the State of West Bengal will be free to move from West Bengal to Bihar or to reside and settle in Madras or . the Punjab without anv let or hindrance other than as provided in clause (5). It is this special right of movement of the Indian citizen in this specific sense and for this particular purpose which is protected by article 19( 1) ( d). It is argued on the authority of a decision of a Special Bench of . the Calcutta High Courc presided over. by Sen J. in Sunil Kumar v.\n\nThe Chief\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stau\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. G•p.Jan\n\nT/,. Stau\n\nDas].\n\nSecretary of West Bengal ( 1 ) that the words \"throughout the territory of India\" occurring in that sub-clause only indicate that our Constitution does not guarantee to its citizens the right of free movement in or into foreign territory and that those words have been added . to save passport restrictions. I am unable to accept this interpretation.\n\nOur Constitution cannot possibly give to any of its citizens any right of free movement in a foreign q:mntry and it was wholly superfluous to specifically indicate this in the Constitution, for that would have gone without saying. The words \"throughout the territory of India\" are not used in connection witli most of the other sub-clauses of clause (1) of article 19. Does such omission indicate that our Constitution guarantes to its citizens freedom. of speech and expression, say, in Pakistan? Does it guarantee to its citizens a right to assemble or to form associations or unions in a foreign territory? Clearly not. Therefore, it was not necessary to use those words in sub-clause ( d) to indicate that free movement in fqreign countries was not being guaranteed. It is said .. that by the use of those words the Constitution makes it clear that no guarantee was being given to any citizen with regard to emigration from India without a passport and that the freedom of movement was restricted within the territory of India.\n\nDoes the omission of those words from article 19(1) (a) indicate that the citizen of India has been guaranteed such freedom of speech and expression as will enable him to set up a broadcasting station and broadcast his views artd expressions ·. to foreign lands without a licences? Clearly not. Dropping this line of argument and adopting a totally . new line of argument it is said that by the use of the words \"throughout the territory of India\" the Constitution indicates that the widest right of free movement that it could possibly give to its citizens has been given. Does, then, the omission of those words from the other subclauses indicate that the Constitution has kept back . some parts of those rights even beyond the limits of the qualifying clauses that follow? Do not those other rights prevail through.out the Indian territory?\n\n{1)54 C. W. N. 394.\n\nClearly they do, even without those words. Therefore, those words must have been used in sub-clause (d) for some other purpose. That othr purpose, as far as I can apprehend it, is to indicate that free movement from one State to another within the Union is protected so that Parliament may not by a law made under Entry 81 in List I curtail it beyond the limits prescribed by clause (5) of article 19.\n\nIts purpose, as I read it, is not to provide protection for the general right of free movement but to secure a specific and special right of the Indian citizen to move freely throughout the territories of India regarded as an independent additional right apart from the general right of locomotion emanating from the freedom of the person. It is a guarantee against unfair discrimination in the matter of free movement of the Indian citizen throughout the Indian Union.\n\nIn short, it is a protection against provincialism.\n\nIt has nothing to do with the freedom of the person as such.\n\nThat is guaranteed to every person, citizen or otherwise, in the manner and to the extent formulated by article 21.\n\nClause (5) of article 19 qualifies sub-clause (d) of clause (1) which should, therefore, be read in the light of clause (5). The last mentioned clause permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right of free movement throughout the territory of India as explained above.\n\nImposition of reasonable restrictions clearly implies that the right of free movement is not entirely destroyed but that parts of the right remain.\n\nThis reasonable restriction can be imposed either in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. The Scheduled Tribes usually reside in what are called the Scheduled Areas.\n\nThe provision for imposing restrition Qn the citizens' right of free movement in the interests of the Scheduled Tribes clearly indicates that the restriction is really on his right of free movement into or within the Scheduled Areas. It means that if it be found necessary for the protection of the Scheduled Tribes the citizens may be restrained from entering into or moving about in the Scheduled Areas although they are left quite free to move about elsewhere. This restraint may well be\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTh8Sta1e\n\nDas].\n\nd. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nnecessary for the protection of the members of the Scheduled Tribes who are generally impecunious and constitute a backward class.\n\nThey may need protection against money-lender~ or others whu may be out to exploit them. They may have to be protected against their own impecunious habits which may result in their selling or mortgaging their hearths and homes.\n\nLikewise, the free movemen, of citizens may have to b.e restricted in the interest of the general public. A person suffering from an mfectious disease may be prevented from moving awut and spreading the disease and regulations for his segregation in the nature of quarantine may have to be introduced.\n\nLikewise, healthy people may be prevented, in the interests of the general public. from entering a plague-infected area.\n\nThere may be protected places, e.g., forts or other strategic place>, access whereto may have to be\n\nregulated or even prohibited in the interests of the general public.\n\nThe point to be noted, however, is that when free movement is thus restricted, whether in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the Scheduled Tribes, such restriction has reference generally to a certain local area which becomes the prohibited area but the right of free movement in all other areas in the Union is left unimpaired.\n\nThe circumstance that clause (5) contemplates only the taking away of a specified area and thereby restricting the field of the exercise of the right conferred by subclause ( d) of clause (I) indicates to my mind that subclause ( d) is concerned, not with the freedom of the person or the general right of free movement but with a specific aspect of it regarded as an independent right apart from the freedom of the person. In other words, in sub-clause (d) the real emphasis is on the words ''throughout ihe terrtory of India.\" The purpose of article 19(1) (d) is to guarantee that there shall be no State barrier.\n\nIt gives protection against provincialism.\n\nIt has nothing to do with the freedom of the person as such.\n\nFinally, the ambit and scope of the rights protcv ted by article 19(1) have to be considered.\n\nDoes it protect the right of free movement and the other\n\npersonal rights therein mentioned in all circumstances irrespective of any other comideration?\n\nDoes it not postulate a capacity to exercise the rights?\n\nDoes its protection continue even though the citizen lawfully loses his capacity, for exercising those rights? How can the continuance of those personal rights be compatible with the lawful detention of the person?\n\nThese. personal rights and lawful detention cannot go together.\n\nTake the case of a person who has been properly con victed of an offence punishable under a section of the [ndian Penal Code as to the reasonableness of which there is no dispute.\n\nHis right to freedom of speech is certainly impaired. Under clause (2) the State may make a law relating to libel, slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.\n\nAny law on any of these matters contemplated by this clause certainly must have some direct reference to speech and expression.\n\nIt means that the law may directly curtail the freedom of speech so that the citizen may not talk libel or speak contemrtuously of the Court or express indecent or immoral sentiments by speech or other forms of expression or utter seditious words. To say that every crime undermines the security of the State and, therefore, every section of the Indian Penal Code, irrespective of whether it has any reference . to speech or expression, is a law within the meaning of this clause is wholly unconvincing and betrays only a vain and forlorn attempt to find an explanation for meeting the argumeqt that any conviction by a Court of law must necessarily infringe article 19(1) (a). There can be no getting away from the fact that a detention as a result of a conviction impairs the freedom of speech far beyond what is permissible under clause (2) of article 19.\n\nLikewise a detention on lawful conviction impairs each of the other personal rights mentioned in sub-clauses (b) to ( e) and (g) far beyond the limits of clauses (3) to (6). The argument that every section of the Indian Penal Code irrespective of whether it has any reference to any of the rights referred to in sub-clauses (b) to ( e) and (g) is a law imposing\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiii Stal•\n\nDas].\n\nreasonable restriction on those several rights has not even the merit of plausibility.\n\nThere can be no doubt that a detention as a result of lawful conviction must necessarily impair the fundamental personal rights guaranteed by article 19 ( 1) far beyond what is permissible under clauses (2) to\n\n(6) of that article•' and yet nobody can think of questioning the validity of the detention or of the section of the Indian Penal Code under which the sentence was passed. Why?\n\nBecause the freedom of his person having been lawfully taken away, the convict ceases to be entitled to exercise the freedom of speech and expression or any of the other personal rights protected by clause (1) of article 19. On a parity of reasoning he cannot, while the detention lasts, exercise any other personal right, e.g., he cannot eat what he likes or when he likes but has to eat what the Jail Code provides for him and at the time when he is by Jail regulations required to eat.\n\nTherefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the rights protected by article (19) (1), in so far as they relate to rights attached to the person, i.e., the rights referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g), are rights which only a free citizen, who has the freedom of his person unimpaired, can exercise.\n\nIt is pointed out, as a counter to the above reasonings, that detention as a result of a lawful conviction does not deprive a person of his right to acquire or hold or dispose of his property mentioned in sub-clause (f).\n\nThe answer is simple, namely, that that right is not a right attached to the person, (ius personarum) and its existence is not dependent on the freedom of the person.\n\nLoss of freedom of the persorr, therefore, aoes not suspend the right to property.\n\nBut\n\n1 suppose a person loses his property by reason of its having been compulsorily acquired under article 31 he loses his right to hold that property and cannot complain that his fundamental right under sub-clause\n\n(f) of clause (1) of article 19 hM been infringed.\n\nI~ follows that the rights enumerated in article 19 (J \\ subsist while the citizen has the legal capacity to excr cise them. If his capacity to exercise them is gone, by reason of a lawful conviction with respect to the rights\n\nin sub-clauses (a) to (c) a11d (g), or by reason of a lawful compulsory acquisition with respect to the right in sub-clause (f), he ceases to have those rights while his incapacity lasts. It further follows that if a citizen's freedom of the person is lawfully taken away otherwise than as a result of a lawful conviction for an offence, that citizen,· for precisely the same reason, cannot exer-. cise any of the rights attached to his person including those enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) of article 19 (1).\n\nIn my judgment a lawful detention, whether punitive or preventive, does not offend against the protection conferred by article 19(1) (a) to (e) and (g), for those rights must necessarily cease when the freedom of the person is lawfully taken away. In short,\n\nthose rights end where the lawful detention begins. So construed, article 19 and article 21 may, therefore, easily go together and there is, in reality, no conflict betwen them.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the validity or otherwise of preventive detention does not depend on, and is not dealt with by, article 19.\n\nTo summarise, the freedom of. the person is not the result of article 19.\n\nArticle 19 only deals with certain particular rights which, in their origin and inception, are attributes of the freedom or the person but being of great importance are regarded as specific and independent rights. It does not deal with the freedom, of the person as such. Article 19(1) (d) protects a specific aspect of the right of free locomotion, namely, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India which is regarded as a special privilege or right of an Indian citizen and is protected as such.\n\nThe protection of article 19 is co-terminous with the\n\nlegal capacity of . a citizen to exercise the rights protected thereby, for sub-clauses (a) to ( e) and (g) of article 19 (0 postulate the freedom of the -person which alone can ensure the capacity to exercise 'the rights protected by those sub-clauses.\n\nA citizen who loses die.freedom of his person by being lawfully detained, whether. as a result of a conviction for an offence or as a result of preventive detention loses his capacity to exercise those rights and, therefore has none of the rights which sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) may protect.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nDos].\n\nA. K. Copa/an ...\n\nTht State\n\nDas],\n\nIn my judgment article 19 has no bearing on the question of the validity or otherwise of preventive detention and, that being so clause (5) which prescribes a test of reasonableness to be defined and applied by the Court has no application at all.\n\nArticle 19 being thus out of the way. I come to article 20 which is concemed with providing protection against what are well known as ex post facto laws, double jeopardy and self-incrimination.\n\nThis artkle constitutes a limitation on the absolute legislative power which would, but for this article be exercisable by Parliament or the State Legislatures under article 246 read with the legislative lists.\n\nIf the Legislature disobeys this limitation the Court will certainly prevent it.\n\nArticle 20 has no bearing on preventive detention laws and I pass or1.\n\nArticle 21 runs thus: \"21. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.\"\n\nThe contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that by this article the Constitution offers to every person, citizen or non-citizen, only a procedural protection.\n\nAccording to the argument, this article does not purport to give any protection to life or personal liberty as a substantive right . but only prescribes a procedure that must be followed before a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty.\n\nI am unable to accept this contention.\n\nArticle 21, as the marginal note states, guarantees to every_ person \"protection of life, and personal liberty.\" As 1 read it, it defines the substantive fundamental right to which protection is given and does not p, urport to prescribe any particular procedure at all.\n\nThat a person shall not be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law is the substantive fundamental right to which protection is given by the Constitution.\n\nThe avowed object of the article, as I apprehend it, is to define the ambit of the nght to life and personal liberty which is to be protected as a fundamental right.\n\nThe right to life and\n\n' -\n\npersonal liberty protected by article 21 is not an absolute right but is a qualified right-a right circumscribed by the possibility or risk of being lost according to procedure established by law. Liability to depriva'tion according to-procedure established by law is in the nature of words Of limitation.\n\nThe article delimits the right by a reference to its liability to deprivation according to procedure established by law and by this very definition throws a corresponding obliiption .on the State to follow a procedure before depriving a: man of his life and personal liberty. What that procedure is to be is not within the purpose or purview of this article to prescribe or indicate.\n\nThe claim of learned counsel for the petitioner is that article 21 prescribes a procedure. This procedure, according to learned counsel, means those fundamental immutable rules of procedure which are sanctioned or well established by principles of natural justice accepted in all climes and countries and at all times. Apart from the question whether any rule of natural proced•Jte exists which conforms to the notions of justice and fair play of all mankind at all times, it has to be ascertained whether the language of article 21 will permit its introduction into our Constitution. The question then arises as to what is the meaning of the expression \"procedure established by law.\" The word \"procedure\" in article 21 must be taken to signify some step or method or manner of proceeding leading up to the deprivation of life or personal liberty. According to the language used in the article, this procedure has to be \"established by law.\" The word \"establish\" according to the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. III, p: 197, means, amongst other things, \"to render stable or firm; to strengthen by material support; to fix, settle, institute or ordain permanently by enactment or agreement.\" Ac; cording to Dr. Annandale's edition of the _Nw Gresham Dictionary the word \"establish,\" means, amongst other things, \"to found permanently; to institute; to enact or decree; to ordain ; to ratify; to make firm.\" It follows that the word \"established\" in its ordinary natural sense means, amongst other things, \"enacted.\" \"Established by law\" will, 15-3 S. C. India/.58\n\nA. K. Gqpa/.,,\n\nThe Stale\n\nDas].\n\n1950•\n\nA. K. Gopalan ...\n\nThe State\n\nDas 7.\n\ntherefore, mean \"enacted by law.\" If this sense of the word \"established\" is accepted, then the word \"law\" must mean State-made law and cannot possibly m, ean the principles of natural justice, for no procedure can be said to have ever been \"enacted\" by those principles.\n\nWhen section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code speaks of \"Government established by law,\" surely it does not mean \"Government set up by natural justice.\" Therefore, procedure established by law must, I apprehend, be procedure enacted by the State which, by its 'definition in article. 12, includes P'lfliament.\n\nThere is no escape from this position if the cardinal rule of con_struction, namely, to give the words used in a statute their ordinary natural meaning, is applied.\n\nAnd this construction introduces no n<'velty or innovation, for at the date or the Constitution the law of procedure in this country, both civil and criminal, was mainly if not wholly, the creature of statute.\n\nThe Hindu or Muhammadan laws of procedure were abrogated and replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, procedure established by law is quite compatible with procedure enacted by law. If, -however, the word \"established\" is, taken to mean \"sanctioned\" or \"settled\" or \"made firm\" then the question will arise as to the meaning of the word \"law\" in that context.\n\nReference is made to Salmond's Jurisprudence, 10th Edition, p. 37, showing that the term \"law\" is used in two senses and it is suggested that the word \"law\" in the expression \"established by law\" means law in its abstract sense of the principles of natural justice. It is \"jus\" and not \"lex\", says learned counsel for the petitioner.\n\nIt is pointed out that both the English and the Indian law in many cases, some of which have been cited before us, have recognised and applied the principles of natural justice and that this Court should do the same in interpreting the provisions of our constitution. I find it difficult to let in rrinc, tples. of natural justice as being within the meaning of the word \"law,\" having regard to the obvious meaning of that word in the other articles.\n\nArticle 14 certainly embodies a principle of natural justice which ensures to\n\nevery person equality before the law.\n\nWhen natural justice speaks of and enjoins equality before the iaw, that law must refer to something outside natural justice, and must mean the State-made . laws.\n\nIt is only when the State law gives equality to every person that that law is said to be in accordance with natural justice.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the words \"in accordance with law\" in article 17 have reference to State law.\n\nLikewise, the word \"law\" in article 20\n\n(1) can mean nothing but law made by the State. The same remark applies to the words \"in accordance with law\" in articles 23, 31 and 32.\n\nNatural justice docs not impose any tax and, therefore, the word \"law\" in articles 265 and 286 must mean State-made law. If this be the correct meaning of the word \"law\" then there is no scope for introducing the principles oi natural justice in article 21 and \"procedure established by law\" must mean procedure established by law made by the State which, as defined, . includes Parlia ment and the Legislatures of the States.\n\nWe have been referred to a number of text books and decisions showing the development of the American doctr\\ne of \"due process of law\" and we have been urged to adopt those principles in. our Constitution.\n\nThe matter has to be considered against its historical background.\n\nThe English settlers in different parts of Ami; rica had carried with them the English common law as a sort of personal law regulating their rights and liberties inter se as well as between them and the State.\n\nAfter the War of Independence the Constitutions of the United States were drawn up in writing.\n\nThi; majority of those who framed the Constitution were lawyers and l1ad closely studied the Commentaries of the great English jurist Blackstone, who in his famous commentaries had advocated the separation of the three limbs of the State, namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.\n\nMontesquieu's Spirit of Laws had already been published wherein he gave a broader and more emphatic expression to the Aristotelain doctrine of separation of powers. The experience of the repressive laws of Parliament had impressed upon the framers of the American Constitution the\n\n•1950\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nDas}.\n\nA. Ir. C.palan •.\n\nTlw 811111\n\nDas].\n\nbelief that it was the habit of all legislative bodies to grasp and exercise powers that did not belong to them.\n\nThe interference of , the colonial Governors with legislation and the judiciary was also real. This sad experience coupled with the political philosophy of the time induced the framers or the American Constitutions to adopt safeguards not only against the executive but also against the legislature. (See Munro on the Government of the United States, 5th Edition, Chapter IV, p. 53 et seq.).\n\nSays Judge Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th Edition, Vol. II, Chapter XI, p. 755:\n\n\"The people of the American States, holding the sovereignty in tJ:ieir own hands, have no occasion to exact any pledges from any one for a due observation of individual rights; but the aggressive tendency of power is such that they have deemed it of no small importance, that, in framing the instruments under which their governments are to be administered by their agents, they should repeat and re-enact this guarantee, and thereby adopt it as a principle of constitutional protection.\" There can be little doubt that the people of the different States in America intended not to take anv risk as to their life, liberty or property even from the legislature. As Munro puts it at pp. 58-Ql :-\n\n\"The framers of the Constitution set boundarie> to the powers of the Congress, and it was their intent that these limitations should be observed.\n\nBut how was such observance to be enforced by ... the Courts? The statesmen of 1767 did not categoncally answer that question.\"\n\nThe Constitution was silent .and there was no express provision as to who was to serve as umpire in case the Congress overstepped the limits of its legislative powers. By the 5th Amendment what is now known as the \"due process clause\" was introduced in the Federal Constitution and by the 14th Amendment a similar clause was adopted in the State Constitutions.\n\nSome of the State Constitutions used the words \"due\n\ncourse of law,\" some repeated the words of Magna Charta, namely, \"the law of the land\" but most of\n\nthem used the expression \"due process of law.\" All the expressions meam the same thing, namely, that no person should be deprived of his life, liberty or property except in due process of law.\n\nThe Constitution by this clause gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to take: upon itself the function or -declaring the national laws unconstitutional.\n\nAnd the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, seized this opportunity and assumed the right to say the last word on questions of constitutionality, and possesses that right to-day: (Munro, p. 62).\n\nThe expression \"due process or law\" has been interpreted by the American Courts in different ways at different times.\n\nCarl Brent Swisher in his book on the Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States at p. 107 says, with reference to the development of the doctrine of due procedure:\n\n\"The American history of its interpretation falls into three periods. During the first period covering roughly the first century of Government under the Constitution \"due process\" was interpreted \"principally as a restriction upon procedure-and largely the judicial procedure-by which the Government exercised its powers. During the second period, which, again roughly speaking, extended through 1936, \"due process\" was expanded to serve as a restriction not merely upon procedure but upon the substance of the activities in which the Government might engage. During the third period extending from 1936 to date, the use of \"due process\" as a substantive restriction has been largely suspended or abandoned, leaving it principally in its original status as a restriction upon procedure.\"\n\nIn the guise of interpreting \"due process of law\" the American Courts went much further than even Lord Coke ever thought of doing. The American Courts gradually arrogated to themselves the power to revise all legislations.\n\nIn the beginning they confined themselves to insisting on a due procedure to be followed hr'orC' a person was deprived of his life, liberty or property.\n\nIn course of time, \"due process of law\" ca1 \"le to be applied to personal liberty, to social contol, to procedure\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTire State\n\nDos].\n\nA. K. Gopalm1\n\nThe Stale\n\nDas].\n\nto jurisdiction and to substantive law : (Willis, p. 642).\n\nIn the worJs of Munro \"due process of law\" became a sort of palladium covering all manner of inJividual rights.\n\nAll the while the Supreme Court refused to define the phrase, but used it to enable it to declare unconstitutional any Act of legislation which it thought unreasonable : (Willis, p. 657). In Holden v.\n\nHardy( 1 ) we find the following observations: \"'This Court has never attempted to define with precmon the words 'due process of law' ............ It is sufficient to sav that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.\"\n\nIn Taylor v. Peter l' ) Bronson J. observed: \"The words 'by the law of the land' as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong.\n\nThat construction would render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the Constitution into mere nonsense.\n\nThe people would be made to say to the two Houses: 'You shall be vested with the legislative power of the State, but no one shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless you pass a statute for that purpose.\n\nIn other words you shall not do the wrong unless you choose to do it.'\"\n\nIt was thus that the Supreme Court of the United States firmly established its own supremacy over the other two iimhs of the State, namely, the executive and the Congress.\n\nIn the words of John Dickinson quoted in Munro at p. 61, \"The Judges of Argon. began by setting aside laws and ended by making them.'' And all this sweeping development could only be possible because of the presence of one little word \"due\" which, in its content, knows no bound and is not subject to any fixed definition. Whenever a substantive law or some procedure laid down in ani law did not find favour with the majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court it was not reasonable and, therefore, it was not \"due.\"\n\n('J 169 U. S. 366 at p. 389. (') 4 Hill 140, 145.\n\nThe very large and nebulous import of the word \"due\" was bound to result in anomalies, for what was not \"due\" on one day according to the Judges then constituting the Supreme Court became \"due\" say 20 years later according to the new Judges who then came to occupy the Bench, for the Court had to adapt the Constitution to the needs of the society which were contmually changing and growing.\n\nThe larger content of due process of law, which included both procedural and substantive due process of law, had of necessity to be narrowed down, for social interest in personal liberty had to give way to social interest in other matkrs which came to be considered to be of more vital interest to the community.\n\nThis was achieved by the Supreme Court of the United States evolving the new doctrine of police powers-a peculiarly American doctrine.\n\nThe police powers are nowhere exhaustively defined.\n\nIn Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v.\n\nDrainage Commissioner ( 1 ) \"police power\" has beeu stated to \"embrace regulations destgned to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public morals or the public safety.\" Reference in this connection may be made to Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition, Vol.\n\nII, p. 1223 and to Chapter XXVI of Willis at p. 727.\n\nThe nett result is that the all-inclusive and indefinable doctrine of due process of law has in America now been brought back to its original status of a procedural due process of law by the enunciation and application of the new doctrine of police power as an antidote or palliative to the former. Who knows when the pendulum will swing again.\n\nTurning now to what has been called the procedural due process of law it will be found that the matter has been described in different languages . in different cases. In Westervelt v. Gregg ( 2 ) Edwards J defined it thus: ·\n\n\"Due process of law undoubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules\n\n(1) 20+ u. s. 561, 592.\n\n(1) 12 N.Y. 202\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nA .K, Gupalan\n\nv, Tht State\n\nDru].\n\nand forms which have been established for the protection of private rights.\"\n\nA more specific definition of the expressiou \"the law of the land\" meaning procedural due process was given by Webster appearing as counsel for the plaintiff 'In error in the \"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward( 1):\n\n\"By the law of the land is most clearly intended. the general law; a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.\n\nThe meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunitie,, under the protection of the general rules which govern society.\n\nEverything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not therefore to be considered the law of the land.\"\n\nWillis in Ch. XXIII, p. 661, says :\n\n\"The guarantee of due process of law as a matter of procedure mans that no part of a person's personal liberty, including ownership, shall be taken away from him except by the observance of certain formalities.\n\nHence its object is the protection of the. social interest in personal liberty.\"\n\nAt p. 662 Willis enumerates the requirements of the procedural due process of law as follows: ( 1) notice,\n\n(2) opportunity to be heard, (3) an impartial tribunal and (4) an orderly course of procedure.\n\nIn short, the procedural due process requires that a person who is to be deprived of his life, liberty or property shall have had \"his day in Court.\" This according to Willough by p. 736, means:\n\n\"(1) that he shall have had due notice, which may be actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings by which his legal rights may be affected;\n\n(2) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, including the right himself to testify, to produce witnesses, and to introduce relevant documents and other evidence, (3) that the tribunal in or before which his rights _are adjudicated is so constituted as to give reasonable assurance of its\n\n(1) 4 Wheaton 518 at p •. ~79; 4 L. Edn. 629 at p, 6~5.\n\nhonesty and impartiality; and ( 4) thatit is a -COurt of competent jurisdiction.\" It will be noticed that the fourth item of Willoughby is different from the fourth item of Willis.\n\nSuch, in short, are the history of the development of the doctrine of the process of law in the United States and the requirements of the procedural due process as insisted on by the Supreme Court of that country.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner before us does not contend that we should import this American doctrine of due process of law in its full glory but that we sho'!_ld adopt the procedural part of it and insist that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the observance of the formalities which justice and fair play require to be observed.\n\nThe arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner are attractive and in the first blush certainlx appeal to our sentiment but on serious reflection I find several insuperable objections to the introduction of the American doctrine of procedural due process of law into our Constitut10n.\n\nThat doctrine can only thrive and work where the legislature is subordinate to the judiciary in the sense that the latter can sit in judgment over and review all acts of the legislature.\n\nSuch a doctrine can have no application to a field where the legislature is supreme. That is why the doctrine of \"due process of law\" is quite different in England where Parliament is supreme.\n\nThis difference is pointedly described by Mathews J. in foseph Hurtado v. People of California ( 1 ) at p. 531:\n\n\"The concessions of Magna Charta were .wrung from the King as guarantees against oppression and usurpation of his prerogatives.\n\nIt did not enter into the. minds of the barons to provide security against their own body or in favour of the commons by limiting the power of Parliament, so that bills of attainder, er post facto laws, laws declaring forfeitures of estates and other arbitrary Acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English history, were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land, for (notwithstanding what was attributed to Lord Coke in Bonham's\n\n(1) (1882) l JO U.S. 516.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\nDas].\n\ncase, [8 Coke 115, 118 (a),] the omnipotence of Parliament over the Common Law was absolute, even against common right and reason.\n\nThe actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons.\n\nIn this country written Constitutions were deemed essential to protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroachments of power delegated to their governments and the provisions of Magna Charta were incorporated in the bills of rights. They were limitations upon all the powers of government, legislative as well as executive and judicial.'\"\n\nThis basic distinction between the two systems should never be lost sight of, if confusion of thought is to be avoided. Although our Constitution has imposed some limitations on the legislative authorities, yet subject to and outside such limitations our Constitution has left our Parliament and the State Legislatures supreme in their respective legislative fields.\n\nIn the main, subject to the limitations I have mentioned, our Constitution has preferred the supremacy of the Legislature to that of the Judiciary. The English principle of due process of law is, therefore, more in accord with our Constitution than the American doctrine which has been evolved for serving quite a different system.\n\nThe picturesque language of Bronson J. quoted above, while that is quite appropriate to the American Constitution which does not recognise the supremacy of the Congress, is wholly out of place in, and has no application to, a Constitution such as ours, which, subject only to certain restnct10ns, recognises the supremacy of the Legislatures in their respective fields. In the next place, it is common knowledge that our Constitution-makers deliberately declined to adopt the uncertain and shifting American doctrine 0£ due process ' of law and substituted the words \"except in due process of law\" that were in the original draft by the more specific expression \"except in accordance with procedure established by law.'' To try to bring in the American doctrine in spite or this fact, will be to stultify the intention of the Constitution as expressed in\n\narticle 21. In the third place, in view of the plain meaning of the language of that article as construed and explained above it is impossible to let in whaf have been called the principles of natui; al justice as adopted in the procedural due process of law by the American Supreme Court.\n\nAgain, even the all-pervading little word \"due\" does not find a place in article 21 so as to qualify the procedure. It speaks of procedure and not \"due\" procedure and, therefore, \"the intellectual yardstick\" of the Court is definitely ruled out. Finally,. it will be incongruous to. import the doctrine of due process of law without its palliative, the doctrine of police powers.\n\nIt is impossible to read the last mentioned doctrine into article 21.\n\nIt has also been suggested as a compromise tha this Court should adopt a middlecourse between the flexible principles of natural justice as adopted by the American doctrine of due process of law and the unbending rigidity of mere Statemade laws.\n\nIt is said that we have our Code of Criminal Procedure which embodies within its provisions certain salutary principles of procedure and we must insist that those underlying principles should be regarded as procedure established or settled by our positive law. But who will\n\nay what are those fundame11tal principles?\n\nWhat principles do I reject as inessential and what shall I adopt as fundamental?\n\nWhat is fundamental to me today may not appear to be so to another Judge a. decade hence, for principles give way with changing social conditions. In America it was suggested that due process of law should be taken to mean the general body of common law as it stood at the date of the Constitution. In Bardwell \"' Collins ( 1) it was negatived in the following words :\n\n\" 'Due process of law' does not mean the general body of the law, common and statute, as it was at the time the Constitution took effect; for that would deny the legislature power to change or amend the law in any particular.\"\n\nThe Court, however, brought in principles of\n\n(1) 44 Minn, 97.\n\nA.K. Gopalan v.\n\nT//4 State\n\nDas].\n\nA.K. Gopa/4n\n\nTl~ State\n\nDas J.\n\nnatural justice under the due process clause.\n\nTo sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code of Criminal Procedure will be to make them immutable and to prevent the legislature even to improve upon them. This is nothing but imposing on the legislature a limitation which the Constitution has not placed on it. I do not think it is a Jlermissible adventure for the Court to undertake.\n\nIt is a dangerous adventure, for it will bring about stagnation which means ruin. We must accept the Constitution which is the supreme law. The Constitution h\" by article 21 required a procedure and has prescribed certain minimum requirements of procedure in article\n\n22. To add to them is not to interpret the Constitution but to recast it according to our intellectual yanlstick and our unconscious predilections as to what an ideal Constitution should be.\n\nArticle 21, in my ju<]gment, only formulates a substantive fundamental right to life and personal liberty which in its content is not an absolute right but 1s a limited right having its ambit circumscribed by the risk of its being taken away by following a procedure established bv law made by the appropriate legislative authoritv and the proximate purpose of article 21 is not to prescribe any particular procedure.\n\nIt is to be kept in mind that at the date when the Constitution came into effect we had the Indian Penal Code creating diverse offences and a conviction for any of them would deprive a person of his personal liberty.\n\nUnder article 246 read with Entry I of the Concurrent List, Parliament or any State Legislature could add more offences and create further means for taking away personal liberty.\n\nBut all this deprivation of personal liberty as a result of a conviction could only be done by following the procedure laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nAgain, at the date of this Constitmion there were preventive detention laws in almost every province and a person could be deprived of his personal liberty under those laws. Those laws, however, provided a procedure of a sort which had to be followed.\n\nTherefore, before the Constitution came into force, personal liberty could be taken away\n\nonly by following the procedure enacted by the Criminal Procedure Code in the case of punitive detention or by the proce<lure enacted by the different Security Acts in case of preventive detention.\n\nPower, however, has been given to Parliament and the State Legislatures under article 246 read with Entry 2 of the Concurrent List to make 1aws with respect to Criminal Procedure.\n\nIf that article stood by itself the Parliament or the State Legislature could repeal the whole of the Criminal Procedure Code and also do away even with the skeleton procedure provided in the Security Acts.\n\nIf article 246 stood by itself then the appropriate legislative authority could have taken away the life and personal liberty of any person without any procedure at all.\n\nThis absolute supremacy of the legislative authority has, however, been cut down by article 21 which delimits the ambit and scope of the substantive right to life and personal liberty hy reference to a procedure and by article 22 which prescribes the minimum procedure which must be followed.\n\nIn this situation the only power of the Court is to determine whether the impugned law has provided some procedure and observed and obeyed the minimum requirements of article 22 and if it has, then it is not for the Court to insist on more elaborate procedure according to its notion or to question the wisdom of the legislative authority in enacting the particular law. however harsh, unreasonable, archaic or odious the provisions of that law may be.\n\nIt is said that if this strictly technical interpretation is put upon article 21 then it will not constitute a fundamental right at all and need not have been placed in the chapter on Fundamental Rights, for every person's life and personal liberty will be at the mercy of the Legislature which, by providing some sort of a procedure and complying with the few requirements of article 22, may, at any time, deprive a person of his life and liberty at its pleasure and whim.\n\nThere are several answers to this line of argument.\n\nArticle 21 as construed by me will, if nothing else, certainly protect every person against the executive and as such will be as niuch a fundamental right deserving\n\nA. K. Gopalon\n\nThe Stat•\n\nDas J.\n\nA.K. Copa/an v.\n\nT!it State\n\nDas].\n\na place in the Constitution as the famous 39th Chapter of the Magna Charta was and is a bulwark of liberty in English law.\n\nIt appears to me that article 21 of our Constitution read with article 32 also gives us some protection even agoinst the legislative authority in that a person may only be deprived of his life and personal liberty in accordance with procedure which, although enocted by it, must at least conform to the requirements of article 22.\n\nSubject to this limitation our Parliament or any State Legislature may enact any law and provide any procedure it plea>es for depriving a person of his life and personal liberty under article 21.\n\nSuch being the meaning of that article and the ambit and extent of the fundamental nght of life and personal liberty which the people of this country have given nnto themselves, any law for depriving any person of his life and personal liberty that may be made bv the appropriate legislative authority under article 246 ond in conformity with 1 he requirements of article 22 does not take awav or abridge any right conferred by article 21, for the very right con fcrred by that article is circumscribed by this possibility or risk and, therefore, such law cannot be regarded as violating the provisions of article 13(2); Our Constitution ts a compromise between Parliamentary supremacy of England and the supremacy of the Supreme Court of the United States.\n\nSubject to the limitations I have mentioned which are certainly ju>ticiable, our Constitution has accepted the supremacy of the legislative authority and, that being so, we must be prepared to face occasional vagaries of that body and to put up with enactments of the nature of the atrocious English statute to which learned counsel for the petitioner has repeatedly referred, namely, that the Bishop of Rochester's cook be boiled to death.\n\nIf Parliament may take away life by providing for hanging by the neck, logically there can be no objection if it provides a sentence of death by shooting by a firing squad or by guilloting or in t:1e electric chair or even by boiling in oil.\n\nA procedure laid down by the legislature may offend against the Court's sense of justice and fair pby\n\nand a sentence provided by the legislature may outrage the Court's notions of penology, but that is a wholly irrelevant consideration.\n\nThe Court may construe and interpret the Constitution and ascertain its true meaning but once that h done the Court cannot question its wisdom or policy.\n\nThe Constitution is supreme.\n\nThe Court must take the Constitution as it finds it, even if it does not accord with its preconceived notions of what an ideal Constitution should be.\n\nOur protection against legislative tyranny, if any, lies in ultimate analysis in a free and intelligent public opinion which must eventually asert itself.\n\nThe conclusion I have arrived at does not introduce any no\\'clty, for in many other Constitutions the supremacy of the legishture is recognised in the matter of depriving a person of his life, liberty and property.\n\nThe English Democratic Constitution is one in point.\n\nTake the Constitution of the Irish Free State. Article 40 (4) (i) provides that no citizen shall be ,\\t:prived of personal liberty save in accordance with law, :m<l article 50 (5) guarantees that the dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.\n\nThe words \"in accordance with law· in both the above clauses must mean the same thiag and I have no doubt in my mind reading clause (5) that it means in accordance with the State-made law, for we have not been referred to any rule prescribed by natural justice regulating searches of, or entry into, dwelling houses.\n\nArticle 107 (2) of the Czechoslovakian Constitution uses the words \"in accordance with law\" which, read with clause (I) of that article, obviously means the law to br. made which will form part of the Constitution.\n\nTake the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig.\n\nArticle 74 of that Constitution which is in Part II headed \"Fundamental Rights and Duties\" provides as follows:\n\n\"The liberty or the person shall be inviolable.\n\nNo limitation or deprivation of personal liberty may be imposed by public authority, except by virtue c•f a la\\\\:\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe State\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopahm\n\nv, The State\n\nDas].\n\nSUJ?REME COURT REPORTS !1950]\n\nThe word \"law\" clearly cannot, in the context, mean principles of natural justice.\n\nAgain, article 75 of that Constitution protects the freedom of movement within the Free City and the right to stay and to settle at any place, to acquire real property and to earn a living.\n\nIt concludes by saying that this right shall not be curtailed without legal sanctions.\n\nLegal sanction1, in this context, can onlv mean sanctions of the City laws.\n\nArticle 114 of the Weimar Constitution is on the same lines and expressed in almost the same language as article 74 of the Danzig Constitution.\n\nTake the Japanese Constitution of 1946 from which our article 21 is reputed to have been taken. Article XXXI of that Constitution says:\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of life or liberty nor shall any other criminal penalty he imposed, except according to procedure established by law.\"\n\nSurely the words \"except according to procedure established by law\" in their application to the imposition of criminal penalty must mean State-made law and the same words in the same sentence in the same article cannot, acconling to ordinarv rules of construction of statutes, mean a different thing in their application to deprivation of life or liberty. 1 am aware that it is not right to construe one Constitution in the light of another and that is not my purpose when I refer to the other Constitutions; but I do think that after reading the relevant proYisions of other written Constitutions one sees auite clearly that there is no pressing special reason applicable to or inherent in written Constitutions which requires the importation of the principles of natural justice or of the American doctrine of due process of law into our Constitution. The several Constitutions referred to above have not adopted that American doctrine but have been content with leaving the life and liberty of their citizens to the care of the laws made by their legislatures.\n\nIt is no novelty if our Constitution has done the same.\n\nFor all these reasons, in spite of the very able and attractive arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner which I freely acknowledge, I am not cominced that there is any scope for the introduction into article 21 of our\n\nConstitution of the doctrine of due process of iaw even as regards procedure.\n\nI may or may not like it but that is the result of our Constitution as I understand it.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has referred to certam debates in the Constituent Assembly on the original clause which has now become article 21, not as evidence to be used in interpreting the languagt of article 21 but as disclosing the historical background.\n\nHis purpose, he says, is to show that the framers of our Constitution had . the essential difference in the meaning of the phrases \"due process of law\" and\n\n\"acrding to procedure' established by law\" clearly expfained to them, that they knew th.tt the former implied the supremacy of the judiciary and the latter the supremacy of . the legislature and with all that knowledge they deliberately agreed to reject the former expression and adopt the latter.\n\nAs, in my opinion, it is possible to interpret the language of article 21 on the ordinary rules of interpretation of statutes, I do not think it is at all necessary to refer to the debates.\n\nAs I do not propose to refer to, or rely on, . the debates, for the purposes of this 'case, I express no opinion on the question of the admissibility or otherwise of the debates.\n\nI now pass on to article 22. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that article 21 by reason of the last few words, \"according to procedure established by law\" attracts the four requirements of the American procedural due process of law as summarised by Willis to which reference has been made earlier, and that, those requirements, except to the extent they have been expressly abrogated or modified by article 22, must be strictly followed before a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberties.\n\nI have already stated for reasons set forth above, that there is no scope -for introducing any rule of natural justice or the American procedural due process of law or any underlying principle of our Code of Criminal Procedure into that article.\n\nThis being the conclusion I have arrived at, the . major premise assumed by learned counsel for the petitioner is missing and this 16-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopolan\n\nV, Tli4Stak\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopala•\n\nThe Statt\n\nDas].\n\nline of argument does not begin and cannot be accepted.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, on the other hand, has at one stage of his argument, urged that article 21 has nothing to do with preventive detention at all and that preventive detention is wholly covered by article 22(4) to (7) whjch by themselves constitute a complete code. I am unable to accede to this extreme point of view also.\n\nThe true position, as I apprehend it, lies between the two extreme views.\n\nArticle 21, to my mind, gives protection to lite and personal liberty to the extent therein mentioned.\n\nIt does not recognise the right to life and personal liberty as an absolute right but delimits the ambit and scope of the right itself.\n\nThe absolute right is by the defintion in that article cut down by the risk of its being taken away in accordance with procedure established by law.\n\nIt is this circumscribed right which is . substantively protected by article 21 as against the executive as well as the legislature, for the Constitution has conditioned its deprivation by the necessity for a procedure established by law made by itself.\n\nWhile subclauses (2) to (6) of article 19 have put a limit on the fundamental rights of a citizen, articles 21 and 22 have put a limit on the power of the State given under article 246 read with the legislative lists.\n\nUnder our Constitution our life and personal liberty are balanced by restrictions on the rights of the citizens as laid down in article 19 and by the checks put upon the State by articles 21 and 22.\n\nPreventive detention deprives a person of his personal liberty as effectively as does punitive detention and, therefore, personal liberty, circumscribed as it is by the risk of its being taken away, requires protection against punitive as well as preventive detention.\n\nThe language of article 21 is quite general and is wide enough to give its limited protection to personal liberty against all forms of detention.\n\nIt protects a person against preventive lletention by the executive without the sanction of a law made by the legislature.\n\nIt prevents the legislature from taking away a person's personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law, although such\n\nlaw is to be by itself.\n\nIf. as contended by the learned Attorney-General and held by me, article 19 only protects the rights of a free citizen as long as he is free and does not deal with total deprivation of personal liberty and if, as contended by the learned Attorney-General, article 21 does not protect a person against preventive detentjon then where is the protection for life and personal liberty as substantive rights which the procedural provisions of article.22 may protect?\n\nWhat is the use of procedural protection if there is no substantive right?\n\nIn my judgment article 21 protects the substantive rights by requiring a procedure and article 22 gives the minimum procedural protection.\n\nClauses (1) and (2) of article 22 lay down the procedure that has to be followed when a man is arrested.\n\nThey ensure four things: (a) right to be informed regarding grounds of arrest, (b) right to_ consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice, (c) right to be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours and ( d) freedom from detention beyond the said period except by order of the magistrate.\n\nThese, four procedural requirements are very much\n\nsimilar to the requirements of the procedural due process of law as enumerated by Willis.\n\nSome of these salutary protections are also to be found in our Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIf the procedure has already been prescribed by article 21 incorporating the principles of natural justice, or the principles underlying our Code of Criminal Procedure what was the necessity of repeating them in clauses (1) and (2) of article 22?\n\nWhy this unnecessary overlapping? The truth is that article 21 does not prescribe any particular procedure but in defining the protection to life and personal liberty merely envisages or indicates the necesity for a procedure and article 22 lays down the minimum rules of procedure that even Parliament cannot abrogate or overlook. This is so far as punitive detention is concerned.\n\nBut clause (3) of article 22 expressly provides that none of the procedure laid down in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply to an alien enemy or to a person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.\n\nIt is , thus expressly\n\n.d.K.~\n\n\"· The State\n\nDos],\n\n..!. /[. C.palan\n\nTt.. St\"\"\n\nDas].\n\nmade clear that a detenu need not be produced before the magistrate and he is not to have the assistance of any lawyer for consultation or for defending him. Such being the express provision of our Constitution nobody can question its wisdom. So I pass on.\n\nClauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of article22 in terms relate to preventive detention.\n\nArticle 246 authorises the appropriate legislature to make a law for preventive detention in terms of Entry 9 il'I List I and/or Entry 3 in List III of the Seventh Schedule. On this legislative power are imposed certain limitations by article 22 ( 4) to (7).\n\nAccording to this the legislature, whether it be Parliament or a State Legislature, is reminded that no law made by it for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months except in two cases mentioned in sub-clauses (a) and (b).\n\nThe proviso to suD-clause (a) and sub-clause (b) refer to a law made only by Parliament under clause (7).\n\nUnder clause (7) it is Parliament alone and not any State Legislature that may prescribe what are specified in the three suDclauses of that clause. Although a State Legisiarure may make a law for preventive detention in terms of Entry 3. in List III of the Seventh Schedule no such law may authorise detention for more than three months unless the provisions ot rnb-clauses (a} and (b) of clause\n\n(4) sanction such detention. Even a law made by Parliament cannot authorise detention for more than three months unless it is a law made under the provisions of clause (7).\n\nIn short, clause (4) of article 22 provides a limitation on the legislative power as to the period of . preventive detention.\n\nApart from imposing a limitation on the legislative power, clause ( 4) also prescribes a procedure of detention for a period longer than three months by providing for an advisory board. Then comes clause (5). It lays down the procedure that has to be followed when a person is detained under any law providing for preventive detention, namely, (a) the grounds of the order of detention must be communicated to the cletenu as soon as may be, and (b) the detenu must he afforded the\n\nearlist opportunity of making a representation against\n\nthe order. The first requirement takes the place of notice and the second that of a defence or hearing These are the only compulsory procedural requirements laid down by our Constitution.\n\nThere is nothing to prevent the Legislature from providip.g an . elabordte procedure regulating preventive detention but it is not obliged to do so.\n\nIf some procedure is provided as envisaged by article 21 and the compulsory requirements of article 22 are obeyed and carried out nobody can, under our Constitution as I read it, complain of the law providing for preventive detention.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner concedes that the four requirements of procedural due process summariied by Willis will have to be modified in their application to preventive detention. Thus he does not insist on a prior notice before arrest, for he recognises that such a requirement may frustrate the very object of preventive detention by giving an opportunity to the person in question to go underground.\n\nThe provision in clause (5) for supplying grounds is a good substitute for notice.\n\nHe also does not insist that the Tribunal to judge the reasonableness of the detention should be a judicial tribunal.\n\nHe will be satisfied if the tribunal or advisory board, as it is called in article 22 of the Constitution, is an impartial body and goes into the merits of the order of the detention and its decision is binding on the executive government. He insists that the detenu must have a reasonable and effective opportunity to put up his defence.\n\nHe does not insist on the assistance of counsel, for that is expressly taken away, by the Constitution itself.\n\nBut he insists on what he calls an effective opportunity of being heard in person before an impartial tribunal which will be free to examine the grounds . of his detention and whose decision should be binding alike on the detenu and the executive authority which detains. The claim may be reasonable but the question before the Court is not reasonableness or otherwise of the provisions of article 22 (4) to (7). Those provisions are not justiciable, for they are the provisions of the Constitution itself, which is supreme over every body\n\nA~ K. Gopalan\n\nTM State\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopaltu1\n\nTiii Stau\n\nDas].\n\nThe Court can only seek to find out, on a proper construction, what protection has in fact been provided.\n\nThe Constitution has provided for the giving of the grounds of detention although facts as distinguished from grounds may be withheld under clause ( 6) and the right of representation against the order of detention. It has_ provided for the duration of the detention.\n\nThere the guaranteed fundamental procedural rights end.\n\nThere is no provision for any trial betore any tribunal.\n\nOne cannot import the condition ot a trial by any tribunal from the fact that a right ot representation has been given.\n\nThe right to make representation is nothing more than the right to \"lodge objections\" as provided by the Danzing Constitution and the Weimar Constitution. The representatious made will no doubt be considered by the Government.\n\nIt is said a prosecutor cannot be himself the judge.\n\nOrdinarily, the orders of detention will in a great majority of cases be made by the District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Officer or the Commissioner of Police.\n\nThe representation of the detenu goes to the Government. Why should it be assumed that a high government official at the seat of the government will not impartially consider the representation and judge the propriety of the order of detention made by local officials? Clause (5) does not imperatively provide for any oral representation which a hearing will entail.\n\nIndeed the exclusion of the provisions of clauses ( 1) and (2) negatives any idea of trial or oral defence. The Court may not, by temperament and training, like this at all but it cannot question the wisdom or the policy of the Constitution. In my judgment as regards preventive detention laws, the only limitation put upon the legislative power is that it must provide some procedure and at least incorporate the minimum requirements laid \"down in article 22 ( 4) to (7).\n\nThere is no limitation as regards the substantive law.\n\nTherefore a preventive detention law which provides some procedure and complies with the requirements of article 22 ( 4) to (7) must be held to be a good law, however odiou.• it may appear to the Court to be.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned Act does not comply with even the bare requirements of article 22 (4) to (7). It is pointed out that section 3 of the Act does not lay down any objective test but leaves it to the authority to define and say whether a particular person comes within the legislative heads.\n\nIn other words, it is contended that Parliament has not legislated at all but has delegated its legislative powers to the executive authorities.\n\nI do not think there is any substance in this contention.\n\nIn the first place this is not an objection as to procedure but to substantive law which is not open to the Court's scrutiny.\n\nIn the next place this contention overlooks the basic distinction between the delegation of power to make the law and the conferring of an authority and discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The impugned Act has specifically set forth an ascertainable standard by which the conduct of a particular person is to be judged by the detaining authority.\n\nIt is next urged that section 12 of the Act does not comply with the requirements of clause (7) of article 22 for two reasons, namely-\n\n(i) that clause (7) contemplates a law prescribing the circumstances up.der which, and the class or class's of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months and then another law thereafter providing for preventive detention for a period longer than three months; and\n\n(ii) that under clause (7) Parliament must prescribe both the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months.\n\nAs regards the first point I do not see why Parliament must make two laws, one laying down the principles for longer detention and another far detention for such longer period. It may be that a State cannot provide for longer detention until Parliament\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Strite\n\nDas].\n\nA. K. Gopo/an\n\nT J., State\n\nDas].\n\nhas made the law, but I can see no reason why Parliament cannot do both by the same Act. In fact, clause (4)\n\n(b) contemplates the detention itself to be in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).\n\nTherefore, the detention can well be under the very law which the Parliament makes under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).\n\nAs to the second point the argument is that Parliament has a discretion under clause\n\n(7) to make a law and it is not obliged to make any law but when our Parliament chooses to make a .Jaw it must prescribe both the circumstances under which, . and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months. I am unable to construe clause (7) (a) in the way suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner.\n\nIt is an enabling provision empowering Parliament to prescribe two things.\n\nParliament may prescribe either or both.\n\nIf a father tells his delicate child that he may play table tennis and badminton but not the strenuous game of football, it obviously does not mean that the chi!, J, if he chooses to play ac all, must play both table tennis and badminton. It is an option given to the child. Likewise, the Constitution gives to Parliament the power of prescribing two things. Parliament is not obliged to prescribe at all but if it chooses to prescribe it may prescribe either or both. Clause 7 (a), in my opinion, has to be read distributively as follow : The Parliament may prescribe the circumstance under which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months and Parliament may prescribe the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months. That appears to ine to be consonant with sound rules of construction. Further, the circumstances and the class or classes of cases may conceivably coalesce. Indeed the Full Bench case No. 1 of 1950 before the Calcutta High Court (Kshitindra Narayan v. The Chief Secretary) itself indicates that the same provision may be read as circumstasces or as a classification. In that case learned counsel conceded that section 12 had prescribed the circumstances but his complaint was that it had not\n\nprescribed the class or classes of cases. The majoritv of the Court repelled this contention. One learned Judge, however, held that section 12 had prescribed the class or classes of cases but had not prescribed the circumstances. It is, therefore, clear that the classification itself may indicate the circumstances.\n\nAgain, the classification may be on a variety of bases.\n\nIt may be according to provinces the detenus come from.\n\nIt may be according to the age of the detenus.\n\nIt may be according to the object they are supposed to have in view or according to the activities they are suspected to be engaged in.\n\nIn this case Parliament has taken five out of the six legislative heads and divided them into two categories. 'flie detenus are thus classified according to their suspected object or activities endangering the several matters specified in the section.\n\nI do not see why Classification cannot be made on the footing of the objectives of the detenus falling in some of the legislative heads, for each legislative head has a specific connotation well undertood in law.\n\nIf I am correct that there has been a classification then the fact that a person falls within ove or the other class may well be the circumstances under which he may be detained for a period longer than three months.\n\nI do not consider it right, as a matter of construction, to read any further limitation in clause 7(a) of article 22~ In my judgment Parliament was not obliged under clause (7) to prescribe both circumstances and classes, and in any case has in fact and substance prescribed both.\n\nI am conscious that a law made by Parliament under article 22\n\n(7) will do away with the salutary safeguard of the opinion of an advisory board. But it must be remembered that our Constitution itself contemplates that in certain circumstances or for certain class or classes of detenus even the advisory board may not be safe and it has trusted Parliament\n\nto make a law for that purpose. Our preference for an advisory board should not blind us to this aspect of the matter. It is true that circumstances ordinarily relate to extraneous things, like riots, commotion,\n\n19j0\n\nA. K. Gopa/an v.\n\nThe Stat\n\nDas].\n\nA. Ii. Gopalan ·\n\nv The State\n\nDaJ],\n\npolitical or communal or some sort of abnormal situa.tion and it is said that the framers of the Constitution had in mind some such situation when the advisory board might be done away with. It is also urged that they had in mind that the more dangerous types of detenus should be denied the privilege of the advisory board.\n\nI am free to confess that prescription of specific circumstances or a more rigid and definite specification of classes would have been better and more desirable. But that is crying for the ideal.\n\nThe Constitution has not in terms put any soch limitation as regards the circumstances or the class or classes of cases and it i~ idle to speculate as to the intention of the Constitution-makers, who, by the way, are the very persons who made this law. It is not for the Court to improve upon o~ add to the Constitution.\n\nIf the law duly made by Parliament is repugnant to good sense, public opinion will compel Parliament to alter it suitably.\n\nFinally, an objection is taken that section 14 of the impugned Act takes away or abridges the right of the detenu to move this Court by appropria_te proceedings.\n\nBoth clauses ( l) and (2) of article 32 speak of enforcement of rights conferred by Part III. The right to move this Court is given to a person not for the sake of moving only but for moving the Court for the enforcement of some rights conferred by Part III and this Court has been given power to issue directions or orders or writs for the enforc.ement of any of such rights. In order, therefore, to attract the application of article 32, the person applying must first satisfy that he has got a right under Part III which has to be enforced under article 32.\n\nI have alreadv said that article 19 does not deal with the freedom of the person.\n\nI have also said that articles 21 and 22 provide for protection by insisting on some procedure. Under article 22 (5) the authority making the order of detention is enjoined, as soon as may he, to communicate t.o the detenu the grounds on which that order has been made.\n\nThis provision has some purpose, namely, that the disclosure of the grounds will afford the detenu the\n\n-Opportunity of making a representation against the\n\n-0rer. Supposing the authority does not give any grounds at all as distinct from facts referred to in clause (6). Surely the detenu loses a fundamental right because he is prevented from making a representation against the order of detention.\n\nSuppose the authority hands over to the detenu a piece of paper with some scribblings on it which do not amount to :my ground at all for detention.\n\nThen also the detenu ca11 legitimately complain that his right has been infringed.\n\nHe can then come to the Court to get redress under article 32, but he cannot show to the Crrnrt the piece of paper with the scribblings on it under ection 14 of the Act and the Court cannot judge whether he has actually got the grounds which he is entitled to under article 22 (5). In such a case the <letenu may well complain that both his substantive right under article 22 (5) as well as his right to constitutional remedies under article 32 have been infringed.\n\nHe can complain of infringement of his remedial rights under article 32, because he cannot show that there has been an infringement of his substantive right under article 22 (5). It appears to me, therefore, that section 14 of the Act in so far as it prevents the detenu from disclosing to the Court the grounds communicated to him is not in conformity wit,11 Part III of the Constitution am! is, therefore, void under article 13(2).\n\nThat section, however, is dearly severable an(! cannot affect the whole Act.\n\nOn this que§tion the views of Meredith C. J. 'and Das J. of Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 124 of 1950 (Lalit Kumar Barman v.\n\nTlze State) and the majority of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Full Bench Case No. 1 of 1950 (Kslzitindra Narayan\n\nv. Tlze Chief Secretary) appear to be correct and sound.\n\nFor the reasons I have given above, in my opinion, the impugned Act is a valid law except as to section 14 in so far as it prevents the grounds being disclosed to the Court.\n\nThe petitioner before us does not complain that he has not got proper grounds.\n\nFurther, the period of his detention under the impugned Act\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe State , __\n\nDn>'].\n\n..!. Jr. Gopala•\n\n'f . .\n\nTl.e Stoll\n\nDOI].\n\nhas not gone beyond three months and, in the circumstances, this application should, irl my opinion, stand dismissed.\n\nPetition di, missed.\n\nAgent for the Petitioner : S. Subrahmanyam.\n\nAgent for the State of Madras and Union of India : P.A. Mehta.", "total_entities": 1504, "entities": [{"text": "A.K.GOPALAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANIA\n\nC.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANIA\n\nC.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "l'ATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 201, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 231, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 235, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 7, 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274, "end_char": 286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 300, "end_char": 321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 19 to 22, 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 534, "end_char": 541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 707, "end_char": 714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 19, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIA C. )", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1722, "end_char": 1732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and was consequently ultra vires and that his detention was therefore illegal:\n\nHeld, per KANIA C. ).,", "canonical_name": "KANIA\n\nC.J."}}, {"text": "PATA1'JAL1 SAsTIU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1735, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATA1'JAL1 SAsTIU, Mu1<HERJEA and DAs JJ. (", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Mu1<HERJEA and", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1754, "end_char": 1768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATA1'JAL1 SAsTIU, Mu1<HERJEA and DAs JJ. ("}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1778, "end_char": 1785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ.", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1790, "end_char": 1797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ."}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1823, "end_char": 1853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1877, "end_char": 1884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2037, "end_char": 2047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2419, "end_char": 2429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ.-Scction 12 of the Act was also ultra, vires, and since it contravened the very provision in the\n\nConstitution under which the Parliament derived its competence 19j0 to enact the law, the detention was illegal."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2529, "end_char": 2534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., FAZL Au, l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.)-Section 14 of the v.\n\nPreventive Detention Act, 1950, contravenes the provisions of The Stall\n\nArt~ 22 ( 5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits a person detained trom disclosing to the Court the grounds on which a detention order has been made or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and is to that extent ultra vires and void.", "canonical_name": "KANIA\n\nC.J."}}, {"text": "l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., FAZL Au, l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.)-Section 14 of the v.\n\nPreventive Detention Act, 1950, contravenes the provisions of The Stall\n\nArt~ 22 ( 5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits a person detained trom disclosing to the Court the grounds on which a detention order has been made or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and is to that extent ultra vires and void.", "canonical_name": "l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2592, "end_char": 2601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., FAZL Au, l'ATANJALI A.K. Gopalan SAsTRI, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.)-Section 14 of the v.\n\nPreventive Detention Act, 1950, contravenes the provisions of The Stall\n\nArt~ 22 ( 5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits a person detained trom disclosing to the Court the grounds on which a detention order has been made or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and is to that extent ultra vires and void.", "canonical_name": "M UKHER JEA"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2615, "end_char": 2625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2637, "end_char": 2667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per KANIA C. 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(", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3337, "end_char": 3344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3552, "end_char": 3562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4178, "end_char": 4185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4235, "end_char": 4242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4285, "end_char": 4292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4412, "end_char": 4419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "F AZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4436, "end_char": 4444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F AZL Au J .-Preventive detention is a direct infringement of the right guaranteed in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsrn1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4752, "end_char": 4768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per KANIA C. 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(", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4793, "end_char": 4800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J. dissenting).-The concept of the right \"to move freely throughout the territory of India\" referred to in Art.", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J. dissenting).-The concept of the right \"to move freely throughout the territory of India\" referred to in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5035, "end_char": 5042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5147, "end_char": 5154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5190, "end_char": 5197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5246, "end_char": 5256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5390, "end_char": 5397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTa1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6464, "end_char": 6480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTa1 and DAs JJ. (", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6665, "end_char": 6672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6803, "end_char": 6810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6812, "end_char": 6819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7020, "end_char": 7027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7179, "end_char": 7186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M UKHER JEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7310, "end_char": 7321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M UKHER JEA J .- Even assuming that Art.", "canonical_name": "M UKHER JEA"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7346, "end_char": 7353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7482, "end_char": 7489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7539, "end_char": 7547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL ALI J.-Art.", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7551, "end_char": 7558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7699, "end_char": 7706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAzL Au J. tfusttnting).-in", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7842, "end_char": 7869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J. tfusttnting).-in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7870, "end_char": 7877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8159, "end_char": 8175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 the word \"law\" has been used in the sense of .State-made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general scn5': embodying the principles of natural justice; and \"procedure established by law\" means procedure established by law made by the State, that is to say, the Union Parliament or the Legislatures of the States."}}, {"text": "Supme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8367, "end_char": 8389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not proper to construe this expression in the light of the meaning given to the expression \"due process of law\" in the American Constitution, by the Supme Court of America."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTP.I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8392, "end_char": 8409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTP.I J.-'-\"Law~ .in Art.", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8425, "end_char": 8432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9219, "end_char": 9226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "F.\\zL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9968, "end_char": 9976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per KANIA C. J., F.\\zL Au, PATANJAU SAsTRI,\n\nMAHAJAN and DAS JJ.-Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, does not delegate any legislative power to an executive officer but merely confers on such officer a discretion to enforce the law made by the legislature, and is not therefore invalid on this ground."}}, {"text": "PATANJAU SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 9993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per KANIA C. J., F.\\zL Au, PATANJAU SAsTRI,\n\nMAHAJAN and DAS JJ.-Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, does not delegate any legislative power to an executive officer but merely confers on such officer a discretion to enforce the law made by the legislature, and is not therefore invalid on this ground.", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10008, "end_char": 10011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per KANIA C. 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(", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12225, "end_char": 12232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12259, "end_char": 12269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12671, "end_char": 12678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALl SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13169, "end_char": 13185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALl SAsTR1 J~In construing the provisions of an Act, speeches made in the course of the debates on the bill should not be taken into consideration.", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13587, "end_char": 13594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras jail in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "relevant provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13903, "end_char": 13960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "This Act may be called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14019, "end_char": 14076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14484, "end_char": 14493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This Act may be called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "This Act may be called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Governmel!t", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14557, "end_char": 14576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(a) \".State Government\" means, in relation to a Part C State, the CKief Commissioner of the State ; and\n\n(b) '1detention order'' means an order made under Section 3 .. 3 .. 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Gopal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38892, "end_char": 38903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while article 21 prescribed that no person can be deprived of hrs life and personal liberty except by procedure\n\nA .K. Gopal an\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\n19 0\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\nKania C.J.\n\nestablished by law.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "State\n\nKania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38912, "end_char": 38924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while article 21 prescribed that no person can be deprived of hrs life and personal liberty except by procedure\n\nA .K. Gopal an\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\n19 0\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\nKania C.J.\n\nestablished by law.", "canonical_name": "State\n\nKania"}}, {"text": "A.K. Gopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38937, "end_char": 38949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while article 21 prescribed that no person can be deprived of hrs life and personal liberty except by procedure\n\nA .K. Gopal an\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\n19 0\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stale\n\nKania C.J.\n\nestablished by law.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39127, "end_char": 39137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39181, "end_char": 39191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41941, "end_char": 41951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42201, "end_char": 42211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42406, "end_char": 42416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42666, "end_char": 42676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43051, "end_char": 43061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43109, "end_char": 43127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43339, "end_char": 43349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".A.K. Gopola", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43447, "end_char": 43459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already mentioned in respect of each of the rights specified in sub-clauses of article 19 ( 1) specific limitations in respect of each is provided, while the expression \"personal\n\n19:;0\n\n.A.K. Gopola\n\nTiii Stau\n\nKania C.j.", "canonical_name": ".A. K. Gopaloa"}}, {"text": "Stau\n\nKania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43466, "end_char": 43477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already mentioned in respect of each of the rights specified in sub-clauses of article 19 ( 1) specific limitations in respect of each is provided, while the expression \"personal\n\n19:;0\n\n.A.K. Gopola\n\nTiii Stau\n\nKania C.j.", "canonical_name": "State\n\nKania"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43541, "end_char": 43551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43655, "end_char": 43665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44248, "end_char": 44258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44426, "end_char": 44436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44736, "end_char": 44746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44950, "end_char": 44960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44962, "end_char": 44972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45025, "end_char": 45036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45346, "end_char": 45356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45363, "end_char": 45373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45609, "end_char": 45619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45856, "end_char": 45866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46232, "end_char": 46242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46279, "end_char": 46289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46291, "end_char": 46301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46373, "end_char": 46383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46571, "end_char": 46581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46812, "end_char": 46822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46849, "end_char": 46859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46908, "end_char": 46918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47735, "end_char": 47748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended for the petitioner that the Indian Constitution gives the same protection to every person in India, except that in the United States \"due process of law\" has been construed by its Supreme Court to cover both\n\ni.5(1\n\n, f K. Gop."}}, {"text": "K. Gop", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47836, "end_char": 47842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended for the petitioner that the Indian Constitution gives the same protection to every person in India, except that in the United States \"due process of law\" has been construed by its Supreme Court to cover both\n\ni.5(1\n\n, f K. Gop.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "A..K. Gopalt111", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47873, "end_char": 47888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA..K. Gopalt111\n\nT1\" Siok\n\nKania C.J.\n\nsubstantive and procedural law, while in.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Siok\n\nKania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47894, "end_char": 47905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA..K. Gopalt111\n\nT1\" Siok\n\nKania C.J.\n\nsubstantive and procedural law, while in."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48123, "end_char": 48133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the United States", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49771, "end_char": 49802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the American Constitution its general structure is noticed in the5e words in \"The Government of the United States\" by Munro (5th Edition) at page 53 : \"The architects of 1787 built only the basement."}}, {"text": "Munro", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49807, "end_char": 49812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the American Constitution its general structure is noticed in the5e words in \"The Government of the United States\" by Munro (5th Edition) at page 53 : \"The architects of 1787 built only the basement."}}, {"text": "James Russell Lowell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50113, "end_char": 50133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Or, to change the metaphor, it has a fabric which, to use the words of\n\nJames Russell Lowell, is still being 'woven on the roaring loom of time'."}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50474, "end_char": 50480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same aspect is emphasized in Professor Willis's book on Constitutional Law and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations."}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50514, "end_char": 50520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same aspect is emphasized in Professor Willis's book on Constitutional Law and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.", "canonical_name": "Cooley"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50992, "end_char": 51003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51168, "end_char": 51178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51188, "end_char": 51209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51527, "end_char": 51537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51719, "end_char": 51729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51832, "end_char": 51856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole argument of the petitioner is founded on the meaning of the word \"law\" given to it by the Supreme Court of America."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the U.S.A.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51943, "end_char": 51970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems unnecessary to embark on a discussion of the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. and how they\n\name to enlarge or abridge the meaning of law in the expression \"due process of law\" Without going into details, I think there is no justification to adopt the meaning of the word \"law\" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. m the expression \"due\n\n19:o\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Slau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA.K. Goftalan\n\n•• Till SIOll\n\nKania C.j."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of U.S.A.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52192, "end_char": 52215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems unnecessary to embark on a discussion of the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. and how they\n\name to enlarge or abridge the meaning of law in the expression \"due process of law\" Without going into details, I think there is no justification to adopt the meaning of the word \"law\" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. m the expression \"due\n\n19:o\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Slau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA.K. Goftalan\n\n•• Till SIOll\n\nKania C.j."}}, {"text": "A.K. Goftalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52281, "end_char": 52294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems unnecessary to embark on a discussion of the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. and how they\n\name to enlarge or abridge the meaning of law in the expression \"due process of law\" Without going into details, I think there is no justification to adopt the meaning of the word \"law\" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. m the expression \"due\n\n19:o\n\nA.K. Gopalan\n\nThe Slau\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA.K. Goftalan\n\n•• Till SIOll\n\nKania C.j.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52380, "end_char": 52390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55253, "end_char": 55264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55603, "end_char": 55613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56222, "end_char": 56232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1895) L.R. 22 I.A. 107", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 56591, "end_char": 56614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57396, "end_char": 57406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57761, "end_char": 57771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57861, "end_char": 57871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58259, "end_char": 58269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58340, "end_char": 58350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58683, "end_char": 58704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58980, "end_char": 58990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59316, "end_char": 59326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59726, "end_char": 59736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 6 and 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59965, "end_char": 59982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60031, "end_char": 60040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60185, "end_char": 60195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60674, "end_char": 60679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Irish Court\" gave the expression \"due course of law\" the meaning given to it according to the English law and not the American law .. It was observed by Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria ( 2), that in accordance with British --J'w-isprudence no member .of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except when he can support the legality of his act before a Court of justice.", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopa/1J11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61042, "end_char": 61057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopa/1J11\n\nTheStalii\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu State\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nIn The King v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs ( ), Scrutton L. J. observed : \"A man undoubtedly guilty of murder must yet be released if due forms of law have not been followed in his conviction.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61081, "end_char": 61094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopa/1J11\n\nTheStalii\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu State\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nIn The King v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs ( ), Scrutton L. J. observed : \"A man undoubtedly guilty of murder must yet be released if due forms of law have not been followed in his conviction.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Scrutton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61178, "end_char": 61186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopa/1J11\n\nTheStalii\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu State\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nIn The King v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs ( ), Scrutton L. J. observed : \"A man undoubtedly guilty of murder must yet be released if due forms of law have not been followed in his conviction.\""}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61449, "end_char": 61459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61506, "end_char": 61516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61542, "end_char": 61552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61790, "end_char": 61801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61876, "end_char": 61886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61944, "end_char": 61954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62053, "end_char": 62063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62245, "end_char": 62255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65204, "end_char": 65214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopa/an v.\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. IC Gopa!an\n\nTIN Siau\n\nKania C.J.\n\narticle 21 at all and is covered wholly by article 22.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "IC Gopa!an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65248, "end_char": 65258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopa/an v.\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. IC Gopa!an\n\nTIN Siau\n\nKania C.J.\n\narticle 21 at all and is covered wholly by article 22.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "TIN Siau", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65260, "end_char": 65268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopa/an v.\n\nThe State\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67900, "end_char": 67910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68113, "end_char": 68123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68286, "end_char": 68296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68794, "end_char": 68804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69184, 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Liversidge case the representation had to be made to •.he Secretary of State 'and not to another body."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72012, "end_char": 72022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72398, "end_char": 72408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73293, "end_char": 73303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73329, "end_char": 73339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73496, "end_char": 73506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73517, "end_char": 73528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73533, "end_char": 73545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. GoltJlaa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74301, "end_char": 74315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. GoltJlaa\n\nT1\" Stall\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. E. Gop,/an\n\nT/,.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "A. E. Gop,/an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74340, "end_char": 74353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. GoltJlaa\n\nT1\" Stall\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. E. Gop,/an\n\nT/,.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Higgins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74478, "end_char": 74485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Higgins in Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees' Union (1), observed: \"Although we are to interpret words of the Constitution on the same principles of interpretation as we apply to any ordinary law, these very principles of interpretation compel us to take into account the nature and scope of the Act that we are interpreting-to remember that it is a Constitution, a mechanism under which laws are to be made and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be.\""}}, {"text": "Berar Act XIV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75002, "end_char": 75023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maurice Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75034, "end_char": 75047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act XIV of 1938 ( 2), Sir Maurice Gwyer C. 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Halliday (•), a Court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person."}}, {"text": "Kaia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78827, "end_char": 78831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K.~• v. 7/wSll*\n\nKaia C.J.\n\nA. K. 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Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Curits", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83669, "end_char": 83675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary to\n\nepeat the often-quoted rema, ks of Mr. Justice Curits, speaking for the whole Court, in Den Exden ltfurray v.\n\nHoboken Land and Improvement Company ( 1), to show that the requirement of a judicial trial does not prevail in every case.\""}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84765, "end_char": 84781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Haldane L. C. in his speech rejected the contention about the necessity of an oral hearing by observing \"But it does not follow that the procedure of every tribunal must be the same."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 86060, "end_char": 86067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of the fact that in England the Parliament is supreme I am unable to accept the view that the Parliament in making laws, legislates against the well-recognised principles of natural justice accepted as such in all civilized countries."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86512, "end_char": 86522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86844, "end_char": 86854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87075, "end_char": 87085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87212, "end_char": 87222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87346, "end_char": 87356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87451, "end_char": 87461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87602, "end_char": 87612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87683, "end_char": 87689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalaa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87699, "end_char": 87712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopalaa\n\nTu Stall\n\nKlllfia C.].", "canonical_name": "A. K. 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93862, "end_char": 93872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93951, "end_char": 93961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94187, "end_char": 94197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94209, "end_char": 94219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94725, "end_char": 94735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94750, "end_char": 94760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94777, "end_char": 94787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94937, "end_char": 94947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95073, "end_char": 95083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95365, "end_char": 95374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96241, "end_char": 96255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Government, as the case may be, any contents or matter purporting to be contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section (1) :\n\nA. K. Gopalara\n\nTll4 State\n\nKania C.].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96708, "end_char": 96717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97403, "end_char": 97413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97657, "end_char": 97667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97712, "end_char": 97722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98161, "end_char": 98171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98228, "end_char": 98238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98668, "end_char": 98678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98966, "end_char": 98976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99349, "end_char": 99359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99957, "end_char": 99967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100099, "end_char": 100109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100142, "end_char": 100152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100505, "end_char": 100515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100634, "end_char": 100644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopa/11n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100712, "end_char": 100726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does not infringe any\n\n4-3 s. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopa/11n\n\nv. tMState\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nprovJS1orts of Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act, except to the extent of section 14, fails.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "tMState", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 100731, "end_char": 100738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does not infringe any\n\n4-3 s. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopa/11n\n\nv. tMState\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nprovJS1orts of Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act, except to the extent of section 14, fails."}}, {"text": "State\n\nFad Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 100771, "end_char": 100785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does not infringe any\n\n4-3 s. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopa/11n\n\nv. tMState\n\nKania C.J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nprovJS1orts of Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act, except to the extent of section 14, fails."}}, {"text": "Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100805, "end_char": 100902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100928, "end_char": 100938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act", "statute": "Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act"}}, {"text": "question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101011, "end_char": 101092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101672, "end_char": 101691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act which is i!Ilpugned was enacted by the Parliament on the 26th February, 1950, and will cease to have effect on the 1st April, 1951, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101730, "end_char": 101745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act which is i!Ilpugned was enacted by the Parliament on the 26th February, 1950, and will cease to have effect on the 1st April, 1951, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date."}}, {"text": "sections 3, 7, 8, 9, 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101863, "end_char": 101886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101904, "end_char": 101913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102448, "end_char": 102468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103249, "end_char": 103258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103732, "end_char": 103741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103976, "end_char": 103985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104267, "end_char": 104281, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104688, "end_char": 104697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104767, "end_char": 104777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104926, "end_char": 104936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105271, "end_char": 105281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106286, "end_char": 106295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106563, "end_char": 106573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106941, "end_char": 106950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108127, "end_char": 108148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108216, "end_char": 108226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K,. Gopaltfl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 108802, "end_char": 108814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K,."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108871, "end_char": 108879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T/,, Stat<\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nMost of the articles which are said to have been disregarded occur under the heading \"Right to freedom,\" these articles being articles 19 ( 1) ( d), 21 and 22.", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109010, "end_char": 109021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109105, "end_char": 109115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109210, "end_char": 109220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Republic of India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 110662, "end_char": 110679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contentions acivanced on behalf of the petitioner with reference to this article are :-(1) that the Act under which he has been detained deprives him who is a citizen of the Republic of India of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, which is guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d), and (2)\n\nS.C.R SUPREME COURT REPOltTS 137\n\nthat under clause_ (5) of article 19, it is open to this Cou1 t to judge whether the restrictions imposed by the Act on the exercise of the right conferred by article 19 (1) (d) are reasonable or otherwise."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110769, "end_char": 110779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110858, "end_char": 110868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110991, "end_char": 111001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111138, "end_char": 111148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Blackstone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111657, "end_char": 111667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blackstone in his \"Commentaries on the Laws of England\" (4th Edition, volume 1, page 134) states that \"personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law\".", "canonical_name": "13lackstone"}}, {"text": "H. J. Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112075, "end_char": 112088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The authority of this statement has never been questioned, and it has been bodily incorporated by H. J. Stephen in his \"Commentaries on the Laws of England\" and has been reproduced by Cooley in his well-known treatise on \"Constitutional Limitations\" (8th Edition, volume 1, page 710), which was extensively quoted by both parties in the course of their arguments."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112562, "end_char": 112579, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113035, "end_char": 113038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\n.", "canonical_name": "ALI"}}, {"text": "Gour", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113427, "end_char": 113431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such interference with the liberty of another's movements is unlawful, unless it may be justified ......... \"\n\nAgain, Dr. Gour in dealing wrongful restraint in his book British India\" (5th Edition, as follows :-\n\nwith the offence of on ''The Penal Law of page 1144) observes\n\n\"Following the principle that every man's person is sacred and that it is free, law visits with its penalties those who abridge his personal liberty, though he may have no design upon his person."}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114575, "end_char": 114584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bird v. Jones ( 1 ), Coleridge J. said that \"it is one part of the definition of freedom to be able t0go whithersoever one pleases\"."}}, {"text": "Alfred Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114757, "end_char": 114771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar opinion has been expressed by several authors including Sir Alfred Denning in his book entitled. \""}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117039, "end_char": 117049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nagpur, Patna and Calcutta High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 117085, "end_char": 117123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as to wh, ether preventive detention is an encroachment on the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d) has been considered by the Nagpur, Patna and Calcutta High Courts."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117268, "end_char": 117278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 117300, "end_char": 117308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that preventive detention is not a violation of the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d), but, in the Calcutta\n\n(!\\"}}, {"text": "K. Gopal~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117332, "end_char": 117341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A .• K. Gopal~\n\nT~S~\n\nFri.ti li_J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFa.r:l Ali J.\n\nHigh Court, where the matter has been elaborately discussed, at least five Judges have held that it does, and in the ultimate analysis the number of Judges who have held the contrary view appears to be the same.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 117382, "end_char": 117387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A .• K. Gopal~\n\nT~S~\n\nFri.ti li_J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nFa.r:l Ali J.\n\nHigh Court, where the matter has been elaborately discussed, at least five Judges have held that it does, and in the ultimate analysis the number of Judges who have held the contrary view appears to be the same.", "canonical_name": "State"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117898, "end_char": 117908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118129, "end_char": 118139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118621, "end_char": 118631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119217, "end_char": 119227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119417, "end_char": 119427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119447, "end_char": 119457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fifth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120486, "end_char": 120500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chota Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 120629, "end_char": 120641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference to the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Government of India: Act, 1935, as well as to certain laws made for Chota Nagpur, Santhal Parganas and other localities will show that great importance has been attached in this country to the protection and preservation of the members of the scheduled tribes and maintenance of order in tribal areas, and."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121751, "end_char": 121764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122174, "end_char": 122200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 122633, "end_char": 122646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ordinance provides for-\n\n\"the apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as tbe case may be su5pects, on grounds appearing to such autbority to be reasonable, of being of hostile origin, or of having acted, acting, being about to act, or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or interest, the defence of British India, ."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124238, "end_char": 124248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124306, "end_char": 124347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124805, "end_char": 124815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944", "statute": "The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125103, "end_char": 125113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944", "statute": "The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944"}}, {"text": "K. Gopalil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126091, "end_char": 126101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will however have to advert to this subject later and will try to show that the\n\n.A. •• K. Gopalil/I\n\nT/14.Slak\n\nFa1:.I .dli J,\n\nA. Ir.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": ".dli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126123, "end_char": 126127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will however have to advert to this subject later and will try to show that the\n\n.A. •• K. Gopalil/I\n\nT/14.Slak\n\nFa1:.I .dli J,\n\nA. Ir."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126465, "end_char": 126475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126525, "end_char": 126542, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Meredith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126718, "end_char": 126726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meredith C. J. of the Patna High Court has given expression to his concern for the situation which will thereby arise, in these words :-\n\n\"It will be seen that the claim made is very sweeping indeed."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 126740, "end_char": 126756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meredith C. J. of the Patna High Court has given expression to his concern for the situation which will thereby arise, in these words :-\n\n\"It will be seen that the claim made is very sweeping indeed."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127024, "end_char": 127034, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127926, "end_char": 127936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 128323, "end_char": 128342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from this aspect of -the matter, I agree with one of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in his remark that \"no calamitous or untoward result will follow even if the provisions of the Penal Code become justiciable.\""}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128438, "end_char": 128448, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 129242, "end_char": 129249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Russell's \"Crimes and Misderneanours\".)"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129282, "end_char": 129291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129299, "end_char": 129322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129533, "end_char": 129550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130467, "end_char": 130484, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131526, "end_char": 131536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131713, "end_char": 131723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131991, "end_char": 132001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132438, "end_char": 132448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132633, "end_char": 132643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133263, "end_char": 133281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133356, "end_char": 133366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133750, "end_char": 133760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133881, "end_char": 133903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133980, "end_char": 133990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134131, "end_char": 134141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134215, "end_char": 134237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134589, "end_char": 134599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gopalon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 134906, "end_char": 134913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalon\n\nThe Sta11\n\nFa<I Ali].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134974, "end_char": 134984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19, 20, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135754, "end_char": 135780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135891, "end_char": 135909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135925, "end_char": 135935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136055, "end_char": 136065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136139, "end_char": 136149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136220, "end_char": 136230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136353, "end_char": 136363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136378, "end_char": 136388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136683, "end_char": 136693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136725, "end_char": 136735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136923, "end_char": 136933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136964, "end_char": 136974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137101, "end_char": 137111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137848, "end_char": 137858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137937, "end_char": 137947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137995, "end_char": 138005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138622, "end_char": 138632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138817, "end_char": 138827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138981, "end_char": 138991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139112, "end_char": 139122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139329, "end_char": 139339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 139350, "end_char": 139363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopalan\n\nTheStlJU\n\nFazl Ali].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Dicey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 140872, "end_char": 140877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar classifications will be found in Dicey's \"Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution\" and Keith's \"Constitutional Law\" and other books on constitutional subjects, but there is no reference anywhere to any freedom or right of movement in the sense in which we are asked to construe the words used in article l9 (1) (d) .. In the Constitutions of America, Ireland."}}, {"text": "Keith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 140943, "end_char": 140948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar classifications will be found in Dicey's \"Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution\" and Keith's \"Constitutional Law\" and other books on constitutional subjects, but there is no reference anywhere to any freedom or right of movement in the sense in which we are asked to construe the words used in article l9 (1) (d) .. In the Constitutions of America, Ireland."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 141198, "end_char": 141205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar classifications will be found in Dicey's \"Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution\" and Keith's \"Constitutional Law\" and other books on constitutional subjects, but there is no reference anywhere to any freedom or right of movement in the sense in which we are asked to construe the words used in article l9 (1) (d) .. In the Constitutions of America, Ireland."}}, {"text": "Ireland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 141207, "end_char": 141214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar classifications will be found in Dicey's \"Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution\" and Keith's \"Constitutional Law\" and other books on constitutional subjects, but there is no reference anywhere to any freedom or right of movement in the sense in which we are asked to construe the words used in article l9 (1) (d) .. In the Constitutions of America, Ireland."}}, {"text": "article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141759, "end_char": 141769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142342, "end_char": 142352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 142673, "end_char": 142691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first world war, the British Parliament passed the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, in 1914, an<l a number of regulations were made under it including regulation\n\n14-B, which permitted the Secretary of State to subject any person \"to such obligations and restrictions as hereinafter mentioned in view of his hostile origin or associations.\""}}, {"text": "Lord Atkin meant that the restriction referred to in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143213, "end_char": 143273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arthur Zadig", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 143335, "end_char": 143347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this regulation, one Arthur Zadig was interned, and he applied to the King's Bench for a writ of habeas corpus which was refused."}}, {"text": "Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 143686, "end_char": 143690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Shaw in narrating -::he facts of th case stated:-\n\n(I) [19~2] A. C. 238."}}, {"text": "A. K. Copa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143830, "end_char": 143840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J.\n\nf930\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe Stat<\n\nFaz/ Ali ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 144844, "end_char": 144852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Lord Atkinson while dealing with the merits of the case made the following observation :-\n\n\"If the legislature chooses to enact that he can be deprived of his liberty and incarcerated or interned for certain things for which he could not have been heretofore incarcerated or interned, that enactment and the orders made under it if intra vires do not inringe upon the Habeas Corpus Acts or take away any right conferred by Magna Charta ...... \" ( • ) This passage read with the previous passage quoted by me will show that both internment and incarceration were regarded as \"restrictions on the freedom of movement\" and that deprivation of liberty and restriction on freedom of movement were used as alternative expressions bearing the same meaning.", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146567, "end_char": 146577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Viscount Maugham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 146686, "end_char": 146702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 1939, Viscount Maugham observed as follows:-\n\n\"The language o£ the Act of 1939 (above cited) shows beyond doubt that Defence Regulations may be made which must deprive the subject \"whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of public safety\" of all his liberty of move\" ment while the regulations remain in force\" ( 1 )."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147605, "end_char": 147614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147622, "end_char": 147665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal Security Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147685, "end_char": 147715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147717, "end_char": 147726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Security Act, 1948", "statute": "the West Bengal Security Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "East unjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147734, "end_char": 147768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147770, "end_char": 147779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East unjab Public Safety Act, 1949", "statute": "the East unjab Public Safety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147787, "end_char": 147831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147833, "end_char": 147842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "statute": "the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Public Order Temporary Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147855, "end_char": 147902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147908, "end_char": 147917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintenance of Public Order Temporary Act, 1947", "statute": "Maintenance of Public Order Temporary Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147925, "end_char": 147966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148703, "end_char": 148713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149244, "end_char": 149254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149966, "end_char": 149976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 150781, "end_char": 150786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am however interested to find that the Patna and Bombay Righ\n\nCourts have held that a person who is externed can successfully assert that the right granted to him under article 19 (1) (d) has been violated."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 150791, "end_char": 150797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am however interested to find that the Patna and Bombay Righ\n\nCourts have held that a person who is externed can successfully assert that the right granted to him under article 19 (1) (d) has been violated."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150911, "end_char": 150921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151151, "end_char": 151161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151359, "end_char": 151369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151914, "end_char": 151924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Goj1alan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 152609, "end_char": 152623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out in the course of the arguments\n\nA. K. Goj1alan\n\n• v.\n\nTlllSllJU\n\nFaz/ Ali J,\n\nA. /(.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152757, "end_char": 152767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152831, "end_char": 152841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153203, "end_char": 153213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154834, "end_char": 154844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 155415, "end_char": 155425, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156015, "end_char": 156025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156485, "end_char": 156495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156630, "end_char": 156640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157037, "end_char": 157047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".A. K. Gopaloa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157129, "end_char": 157143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will now pass on to the consideration of article 21, which runs as foilows :-\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal\n\n.A. K. Gopaloa\n\nv,..\n\nThe.", "canonical_name": ".A. K. Gopaloa"}}, {"text": "SIJIU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 157155, "end_char": 157160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SIJIU\n\nFad .Ali]."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157557, "end_char": 157567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158540, "end_char": 158550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Edward III", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 158853, "end_char": 158863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the reign of Edward III, howver, the words \"due process of law\" were used in a statute guaranteeing that no person will be deprived of his property or imprisoned or indicted or put to death without being brought in to answer by due process of law (28, Edward III, Ch."}}, {"text": "11Iiller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160069, "end_char": 160077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to by Mr. Justice 11Iiller in Davidson v. New Orleans, where the opinion was expressed that it is wiser to ascertairi their intent and application by the' gradual process of judicial inclusion."}}, {"text": "S. 512", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161438, "end_char": 161444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopa!a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161460, "end_char": 161472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) 115 U.S. 512 at page 518 •\n\nA. K. Gopa!a, t.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl Ali J-.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "l. K. Gopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161618, "end_char": 161631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and _this characteristic was especially l. K. Gopalan , v.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl A!i J.\n\nevident in the preamble•-\" particularly reminiscent of the American Declaration of Independence, a preamble which, it has been observed, no Japanese could possibly have conceived or written and which few could evenunderstand.\" [", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Fazl A!i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161649, "end_char": 161657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and _this characteristic was especially l. K. Gopalan , v.\n\nThe State\n\nFazl A!i J.\n\nevident in the preamble•-\" particularly reminiscent of the American Declaration of Independence, a preamble which, it has been observed, no Japanese could possibly have conceived or written and which few could evenunderstand.\" [", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "Zink", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 161902, "end_char": 161906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Ogg and Zink's \"Modern Foreign Governments\"]."}}, {"text": "articles 33 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162428, "end_char": 162446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Carl Brent", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 162966, "end_char": 162976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Carl Brent\n\nSwisher's\" The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States\" (page 107) :-  · \" The American history of its interj>retation falls into three periods.", "canonical_name": "Carl Brent Swisher"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168006, "end_char": 168012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168033, "end_char": 168037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168049, "end_char": 168054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Byles", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 170816, "end_char": 170821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Byles J. in dealing with the matter observed as follows :-\n\n\"I conceive they acted judicially because they had to determine the offence."}}, {"text": "Bentley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 171080, "end_char": 171087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being so, a long course of decisions, beginning with Dr.\n\nBentley's case, and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.", "canonical_name": "Bentley"}}, {"text": "Fortescue", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171349, "end_char": 171358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue, in Dr. Bentlev's case, is somewhat quaint, but it is very applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present."}}, {"text": "Bentlev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 171367, "end_char": 171374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue, in Dr. Bentlev's case, is somewhat quaint, but it is very applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present.", "canonical_name": "Bentley"}}, {"text": "Erle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171662, "end_char": 171666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case Erle C. J. observed :- \"It has been said that the principle that no man shall be deprived of his property without an opportunity of being heard, is limited to a judicial proceeding ...... I do not quite agree with that ; ...... the law, I think, has been applied to many exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all more a judicial proceeding than would be the act of the District Board in ordering a house to be pulled down.\""}}, {"text": "Robert Collier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 172181, "end_char": 172195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations made bv Erle C. J. were quoted and applied by Sir Robert Collier in Smith v. The\n\nQueen('), and the observations of Lord Campbell in Regina v. The Archbishop of Canterbury (1) were to the same effect."}}, {"text": "Campbell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 172252, "end_char": 172260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations made bv Erle C. J. were quoted and applied by Sir Robert Collier in Smith v. The\n\nQueen('), and the observations of Lord Campbell in Regina v. The Archbishop of Canterbury (1) were to the same effect."}}, {"text": "George Jessel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 172434, "end_char": 172447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar opinion was expressed by Sir George Jessel in Fisher v. Keane (1), Labouchere v. Earl of W harncliffe, (2) and Russel v.\n\nRussel (8) • In the last mentioned case, he observed as follows:-\n\n\"It [Wood v. Woad(')] contains a verv valuable statement by the Lord Chief Baron as to his view of the mode of administering justice by persons other than Judge~ who have judicial functions to perform which I should have been very glad to have had before me on both those club cases that I recently heard, namely, the case of Fisher v. Keane and the case of Labouchere v. Earl of W harncliffe."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 173527, "end_char": 173537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This opinion was quoted with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v.\n\nL'Association etc."}}, {"text": "Tribunal of Appeal under the Housing Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 174089, "end_char": 174135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 174439, "end_char": 174452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTheSlaU\n\nFozl Ali].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Kelly", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 175160, "end_char": 175165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Earl of Reading in delivering the judgment observed :\n\n\"The principle of law applicable to such a case is well stated by Kelly C.B. in Wood v. Woad in a passage which is cited with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v. L' Association etc."}}, {"text": "Gavin Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 176437, "end_char": 176450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commenting upon this case, which is generally regarded as an extreme case, Mr. Gavin Simonds, who afterwards became a member of the House of Lords observes :-\n\n(') [19U) A. C. 120."}}, {"text": "C K. Allen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 176750, "end_char": 176760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See C K. Allen's \"Law and Orders,\" page 167)."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 177246, "end_char": 177254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have only to add that Halsbury .after enumerating the most important liberties which are recognized ' in England, such as right of personal freedom, right to freedom of speech, right of public meeting, etc.,·"}}, {"text": "sections 107, 108, 109, 110 and 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178893, "end_char": 178928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179250, "end_char": 179260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181105, "end_char": 181115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181118, "end_char": 181128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182903, "end_char": 182913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183058, "end_char": 183060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183250, "end_char": 183268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183340, "end_char": 183358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183383, "end_char": 183393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183425, "end_char": 183435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183608, "end_char": 183626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184062, "end_char": 184070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184281, "end_char": 184289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184750, "end_char": 184758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185018, "end_char": 185026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185824, "end_char": 185834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186321, "end_char": 186331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187255, "end_char": 187265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188264, "end_char": 188280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188975, "end_char": 188984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189619, "end_char": 189639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "articles 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190584, "end_char": 190595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190656, "end_char": 190666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190746, "end_char": 190756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190929, "end_char": 190939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193042, "end_char": 193052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193107, "end_char": 193117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193701, "end_char": 193711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194921, "end_char": 194931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopolan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 196139, "end_char": 196152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I think that clause (7) (a) can be accurately paraphrased somewhat as follows :-\"Parliament may dispense with an advisory board, but in that case it shall prescribe the circumstances and the class or\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nF!Jl{.l Ali J.\n\nA. K. Gopolan ·\n\nv. 1\"he State\n\nFaz/ Ali].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197238, "end_char": 197248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197527, "end_char": 197537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200251, "end_char": 200260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200420, "end_char": 200429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200435, "end_char": 200445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200594, "end_char": 200604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fad Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 200721, "end_char": 200728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Copa/an\n\nTl:.t State\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nmore heinous types of acts falling within the category of acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order (or other heads) should be prescribed so as to define and circumscribe the area of an exceptional piece of legislation."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 201794, "end_char": 201803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203840, "end_char": 203850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But all that has been done is that words which occur in the legislative Lists have been taken and transferred into the Act", "statute": "But all that has been done is that words which occur in the legislative Lists have been taken and transferred into the Act"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204213, "end_char": 204223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But all that has been done is that words which occur in the legislative Lists have been taken and transferred into the Act", "statute": "But all that has been done is that words which occur in the legislative Lists have been taken and transferred into the Act"}}, {"text": "Puniab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 204602, "end_char": 204619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not for me to answer this question, but I apprehend that an impending rebellion or war, serious disorder in a particular area such as has induced the Puniab Government to declare certain areas as \"disturbed areas,'.'"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205250, "end_char": 205260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206725, "end_char": 206735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207070, "end_char": 207080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence the authors of the Constitution have made it necessary that the Parliament should put certain specifications into the Act", "statute": "Hence the authors of the Constitution have made it necessary that the Parliament should put certain specifications into the Act"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208026, "end_char": 208036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hence the authors of the Constitution have made it necessary that the Parliament should put certain specifications into the Act", "statute": "Hence the authors of the Constitution have made it necessary that the Parliament should put certain specifications into the Act"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208163, "end_char": 208173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208221, "end_char": 208231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209267, "end_char": 209277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209783, "end_char": 209793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210622, "end_char": 210632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210935, "end_char": 210945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211441, "end_char": 211451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212440, "end_char": 212450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212974, "end_char": 212984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213271, "end_char": 213281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214329, "end_char": 214339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214532, "end_char": 214541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215255, "end_char": 215266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215491, "end_char": 215502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215631, "end_char": 215640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216124, "end_char": 216133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216360, "end_char": 216370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216508, "end_char": 216518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216801, "end_char": 216819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216874, "end_char": 216884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216922, "end_char": 216932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216970, "end_char": 216980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217159, "end_char": 217169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217432, "end_char": 217442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217677, "end_char": 217687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217826, "end_char": 217836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217867, "end_char": 217877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopal1J11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 218475, "end_char": 218490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopal1J11\n\nThe Stau\n\nFazlAli J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu Stal<\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nI have only to add a few concluding' remarks to my judgment.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Stau\n\nFazlAli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 218496, "end_char": 218509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopal1J11\n\nThe Stau\n\nFazlAli J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu Stal<\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nI have only to add a few concluding' remarks to my judgment."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 219991, "end_char": 220000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Liversidge v.\n\nSir John Anderson ( '), Lord Macmillan struck the same note in these words:~\n\n\"The liberty whlch we so justly extol is itself the gift of the law and as Magna Charta recognizes may by the law be forfeited or abridged."}}, {"text": "Magna Charta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 220115, "end_char": 220127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Liversidge v.\n\nSir John Anderson ( '), Lord Macmillan struck the same note in these words:~\n\n\"The liberty whlch we so justly extol is itself the gift of the law and as Magna Charta recognizes may by the law be forfeited or abridged."}}, {"text": "28th January, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 221876, "end_char": 221894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I also find that the Secretary of State stated in the House of Commons on the 28th January, 1943, that the general order would be to allow British subjects detained under the Regulation to have consultations with their legal advisers out of the hearing of an officer."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222778, "end_char": 222788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IC GojJala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 222893, "end_char": 222903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I_ find that there is a provision in section 12 (2) of the Act for the review of the cases of detenus after six months, but this is quite different\n\nA. IC GojJala\n\nT/rt f; au\n\nFazl Ali_}.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 222937, "end_char": 222944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalan\n\nTJ,.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 224342, "end_char": 224351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and I do not see how the establishment of ; m appropriate machinery giving him such a chance can be an impediment to good and just government\n\nPATANJALI\n\nS11STRI J.-This is an application under article 32 of the C', onstitution of India for rckasing the pettt10ncr from detention jn jail without trial under directions purporting to be issued by the Government of Madras under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and it has the distinction of being the first application invoking the p; uaranteed protection of this Court as the guardian of Fundamental Rights against alleged infringement of the petitioner's right to freedom of movement.", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "S11S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224353, "end_char": 224357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224393, "end_char": 224403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224549, "end_char": 224610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 225120, "end_char": 225144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the case involved issues of great public importance and breaking of new ground it was argued with thoroughness and ability on both sides, reference being made to more or less analogous provisions of the Constitutions of\n\nother countries and in particular the Constitution of the United States of America."}}, {"text": "Government under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 225233, "end_char": 225298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 225489, "end_char": 225573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th February 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 225724, "end_char": 225742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on 25th February 1950, and, on the 27th February, the Government of Madras, in purported exercise of the powers conferred by the impugned Act and in supersession of earlier orders, directed the detention of the petitioner, and - the' Qrder was served on him on 1st March."}}, {"text": "sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226057, "end_char": 226093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226188, "end_char": 226198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226269, "end_char": 226279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226624, "end_char": 226634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226872, "end_char": 226882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State\n\nPalanja/i Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 227142, "end_char": 227165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (2) of the article, on which the petitioner's contention is primarily founded reads as follows :\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nPalanja/i Sastri }."}}, {"text": "K. G.pa!an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 227174, "end_char": 227184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A., K. G.pa!an\n\nTh•S<au\n\nPatlJl!iali Sastri ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 228009, "end_char": 228016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Nambiar appearing for the petitioner advanced three main lines of argument.", "canonical_name": "N\"ambiar"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228179, "end_char": 228189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228512, "end_char": 228522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228959, "end_char": 228969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229053, "end_char": 229063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "John Stuart Mill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 229132, "end_char": 229148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the first question for consideration is whether article 19 (1) (d) and (5) is applicable to the present case : \"Liberty,\" says John Stuart Mill, \"consists in doing what tine desires."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229582, "end_char": 229592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230024, "end_char": 230034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231440, "end_char": 231451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231488, "end_char": 231498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232658, "end_char": 232668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232712, "end_char": 232730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232748, "end_char": 232758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232854, "end_char": 232865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233138, "end_char": 233148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233390, "end_char": 233400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 233902, "end_char": 233922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a recent unreported decision brought to our notice,\n\napplied the test of undermining the security of the State or tending to overthrow it in determining the validity or other wise of the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234157, "end_char": 234167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235167, "end_char": 235177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236000, "end_char": 236010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236170, "end_char": 236180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K.Gopalan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 236260, "end_char": 236272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K.Gopalan\n\nV, Tlw Stau\n\nPatatifali Sastri ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236444, "end_char": 236454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236501, "end_char": 236511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237209, "end_char": 237219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237456, "end_char": 237466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238304, "end_char": 238314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238510, "end_char": 238520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238574, "end_char": 238584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238786, "end_char": 238796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238857, "end_char": 238867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239166, "end_char": 239176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239251, "end_char": 239261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239500, "end_char": 239510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239799, "end_char": 239809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 239950, "end_char": 239960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 240741, "end_char": 240757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And the first and essential step in a procedure established by law for such deprivation must be a law made by a competent legislature 8-3 S .C. India/SP\n\nA. K. Copa/an v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nPatmefali Sastri J.\n\nauthorising such deprivation.", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Patmefali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 240791, "end_char": 240807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And the first and essential step in a procedure established by law for such deprivation must be a law made by a competent legislature 8-3 S .C. India/SP\n\nA. K. Copa/an v.\n\nThe Stale\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nPatmefali Sastri J.\n\nauthorising such deprivation."}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240882, "end_char": 240900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243863, "end_char": 243873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K Gopalti.n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 244753, "end_char": 244767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Nambiar conceded that these reauirements might have to be modified or adapted to suit the nature of the particular proceeding and the object it had in\n\nA. K Gopalti.n\n\nTM State\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nd. K. Gopalan\n\nTJt, Stat•\n\nP atatliali S4\"'i ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244839, "end_char": 244841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245932, "end_char": 245945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 246592, "end_char": 246599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madison (who played a prominent part in framing the First Amendment of the American Constitution) pointing out the distinction, due to historical reasons, between the American and the British ways of securing \"the great and sscn tial rights of the people,\" observed \"Here they arc secured not by laws paramount to prerogative but by Constitutions paramount to laws\" : Report on the Virginia Resolutions, quoted in Near v. Minnesota ( 1 )."}}, {"text": "S. 697", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247042, "end_char": 247048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247777, "end_char": 247787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248143, "end_char": 248153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 248583, "end_char": 248587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, and Coke in his Institutes identified the term with the expression \"the law of the\n\nland\" in the great Charter of John."}}, {"text": "John", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 248693, "end_char": 248697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, and Coke in his Institutes identified the term with the expression \"the law of the\n\nland\" in the great Charter of John."}}, {"text": "Bonham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 248892, "end_char": 248898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coke understood these terms as implying an .inherent limitation on all legislation, and ruled in Dr. Bonham's Case (1) that \"the common law will control Acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void when they are against common right and reason.\""}}, {"text": "A. K. Goj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 249151, "end_char": 249160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Goj>lllt111\n\nThe Stat•\n\nPala, Yali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Staie\n\nPatanja{i Sastri ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Pala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 249181, "end_char": 249185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Goj>lllt111\n\nThe Stat•\n\nPala, Yali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Staie\n\nPatanja{i Sastri ]."}}, {"text": "S. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251360, "end_char": 251365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.596", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251378, "end_char": 251383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251915, "end_char": 251925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopl'11111", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 253559, "end_char": 253575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A speech\n\nA. K. Gopl'11111\n\nTlllStaU\n\nPatanjali So.slri J.\n\nA. IC.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Patanjali So.slri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 253587, "end_char": 253604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A speech\n\nA. K. Gopl'11111\n\nTlllStaU\n\nPatanjali So.slri J.\n\nA. IC.", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "ali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 253643, "end_char": 253653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalan\n\nTlw Stat•\n\nPatan; ali Sastri J.\n\nmade in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not .reflect the inarticulate mental processes I ying behind the majority vote which carried the bill.", "canonical_name": "jali Sastri"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254317, "end_char": 254327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254333, "end_char": 254343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254471, "end_char": 254484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 13 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254960, "end_char": 254978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255386, "end_char": 255396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255574, "end_char": 255584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255681, "end_char": 255691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255825, "end_char": 255835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256089, "end_char": 256099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256361, "end_char": 256371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256680, "end_char": 256690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257226, "end_char": 257235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 257904, "end_char": 257911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that was because, as Lord Dunedin pointed out \"the British Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses of Parliament subject to the assent\n\n(') [1924) 2 I.R; 104."}}, {"text": "A. 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Gopalan\n\nThe Stl.tt\n\nPatanjaJi SastriJ.\n\nof the King, an absolute power untrammelled by any written instrument obedience to which may be compelled by some judicial body,\" whereas the Irish Constitution restricted the legislative powers of the Irish Parliament by a formal declaration of fundamental rights and by providing for a judicial review of legislation in contravention of the Constitution (article 65).", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "article 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258520, "end_char": 258530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258649, "end_char": 258659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 259139, "end_char": 259146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in monarchical Britain the struggle between prerogative and law has long since ended in favour of the latter. \""}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 259859, "end_char": 259869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260165, "end_char": 260175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260295, "end_char": 260305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262246, "end_char": 262256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262403, "end_char": 262413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 161", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 262452, "end_char": 262469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. 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K. Gopalan\n\nTiu State\n\nPaJQl/jali Sastri J.\n\nA. K. 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K. Gojialan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 275793, "end_char": 275807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, it w::i~ contended that section 3, which empowers the Central Gov&nment or the State Government to detain any person if it is \"satisfied\" that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (among other 9-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gojialan\n\nThe Slat•\n\nPatanjali Sa.riri ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sa.riri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 275820, "end_char": 275837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, it w::i~ contended that section 3, which empowers the Central Gov&nment or the State Government to detain any person if it is \"satisfied\" that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (among other 9-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gojialan\n\nThe Slat•\n\nPatanjali Sa.riri ].", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277262, "end_char": 277272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278360, "end_char": 278369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278852, "end_char": 278868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278937, "end_char": 278947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PatanJaJi Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 280145, "end_char": 280161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a two-fold fallacy in\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu Stall\n\nPatanJaJi Sastri J.\n\nA.. K. Gopcla•\n\n•• Tlw S'°\"\n\nPatatrjali SasJri \"].", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "Patatrjali SasJri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 280195, "end_char": 280212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a two-fold fallacy in\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTiu Stall\n\nPatanJaJi Sastri J.\n\nA.. K. Gopcla•\n\n•• Tlw S'°\"\n\nPatatrjali SasJri \"].", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281618, "end_char": 281627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281680, "end_char": 281690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282414, "end_char": 282424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283085, "end_char": 283095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283503, "end_char": 283513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 283572, "end_char": 283638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284042, "end_char": 284058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284192, "end_char": 284202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Patmijali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 284739, "end_char": 284755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ian\n\nTJ..Sta11\n\nPatmijali Sastri ].", "canonical_name": "PatanjaJi SastriJ."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284791, "end_char": 284801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284983, "end_char": 284993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285051, "end_char": 285061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285494, "end_char": 285504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285617, "end_char": 285627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285745, "end_char": 285755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286665, "end_char": 286675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 287061, "end_char": 287071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 287684, "end_char": 287694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288118, "end_char": 288128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 288765, "end_char": 288775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1949] F. C.R. 827", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 289056, "end_char": 289074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Gopa/41.•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 289082, "end_char": 289094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..t. K. Gopa/41.•\n\nTluSUU\n\nP\"\"'11jali Sa.dri ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. 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K.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 293229, "end_char": 293234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that the legislative will expressed herein\n\nA. K. (' , paian\n\nTM State\n\nMahqian].", "canonical_name": "A. K. 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Jr. Gopalan\n\nTheStau\n\nMahajan j.\n\nquestion for consideration is whether it was intendd that article 19 would govern a law made under the provisions of article 22."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310825, "end_char": 310835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310884, "end_char": 310894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310896, "end_char": 310906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 311061, "end_char": 311071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.arliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 311117, "end_char": 311128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It empowers Parliament to make a law imposing reasonable restriction on the right of freedom of movement while article 22 (7) is another enabling provision empowering P.arliament to make a law on the subject of preventive detention in certain circumstances."}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 311257, "end_char": 311270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 311406, "end_char": 311416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 311517, "end_char": 311527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of 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"end_char": 315249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State\n\nMahejan J.\n\nA. 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"Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320944, "end_char": 320954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321218, "end_char": 321227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321415, "end_char": 321425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321756, "end_char": 321766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321859, "end_char": 321869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 322068, "end_char": 322078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", 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Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 327848, "end_char": 327856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has been expressed by my brother Sir Faz!", "canonical_name": "FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328086, "end_char": 328096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopal1111", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 328371, "end_char": 328386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are both the circumstances as well as\n\nA. K. Gopal1111\n\nThe Stale\n\nMahajan].", "canonical_name": "A. K. 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"end_char": 329725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330315, "end_char": 330325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Defence of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 330541, "end_char": 330557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Entry 9 of the UniOn List and Entry 3 of the Concurrent List of the 7th Schedule lay down the ambit of legislative power of Parliament on the subject of preventive detention on the following six subjects :-\n\n( l) Defence of India, (2) Foreign Affairs, (3) Security of India, ( 4) Security of the State, (5) Maintenance of public order, ( 6) Maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community."}}, {"text": "Security of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 330584, "end_char": 330601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Entry 9 of the UniOn List and Entry 3 of the Concurrent List of the 7th Schedule lay down the ambit of legislative power of Parliament on the subject of preventive detention on the following six subjects :-\n\n( l) Defence of India, (2) Foreign Affairs, (3) Security of India, ( 4) Security of the State, (5) Maintenance of public order, ( 6) Maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community."}}, {"text": "Security of the State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 330608, "end_char": 330629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Entry 9 of the UniOn List and Entry 3 of the Concurrent List of the 7th Schedule lay down the ambit of legislative power of Parliament on the subject of preventive detention on the following six subjects :-\n\n( l) Defence of India, (2) Foreign Affairs, (3) Security of India, ( 4) Security of the State, (5) Maintenance of public order, ( 6) Maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330750, "end_char": 330760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 331610, "end_char": 331620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 331912, "end_char": 331922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 332280, "end_char": 332290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 332317, "end_char": 332327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333414, "end_char": 333424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 333637, "end_char": 333647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334031, "end_char": 334041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334057, "end_char": 334067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334187, "end_char": 334197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334485, "end_char": 334494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hurt is an offence under the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 335318, "end_char": 335364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 352 to 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335850, "end_char": 335869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hurt is an offence under the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Hurt is an offence under the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Another illustration is furnished by the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 336157, "end_char": 336221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 107 to 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336240, "end_char": 336259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another illustration is furnished by the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Another illustration is furnished by the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338440, "end_char": 338450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338973, "end_char": 338983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339193, "end_char": 339203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339259, "end_char": 339269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339338, "end_char": 339348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341521, "end_char": 341531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341634, "end_char": 341645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. G•polan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 341750, "end_char": 341763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section is in these terms :-\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stau\n\nMahaj\"\" J.\n\nA. K. G•polan\n\nThe Stale\n\nMaliDjan :J.\n\n\" ( 1) No Court shall except for the purposes ot a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any statement to be .", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "MaliDjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 341776, "end_char": 341784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section is in these terms :-\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe Stau\n\nMahaj\"\" J.\n\nA. K. G•polan\n\nThe Stale\n\nMaliDjan :J.\n\n\" ( 1) No Court shall except for the purposes ot a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any statement to be ."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 342025, "end_char": 342034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343363, "end_char": 343373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343568, "end_char": 343578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 344643, "end_char": 344653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 344703, "end_char": 344716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 344858, "end_char": 344868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345856, "end_char": 345866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G•palan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 346037, "end_char": 346044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G•palan\n\nT 1\" Siok\n\nMahajan]. -", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Siok", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 346051, "end_char": 346055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G•palan\n\nT 1\" Siok\n\nMahajan]. -"}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 346689, "end_char": 346707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 346870, "end_char": 346888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347125, "end_char": 347138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347557, "end_char": 347567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347628, "end_char": 347642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347721, "end_char": 347731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Malabar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 348011, "end_char": 348018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, it is said, was initially arrested in Malabar on 17th of December, 1947, and prosecution was started against him on various charges for having\n\nS, C.R.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS 245\n\ndelivered certaiq violent speeches."}}, {"text": "17th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 348022, "end_char": 348044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, it is said, was initially arrested in Malabar on 17th of December, 1947, and prosecution was started against him on various charges for having\n\nS, C.R.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS 245\n\ndelivered certaiq violent speeches."}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Public Order Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 348291, "end_char": 348322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 348326, "end_char": 348342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case~ were going on, he was served with an order of detention under the Madr.as Maintenance of Public Order Act on 22nd April, 1948."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 348398, "end_char": 348415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order of detention was held to be illegal by the Madras High Court, but 011 the same day that the judgment was pronounced, a second order of detention was served upon him."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 349018, "end_char": 349035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In two out of the three criminal cases the trial before the magistrate ended on February 23, 1949, and the petitioner was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months in each of the cases."}}, {"text": "26th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 349183, "end_char": 349203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These sentences however, were set aside in appeal on 26th September, 1949."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of North Malabar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 349252, "end_char": 349283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the third case he was tried by the Sessions Judge of North Malabar and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years but this sentence was redi1ced to 6 months' imprisonment by the Madras High Court on appeal."}}, {"text": "Public Order Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 349583, "end_char": 349599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 349749, "end_char": 349768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th February, 1950, the Preventive Detention Act wa:s passed by the Parliament and on the 1st of March following, the detention of 'the applicant under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act was cancelled and he was served with a fresh order of detention under section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "1st of March", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 349840, "end_char": 349852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th February, 1950, the Preventive Detention Act wa:s passed by the Parliament and on the 1st of March following, the detention of 'the applicant under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act was cancelled and he was served with a fresh order of detention under section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350015, "end_char": 350027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Order Act", "statute": "Public Order Act"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 350035, "end_char": 350059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350421, "end_char": 350423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On behalf of he respndents the detention of the petitioner is sought to be justified on the strength of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "On behalf of he respndents the detention of the petitioner is sought to be justified on the strength of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Indian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 350924, "end_char": 350930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His first contention is that as preventive detention is, in substance, a restriction on the free movements of a person throughout the Indian territory, it comes within the purview of article 19(1)\n\n(d) of Part III of the Constitution which lays down the fundamental rights."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350973, "end_char": 350986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On behalf of he respndents the detention of the petitioner is sought to be justified on the strength of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "On behalf of he respndents the detention of the petitioner is sought to be justified on the strength of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 351514, "end_char": 351550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 351742, "end_char": 351752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352323, "end_char": 352333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352491, "end_char": 352501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352563, "end_char": 352573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352605, "end_char": 352615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352803, "end_char": 352813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352868, "end_char": 352881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352979, "end_char": 352996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 353161, "end_char": 353171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 353469, "end_char": 353490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 516", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 354692, "end_char": 354698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Copola11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 354701, "end_char": 354715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Copola11\n\nT/,.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 354809, "end_char": 354825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355185, "end_char": 355198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356300, "end_char": 356310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356380, "end_char": 356390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356514, "end_char": 356524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356607, "end_char": 356617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356798, "end_char": 356808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357253, "end_char": 357266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357504, "end_char": 357514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358039, "end_char": 358055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of Realm Consolidation Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 358239, "end_char": 358279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.K. Gan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 358897, "end_char": 358905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Gan\n\n•• Tlw St\"'4\n\nMuklwrJla J.\n\nA. IC Gopalon\n\nThe Stott\n\nMukheefea ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "IC Gopalon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 358938, "end_char": 358948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Gan\n\n•• Tlw St\"'4\n\nMuklwrJla J.\n\nA. IC Gopalon\n\nThe Stott\n\nMukheefea ].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359760, "end_char": 359770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360123, "end_char": 360133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360157, "end_char": 360167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360566, "end_char": 360577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360750, "end_char": 360760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361266, "end_char": 361276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 362664, "end_char": 362674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 362890, "end_char": 362900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363207, "end_char": 363218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukhnjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 363494, "end_char": 363502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K, Gopalan\n\nTJwSJ:iu\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\nl950\n\nA. I(, G.,,.i...\n\nv. nt.lld\n\nMakJr,, jra J.\n\nto preventive detention.", "canonical_name": "M UKHER JEA"}}, {"text": "A. I(, G.,,.i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 363513, "end_char": 363526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K, Gopalan\n\nTJwSJ:iu\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\nl950\n\nA. I(, G.,,.i...\n\nv. nt.lld\n\nMakJr,, jra J.\n\nto preventive detention."}}, {"text": "MakJr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 363542, "end_char": 363547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K, Gopalan\n\nTJwSJ:iu\n\nMukhnjea J.\n\nl950\n\nA. I(, G.,,.i...\n\nv. nt.lld\n\nMakJr,, jra J.\n\nto preventive detention."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363658, "end_char": 363668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363751, "end_char": 363761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364319, "end_char": 364337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 364849, "end_char": 364855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In interpreting the words of a Constitution, the same principles undoubtedly apply which are applicable in construing a statute, but as was observed by Lord Wright in /11mes v. Commonwealth of Australia( 1 ), \"the ultimate result must be determined upon the actual words used not in· vacuo but as occurring in a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other.\" \""}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365508, "end_char": 365518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365706, "end_char": 365716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 19 to 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 365957, "end_char": 365974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Cour, t of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 366533, "end_char": 366559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Supreme Cour, t of America in Jacobson v. Massachusetts\n\n( 1 ), are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and morals of the community."}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367900, "end_char": 367905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalllll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 367908, "end_char": 367923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopalllll\n\nThe Stale\n\nMukhtrjea J.\n\nA. K. Copa/an\n\nThe State\n\nMukhnjta].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368546, "end_char": 368556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368793, "end_char": 368815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 369061, "end_char": 369071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 20, 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 369287, "end_char": 369309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 370094, "end_char": 370104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20 to 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 370743, "end_char": 370760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371651, "end_char": 371661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371779, "end_char": 371789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372407, "end_char": 372417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 372474, "end_char": 372483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 19, on the other hand,\n\n19~0\n\nA. K. Gopalan v.\n\nThe State\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nMukhtl}aa J.\n\nenunciates certain particular forms of civil liberty quite independently of the rights dealt with under article\n\n21.", "canonical_name": "M UKHER JEA"}}, {"text": "article\n\n21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372632, "end_char": 372643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372766, "end_char": 372776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 373062, "end_char": 373072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 373638, "end_char": 373648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Danzig", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 373809, "end_char": 373815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, \"the liberty of the person has been declared to be inviolable and no limitation or deprivation of personal liberty may be imposed by public authority except by virtue of a law\" ( vide article 74)."}}, {"text": "article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374001, "end_char": 374011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374014, "end_char": 374024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374081, "end_char": 374091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374483, "end_char": 374493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374552, "end_char": 374562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374721, "end_char": 374731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374772, "end_char": 374782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374894, "end_char": 374904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375047, "end_char": 375057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375117, "end_char": 375127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375207, "end_char": 375220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375250, "end_char": 375260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375465, "end_char": 375475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375566, "end_char": 375576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376023, "end_char": 376036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376070, "end_char": 376080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376144, "end_char": 376154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376468, "end_char": 376481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376556, "end_char": 376569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "IC Gopalan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 376910, "end_char": 376920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. IC Gopalan\n\nTire si.11\n\nMul<i..efea J.\n\n( f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.\"", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 377473, "end_char": 377483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 378032, "end_char": 378043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 378213, "end_char": 378223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. E. Gopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 381433, "end_char": 381446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This .view will receive further support .. if we look to some analogous provisions in the Constitution of\n\n12-s S. C. India/ 8\n\nA. E. Gopalan\n\nThe Stau\n\nMuklrlrj•tt].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381589, "end_char": 381599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381675, "end_char": 381685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382252, "end_char": 382262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382371, "end_char": 382382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382768, "end_char": 382780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382902, "end_char": 382912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383273, "end_char": 383283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383760, "end_char": 383770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383803, "end_char": 383814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384013, "end_char": 384023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384281, "end_char": 384294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384557, "end_char": 384567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384916, "end_char": 384926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 385111, "end_char": 385121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "13lackstone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 385837, "end_char": 385848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or curtail the right of free movements and in fact, \"pr.rsonal liberty\" according to him, connotes nothing else but unrestricted right of locomotion.. 'The learned counsel refers in this connection to certain passages in 13lackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, where\n\n19:;0\n\nA. K. Gopalan\n\nTlte Stat1\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nA. Ir.", "canonical_name": "13lackstone"}}, {"text": "Mukherjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 385971, "end_char": 385980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalan\n\nTire State\n\nMukherjta J.\n\nthe author discusses what he calls the three absolute rights inherent in every Engiishman, namely, rights of personal security, personal liberty and property. \"", "canonical_name": "M UKHER JEA"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387662, "end_char": 387672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387713, "end_char": 387723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387976, "end_char": 387986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387988, "end_char": 387998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388035, "end_char": 388045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vide Chase", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 388112, "end_char": 388122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the views of the Drafting Committee were accepted by th~\n\n(1) Vide Chase's Blackstone, \"th Edn .. pp."}}, {"text": "Vide Dicey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 388164, "end_char": 388174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) Vide Dicey on Constitutional Law, 9th Edn."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388303, "end_char": 388313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388364, "end_char": 388374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388669, "end_char": 388679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388982, "end_char": 388992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 389089, "end_char": 389099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 389209, "end_char": 389254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well known that the word \"liberty\" standing by itself has been given a very wide meaning by the Supreme Court of the United States of America."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 389824, "end_char": 389834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390123, "end_char": 390133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390362, "end_char": 390372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Muk\"4rjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 390531, "end_char": 390540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopalan\n\nThe State\n\nMuk\"4rjea J.\n\nnot be affected if the owner is imprisoned or detained."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390978, "end_char": 390988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nambiar cannot succeed and it must be held that we are not entitled to examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Nambiar cannot succeed and it must be held that we are not entitled to examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "N\"ambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 391037, "end_char": 391045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I now come to the second point raised by Mr.\n\nN\"ambiar in support of the application; and upon this point we had arguments of a most elaborate nature addressed to us by the learned counsel on both sides, displaying a considerable amount of learning and research.", "canonical_name": "N\"ambiar"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 391339, "end_char": 391349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nambiar cannot succeed and it must be held that we are not entitled to examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Nambiar cannot succeed and it must be held that we are not entitled to examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392018, "end_char": 392029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392632, "end_char": 392642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392890, "end_char": 392900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393085, "end_char": 393095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393139, "end_char": 393149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393337, "end_char": 393347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 394106, "end_char": 394116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalat1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 394917, "end_char": 394931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopalat1\n\nThe Stale\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n.4.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Stale\n\nMukherjea", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 394937, "end_char": 394953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopalat1\n\nThe Stale\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n.4.", "canonical_name": "State\n\nMukherjea J."}}, {"text": "K. Gopalan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 394962, "end_char": 394972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Gopalan\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "State\n\nMukherjea J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 394983, "end_char": 395002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nIt may be noted here that in the original draft of the Indian Constitution the words used in article 15 (which now stands as article 21) were \"in accordance with due process of law\".", "canonical_name": "State\n\nMukherjea J."}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395097, "end_char": 395107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395129, "end_char": 395139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395362, "end_char": 395372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395404, "end_char": 395414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N ambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 395629, "end_char": 395637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present article 21 seems to have been modelled on article 31 ot the Japanese Constitution, where the language employed is \"no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, excep< according to procedure established by law\" Mr.\n\nN ambiar argues that the expression \"procedure established by law\" in article 21 of the Constitution bears the same meaning as the \"due process\" clause does in America, restricted only to this extent, viz.,", "canonical_name": "N\"ambiar"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395699, "end_char": 395709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396079, "end_char": 396089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 397009, "end_char": 397015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) known as \"Statute of Westminster of the liberties of London\", that the expression \"due process of lw\" for the first time appears."}}, {"text": "Edward Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 397189, "end_char": 397200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither of these phrases was explained or dfined in any of the\n\ndocuments, but on the authority of Sir Edward Coke it may be said that both the expressions have the same meaning."}}, {"text": "Vide Willoughby", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 399124, "end_char": 399139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Vide Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol.", "canonical_name": "Vide Willoughby"}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 399211, "end_char": 399216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 516", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 399268, "end_char": 399274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. 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S 1 R.\n\n(2) 13 N. Y. 379."}}, {"text": "Wheaton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 401437, "end_char": 401444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coke's dictum of a supreme fundamental law which obviously referred to principles of English common law certainly did exercise considerable influence upon the minds of the American Judges ( ') -and there are observations in some cases ( 1) DartTWuth College case, 4 Wheaton p. S 1 R.\n\n(2) 13 N. Y. 379."}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 401448, "end_char": 401451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 401479, "end_char": 401485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 647."}}, {"text": "A. K. Gop", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 403706, "end_char": 403715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19~0\n\nA. K. Gop:dan\n\nTiu State\n\nMul.herjea J,\n\nA.. K. 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IC Gopalan\n\nThi Stale\n\nMukhldta J.\n\nheads or subjects in the two Items in the legislative lists, namely, item No."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426214, "end_char": 426224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426531, "end_char": 426541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426711, "end_char": 426724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427192, "end_char": 427205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427284, "end_char": 427294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427418, "end_char": 427431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 428189, "end_char": 428199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 428648, "end_char": 428658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429396, "end_char": 429406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430157, "end_char": 430170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 431509, "end_char": 431519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 431884, "end_char": 431894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 431947, "end_char": 431957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 432105, "end_char": 432114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433833, "end_char": 433843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434619, "end_char": 434629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435039, "end_char": 435049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435172, "end_char": 435182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436326, "end_char": 436336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437065, "end_char": 437074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437124, "end_char": 437134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437572, "end_char": 437581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437628, "end_char": 437638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438270, "end_char": 438288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438509, "end_char": 438519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438760, "end_char": 438769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438858, "end_char": 438860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tiu StaU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 438895, "end_char": 438903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 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Gopalan\n\nTiu StaU\n\nDo.]."}}, {"text": "Part Ill of the Constitution and that this Court should declare the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 439311, "end_char": 439382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439401, "end_char": 439414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Ill of the Constitution and that this Court should declare the Act", "statute": "Part Ill of the Constitution and that this Court should declare the Act"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 440468, "end_char": 440502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As will be seen more fully hereaf1er, the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law'', an expression tp be found in the Fifth ."}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 440542, "end_char": 440550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As will be seen more fully hereaf1er, the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law'', an expression tp be found in the Fifth ."}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443060, "end_char": 443071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443184, "end_char": 443200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443576, "end_char": 443592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443657, "end_char": 443668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 447332, "end_char": 447337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Entry 81 Parliament could have made any law restricting oreven 'prohibiting inter-State migration so that a Bengali would not be able to move into and settle in Bihar or\n\nvice versa."}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447474, "end_char": 447485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448223, "end_char": 448234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448359, "end_char": 448372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448674, "end_char": 448686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449130, "end_char": 449141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449695, "end_char": 449706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.K. Copa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 451991, "end_char": 452000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\n14-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA.K. Copa/an\n\nThe Statt\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482185, "end_char": 482195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482260, "end_char": 482270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482273, "end_char": 482283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482545, "end_char": 482558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482806, "end_char": 482816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482954, "end_char": 482964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 483484, "end_char": 483494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 483718, "end_char": 483728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 483766, "end_char": 483776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484079, "end_char": 484090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484207, "end_char": 484217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484279, "end_char": 484289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484884, "end_char": 484894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485585, "end_char": 485595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 486303, "end_char": 486313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 486769, "end_char": 486779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 486957, "end_char": 486967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Annandale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 487459, "end_char": 487468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ac; cording to Dr. Annandale's edition of the _Nw Gresham Dictionary the word \"establish,\" means, amongst other things, \"to found permanently; to institute; to enact or decree; to ordain ; to ratify; to make firm.\""}}, {"text": "A. K. Gqpa/.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 487813, "end_char": 487825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Established by law\" will, 15-3 S. C. India/.58\n\nA. K. Gqpa/.,,\n\nThe Stale\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 488170, "end_char": 488181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 488191, "end_char": 488208, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 488924, "end_char": 488951, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 488959, "end_char": 488985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 489278, "end_char": 489285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference is made to Salmond's Jurisprudence, 10th Edition, p. 37, showing that the term \"law\" is used in two senses and it is suggested that the word \"law\" in the expression \"established by law\" means law in its abstract sense of the principles of natural justice."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490044, "end_char": 490054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490517, "end_char": 490527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490586, "end_char": 490596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 23, 31 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490711, "end_char": 490733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 265 and 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490810, "end_char": 490830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490982, "end_char": 490992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 492922, "end_char": 492928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Says Judge Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th Edition, Vol.", "canonical_name": "Cooley"}}, {"text": "John Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 494903, "end_char": 494916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, seized this opportunity and assumed the right to say the last word on questions of constitutionality, and possesses that right to-day: (Munro, p. 62)."}}, {"text": "Carl Brent Swisher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 495189, "end_char": 495207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Carl Brent Swisher in his book on the Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States at p. 107 says, with reference to the development of the doctrine of due procedure:\n\n\"The American history of its interpretation falls into three periods.", "canonical_name": "Carl Brent Swisher"}}, {"text": "Bronson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 497433, "end_char": 497440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Taylor v. Peter l' ) Bronson J. observed: \"The words 'by the law of the land' as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong."}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 498205, "end_char": 498213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was thus that the Supreme Court of the United States firmly established its own supremacy over the other two iimhs of the State, namely, the executive and the Congress."}}, {"text": "John Dickinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 498232, "end_char": 498246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of John Dickinson quoted in Munro at p. 61, \"The Judges of Argon."}}, {"text": "S. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 498754, "end_char": 498760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Edwards", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 500669, "end_char": 500676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Westervelt v. Gregg ( 2 ) Edwards J defined it thus: ·\n\n\"Due process of law undoubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules\n\n(1) 20+ u. s. 561, 592."}}, {"text": "s. 561, 592", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 500815, "end_char": 500826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willough", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 502362, "end_char": 502370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This according to Willough by p. 736, means:\n\n\"(1) that he shall have had due notice, which may be actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings by which his legal rights may be affected;\n\n(2) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, including the right himself to testify, to produce witnesses, and to introduce relevant documents and other evidence, (3) that the tribunal in or before which his rights _are adjudicated is so constituted as to give reasonable assurance of its\n\n(1) 4 Wheaton 518 at p •. ~79; 4 L. Edn.", "canonical_name": "Willoughby"}}, {"text": "Mathews", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 504420, "end_char": 504427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This difference is pointedly described by Mathews J. in foseph Hurtado v. People of California ( 1 ) at p. 531:\n\n\"The concessions of Magna Charta were .wrung from the King as guarantees against oppression and usurpation of his prerogatives."}}, {"text": "S. 516", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505094, "end_char": 505100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 507371, "end_char": 507381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 507735, "end_char": 507745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508101, "end_char": 508111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 508389, "end_char": 508415, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 509541, "end_char": 509620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510076, "end_char": 510086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code", "statute": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code"}}, {"text": "article\n\n22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510172, "end_char": 510183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code", "statute": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510373, "end_char": 510383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code", "statute": "To sanctify what I may today regard as the basic principles underlying our Code"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510734, "end_char": 510744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 510884, "end_char": 510901, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 511016, "end_char": 511027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 511326, "end_char": 511352, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 511975, "end_char": 511986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512289, "end_char": 512300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512541, "end_char": 512551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512676, "end_char": 512686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512918, "end_char": 512928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513275, "end_char": 513285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513582, "end_char": 513592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513733, "end_char": 513743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopalon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 513899, "end_char": 513912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 21 as construed by me will, if nothing else, certainly protect every person against the executive and as such will be as niuch a fundamental right deserving\n\nA. K. Gopalon\n\nThe Stat•\n\nDas J.\n\nA.K. Copa/an v.\n\nT!it State\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514115, "end_char": 514125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514156, "end_char": 514166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514412, "end_char": 514422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 514456, "end_char": 514466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subject to this limitation our Parliament or any State Legislature may enact any law and provide any procedure it plea>es for depriving a person of his life and personal liberty under article 21."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514609, "end_char": 514619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514930, "end_char": 514941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514986, "end_char": 514996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 515050, "end_char": 515060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 515228, "end_char": 515241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rochester", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 515785, "end_char": 515794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subject to the limitations I have mentioned which are certainly ju>ticiable, our Constitution has accepted the supremacy of the legislative authority and, that being so, we must be prepared to face occasional vagaries of that body and to put up with enactments of the nature of the atrocious English statute to which learned counsel for the petitioner has repeatedly referred, namely, that the Bishop of Rochester's cook be boiled to death."}}, {"text": "Article 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517115, "end_char": 517125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517233, "end_char": 517243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517690, "end_char": 517701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517957, "end_char": 517967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopahm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 518267, "end_char": 518279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopahm\n\nv, The State\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518424, "end_char": 518434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518773, "end_char": 518784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518878, "end_char": 518888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518972, "end_char": 518982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 520538, "end_char": 520548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 520857, "end_char": 520867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 520928, "end_char": 520938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521504, "end_char": 521514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521829, "end_char": 521839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521902, "end_char": 521912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 522234, "end_char": 522244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 522540, "end_char": 522566, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopolan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 522739, "end_char": 522752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "major premise assumed by learned counsel for the petitioner is missing and this 16-3 S. C. India/58\n\nA. K. Gopolan\n\nV, Tli4Stak\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopala•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 522774, "end_char": 522787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopala•\n\nThe Statt\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 522958, "end_char": 522968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523071, "end_char": 523084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523274, "end_char": 523284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523734, "end_char": 523744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523951, "end_char": 523961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524019, "end_char": 524037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524093, "end_char": 524104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524267, "end_char": 524277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524318, "end_char": 524336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524625, "end_char": 524635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525114, "end_char": 525124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525305, "end_char": 525315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525603, "end_char": 525613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525675, "end_char": 525685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525751, "end_char": 525761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 526352, "end_char": 526378, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526429, "end_char": 526439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 526522, "end_char": 526548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526616, "end_char": 526626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526681, "end_char": 526691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526859, "end_char": 526869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 527031, "end_char": 527041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "C.palan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 527307, "end_char": 527314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.palan\n\nTt.. St\"\"\n\nDas]."}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 527677, "end_char": 527688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 527833, "end_char": 527849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 527912, "end_char": 527922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 528584, "end_char": 528600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 528922, "end_char": 528932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 529948, "end_char": 529958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 529994, "end_char": 530004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 530829, "end_char": 530839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 531596, "end_char": 531606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. Gopalan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 531750, "end_char": 531760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those provisions are not justiciable, for they are the provisions of the Constitution itself, which is supreme over every body\n\nA~ K. Gopalan\n\nTM State\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopaltu1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 531779, "end_char": 531793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopaltu1\n\nTiii Stau\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 533686, "end_char": 533696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 533872, "end_char": 533882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 534094, "end_char": 534104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 534140, "end_char": 534149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 535060, "end_char": 535070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 535137, "end_char": 535147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Gopo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 535961, "end_char": 535971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Gopo/an\n\nT J., State\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "A. K. Gopl'11111"}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 537429, "end_char": 537437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538163, "end_char": 538173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538378, "end_char": 538388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539639, "end_char": 539650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539654, "end_char": 539664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539881, "end_char": 539891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 541484, "end_char": 541494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 541640, "end_char": 541650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 542039, "end_char": 542049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 542160, "end_char": 542170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 542198, "end_char": 542208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 542278, "end_char": 542296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 542358, "end_char": 542368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543212, "end_char": 543222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543427, "end_char": 543437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543526, "end_char": 543536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543595, "end_char": 543605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543689, "end_char": 543699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543791, "end_char": 543801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543841, "end_char": 543851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 544047, "end_char": 544060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 544560, "end_char": 544570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 545032, "end_char": 545047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Petitioner : S. Subrahmanyam."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 545064, "end_char": 545079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Madras and Union of India : P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 545101, "end_char": 545111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Madras and Union of India : P.A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_940_949_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "OhiranjitzaZ\n\nOhowdhuri\n\nThe Union of\n\nIndia and\n\nOthtJTS.\n\nDasJ.\n\nDec. 14,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\nand their shareholders and has penalised this particular company and its shareholders, leaving out other companies and their shareholders who may be equally guilty of the alleged vice of mismanagement and neglect of the type referred to in the preambles. In my opinion the legislation in question infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner and offends against article 14 of our Constitution.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this petition ought to succeed and the petitioner should have an order m terms of prayer (3) of the petition with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed .\n\nAgent for the.petitioner: M. S. K. Aiyengar .\n\nAgent for opposite party Nos. 1 & 2: P.A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for opposite party Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 to 10:\n\nRajinder Narain.\n\nJ ANARDAN REDDY AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SA!YID FAZL ALI,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 134, 136, 374(4)-Special leave to appeal-Judgment of Hyderabad High Court passed before !16th Jan.\n\n1950-Application for special leave-1'.faintainability-Pendency of application for leave to appeal to Judicial Committee of Hyikrabad when new constitution came into force, effect of-Scope of Art. 136- \" Any court or tribunal in the territory of India \"-Interpretation of •tatute.-Presumption of prospective operation--Right to appeal.\n\nThe petitioners, who v.ere convicted and sentenced to death by a special tribunal in the Hyderabad State, preferred appeals to the High Court of Hyderabad which were dismissed, and they applied to the.High Court on the 21st Jan., 1950, for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad against the judgments of the High Court. On the 26th Jan., 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and under the Constitution, Hyderabad became a part of India, the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before that\n\nCommittee stood transferred to the Supreme Court of India.\n\nThe 1950\n\napplLntions of the petitioners were amended so as to 1nake them - applications under Art. 134 of the Constitution, but they wereJana?\"dan Reddy dismissed on the ground that no such petitions lay under Art. and Others 134 and also on the merits.\n\nThe p!3titioners thereupon made v. an application to the Supreme Court of India under Art. 136 of The State. the Constitution for special leave to appeal:\n\nHeld that, inasmuch as Art. 136 confers power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal only from any judgment, decree, sentence or order passed or made by \" any court or tribunal in the territory of India,\" and the Hyderabad High Comt was not a Court in the territory of India when the judgments in question were pronounced the Supreme Court bad no jurisdiction to grant special leave. Art. 136 cannot be so construed as to apply to judgments or orders pronounced before Hyderabad became part of India and tc confer a right of appeal inferentially, merely because the petitioners bad a right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad when the Constitution came into force and they had been deprived of this right by the abolition of that Committee without making a provision enabling them to appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION (Criminal) : Criminal Mis. cellaneous Petitions Nos. 71 to 73 of 1950.\n\nPetitions under Art. 136 of the Constitution praying for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad dated 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, dismissing the appeals preferred by the petitioners against orders of the Special Tribunal of Hyderabad con\\'icting them of murder and sentencing them to death.\n\nThe material facts and arguments of the counsel appear from the judgment.\n\nD. N. Pritt (K. B. Asthana, Daniel Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and A. S. R. Chari, with him) for tbe petitioners.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, .Attorney-General for India, and Raja Ram Iyer (G. N. Joshi, with them) for the respondent.\n\n1950. December 14.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKANIA C.J.-These are three criminal miscellaneous Kania c. J. petitions asking for special leave to appeal to the\n\n- ·-------------------------\n\n, '\n\n\\ [1950]\n\n1950 • Supreme Court under articie 136 of the Constitution of\n\n- -· _India. ·-- Janard'an Reddy ·- . . a•a Others .\n\nAll the accused were charged WI th berng members of\n\n- •. ,__ .the Communist Party wedded to the policy of over- Th• Stat•. throwing the existing Government at Hyderabad by violence and establishing in its place a communist\n\nKa•i~C. J. regime:-- It is alleged that they demanded subscriptions towards their communist organization and some of the villagers who did not meet their demands were abducted on the 21st of September, 1948, and murdered. They were charged with various offences including murder before a special tribunil established under the regulations promulgated by tlie Military Governor under the -authority of H. E. H. the Nizam and convicted and sentenced to deathon the 9th, 13th and 14th of August, 1949, by separate judgments. The petitioners appealed from those judgments to the Hyderabad High Court and the High Court, by its judgments dated the 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, respectively, dismissed the appeals. The petitioners applied to the High Court for a certificate to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Hyderabad State on the 21st of January, 1950. It appears that H.E. H. the ' Nizam issued a jirman.on the 23rd of November, 1949, stating that the proposed Constitution of India was suitable for the government of Hyderabad and he accepted, it as the Constitution of, the Hyderabad State as one of the States of PartB in the First Schedule. On the 26th of January, 1950, the Constitution of India became applicable to the Union of India and the Part B States. The petitions originally filed for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the Hyderabad State were, by leave of the Court, amended, and made into petitions under article 134 of the Constitution of India. A Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad considered the petitions and dismissed therri on the ground that no such petitiim-slay under article 134 and they also declared that on the merits no case was made out for a certificate as asked by the petitioners. Tlie petitioners have now filed their petitions to this Court under\n\narticle 136 of the Constitution of India, for special 19zo leave to appeal from the judgments of the High . Court ; r -d -R aa .· dated the 12th, 13th and 14th of December, 1949. a:i:; d ~h,:, Y Two questions arise for consideration. The'first is, v. whether any application under article 136, under the Th• St•t•. circumstances of the case, can be made to the Supreme\n\nCourt;-and, the second is, whether on a consideration Kan; a c. J. of the facts, if it has jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, the Court should grant special leave. The first question depends on the construction of the relevant articles in the Constitution of India. Under article 374 (4), on and from the commencement of this Constitution the jurisdiction of the authority functioning as the Privy Council in a State specified in.\n\nPart B to the First Schedule to entertain and dispose of appeals and .petitions from or in respect of any judgment, decree or order of any court within that State ceased, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before the said authority at such commencement stand transferred to and have to be disposed of by the Supreme Court. This sub-clause thus abolishes the jurisdiction of the Privy Council of the Hyderabad_ State and after the Constitution of India came into force that body and its jurisdiction altogether ceased.\n\nOn the facts before us, it is clear that as no proceeding or appeal in respect of these judgments of the Hydera-. bad High Court.was pending before the Hyderabad Privy Council before its abolition, nothing got transferred to the Supreme Court by operation of this sub- . clause.\n\nIt wls argued on behalf of the petitioners that on the 25th January, 1950, they had a right to move the High Court at Hyderabad for a certificate granting them leave to appeal to the Privy Council of the Hyderabad State. In fact such petitions were pending on that day. It was therefore argued that a right to appeal which existed on the 25th of January, 1950, cannot be impliedly taken away by the Constitution of India being made applicable to the State of Hyderabad. It was pointed out that in respect of convictions all pers.ons who had rights of appeal, or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]\n\n1950 who had time to file their applications for a certificate, - as also persons whose petitions were pending before\n\nJa:a;:~::::dy the Hyderabad High Court sking for such. certificates v. and which had not been disposed of because of the The State. congestion of work in the High Court would lose their right to appeal to the higher court if article 136 is not\n\nKm1ia c. J. construed so as to give a right of appeal to the Supreme Court of India. It was pointed out by the Attorney- General, appearing on behalf of the State, that if a wide construction is given to article 136 it will not only permit persons who are stated to be under such hardship to apply for leave under article 136 but several . other rights will be created. Such rights will arise not . only in criminal cases but in civil cases also and they can be exercised without any limitation as to the period within which the application has to be made, with the result that old judgments may also be called into question. Moreover, on the wider construction of article 136, judgments which had become final in those States in which there existed no court like the Privy Council to whom appeals could lie from the judgments of their High Courts, will be subject to appeal though no such appeal lay before. It was therefore argued that on the ground of convenience the balance if at all. is against the argument advanced by the petitioners.\n\nIt was strenuously urged that this is a wrong approach to the question altogether.\n\nArticles of the Constitution have to be construed according to their plain natural meaning and cases of hardship should not be brought to bear on the natural construction. Hard cases should not be permitted to make bad law. In our opinion, this argument of the Attorney-General is sound.\n\nThe question of hardship cannot be and should not be allowed to affect the true meaning of the words used in the Constitution. It is therefore proper to approach the articles irrespective of considerations of hardship.\n\nIn order to decide whether on the facts of this case, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant special leave, it is necessary only to consider articles 133, 134, 135 and 136 of the Constitution of India. Article 133, in substance, retains the old provisions of the Civil\n\n...\n\nProcedure Code in respect of appeals to the Privy 1950 Council from High Courts in civil matters. Under 1 d-R dd article 134, it is provided that an appeal shall lie to· •::d h.:, 11 the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or v. sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in The Stato. the territory of India if the High Court ......... (then follow three contingencies under which such appeals Kania c. J. can lie).\n\nIn article 133 also the words \" in the territory of India \" are used. Article 135 provides for matters to which the provisions of articles 133 or 134 do not apply. It is there provided that until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or 134 do not apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law. This article was included in' the Constitution to enable the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction in cases which were not covered by articles 133 and 134, in respect of matters where the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain appeals etc. from the High Courts under threviously existing law.\n\nThis is obviously a provision to vest in the Supreme Court the jurisdiction enjoyed by the Federal Court, under the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949. It may be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Privy Council to entertain appeals from High Courts, except those which were already pending before it on the 10th October 1949, was taken away by this Act. Provision had therefore to be made in respect of appeals which were already pending or which were not covered by th~ provisions of articles 133 and 134. Article 136 of the Constitution of India is in these terms:~\n\n\"136. (1) \"Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India.''\n\nl~\\\n\n(2) ......... \" -- The expression \"territory of India\" is defined in\n\nJa•ar:~:hReddy article 1 in these terms :-\n\n•• v. \"' \"1. The territory of India shall comprise Th• State.\n\n(a) the territories of the States (meaning the States mentioned in Parts A, B and C of the First Kania G. J. Schedule),\n\n(b) the territories specified in Part D of the First Schedule, (viz., The Andaman and Nicobar Islands) and\n\n(c) such other territories as may be acquired.\" The question for consideration is whether on the facts of the present case the Supreme Court can grant special leave to appeal from a judgment, sentence or order which was passed and made by the Hyderabad High Court before 26th January, 1950. The important fact to be borne in mind is that the Hyderabad courts were not courts within the territory of India when they pronounced their judgments on the 12th, 13th and 14th of December, 1949. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that a narrow construction will take away the valuable rights of appeal which had existed in persons iJ.i the position of petitioners when the Constitution onndia was directed by H. E. H. the Nizam by his firman to be applicable to the Hyderabad State on the 26th of January, 1950, it should be held that as no substantive right was provided in the Constitution separately, the words of article 136 were wide enough to give such right to the petitioners.\n\nOn the other hand, it was then argued by the learned Attorney- General that every legislation is primarily prospective and not retrospective.\n\nA right of appeal has to be given specifically by a statute and it is not merely a procedural right. If therefore there exists no right of appeal under the Constitution such right cannot be inferentially held to come into being on the application of the Constitution to the Hyderabad State.\n\nFor this, reliance was placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi & Another(') and The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving(•).\n\n(1) 54 I.A. 421.\n\n(2) [190\\] A.O. 369,\n\nIn our opinion, the contention of the Attorney- !950 general on this point is correct.\n\nThere appears no --- reason why in the present case the normal mode ofJanardan Reddy\n\n t 1 1 t · I ] and Others mterpre mg a eg1s a 10n as prospective only s iou d be v. departed from. It was contended by Mr. Pritt that The State. the interpretation sought to be put by the State on article 136 will require the insertion of the word Kania c. J. \"hereafter\" in the clause, for which there was no justification. We are unable to accept this contention because, prima f acie, every legislation is prospective and even without the use of the word \"hereafter\" the language of article 136 conveys the same meaning. It should be noticed in this case that before the 26th January, 1950, the Government of H. E. H. the Nizam was an independent State in the sense that no court in India or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London had any jurisdiction over the decisions of the Hyderabad State Courts. To give the Supreme Court of India jurisdiction over the decisions of courts of such a state, one requires specific provisions or provisions which necessarily confer jurisdiction to deal, on appeal, with the decisions of such courts. It is com. mon ground that there is no express provision of that kind.\n\nThere appear to us also no such necessary circumstances which on reasonable construction should\n\nbe treated as impliedly giving such right of appeal. Indeed the words \"territory of India\" lead to a contrary conclusion.\n\nUnder the words used in article 136 the courts which passed judgments or sentence must be courts within the territory of India. The territory of the Government of H.E.H. the Nizam was never the territory of India before the 26th of January, 1950, and therefore the judgment and sentence passed by the High Court of H.E.H. the Nizam on the 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, cannot be considered as judgments and sentence \"passed by a court within the territory of India\". On that short ground alone it seems that the petitioners' contention must fail.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. Pritt on behalf of the petitioners that if such construction were put, the territory of the Province of Bombay also may be exduded from\n\n1950 the operation of article 136. The answer however is that a right to file an appeal from the judgments of Janardan R•ddy the High Court at Bombay in both civil and criminal\n\nand Othors matters existed under the Civil Procedure Code,\n\nCriminal Procedure Code and the Letters Patent of The State the High Court before the 26th of January, 1950. Such\n\nKania o. J. right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the\n\nPrivy Council, which previously existed, was transferred to the Federal Court by the appropriate legislation and eventually by article 135 to the Supreme Court. Therefore by the interpretation, which we think is the proper interpretation of article 136 of the Constitution of India, the right of appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High Court is not taken away. It is true that having regard to the words used in article 136 which can bear a wider meaning a right to apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is given in respect of decisions not only of High Courts but of other tribunals also. That larger right, if it did not exist before the 26th January, 1950, can be legitimately construed as newly conferred by article 136 and such construction does not give rise to any' anomaly. In our opinion, therefore as the judgments were pronounced and sentences passed in all these matters before us by the High Court of Hyderabad, which was in the territory of H.E.H. the Nizam and which territory was not the territory of India before the 26th of January, 1950, and as those judgments were passed before the Constitution came into force they do not fall within the class of judgments against which special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court can be asked for under article 136. It is obvious that such judgments are not covered under article 135 of the Constitution of India.\n\nIn our opinion this Court has therefore no jurisdic- • tion to entertain these petitions for special leave to appeal against such judgments of the High Court of Hyderabad under Article 136 of the Constitution.\n\nCases like those of the petitioners are thus not covered by articles 134, 135 or 136 and therefore the Supreme Court in the present state of the legislation is unable to\n\nrender any assistance to them. An omission to pro- 1950 vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be d. d b h S C d fJanardan Reddy reme 1e y t e upreme ourt an assumption o d Oth jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words an\n\nv. \"'\n\ni!O' of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to mak- Tile Stat•· ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never its function to do.\n\nKania o. J.\n\nThe petitions, under the circumstances, are rejected.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners : I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nGNANAMBAL AMMAL v.\n\nT. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS.\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Will-Construction-General pinciples-Presunw tion ag iinst intestacy.\n\nThe cardinal maxim to be observea by courts in construing a will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testi:i.tor.\n\nThis intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done if he had been better informed or better advised.\n\n~ The courts are however entitled and bound to bear in mind other matters than merely the words used.\n\nThey must consider\n\n~-, the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armch&ir '.\n\nBut all this is solely ae an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of the language - when used by that particular testator in that document.\n\nAs soon as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry out the intentions as expressed. The court is in no c•se justified in adding to testarnentary dispositions.\n\nIn all cases it musb loyally carry out the will as properly construed, &nd thi~ duty is\n\nDec. 21.", "total_entities": 127, "entities": [{"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 475, "end_char": 485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 709, "end_char": 726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the.petitioner: M. S. K. Aiyengar ."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 & 2: P.A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A. 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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 998, "end_char": 1019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 134, 136, 374(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1021, "end_char": 1043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1318, "end_char": 1326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1594, "end_char": 1617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, who v.ere convicted and sentenced to death by a special tribunal in the Hyderabad State, preferred appeals to the High Court of Hyderabad which were dismissed, and they applied to the."}}, {"text": "21st Jan., 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court on the 21st Jan., 1950, for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad against the judgments of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court on the 21st Jan., 1950, for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad against the judgments of the High Court."}}, {"text": "26th Jan., 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1806, "end_char": 1821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th Jan., 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and under the Constitution, Hyderabad became a part of India, the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before that\n\nCommittee stood transferred to the Supreme Court of India."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1827, "end_char": 1848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2074, "end_char": 2096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th Jan., 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and under the Constitution, Hyderabad became a part of India, the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and all appeals and other proceedings pending before that\n\nCommittee stood transferred to the Supreme Court of India."}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2194, "end_char": 2202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2441, "end_char": 2449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2534, "end_char": 2542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2564, "end_char": 2577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 confers power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal only from any judgment, decree, sentence or order passed or made by \" any court or tribunal in the territory of India,\" and the Hyderabad High Comt was not a Court in the territory of India when the judgments in question were pronounced the Supreme Court bad no jurisdiction to grant special leave."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2723, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 confers power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal only from any judgment, decree, sentence or order passed or made by \" any court or tribunal in the territory of India,\" and the Hyderabad High Comt was not a Court in the territory of India when the judgments in question were pronounced the Supreme Court bad no jurisdiction to grant special leave."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Comt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2739, "end_char": 2758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 confers power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal only from any judgment, decree, sentence or order passed or made by \" any court or tribunal in the territory of India,\" and the Hyderabad High Comt was not a Court in the territory of India when the judgments in question were pronounced the Supreme Court bad no jurisdiction to grant special leave."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2995, "end_char": 3004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 cannot be so construed as to apply to judgments or orders pronounced before Hyderabad became part of India and tc confer a right of appeal inferentially, merely because the petitioners bad a right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad when the Constitution came into force and they had been deprived of this right by the abolition of that Committee without making a provision enabling them to appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3353, "end_char": 3375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPELLATE JURISDICTION (Criminal) : Criminal Mis."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3573, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution praying for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad dated 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, dismissing the appeals preferred by the petitioners against orders of the Special Tribunal of Hyderabad con\\'icting them of murder and sentencing them to death."}}, {"text": "12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution praying for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad dated 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, dismissing the appeals preferred by the petitioners against orders of the Special Tribunal of Hyderabad con\\'icting them of murder and sentencing them to death."}}, {"text": "Special Tribunal of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution praying for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad dated 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, dismissing the appeals preferred by the petitioners against orders of the Special Tribunal of Hyderabad con\\'icting them of murder and sentencing them to death."}}, {"text": "D. N. Pritt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Pritt (K. B. Asthana, Daniel Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and A. S. R. Chari, with him) for tbe petitioners."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Pritt (K. B. Asthana, Daniel Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and A. S. R. Chari, with him) for tbe petitioners."}}, {"text": "Daniel Latifi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3918, "end_char": 3931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Pritt (K. B. Asthana, Daniel Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and A. S. R. Chari, with him) for tbe petitioners."}}, {"text": "Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Pritt (K. B. Asthana, Daniel Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and A. S. R. Chari, with him) for tbe petitioners."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Pritt (K. B. Asthana, Daniel Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and A. S. R. Chari, with him) for tbe petitioners."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4009, "end_char": 4023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, .Attorney-General for India, and Raja Ram Iyer (G. N. Joshi, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Raja Ram Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4058, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, .Attorney-General for India, and Raja Ram Iyer (G. N. Joshi, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4073, "end_char": 4084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, .Attorney-General for India, and Raja Ram Iyer (G. N. Joshi, with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKANIA C.J.-These are three criminal miscellaneous Kania c. J. petitions asking for special leave to appeal to the\n·-------------------------\n\n, '\n\n\\ [1950]\n\n1950 • Supreme Court under articie 136 of the Constitution of\n-· _India. ·--", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "21st of September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4867, "end_char": 4890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the accused were charged WI th berng members of\n•. , .the Communist Party wedded to the policy of over- Th• Stat•. throwing the existing Government at Hyderabad by violence and establishing in its place a communist\n\nKa•i~C. J. regime:-- It is alleged that they demanded subscriptions towards their communist organization and some of the villagers who did not meet their demands were abducted on the 21st of September, 1948, and murdered."}}, {"text": "H. E. H. the Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5085, "end_char": 5103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were charged with various offences including murder before a special tribunil established under the regulations promulgated by tlie Military Governor under the -authority of H. E. H. the Nizam and convicted and sentenced to deathon the 9th, 13th and 14th of August, 1949, by separate judgments.", "canonical_name": "H.E. H. the ' Nizam"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5259, "end_char": 5279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners appealed from those judgments to the Hyderabad High Court and the High Court, by its judgments dated the 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, respectively, dismissed the appeals."}}, {"text": "21st of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners applied to the High Court for a certificate to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Hyderabad State on the 21st of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "H.E. H. the ' Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that H.E. H. the ' Nizam issued a jirman.on the 23rd of November, 1949, stating that the proposed Constitution of India was suitable for the government of Hyderabad and he accepted, it as the Constitution of, the Hyderabad State as one of the States of PartB in the First Schedule.", "canonical_name": "H.E. H. the ' Nizam"}}, {"text": "23rd of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5608, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that H.E. H. the ' Nizam issued a jirman.on the 23rd of November, 1949, stating that the proposed Constitution of India was suitable for the government of Hyderabad and he accepted, it as the Constitution of, the Hyderabad State as one of the States of PartB in the First Schedule."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5658, "end_char": 5679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5826, "end_char": 5840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th of January, 1950, the Constitution of India became applicable to the Union of India and the Part B States."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th of January, 1950, the Constitution of India became applicable to the Union of India and the Part B States."}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6187, "end_char": 6208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the High Court at Hyderabad considered the petitions and dismissed therri on the ground that no such petitiim-slay under article 134 and they also declared that on the merits no case was made out for a certificate as asked by the petitioners."}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th, 13th and 14th of December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6682, "end_char": 6719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated the 12th, 13th and 14th of December, 1949."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6823, "end_char": 6834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt;-and", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The'first is, v. whether any application under article 136, under the Th• St•t•. circumstances of the case, can be made to the Supreme\n\nCourt;-and, the second is, whether on a consideration Kan; a c. J. of the facts, if it has jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, the Court should grant special leave."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7161, "end_char": 7182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7190, "end_char": 7201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7364, "end_char": 7378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7791, "end_char": 7812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It wls argued on behalf of the petitioners that on the 25th January, 1950, they had a right to move the High Court at Hyderabad for a certificate granting them leave to appeal to the Privy Council of the Hyderabad State."}}, {"text": "25th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8498, "end_char": 8519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was therefore argued that a right to appeal which existed on the 25th of January, 1950, cannot be impliedly taken away by the Constitution of India being made applicable to the State of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was therefore argued that a right to appeal which existed on the 25th of January, 1950, cannot be impliedly taken away by the Constitution of India being made applicable to the State of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9097, "end_char": 9108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9321, "end_char": 9332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9431, "end_char": 9442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9782, "end_char": 9793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 133, 134, 135 and 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10900, "end_char": 10930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10938, "end_char": 10959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10961, "end_char": 10972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11147, "end_char": 11158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the territory of India if the High Court ......... (then follow three contingencies under which such appeals Kania c. J. can lie).", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11471, "end_char": 11482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11538, "end_char": 11549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11598, "end_char": 11610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11664, "end_char": 11674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is there provided that until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or 134 do not apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11814, "end_char": 11825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 133 and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12155, "end_char": 12175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th October 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12646, "end_char": 12663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Privy Council to entertain appeals from High Courts, except those which were already pending before it on the 10th October 1949, was taken away by this Act."}}, {"text": "articles 133 and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12824, "end_char": 12844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "statute": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12846, "end_char": 12857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "statute": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12865, "end_char": 12886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13276, "end_char": 13285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13536, "end_char": 13550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13868, "end_char": 13886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question for consideration is whether on the facts of the present case the Supreme Court can grant special leave to appeal from a judgment, sentence or order which was passed and made by the Hyderabad High Court before 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14514, "end_char": 14525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ofJanardan Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15422, "end_char": 15438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There appears no --- reason why in the present case the normal mode ofJanardan Reddy\n\n t 1 1 t · I ] and Others mterpre mg a eg1s a 10n as prospective only s iou d be v. departed from.", "canonical_name": "ofJanardan Reddy"}}, {"text": "Pritt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15563, "end_char": 15568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Pritt that The State."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15637, "end_char": 15648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15688, "end_char": 15693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the interpretation sought to be put by the State on article 136 will require the insertion of the word Kania c. J. \"hereafter\" in the clause, for which there was no justification.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15926, "end_char": 15937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of H. E. H. the Nizam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16038, "end_char": 16070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be noticed in this case that before the 26th January, 1950, the Government of H. E. H. the Nizam was an independent State in the sense that no court in India or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London had any jurisdiction over the decisions of the Hyderabad State Courts."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16182, "end_char": 16188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be noticed in this case that before the 26th January, 1950, the Government of H. E. H. the Nizam was an independent State in the sense that no court in India or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London had any jurisdiction over the decisions of the Hyderabad State Courts."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad State Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16236, "end_char": 16258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be noticed in this case that before the 26th January, 1950, the Government of H. E. H. the Nizam was an independent State in the sense that no court in India or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London had any jurisdiction over the decisions of the Hyderabad State Courts."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16810, "end_char": 16821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of H.E.H. the Nizam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16935, "end_char": 16965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The territory of the Government of H.E.H. the Nizam was never the territory of India before the 26th of January, 1950, and therefore the judgment and sentence passed by the High Court of H.E.H. the Nizam on the 12th, 13th and 14th December, 1949, cannot be considered as judgments and sentence \"passed by a court within the territory of India\"."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17465, "end_char": 17471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Mr. Pritt on behalf of the petitioners that if such construction were put, the territory of the Province of Bombay also may be exduded from\n\n1950 the operation of article 136."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17520, "end_char": 17531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Janardan R•ddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17608, "end_char": 17622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The answer however is that a right to file an appeal from the judgments of Janardan R•ddy the High Court at Bombay in both civil and criminal\n\nand Othors matters existed under the Civil Procedure Code,\n\nCriminal Procedure Code and the Letters Patent of The State the High Court before the 26th of January, 1950.", "canonical_name": "ofJanardan Reddy"}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17627, "end_char": 17647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The answer however is that a right to file an appeal from the judgments of Janardan R•ddy the High Court at Bombay in both civil and criminal\n\nand Othors matters existed under the Civil Procedure Code,\n\nCriminal Procedure Code and the Letters Patent of The State the High Court before the 26th of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17736, "end_char": 17759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18040, "end_char": 18051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18173, "end_char": 18194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18241, "end_char": 18258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore by the interpretation, which we think is the proper interpretation of article 136 of the Constitution of India, the right of appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High Court is not taken away."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18329, "end_char": 18340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18638, "end_char": 18649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19187, "end_char": 19198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19256, "end_char": 19267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19275, "end_char": 19296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19476, "end_char": 19487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 134, 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19570, "end_char": 19587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "fJanardan Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19803, "end_char": 19818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An omission to pro- 1950 vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be d. d b h S C d fJanardan Reddy reme 1e y t e upreme ourt an assumption o d Oth jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words an\n\nv. \"'\n\ni!O' of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to mak- Tile Stat•· ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never its function to do.", "canonical_name": "ofJanardan Reddy"}}, {"text": "articles 134, 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19941, "end_char": 19958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20199, "end_char": 20211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners : I. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20240, "end_char": 20251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20303, "end_char": 20318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SA!YID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20320, "end_char": 20329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_949_960_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 949\n\nrender any assistance to them. An omission to pro- 1950 vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be d. d b h S C d fJanardan Reddy reme 1e y t e upreme ourt an assumption o d Oth jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words an\n\nv. \"'\n\ni!O' of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to mak- Tile Stat•· ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never its function to do.\n\nKania o. J.\n\nThe petitions, under the circumstances, are rejected.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners : I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nGNANAMBAL AMMAL v.\n\nT. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS.\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Will-Construction-General pinciples-Presunw tion ag iinst intestacy.\n\nThe cardinal maxim to be observea by courts in construing a will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testi:i.tor.\n\nThis intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done if he had been better informed or better advised.\n\n~ The courts are however entitled and bound to bear in mind other matters than merely the words used.\n\nThey must consider\n\n~-, the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armch&ir '.\n\nBut all this is solely ae an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of the language - when used by that particular testator in that document.\n\nAs soon as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry out the intentions as expressed. The court is in no c•se justified in adding to testarnentary dispositions.\n\nIn all cases it musb loyally carry out the will as properly construed, &nd thi~ duty is\n\nDec. 21.\n\nGnanambaZ\n\nAmmal\n\nv. 'l', Raju Ayyar\n\nand Others.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1950)\n\nuniversal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every religion or ra.nk of life.\n\nA presumption against intestacy may be ra!sed if it is justified by the context of the document or the surrounding circumstances; but it can be invoked only when tbe\"e is undoubted ambiguity in ascertainment of the intentions of the testator.\n\nIt cannot be that merely with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise than construe plain words a.ccording to their plain mea.ning.\n\nA Hindu died leaving a widow, a widowed daughter N, and a married daughter G, after he had ma.de a will giving authority to bis widow to adopt a son of G should she beget one, or in tbe alternative a. son of One of his nephews.\n\nPara. 4 of the will provided that if his widow adopted G's son all bis properties except the village of K and the house at I and other properties disposed of by the will shall pass to the adopted son ; and par&. 5 provided as follows: \"The whole of the village of Kand tho house al I, my daughter N shall enjoy with life interest and after her the said properly shall pass to my daughter G and her children on p•yment by the latter of Rs. 5,000 to A, the daughter of N.\" Later on, amongst the provisions which he wished to ma.ke if a.\n\nson of a nephew was adopted, there was a provision which ran as follows: \" Para. 13.\n\nThe village of K shall Le enjoyed by N as stated in para. 5.'' A nephew's son was arlopted and he insti luted a suit against G after N's death for recovery of the village K contending that under para. 13 of the will there was no disposition of the village after the life interest of N and on her death the village vested in him as the testatof's heir: Held, on a construction of the will as a whole, thal the testator did not intend that in the contingency of the adoption of a nephew's son, \\he village K should pass, on N's death, to the adopted son; on ohe other hand, the provisions of para. 5 of the will were intended to apply even in the case of such a contin gency and the village passed to G on N's death under para. 5 of the will.\n\nJudgment of the High Court of Madras reversed.\n\nVenkatanarasimha v. Parthasarathy (HI.A. 51) and Re Edward; Jones v. Jones [1906, 1 Ob. 570], referred to.\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. XIII of 1950.\n\nAppeal from a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court (Wadsworth and Rajamannar JJ.) dated 27th November, 1945, in Appeal No. 518 of 1941, reversing the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram dated 10th July, 1944, in Original Suit No. 34 of 1943.\n\nB. Somayya (R. Ramamurti, with him) for the\n\napellant.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K. Narasimha rnso Aiyangar, with him) for respondent No. 1.\n\nGnanambaZ\n\n1950. December 21. The Judgment of the Court Ammal was delivered by v.\n\nT. Raju Ayyar M UKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against an and Others. appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated November 27, 1945, reversing the Muklieriea J, decision of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram made in Original $uit No. 34 of 1943.\n\nThere is no dispute about the material facts of the case which lie within a short compass and the controversy centers round one point only which turns upon the construction of a will left by one Kothandarama Ayyar to whom the properties in suit admittedly belonged. Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu.\n\nKothandarama executed his last will on 13th March, 1905, and by this will, the genuineness of which is not disputed in the present litigation, he gave an authority to his widow to adopt unto him a son of his second daughter Gnanambal, should she beget one before January, 1908, or in the alternative any of the sons of his two nephews, if the widow so chose.\n\nThe suit, out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by Raju Ayyar, who was a son of the testator's nephews and was taken in adoption by the widow in terms of the will; and it was for recovery of possession of certain properties, known as Kothangudi properties whicl; l formed part of the testator's estate on the allegation that under the will mentioned above, these properties were given to Nagammal, the widowed daughter of the testator for her life-time, but as there was no disposition of the remaining interest after the death of the life tenant, the properties vested in the\n\nGnan.atnbai\n\nAmmal\n\nT. Raju Ayyar\n\na'ld Oth1rs.\n\nJfukherjea J.\n\nplaintiff as the adopted son and heir of the deceased on the death of Nagammal which took place on 3rd of ] anuary, 1943. Gnanambal, the second daughter of the testator, was the first and main defendant in the suit, and she resisted the plaintiff's claim primarily on the ground that there was no intestacy as regards the suit properties after the termination of the life interest of Nagammal, and that under the terms of the will itself she was entitled to get these properties in absolute right after the death of Nagammal, subject to payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu, the daughter of Nagammal.\n\nAlamelu was made the second defendant in the suit and as she died when the snit was pending in the trial court, her heirs were impleaded as defendants 3 to 9.\n\nThe first court accepted the contention of the defendant No. 1 and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal to the High Court, the judgment was reversed and the plaintiff's claim was allowed. The defendant No. 1 has now come up appeal to this court.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions that have been raised by the parties to this appeal, it would be convenient first of all to refer briefly to the relevant provisions of the will: After cancelling his previous wills. the testator in the third paragraph of his will, gave his widow authority to adopt a son. She was to adopt the son of Gnanambal, if the latter got a son previous to January 1908, or she could adopt any of the sons of the testator's nephews. Paragraph 4 provides that if the first course is followed, that is, if the son of Gnanambal is adopted by the widow, then all the properties, movable and immovable, belonging to the testator excepting the village of Kothangudi, the house at Injigudi and the other properties which were disposed of by the will would go to such adopted son. Paragraph 5, which is material for our present purposes runs as follows :-\n\n\" The whole village of Kothangudi and the house at lnjigudi, both of Nannilam Taluk, my daughter Nagammal, shall enjoy with life interest and after her the said property shall pass to my daughter Gnanambal and her children on payment by the latter of Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu, Nagammal's daughter.\"\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 953 , ' By the sixth paragraph the Nallathukudi and 1950 Pungavur villages together with certain house prot M h , d Gnanabal per y at ayavaram are given tot e testators a op- Ammal tive mother and wife in equal shares to be enjoyed v. by both of them during their life-time and after r. Raiu Ayyar their death they are to pass on to the adopted son. and Othm.\n\nParagraph 7 gives a small house absolutely to Nagam.\n\nMukherJ•• J mal for her residence and paragraph 8 makes certain provisions for management of the properties. In para. graph 9 direction is given to collect the money due on the insurance policy on the life of the testator an.d to. pay off his debts.\n\nParagraph IO mentions certain charities, the expense;; of which are to be defrayed from the income of the Nallathukudi properties. Para. graph 11 then says that in the event of the widow adopting any of the nephew's sons of the testator, such son shall inherit the entire property at Kokkur and also the lands of Nallathukudi after the death of the testator's wife and mother. By paragraph 12, the village of Maruthanthanallur is given to Gnanambal and paragraph 13 provides that \"the village of Kothangudi shall be enjoyed by Nagammal as stated in paragraph 5 \". By paragraphs IS and 16 the remainder in the house at Mayavaram situated in the east row of Vellalarkovil Street is given to Gnanambal after the death of the testator's wife and mother. Paragraph 18 provides for certain other charities. In paragraph 20 it is stated that if the wife of the testator should die before January, 1908, without making any adoption, then the eldest or any son of Gnanarnbal would be his adopted son without any formality and inherit all the properties subject to the conditions mentionecj in the will. Paragraph 21, which is the penultimate paragraph in the will, further lays down that if all the three contingencies fail and no adoption is taken, the male chilci or children born to Gnanambal shall inherit as grandsons all the properties of the testator, subject to the conditions specified in the will. These, in brief, are the dispositions made in the will. The plaintiff founds him claim upon paragraph 13 of. the will which, according to him, contams the et1tlre disposition so far as the Kothangudi\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950) ' 1950 property is concerned.\n\nThat village is given to Nagammal for her life with no disposition of the Gnanamba.l b Ammal remaining interest. If the remain<ler has not een v. disposed of, there is no doubt that the plaintiff would T. Raju Ayyar be entitled to the property as the heir of the testator ·\n\nand Others. under the ordinary law of inheritance.\n\nMukherjea J, The defen<lant No. l, on the other hand, relies on paragraph 5 of the will, which gives the Kothangudi village and the Injigudi house to Nagammal to be enjoyed by her so long as she lives and after her death they are to go to Gnanambal and her children. subject to the payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000 to be paid .to Alamelu, the daughter of Nagammal.\n\nThe High Court on a construction of the will has found in favour of the plaintiff primarily on the ground that in the contingency which happened in the present case, viz., that the widow took in adoption a nephew's ,; on of the testator, paragraph 5 of the will did not come into operation at all. The disposition as regards Kothangudi property is, therefore, to be found exclusively in paragraph 13 of the will and the actual words employed by the testator in that paragraph do not . indicate that apart from Nagammal's taking a life estate in the Kothangudi village the rest of the provisions in regard to this property as laid down in paragraph 5 would also be incorporated into para- graph 13.\n\nAn obvious difficulty, according to the learned Judges, in accepting the construction sought to be put upon the will by. defendant No. 1 is that paragraph 5 speaks both of Kothangudi and Injigudi properties, whereas paragraph 13 does not mention the Injigudi house at all, nor does it purport to give a life interest in the same to Nagammal. It could not be reasonably held on a construction of the will that the intention of the testator was that Gnanambal was to pay Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu for the Kothangudi property alone.\n\nThe result was that the plaintiff's claim was allowed. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in this appeal.\n\nIn course of the arguments, we have been referred by the learned Counsel on both sides to quite a large\n\nnumber of decided authorities, both English and Indian, in support of their respective contentions. It is seldom profitable to compare the words of one will with those of another or to attempt to find out to which of the wills upon which decisions have been given in reported cases, the will before us approximates closely. Cases are helpful only in so far as they purport to lay down certain general principles of construction and at the present day these general principles seem to be fairly well settled.\n\nThe cardinal maxim to be observed by courts in construing . a will is to endeavour to ascertain the inten. tions of the testator. This intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done if he had been better informed or better advised. In construing the language of the will as the Privy Council observed in Venkata Narasimha v.\n\nParthasarathy (1), \"the courts are entitled and bound to bear in mind other matters than merely the words used.\n\nThey must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that. he would use words in a particular sense, and many other things which are often summed up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'The court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armchair' ...... Ent all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document.\n\nSo soon as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry out the intentions as expressed, and none other. The court is in no case justified in adding to testamentary dispositions ...... In all cases it must loyally carry out the will as properly construed, and this duty is universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every religion or rank of life.\"\n\nA question is sometimes raised as to whether in construing a will the court should lean against\n\n\\\\) i l. 1-.. nl at~- io.\n\nGnanatnbal\n\nAmtnal\n\nT. Raju Ayyru\n\nand Othera.\n\nkfuk1ierjea J,\n\n1950 intestacy. The desire to avoid intestacy was considered by the Privy Council in the case referred to Gnananibal above as a rule based on English necessity and English Ammal v. habits of thought which should not necessarily bind an T. Rniu Ayyar Indian court. It seems that a presumption against\n\nand Others. intestacy may be raised if it is justified by the context of the document or the surrounding circumstances; Muk7\"'j'\" J. but it can be invoked only when there is undoubted ambiguity in acertainment of the intentions of the testator.\n\nAs Lord Justice Romer observed in Re Edwards; Jones v. Jones (1), \"it cannot be that merely with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise than construe plain words according to their plain meaning\". It is in the light of the above principles that we should proceed to examine the contents of the will before us.\n\nThe present will, which is the last of four testamentary document executed by the testator, appears to have been prepared with a great deal of care and circumspection. The testator had clearly in mind the different situations that might arise in case his widow adopted either Gnanambal's son or a son of one of the nephews of the testator.\n\nHe envisaged also the possibility of the widow dying without making any adoption at all. Besides the son to be adopted, the only other relations who had natural claims upon the affection and bounty of the te,; tator and for whom he desired to make provisions were his wife, his adoptive mother, the two daughters and the infant grand-daughter. The interests given to his wife, the adoptive mother and the eldest daughter, who were all widows, were for their life-time, except a small house \\..- property which was given absolutely for the residence of the eldest daughter. On the other hand, the bequests in favour of Gnanambal, who was a married daughter, and the adopted son of the testator, were absolute in their character. Besides these dispositions, there were certain gifts for charity which were to be met out of the income of the properties given to the wife and the adoptive mother for their lives.\n\nOne singular feature\n\n(II [1906] 1 Ch. 570 at p. 574.\n\nin the will is that the testator took scrupulous care to 1950 include in it every item of property that he owned.\n\nGnanambal There are two provisions in the wiJI relating to Ammal Kothangudi property to which the dispute in the prev. sent suit relates. One is in paragraph 5 which gives T. Raju Ayyar this property along with the house at Injigudi to and Othe ....\n\nNagammal, the remainder being given to the appellant Mu,;;:erjea J, subject to the payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu, the daughter of Nagammal. The other is in paragraph 13, which merely says that Nagammal was to get it for life as stated in paragraph 5. The view taken by the High Court and which has been pressed for our acceptance here by the learned Counsel for the respondents is that paragraph 5 was meant to be operative only if Gnanarnbal's son was adopted by the widow.\n\nAs that was not done, paragraphs 4 to 8 of the will, it is urged, will go out of the picture altogether and it is not permissible to refer to them except to the extent that they were impliedly incorporated in the subsequent paragraphs of the will. We do not think that this is the correct way of reading the document.\n\nThe testator undoubtedly contemplated different contingencies; but a reading of the whole will d<;>es not show that he wanted to make separate and self-contained provisions with regard to each of the .contingencies that might arise and that each set of provisions were . to be read as exclusive of the other set or sets. That does not appear to be the scheme of the will. The testator's main desire undoubtedly was that his widow should adopt the son of his daugllter Gnanam bal, and in the first part of his will after making provisions for his two daughters, his wife and adoptive mother and also for certain charities, he left the rest of his properties to the son of Gnanambal that was to be adopted by his widow. ln the second part of the will, which is comprised in paragraphs II to 16, the testator sets out the modifications which he desires to make in the earlier dispositions in case a son of one of his nephews was adopted by the widow. It was not the intention of the testator that on the happening of the second contingency, all\n\nGnanambal\n\nAmmal\n\nT. RaJu Ayyar\n\nand Others.\n\nM11, kherjea J.\n\nthe earlier provisions of the will would stand cancelled and the entire dispositions of the testator's property would have to be found within the four corners of paragraphs 11 to 16 of the will.\n\nIn our opinion, the provisions made for the two daughters, the widow and the adoptive mother as made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the will and also the provisions for charities and payment of debts contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 were meant to be applicable under all the three contingencies referred to above.\n\nThis is clear from the fact that provisions of paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 have not been repeated or incorporated in paragraphs 11 to 16, although it cannot be suggested that they were not to take effect on the happening of the second contingency.\n\nAgain in the third contiugency contemplated by the testator, which is described in paragraph 20, it is expressly stated that if no adoption is made, the eldest or any son of Gnanambal would inherit the properties and he shall take the properties subject to the conditions mentioned in the will.\n\nThe conditions spoken of here undoubtedly refer to the provisions made for the mother, wife and the two daughters of the testator as well as in respect to payment of debts and carrying out of the charities specified in paragraph 10.\n\nThe changes that are to take effect on the happening of the second event are in regard to the beq nests in favour of the adopted son.\n\nUnder paragraph 4 of the will, the adopted son was to get all the properties of the testator with the exception of those given to the two daughters, the mother and the wife.\n\nUnder para. graph 11, if the adoption is of a nephew's son of the testator, the adopted son gets only the Kokkur properties and the reversionary interest in Nallatlmkudi village after the death of the testator's wife and mother.\n\nThe village Maruthanthanallur which would go to the adopted son under paragraph 4 is taken away under paragraph 11 and is given to Gnanambal.\n\nShe is also given the remaining interest in the Mayavaram house which was given to the adopted son under paragraph 6.\n\nSubject to the changes thus made, the provisions\n\n-,..\n\nof paragraphs 5. 6 and 7 would, in our opinion, still remain operative even if the person adopted was a nephew's son of the testator. No change is made in paragraphs 11 to 16 with regard to the provision in paragraph 5 of the will.\n\nIn paragraph 13 it is only stated that the village Kothangudi shall be enjoyed by Nagammal as stated in paragraph 5. It may be conceded that this statement by itself does not let in the entire provision of paragraph. 5, but that is not material for our present purpose. It is enough that paragraph 5 has not been changed .or altered in any way. The statement in paragraph 13 may, after all, be a loose expression which the testator used only for the purpose of emphasising that the Kothangudi village would be enjoyed by Nagammal even if Gnanambal's son was not adopted. This is not by way of making any new disposition, but only to affirm what has been already done.\n\nThe affirmation of a portion of the provision which is perfectly superfluous cannot exclude the rest.\n\nIt is somewhat difficult to say why the rest of the provisions in paragraph 5, particularly the benefit that was meant to be given to Alamelu, was not repeated in paragraph 13. It may be that the testator did not consider it necessary or it may be that it was due to inadvertance. It is to be noted here that the testator did not mention anywhere in paragraphs 11 to 16 the small house that was given absolutely to Nagammal under paragraph 7. It was certainly not the intention of the testator that Nagammal would not have that house on the happening of the second contingency. If paragraph 5 itself is held to be a pp Ji. cable-and in our opinion it should be so held-there is no question of adding to or altering any ofthe words made use of by the testator. It is not a question of making a new will for the testator or inventing a bequest for certain persons simply because the will shows that they were the objects of the testator's affection.\n\nThe provision is in the will itself and it is only a. question of interpretation as to whether it is applicable in the circumstances which have happened in the present case. The position, therefOie, seems\n\n1950 .\n\nGnanambal\n\nAnimal\n\nv. 1'. Raju Ayyar\n\nand Others.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\n' 1950\n\nto be that the disposition made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, which were in favour of the mother, the wife and the Gnanamb:tl\n\nAmmal two daughters of the testator were meant to take effect v. immediately on the testator's death. They were not T. Raju Ayyar contingent gifts in the sense of being made dependent\n\nand Othors upon the adoption of Gnanambal's son by the wife of the testator. Only the reversionary interest in the Mukherjea J. Mayavaram house, which was to vest in the adopted son under the provision of paragraph 6 after the death of the widow and the mother was taken away from the adopted son and given to Gnanambal in case the person adopted was not her own son. If the whole of paragraph 5 remains operative the Injigudi house must also be deemed to have been given to Nagammal for her life and in fact the evidence is that she enjoyed it so long as she was alive.\n\nNo difficulty also arises regarding the payment of Rs. 5,000 to Alamelu as has been stated by the High Court in its judgment.\n\nHaving regard to the meticulous care with which the testator seems to have attempted to provide for the different contingencies that might arise and the anxiety displayed by him in making an effective disposition of all the properties he owned, it is not probable that he would omit to make any provision regarding the future devolution of the Kothangudi village if he really thought that such direction had to be repeated in the latter part of the will. The omission of the gift of Rs. 5,000 to Alame\\u also cannot be explained on any other hypothesis. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present case to invoke any rule of . presumption against intestacy, but if the presumption exists at all, it certainly fortifies the conclusion which we have arrived at..\n\nThe result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the of the High Court are set aside and those of the Subordinate Judge restored.\n\nThe appellant will have costs of all the courts.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nM. S. Krishnamoorthi\n\nSastri,.\n\nAgent for respondent No. I:", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "fJanardan Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An omission to pro- 1950 vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be d. d b h S C d fJanardan Reddy reme 1e y t e upreme ourt an assumption o d Oth jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words an\n\nv. \"'\n\ni!O' of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to mak- Tile Stat•· ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never its function to do."}}, {"text": "articles 134, 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An omission to pro- 1950 vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be d. d b h S C d fJanardan Reddy reme 1e y t e upreme ourt an assumption o d Oth jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words an\n\nv. \"'\n\ni!O' of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to mak- Tile Stat•· ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never its function to do."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners : I. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 594, "end_char": 605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 623, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 628, "end_char": 653, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 657, "end_char": 672, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 683, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 689, "end_char": 713, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GnanambaZ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2074, "end_char": 2083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GnanambaZ\n\nAmmal\n\nv. 'l', Raju Ayyar\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Raju Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2100, "end_char": 2110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GnanambaZ\n\nAmmal\n\nv. 'l', Raju Ayyar\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Raju Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Kand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 provided as follows: \"The whole of the village of Kand tho house al I, my daughter N shall enjoy with life interest and after her the said properly shall pass to my daughter G and her children on p•yment by the latter of Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the High Court of Madras reversed."}}, {"text": "Wadsworth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4529, "end_char": 4538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court (Wadsworth and Rajamannar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Rajamannar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court (Wadsworth and Rajamannar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4729, "end_char": 4739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (R. Ramamurti, with him) for the\n\napellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ramamurti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (R. Ramamurti, with him) for the\n\napellant."}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K. Narasimha rnso Aiyangar, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Narasimha rnso Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar (K. Narasimha rnso Aiyangar, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "GnanambaZ", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GnanambaZ\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Ammal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court Ammal was delivered by v.\n\nT. Raju Ayyar M UKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against an and Others.", "canonical_name": "Ammal"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated November 27, 1945, reversing the Muklieriea J, decision of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram made in Original $uit No."}}, {"text": "November 27, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5103, "end_char": 5120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated November 27, 1945, reversing the Muklieriea J, decision of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram made in Original $uit No."}}, {"text": "Muklieriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated November 27, 1945, reversing the Muklieriea J, decision of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram made in Original $uit No."}}, {"text": "Kothandarama Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute about the material facts of the case which lie within a short compass and the controversy centers round one point only which turns upon the construction of a will left by one Kothandarama Ayyar to whom the properties in suit admittedly belonged.", "canonical_name": "Kothandarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Kothandarama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu.", "canonical_name": "Kothandarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Tanjore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu."}}, {"text": "25th April 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5611, "end_char": 5626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu."}}, {"text": "Valu Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5689, "end_char": 5699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu."}}, {"text": "Parbati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu."}}, {"text": "Nagammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5737, "end_char": 5745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu.", "canonical_name": "Nagammal"}}, {"text": "Gnanambal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5750, "end_char": 5759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Alamelu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5859, "end_char": 5866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama, who was a Hindu inhabitant of the District of Tanjore and owned considerable properties, died on 25th April 1905, leaving behind him as his near relations his adoptive mother Valu Ammal, his widow Parbati and two daughters Nagammal and Gnanambal, of whom Nagammal, who became a widow during the testator's life time had an infant daughter named Alamelu.", "canonical_name": "Alamelu"}}, {"text": "13th March, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5908, "end_char": 5924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kothandarama executed his last will on 13th March, 1905, and by this will, the genuineness of which is not disputed in the present litigation, he gave an authority to his widow to adopt unto him a son of his second daughter Gnanambal, should she beget one before January, 1908, or in the alternative any of the sons of his two nephews, if the widow so chose."}}, {"text": "Raju Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit, out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by Raju Ayyar, who was a son of the testator's nephews and was taken in adoption by the widow in terms of the will; and it was for recovery of possession of certain properties, known as Kothangudi properties whicl; l formed part of the testator's estate on the allegation that under the will mentioned above, these properties were given to Nagammal, the widowed daughter of the testator for her life-time, but as there was no disposition of the remaining interest after the death of the life tenant, the properties vested in the\n\nGnan.atnbai\n\nAmmal\n\nT. Raju Ayyar\n\na'ld Oth1rs.", "canonical_name": "Raju Ayyar"}}, {"text": "T. Raju Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit, out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by Raju Ayyar, who was a son of the testator's nephews and was taken in adoption by the widow in terms of the will; and it was for recovery of possession of certain properties, known as Kothangudi properties whicl; l formed part of the testator's estate on the allegation that under the will mentioned above, these properties were given to Nagammal, the widowed daughter of the testator for her life-time, but as there was no disposition of the remaining interest after the death of the life tenant, the properties vested in the\n\nGnan.atnbai\n\nAmmal\n\nT. Raju Ayyar\n\na'ld Oth1rs.", "canonical_name": "T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Jfukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6864, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jfukherjea J.\n\nplaintiff as the adopted son and heir of the deceased on the death of Nagammal which took place on 3rd of ] anuary, 1943."}}, {"text": "Gnanambal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7001, "end_char": 7010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gnanambal, the second daughter of the testator, was the first and main defendant in the suit, and she resisted the plaintiff's claim primarily on the ground that there was no intestacy as regards the suit properties after the termination of the life interest of Nagammal, and that under the terms of the will itself she was entitled to get these properties in absolute right after the death of Nagammal, subject to payment of a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Kothangudi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8567, "end_char": 8577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 4 provides that if the first course is followed, that is, if the son of Gnanambal is adopted by the widow, then all the properties, movable and immovable, belonging to the testator excepting the village of Kothangudi, the house at Injigudi and the other properties which were disposed of by the will would go to such adopted son."}}, {"text": "Injigudi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8592, "end_char": 8600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 4 provides that if the first course is followed, that is, if the son of Gnanambal is adopted by the widow, then all the properties, movable and immovable, belonging to the testator excepting the village of Kothangudi, the house at Injigudi and the other properties which were disposed of by the will would go to such adopted son."}}, {"text": "Nannilam Taluk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8836, "end_char": 8850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 5, which is material for our present purposes runs as follows :-\n\n\" The whole village of Kothangudi and the house at lnjigudi, both of Nannilam Taluk, my daughter Nagammal, shall enjoy with life interest and after her the said property shall pass to my daughter Gnanambal and her children on payment by the latter of Rs."}}, {"text": "Nagam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9500, "end_char": 9505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 7 gives a small house absolutely to Nagam.", "canonical_name": "Nagammal"}}, {"text": "MukherJ••", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukherJ•• J mal for her residence and paragraph 8 makes certain provisions for management of the properties.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Kokkur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10043, "end_char": 10049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "graph 11 then says that in the event of the widow adopting any of the nephew's sons of the testator, such son shall inherit the entire property at Kokkur and also the lands of Nallathukudi after the death of the testator's wife and mother."}}, {"text": "Nallathukudi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10072, "end_char": 10084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "graph 11 then says that in the event of the widow adopting any of the nephew's sons of the testator, such son shall inherit the entire property at Kokkur and also the lands of Nallathukudi after the death of the testator's wife and mother."}}, {"text": "Maruthanthanallur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10168, "end_char": 10185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By paragraph 12, the village of Maruthanthanallur is given to Gnanambal and paragraph 13 provides that \"the village of Kothangudi shall be enjoyed by Nagammal as stated in paragraph 5 \"."}}, {"text": "Mayavaram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10377, "end_char": 10386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By paragraphs IS and 16 the remainder in the house at Mayavaram situated in the east row of Vellalarkovil Street is given to Gnanambal after the death of the testator's wife and mother."}}, {"text": "Gnanarnbal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10714, "end_char": 10724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 20 it is stated that if the wife of the testator should die before January, 1908, without making any adoption, then the eldest or any son of Gnanarnbal would be his adopted son without any formality and inherit all the properties subject to the conditions mentionecj in the will.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J, The defen<lant No.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Gnanambal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11985, "end_char": 11994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, on the other hand, relies on paragraph 5 of the will, which gives the Kothangudi village and the Injigudi house to Nagammal to be enjoyed by her so long as she lives and after her death they are to go to Gnanambal and her children."}}, {"text": "Kothangudi village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12658, "end_char": 12676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "indicate that apart from Nagammal's taking a life estate in the Kothangudi village the rest of the provisions in regard to this property as laid down in paragraph 5 would also be incorporated into para- graph 13."}}, {"text": "T. Raju Ayyru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15721, "end_char": 15734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gnanatnbal\n\nAmtnal\n\nT. Raju Ayyru\n\nand Othera.", "canonical_name": "T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Gnananibal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15871, "end_char": 15881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The desire to avoid intestacy was considered by the Privy Council in the case referred to Gnananibal above as a rule based on English necessity and English Ammal v. habits of thought which should not necessarily bind an T. Rniu Ayyar Indian court.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Romer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16328, "end_char": 16333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Justice Romer observed in Re Edwards; Jones v. Jones (1), \"it cannot be that merely with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise than construe plain words according to their plain meaning\"."}}, {"text": "Ammal Kothangudi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18117, "end_char": 18133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gnanambal There are two provisions in the wiJI relating to Ammal Kothangudi property to which the dispute in the prev."}}, {"text": "Gnanam bal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19583, "end_char": 19593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The testator's main desire undoubtedly was that his widow should adopt the son of his daugllter Gnanam bal, and in the first part of his will after making provisions for his two daughters, his wife and adoptive mother and also for certain charities, he left the rest of his properties to the son of Gnanambal that was to be adopted by his widow.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Gnanambal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20158, "end_char": 20167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not the intention of the testator that on the happening of the second contingency, all\n\nGnanambal\n\nAmmal\n\nT. RaJu Ayyar\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "GNANAMBAL AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Ammal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20169, "end_char": 20174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not the intention of the testator that on the happening of the second contingency, all\n\nGnanambal\n\nAmmal\n\nT. RaJu Ayyar\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Ammal"}}, {"text": "T. RaJu Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20176, "end_char": 20189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not the intention of the testator that on the happening of the second contingency, all\n\nGnanambal\n\nAmmal\n\nT. RaJu Ayyar\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "kherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20209, "end_char": 20216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M11, kherjea J.\n\nthe earlier provisions of the will would stand cancelled and the entire dispositions of the testator's property would have to be found within the four corners of paragraphs 11 to 16 of the will.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Nallatlmkudi village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21970, "end_char": 21990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "graph 11, if the adoption is of a nephew's son of the testator, the adopted son gets only the Kokkur properties and the reversionary interest in Nallatlmkudi village after the death of the testator's wife and mother."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24580, "end_char": 24589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\n' 1950\n\nto be that the disposition made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, which were in favour of the mother, the wife and the Gnanamb:tl\n\nAmmal two daughters of the testator were meant to take effect v. immediately on the testator's death.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea J. Mayavaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25025, "end_char": 25047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only the reversionary interest in the Mukherjea J. Mayavaram house, which was to vest in the adopted son under the provision of paragraph 6 after the death of the widow and the mother was taken away from the adopted son and given to Gnanambal in case the person adopted was not her own son."}}, {"text": "Alame\\u", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26105, "end_char": 26112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 to Alame\\u also cannot be explained on any other hypothesis.", "canonical_name": "Alamelu"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26622, "end_char": 26639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "M. S. Krishnamoorthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26642, "end_char": 26662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. Krishnamoorthi\n\nSastri,."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_961_968_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 961\n\nV. V. R. N. M. SUBBAYYA CHETTIAR\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME.TAX, MADRAS.\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\nIndian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 4A (b)-Hindu undivided family-Residence-Tests--Occasional visits to India and attending to family affairs there, effect of-B, wden of proof-\" Control and management\",'' situated\", \"wholly\" and\n\n11 affairs\", meanings of.\n\nThe words used in s. 4A (b) show: (i) that, normally a Hindu undivided family will be taken to be resident in the taxable territorieE1, but such a. presumption will not apply if the case can be brought under the second part of the provision, (ii) the word 11 affairs \" means affairs which are .relevant for the purpose of the Income-tax Act and which have some relation to income, (iii) the question whether the case falls within the exception depends on whether the seat of the direction and control of the affairs of the family is inside or outside British India, and (iv) the onus of proving facts which would bring his case within the exception which is provided by the latter p.rt is on the assessee.\n\nThe expression \"control and management\" ins. 4A (b) ol the Income-tax Act signifies the controlling and directive power, the\n\n\"head and brain\" as it is sometimes called;\n\n11 situated\" implies the functioning of such power at a particular place with some degree of permanence; and ''wholly\" seems to recognise the possibility ol the seat of such power being divided between two distinct a.ad separate places and thn.t a Hindu undivided family may have more than one residence in the same way as a corporation may have.\n\nThe karta of a Hindu undivided family lived with bis wife and children and ca, rried on business in Ceylon, which bad become their place of domicile. He owned some immoveable property and bad a house. anil investments in British India. In the year of account be visited British India and stayed there for periods amounting in all to 101 days and during his stay started two firms in British India, personally attended to a litigation relating to tbe family lands, and appeared before the Income-tax 1rnthorities in proceedings relating to assessment of the. income of the family: Held, that these facts were not necessarily conclusive to establish tbe existence of a centre of control and management of the affairs of the family in British India, but they were by no ineans irrelevant to the matter in issue, and inasmuch as the assessee had not discharged the onus which lay upon him under the law by producing all' the material evidence which be was p&lled upon to produce to show that norms.11¥ and s.s a matter of\n\nl l3\n\nDec, 21.\n\n1950 course the affairs in India were also being controlled from Colombo, the normal presumption under the firot part of s. 4 A (b) V. V. R. N. M. must be given effect to and the assessee must be treateil as a\n\nSubQayya resident in British India during the year in question. It was\n\nGhttiar however open to the assessee to prove in future years by proper v. evidence that the seat of control and managerr1ent of the affairs Oommissiontir of of the fau1ily wa.s wholly out.side British InUia.\n\nIncometa•, De.Beere V Howe 15 Tax Oas. 198), Swedish Central Railway Madra•.\n\nCo. Ltd. v. Thompson (9.Tax Oas. 373) l'eferred to.\n\nAPPELLATE jURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.\n\nXXXVIII of 1949.\n\nAppeal from a Judgmept of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Gentle C. J. and Patanjali Sastri J.) dated August 22, 1947, in a reference under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act made by the Income.tax Appellate Tribunal (Ref. No. 25 of 1946).\n\nK. Rajah Aiyar (K. Srinivasan, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi, with him) for the res. pondent.\n\n1950: December 21.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFa•! A!i J.\n\nFAZL ALI J. -This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras on a reference made to it under section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in connection with the assessment of the appellant to income-tax for the year 1942-43. The question of law referred to the High Court was as follows:-\n\n\" Whether in the circumstances of the case, the assessee (a Hindu undivided family) is 'resident' in British India under section 4A (b) of the Income-tax Act.\"\n\nThe circumstances of the case may be briefly stated as follows. The appellant is the karta of a joint Hindu family and has been living in Ceylon with his wife, son and three daughters, and they are stated to be domiciled in that country. He carries on business in Colombo under the name ano style of the General Trading Corporation, and he owns a house, some immoveable property and investments in British India.\n\nHe has also shares in two firms situated at Vijaya- 1950 puram and Nagapatnam in British India. In the year of account, 1941-42, which is the basis of the present v.;;,::; Y:~ M. assessment, the appellant is said to have visited Oh•ttiar British India on seven occasions and the total period v. of his stay in British India was 101 days. What he Commissioner of did during this period is summarized in the judgment Incom•tax, of one of the ]earned Judges of the High Court in Madras. these words : - Fazl Ali J. \" During such stays, he personally attended to a litigation relating to the family lands both in the trial\n\nCourt and in the Court of appeal. He was also attending the income tax proceedings relating to the assessment of the family income, appearing before the income. tax authorities at Karaikudi and Madras.\n\nOn one of these occasions, he obtained an extension of time for payment of the tax after interviewing the authority concerned ....... \"\n\nThe other facts relied upon by the income-tax authorities were that he did not produce the file of correspondence with the business in Colombo so as to help them in determining whether the management and control of the business was situated in Colombo and he had started two partnership businesses in India on 25th February, 1942, and remained in India for some time after the commencement of those businesses.\n\nUpon the facts so stated, the Income-tax Officer and the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax held that the appellant was a resident within the meaning of section 4A (b) of the Income-tax Act, and was therefore liable to be assessed in respect of his foreign income.\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal however came to a different conclusion and held that in the circumstances of the case it could not be held that any act of management or control was exercised by the appellant during his stay in British India and therefore he was not liable to assessment in respect of his income outside British India. This view was not accepted by a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Patanjali Sastri]. They held that the Tribunal had misdirected itself in determining the\n\n1950 question of the \" residence\" of the appellant's family and that on the facts proved the control and managev. ; b~~Y~~ M. ment of the affairs of the family cannot be held to have\n\nGhettiar been wholly situated outside British India, with the v. result that the family must be deemed to be resident Commissioner of in British India within the meaning of section 4A (b)\n\nIncome-ta•, of the Income-tax Act.\n\nIn this appeal, the appellant\n\nMa.dra\" has questioned the correctness of the High Court's\n\nFa•I Ali J. decision :-\n\nSection 4A (b) runs thus:- \"For the purposes of this Act- A Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons is resident in British India unless the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly without British India.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that section 4A deals with \" residence \", in the taxable territories, of (a) individuals, (b) a Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons, and (c) a company. In each of these cases, certain tests have been laid down, and the test with which we are concerned is that laid down in section 4A (b ).\n\nThis provision appears to be based very largely on the rule which has been applied in England to cases of corporations, in regard to which the law was stated thus by Lord Loreburn in De Beers\n\nv. Howe(').\n\n\"A company cannot eat or sleep, but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does business ...... The decision of Chief Baron Kelly and Baron Huddleston in The Calcutta jute Mills v. Nicholson and The Cesena Sulphur Company v. Nicholson('), now thirty years • ago, involved the principle that a company resides for purposes of income-tax where its real business is carried on. Those decisions have been acted upon ever since. I regard that as the true rule, and the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually abideS\".\"\n\nIt is clear that what is said in section 4A (b) of the Income-tax Act is what Lord Loreburn intended to\n\n(1) 5 Tax C••· 198. (2; (18761 1 Ex. D. 428,\n\nconvey by the words \" where the central management !950 and control actually abides.\" . h\" ~~&~• The principles w ich are now well-established in subbayya England and which will be found to have been very Ohettiar clearly enunciated in Swedish Central Railway Comv. pany Limited v. Thompson(1), which is one of the Commissioner of 1 d th b t Income-tax ea mg cases on e su 1ec , are:- Madra•.'\n\n(1) that the conception of residence in the case of a fictitious \"person \", such as a company, is as artificial Farl Ali J. as the company itself, and the locality of the residence can only be determined by analogy, by asking where is the head and seat and directing power of the affairs of. the company. What these words mean have been explained by Patanjali Sastri J. with very great clarity in the following passage where he deals with the meaning of section 4A (b) of the Income-tax Act:-\n\n\"Control and management \" signifies, in the present context, the controlling and directive power, \"the head and brain\" as it is sometimes called, and \"situated\" implies the functioning of such power at a particular place with some degree of permanence, while \"wholly\" would seem to recognize the possibility of the seat of such power being divided between two distinct and separated places.\"\n\nAs a general rule, the control and management of a business remains in the hand of a person or a group of persons, and the question to be asked is wherefrom the person or group of persons controls or directs the business.\n\n(2) Mere activity by the company in a place does not create residence, with the result that a company may be \"residing\" in one place and doing a great deal of business in another.\n\n(3) The central management and control of a company may be divided, and it may keep house and do business in more than one place, and, if so, it may have more than one residence.\n\n(4) In case of dual residence, it is necessary to show that the company performs some of the vital organic\n\nIll 9 T•x Oas. R73.\n\n1950 functions incidental to its existence as such in both the places, so that in fact there are two centres of\n\nV.~R.N M. t Subbayya managemen .\n\nGhettiar It appears to us that these principles have to be v. kept in view in properly construing section 4A(b) of Gommi,, fon.r afthe Act.\n\nThe words used in this provision clearly\n\nIncome.ta~. show firstly, that, normally, a Hindu undivided family\n\nMadras. will be taken to be resident in the taxable territories,\n\nFa•t Ali J. but such a presumption will not apply if the case can be brought under the second part cf the provision.\n\nSecondly, we take it that the word \" affairs \" must mean affairs which are relevant for the purpose of the Income-tax Act and which have some relation to income.\n\nThirdly, in order to bring the case under the exception, we have to ask whether the seat of the direction and control of the affairs of the family is inside or outside British India. Lastly, the word \" wholly \" suggests that a Hindu undivided family may have more than one \"residence\" in the same way as a corporation may have.\n\nThe question which now arises is what is the result of the application of these principles to this case, and whether it can be held that the central control and management of the affairs.of the assessee's family has been shown to be divided in this case.\n\nIt seems to us that the mere fact that the assessee has a house at Kanadukathan, where his mother lives, cannot constitute that place the seat of control and management of the affairs of the family. Nor are we inclined in the circumstances of the present case to attach much importance to the fact that the assessee had to stay in British India for 101 days in a particular year. He was undoubtedly interested in the litigation with regard to his family property as well as in the income-tax proceedings, and by merely coming out to India to take part in them, he cannot be said to have shifted the seat of management and control of the affairs of his family, or to have started a second centre for such control arid management. The same remark must apply to the starting of two partnership businesses, as mere\" activity \" cannot be the test of residence.\n\nIt seems to us that the learned Judges of the High 1950 Court have taken rather a narrow view of the meaning of section 4A(b). because they seem to have proceeded v. v. R. N. M. .\n\nSubbavya on the assumption that merely because the assessee Chsttiar attended to some of the affairs of his family during his v. visit to British India in the part!cular year, he brought Oommissw•er of himself within the ambit of the rule.\n\nOn the other focoms-tax, hand, it seems to us that the more correct approach to Madras. the case was made by the Appellate Assistant Com- Faz! Ali J. missioner of Income-tax in the following passage which occurs in his order dated the 24th February, 1944 :-\n\n\" During a major portion of the accounting period (year ending 12th April, 1942) the appellant was controlling the businesses in Burma and Saigon and there is no evidence that such control was exercised only from Colombo. No correspondence or other evidence was produced which would show that any instructions were issued from Colombo as regards the management of the affairs in British India especially as it was an unauthorized clerk who was looking after such affairs.\n\nThe presumption therefore is that whenever he came to British India the appellant was looking after these affairs himself and exercising control by issuing instructions ............... It has been admitted that there are affairs of the family in British India. Has it been definitely established in this case that the control and management of such affairs has been only in Colombo?\n\nI have to hold it has not been established for the reasons already tated by me.\"\n\nThere can be no doubt that the onus of proving facts which would bring his case within the exception, which is provided by the latter part of section 4A (b), was on the assessee. The appellant was called upon to adduce evidence to show that the control and management of the affairs of the family was situated wholly outside the taxable territories, but the correspondence to which the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax refers and other material evidence which might have shown that normally and as a matter of course the affairs in India were also being controlled from Colombo were not produced. The position therefore is this.\n\nOn the one\n\n1950 hand, we have the fact that the head and karta of the assessee's family who controls and manages its affairs\n\nv. v. R. N. M. permanently lives in Colombo and the family is domi-.\n\nSubbayya .\n\nOh•ttiar ciled in Cey Ion. On the other hand, we have cert am v. acts done by the karta himself in British India, which, Oommisaioner o[though not conclusive by themselves to establish the ·\n\nIn\"me-ta>, existence of more than one centre of control for the\n\nMadras. affairs of the family~ are by no means irrelevant to the\n\nFaz! Ali J. matter in issue and therefore cannot be completely ruled out of consideration in determining it.\n\nIn these circumstances, and in the absence of the material evidence to which reference has been made, the finding of the Assistant Commissioner, that the onus of proving such facts as would bring his case within the exception had not been discharged by the assessee and tlie normal presumption must be given effect to, appears to us to be a legitimate conclusion. In this view, the appeal must be dismissed with costs, but we should like to observe that as this case has to be decided mainly with reference to the question of onus of proof, the decision in this appeal must be confined to the year of assessment to which this case relates, and it would be open to the appellant to show in future years by proper evidence that the seat of control and management of the affairs of. the family is wholly outside British India.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my learned brother, :f:azl Ali J., both in his reasoning and in his conclus10n.\n\nd kh CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-I concur in the 1'udg- Chan rase ara f I .\n\nAi.yar 1. ment o my earned brother, Faz! Ah J.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "961\n\nV. V. R. N. M. SUBBAYYA CHETTIAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. V. R. N. M. SUBBAYYA CHETTIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME.TAX, MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME.TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 765, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1191, "end_char": 1205, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ceylon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1751, "end_char": 1757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The karta of a Hindu undivided family lived with bis wife and children and ca, rried on business in Ceylon, which bad become their place of domicile."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1872, "end_char": 1885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "anil investments in British India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2713, "end_char": 2718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950 course the affairs in India were also being controlled from Colombo, the normal presumption under the firot part of s. 4 A (b) V. V. R. N. M. must be given effect to and the assessee must be treateil as a\n\nSubQayya resident in British India during the year in question."}}, {"text": "Colombo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2751, "end_char": 2758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950 course the affairs in India were also being controlled from Colombo, the normal presumption under the firot part of s. 4 A (b) V. V. R. N. M. must be given effect to and the assessee must be treateil as a\n\nSubQayya resident in British India during the year in question."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a Judgmept of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Gentle C. J. and Patanjali Sastri J.) dated August 22, 1947, in a reference under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act made by the Income.tax Appellate Tribunal (Ref."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3518, "end_char": 3528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3561, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. Rajah Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3628, "end_char": 3642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajah Aiyar (K. Srinivasan, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Srinivasan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3644, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajah Aiyar (K. Srinivasan, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi, with him) for the res."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi, with him) for the res."}}, {"text": "A!i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A!i J.\n\nFAZL ALI J. -This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras on a reference made to it under section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in connection with the assessment of the appellant to income-tax for the year 1942-43."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A!i J.\n\nFAZL ALI J. -This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras on a reference made to it under section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in connection with the assessment of the appellant to income-tax for the year 1942-43.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3882, "end_char": 3916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A!i J.\n\nFAZL ALI J. -This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras on a reference made to it under section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in connection with the assessment of the appellant to income-tax for the year 1942-43."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4302, "end_char": 4312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4338, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagapatnam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4823, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also shares in two firms situated at Vijaya- 1950 puram and Nagapatnam in British India."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What he Commissioner of did during this period is summarized in the judgment Incom•tax, of one of the ]earned Judges of the High Court in Madras."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these words : - Fazl Ali J. \" During such stays, he personally attended to a litigation relating to the family lands both in the trial\n\nCourt and in the Court of appeal.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tax authorities at Karaikudi and Madras."}}, {"text": "25th February, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6026, "end_char": 6045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On one of these occasions, he obtained an extension of time for payment of the tax after interviewing the authority concerned ....... \"\n\nThe other facts relied upon by the income-tax authorities were that he did not produce the file of correspondence with the business in Colombo so as to help them in determining whether the management and control of the business was situated in Colombo and he had started two partnership businesses in India on 25th February, 1942, and remained in India for some time after the commencement of those businesses."}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6319, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6778, "end_char": 6795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was not accepted by a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Patanjali Sastri]."}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7287, "end_char": 7297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7435, "end_char": 7438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal, the appellant\n\nMa.dra\" has questioned the correctness of the High Court's\n\nFa•I Ali J. decision :-\n\nSection 4A (b) runs thus:- \"For the purposes of this Act- A Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons is resident in British India unless the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly without British India.\""}}, {"text": "Section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7455, "end_char": 7465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8015, "end_char": 8025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8119, "end_char": 8126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision appears to be based very largely on the rule which has been applied in England to cases of corporations, in regard to which the law was stated thus by Lord Loreburn in De Beers\n\nv. Howe(')."}}, {"text": "Loreburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8204, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision appears to be based very largely on the rule which has been applied in England to cases of corporations, in regard to which the law was stated thus by Lord Loreburn in De Beers\n\nv. Howe(')."}}, {"text": "Chief Baron Kelly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8407, "end_char": 8424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does business ...... The decision of Chief Baron Kelly and Baron Huddleston in The Calcutta jute Mills v. Nicholson and The Cesena Sulphur Company v. Nicholson('), now thirty years • ago, involved the principle that a company resides for purposes of income-tax where its real business is carried on."}}, {"text": "Huddleston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does business ...... The decision of Chief Baron Kelly and Baron Huddleston in The Calcutta jute Mills v. Nicholson and The Cesena Sulphur Company v. Nicholson('), now thirty years • ago, involved the principle that a company resides for purposes of income-tax where its real business is carried on."}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8903, "end_char": 8917, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Farl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9506, "end_char": 9514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pany Limited v. Thompson(1), which is one of the Commissioner of 1 d th b t Income-tax ea mg cases on e su 1ec , are:- Madra•.'\n\n(1) that the conception of residence in the case of a fictitious \"person \", such as a company, is as artificial Farl Ali J. as the company itself, and the locality of the residence can only be determined by analogy, by asking where is the head and seat and directing power of the affairs of.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9848, "end_char": 9858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9870, "end_char": 9884, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11239, "end_char": 11252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11683, "end_char": 11697, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kanadukathan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12391, "end_char": 12403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that the mere fact that the assessee has a house at Kanadukathan, where his mother lives, cannot constitute that place the seat of control and management of the affairs of the family."}}, {"text": "section 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13293, "end_char": 13306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subbavya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13362, "end_char": 13370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subbavya on the assumption that merely because the assessee Chsttiar attended to some of the affairs of his family during his v. visit to British India in the part!cular year, he brought Oommissw•er of himself within the ambit of the rule."}}, {"text": "24th February, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13838, "end_char": 13857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J. missioner of Income-tax in the following passage which occurs in his order dated the 24th February, 1944 :-\n\n\" During a major portion of the accounting period (year ending 12th April, 1942) the appellant was controlling the businesses in Burma and Saigon and there is no evidence that such control was exercised only from Colombo."}}, {"text": "Burma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13991, "end_char": 13996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J. missioner of Income-tax in the following passage which occurs in his order dated the 24th February, 1944 :-\n\n\" During a major portion of the accounting period (year ending 12th April, 1942) the appellant was controlling the businesses in Burma and Saigon and there is no evidence that such control was exercised only from Colombo."}}, {"text": "Saigon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14001, "end_char": 14007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J. missioner of Income-tax in the following passage which occurs in his order dated the 24th February, 1944 :-\n\n\" During a major portion of the accounting period (year ending 12th April, 1942) the appellant was controlling the businesses in Burma and Saigon and there is no evidence that such control was exercised only from Colombo."}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14943, "end_char": 14953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cey Ion", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15662, "end_char": 15669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oh•ttiar ciled in Cey Ion."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15967, "end_char": 15975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "affairs of the family~ are by no means irrelevant to the\n\nFaz!"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16902, "end_char": 16911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my learned brother, :f:azl Ali J., both in his reasoning and in his conclus10n.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16916, "end_char": 16925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my learned brother, :f:azl Ali J., both in his reasoning and in his conclus10n.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "azl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16965, "end_char": 16972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my learned brother, :f:azl Ali J., both in his reasoning and in his conclus10n.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ah J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17132, "end_char": 17142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ment o my earned brother, Faz!"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17233, "end_char": 17243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_969_979_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 969\n\nEXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF ] . K. DUBA.SH\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOMETAX, BOMBAY\n\nCITY.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.]\n\nIndian Inrom•-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 25 (4)-Succmion-\n\nDrith of person carrying on business-Executors ca.•rrying on busi ness as going concern for selling it tnder ter111s of u•ill-Whether 1 ' succeed in su!:h capacity\" to testator-Date of succession\n\nA person who carried on a business on which tax had been levied under the Income-tax Act of 1918 died on the 9th of April, 1942, leaving a will by which he authorised his executore to carry ou his business as a going concern, as if they were absolute owners but without being responsible for looe, for • period not exceeding 12 months during which if any of his nephews wanted to purchaee the husinese, they might sell it to him or them. The husineee was sold to one of the nephews on the let January, 1943. The question being whether for the purposee of s. 25 (4) of the Income-tax Act of 1922 as amended in 1939 the succeseion to the business took place on the 9th April, 1942, when the testator died or on the 1st January, 1943, when the business was sold: Held, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court, that inaemuch as the business got vested in the executors on the death of the testator and the executors carried on the business within the meanin~ of ss. 3 and 10 of the Act, and as such become personally liable as assessees and there wa.s thus a. change in the assesses, a. succession to the testator \"in such capacity\" took place on the date of the death of the assessee, even though the executors carried on the business as a going concern under the terms of the will and the business was also being carried on not for the benefio of the executors but for the benefit of the estate of the testator. i' Per PATANJALI SASTRI J.-The expression \"succeeded by another person\" in s. 26 (2) and s. 25 (4) of the Act includes not only cases of succession inter vivos but also cases of succession on death.\n\nWhile it is true that a transfer of ownership is ordir.ari!y involved in cases of succession falling wi.thin s. 26 (2) ands. 25 (4), it is not an essential element of succession within the meaning of those provisions.\n\nThe words \"in such capacity \" in s. 26 (2) and s. 25 (4) mean nothing more than the capacity of a person who carries on the business as the predecessor was carrying it on, that is, with a\n\nliability to be \\xed on its profibs ud g&ius. ·\n\nI~•\n\n19~0\n\nDec. l.\n\n1950 Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. P. E. Polson (L-R. 72 I-A. 196) referred to- Execu!ors 01 Ju, pu(li Kesava Rn, o v. Commi5sioner of Income-tax, Madraf th• Estate of (59 Mad. 377 ! explained.\n\nJ. K. Dubash - v.\n\nAPPEAL (Civil Appeal No. CV of 1949) from a\n\ncom,,•issioner of Judgment of the Bombay High Court (Chagla C.J. and\n\nIncomc-taz, Tendolkar J.) dated March 19, 1948, in a reference\n\nBomb•y Cit11made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act (Incometax Reference No. 26 of 1947).\n\nSir N. P. Engineer (R. ]. Kolah, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1950. December 21. The Court delivered Judgment as follows:\n\nKania o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J- --This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay delivered on a reforence by the Income-tR.x Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThe material facts are these.\n\nThe assessees (appellants) are the executors of the will of Mr. ]. K. Dul>ash who died on the 9th of April, 1942, having made his last will on the 8th of April, 1942.\n\nProbate of the will was issued to the executors on the 10th of August, 1942. During his life-time, the testator carried on the business of shipping agents.\n\nClause 13 of the will contains directions about carrying on this business of the testator till its disposal. It directs the executors to carry on the business as a going concern after his death with power to make fresh contracts and discharge the existing and future liabilities and all other usual and necessary powers, unless special circumstances arose which, in the opinion of the executors, made it expedient to sell the business earlier.\n\nThis business was to be carried on for a period not exceeding twelve months during which time the exe cutors were to ascertain whether or not any of his nephews was willing to purchase the said undertaking.\n\nFor this purpose and generally for sale purposes, he directed that the executors shall, as soon as possible,\n\nafter his death, have a valuation made of the said 19~0 undertakir1g.\n\nThe undertaking was to be sold so as to .\n\nExecutors of include all hlS interest in the premises, the goodwill, the Estat• of the stock-in-trade, plant, furniture etc. but excluding J. K. Dubash securities for rfl.oney and cash in the bank to the credit v. of the account of that undertaking. If the executors OommiSBionor of were satisfied before the expiration of one year from ;\" 00bm•·~~· the testator's death that the said undertaking would\n\n\"' •Y '•· not be sold to his nephews because none was willing or Kania o. J. able to purchase it or if it remained unsold, at the end of a year, to any of the nephews then (whichever event first happened) the executors were directed to sell the undertaking to such third person on such terms and at such price as they thought proper. The clause ended with the following words:-' 'l expressly declare that in carrying on the said undertaking my trustees shall, in addition to all powers, discretion and authorities vested in them by law, have power to carry on or discontinue any part of the said undertaking or to augment or diminish the capital employed and generally to act as absolute owners without being responsible for any loss.\" The business was sold to one of the nephews on the 1st of January, 1943.\n\nThe appellants contended that within the meaning of section 25 (4) of the Indian Income tax Act the succession to the business took place on the 1st of January, 1943, while the taxing authorities contended that the succession was on the 9th of April, 1942, when the testator died.\n\nThe first question submitted for the High Court's opinion related to this dispute.\n\nThe second question referred to the High Court for its opinion was in respect of an amount paid by the executors to the widow of the testator. That question was answered against the appellants by the High Court. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants intimated that he did not want to contest the High Court's decision on the point. The appeal therefore is limited to the first question only.\n\nSection 25 of the Indian Income.tax Act, 1939, gives certain concessions in respect of a business where tax had been paid by the person carrying the business\n\n1950 under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918.\n\nThe material part of sub-clause 4 of section 25 E•ocutora of is in these terms : - the Estate of J. K. Dubash \" Where the person who was at the commence-\n\n- v, ment of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 0••nm\"\"0\"\" of 1939 (VII of 1939), carrying on any business, profes-\n\n;;~~:; i;;~. sion or vocation on which tax was at any time charged under the provisions of the Indian Income-\n\nKania o . .r. tax Act, 1918, is succeeded in such capacity by another person ............ \"\n\nThe scheme of section 25 read with the provisions of section 26 (2) appears to be to give relief, inter alia, to persons who were carrying on business in 1921 and had been taxed on their income under the Income-tax Act of 1918.\n\nBy a change effected by the Incometax Amendment Act of 1922 they were subjected to taxation twice on the income of 1921-22. The relief is intended against this levy of tax twice over.\n\nThe rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties are these. The assessee contends that on the death of the testator under clause rn of the will of the deceased, the executors were carrying on the business of the deceased only for the purpose of winding it up, and there was no succession to the business on the death of the deceased within the meaning of section 25 (4) of the Income-tax Act. It is _argued that the clause provides for nothing else than a direction to carry on the business with a view either (a) to sell it within a year to one of the nephews, or (b) to sell it to someone else at the end of the year as a going concern. It was pointed out that all directions in the clause permitting contracts to be made etc. were for the purpose of keeping the business alive and not allowing it to die so that the business which was a valuable asset of the deceased could be sold as a going concern with its goodwill.\n\nIt was therefore argued that the succession to the business took place only on the 1st of January, 1943, when the business was sold by the executors to one of the nephews in terms d clause 13 of the will.\n\nJn actual money, the contest is whether the executors\n\n--...\n\nare entitled to get the benefit of the exemption from 1950 income-tax in respect of the profits earned only for the Executors oi nine days between the 1st of April and the 9th of April, the Estate of 1942, or between. the 1st of April, 1942, and 1st of J. K. Du•ash January,\" 1943, under section 25 (4) of the Indian In. v • come tax Act. The High Court has answered the Commissioner of · t h Income.tax, question agams t e assessee.\n\nBombay City, In our opinion, the conclusion of the High Court is correct. It cannot be disputed that in the event of a .Kania a. J. sale or gift of the business by the original owner the succession within the meaning of section 25 (4) will take place only on the date of such sale or gift and the exemption from liability to tax will be for a period terminating on that day. It cannot again be seriously disputed that if the testator settled his business on trust under a deed of settlement there will be a succession to the business by another person on the day of the settlement. Similarly in the event of his death intestate his heir-at-law will succeed to the business on the date of his death. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that in the present case having regard to the terms of clause 13 of the will there has been \"no succession in such capacity to another person\" because the executors were carrying on the business only with a view to sell it as a going concern, cannot be accepted because on the day of the death of the deceased the estate including the business got vested in the executors and the executors carried on the business within the meaning of section 3 read with section IO of the Act and as such became personally liable as assessee. Thus there came about a change in the assessee and therefore \" a succession in such capacity\" took place within the meaning of section 25\n\n(4) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nIt seems clear that if the testator had transferred the business to a trustee, although the trustees will not be the beneficial owners, in law there will be a succession of the business to ano. ther person within the meaning of section 25 (4) of the Indian Income tax Act. If in such a case that result follows there appears no reason why when the legal estate is transferred by operation of law to an executor\n\n1950 there should not be considered a succession to the estate by another person within the meaning of the\n\n~:·;;,;:;; :: same section 25 (4). The words \"in such capacity\" in\n\nJ. K. Duba•I• that clause further make the position clear. It makes v. the distinction of legal and beneficial owner:; hip irre.\n\nComm;,,; ontr •/levant. The contention that the business was to be car-\n\nInncome-ta\"' ried on by the executors as such, as a going concern Bombay C>ty. or that it was being carried on for the benefit or loss\n\n 0 J of the testator's estate is not relevant for the present ania . .\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\ndiscussion. The only relevant question under sec. tion 25 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act is whether in respect of the business there is a succession to another person. This is a provision to give relief and the scope of the relief must be governed by the words used in the Act. In our opinion the answer to this question, on the facts of the present case, must be in the affirmative and the date of such succession must be considered to be the death of the testator, which was on the 9th of April, 1942.\n\nThe result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-I agree that this appeal should be rejected.\n\nThe l)laterial facts have been set out in the judgment which has just been delivered.\n\nThe only question now remaining for decision is : on what date was the testator, who was carrying on the business of shipping agent and land contractor \"succeeded in such capacity by another person\" within the meaning of section 25\n\n(4) of the Act-on the 9th April, 1942, when the testator died and the appellants as the executors took over the business and carried it on or on the 1st January, 1943, when the business was sold by them as a going concern?\n\nThe business being admittedly one which was charged to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1918, if there was no succession within the meaning of section 25 (4) until the sale took place, as the appellants contend, the profits and gains 9f the period from 1st April, 1942, to !st January, 1943, would not be liable to tax, whereas, if the testator could be said to have been \"succeeded\"\n\n1960 by the appellants, the profits of the much shorter period between 1st April, 1942, and 8th April, 1942, alone\n\nExecutor& of would be exempt from taxation. The reason for this the Estate of relief is to be found in the change of the basis of taxa- J. K. Du'ash tion when the Act of 1922 was passed which resulted v. in the profits of the year 1921-22 being assessed twiceGommiss; on\" of over once in that year as the income thereof ''on l•com•taz, d . ' \" d h A f 1918 d . ti Bambay City. a iustrnent un er t e ct o an once m le next year as the income of the \"previous year\" under Pato•iali the Act of 1922 [see Commissioner of Income.tax, Sast•il.\n\nBombay v. P. E. Polson(')].\n\nThe relief was,. however, confined to discontinued businesses, as, m cases of succession till 1938 the successor alone was assessed to tax on the whole of the profits of the previous year including those earned by his predecessor before the succession occurred. But the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the amending Act). having amended section 26 (2) so as to provide, in the case of a succession in business, profession or vocation, for the assessment of the predecessor and the successor, each in respect of his actual share of the profits of the previous year, the relief was extended, by enacting section 25 (4), to cases of succession occurring after the commencement of that Act, with the same object as in the case of discontinuance, namely, to redress the hardship of the business having been charged twice over on the income of 1921-22. In other words, the predecessor is given the same relief as if he had discontinued the business on the date of succession. . It will thus be seen that the enactment of section 25 (4) is consequential on the amendment of section 26 (2), and the scope and meaning of the expression \"succeeded in such capacity by another person\" in section 26 (2) must determine also its scope and meaning in section 25 (4).\n\nThe first question which arises on the language of the amended section 26 (2), which speaks of \" the person succeeded\" being \"assessed\" and of his not being \"found\", is whether the sub.section should be construed as applicable only to cases of succession\n\n(117~ u. 1~6\n\n.-····\n\n1960 inter vivas.\n\nWhatever force there may have been in the sug,,\"'estion that the sub-section could not have Ex:eutors of the Estate of contemplated cases of testamentary or intestate J. K. Dubash succession if there was no provision for the assessment v. of profits earned by a deceased person in the hands of Commissioner 0/his representatives, there seems to be no sufficient\n\nIncome-0tax, reason for excluding from the scope of the sub-section Bombay ity. f d\n\nI · f h cases o success10n on eat i m view o t e pro-\n\nPatanjali vision ih section 24B.\n\nOn the other hand, proviso saotr• J.\n\n(c) to section 24(2), which refrs to a person \"succeeded in such capacity by another person otherwise than by inheritance'', would seem to imply that \"succession\", as that term is used in the Act, includes devolution on death.\n\nThe next question is what is the meaning to be attributed to the phrase \" in such capacity \"? A Full Bench. of the Madras High Court in jupudi Kesava Rao v. Commissioner of Income tax, Madras('), held that the expression meant\" in the capacity as owner\", so that \" the person who succeeds another must, by such succession, become the owner of the business which his predecessor was carrying on and which he, after the succession, carries on in such capacity, that is. the capacity as owner\". Applying that test they held that the sole surviving member of a Hindu undivided family did not succeed to the business of the family within the meaning of section 26(2), as he was previously a part-mvner of the business and there was no tranSfer of ownership. While it is undoubtedly true that a transfer of ownership is ordinarily involved in cases of succession falling within section 26 (2) or section 25(4), it cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as an es.sential element of succession within the meaning of those provisions. The Income.tax Act directs its attention primarily to the person who receives the income, profits or gains rather than to the ownership or enjoyment thereof. The assessee is defined in sec. tion 2 (2) as the person by whom the income-tax is payable and by section 10 the tax is payable by an assessee who carries on the business, profession or\n\n11) I.L.R. ~9 M•d. 377.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOf~TS 977\n\nvocation. The statute thus fastens on the person who 1950 carries on the business, etc., the liability to pay the Executors of tax on the profits earned by him regardless of their th• Estat• of destination or enjoyment. It is also worthy of note J. EL Dubash that in several instances persons who have no propriev. tory or other right in the income charged to tax are Oommissionor of made liable to pay tlie tax for no other reason than Income-tax, h f t d 11 t' S h Bombay Oil!/. t e convemence o assessmen an co ec 10n. uc instances are to be found in section 26(2) proviso, Pata•jali section 18 (7), section 23-A (3), section 25-A and SastriJ. section 42(1). As observed by Lord Ca'\\e in Williams v.\n\nSinger & Others(') \"the fact is that, if the Income-tax Acts are examined, it will be found that the person charged with tax is neither the trustee nor the beneficiary as such, but the person in actual receipt and control of the income, which it is sought to reach\".\n\nThere seems to be no warrant, therefore, to insist on a transfer of ownership as the decisive test of 'succession' within the meaning of section 26(2) or section 25(4) any more than for insisting on the ownership of the business by the person carrying on a business, for the purposes of section 10.\n\nI Jo not of course wish to be understood to say that a clerk or an agent in management of a business would be an assessee liable to be taxed in respect of its profits and gains. Some kind of title there must be, though not of a beneficial character.\n\nNor need it be of the same quality in the predecessor and the successor. The question in each case must be: Is the person who has come in carrying on the business as a principal? If so, the Revenue looks to him and makes him liable for payment of the tax. The words \"in such capacity\" in sections 25 (4) and 26 (2) mean nothing more than the capacity of a person who carries on the business as the predecessor was carrying it on, that is, with a liability to be taxed on its profits and gains.\n\nApplying these principles to the present case, I am clearly of opinion that the testator who was carrying on the business in question was succeeded in such\n\n(I) (1921] I A.O. 65,\n\n1Q5\n\n1950 capacity by the appellants when the former died on 9th April, 1942, and his. estate vested in them. As Executor!J of tho Estate of already stated, the testator expressly authorised the J, K. Dubash appellants to carry on the business as a going concern\n\nv. for one year after his death and gave them power to Oommi,, ioner 0/enter into fresh contracts and to discharge liabilities\n\nIncom•taz, past and future. They are thus an \"association of Bomb•Y G>ty. ,, b d b bl persons carrymg on usmess, an , emg assessa e as Patani••• such in respect of the profits and gains of the business Sastri J. carried on by them under section 10 read with sec tion 3 of the Ac.t, they are liable to be taxed on the profits earned after the 9th April, 1942.\n\nIt was objected that the appellants being assessable as the representatives of the testator under section 24-B in respect of the profits earned by him in the accounting year, they could not be treated as sue. cessors assessable under section 26 (2) in respect of the profits earned during the rest of that year, as such apportionment would be meaningless, the same interest, namely, the testator's estate, having to bear the incidence of the tax in either case. It was accordingly suggested that unless there was a break in the contin. uity of the interest represented by the executors, there could be no real apportionment such as is contemplated by section 26 (2) and, therefore, no succession within the meaning of that section or of section 25 (4) where the same expression is used. The argument is, in my opinion, fallacious. It overlooks the distinction between the position of the executors vis a vis the Revenue and their position vis a vis the testator's estate.\n\nAs already pointed out, their liability to pay the tax on the profits earned after the testator's death arises under section 10 (1) and, being that .of assessees carrying on the business, is personal to them, although as between them and the estate they would be <mtitled to be indemnified in respect of the tax paid; while their liability to pay tax on the profits earned during the testator's life. time arises under section 24-B and, being that of legal representatives of the testator, is limited \"to the extent to which the testator's estate is capable of meeting the charge\". It is therefore not correct to\n\n' .\n\n' -\n\n:t'\n\nsay that an apportionment under section 26 (2) would be meaningless, though, if the testator's estate was sufficiently solvent, it would have no practical significance.\n\nDAS J.-I agree with the Chief Justice.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R. S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A.Mehta.\n\nPANNALAL JANKIDAS v.\n\nMOHANLAL AND ANOTHER.\n\n(SHRr'HARILAL KANIA C.J ., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAs JJ.]\n\nContract-Damages-Remoteness of damage-Agent neglecting ta inwre goads against fire-Goads destroyed by explosian-Liabi lity al agent-Bombay Explosion (Compensation) Ordinance, 1944, ss. 14, 18-0rdinance granting compensation for damage by explosion-Loss by explosioii not covered by policy-Loss of compensation undu Ordinance by failure to insttre-Whetlwr direct or remote damage-Claim by principal against agent, whet/wr barred by Ordin ance-Indian Contract Aot, 1872, s. 212.\n\nThe plaintiffs who were commission agents purchased piecegoods according to defendant's instructions and storsd a portion of the goods in a godown in Bombay pending receipt of a permit from the Government authorities for consigning the same to the defendants. Before the goods could be despatched, a big explosion occurred in the Bombay Harbour and the goods stored were destroyed either by the fire or the explosion.\n\nA few months later the Governor-General promulgated the Born bay Explosion (Compensa tion) Ordinance, 1944, which provided, inter alia, (i) that the Government shall pay a compensation of 50 per cent. of the damage caused in respeet of uninsured goods, and the entire damage in reepect of insured goods; and (ii) that no person 8hall have or be deemed ever to have bad, otherwise than under the Ordinance any right whether in contract or in tort or otherwise to any compensation for damage to or loss of property arising out of the explosion and no suit or other legal proceeding for any such compensation or damage shall be maintaiDable in any civil court. The plaintiffs received GO per cent. of the value of the destroyed goods as \\hey\n\n!950\n\nEtttcutors of the Estaf4 of J. K. Dubt:uh\n\n•• Commissioner of\n\nIncome-ta:t, Bombay City.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSaatri J.\n\nDae. 21.", "total_entities": 107, "entities": [{"text": "969\n\nEXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF ] . K. DUBA.SH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF J. K. DUBASH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214, "end_char": 219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "person who carried on a business on which tax had been levied under the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 987, "end_char": 992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Date of succession\n\nA person who carried on a business on which tax had been levied under the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Date of succession\n\nA person who carried on a business on which tax had been levied under the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1004, "end_char": 1018, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "9th April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1095, "end_char": 1110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question being whether for the purposee of s. 25 (4) of the Income-tax Act of 1922 as amended in 1939 the succeseion to the business took place on the 9th April, 1942, when the testator died or on the 1st January, 1943, when the business was sold: Held, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court, that inaemuch as the business got vested in the executors on the death of the testator and the executors carried on the business within the meanin~ of ss."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question being whether for the purposee of s. 25 (4) of the Income-tax Act of 1922 as amended in 1939 the succeseion to the business took place on the 9th April, 1942, when the testator died or on the 1st January, 1943, when the business was sold: Held, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court, that inaemuch as the business got vested in the executors on the death of the testator and the executors carried on the business within the meanin~ of ss."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1228, "end_char": 1245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question being whether for the purposee of s. 25 (4) of the Income-tax Act of 1922 as amended in 1939 the succeseion to the business took place on the 9th April, 1942, when the testator died or on the 1st January, 1943, when the business was sold: Held, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court, that inaemuch as the business got vested in the executors on the death of the testator and the executors carried on the business within the meanin~ of ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1398, "end_char": 1410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Date of succession\n\nA person who carried on a business on which tax had been levied under the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Date of succession\n\nA person who carried on a business on which tax had been levied under the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1925, "end_char": 1930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1939, "end_char": 1944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2159, "end_char": 2164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2316, "end_char": 2321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. K. Dubash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. K. Dubash - v.\n\nAPPEAL (Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Duba•I•"}}, {"text": "APPEAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2749, "end_char": 2755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. K. Dubash - v.\n\nAPPEAL (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2988, "end_char": 2998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3017, "end_char": 3031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. P. Engineer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3075, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir N. P. Engineer (R. ]."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3134, "end_char": 3148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3179, "end_char": 3191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3285, "end_char": 3290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered Judgment as follows:\n\nKania o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J- --This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay delivered on a reforence by the Income-tR.x Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act.", "canonical_name": "Kania"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered Judgment as follows:\n\nKania o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J- --This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay delivered on a reforence by the Income-tR.x Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act.", "canonical_name": "Kania"}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3352, "end_char": 3372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered Judgment as follows:\n\nKania o. J.\n\nKANIA C.J- --This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay delivered on a reforence by the Income-tR.x Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. Dul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Dul>ash who died on the 9th of April, 1942, having made his last will on the 8th of April, 1942."}}, {"text": "9th of April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Dul>ash who died on the 9th of April, 1942, having made his last will on the 8th of April, 1942."}}, {"text": "10th of August, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Probate of the will was issued to the executors on the 10th of August, 1942."}}, {"text": "Clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3826, "end_char": 3835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Appellate Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5969, "end_char": 5979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of January, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6062, "end_char": 6082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants contended that within the meaning of section 25 (4) of the Indian Income tax Act the succession to the business took place on the 1st of January, 1943, while the taxing authorities contended that the succession was on the 9th of April, 1942, when the testator died."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6683, "end_char": 6693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6875, "end_char": 6902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6930, "end_char": 6938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6942, "end_char": 6952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "J. K. Dubash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7002, "end_char": 7014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of sub-clause 4 of section 25 E•ocutora of is in these terms : - the Estate of J. K. Dubash \" Where the person who was at the commence-\nv, ment of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 0••nm\"\"0\"\" of 1939 (VII of 1939), carrying on any business, profes-\n\n;;~~:; i;;~. sion or vocation on which tax was at any time charged under the provisions of the Indian Income-\n\nKania o .", "canonical_name": "J. K. Duba•I•"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7399, "end_char": 7409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7438, "end_char": 7448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7603, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8158, "end_char": 8168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 1st of April, 1942, and 1st of J. K. Du•ash January,\" 1943, under section 25 (4) of the Indian In."}}, {"text": "1st of J. K. Du•ash January,\" 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9241, "end_char": 9275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 1st of April, 1942, and 1st of J. K. Du•ash January,\" 1943, under section 25 (4) of the Indian In."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9283, "end_char": 9293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9430, "end_char": 9441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay City, In our opinion, the conclusion of the High Court is correct."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9650, "end_char": 9660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10234, "end_char": 10243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10615, "end_char": 10624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10834, "end_char": 10844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10857, "end_char": 10871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11413, "end_char": 11423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. K. Duba•I•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words \"in such capacity\" in\n\nJ. K. Duba•I• that clause further make the position clear.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Duba•I•"}}, {"text": "Patanjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11873, "end_char": 11882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\ndiscussion.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11884, "end_char": 11890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\ndiscussion.", "canonical_name": "Sastri"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11971, "end_char": 11985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12842, "end_char": 12852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "business being admittedly one which was charged to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13082, "end_char": 13167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13218, "end_char": 13228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The business being admittedly one which was charged to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "The business being admittedly one which was charged to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "1st April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13328, "end_char": 13343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The business being admittedly one which was charged to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1918, if there was no succession within the meaning of section 25 (4) until the sale took place, as the appellants contend, the profits and gains 9f the period from 1st April, 1942, to !"}}, {"text": "st January, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13349, "end_char": 13365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st January, 1943, would not be liable to tax, whereas, if the testator could be said to have been \"succeeded\"\n\n1960 by the appellants, the profits of the much shorter period between 1st April, 1942, and 8th April, 1942, alone\n\nExecutor& of would be exempt from taxation."}}, {"text": "8th April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13552, "end_char": 13567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st January, 1943, would not be liable to tax, whereas, if the testator could be said to have been \"succeeded\"\n\n1960 by the appellants, the profits of the much shorter period between 1st April, 1942, and 8th April, 1942, alone\n\nExecutor& of would be exempt from taxation."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14517, "end_char": 14527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14782, "end_char": 14792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15195, "end_char": 15205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15247, "end_char": 15257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15357, "end_char": 15367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15417, "end_char": 15427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15497, "end_char": 15507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16254, "end_char": 16265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16313, "end_char": 16326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16649, "end_char": 16666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Madras High Court in jupudi Kesava Rao v. Commissioner of Income tax, Madras('), held that the expression meant\" in the capacity as owner\", so that \" the person who succeeds another must, by such succession, become the owner of the business which his predecessor was carrying on and which he, after the succession, carries on in such capacity, that is."}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17182, "end_char": 17195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17406, "end_char": 17416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17424, "end_char": 17437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17812, "end_char": 17822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOf~TS 977", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17926, "end_char": 17952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPOf~TS 977\n\nvocation."}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18508, "end_char": 18521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18541, "end_char": 18551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18557, "end_char": 18567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18575, "end_char": 18585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18601, "end_char": 18614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19063, "end_char": 19076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19080, "end_char": 19093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19765, "end_char": 19776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J, K. Dubash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20347, "end_char": 20359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Executor!J of tho Estate of already stated, the testator expressly authorised the J, K. Dubash appellants to carry on the business as a going concern\n\nv. for one year after his death and gave them power to Oommi,, ioner 0/enter into fresh contracts and to discharge liabilities\n\nIncom•taz, past and future.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Duba•I•"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20781, "end_char": 20791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21002, "end_char": 21012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21138, "end_char": 21148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21641, "end_char": 21651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21994, "end_char": 22004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22296, "end_char": 22306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22538, "end_char": 22548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22760, "end_char": 22772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R. S. Narula."}}, {"text": "P. A.Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22801, "end_char": 22811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A.Mehta."}}, {"text": "SHRr'HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22860, "end_char": 22878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SHRr'HARILAL KANIA C.J .,"}}, {"text": "ss. 14, 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23099, "end_char": 23109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23387, "end_char": 23393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23546, "end_char": 23552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs who were commission agents purchased piecegoods according to defendant's instructions and storsd a portion of the goods in a godown in Bombay pending receipt of a permit from the Government authorities for consigning the same to the defendants."}}, {"text": "J. K. Dubt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24589, "end_char": 24599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "950\n\nEtttcutors of the Estaf4 of J. K. Dubt:uh\n\n•• Commissioner of\n\nIncome-ta:t, Bombay City.", "canonical_name": "J. K. Duba•I•"}}, {"text": "Saatri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24662, "end_char": 24668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSaatri J.\n\nDae.", "canonical_name": "Sastri"}}]}
{"document_id": "1950_1_979_1008_EN", "year": 1950, "text": "' -\n\n:t'\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 979\n\nsay that an apportionment under section 26 (2) would be meaningless, though, if the testator's estate was sufficiently solvent, it would have no practical significance.\n\nDAS J.-I agree with the Chief Justice.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: R. S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A.Mehta.\n\nPANNALAL JANKIDAS v.\n\nMOHANLAL AND ANOTHER.\n\n(SHRr'HARILAL KANIA C.J ., PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAs JJ.]\n\nContract-Damages-Remoteness of damage-Agent neglecting ta inwre goads against fire-Goads destroyed by explosian-Liabi lity al agent-Bombay Explosion (Compensation) Ordinance, 1944, ss. 14, 18-0rdinance granting compensation for damage by explosion-Loss by explosioii not covered by policy-Loss of compensation undu Ordinance by failure to insttre-Whetlwr direct or remote damage-Claim by principal against agent, whet/wr barred by Ordin ance-Indian Contract Aot, 1872, s. 212.\n\nThe plaintiffs who were commission agents purchased piecegoods according to defendant's instructions and storsd a portion of the goods in a godown in Bombay pending receipt of a permit from the Government authorities for consigning the same to the defendants. Before the goods could be despatched, a big explosion occurred in the Bombay Harbour and the goods stored were destroyed either by the fire or the explosion.\n\nA few months later the Governor-General promulgated the Born bay Explosion (Compensa tion) Ordinance, 1944, which provided, inter alia, (i) that the Government shall pay a compensation of 50 per cent. of the damage caused in respeet of uninsured goods, and the entire damage in reepect of insured goods; and (ii) that no person 8hall have or be deemed ever to have bad, otherwise than under the Ordinance any right whether in contract or in tort or otherwise to any compensation for damage to or loss of property arising out of the explosion and no suit or other legal proceeding for any such compensation or damage shall be maintaiDable in any civil court. The plaintiffs received GO per cent. of the value of the destroyed goods as \\hey\n\n!950\n\nEtttcutors of the Estaf4 of J. K. Dubt:uh\n\n•• Commissioner of\n\nIncome-ta:t, Bombay City.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSaatri J.\n\nDae. 21.\n\nPannalal\n\nJankida!\n\nv Mohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nwere not insured, and, alleging that as agents they bad the right to be indemnifiod by the defendants, sued the latter 1or recovery of the remaining 50 per cent. of the value of the goods. The defendants pleaded, and it was found as a fact, that they bad instructed the plaintiffs, and the latter bad agreed, to insure the goods but had omitted to do so, and they claimed that inasmuch as they would have been entitled to receive the full value of the goods as compensation under the Ordinance if the plaintiffs bad insured, they were entitled to set off or counter claim the value of the goods as damages caused to them by the neglect or breach of duty of the plaintiffs.\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J. and\n\nDAS J. (PATANJALI SASTRI J. dissenting).-(i) As full compensation under the Ordinance was payable on proof of the existence of a fire insurance policy irrespective of the terms of the policy, and the non-recovery of half the value of the goods from the Government under the Ordinance was due to the absence of a fire insurance policy, the loss to the defendants arose directly from the neglect or breach of duty of the plaintiffs to insure the goods as they had been instructed and agreed to do; intervention of the Ordinance did npt break the chain of causation or make the loss remote 6r indirect; the Ordin ance did not create any new liability but only quantified the damages; and the fact that it did not exist at the time of the explosion and could not have been in the contemplation of the parties was irrelevant for deciding the question of liaibility;\n\n{ii) the plea of the defendants was not barred by the Ordinna.nce inasmuch a.a their cause of action against the plaintiffs was misconduct of the lg, tter in the business of their agency, and this cause of action was completed by the averment that there was a duty or a.greement to insure, that there was failure to per form that duty and that the failure bad caused damage to the defendants, and the quantum of the damages was not a part of the ca.use of action.\n\nPer PATANJALI SAoTR( J.-(i: The defendants' inability to recover the full value of the goods from the Government under the Ordinance did not arise directly and naturally in the usual course of things from the plaintiffs' failure to insure, but from indepenaent and disconnected events, namely1 the Government's scheme for compensation, embodied in the Ordinance, the agree. went with the insurance companies regarding contribution and the consequent discrimination made by the Government between insured and uninsured good's.\n\nThe Ordinance did not. displace the ordinary rules of law as to remoteness of damage or amend or abrogate any terms in the fire insurance policies and it was further difficult to see bow by virtue of an Ordinance passed some months after the explosion, the right to damages could become enlarged.\n\nThe broad principle of restitutio in integrum upon which the assessment of the quantum. of damages is based cannot be carried to its utmost logical results but must be qualified by the rule of remoteness.\n\n(ii) The bar under the Ordin1'nce was not based upon the 1950 nature of the cause of action but upon the damage or Joss being 1 ' due to or in any way arising out of \" the explosion and the Pan.natal claim of the defendants was clearly barred. In any event the lankidaa defendants cannot be allowed to claim that the loss of the goods v. was explosion damage so as to bring the case under g. 14 and at Mohanlal and the same time contend that the loss was not due to or did not in Another. any way arise out of the explosion in order to avoid the bar under s. 18.\n\nIn re an Arbitration between Polemis and Another an~ Furness Withy d! Co. Ltd. [1921] 3 K.B. 560, Weld-Blundell v. Stephen• [1920] A.O. 983, Monarch Steamship Co- Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker [1949] A.O. 196. Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Ex. 341), Livingstone y. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App. Oas. 25, British\n\nWestinyhouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. Underwood Electric Railways Co., London [1912] A.Q. 673, Liesbosch (owners)\n\nv. Edison (owners) [1933] A.O. 449, Smith Hogg ct Co. Ltd. v.\n\nBlack Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co, Ltd. [1940] A.O. 997, Standard Oil Co. of New York y. Olan Line Steamers Ltd. [1924] A.O. 100 referred to.\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1949. \" Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 11th April, 1947, (Sir Leonard Stone C.J. and Chagla J.) in Appeal No. 39 of 1946 reversing the judgment and decree of Bhagwati J., dated 27th March, 1946, in Civil Suit No. 1373 of 1944 of the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction.\n\nRang Behari Lal (Rajeswar Nath Nigam, with him) for the a pp ell an ts.\n\nM. C. Setalvad (Ram Ditta Mal and B. Sen, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1950. December 21. The Court delivered judgment as follows:-\n\nKANIA C.J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay. Although the record is heavy and many points were argued in the trial court and in the court of appeal at Bombay, the important point argued before us is only one,\n\nThe appellants (plaintiffs) are a firm of commission agents in Bombay. The respondents (defendants)\n\nKania C. J.\n\nPannalal Jankidas\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\n- Kan.ia 0. J.\n\nwere their constituents.\n\nAccounts between the parties in respect of their dealings were made up and settled up to the 30th of October, 1943.\n\nPiecegoods and yarn continued to be purchased and consigned by the plaintiffs to the defendants' joint family firm thereafter. One bale of piecegoods was purchased and despatched in November, 1943.\n\nIn January, 1944, restrictions were imposed against the consignment of piecegoods and/or yarn outside Bombay by rail without obtaining the necessary previous permit from the Textile Commissioner at Bombay. On or about the 6th February, 1944, Mohanlal of the defendants' joint family firm came to Bombay and the plaintiffs purchased on their behalf 278 bales of piecegoods. Ninety. four out of those were despatched according to the defendants' instructions. The plaintiffs, according to the defendants' instructions, applied for and obtained permit to consign several more bales. On the permits being issued they were despatched on 14th February, 1944, to destinations given by the defendants. , On the 10th April, 1944, the plaintiffs, after obtaining the necessary permits, despatched more bales as directed by the defendants. The dispute between the parties relates to the remaining 92 bales which were stored in godown No. 424, Baroda Street, Argyle Road, Bombay, pending the receipt of permit for consigning the same.\n\nOn the 14th April, 1944, there occurred a big explosion in the Bombay harbour which destroyed several immovable properties and godowns with moveable property covering a large area near the port. Fires were caused by the explosion and they also caused considerable destruction of moveable and immoveable properties.\n\nThese 92 bales purchased by the plaintiffs on account of the defendants were also destroyed either by the fire or the explosion. The plaintiffs filed a suit to recover the price of these 92 bales from the defendants on the ground of the agent's right to indemnity. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs were their pucca adatiyas, that the property in the goods did not pass to them and that they were not liable for the price\n\n.• z;.\n\ntill delivery of the goods was given to them.\n\nIn the alternative, in para. 4 of their written statement, they pleaded that when Mohanlal of the defendants' firm was in Bombay and the plaintiffs stated that the goods could not be railed until permits were obtained; lt was agreed between the plaintiffs and the defendants that the defendants were to pay annas four per bale per month to the plaintiffs for insurance charges and the goods were th us to remain insured till despatched according to their instructions.\n\nIn paragraph 21 of their written statement, they contended that if their plea that the plaintiffs \\\\'.ere pucca adatiyas was not accepted and the plaintiffs were held to be their commission agents, the plaintiffs were guilty of negligence and misconduct in the business of agency, as in spite of specific instructions and agreement they had failed to insure the goods. They contended that owing to this negligence and misconduct the plaintiffs were not entitled to the indemnity claimed. In the alternative they contended that the plaintiffs were liable to make good the loss caused to the defendants by their failure to insure the said bales. They con tended that they were entitled to set off this loss against the claim for the price. They also counterclaimed the same amount if their set-off was not allowed.\n\nOn these pleadings the parties went to a hearing. Issue 10 covered the defendants' plea about the plaintiffs' negligence and misconduct in not insuring the 92 bales and the counter-claim arising therefrom.·\n\nNumerous witnesses were called before the trial court and the learned judge after considering their demeanour and hearing their evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' witnesses were unreliable,\n\nexept when they we:e co.rroborated by documentary evidence. He also drsbeheved the defendants' evidence. He held that the agreement to insure the goods was not proved and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal, differing from the view of the trial court, the appeal court held that instructions were (liven by Mohanlal to insure the goods and that\n\nPannalal Jankida3\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C J. •\n\nPannalal\n\nJankidas v.\n\nMohanlal a1ul\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C. J,\n\nthe agreement was proved. In thus differing from the trial court's decision, they accepted the well-recognised principle ·.to give full weight to the trial judge's o bser. vations about the witness. They however found that on the doeuments the view of the learned trial judge was not correct. In doing so, they principally relied on state. ments of account sent by the plaintiffs to the defendants in respect of bales purchased in February. 1944, and despatched by them out of the lot of 278 bales previously and where the plaintiffs had charged the defendants insurance premia at the rates mentioned in the defendants' written statement. They rejected the plaintiffs' explanation, wliich was accepted by the trial judge, that these entries were foolishly made out of cupidity by the plaintiffs.\n\nAfter a brief discussion in which this point was haltingly urged before us, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs did not very properly dispute this conclusion of the .appeal court. In our opinion, the finding of the appeal court, having regard to the documents, was correct.\n\nThat left for decision the important question of damages 'to which the respondents were entitled.\n\nBefore the appellate court in Bombay, it was conceded by the respondents' counsel that the insurance which was to be effected by the appellants under the agreement was on the usual terms of fire insurance policies prevalent in Bombay. Clause 7 of that form of policy, inter alia, provided as follows :-\n\n\" Unless otherwise express! y stated in the policy, this insurance does not cover ......\n\n(h) any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence of explosion but loss or damage by explosion of gas used for illuminating or domestic purposes in a building in which gas is not generated and which does not form part of any gaswork will be deemed to be lost by fire within the meaning of this policy.\"\n\nThe appellants urged that granting that they were in default and had committed a breach of duty in not -•\n\n~ •\n\ninsuring the goods according to the instructions or the agreement, the respondents could not recover anything from them due to damage arising from the explosion, because the policy of fire insurance, if taken out, would not have given to the respondents the money claimed by them. For this purpose they relied on a statement n Mayne on Damages, (11th Ed.) at page 592, as follows:-\n\n\" Therefore if an agent is ordered to procure a policy of insurance for his principal and neglects to do it, and yet the policy, if procured, would not have entitled the principal, in the events which have happened, to recover the loss or damage, the agent may avail himself of that as a complete defence.\"\n\nIn the present case, after the explosion considerable discussion about the liability of the insurance companies under their policies of fire insurance and the liability of Government for alleged negligence in unloading high explosives from a ship on the docks appears to have taken place. On the 1st of July, 1944, the Governor-General promulgated the Bombay Explosion (Compensation) Ordinance, 1944. The preamble to that Ordinance runs as follows :-\n\n\"Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide for and regulate the payment of compensation for. ..... damage to property due to, or arising out of, the explosions and fires which occurred in the Bombay Docks on the 14th April, 1944, to restrict litigation in connection with the said explosions and fires and to make certain other provisions in connection therewith.\"\n\nThe other relevant provisions may be also noticed at this stage. Uninsured property was defined to mean property which was not covered whether wholly or partially by any policy of fire, marine or miscellaneous msurance at the time of the explosion. After providing for the procedure according to which compensation may be claimed and dealt with by the Claims Committee to be set up under the Ordinance and an appeal and review from their decision, section 14 provided as follows;-\n\n.126\n\nPannalal Jank1das\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C J.\n\nPannalal\n\nJankidas v. lllohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania 0. J.\n\n14. \" Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, there shall be paid by the Central Government compensation for explosion damage to property being\n\n(a) damage caused by fire to property insured whether wholly or partially at the time of the explosion against fire under a policy (other than a lJO!icy of marine insurance) covering fire risk, or damage cause<;] by blast without fire intervening to property insured whether wholly or partially at the time of the explosion under a policy (other than a policy of marine insurance) covering fire and explosion risks, of an amount equal to the proved loss, or\n\n(b) damage caused by blast without fire intervening to property insured whether wholly or partially at the time of the explosion against fire under a policy-\n\n(other than a policy of marine insurance) covering fire risk but not explosion risk, of an amount equal to 87 l per centum of the proved loss, to the holder of the policy of insurance covering the damaged property, or if he is deceased, to his legal representatives.\n\nSection 15 provided for contribution by the insurers towards the payment of amounts to be paid under the Ordinance. Section 18 of the Ordinance runs as\n\nfollows:~\n\n18. (1) Nothing in this Ordinance shall prevent the recovery of compensation for death or personal injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), or under any policy of life insurance or against personal accident or under any other contract or scheme providing for the payment of compensation for death or personal injury, or for damage to property under any policy of marine or miscellaneous insurance.\n\n(2) Save as provided in sub-section (1). no person shall have, or be deemed ever to have had, otherwise than under this Ordinance any right whether in contract or in tort or otherwise to any compensation or damages for any death, personal injury or damage to or loss of any property, rights or interests, due to or in any way arising out of the explosion ; and no suit or other ..\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{EPORTS 987\n\nlegal proceedings for any such compensation or damages shall, save as aforesaid, be maintainable in any Court against the Crown or the Trustees of the\n\nPort of Bombay or the Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay or against any servants or agents of the Crown or of the said Trustees or Municipal Corporation or againt any other person whomsoever; and no act or omission which caused or contributed to the explosion shall be deemed to have been done or omitted to be done otherwise than lawfully.\n\n(3) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding whatsoever shall lie against any person for anything in good faith done or ordered to be done in combating or mitigating the effects of the explosion, or for any. thing in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Ordinance or any rules or orders made thereunder.\"\n\nIt is common ground that in respect of uninsured merchandise fifty per cent. compensation was to be paid under the Ordinance. The appellants have recovered that amount and have now agreed to give credit of the same to the respondents. The dispute is in respect of the remaining fifty per cent. It is not disputed that if the goods had been insured, under section 14 of the Ordinance, full compensation would have been recovered by the appellants and become payable to the respondents.\n\nThe appellants' contention is two-fold. Firstly, that if they had insured the goods the ordinary fire insurance policy would not have covered the risk and therefore although they had committed a breach of the agreement or been negligent in their duty as agents, they were not liable to pay anything more to the respondents. In the alternative it was argued on their be?alf that the interventin of Government in passing this Ordinance could not increase or add to the liability of the appellants for the breach of contract or breach of duty and therefore they were not liable to pay the compensation which would have been receivable by the respondents if the goods had been\n\nPannalal Jankida8\n\nv, Mohanlal and\n\nAnother,\n\nKatiif'l 0, J,\n\nPaanalal Jankidaa\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C. J.\n\ninsured. The second contention is that the counterclaim of the respondents is barred under section 18 (2) of the Ordinance. In the Indian Contract Act, sections 211 and 212 provide for the consequences of an agent acting otherwise than according to his duty towards the principal.\n\nUnder section 211 when an agent conducts the business of the principal otherwise than according to the directions given by the principal, if any loss be sustained he must make it good to his principal and if any profit accrues he must account for it. In Smith v. Lascetles(1), it was held that if an agent was instructed to insure goods and neglected to do so he was liabie to the principal for their value in the event of their being lost.\n\nSection 2 J 2 of the Indian Contract Act provides as follows :-\n\n\" An agent is always bound to act with reasonable diligence and use such skill as he possesses ; to make compensation to his principal in respect of the direct consequences.of his own neglect, want of skill or misconduct, but not in respect of loss or damage which are indirectly or remotely caused by such neglect, want of skill or misconduct.\" These sections make it clear that in case of the agent's negligence he is liable to make good the damage directly arising from his neglect but not indirectly or remotely caused by such neglect or misconduct. The question therefore is whether in the present case the claim of the respondents based on the neglect or misconduct can be stated to be a direct consequence of such neglect or misconduct or is only indirectly or remotely caused by such neglect.\n\nTwo positions can be visualized as ans1ng from the appellants' neglect in this case. The appellants could be treated either as insurers themselves or can be con. sidered as having agreed to cause the goods insured by a recognised insurance company on the usual fire insurance policy terms. In Ticket v. Short('), the Lord Chancellor shortly stated the proposition of law in these terms :-\" The rule of equity is, that if an order\n\n(1) (1788) 2 T.R. 187.\n\n(2) 2 Vei. Sen. 289. -\n\nis sent by a principal to a factor to make an insurance; 1950 and he charges his principal, as if it was made; if he Pannalal never in fact has made that insurance, he is considered Jankidas as the insurer himself.\" If therefore, as in the present v. case, the appellants were given instructions to insure Mohanlal and the goods and they charged the respondents as if they Another. had insured the goods, the law would throw upon Kania o. J, them the liability of an insurer as if they stood in the position of insurers, i.e., the Court will then be entitled in equity to proceed on the footing as if an insurance had been effected by the appellants and the goods stood covered under a fire insurance policy. Whatever consequences follow from that position must be accepted and enforced in a court of equity against the appellants. Proceeding on that line of reasoning under section 14 of the Ordinance the only thing which is required to be considered is whether the goods were covered by a fire insurance policy. The terms of the policy are immaterial. If, therefore, the appellants are considered as having insured the goods and are precluded from saying that the goods were not covered by a fire insurance policy, the loss arising from the fact that the goods were not so covered is a Jirect consequence of their neglect and they must make it good. That will make them liable to pay what was claimed by the respondents.\n\nIf, however, it is considered that they were not themselves insurers but that they had agreed only to keep the goods insured under a policy of insurance of a recognised insurance company on the usual fire insurance policy terms, the question is whether the damages claimed by the respondents directly flow from their neglect of duty in not being able to produce such a fire insurance policy.\n\nOur attention has been drawn to an instructive judgment which makes the distinction between direct and remote damages clear. In In Re An Arbitration between Polemis & another and Furness Withy & Co. Ltd. (1) there is a discussion on this point in the judgment of Banks L.J. He drew attention to the observations of Lord Sumner in Weld-Blundell v.\n\nIll [1921) 3 K.B. 560.\n\n/ /\n\nPannalal\n\nJankidas\n\nMohanlal. and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nStephens (1), who observed as follows:-\" What are natural, probable and necessary consequences ? Everything that happens, happens in the order of nature and is therefore natural.\n\nNothing that happens by the free choice of a thinking man is necessary except in the sense of pre-destination.\n\nTo speak of probable consequences is to throw everything upon the jury. It is tautologous to speak of effective cause or to say that damages too remote from the cause are irrecoverable, for an effective cause is simply that which causes, and in law, what is ineffective or too remote is not a cause at all.\n\nI still venture to think that direct cause is the best expression .................. What a defendant ought to have anticipated as a reasonable man is material when the question is whether or not he was guilty of negligence, that is, of want of due care according to the circumstances, This however goes to culpability, not to compensation.\" Banks L.J., after noticing the above observations, stated as follows:-\" Under these circumstances I consider that it is immaterial that the causing of the spark by the falling of the plank could not have been reasonably anticipated.\n\nThe appellants' junior counsel sought to draw a distinction between the anticipation of the extent of damage 'resulting from a negligent act, and the anticipatie>n of the type of damage resulting from such an act.. .......... I do not think that the distinction can be admitted. Given the breach of duty which constitutes the negligence, and given the damage as a direct result of that negligence, the anticipations of the person whose negligent act has produced the damage appear to me to be irrelevant,\"\n\nThe question of what is remoteness of damages in a case of negligence has been reviewed in detail in a recent decision of the Honse of Lords in Monarch Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker(').\n\nIn that case the question arose in respect of damages due to the late delivery of goods shipped for a port in Sweden, but which ship, owing to its unseaworthiness, was delayed in its voyage and owing to the outbreak of war\n\n(11 [\\920] A.O. 98.3-981.\n\n12) fl 949] A.O. 196,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{EPOl{TS 991\n\nunder orders of the British Admiralty, was directed not to proceed to the Swedish port but ordered to discharge the cargo at Gla>gow. The assignees of the bills of lading from the shippers had to forward th~ goods in neutral ships chartered for the purpose to the Swedish port. A war risks clause in the charte1'party exonerated the owners of the vessel in the event of compliance with any orders given by the government of the nation under whose flag the ship sailed, as to destination delivery or otherwise. The holders of the bills of lading claimed the re-transport charges from Glasgow to the Swedish port.\n\nIt was contended that these damages were too remote.\n\nThe House of Lords rejected the contention.\n\nIn the speech of Lord Wright most of the relevant authorities have been reviewed and the ratio decidendi has been set out.\n\nIn Hadley v. Baxendale (') Alderson B., giving the judgment of the Court, thought that the proper rule in such a case consisted of two alternatives.\n\nHe said: \"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either. arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.\" In the opinion of Lord \\Vright this in truth gives effect to the broad general rule of the law of damages that a party injured by the other party's breach of contract \"is entitled to such money compensation as will put him in the position in which he would have been but for the breach.\" This rule was stated by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone\n\nv. Rawyards Coal Co. (2) as follows :-\"Where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured,\n\n(1) 9 Ex, 341, i~I (1880) 5 App. O•a. 25, 39,\n\n!950\n\nP(J.nttalal Jankidas v.\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania 0. J.\n\nPaiinalal Ja1kidas\n\nMokattlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania 0. J.\n\nor who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation.\"\n\nThe rule stated by Alderson B. has consistently been accepted as corect ; the only difficulty has been in applying it. The distinction drawn is between damages arising naturally (which means in the normal course of things) and cases where there were special and extraordinary circumstances beyond the reasonable prevision of the parties.\n\nThe distinction between these types is usually described in English Law as that between general and special damages; the latter are such that if they are not communicated it would not be fair or reasonable to hold the defendant responsible for losses which he could not be taken to contemplate as likely to result from his breach of contract. Viscount Haldane L. C. in The British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Underground Eleic Railways Co. of London ('), on the question of damages said :-In some of the cases there are expressions as to the principles governing the measure of general damages which at first sight seem difficult to harmonize.\n\nThe apparent discrepancies are, however, mainly due to the varying nature of the particular questions submitted for decision. The quantum of damage is a question of fact, and the only guidance the law can give is to lay down general principles which afford at times but scanty assistance in dealing with particular cases. The Judges who give guidance to juries in these cases have necessarily to look at their special character, and to mould, for the purposes of different kinds of claim, the expression of the general principles which apply to them and this is apt to give rise to an appearance of ambiguity ... It was necessary to balance loss and gain and no simple solution was possible.\" The House of Lords in Liesbosch (Owners) v. Edison (Owners) (') has stated at page 463 that it is im. possible to lay down any universal formula.\n\nThe dominant rule of law is the principle of restitutio in\n\ninteruni and subsidiary rules can only be justified if\n\n\\1) [1912] A, C. 678, 689.\n\n(21 (1933] A.O. H9,\n\nthey give effect to that rule. (The italics are mine). In Smith, Hogg & Co. Ltd. v. Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co. Ltd. (1), the loss of a vessel occurred through the negligence of the master operating on conditions of unseaworthiness existing since the commencement of the voyage.\n\nThe loss was held to be caused by the breach of the warranty of seaworthiness and recoverable accordingly. There was an exception of negligence. At page 1005 in the judgment of that case it is stated \"no distinction could be drawn between cases where the negligent conduct of the master is a cause and cases where any other cause, such as perils of the sea, is a co.operating cause. A negligent act is as much a co.operating cause if it is a cause at all, as an act which is not negligent.\" . \\Vhat was then being emphasized was that a voluntary act (negligent or not) of a human agent is not generally an independent or new cause for this purpose which breaks the chain of causation, as it is called, so as to exclude from consideration the causal effect of the unseaworthiness.\n\nIn that case it was held that the unseaworthiness created in the vessel instability which, combined with negligence of the master, caused the Joss. No new law was laid down in that case.\n\nSimilarly in The Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Clan Line Steamers Ltd.('), the vessel capsized because the master not being instructed by his owners as to the peculiarities of a turret ship, so handled her that she capsized. That loss was immediately due to perils of the sea which overwhelmed her when she capsized, liability for which was excepted, but the dominant cause was her unseaworthiness in that her master, though otherwise efficient, was inefficient in not being aware of the special danger. In general, all the authorities are in agreement in this respect and embody the same rule. The shipowner, of course, under the familiar general rule, is debarred by his breach of duty from relying on the specific exception. Though he would not be liable for the consequences caused by the specific excepted peril or the accident alone if he\n\n\\l! \\.\\940) A, C. 907,\n\n(2) (192!11 A.O. !CO. 127\n\n19~0\n\nPanna.lal Jankidas\n\nMo1ranlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania c. J.\n\n19!0\n\nP, inn1lal Jank'idas\n\n•• Mohanlal an:l\n\nAKothe,..\n\nKania O. I.\n\nwere not in default, though the unseaworthiness existing at the commencement of the voyage might not be operative or known until the time when the accident occurs, yet then the breach of the warranty operates directly as a cause and, indeed, a dominant cause.\n\nCausation in law does not depend on remoteness or immediacy in time.\" These obsrrvations meet the appellants' contention about the Government Ordinance intervening to fix the damages.\n\nThey show that such intervention does not break the chain of causation, nor does it make the loss, i.e., damages, remote.\n\nThe statement of law in Mayne on Damages quoted above, only reproduces the principle of law stated by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Company(').\n\nBearing in mind this state of the law it appears clear that in the present case it was the duty of the appellants to insure the goods, as they had agreed to do.\n\nOnce misconduct is admitted or proved, the fact that the Ordinance did not exist and could not have been in the contemplation of the parties is irrelevant for deciding the question of liability. The liability was incurred by reason of the breach of their duty and the appellants made tbemselves liable to ray damages.\n\nThe measure of damages was the loss suffered by the respondents on account of the goods not being insur,:d.\n\nThe next point to be decided is what difference the promulgation of the Ordinance makes in the liability of the appellants. The relevant provisions are noted above. The scheme of the Ordinance clearly is, as stated in the preamble, to provide for and regulate the payment of compensation and to prevent litigation, amongst other things. It is thus a comprehensive legislation which replaces the rights of parties either under the p'.)licy of insurance against insurance crim. panies, or on the ground of negligence against Government by the owners of the goods, as also claims by insurance companies against Government. The validity of this legislation is not challenged. Section 18 gives it a retrospective effect.\n\nTherefore the Ordinance only\n\nill 118801 5 App. Cas. 25.\n\nsubstitutes a new basis for assessing compensation for 19~0 the ordinary basis for assessing unliquidated damages.\n\nPannaltil The compensation under the Ordinance is payable on lankida• proof of the existence of a fire insurance policy irrev. spective of the terms of the policy. The non recovery Mohan/al a•d of half the amount of the respondents' claim from the Another.\n\nGovernment under the Ordinance because of the absence of a fire insurance policy, thus directly arises from the Kania 0 J. neglect of the appellants to insure the goods, as they had been instructed to do or agreed to do and which in fact they represented that they had done. In our opinion, these are not indirect or remote damages.\n\nThe contention that under the policy of insurance the assured could not have recovered anything for loss caused by the fire due to explosion cannot be accepted.\n\nFirstly, this contention of the assured's inability to receive any compensation because of clause 7 of the form of common policy was not raised in the trial court.\n\nNo issue was raised in respect thereof and no arguments in support or against it were heard. It was suggested for the first time, as appears from the judgment of Chagla J., in the court of appeal. The assumption that because of clause 7 of the policy no insurance company would have paid the Joss cannot be assumed to be necessarily and unquestionably sound and in view of tbe terms of the Ordinance not capable of being determined. There appears no reason under the circumstances to proceed as if an ad verse decision on the interpretation of the policy had been given against the respondents and to hold the appellants free from liability for not recovering half the value of the goods which could have been recovered if the goods had been insured (irrespective of the terms on which the policy stood) as agreed to be done by them. I do not think when the relations between the parties are of a princi. pal and an agent and the agent is found to have committed a breach of his duty, it is correct to take a narrow view of the situation. The agent chose to gamble in not insuring the goods and desired to charge the agreed premia, on the footing that the goods were covered by insurance.\n\nIf so, he must take the\n\n19~0\n\nPa.11.ti-ilal Jankidas\n\nv. ;\\foha>ilal and\n\nAn.other,\n\nKania 0. J.\n\nconsequences of his default.\n\nThe argument that their liability as an agent who had agreed to insure should be ascertained as on the date of the explo5ion is no answer to the claim of the respondents. The position would be this. Assuming that the appellants had insured the goods on the terms of the usual fire insurance policy, the respondents could ask them either to assign the policy to the respondents or to file a suit against the insurance company contending that the fire, and not the explosion, was the cause of the loss and was covered by the policy of insurance.\n\nBefore the Court could decide the rights of the parties, the Ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General prevented the decision of the dispute, but the Government undertook to pay the loss on the footing that the policy covered the risk. The misconduct gave rise to the liability to make good the damage and to put the respondents in the same position in which they would have been if their goods had beeen insured.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants it was urged that because of the Government intervention in issuing the Ordinance they were sought to be made liable under a new liability. Their liability has been and exists on the basis that a fire insurance policy existed, as they were instructed to insure the goods and which they represented they had done. The liability arises not because of the Ordinance but because of the breach of their duty in failing to insure, which has taken place apart from the Ordinance and which is not affected by the Ordinance. The utmost that they could urge is that the extent of their liability arising from their misconduct was not anticipated by them when they agreed to perform their duty. That however is no defence in law if the damages directly flow from the breach of duty.\n\nThe Ordinance only quantifies the damages instead of leaving the unliquidated damages to be assessed in the usual way. The Ordinance Jays down the yard. stick for fixing the damages under different circumstances, which cover all alternative situations, and the liability for failure to insure must now be mesured by the new basis. It does not create any new liability.\n\nThe appellants' contention on this point therefore must be rejected.\n\nThe only other point urged before us was based on the construction of sect ion J 8 of the Ordinance.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the appellants that apart from what could be recovered under clause (!) of section 18, the Ordinance extinguished all right, whether in contract or tort or otherwise, to any compensation or damage for loss of any property due to, or in any way arising out of, the explosion and provided that no suit or other legal proceedings for any such compensation or damages shall, save as aforesaid, be maintainable in any court against the Crown or against any other person whatsoever. It was urged that in establishing their claim, the respondents must plead the right to recover the amount due to explosion and that was barred under section 18 (2).\n\nIn our opinion, this contention is unsound. The appellants have filed this suit to recover the price of the goods on the ground of indemnity. The respondents' answer is that the appellants are not entitled to the indemnity because they are guilty of a breach of duty in the business of the agency. They contend that they would be liable to pay for the goods only if the appellants give them the goods or deliver the same according to their instructions. They counterclaim that if the appellants are unable to give them the goods, they must pay them the value thereof.\n\nThe appellants plead by way of defence to the counterclaim that the goods were destroyed without any neglect on their part by fire caused by the explosion and therefore they were not liable. The respondents' rejoinder is that they had asked the appellants to insure the goods and if the appellants had not failed in their duty they would have reimbursed the respondents. The appellants then plead that even if they had insured the goods the respondents could not have recovered anything from the insurance companies. It is in reply to this contention that the respondents say that the appellants' liability to recover money from the insurance company on the terms of the usual fire insurance policy is irrelevant\n\nPanna1al\n\nJankidaa\n\nAfohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C. J.\n\n19M\n\nPa11nalal\n\nJankidas\n\nMohatilal and\n\nAnother.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nPata,,, jali\n\nSa.striJ.\n\nbecause they could have recovered the money if they had insured in fact, irrespective of the terms of the policy, under the Ordinance. The respondents are not thus claiming to recover money from the appellants otherwise than under section 18 (1) of the Ordinance.\n\nTheir cause of action is the misconduct of the agent in the business of agency and is quite different. It is not for compensation arising from explosion.\n\nIt was argued that damages formed part of the cause of action of the respondents in framing the counterclaim and therefore section 18 (2) stood in the way of the respondents. The contention is unsound because the cause of action is completed by the aver. ment that there was a duty or agreement to insure, that there was a failure to perform that duty, that loss had occasioned to the respondents because of the failure to perform the duty and the appellants were therefore liable for the breach of the duty. The quantum of damages is not a part of the cause of action.\n\nIt is a matter to be ascertained by the court according to well laid down principles of law.\n\nThe result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the judgment just delivered by my Lord which I have had an opportunity of reading. As the facts of the case have been fully stated in that judgment it is unnecessary to re-state them here.\n\nThe main question arising for determination is what damages are the appellants liable to pay to the respondents for their failure to insure the respondents' goods which were destroyed by fire caused by the big explosions which occurred in the Bombay Docks on 14th April, 1944? The goods had been purchased by the appellants in Bombay as the commission agents of the respondents and were left in their godowns pend. ing their despatch to the respondents' place of business. It was found by the appellate bench of the Court below that the appellants had agreed to keep the goods insured against fire while in their custody ..\n\n..,\n\nand had debited the respondents in their books with the insurance charges.\n\nA suggestion was made in the course of the arguments before us that the appellants agreed to be the insurers themselves, but the findings of the appellate bench leave no room for doubt that all that the appellants agreed to do was to procure a policy of fire insurance in the ordinary or common form and subject to the conditions usually stipulated in that form of policy. This is also made clear by the concession of the respondents' counsel in the court below that \"he was only relying on the agreement to the extent that the insurance was to be effected against fire on an ordinary fire insurance policy\". It is common ground that one of the general conditions in that form of policy is that \"it does not cover\" among others any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence of explosion\". Relying on that condition, it was contended for the appellants that even if they had effected an insurance on the goods according to the agreement, the loss of the goods by fire caused by the explosion would have been an excluded loss for which no damages could have been claimed from the insurer and that, therefore, the respondents would not be entitled to recover from the appellants anything more than nominal damages for failure to insure. This contention must, in my opinion, prevail.\n\nAs pointed out by Mr. Mayne in his Treatise on Damages (p. 591, 11th Edition) \"When the agent can show that under no circumstances could any benefit to the principal have followed from obedience to his orders, and therefore that disobedience to them has produced no real injury, the action will fail.\n\nThere fore, if an agent is ordered to procure a pol icy of insurance for his principal, and neglects to do it, and yet the policy, if procured, would not have entitled the principal, in the events which have happened, to recover the loss or damage, the agent may avail himself of that as a complete defence.\"\n\nA complication, however, is introduced by an Ordinance promulgated by the GovernorGeneral known as the Bombay Explosion (Compensation)\n\nPannalal Jankidal\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nJlatan.;'ati\n\nSastrl J.\n\nPannalal Jank, das\n\nMohan.la! and\n\nAnolhar.\n\nPatanjalt\n\nSastri J,\n\nOrdinance (No. 32 of 1944) which came into force on 1st July, 1944. The preamble states \"Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide for and regulate the payment of compensation for ......... damage to property due to, or arising out of, the explosions and fires which occurred in the Bombay Docks on 14th April, 1944, to restrict litigation in connection with the said explosions ...... \". By section 2 \"the explosion\" is defined as meaning \"the explosions which occurred in the Bombay Docks on 14th April, 1944, and the fires which ensued therefrom.\" An \"explosion damage\" is defined as \"damage which occurred, whether accidentally er not, as the direct result of the explosion ... \" \"Uninsured property\" means \"property which was not covered whether wholly or partially by any policy of fire, marine or miscellaneous insurance at the time of the explosion.\" Section 14. so far as it is material here, provides that \"there shall be paid by the Central Government compensation for explosion damage to property, being damage cau, ed by fire to property insured whether wholly or partially at the time of the explosion against fire under a policy covering fire risk ... of an amount equal to the proved loss.\" Section 15 provides for contribution to Government by insurance companies. Section 16 provides for compen. sation for such damage to uninsured property on a certain scale mentioned in that section. Section ltl(2) enacts, subject to certain exceptions not material here,\n\n\"no person shall have, or be deemed ever to have had, otherwise than under this Ordinance any right, whether in contract or in tort or otherwise to any compensation or damages for any ... or damages to or loss of any property, rights or interests. due 1o or in any way arising out of the explosion; and no suit or other legal proceedings for any such compensation or damages shall, save as aforesaid. be maintainable in any court against the Crown ... or against any servants or agents of the Crown .... or against any other person whomsoever; and no act or omission which caused or contributed to the explosion shall be deemed to have been done or omitted to be done otherwise than lawfully.\" ..\n\n...\n\nIt is admitted that the appellants recovered from the Central Government under section 16 nearly one-half of the value of the goods destroyed by fire while in their custody as compensation for the loss of the respondents' goods and have given credit to the respondents in their accounts for the amount thus received.\n\nThe dispute now relates to the respondents' claim to the balance of the value of the goods as damages for the appellants' failure to keep them insured according to the agreement between the parties as the full value of the goods could have been obtained from the Government under section 14 without regard to any excepted risk if only they bad been insured against fire.The scheme of the Ordinance appears to be that the Government, instead of having probably to fight out numerous law suits for compensation for loss or damage to property based upon alleged negligence of their officers in having allowed the explosion to take place, undertook to pay an amount equal to the \"proved loss\" in cases of loss or cfamage to goods which had been insured against fire, etc. and smaller amounts for loss or damage to uninsured goods, putting an end, at the same time, to all rights to compensation or damages arising out of the explosion, and barring all suits or legal proceedings for the same.\n\nOn the basis of these provisions it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the appellants, by reason of their failure to keep the goods insured, were liable under the law to place the respondents, who had suffered the loss, in the same position as if the appellants had performed their agreement or carried out the instructions of the respondents. Learned coun sel for the respondents based the claim on the neglect of duty on the part of the appellants as commission agents in carrying out the instructions of their principals, and relied on the provisions of section 212 of the Indian Contract Act, which provides, inter alia, that an agent is bound \"to make compensation to his principal in respect of the direct consequence of his own neglect, want of skill or misconduct, but not in respect of loss or damage which are indirectly or remotely\n\n!2@\n\nPaanalal Ja11kidas\n\nMohanlal and\n\nAnother,\n\nPatanjali\n\nBastri J,\n\nPannalal\n\nJankida&\n\n!tlohanlal anti\n\nAnother.\n\nPatat'l.jal1 Sastri J.\n\ncaused by such neglect, want of skill or misconduct.\" On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that the question had to be determined on the basis of a breach of contract for the consequences of which provision is made in section 73 of the Indian Contract Act. That section says that \"when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote or indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.\" I <lo not think that it makes much difference, so far as the assessment of general damages is concerned, whether the default of the appellants is treated as a breach of contract between two contracting parties or a neglect of duty by agents in failing to carry out the instructions of their principal. Although the Indian Contract Act makes separate provisions for the consequences in each case, the rule laid down as to measure of damages is the same, namely, the party in breach must make compensation in respect of the direct consequences flowing from the breach and not in respect of loss or damage indirectly or remotely caused, which is also the rule in English common law. The rule is based on the broad principle of restitutio in integrum, that is to say, that the party who has suffered the loss should be placed in the same position, as far as compensation in money can do it, as if the party in breach had performed his contract or fulfilled his duty. That principle was once carried to its utmost logical, if grotesque, result as in an old English case to which Willes J. referred in British Columbia Saw.Mill Co. v. N ettteship(1) : \"Where a man goir.g to be married to an heiress, his horse having cast a shoe on the journey, employed a blacksmith who did the work so unskilfully that the horse was lamed, and the rider not having\n\n111 L. R, 3 C.P. 4,9, 6:6. ..\n\narrived in time the lady married another ; and the blacksmith was held liable for the loss of the marriage.\" And the learned Judge warned \" We should inevitably fall into a similar absurdity unless we applied the rules of commonsense to restrict the extent of liability for the breach of a contract of this sort.\" The common\n\nsense point of view was thus put by Lord Wright in Liesbosch, Dredger v. Edison S. S. (Owners) (1) : \"The Jaw cannot take account of everything that follows a wrongful act; it regards some subsequent matters as outside the scope of its selection because 'it were infinite for the law to judge the cause of causes,' or consequence of consequences. Thus the loss of a ship by collision due to the other vessel's sole fault may force the shipowner into bankruptcy and that again may involve his family in suffering, loss of education or opportunities in life, but no such Joss could be recovered from the wrongdoer. In the varied web of affairs the law must abstract some consequences as relevant, not perhaps on grounds of pure logic but simply for practical reasons.\" These considerations have led the courts to evolve the qualifying rules of remoteness subject to which alone the broad principle of restitutio in integrum now finds its application.\n\nApplying these principles to the facts of the present case, what is the position? The respondents lost their goods by fires arising out of the explosion presumably due to the negligent conduct of the Government's officers or servants at the docks. Even if the appellants had taken out a fire insurance policy in ordinary form it would not have covered the loss, for fire due tc explosion would be an excepted peril. So, the appellants' failure keep the goods insured produced no direct consequence for which damages could in law be claimed.\n\nIt is true enough to say that if the appellants had taken out a fire policy covering the goods, the respondents could have obtained the full value of the goods from the Government. But did the respondents' inability to recover such full value from the Government arise directly or naturally in the usual course\n\nii I [1933] A.C. 449.\n\nPannalal Janhtdas\n\nMoha.nlal tnid\n\nAnother.\n\nPata, iali Sastri J.\n\nPannalal Jankidaa\n\n•• Mohanlal and\n\nAnother.\n\nPatan.jali\n\nSatri J,\n\nof things out of the appellants' failure to insure?\n\nI think not, since independent and disconnected events had to occur to produce the result, viz., the Government's scheme of compensation embodied in the Ordinance, the agreement with the Insurance Companies regarding their contribution, and the consequent distinction made between insured and uninsured property in providing compensation for their loss.\n\nSuppose the fire was caused by an explosion due to the negligence of a private individual. The respondents would have their remedy by suing him for damages.\n\nBut if he was insolvent, could the respondents' inability to recover damages from him be.a direct and natural consequence of the appellants' failure to insure? Surely not, for even if the appellants had insured the goods according to their agreement with the respondents, the latter would be in no better position.\n\nHere, the Government, presumably being satisfied, or at any rate apprehending, that the explosion was due to the negligence of their servants, got the Ordinance passed providing for payment of compensation by the Government on the terms stated therein and at the same time putting an end to all rights to recover compensation save as provided in the Ordinance and barring all smts and other proceedings for that purpose.\n\nAs any claim to compensation against the Government must be based upon the negligence of their servants, the Government took no note of excepted risks in insurance policies and undertook liability to pay full compensation in case of all insured property, doubtless because, under an arrangement with certain Insurance Companies the Government obtained a proportionate contribution as provided for in section 15, though on the hypothesis of their servants' negligence their liability in law would be the same in respect of insured and uninsured property. If the Ordinance\n\nhad provided for partial compensation in both cases, as it would probably have done if the Insurance Companies had not agreed to come into the scheme with their contributions, the respondents could have no claim to recover the balance from the appellants, ..\n\nnotwithstanding that the supposed direct causal connection between the appellants' default and the respondents' loss would still be there. The truth is there was no such connection and it was because of the provisions of the Ordinance which made a distinction between insured and uninsured property in the matter of compensation for explosion damage, and barred rights and remedies under the general law in relation thereto, that the respondents were unable to recover the balance of the value of their goods des. troyed by fire.\n\nBut such inability cannot be regarded as flowing naturally or directly from the appellants' default.\n\nIt was suggested that the provisions of the Ordinance must be taken to have displaced the ordinary rules oflaw as to remoteness of damage, as section 18 (2) extinguished, retrospectively from the date of the explosion, all rights and remedies under the general law for obtaining compensation for explosion damage and substituted the rights therein provided. The substituted right to compensation, so far as the Government and insured property were concerned, was not subject to any restrictive conditions in the policies, and therefore, it was claimed, the measure of damages in this case must be determinec1 irrespectively of the existence of the clause excluding \"explosion\" from the scope of the common form of policy. The argument is, in my opinion, more ingenious than sound. The short answer to it is that the Ordinance did not purport to displace or supersede any rule of law as to measure of damages or to amend or abrogate any terms in insurance policies.\n\nThere is nothing in the Ordinance to indicate that the clause excepting explosion con_ tained in the fire insurance policies issued in Bombay should be deemed to be null and void. As already stated, the Government, having accepted liability for explosion damage, were not really concerned with the restrictive conditions in the policies. Their liability did not arise out of such policies. In view of certain Insurance Companies having agreed to contribute acertain proportion, the Government undertuok liability\n\nPannalal Jank1das\n\nv. !l'fohanlal and\n\nAnother,\n\nPatanjali Sastrt J,\n\nPannaral Jankidas\n\nMohanlal aiid\n\nAnother.\n\nPatanja($\n\nSastri J.\n\nto pay full compensation for loss of insured pro. perty regardless of the terms of insurance, which had no relevance to the liability which they assumed. To suggest, in such circumstances, that the clause excepting explosion risk in all fire policies issued in common form in Bombay was legislatively abrogated is, in my opinion, extravagant and far-fetched. The respondents' goods were destroyed when the explosion occurred on the 14th April, 1944, and on that date they could have recovered nothing except perhaps nominal damages for the appellants' failure to insure the goods as they agreed to do. It is difficult to see how by virtue of the Ordinance passed more than two months later, their claim against the appellants, which the respondents themselves are contending is not in any way affected ·by the provisions of the Ordinance, could become enlarged.\n\nThe next contention raised on behalf of the apellants before us relates to the maintainability of the respondents' counter-claim. The contention is based upon section 18 (2) of the Ordinance which provides that \"no suit or other ; legal proceedings for any such compensation or damages\" (i.e., compensation or damages for any damage to or loss of any property, rights or interests due to or in any way arising out of the explosion) \"shall, save as aforesaid\" (exceptions not material here) \"be maintainable in any court against the Crown ......... or against any other person whomsoever ...... \". The learned Chief Justice in the Court below makes no reference in his judgment to this contention, but Chagla J. repelled it thus . \"Now, in my opinion, the defendants' claim does not arise out of the explosion nor is it in any way due to the explosion. The plaintiffs have filed the suit as agents on an indemnity and the defendants' answer is that they were entitled to set off against the amounts due to the plaintiffs, the loss incurred by them by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs as the defendants' agents did not carry out the defendants' instructions. If the plaintiffs' claim on the indemnity does not arise out of the explosion equally so does the defendants' setoff not so arise. The defendants' cause of action is failure by the plaintiffs to carry out their instructions and that cause of action has nothing whatever to do with the explosion\". With all respect I find it difficult to follow this reasoning.\n\nThe appellants' claim on the indemnity does not certainly arise out of the explosion, for their case is that they purchased the goods in question paying the price on the respondents' instructions, and they claim to recover the price so paid notwithstanding the destruction of the goods by fire for which they say they were in no way responsible.\n\nBut the basis of the respondents' counter-claim is quite different. They say that if the appellants had kept the goods insured according to the agreement, they (the respondents) could have recovered the full value of the goods from the Government under section 14 of the Ordinance, and the appellants, having failed to do so, are liable to pay by way of damages the balance of the value of the goods. It is a little difficult to see how it could be said that the respondents' claim \"does\n\nnot arise out of the explosion nor is it in any way due to the explosion\". The bar under section 18 is not based upon the nature of the cause of action for the suit or proceeding barred, but upon the damage or loss of property having been \"due to or in any way arising out of\" the explosion.\n\nIndeed, the respondents appear to my mind to be in a dilemma in regard to this point.\n\nThey must necessarily say, in order to have been able to claim the full value of the goods from the Government if they had been insured, that the damage to .the goods was \"explosion damage to property, being damage caused by fire to property insured whether wholly or partially at the time of the explosion against fire under a policy covering fire \"risk\". For, unless they said that, no claim could be made against the Government under section 14, and so the very basis of their claim against the appellants that, but for the appellants' neglect of duty, the respondents could have recovered the full value of the goods from the Government, would fail. But if they had to say that the goods were lost by explosion damage within the meaning\n\nPannalal Jankidas v. ll1ohanlal a11d\n\nAnother.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nPatntalal Jankid-:u\n\nv, Mohanlal and\n\nAnother,\n\nPata1tjali S11stri J.\n\n!950\n\nDeo, 21.\n\nof section 14, it seems to me, they would be bringing themselves under the bar of section 18 (2).\n\nThe respondents cannot therefore claim that the loss of the goods was explosion damage within the meaning of the Ordinance so as to bring the case within section 14 and at the same time contend that the loss was not \"due to or did not in any way arise ont of the explosion\" in order to a void the bar under section 18.\n\nBoth section 14 and section 18 have in view the physical cause for the loss or damage to property for which compensation is claimed and not the cause of action in relation to the person against whom relief is sought. The respondents cannot, in my opinion, be allowed to take up inconsistent positions in order to bring themselves within the one and to get out of the other.\n\nI would therefore allow the appeal and dismiss the counter-claim.\n\nDAS J. agreed with the Chief Justice.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Mohan Behari Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondents : I. N. Shroff.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL v.\n\nCALCUTTA AGENCY LTD.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA CJ., PATANJAL! SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.]\n\nfoli.tn Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), ss. 10 (2) (xv), 66-Reference-Jwrisdiction of High Ooilft-Duty to decide case ori facts stated by Tribuna.l-Accepting arauments of CO'ltnsel as proved fa.cts and basing decision on them, impropriety of-Business expenditnre- Payments to avoid disclosure of misfeasance of director.~-Burden of prcof.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of incometax references is an advisory jurisdiction and under the Inco:netax Act the decision of the Appellate Tribunal on facts is final unless it can be successfully assailed on the ground tha~ there was", "total_entities": 134, "entities": [{"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 87, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DAS J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 221, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 299, "end_char": 311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: R. S. Narula."}}, {"text": "P. A.Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A.Mehta."}}, {"text": "PANNALAL JANKIDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 353, "end_char": 370, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Panna.lal Jankidas", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHANLAL AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 375, "end_char": 395, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHANLAL AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRr'HARILAL KANIA C.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 421, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 425, "end_char": 441, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 14, 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 926, "end_char": 932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1085, "end_char": 1091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs who were commission agents purchased piecegoods according to defendant's instructions and storsd a portion of the goods in a godown in Bombay pending receipt of a permit from the Government authorities for consigning the same to the defendants."}}, {"text": "Saatri J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSaatri J.\n\nDae."}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2222, "end_char": 2230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pannalal\n\nJankida!", "canonical_name": "Pa11nalal"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J. and\n\nDAS J. (PATANJALI SASTRI J. dissenting).-(i) As full compensation under the Ordinance was payable on proof of the existence of a fire insurance policy irrespective of the terms of the policy, and the non-recovery of half the value of the goods from the Government under the Ordinance was due to the absence of a fire insurance policy, the loss to the defendants arose directly from the neglect or breach of duty of the plaintiffs to insure the goods as they had been instructed and agreed to do; intervention of the Ordinance did npt break the chain of causation or make the loss remote 6r indirect; the Ordin ance did not create any new liability but only quantified the damages; and the fact that it did not exist at the time of the explosion and could not have been in the contemplation of the parties was irrelevant for deciding the question of liaibility;\n\n{ii) the plea of the defendants was not barred by the Ordinna.nce inasmuch a.a their cause of action against the plaintiffs was misconduct of the lg, tter in the business of their agency, and this cause of action was completed by the averment that there was a duty or a.greement to insure, that there was failure to per form that duty and that the failure bad caused damage to the defendants, and the quantum of the damages was not a part of the ca.use of action.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAoTR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per PATANJALI SAoTR( J.-(i: The defendants' inability to recover the full value of the goods from the Government under the Ordinance did not arise directly and naturally in the usual course of things from the plaintiffs' failure to insure, but from indepenaent and disconnected events, namely1 the Government's scheme for compensation, embodied in the Ordinance, the agree.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Mohanlal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5727, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event the lankidaa defendants cannot be allowed to claim that the loss of the goods v. was explosion damage so as to bring the case under g. 14 and at Mohanlal and the same time contend that the loss was not due to or did not in Another."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5881, "end_char": 5886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Liesbosch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25, British\n\nWestinyhouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. 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false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22379, "end_char": 22387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is sent by a principal to a factor to make an insurance; 1950 and he charges his principal, as if it was made; if he Pannalal never in fact has made that insurance, he is considered Jankidas as the insurer himself.\"", "canonical_name": "Pa11nalal"}}, {"text": "Jankidas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22444, "end_char": 22452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is sent by a principal to a factor to make an insurance; 1950 and he charges his principal, as if it was made; if he Pannalal never in fact has made that insurance, he is considered Jankidas as the insurer himself.\"", "canonical_name": "Jankidas"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22692, "end_char": 22697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had insured the goods, the law would throw upon Kania o. J, them the liability of an insurer as if they stood in the position of insurers, i.e., the Court will then be entitled in equity to proceed on the footing as if an insurance had been effected by the appellants and the goods stood covered under a fire insurance policy.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23137, "end_char": 23147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Polemis", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24237, "end_char": 24244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In Re An Arbitration between Polemis & another and Furness Withy & Co. Ltd. (1) there is a discussion on this point in the judgment of Banks L.J. He drew attention to the observations of Lord Sumner in Weld-Blundell v.\n\nIll [1921) 3 K.B. 560."}}, {"text": "Furness Withy & Co. 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(2) as follows :-\"Where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured,\n\n(1) 9 Ex, 341, i~I (1880) 5 App."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28910, "end_char": 28915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania 0.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "Paiinalal Ja1kidas\n\nMokattlal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28923, "end_char": 28952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nPaiinalal Ja1kidas\n\nMokattlal and\n\nAnother."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28968, "end_char": 28973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania 0."}}, {"text": "Alderson B.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29163, "end_char": 29174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule stated by Alderson B. has consistently been accepted as corect ; the only difficulty has been in applying it."}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29826, "end_char": 29842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Haldane L. C. in The British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Underground Eleic Railways Co. of London ('), on the question of damages said :-In some of the cases there are expressions as to the principles governing the measure of general damages which at first sight seem difficult to harmonize."}}, {"text": "Panna.lal Jankidas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33326, "end_char": 33344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "127\n\n19~0\n\nPanna.lal Jankidas\n\nMo1ranlal and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Panna.lal Jankidas"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33371, "end_char": 33376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania c. J.\n\n19!0\n\nP, inn1lal Jank'idas\n\n•• Mohanlal an:l\n\nAKothe,..\n\nKania O. 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