BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS.

SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS.

May, 4, 1984

[D. A. DEsAi, o. CaINNAPPA REDDY AND A.

VARADARAJAN, JJ.J

Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act 1960-Sctions 61 and. 66-:- 0rder of dismissal or remo'la! front service made agalnst an employee- Jurl&-

dicrin af Lfibu.' Court ro t'nterfere in an app/catlon under sect/On 6/.-Lahour

Court e1; titled to. exanine thf! proprlety .or irnproprlety of the order-Jurisdiction of Industrial Court to interfere with the .order of Labour Court-lnduStriaI

c~Urt can cone to a different co.1clusio.1 ori same set ; I facts.

Words and Phrases-r~As.it tzifiks fit"-Legalltj and propr/ety"-Meaniq of-Madhya Prade, h Industrial Relations Act, 1960. ,; c:ion 66 (J).

The D.ppellants were workmen emplo)'ee5 of the first respondent com .. pany.

Itwa~ allegd that .they assault_ed a11otber workmari as a result of which he sustaineJ bleeding.lnjuries.oa his had.

A ch1rgsb~'!t WJS draWQ• up _by the m1nagemen!, was served on the appellants,. hich .. was followed by a comi)osit' domestic enquiry at the end :of which all of them were dismissed rom service •.

The appellants moved five different applications before the Labour CoUrt _questioning the validity of the don1cstic enquiry as also the legality and propriety of the oiders te_rmioating their services; The Labour Court -'findirig that the domestic_ enquiry was held according to the relevant rules, and that there W:is evidence in S\JPP.ort of the alleged misconduct, held that the managemant fYas justified . in. imposing_ the Penalty of dismissal from' service.

G The appellants flied five separate revision petitions befOre the Industrial Courtunder sections 66 aad 67 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, t 960.

The President of the lnciustcial Court, findillg that the entire approach of-tho Inquiry Officer.-Man'lger in -arriving at the fia lings_ of' mis .. collduct in the domestic enquiry ppoaied to be biase(I and qnfair,_ and that the Conclusions neither fair nor reasonable, held that the dismissal could not H bo sustained.

All the revision petitions were therefore .allowed, and the orders of. the Labour Court dismising the applications were set aside, and

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llABULAL v. SHREB SYNTHBTics '173.

the matters were remanded for a fresh decision after giving the pirties due A opr)ortunity to adduce' evidence ia respect of the alleg'ed mis..::onduct.

The respondent-company filed Writ pe_titions before the High Court questioning tile correcJness of the-order of _the Industrial Court and a Divi- . sioo Bench held that the Industrial Court e:x; ceeded 'its jurisdfction by inter

fering with the findings of

0 facts, and' as this was an erro~_apparent on the face of the award, quashed the decision of the Industrial Gourt.

AlloWing the appeals to t'his Court;

HELD : I': (i) Times without numb", it h1s been po!nted out . that Art. 226 is a device t~ secur~ and advance juslice and. not otherwis.,;. [7 d7E]

Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Tra, sport Corporaiion, [ 1983] 4 SCC 156, referred

to. • (ij) Ordinarily, th~ Courts exercisi11g cxtraordia1ry jurisdL:tion is loathe to interfere With an order remandicig the m1tter io the athority. directed to iovCstigate facts. [787F] ·

.D. P. Maheshwarl v. Delhi Administratio1 and Ors., [1983] 4 SCC 293;

ref1.rr.ed tp.·

In the instant case, the Indutrial. Court had made an Order of rem1nd.

The High Court was not justified in interfering with the Same .. By tllis

uncalle~ for iiJtcrference, it has merely .Prolonged the agony of the unem-. ptOyed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the Higll Court urider Art. 226 'to be explojted by thOse who can well afford to Wait to t'he detriment Or those wlio can illaff"rd to wait by drJggiag the 1.ltter from cou.rt to court for.adjudication of peripheral is_ues more vital to thm. [787F-GJ

. . .. '

2. (i) DisrnisSal frolil service is an order made under th6 relevant stnding orders. A relief agaiQst sU.ch an order can be obtained by making all application under section 6 l to the Labour Court. Agaibst the order

mad~ by the ~1hour Court un.der se'ction 0 l, a reviSion would lie Under section 66 to the Industrial Court. [779H; 780C]

(ii) If and when an application under ection 61 is made the Labour

Court will have jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the order G or'dismiSsal or removal from service.

When jurisdiction is conferredupoa the babour Court, not oi:ily to examine tho 1e8aHty of the order as also the proprie!y of the Order, the. Labour Court ca.a in exefcise of th~• jurisdiction examine the propriety ot imp'ropriety of tho order. [181C]

3. (i) The main put .of Sec. 66 elearly spells out the jurisdiction of ' the Industrial _Court to pass any order in reference to the case. brought-. before it 'as-it thinks fit.' The expressio1 'as it thinks fitr confers a, very

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114 SiJPRBMB COURT REPORTS [!9S4J 3 s.c.ll.

A wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely.different view on the same set of facts.

The expression 'as it thinks fit' has the same connotation, unless the context othrwise indicates 'asb~ de"em; fit\ [7858-C]

8aja Ram Mahadev_ Paranjype and Ors. v •. Aba Maruti Mali and Ors.1 [1962] Suppl. l.SCR 739; referred to.

(ii) Sub.cl. (c) of tho first proviso to S!ction 66 (1) will permit tho Industrial Court to interfere with th'e order m1.de by the LabJur Cout, if the Labour Court has acted with m1terial irregularity in di5posal of the _dispute before it~ If the finding rec0rded by th~ •Labour C'Jurt is such to which no reason1ble man can arrive, the Indultrial CJurt in x:rcise of 1 its revisiorial jurisdictiOn would be entitled to inttJrfere eve11 if p1tent juridic_ .. tional error is, not poiated out. [78Sll -F]

The -expression 'propriety' is variou.ly urtderstooJ; oae mJ1uin~ assigned to it-bing 'justice'.

ArnJn.gst va&ds sbad.;:s of mJ.1.ning asiigad to the expression, th3 dictionary sets out: 'fitness, appro?riate1.;:sJ; ap~HuJ.;:; suitability etc.' as some of them. [7810-E]

S If the justice or the justness in relation to a Jegal procee4ing where evidence is led is questioned and th;) authority is coaferred wHb jurisdiction to examlne the pop'riety of tb3 ord.;:r or deisio:i thit avth:Jrity will h:i.ve the. slm~ jurisdiction as the originalauthority tocom~ to a dffferent conclusion o:i the same set of facts-• If a11y other vieN is taken, the expressiqn 'propriety' woulj lo;~ all sig1ifi;:111::e.

The expre3sioJ 'I_eg1lity a1d propriety' b1s been i.lied iii!. varioui statutei wh.;:re appJliate o; revisiooal jurisdiction is confecred up1n a su}orior authority. o[781E-'3]

Ra'llan nd Rama• Lt</. v. Th? State of M>ira; and Aiir., ( 1956] S.C.R. 2S6, Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan a"dOs., [1960] 2 S.C.R. 895, Awdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. ( .Yeaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr. [1972] Llb. and I_C. 84i; referred to. .

In the insta1t cise, the lod03triiil C:>urt. while h'1rlng th' ievi3ion Petitloii.s "'found that th~· p.HitioJers wre; tradunioJ WJrkers and tb.1t three , of them w<!re offi.; e-aers of th' union, and . that a m ltedal p:ece of e\ridence clearly' pJiriting tO th.;: coatrary was whcilly overlookd by th' Inqniry officer. Tho Indu•triai'Court also pointed out th1t report (E< D/18) purpJr-ting to have ben. m1de by the ass1ulted w.>rker to th3 factory Manlger on the day following the date of the occilrrence When P.rop_3tJy scanned appeared to be highly suspiciou~ evidenc;:: hJcau3e: 'it WJS not dated 3.nd did not bear the eadorsement of the officer to whrn it Was preSerited. . After referring to other infirmities in theapproach of tho Labour Court, the Industriiil Court concluded that the entir_, approach Or the 'M1nager in arriving at the find-ings of roisCondu:t in bis enquiry -'app:::ared to be biased and unfair', and 'tha coaclusioi:is o; iither fair nor reasonable aild any order of dismisal blsed thereon collld not b~ sustained.' The ... InduStrial Court was, therefore perfectly ju<; tifi d in iOter .. ferin$ with the order of the Labour Court. lt m>rely set aside the awar4

BABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.) 775

of the Lo bour cOurt and d.id not proceed to reappraie the evidence but A femitted the case to the Labour Court for fresh deciSion.

It was thus an -eminently just order.

The High Ccurl however; observed that tho Labour Court could only interfere wi.th the decision of the inquiry officer if the findings atrived at were perverse.

The High Court comptetely missed the - ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the order.

Impropfiety. as converse of propriety cannot be equated with perversity. _The ll:igb Courl wholly,

:JJ misread the relevant provfsiorf and interfered with the dedsion of the Industrial Court which was pre-eminently just and within the four corners of its jurisdiction. [7850; 786A-G; 787A-D]

• CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1891-1895 of 1982.

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Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the !\th September, 19i9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos; 77 !o 81 of 1979.

J. Ramamurthy and Ms. R. Vaigaifor the Appellants.

• G.B. Pal, S.K: G, imbhir, Ashok Mahajan and Ms. Sun/ta Kripalani for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DesAT, J. Nothing appears more well settled than that the extraordinary ju~diction under Art. 226 conferred on the High ·

Court was a -.veapon forged to overreach injustice and secure and advance justice. When therefore, this extraordinary power is. used to defeat justice and to promote technicality not only its raison d'etre is violated but. it becomes a handy instrument for those to whoni litigation cost is a luxury enjoyed at the cost of others and employed toexhaust and harass an unequal opponent. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal.

The first respondent-Shree Synthetics Ltd. ('respondnt' for short) appears to be a company governed by the Companies Act,

1956. It has.set up a factory at Ujjain where it manufactures. polyester fibre. 'Appellants in eacli of these appeals were the wdtkmen

of the respondent. Th.ere is a trade union of the workmen e)llployed

by the respondent of which at the relevant time three out of the five appellants in this group of_appeals'wer~ office bearers. Babula!

Nagar was the President of the Union : Babula! Jaiswalwas the General Secretary and Ramesh Candra was the Secretary.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1984J 3 S.C.R.

According to the respondents on June 3, 1975 around 11.10 P. M one Verma a workman of the respondent on the shift being. over Wdnt, out. of the compound gate-and took his seat in a tempo when Babula! Nagar a_Tld Babula! Jaisw'al along with three other. appellants approached him and asked Verm1 to alight from the tempo as they wanted to talk to him .. On Venm's disinclination to come ou~ of the vehicle, it was all>ged that Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal pulled Verma out of the vehicle and all the appellants. assaultod him with fists and kicks and felled him down as a result of which Verma sustained .bleeding injuries on his head. On hearing the commotion, sta!T of the security department. intervened. and rescued him. ·

Setting out these allegations a charge-sheet was drawn-up .and served on the five appellants followed by a composite cjomestic enquiry at the end of which all of them were dismi&sed frpm service.

The appellants moved five different .applications before th.e Labour Co trt questioning the validity of the domestic efiquiry held againat them as also tlie]egality and propriety of the orders terminating their services. The Labour Court .was of -the opinion that the domestic enquiry was held according to the relevant ru \es and as there was evidence in support of the alleged m!sconduct the manage,, mentwas justified in imposin'g the penalty of dismissal from service and accordingly all the five applications were dismissed. ,

The appellants filed five separate revision petitions before the Industrial Court under Secs, 66 and 67 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, J 950.('Act' for short). All the five revision petitions were he1rd by the President of the Industrial Court at Indore who. was q{ the opinion that the entire approach of the inquiry officer-Manager-in arrivingat the findings of misconduct in his enquiry. appear to be biased aµd unfair and that the conclusions are neither fair nor reasonable and as such the dismissal cannot be sustained on the basis thereof. Accordingly he, by, a common judgment dated Febrnary 26, 1979, allowed all the revision petitions and set '!lside the orders of the Labour Court dismissing the applications and n; manded the matters.to the Labour Court for a fresh. decision after giving both the parties due opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of the alleged misconduct. ·

The respondent moved five separate misc, petitions in.the Hih

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DABULAC v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.)

Court of Madhya Pradesh," Jabalpur at Indore under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution questioning the correctness of the decision of the Industrial Court. A Division Bench of the High Court he .Id that the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering 'with the findings of facts and this was in error apparent on the face of the award. Accordingly, it issued a writ of certiorari and quashe_d

the decision of the Industrial Court. Hence these five civil appeals by special leave. ·

Conditions of service in respect of the cniployees employed by the respondent are governed by the Certified Standing Orders. s. o.

12 (f) which was relied upon by the respondent for imputing mis- ' r. conduct to the appellants reads asunder : C

"12. Disciplinary action for !llisconduct (1) The folio- . wing ts or omissions on tM part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct :

(a) to (el xx xx xx

xx xx xxxx xx xx

(f) drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour, during working hours at the undertaking or condut:t endangering the life or safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of dmcipline." - • The allegation in the charge-sheet on the basis of which the domestic enquiry wa~ held reads as under : ' .. . • ...Babula! was on duty on 3.6.1975 in the B Shift from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m.

At about 8.15 p.m. when Shri Satya- Prakash Verma, a Telephone Operator and Shri K. C. Bagdi, Shift-time keeper were coming out ofthe canteen after taking their meals, Babula] Nagar and Babula\ Jaiswalwere sitting in the lavyn in front of the canteen. At that time, Babula! Jai'swal asked Babula! Nagar to explain to Verma the whole position in Hindi. There upo11 Babula! J\'agar went to Bagdi and Verma and uttered the following meanjngful words : _:_"You are just a child now. You do not understand anything; if you interfere in this, you will have to pay a heavy price, (true transl; ltion)" Verma ave no reply and both Veq:na and Ba¥di ·

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SUPREME C\tURT REPORTS • • [1984] 3 s.c.R

iv.ent into the office. Thereafter, at 9.15 p. m. A. K. Awdsthi and Rajendra Jain went to the canteen to iake their meals. At that time both the petitioners namely, Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal we.re. present there. Babula! Nagar took oµt

a false token and . challenged that it may be checked b) any security officiaL Rajendra Jain thereupon said that he was not in his uniform. At. that time, Babula! Jaiswal uttered some filthy words and thereafter both Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal left the cantoen uttering filthy abuses.

At 9.30 p. m. Babula! Nagar spoke to Verma on telephone that he should. come. out of the Plant as he wanted to talk to him. Verma, therefore, come ont in the lawn from his office where both Bbulal Nagar and Babula! Jaiwal were present. At that time, Babula! Jaiswal said to Verma as under :-

• "You. have put end to our movement. Jn future things -will not be ri, gllt, if you interfere with us, and threatened, , that we shall see at 11'0 clock outside the gate." (true traµslation)

After the shift was over at about 11.10 pm. when Verma went outof the gate and too.k his seat _in the tempo Babula! Nagar and Babula!. Jaiswal along with the otl!er three petitioners wtnt to him and asked Verma to come cut of the tempo as they Mnted to talk to him .. Verma replied that they could talk to him there.' Thereupon both Babula!

Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal pulled Verma out of fhe tempo and all the petitioners as•aulted Verma with fists and kicks and felled him dJwn as a result of which he sustained a. bleeding injury on his head."On hearing the cries of Verma members. of the security Department rescued him an~ took him inside the gate." ·

Apart from anything else, a very serious question touching upon the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority to hold an enquirf on the , allegation that S. 0. 12 (!) (f) was violated would arise before the Labour Court more particularly in view of the recent decision of this Court in M/s Glaxo Lcboratorles (I) Ltd. v.

Presiding Office;, Labour Court, Meerut & Ors. \1) wherein S. 0. 22 11pplicable to. Glaxo l, aboratori_!!S (I) Lt<;!. wh:vb. is in pari materia

(O [1984) 1 src 1,

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llABULAL \', ~H~EE SYNT!IETlCS (Desai, J.)

with the S. 0. 12 (!) (f) came up for construction nt' this Court.

After an exhaustive rcvie\.v of the various di.; cisions on the subject, this Court after repelling the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant in thaf'c<1se th1t such acts as drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour are per se misconduct unconnected with time place content and wherever committed would constitute misconduct, held that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misicondnct for the purpose of the relevant standing orders, if commit ted within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. The Court further held that what constitutes 'establishment' or 'its vicmity' wouldde pend-upon the facts and circumstances

of each case.

But we shall not flr.ally pronounce on this point c as the Industrial Court had remanded the matter to the Labour Court which has jurisdiction to examine this cesc and we are inclined to uphold that order.

Therefore, the narrow question which we propose to examine in this case is whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art,. 226 and 227 should have by giving undue importance to a technical objection of jurhdiction which on proper fathoming, it itself lacked should have set a.ide a well-con, idered reasoned judgment of the President of the Industrial Court which again had merely remanded the matter thus prolonging to some extent the agony of the unemployed workers commencing from 1975,

Let us at the commencement acquaint ourselves with the scope and ambit of the power of the Labour Court as well as.the Industrial Court under the Act which would provi:ie a correct perspcclive to determine whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 was at all justified in interfering with the order made by the Industrial Court or that legalese prevailed over substantial social justice.

Sec. 61 prescribes the powers of the Labour Court which inter alia includes the power-(A) to decide-(a) disputes regarding which application has been m1dc to it under sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Act. Sec. 3 l enables an employee to make an application for relief against an order of an employer made under any of the standing orders. D:smissal from service is an order made under the relevant standing orders.

A relief against such order can be obtained by making an application under Sec. 61.

Entry l in

[ 1984) 3 S C R.

A Schedule II of the Act prior to the amendment of l "81 provided that the Labour Court may examine :

"the propriety or legality of an order passed or action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders."

Tile only feature worth-noticing is that the scope ambit and contours of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in such an appli cation would have to be determined within the parameters or the expression 'the propriety or legality of an order.' Against an order made by the Labour Court under Sec. 61, a revision would lie under Sec. 66 to the Industrial Court.

Sec. 66 has been wholly recast in I 98 l. However at the relevant time, Sec. 66 read as under :

"66; Revision. (!) The Industrial Court may, on the application by any party to a case which has been finally. decided by a Labour Court other than a case decided under paragraph (D) of sub section (l) of section 61, call for and examine the record of such case and may pas• order in reference thereto as it thinks fit :

Provided that the Industrial Court shall not vary or reverse any order of the Labour Court under this section unless-

(i) it is satisfied that the Labour Court has-

(a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or

(b) failed to exercise a jucisd1ctbn so vested; or

(c) acted in exercise or its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;

(ii) note has been served on tho part_ies to the case and opportunity given to them for bemg heard.

(2) No application under sub-section (I) shall lie to the Industrial Court unless it is made within thirty days of the date on which the case has been finally decided by:the Labo11r Court;

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DABULi\L ,._ SllREE Si'NT!llTlCS (Desai, J.) 781

Provided that in computing the p(riod of thirty days the A period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded." ..

Having noticed the relevant provisions, it is now necessary to ascertain with precision the jurisdiction of the labour Court under

Sec. 61.

The scheme of the standing orders applicable to jhe respondont-Company would show that a penalty of dismissal or removal from service can be imposed after hold:ng a domestic enquiry.

According to the relevant provis:ons in the standing orders,· such an order when made would be opeu to challenge by a substantive application under Sec. 66 (I) and in st1clr an application, if and when made, the Labour Court will have jurisdictinn to decide the legality and the propriety of the order. When jurisdiction is conferred upon the Labour Court, not onl:)'. to examine the legality of the order as also the propriety of the order, the Labour Court can in exercise of the jurisdiction examine the propriety or 1mpro priety of the order. The expression 'propriety' is variously understood, one meaning assigned to it being 'justice' in Legal Thesaurus by Burton at page 902.

Amongst various shades of meaning a&signed to the expression, the Oxford EPglish Dictionnry, Vol. VIII page 1484 sets out 'fitness; approprfateness; apt'tude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions, conformity \vith requirement; rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness etc.' If therefore, the justice or the justness in relation to a legal proceeding where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is cunferred with jur:sdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the orig'nal authority to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts.

If uny

othr vic\v is taken the cxpress:on 'propriety' would Jo'."c all sgnift cance. The expression 'legality and propr'ety' hm bc:e; i med in various statutes where appellate or revisional jurisdiction is conferred upon a superior authority. Jn Raman & Ranum Ltd. v The State of Madras & Anr\1) while examining the ambit of the jurisdiction of the State Government under Sec. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras) Amendment Act, 1948 to interfere with the orders of subordinate Regional 1 ransport Authority on the ground of propriety, this Court observed as under :

"The word "propriety" has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. fn the

OlH19l6) SCR 256.

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SUPREME COURT R~PORTS

(1984] 3 S C.R.

Oxford English Dictwnary (Vol. VIII), it has been stated to mean "fitne>'S; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condtions; conformity • with requirement, rule or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy". If the State Govenment was of the opinion .thatrespondent No. I had better facllities for operation than the appellant and their servic! to the public would be more beneficial, 1t could not be said that the State Government was in error in thinking that the order of the Board confirming the order of the Regional Transport Authority was improper."

In Moti Rom v. Suraj Bhan & Ors. 11) while exammmg the scope and ambit of junsdiction of the High Court under Sec. 15

(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949, this Court observed as under :

"Under Sec. 15 (5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or legality of the finding made by the 1uthorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under s. 13 (3) (a) (iii) ...

After referring to these two decisions, in Ching Chong Sine v.

Puttay Gowdr,(') Alagiriswami, J. held that the court exercising revisional jurisdiction to decide the legality or propriety of an order has the power to come to a conclusion different from that arrived by the subordinate court on the same set of circumstances. In Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Company Ltd. v. Industrial Court, Ahmedabad and Anr.(3) a Div'sion Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the expression 'legality and propriety' in S. 78(1J of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act does not limit the jurisdiction of the labour court to a revisional jurisdiction. And that any order made by the employer undor the standing order is subject to the jurisdiction conferred on the labour court under Sec. 78, which can scrutinise the legality and propriety of the order.

This jur; sdiction was described by the court as original jurisdiction meaning thereby that the labour

(1) [1960] 2 SCR 896.

H (2) AIR 1968 Madras 152. (3)

[1965] 1 LLJ;155,

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llABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.)

court c1n come to an entirely differer.! conclusion on the same set of facts. This viow was followed by another Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Manekchown and Ahmedabad Manufacturing Company Ltd v. Industrial Court and another.(1) In Vithoba Maruti Chavan v. S. Tuki Bilgrami, Member Industrial Court, Bombay and Anr.,(2) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the power to decide 'propriety' and legality of the order made under standing order doos not confer a mere revisional jurisdiction but a wider jurisdiction wh'ch will enable the Labour Court to set aside the order of the employer depending upon the facts and circumstances of tile case.

Mr. Pai on the other hand C:rew our attention to Vaidyanath v.

The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.(3) While observing that a Labour Court c1nnot exercise the power of an appellate court and cannot rea;1~:aise the evidence, yet both the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the findings of fact of the inquiry otlicer of the employer only where they are not supported by any legal evidenco or are so perwrse that no reasonable p:::rson would arriv~ at such findings on the materials placed before him. It was held that the power of the Labour Court or the Industrial Court under the Act are not wider than those of Industrial Tribunal under the Indu5trial Disputes Act, 1947 before the introduction of Sec. llA in the latter Act. In Kymore Cement Mazdoor Congress v. Industrial Court, Indore and Ors.,(') it was held that the expression 'illegally or with material irregularity' in sub-cl.

(c) of the first provho of Sec. 66(1) do not cover either errors of facts or law and they do not refer to the decisi0n arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. Approaching the matter from this angle, the High Court set aside the decision of the Industrial Court in rcvhion against the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the Industrial Court had interfered with a finding of fact which even if erroneous would not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Court to interfere in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

Mr. Pdi emphasised that the view of M.P. High Court on the interpretation of Sec. 61 should prevail over the view of Gujarat High Court interpreting a different statute. This does not carry conviction because Sec. 61 of the Act is iJi pari materia with Sec. 78

(l) (1967) I LLJ 463.

(2) AIR 1965 Bombay 81.

(3) 1974 Lab. & I.C. 1447.

(4) (1966) 1 LLJ 117,

(1984) 3 S.C.R.

of the Gujarat Act. However, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of this Court in iwdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr.(1) in which this Court while examining the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by Sec. 66 on the Industrial Court under the Act held that if the Labour Court has committed serious mistakes, the Industrial Court has jurisdictio!l to interfere with the same and upheld the decision of the Industrial Court which had interfered with thefind ings of facts recorded by the.

Labour Court A full Bnch of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nandkumar Singh v. The State Industrial Court, Indore and Ors(.2) held that perverse or arbitrary findings based on no material fall within foe ambit of the phrase "exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with rnaterbl irtegularity" justifying interference in revision. It is not necessary to farther multiply the authoritis. Therefore, it appears.well-established that the Labour Court having jurisdiction to examine the legality and propriety of the order made by the employer under the standing order will have jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the orJ.er which will permit it to come to a con

c!usion dilforent from the one to which the employer arrived at.

Such being the amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court if upon a wrong view of ambit of its jurisdiction Labour Court approaches the matter as if it exercises narrow revisional jurisJiction, the ludustrial Courr in rJvision cin interfere on the ground of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.

Sec. 66(1) of the Act provides that the Industrial Court omit· ting the portion nm relevant for the present purpose, may call for and examine the record of such case and pass order in reference thereto as it tbinks fit. If the Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to pass any order in reference to a case called for by it thinks fit, obviously it c:in come to a conclusion on the same set of facts different from the one to which the Labour Court had arrived. It was however urged that this jurisdiction of wide amplitude has been cut down by the proviso which provides that the Industrial Court shall not very or reverse any order of the Labour Court under Sec. 66(\) unle'5-(i) 1t is s_atisfied that the Labour Court has-(a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) failed to exercise a

(I) (1972) Lab. & I.C. 842.

(2) (1977) Lcb. & l.C'. i279.

BABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai,.J) .

jurhdiction so vested; or (c) acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with mitcrial irregularity. It was urged that these clauses so circumscribe and cut down the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Sec. 66 as to be on par with Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The maill part of Sec. 61 clearly spells out the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to pass any order in reference to the case brought before it as it thinks fit. The expression 'as it thinks fit' confers a very .wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression 'as it thinks fit' confers a very wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression 'as it thinks fit' has the same connotation, unless context otherwise indicates, 'as . he deems fit' and the btter expression was interpreted by this Court

78~

in Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype & Ors. v. Aha Maruti Mali & Ors.(1) to mean to make an order in terms of the statute, an order which would give effect to a right w'.iich the Act has elsewhere conferred. Is this jurisdiction so circumscribed as to bring it on par with Sec. ll5 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Proviso does cut down the ambit of the main provision but it cannot be interprted to denude the main provision of any efficacy and reduce it to a paper proviSion. Both mus.t be so interpreted as to permit interference which if not undertaken there would be miscarriage of justice.

Sub-cl. (c) of the first proviso to Sec. 66(1) will permit the Industrial Couit to interfere with the order made by the Labour Court, if the Labour Court has acted with material irregularity in disposal of the • dispute before it. If the finding recorded by the Labour court is such to which no reasomble man can arrive, obviously, the Industrial Com t in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would be entitled to interfere with the same even if patent jurisdictional error is not pointed out.

Reverting to the facts of this case, the Industrial Court while hearing the revision petitions found that the petitioners were trade union workers and the three of them were the office-bearers of the Union. It was further found that a material piece of evidence clearly pointing to the contrary was wholly overlooked by the inquiry officer. It extracted the relevant portion of the evidence of witness Balchand and pointed out in no uncertain terms that if the inquiry officer had taken note of the relevant piece of evidence and

(1) [1962] Suppl. I SCR 739.

'786

• E

• SUPREME COURT AEPORTS

had applied its mind to it and dealt with it in the report, it would have been difficult to hold the charge proved. The non-application of mind of the inquiry officer was pointed out by referring to that part of the final order which manifestly overlooked the material piece of evidence which would go to the root of the matter. The Industrial Court observed that the inquiry officer quitely skipped over very ma'.erial portion of the evidence of Balchand which went a long way to falsify the charges relating to the incidents which preceded the actual assault on Verma. 'The Industrial Court then pointed out that report \Ex. D/18) purporting to have been made by victim Verma to the factory Manager on the day following the date of the occurrence when properly scanned appears to be a highly suspicious evidence because: 'it is not dated and does not bear the endorsement of the officer to whom it was presented.' This is permissible bocause the revisional jurisdiction enables the authority to point something which is no evidence legally speaking or in the eye of law. It was pointed out that Verma did not identify the report. The Industrial Court concluded that the possibility of this report being intwduced at a later stage to strengthen the case against the five appellants cannot be rukd-out. After referring to other infirmities in the approach of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court concluded that the entire approach of the Manager in arriving at the findings of mISconduct in bis inquiry 'appear to be biased and unfair', and 'the conclnsions are neither fair nor reasonable and any .order of dismissal based thereon cannot be sustained.' Can it ever be said that in reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction '/ The whole approach .of the Labour Co11rt dealing with tile report of the inquiry as also th~ inquiry itself clearly disclosed material irregularity and thereby the Labour Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested Ill it namely, to examine the propriety of the order wilith it failed to do. The Industrial Court, in our opinion, was perfectly justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court. Even then the approach of the Industrial Court, being conscious of the severe constraints on its jurisdiction was of digmlied restraint and just. It merely set aside the award of the Labour Court and did not proceed to reappraise evidence but remitted the case to the Labour Court for a fresh decision. It was thus an eminently just order.

Is it such an order which the High Court could have interfered H with in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction 1 Ihe High Court

• j

' - UABULAL v. Sl!REE SYNTl!ETICS (Desai, J.)

observed that the Labour Court can only interfere with the decision of the inquiry officer, if the findings arrived at by him were p_erverse.

The High Court completely missed the ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the ord; r. Improprioty as converse of propriety cannot be equated with pervorsity as understood by the High Court.

The High Curt further observed that if 'the finding of ihe misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the enquiry, the labour tribunals have no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer, as an appellate body. This betrays complete fack of understanding of the jurisdiction of th' Labour Court in re>pect of an order made under the standing order as set out m Schedule II item I to the Act which enables the Labour Court to examine the legality and propriety of the order. The High Court therefore, wholly misread the relevant provision and interfered with the decision of the Industrhl Court which was pre-eminently just and within the four corners of its jurisdiction. What left us guessing was that according to the High Court the Industrial Court had narrow jurisdiction while dealing with the order of the Labour Court, yet the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction interfered with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. Times "ithout number, it has been pointed out that Art. 226 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. (Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation)(l)

Ordinarily, the courts exerc1smg extraordinary jurisdiction is loathe to interfere with an order remanding the matter to the authority directed to investigcite facts.

The Industrial Court had made an order of remand. The High Court was not justified in interfering with the same. By this uncalled for interference, it has merely prolonged the agony of the unemployed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the High Court under Act. 226 to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the deteriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. (D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors.\2)

(Il [1983] 4 sec 156.

(2) [1983] 4 sec l93.

?88

SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ984] 3 s.c.R.

. {.,,.

Accordingly these appeals succeed and are allowed and. the decision of the High Court is set aside and the one of the Industrial Court is restored with costs.

As the matter is an old one, the Labour Court is directed to give top priority to this matter and dispose this of as early as possible and not later than six months from today.

N.V.K.

Appeals allowed.'<

BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS

SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS

D. A. DEsAi

o. CaINNAPPA REDDY

VARADARAJAN, JJ

Industrial Relations Act, 1960

sections 66

Art. 226

Art. 226

section 6

section 66

Sec. 66

[1960] 2 S.C.R. 895

J. Ramamurthy

R. Vaigaifor

G.B. Pal

Ashok Mahajan

Sun/ta Kripalani

DesAT

Art. 226

Shree Synthetics Ltd.

Companies Act

Ujjain

Babula!

Nagar

Babula! Jaiswalwas

Ramesh Candra

Verma

Venm

Babula! Jaiswal

Febrnary 26, 1979

Arts. 226 and 227

Babula

Satya- Prakash Verma

K. C. Bagdi

Babula\ Jaiswalwere

Babula! Jai'swal

Babula! J\'agar

Bagdi

J\'agar went to Bagdi and Verma and uttered the following meanjngful words : :"You are just a child now.

A. K. Awdsthi

Rajendra Jain

Babula! Nagar

Babula! Nagar

Babula! Jaiwal

Babula!. Jaiswal

Babula!

Nagar

S. 0

S. 0

EE SYNT!IETlCS

Desai

S. 0

Arts. 226 and 227

Sec. 61

section 31

Sec. 3

Sec. 61

Schedule II of the Act

Sec. 61

Sec. 66

Sec. 66

Sec. 66

section 61

Sec. 61

Sec. 66

Burton

Sec. 64A

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

Amendment Act, 1948

Sec. 15

Sec. 15

s. 13

Alagiriswami

Gujarat High Court

[1960] 2 SCR 896

Bombay High Court

Pai

Disputes Act, 1947

Sec. 66(1)

Pdi

M.P. High Court

Sec. 61

Sec. 61

Sec. 78

Sec. 66

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Sec. 66(1)

Sec. 66(\)

Sec. 66

Sec. 115

the Code of Civil Procedure

Sec. 61

the Code of Civil Procedure

Sec. 66(1)

Balchand

Balchand

Schedule II item I to the Act

Art. 226

sec 156


.. .

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

ZAVAD ZAMA KHAN

May4, 1984

'.(D.A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.]

Pub/" Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act (Act XLV of 1980), Section 14- Revocation of orders of detention-Due compliance with requirements of section 8(1) read with Article 22(5) of the Constitution though con1plied with, subsequent representation for revocation to Prime Minister made through the counsel filed by t'ie Central Government-Whether non-passing of any order on the revocation representation vitiates the detention.

The facts are that the respondent made a represenation dated June 18, 1983

aainst an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Morada bad dated Noven1ber 6, 1982 for his detention under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, and the same was duly forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Advisory Board on June 21, 1983. The State Government had in the mean while on June 13, 1983 made a reference to the Advisory Board under s- 10 of the Act i.e. within three weeks from the date of detntion together with the order of detention and the grounds therefor for its opinion. On June 23, 1983 the representation was examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department who marked the file to the Home Secretary on June 27, 1983 who on his turn placed the file before the Chief Minister for his comments on June 27, 1983. The Chief Minister tooA. to daysto study the file and ultimately passed an order rejecting the representation. On July 2, 1983 the Stat_e Government forwarded the representation made together with the commens to the Government of India and the Central"Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983.

It appears th<it on July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation-of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one ad(ressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the Slate

Government. The representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister's Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent before the High

Court was that the Central Government h<id not dealt with his application for the revocation of the order of detention under s.14 of the Act. The l-ligh Court obser~ ved that the right of the detenu to make a representation to.the Central Government

for r .... vocation of the order of detention unde_r s. 14 of Act was intended to be an additional ch{'C1< or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of H detention by the detaining authority or the State Governfnent and therefore the failure on the part of the Central Government to consider the same was tantamount 10 a denial of the consitutional safesuard as contemplated by Art. 22(5)

A ofthe Consti'.ution. It accordingly held the continued detention of the respon dent to be illegal.

Aggrieved by the Order, the State preferred an Special Leave.

Aile wing the appeal, the Court,

• HELD : (1) The constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) enjoin that where a detenu simultaneously makes representation to the detaining authority as well as an application under s. 14 of the Act, they must not be dealt with by the appropriate Government at the same tin1e and there was no question of any conflict of jurisdiction. If the Central Government were to revoke the order of detention under s. 14 of the Act, there would be no representation for the State Governn1ent to consider, or refer to the Advisory Board under s. 8(b) of the Act nor will thre arise any question of Advisory Board making a report to it, or on receipt of such a report, confirming the order of detention under section 8(f).

The other type of cases can be where notwithstanding that the order of detention has been confinned under s. S(f) the appropriate Government may, at any time, revoke the same under s. 14. The power of revocation conferred on the appro~ priate Government un<ler s. 14 is independent of the power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under s. S(f) [795H ; 796A-D]

2. The pO\\'Cr of revocation conferred on the Central Government under s. 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information reCeived by the Central Governn1ent from its own sources including that supplied by the State Gov:::rnment under sub-s. (5) of s. 3, or from the detenu in the form of a petition or representation. It is for the Central Governn1ent to decide whether or not it 'should revoke the order of detention in a particular case.

[796G-H]

-Any lapse on the part of State Government in forwarding the representation n1ade by the detcnu to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 of the Act or non-consideration of the same by the Central Government makes the continued detention of the detenu bad. [793B-C]

In the present case, however, the detenu was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution read Withs, 8(1) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneouly make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Govcrn111ent under Art. 22(5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Centr:il Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith.

The Central Government duly considered that representation which in effect was nothing but a representation for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 of the Act. That being so. it was not obligatory on the parr of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under s. 14 of the Act. [797A-D]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 57 A of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25-10-1983 of the Allahabad High Court in Habeas Corpus WP. No. 8420 of 1983.

Manoj Swarup and Dalveer Bhandari for the appellant.

Mrs. & Mr. Qamaruddin, Rizwan A. Hajiez and Desh Raj for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

• c SEN, J. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh has preferred this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated October 25, 1983 by which the High Court issued a writ in the nature of habeas corpus quashing an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Moradabad dated November 6, 1982 for the detention of the respondent under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 on being satisfied that his detention was necessary "with a view to preventing him 'from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."

It appears that the respondent is alleged to have committed an offence of murder punishable under s. 302 and of causing disappearance of evidence punishable under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in connection with the communal riots that occurred in the Moradabad city.

On November 6, 1982, the District

Magistrate, Moradabad passed the impugned order of detention ll but it could not be served on the respondent as he was absconding.

As required under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3, the District Magistrate forthwith made a report of the fact to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh that he had passed an order for the detention of the respondent under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the Act, together with the G grounds on which the order had been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, had a bearing on the matter.

The State Government received the order of detention on November 8, 1982 and approved of the same on November 11, 1982 under sub's. (5) of s. 3, and as required thereunder, forwarded a report to the Central Government on the next day i.e. on November 12, 1982. ff The respondent surrendered to the police on May 24, 1983 and the impligned order of detention was served on him in District Jail, ·

792 SUPREME COURT Rb1'0RTS [1984] 3 s.C, R,

A Moradabad on June 1, 1983 and the grounds of detention were fur• nished to hirn on June 2, 1983.

The respondent made a representation dated June 18, 1983 through the Superintendent, District Jail, Morada bad and he immediately forwarded the same to the District Magistrate.

On June 20, 1983 the District Magistrate forwarded the representation to the Advisory Board and the same was received by the Advisory Board on June 21, 1983. The State Government had in the meanwhile on June 13, 1983 made a reference to the Advisory Board under s. 10 of the Act i.e. within three weeks from the date of detention together with the order of detention, and the grounds therefore, for its opinion.

On June 23, 1983 the representation of the respondent forwarded by the District Magistrate together with his

comment; was examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department The file was placed before the Home Secretary on June 27, 1983 who placed it before the \ hief Minister with his comments. The Chief Minister took two days to study the file and ultimately passed an order rejecting the representation on June 30, 1983.

On July 2, 1983 the State Government forwarded the representation made by the respondent together with its comments to the Government of India and the Central Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983.

On July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel D.S. Misra simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one addressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the State Government.

It appears that the representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent was that the Central Government had not dealt with his application for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 even

IlO\V,

In his counter-affidavit by one M.L. Miglani, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, it was stated that the Central Government had fully discharged its functions by expedi- . tiously taking a decision on the earlier representation directly addressed by the respondent and it was under. no statutory obligation to consider the subsequent representation for revocation addressed by the respondent through his counsel to the Prime Minister, I was not a statuto1y representation for revocation of the impugned

order of detention under s. 14 and therefore it was not at all neces- A sary for the Central Government to deal with jt,

 The High Court placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Phillippa Anr.e Duke v. Stara of Tamil Nadu & Ors.(1) and certain of its own decisions held that the respondent had a right to make an application to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention and the failure on the part of the Central Government to apply its mind to it made the continue<! detention illegal.

The only question canvassed in the appeal before us is that the judgment of the High Court betrays complete lack of awareness of the nature of the constitutional safeguards enshrined under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It is urged that the constitutional impe i ratives enacted in Art. 22(5) are two-fold ; (I) The detaining authority must, as soon as may be i.e. as soon as practicable, after the detention, communicate to the detenu the .grounds on whic.h the order of detention bas been made. And (2) The detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. In the present ease, it is said that the requirements of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution . read with s. 8(1) of the Act had been duly complied with. There is no question of any violation of Art. 22(5) or cif s. 8(1) and further that the grounds for detention set out the facts with sufficient degree of particularity and they did furnish sufficient nexus for

forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The order of detention cannot therefore be challenged on the ground that the grounds furnished were not adequate or sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, or for making an effective representation. It is further urged that there being due compliance with the constitutional requirements of Art. 22(5) and of s. 8(1), the High Court was wrong in holding that the continued detention of the respondent was invalid merely because the Central Government refused to act on his application for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 of the act.

We find considerable force in the submission.

We are not oblivious of the fact that this Court has in certaii:i cases given expression to the view that any lapse on the part of the

State Government in forwarding the representation made for revo-

(1);[1982h3 SCR ?69.

SUPREMH COURT REPORTS

[1984) 3 S.C.R.

cation of his order of detention under s. 11( i)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 or the failure of the Central Government to expeditiously consider the same was a denial of the constitutional right of beil}g afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order" as contemplated by Art. 22(5).

At one time it was thought thats. 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 which was in pari materia with s. 14 of the Act, did not confer any right or privilege on the detenu but there is a definite shift in the judicial attitude, for which there appears to be no discernible basis. .J In Shyam Ambalal Siroya v. Union of India & Ors(1)., the contention Ji was that be'cause a representation properly addressed to the Central Government to order revocation under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act was not forwatd"d by the detaining authority to the Central Government, the detention was illegal. The Court construed the power conferred on the Central Government to direct revocation of an order of detention under s. 1! of that Act to be "statutory". It was observed that the power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the dctenu can make a representa- • tion for exercise of that power and a petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition.

Since a representation properly addressed by the detenu of the Central Government was not forwarded to the Central Government, the continued detention of the detenu was held to. be ille.gal.

In Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors(2)., the Court held that non-consideration by the Central Government of a representation for revocation made by the detenu under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act made the continued detention to be bad, following the decision in Shyam Amba/al Siroya's case, supra. It was however observed that the power conferred bys. 11 on the Central Government was a supervisory power and it was intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by .the detaining authority or the State Government.

G In Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.(3), the Court went

still further. There was, in that case, a lapse on the part of the State Government in forwarding the.· representation simultaneously made by the detenu to the Central Government for revocation . of the order of detention under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. The

(I) [1980] 2 SCR 1078

(2) [1980] 3 SCR 738

(3) [1982] l SCR 1010

Court struck down the order of detention on the groud that there was a denial of the right of making representation to the Central Government for revocation f the order of detention under s. II of the Act and this was tantamount to!a denial) of the constitutional safeguard of Art. 22(5). ' . Soon thereafter, the'Courtin Sat Pal v. State of Punjab & Ors.(') examined the nature of the power of revocion conferred on the Central Government under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and he1d that it was iiUpervisoryin natre, and. it was observed : ·

"That is, as it should be, as~ under .our federal structure the Centre must always keep a vigilant eye in the matter oflife and Jiberty of a citi.ren guaranteed under Article 21.

• Ours is a Constitution where there is a combination of federal structure with unitary features while in a unitary State there is only one Government; federal State involves multi-Governments namely, national or federal Goyern-· ment and the Governments of component . States. A federal State, in short, is a fusion ofseveral States into a single State in regard to matters affeding common interest leaving each component State to enjoy autonomy in regard to other matters. Under o'llr Constitution, certain powers vest in the central Government leaving certain to its component units to exercise autonomy in spheres assigned to. them in the Constitution itself. The component States are not merely delegates or agents of the federal Government. .Both federal and Stale Governments draw their authority from the same source, the Constitution. The conferment of executive power on the States in relation to a subject with respecfto which the1legisfatures of the States have no' • power to make a law undr Art. 258(2) must necessarily .be subject to the administrative control of the Union under Arts. 256 and 247(1),'fo the giving of such directions to the States as.· may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose."

It.was then . observed that the constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) enjoin that where a detenu simultaneo11sly makes a re-

(1). ~1982) 1 sec 12,

• D

presentation to the c(etaining authority as well.as an application for revocation under s.· 11 of the Act. they must both be dealt_ with by the appropriate Government at the same time' and there was no question of any conflict of jurisdiction. To illustrate, it was said that i_f the Cent, ial Government were to revoke an order of deten, tion under s. 11 of the Act, there would . b~ no. representation for the State Government. to consider, or refer' the. Advisory Board under s. 8(b) ; nor will there arise any question of Advisory Board submitting a report to it, or Q~ receipt of such a report confirming the order of detention under s. 8Cf). It was further observed that t!ie other types of cases would be where . notwithstanding that the order of detention has been confirmed under s. S(f), the appro' priate Government may, atany time, revoke the same under s. _ H of the Act. It was accordingly held th:it the power of revocation .conferred on the appropriate Governmet unders. 11 is independent of tfie power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under s. 8(f) ..

As to the nature of th~ power of revocation conferred on• the Central Government under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act,· it was stated :

"The making of an application for revocation to the Central Governmet under s. 11 of the Act is therefore part of the con_stitulicnal right a .citizen has against his_ "detention under a law relating to preventive detention,

While Art. 72(5) contemplates the making of a representation against the order of detention to the detaining authority, which has to be referred by the appropriate Government to the Advisory Board constituted under s. 8(a) of the Act, Parliament has, in its wisdom, enacted s .. 11 and

conferred an additional safeguard agninot arbitrary _executive action.'?

The principle that emerges (rcim. all these decisions is that the power of revocation conferred oil tl1e Central Government under s." 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from .its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 or from the detenu in the form of. a petition or representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whet!:ter o~ pot it should revoke tile order of detention in a par*ular

case, In the present case, the dete.nu was not deprived• of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution read with s. 8(1) of the Act. Al though the deteriu had no right to simuijaneously make a repre• . senfafion against the order of qetention to the Central . Government nnder Art 22(5) and there was no duty cast on. the State Government to forward the same to the Central Government, neverthe less the State Government forward the same forthwith. The Centrai Government duly considered that representation whfoh in effect was n()thing but a Representation for revocation of the. order . of detention under s. 14 of the Act. That being so, it was nofobliga- . tory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second . representation for revocation under s. 14.

We may profitably refer to Phi/Uppa Anne D1ike's case, supra, where in somewhat ·. similar circumstances it was held that failnre of the Central

. Government to consider a representatlQD for revocation of an order of detention under s: ll(l)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act handed over to the Prirµe Mi.nister during her visit to England did not render the continued detention invalid. It was observed :

"Representations f; om whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government cannot be treated as a representation to the

Governmeritunder s. ll(S)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act." Jil • > The re.suit therefor.e is. that the appeal Succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the. High Court is set aside and the oroer .of detention passed by the District Magistrate under sub-s. (3) ofs. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 is maintained.

S.R.

Appeal allowed.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

ZAVAD ZAMA KHAN

D.A. DESAI

A.P. SEN

V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.

Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act

Section 14

section 8(1)

Article 22(5)

s. 3

National Security Act, 1980

June 13, 1983

June 23, 1983

June 27, 1983

July 2, 1983

Government of India

July 19, 1983

July 5, 1983

s. 14

Central Government

July 7, 1983

s. 14

Art. 22(5)

Art. 22(5)

s. 14

s. 14

s. 8(b)

section 8(f)

s. 14

s. 14

s. 14

s. 3

s. 14

Art. 22(5)

Central Govcrn111ent

Art. 22(5)

Centr:il Government

s. 14

s. 14

Allahabad High Court

Manoj Swarup

Dalveer Bhandari

Qamaruddin

Rizwan A. Hajiez

Desh Raj

State Government of Uttar Pradesh

s. 3

National Security Act, 1980

s. 302

s. 201

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Moradabad city

November 6, 1982

District

Magistrate, Moradabad

s. 3

s. 3

November 8, 1982

November 11, 1982

s. 3

November 12, 1982

May 24, 1983

s. 10

June 30, 1983

D.S. Misra

s. 14

India

s. 14

M.L. Miglani

Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi

s. 14

Art. 22(5)

Art. 22(5)

Art. 22(5)

s. 8(1)

Art. 22(5)

s. 8(1)

Art. 22(5)

s. 8(1)

s. 14

SUPREMH COURT

s. 11( i)(b)

COFEPOSA Act, 1974

Art. 22(5)

s. 14

s. 11

s. 1

s. 11

Shyam Amba

al Siroya

s. 11

[1980] 2 SCR 1078

[1980] 3 SCR 738

Art. 22(5)

s. 11

Article 21

Art. 258(2)

Arts. 256 and 247(1)

Art. 22(5)

sec 12

s. 11

s. 8(b)

s. 8C

s. 8(f)

s. 11

s. 11

Art. 72(5)

s. 8(a)

s. 3

Art. 22(5)

s. 8(1)

Central . Government

Art 22(5)

Centrai Government

s. 14

s. 14

Uppa Anne D1ike

Central

. Government

England

National Security Act, 1980


KATHEEJA BAI

THE SUPERIN"iENDJNG ENGINEER & ORS.

MayJO, 1984

[0. CHINNAPPA l!-EDDY, A.P. SEN AND

• E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu.-Electrictjr Board Cotribulorj ProvidelJI Fund RegulatiOn1 frcimed by Tarilil Nadu Electricity Board .under Electricity Supply Act, 1948- Regulation 37-Whether_SP, t; Cial Contribiltion to be made by ElectriCity BQard. to the Contributory Provident Fund of the einpJOyees is _Same as Gr.atuity tinder Payment' of G; atufty Act, 1.912-W.hethi PaylTll!nt of Gratuity under Payment of _Gratuity A.ct debars paym.e"nt of SpeCial ConttibJ,(lion. to be made under Regula

ion 31.

Public Interest L'it1'gation-Letfer-to 1udgetreated wrii petition~

Regaiation 37 of the. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Contributory Provident Fund Regulations framed by the Tamil Natlu Electricity Board under the Electricity-Supply Act, 1948 provides that the Electricity Board shall credit.to a member's.-provident fund acCount a special contribution calC\1lated in the specified ·rnanrier, in addition to. the contribution credited under Regut3.ti0n. ll, if the Board is satisfied that the service of the member has been good efficint and-_ faith .. ful and th¢_ member ha~ not beCn diSJ:n-issed from erviCe or the member hjs Jl(lt been removed ftom service. in which Case the sanction of the Board hiid to be obtained. ·

The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1!i12 which was also applicable .. to' the Tamil Nadti Electricity Board provided for the Payment of greatiuty to em .. ployees _who would fetife after rendering service for a specified number of . years .

. . The petitioner's huband retired in 1976 after serving the Tamil Nadu Electricity B0ard for about 34 _years and died three.mo.n1hs thereafter. The petitioner was paid_ her husband's stibscription to the Contributory Provident Fund and interest and the.Electdity Bo1lrd's contribution and intereSt and also thc-gratUity under the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 .. The Electricity Board did not pay theSJ)ecial Contribrition to be ma.de by it to the contributory Provident Fund under. 'Regulation 37. on tqC grond that-the specia~· contributioll being nothing other than tbe payment of gratuity, they could n.ot be asked to. pay gratuity t\Vice Over, once under Payment of Gratuity Act and ain under _ Regii1ation 37. The petitiorier having got no relief from ailywhere wrote a letter tQ a!Judge of the Supreme Court which wa.• treated as a writ petitioll:

Allowins!the petition,

• •

KATilEEJA BAI v. SUPDT ENGINEER (Cb; nnappa Reddy, 'J.) 799.

HELD :. The Electrjcity BOard cannot avoid payn1ent of the special -Contribution to Provident Fuiid under their own Provident Fund RegulatiOlIS on the pretext that ii is a.kin to or_ the same as Gratuity payable_ under the Payment of Gratuity Act. In the first place, the Board, in thC:ir Regulations, h3ye themselves IabllC:d the Speci31 Contribution under Regulation 37 .as a Special -contribution to Provident Fund .andnOt as Gratuity. It is not as if they were

utiaware of the word '_Gratuity' -and what it meant Since it -is found that there is a reference in Regulation 5 to aGratuitt,.Scheme of.. th~.-Tilmil a~ Government which had been adopted by the.Bd!rd .. The Special Contr1but1on under Regulation 37 is part of a Well thought out _Provident Fund Scheine designed tO

benefit ·good-, efficient and faithfur employees (borrowing th:e wordsfrom the Regulation'itself) by _making annual contributions in_ additionto the monthly contributions .undr Re!iulation JI.· This is what apnears from Regulation 37 itself. There is no justification ror first dubbing it as a gratuity on the ground that it Ii.as some or the known ch_aractcristics of gratuity and then proceeding to deny the employees the benefit o.f it Qn the-gt"ound that the Beard are paying gratuity under the. Pa:yment of Gratuity Act. If the Special Contribution has so.me _cOII)mon features with gratuity, it has also distinctive features which ctis

tiguish it .from gratuity payable under the Ir.yment of Gratuity At. [803B-F]

. . in view of the finding that . .Special. Contribtion un<; te~ Regulation 37 is not the same as grat_uityunder Payment of Gratuity Act; the argument that the provision for Special Contribution under Regulation 37 was inconsistent With • the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act .and therefore the Jatier should prevail to the eXclusion of the former must fail. [804H ; 805A] ·

ORIGINA~ JURisDier10N : Writ Petition .No. 13009 of 1983.

(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)

.G; pal Subra aniam (A.C) for the Petitioner.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, AY. Rangam and Mrs: Sar/a Chandra for the Respondeni. • The Judgm; niof the Court was delivered by

. CHINNAP.PA REDDY, J. Smt. .Kathoeja Bai, is the widow of Abdul Salam who retired .as a Line Inspector, Grade l, in the employment of the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board on 31.7.76 and who unfortunately. died on 15.10.76. Smt. Katheeja Bai failed to get from her late husband's employers .certain amounts" which she clamd werl!o due to her husband. She. knocked contii)Uously, but m varn, at the doors of the Regional Provident Commissioner

Madras, Central Provident Commissioner, New Delhi ad th; Minister for Labour Government of India for several years for

Mo SUPREME CotJRT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.ll..

redress. In sheer :desperation she nltimately turned to this CQurt as a last resort. Unable to engage a lawyer, she addressed a letter to . a learned judge of the Court setting forth her grievance. After being processed in the. Registry; the letter was t)'eated asa Writ Petition under Art 32 of th~ Constitution. A Rule Nisi was issued and the Tamil Nadu .. State. Electricity 'Board have app.eared before • us through connsel. At our request Sri' Gopala Subramanyam argued the case for the widoJ' i!S amicus curiae. He presel)ted the case with understanding and .thoroughness and yie are grateful to bim, as also fo Dr. Chitaley who' presented the employer's case with his usual fairness.·

In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 79( c) of the Electricity Supply Act, .1948, the Tamil Nadn Electricity Bo.ard made the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Contributory Provident , fund.Regulations.

Regulation 3 Provides for the estabfahment. of a fund kno.wn as the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employees' Contributory Provident Fund; with effect from 1.7.57. Regulation 3A to 3-K provide for the managemnt and administration of the fund by the Board of .

Truste&. Regulation 4 prescribes that the. Fund .shall be governed •

by regula!iou as may be in force for the . time being but provides that no addition, alteration or repeal, of any .regulation which may adversely effect a subscriller shall be. retrospective. Regulation 5 provides th.at all en; ployees who are eligible for the Contributory Prov.ident Fund (Tamil Nad1,1) Scheme and Gratuity Scheme oft.he Governfi1ent of Tamil Nadu except certain categories of employees with whom we are not. co.ncerned shall become subscribers to the fund o~ completion of three months continuous service. Regulation. 6 prescribes that. an account shall be opened in the name of eac.h member in which shall be credited, the member's subscriptions and interest thereon, the contributions maie by the Electricity Bo'ard to his account and interest thereon and the J)reexisting account before. the Electricity Department was taken.over by thil Electricity Board.

Regulation 9 provides ror subscription to the fund by member~ at the rate of 7-1/2 % of pay' iJlus dearness allowance. RJ)gnlation 11 provides for contribution byjhe Electricity Board to the account of. each member at the. rate of7t% of pay plus dearness allowance.

The member's subscription along with the Electricity B.oard's Contri- . bution is required to be credited to the individual. acount ofthe mem

. ber before the 15th of every month. Regulation 37 prescribes that the

Electricity Board shall credit to a memb<; r's Provide!lt Fund account a special contribution calculated in the specified maimer. in addi-

• •

' '

~ATHESJA. BAI l'. SJPDT ENG!NEER (G:/iinnappa Raddy, J.j 80i

tion to the contributi'oncrediled under Regulation 11, ifthe Board .A is .satisfied that tlie service of the member has been .good, .efficient and faithful and the member has not bon dismissed from service or the membor h:ls not been removed from service in which case the sanction of the Board bas to be obtained. In the case of a Class I or Class Hcmpbyee who quits service on attainment of'the age of supernnuation, ne is to be credited, if his service exec.eds 18 years B with six months pay plus. half a month's pay for each completed year of service afte;- the J8t~1 but not so 1s to e<cced, in all, twelve . months' pay or rnpees tw:n!y:five thonsand, h1chever is less. If the employee's service does not exceed 1.8 years, he is to be credited with half a month's pay for each completed year of si:rvice".so as . • . .

G not to exceed six months' pay. In the case of a Class Ill or Class IV employees who bas attained tltc'age of superannuation after 15 years' . • service, th~ Electricity B.oard is requiccd to 9redit .his account with half a month's pey for each completed year of service., but no.t so as to exceed to 15 montl1s' pay. Jf the service is short of 15 years, he is to be credited .with half a month's pay !or e'ach completed yer .D of service so-as n0t 15 exc;!ed six mopths' pay. rt is provided in Regulation 37 that pay for the purpose. of reckoning special contri bution shall be the pay last drawn during the lastthree years .of service, whichever is more. The Board is also empowered to withhold or reduce the Special Contribution in any particular case. . . : . ~

At this stage, we may refer to s.12 of the Emloyees' Provident Funds, And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 which prohibits an employer from rcducinr; directly or indirectly the total quantum of benefits in the nature of uld age pension-, gratuity or Provident Fund or Life Insurance to whic:1 the employee is entitled under the terms of his employment, express or implied, by reason only of his liability for the payment of any contribution to th.e Fund (wh°ich. is defined by i.2 (h) as meaning a. Provident Fund . established under the Employed Provident Fund Scheme framed under s.5). . '

G In 1972, Parliament enacted the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to provide for' a schem<": for the payment of gratuity to emplo:. yees in cert1iin establishments. There 'is no. dispute that the Act applies to the Tamil Nadu 'State Electricity }3oard. Section 4 of the .Act.,.equircs payment of gratuity to, an employee who .as rendered . continnous s; rvico for not less than-five years, on the termination H of his employment' on superannuation or on retirement or on. his . . '

. '

.· c

802 . SUPREME COURT RliPORrs . [l 984] 3 S.C.R. , c '

death or disable.ment due.to accideut or disease. The employer is required to pay the gratuity to.the employee at tbe rate of fifteen days' wages for each completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months. The amount of gratuity. is not to exceed 20 'months' wages. The employer is not requfred to pay any gratuity to an employee if .the service of the employe.e has. been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or '. loss tci; or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, or if '< the services of the employee have been terminated for riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part or if his servicea have \)een terminated for any act involving moral turpitude provided ihat suc}). offence' is committed by him i.n the course.of his employment. Section 14 provides tl\at the contribution of the Act shall have effect notwithhstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than tbis Act or in any instrumenJ; or contract }).aving effect by virtue of any enactmsnt other than the Payment of Gratuity Act.• •

Abdul Salam, w!io held a non-pensionable post, retired on 31.7.76, after a service. of 34 years.and five months. He died on 15.10.76 within three months after his retirement. He was entitled or, in this case his widow was entitled to the paymorit of the entire amount standing to. his credit in his Provident Fund account and the gratuity pa.yable u.nder the Payment of Gratuity Act. The . Electricity Boai:d, however-, took the stand that she was entitled to

he paid the member's subscription and interest, the employer's contribution. and 'inte.rest and. gratuity but not the special contribution under Reg'!lation 37 of the Tamil Nudu State Electricity Board Contri.butory Provident Fund Regulitions .. The reason Jor the Board's .attitude was that the sp, ecial contribution required to be paid under Regulation 37 was nothing other than payment of gratuity and that !hey could not be asked to pay gratuity twice over, once under the Payment of Gratuity Ac( and again under Regulatio~ 37, Since they were ready to pay the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act,. which. was more .favourable to the employee, they. were not obliged to make payent of tbe contribution under Regulation 37. We may mention here that tl)e Board B has paid to the widow, the member's subscription with interest and the employer'& contribu.tion with interest. but not the special ont.ri-. bution under Regulation 37. The Board has paid a sum ofRs.4275/- towards gratuity under the payment of Gratuity Act but a um of ·•

'\ -

KATHEEJA BAI v. SUP!)T, ENG!l:!EE'R (Chinnappa Raddy, J.) 803

Rs, 3167/- is admittedly yet due from the Board to_wards gratuity.

In the coun_ter affidavit filed on bhalf of the Electricity Board we A are not able to find any reason.for non-payment of the balance_ of gratuity .

We are unable to appreciate how the Electricity. Board can . avoid payment of the Special Contribution to Provident Funct'

_under their own Provident Fund Regulatio11s on the pretext that it is akin to or the same as Gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Aci. In the first place, the Bqard, in their Regulations, have themselves labelled the Special Contribution under Reglilation 37 as a Special Contribution to Provident' Fund not as Gratuity. 'It is not.as if .they were uriaware of the word 'Gratuity' and what it meant since w.e find that there is a reference in Regulation 5 to a Gratui_ty Scheme -of the Tamil Nadil Government which had beeri adopted by the Board. The Special Contri- 'bution under Regulation 37 is part of a well thought out Provident Fund Scheme designed. to benefit 'good; efficient and faithful . "employees (we borrow the words from the . Regulation itself) by

making annual contributiOns ina\ldition the monthly contributions. under Regulation 11. This is wbat appears from Regulation or itself, we see no justification for first dubbing It as a gratuity on the ground that it has some of the known cbaracteristics of gratuity and then proceeding to. deny' the employees the benefit of it on the ground that the Board are paying gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. If the Special Contribution has some common: features with gratuity, it has also. distinctive features which .distinguish It.from gratuity payable under the payment of Gratuity Act; For example, one important feature which discrimin_ates the Special Contribution under Regulation 37 from gratuity under the.Payment of Gratuity Act is that while tlie Payment of the latter is-obligatory and. can only be denied if the employee's services have been termi~ nated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of

'violence on-his part or.any act which 'Constitutes an offence involving - G moral turptitude and can also be denied to the_ extent. ofthe damage orlosscaused by the employee, where the employee's services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or to loss, or destruction of, property belonging to the . emp1oyer, the payment of the former is_ discretionar_y and may not -

be made if the service of the employee has not been good, efficient ani.l faith(ul. The employer has also the discretion to with, ho)d or reduce the Special 8ontribution in any. particular case. Of course,

. " . ,..

SUPREME CoURT REPORTS [l9g4j j S.C.R •.

the einpfoyer canhot arbitrarily clai'm that th~ employee's service. . was not good., efficient and faithful, . or with-hold or reduce the

Special Contribution in an arbitrary fashion. Even so,. the distinction between the mandate of the Payment of Gratuity Act and the . discretion involved in makin,!J the Special Contribution under Regula1ion 37 is iriielligibly clear, Another feature which di1tinguishes the.two is that the benefit of the Payment of Gratuity Act is confin- .ed to persons drawing wages not exceeding Rs. 1000 and does :not extend to persons employed in a managerial or administrative capacity .wliereas the SpeCial Contr, ibution under Regulaiion 37 is not so confined and extends to every employee of the Board° except casual employees, State or Cenfral Government employees employed with the Board on foreign service terms etc. etc. For the ·

purpose of contibution of, Provident Fund under Regulation 11 or Regulation 37 it makes no difference that a person is employed in a managerial or administtarive capacity on that he draws wages more than Rs. 1000 pet month. A thin;\, feature which marks the two apart is that the contribution to the. Provident Fund whether under Regulation 11 or Regulation 37 becomes .part of the Fund established py Regulation 3 andis to be managed and administered by trustees u.nder Regulation 3-A to 3-K, whereas the payment of Gratuity Act does .not provide for the Constitution of a fund to be managed and administered by trustees.. In addition -to th.ese broad feature;, we have the outstanding circumstance that the Board themselves have describ.ed the contribution under Reguiation 37 as a contribution to Provident Fund and have chosen to include it in their Provident Fund Scheme. That should conclude the matter.

 Dr. Chitaley invi.ted our attention to s.14 of the Payment of• Gratuity Act; i972 which provides, ·

"The provisions of this Act or any rule mae there .under shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in an enactment other than th.is Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactmel/.t other thau this Act," ..

He argued that the provision for Special Contribution under Regulation 37 was inconsistent with.the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act and therefore the latter should prevail to the H exculusion of the former .. This ,'argument is. dependent on the assumption that the SpeCial Contribution nuder Regulation 37 is the samething as the gratuity contemplated by the Payment of .

. ,.J

KATl!imJA BAI v. SUPDT. ENGINEER (Chinnappa Raddy, J.) 805 '

' Gratuity Act. We have held that it. is not and the argument, "therefore, fails.

There was then the usual lament that a large number of employees were involved and, therefore, the cost will be.heavy. We do not understand this argument at all .. Does it inean that beneficent. legislations . and beneficent schemes must be confined to small establishments emploY, ing a Jew workers only ? On the other hand, it is misreading to say that the cost is heavy. The cost is made to appear heavy divorced from the size of the establishment. If the. establishment is huge and if a large number of workmen are employ- . ed the total wagejbill may appear to bepeayy, but is it really so? ls it disproportionate to the size of the estblishmeut,' its resourees, . -its revenues and its other expenditure ? Is the individual wage-bill. also very high ? To talk of heavy cost without refere.nce to .other circumstances is to present an entireiy unfaithful pictl!re. We need . . <-rnake no further .comment. ·

In the resuJt we direct the respondent Board to pay to the . petitioner the whole of the. Special Contribution under Regulation

37" which was payable. to her husband and the balan.ce of the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, part of which we are told has beenpaid leaving the sum of Rs. 3167 unpaid. Tbese amounts should be paid to the. petitiouer with interest at 15% per annum froin the date on w.hich the amO.unts fell due. The respondent Board -shol!ld also pay a sum of Rs. 2500 to the "petitioner towards compensatory costs. We must add that the case haa left us with the.feeling of: uneasiness and distress at the plight.of helpless persons like the petitioner whose repeated representations to those in authority were left uncared for. so the tediously long despite frequent protestations pf social j)lstice .

H.S.K.

Petirion allowed.

BAI

THE SUPERIN"iENDJNG ENGINEER & ORS

A.P. SEN

E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.

Electricity Supply Act, 1948

Payment of Gratuity Act

Payment of Gratuity Act

Supreme Court

Payment of Gratuity Act

Payment of Gratuity Act

Special Contribution under Regulation

Payment of Gratuity Act

article 32

Constitution of India

; pal Subra aniam

Y.S. Chitale

AY. Rangam

Sar/a Chandra

CHINNAP.PA REDDY

.Kathoeja Bai

Abdul Salam

Katheeja Bai

Art 32

Gopala Subramanyam

Chitaley

s. 79( c)

Tamil Nadu

~ATHESJA. BAI l'. SJPDT ENG!NEER

G:/iinnappa Raddy

And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952

Section 4

Section 14

Payment of Gratuity Act

Abdul Salam

Payment of Gratuity Act

payment of Gratuity Act

Tamil Nadil Government

It is not.as if .they were uriaware of the word 'Gratuity' and what it meant since w.e find that there is a reference in Regulation 5 to a Gratuity Scheme -of the Tamil Nadil Government which had beeri adopted by the Board.

Payment of Gratuity Act

payment of Gratuity Act

Payment of Gratuity Act

SUPREME CoURT REPORTS

Payment of Gratuity Act

Payment of Gratuity Act

Provident Fund under Regulation

Provident Fund whether under Regulation

payment of Gratuity Act

Payment of Gratuity Act

Special Contribution under Regulation

Payment of Gratuity Act